05000282/FIN-2015002-04
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Design Control Measures not Implemented to Ensure Group E Pressurizer Heaters Remain Operational Post-Fire |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, on October 13, 2014, for the licensees failure to ensure the design requirements of the fire protection program were maintained. Specifically, the licensee had not ensured that Group E pressurizer heaters would continue to operate following a fire in Fire Area 32 (the Unit 1 side of the auxiliary feedwater pump room). As a result, the licensee was unable to ensure that the Unit 1 reactor would be able to achieve and maintain a cold shutdown condition following a fire in this area. The inspectors determined that the failure to ensure the design requirements of the fire protection program were maintained was contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, and was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection from External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. The finding also impacted the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors utilized IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated June 19, 2012, and determined that this finding was best assessed for safety significance by using IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process. The inspectors used IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, Fire Protection SDP Phase 1 Worksheet, dated September 20, 2013, and assigned a Post-Fire Safe Shutdown fire inspection finding category to the issue per Step 1.2. Based upon the information contained in Step 1.3 of IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because any fire related damage to the Group E pressurizer heater cables did not impact the licensees ability to reach and maintain a safe shutdown condition (either hot or cold). No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this issue since the missed opportunities to identify this issue occurred more than three years ago and were not reflective of current performance. |
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000282/2015002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2015 (2015Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Shaikh J Corujo-Sandin K Riemer K Stoedter L Haeg L Kozak M Jeffers M Phalen N Feliz-Adomo P Laflamme |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Prairie Island - IR 05000282/2015002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Prairie Island) @ 2015Q2
Self-Identified List (Prairie Island)
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