An inspector identified finding of very low safety significance and a
NCV of
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures and Drawings," occurred on January 27, 2015, due to operations personnel failing to follow Procedure FPOPOL01, Operability/Functionality Determination, while assessing the operability of the 14 containment fan coil unit (CFCU) and the Unit 1 containment. Specifically, personnel failed to perform an immediate
operability determination for the 14 CFCU and the Unit 1 containment after the inspectors identified that the 14 CFCU was potentially leaking. Corrective actions for this issue included documenting the immediate
operability determination after the inspectors brought this issue to the attention of the operations department and sharing the details of this event with other operations personnel. The inspectors determined that the failure to perform an immediate
operability determination on the 14 CFCU and the Unit 1 containment as required by Step 5.3.1 of Procedure FPOPOL01 was more than minor because if left uncorrected, the failure to perform
operability determinations, as required by procedure could result in incorrect/untimely operability conclusions and the failure to take action to correct degraded or deficient conditions, as required by the technical specifications (TS). In addition, this is the second example of an untimely CFCU
operability determination identified by the inspectors in the last ten months. The inspectors utilized
IMC 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and determined that this issue was of very low safety significance because each question provided in
IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 3,
Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, Part B, was answered No. The inspectors concluded that this finding was cross-cutting in the Human Performance, Teamwork area because individuals and work groups failed to communicate and coordinate their activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety was maintained (H.4).
