05000306/FIN-2015004-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Meet ANSI N14.6 Section 5.3.1 Requirements |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green), and an associated NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to incorporate the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N14.61978, Section 5.3.1 required testing frequency for the reactor vessel head and reactor vessel internals lifting devices into the controlling preventive maintenance procedure. Compliance with the ANSI standard was documented in the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for the licensees control of heavy loads. The licensee documented the issue in the corrective action program (CAP) as CAP 01497779 and performed testing on the reactor vessel head and internals lifting devices during the outage. The inspectors determined the licensees failure to comply with ANSI N14.61978, Section 5.3.1, for the continued use testing of special lifting devices was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was determined to be more-than-minor and a finding because the PD was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of design control, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset the plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown, as well as power operations. Specifically, compliance with ANSI N14.61978, Section 5.3.1 ensured safe load handling of heavy loads over the reactor core, and/or over safety-related systems through established testing for the continued functionality of the special lifting devices. The failure to perform the required frequency of testing on special lifting devices could increase the likelihood of a load drop and could decrease the load handling reliability of the lifting device if the device were returned to service with potentially unacceptable flaws. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the Significance Determination Process in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase I - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Table 3. Since the finding was associated with shutdown conditions, the inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process. The inspectors determined that none of the conditions constituting a loss of control were met, as described in Appendix G, Attachment 1, Phase I Operational Checklists for Both PWRs [Pressurized Water Reactors] and BWRs [Boiling Water Reactors], for this finding, and neither a Phase II nor a Phase III analysis was required. Therefore, the inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors determined that this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Resources, for the licensees failure to ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources were available and adequate to support nuclear safety. Specifically, the licensee staff evaluated NRC Information Notice (IN) 201412, Crane and Heavy Lift Issues Identified during NRC Inspections, in corrective action program (CAP) document 01457469. However, in CAP 01457469, the licensee concluded that issues identified in IN 201412 related to other licensees not performing testing in accordance with ANSI N14.6 requirements were not applicable to the licensee at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant. Therefore, the inspectors determined that there was a recent missed opportunity for the licensee to have reasonably identified that the current preventive maintenance procedure for special lifting devices was not in accordance with the ANSI N14.61978 requirements, as referenced in the SER. |
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000306/2015004 Section 1R08 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2015 (2015Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.08 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Shaikh G Edwards J Cassidy K Barclay K Riemer L Haeg M Garza P Laflamme S Bell |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control |
| CCA | H.1, Resources |
| INPO aspect | LA.1 |
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Finding - Prairie Island - IR 05000306/2015004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Prairie Island) @ 2015Q4
Self-Identified List (Prairie Island)
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