ML20202G460

Summary of ACRS Subcommittee on Human Factors 860319-20 Meeting in Washington,Dc Re Potential for Automating Addl Monitoring & Control Functions in Nuclear Power Plants & Review of 1985 Progress on Human Factors Program Plan

ML20202G460
Person / Time
Issue date:	04/01/1986
From:	Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To:	Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
References
ACRS-2408, NUDOCS 8607150398
Download: ML20202G460 (21)

Text

', *

', O(($"dYdh

N

p w g\Fj f i CERTIFIED COPY -

j & y Q k b dr4 (lh

SUMMARY

/ MINUTES OF THE hg

,p .

gi DATE ISSUED: APR. 1, 1986 o y//y/y6 ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN FACTORS MARCH 19-20, 1986 WASHINGTON, D.C.

The ACRS Subcommittee on Human Factors met in Washington, D.C. on March 19-20, 1986 to a) explore the potential for automating more of the monitoring and control functions in nuclear power plants so as to relieve the burden on plant operators and enhance safety, b) review the 1985 progress on the Human Factors Program Plan (HFPP), and c) be briefed on the status of Emergency Operating Procedures (E0P) implementation.

Notice of the meeting was published in the Federal Register on March 10, 1986(AttachmentA). The schedule of items covered in the meeting is in Attachment B. A list of handouts kept with the office copy of the minutes is included in Attachment C. There were no written or oral statements received or presented from members of the public at the meeting. E. Igne was the cognizant ACRS staff member for the meeting.

Principal Attendees ACRS NRC Staff D. Ward, Chairman D. Jones C. Wylie, Member F. Rowsome D. Moeller, Member J. Bongarro F. Remick, Member L. Beltracchi C. Michelson, Member B. Bolger K. Gimmy, ACRS Consultant W. Kennedy E. Igne, ACRS Staff S. Weiss Others J. Carrera, Westinghouse s R. Contratto, Westinghouse J. Easter, Westinghouse R. Duffey, EPRI ,

P. Springer, Georgia Power Co.

L. Gucwa, Georgia Power Co.

W. Williamson, TVA R. Knobel, Knebel & Assoc.

M. Paradies, tiniv. of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign B. Jones, Univ. of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign W. Bertch, Energy Inc.

G. Niederauer, Energy Inc.

g g m a CMGUEL 8607150398 860401 PDR Cortified E7_ --

ACRS 2408 pop

u ..m.__

, a HUMAN FACTORS 2 March 19-20, 1986 Meeting In opening the meeting, D. Ward stated that the meeting is essentially a gathering of information on automation and its monitoring and control of plant parameters in order to enhance nuclear power safety. The subcommittee in particular should consider the following questions:

. Are there NRC regulations or perhaps attitudes within the Staff that inhibit movement in the adoption of the technology that is available?

. Should there be NRC regulations or attitude in the Staff tb t would actually promote moving in the direction of adoption of the technology that is available?

. Should or can the ACRS do anything to promote or inhibit movement in this direction?

D. Moeller stated that human factors aspects of the control room should include control room environmental conditions, i.e., temperature and humidity.

NRC Presentation S. Weiss, NRC, discussed NRC's past and present attitude toward automation or computers in control room in nuclear power plants and commented on a topical meeting on computer operators for nuclear power plant operation and control that was held in Pasco, Washington.

With respect to D. Moeller's question, S. Weiss stated that the guidelines in NUREG-0700 give environmental conditions for equipment surviyability in the control room. He would like to chang 9 the technical specification to include temperature considerations for the operator. He further stated that he is aware of the problem and some work to alleviate this oversight is ongoing.

l

. 9 *

- HUMAN FACTORS 3 March 19-20, 1986 Meeting The NRC has no formal criteria for the use of digital computers in operational nuclear plants. However, informal criteria have been established from experience gained in the safety evaluation of computer-based protection systems, e.g., Core Protection Calculator System and RESAR-414 Integrated Protection System. Another source of NRC experience has been the review of the Safety Parameter Display l Systems (SPDS). Subsequent to TMI-2 accident the NRC established requirements for a SPDS in control rooms of nuclear plants. The nuclear industry has responded to this requirement by designing computer driven CRT display systems. The Staff has surveyed six plants to determine the state of SPDS implementation, and to ascertain the scope and depth of a review necessary for post-implementation audits. In general, S. Weiss stated that the SPDS's surveyed have major deficiencies, and some are identified as follows:

. Lack of SPDS availability because of gross system malfunctions,

. Display of unreliable or invalid data and alarms,

. Poor acceptance of SPDS by operators because of reliability problems,

. Failure of management to integrate SPDS into the operational environment,

. Inadequate documentation of SPDS and failure to control system testing and modifications, and

.- ' Slow SPDS response to some operator commands.

S. Weiss did state that two plants audited did well. These plants had extensive use of computers or worked closely with vendors or people with i

i i i

t

-wm -- - - , , , - - - - . . - - , , - - . _ , - - _ - - - . - - , 2 + - -- - -

. HUMAN FACTORS 4 March 19-20, 1986 Meeting I computer experience. As a result of this study NRC is planning to perform post-implementation audits of the SPDS on all plants. '

Problems similar to those described above have also been identified by the NRC during the evaluation of the emergency data acquisition systems as a part of the Emergency Response Facility appraisals.

In response to a question regarding the advisability of the use of SPDS in plants, S. Weiss stated that the concept of an SPDS is fine if its working, as shown in our audit of two good working SPDS. It was further stated that as a regulatory agency, the NRC is trying to keep abreast of the technology that is developing so that the right questions during review can be asked. The NRC is not manditing a particular equipment to be used for the SPDS.

Next, S. Weiss presented a very brief overview of some papers that were presented at the September 8-12, 1985 Pasco, Wastington Topical Meeting on computer application for nuclear power plant operation and control.

L. Beltracchi, NRC, discussed a survey of Savannah River Plant (SRP) advanced control room design. The goal of the survey was to collect information on design of advance control rooms in order to establish design knowledge data base computer technology and its impact on safe plant operation. The SRP is a DOE production facility. Each large reactor on-site is now equipped with multiple on-line digital computers that perform process data monitoring and display functions, and process control functions. The computers also address functions to shut down the reactor when the plant approaches a violation of the safety function and are also used to provide expert advice to control room operators when multiple alarms occur, thereby reducing operator work loads during critical events. All computers have been backfitted into the operation of the plant. The initial design and operation of the control room were totally dependent on operator hard-wire technology.

HUMAN FACTORS 5 March 19-20, 1986 Meeting It was noted that major differences exist between the design and operation of the reactor plants at SRP and the design and operation of a commercial nuclear plant. Some of the differences are as listed below:

. Plant design and operation are much simpler at SRP

. At SRP, all functions and tasks assigned operators are performed according to documented procedures

. Development of operator's procedures began during plant design

. As a rule, based expert system aids operators in responding to multiple alarms which identifies critical procedures.

In summary, L. Beltracchi stated that SRP uses digital computers for process control, for safe shutdown of the reactor, and as an expert system to provide realtime operator support during periods of information overload due to multiple alarms. These uses of digital computers have reduced operator workloads, improved productivity and process control, and improved operational safety.

W. Kennedy, NRC, presented a summary of NASA presentation to the NRC Staff on NASA's (Kennedy Space Center, KSC) experience with automation. l I

The NRC Staff wanted to: (1) assess the role and function of the control room operations crew, the operator aids required to control and monitor operations, and the degree of automation used in operations; (2) identify and evaluate the design guidelines used to develop an advanced control room, such as the guidelines used to assign functions to operations, automatic systems, or digital computers; and (3) evaluate how the launch l support facility operates using highly automated control rooms. This information will be used to establish a NRC data base of design guidelines and operational experience for use by the Staff in the review of (1) designs for advance control rooms for nuclear plants, and

i HUMAN FACTORS 6 March 19-20, 1986 Meeting i

(2) major revisions and modifications proposed for current control i rooms. Establishment of this data base is important because designs for advanced control rooms based on computer technology have been submitted for NRC Staff review.

? The KSC uses digital computers to automate many functions within the ground support systems and launch support systems. The complex operations required to prepare and support a vehicle's launch contain many hazardous steps, and some of these are manually controlled by human operators. The error-free human performance during critical steps of I operation is being met through the use of computer-stored interrupt programs and control logic. The interrupt programs are called when an off-normal condition exists and detected from computer-monitored sensor

signals. The interrupt programs perform diagnostics on the problem area and take predetermined action, based on logic stored in the computer.

Control logic is a specific form of sequence control, defined as system logic that monitors specified functions and takes-direct action when an off-normal condition exists. Good performance of software is attributed to the design process, quality assurance and control, and the verification and validatinn methods used at KSC. It was also mentioned that should the computer for a work station fail a hardwire backup I control panel located at the work station is used. Under this condition, the operator manually controls critical functions to maintain ,

safe operation.

l Based on the information provided by KSC personnel, it was stated that these tools would be useful to control room operators during emergency operations at nuclear plants. The technology is available and has been demonstrated.

W. Kennedy next discussed NRC's attitude toward future automation. He stated that control room automation applications are being considered.

I' He stated that automation is useful to both the industry and NRC's i

i 1 . . - _ _ . - - _ - . _ , - - - . _. _ - _ _ - .

1

. HUMAN FACTORS 7 March 19-20, 1986 Meeting l mission, and that artificial intelligence has significant potential in nuclear plant applications. He did caution that there are limits to what the NRC can require because of the backfit rule. Some NRC concerns toward future automation are as follows:

1

. What applications of this new technology should or need to be regulated?

. Who has responsibility for its use?

. How to evaluate and regulate advanced technology?

{

M. Paradies, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, discussed cognitive allocation and the control room to improve nuclear power plant performance. He stated that a weak link in current commercial nuclear.

plant design is an insufficient attention to the needs and capabilities of the human operator. This flaw causes decreased plant reliability and reduced plant safety. To improve the design, these human errors must be

considered early in the design process.

The allocation of functions needs to be considered not only in mechanical tasks to be performed but also the control requirements and the overall control philosophy. " Cognitive allocation" is the allocation of the decision making process between operators and machines. It defines the operator's role in the system. When designing a nuclear plant, a cognitive allocation starts the process of considering the operator's abilities. This is the first step to correcting the weak link in the current plant design.

He stated that industry figures show that 25% to 40% of all nuclear ,

power plant outages are caused by human error. If the average outage

causes the plant to be down for one day, it will cost the utility about i

$750,000 in replacement power cost alone.

3

_l_ , .,. -. , . . - , . , - _ . _ . , , - - . - , . _ - - - _ . , - - , - , , . , , .- - ,-

HUMAN FACTORS 8 March 19-20, 1986 Meeting Using Rasmussen's decision making model, Mr. Paradies developed guidelines for normal and off-normal operations. For normal operations the suggested guidelines are as follows:

. Involve the operator in the control loop and help him refine his mental model of the plant.

. Do not unintentionally increase the operators workload during events by adding tasks during normal operation that will carry over into abnormal situations.

. Reduce the operator's monitoring load or change the form of the .

l monitoring required.

. Reduce paperwork and redundant tasks that take the operator out of the control loop.

For off-normal events the suggested guidelines are as follows:

. Maximize the use of the operator's decision making ability

. Maximize the operator's time sharing

. Simplify the operator's mental model

. Leave the operator in overall control, keeping the computer as a tool to be used to assist the operator.

B. Jones, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, discussed embedded training considerations. He stated that in the context of nuclear power plant operators, it includes operator instruction as an integral part of system control room and training occurs simultaneously with plant operations. The significance of the use of real nuclear plant control

• l HUMAN FACTORS 9 March 19-20, 1986 Meeting '

rooms for training operators is to prevent operator boredom and maintain operator proficiency. Some problems with embedded training are (1) conflict between operational and training missions, installation in current operating plants would involve significant hardware and software modifications and (3) overcoming potential initial operator reliability decrement when changing from simulation to operation following an event.

J. Easter, Westinghouse, discussed Westinghouse views on advances in nuclear plant automation. He stated that the expected performance of nuclear plant automation set for the Westinghouse owners group is very high, i.e., target is two trips / year, but the control of the turbine-generator, which is already highly automated will contribute 1/2-1 trips per plant / year depending on the age of the system (newer units having the higher frequency). The Japanese trip rate is already in this range. Some of the design goals are listed below:

. Build the system so that no single failure will actuate more than one method of inserting reactivity.

. The proper role of the I&C systems is to minimize transients to major plant components because the transients could jeopardize

~

their integrity.

. Do not violate the process with more sensor penetrations than necessary, which lead to the sharing of sensors between control and protection.

. The machine role is still subservient to the human operator.

J. Easter indicated that system reliability benefits favor the digital technology. This technology offers the capability to build in large degrees of self testing, and the ability to take fault tolerant design approaches and make them reasonably cost effective.

e - -

l HUMAN FACTORS 10 March 19-20, 1986 Meeting The new Westinghouse control room design will factor the applications of human factors engineering and artificial intelligence Expert Systems.

Westinghouse believes that by properly allocating tasks to man and machine and by continuing to press for the human factors community for principles applicable by I&C engineering personnel and for expanding the human factors understanding as applied to nuclear plants, that the growth of automation in nuclear plants can both aid in improving the safety of these plants as well as improve their cost effectiveness.

1 D. Duffey, EPRI, discussed the research on automatic monitoring and l control functions of nuclear plants. Based on industry (including NASA, DOE and SRP) inputs, the EPRI research program in this area is to make the machine more tolerant to human intervention and error and to assist the operating and emergency staffs in decision making. He stated that the application of this new technology to existing power plants is the subject of current research and that implementation depends on actual benefits to plant operation.

R. Duffey, in parting, stated that a seminar on SPDS implementation is I scheduled on May 6-8, 1986, at the Lafayette Hotel in Boston and that  !

the ACRS is invited to attend.  ;

1 W. Bertch, Energy Inc., discussed the potential for and use of artificial intelligence (AI) in the nuclear power industry. He stated that an expert system is not a close loop control process but is an operator aid because you are automating the observation, interpretation and decision for the operator and giving him the choice as to either pick his own decision or concur with the computer. The current l capabilities are to focus on providing the correct recommendation to the l

l l

l

HUMAN FACTORS 11 March 19-20, 1986 Meeting user. Justification for supporting the conclusions is provided which allows for verification of the conclusions.

He stated that certain types of knowledge cannot be encoded with the current technology and that validation forces all applications to fit the domain of the knowledge base. The operator could also overrely on the expert systems and following its recommendation would be irrestible.

Current industry developments are in the areas of technical specification monitoring, operator aids, diagnostic systems, and performance aids. Other domains within artificial intelligence include the understanding of natural language learning, vision and robotics. In these areas work has been started but results are not expected in the near future.

George Niederauer, Energy, Inc., briefly discussed computers in nuclear power plants. Currently computers are mainly used in monitoring roles and that little analysis and control are performed by computers.

Computers in the future should be used to make plants and personnel more expert in order to relieve people of tedium and make their jobs smarter.

The computer should be incorporated in a total unified plant information system that will perform analysis and design of support and control functions and be implemented by component, system and plant.

D. Jones, NRC, reviewed the 1985 progress of the Human Factors Program Plan (HFPP). The HFPP essentially started after the TMI era. This three-year program is now ended. In the HFPP there were 33 TMI action items that pertained to human factors. All but six of those items are now complete. Of the remaining six, several, and all, long-term items will require more than the three years to complete. Others are essentially complete and will be pursued by INPO and NUMARC under a memorandum of understanding with NRC. INP0 has been assigned the training and qualifications activities and NUMARC is working on self-initiatives on self-regulation. Also, 51 additional human factors

, s v

March 19-20, 1986 Meeting HUMAN FACTORS 12 items were recomended by the Human Factors Society. NRR accepted a majority of these recomendations as being appropriate and a few recomendations were so-called industry activities, one of which is natural selection testing. Implementation of these recommendations is

in progress, although not as prompt and effective as NRR would want it to be--in part because of industry self-regulation.

A sumary of the elements of the HFPP was then presented. Of the seven major elements, D. Jones eliminated the discussion on the human reliability program because this element is essentially funded by the probabilistic risk assessment group, while the others are funded by NRR.

The six major elements discussed and a brief sumary of each is listed below.

. Staffing and qualifications. Only reactor operators at this time need to be licensed. Regarding educational qualifications, it was stated that specialized course work, A.S. degree and B.S. degree, educational programs are similar in their job relevance in terms of

coverage of knowledge list content remains to be covered outside existing educational programs. Approximately half or more of the l academic knowledge list content remains to be covered outside f

existing educational programs. It appears there is substantial

reliance on plant training programs for coverage of academic l knowledge necessary for licensed operator positions. D. Jones i stated that about 15% of current operators are degreed.

. Training. A policy statement has been issued by the Commission l accepting INP0 accreditation of training . NRR will evaluate j INPO's training program for the next two years and report to the ,

i Comission its recomendation. NUREG/CR-4344 has been published on team skill training.

4 l '

- _ . . . _- . . _ . _ _ . _ - _,..-___-_-___._-m,..- . . _ , . . - - - _ . _ . _ , . , . _ . -

HUMAN FACTORS 13 March 19-20, 1986 Neeting

. Licensing Examinations. Rulemaking (10 CFR Parts 55 and 50) is in the works on operator licensing qualifications, medical evaluation and simulators for exams. An examiner's handbook that tells how to prepare exams was prepared (NUREG-1121).

, . Procedures. An E0P inspection module which is used by inspection enforcement, resident inspector and others on their trips out has been developed. He stated that research on various alternative techniques and formats in presenting procedur information has been completed. The results of this study indicate that it doesn't make much difference what the technique or format is, as to presenting the procedure information, as long as it is presented logically, clearly and in a sensible manner.

. Man-Machine Interface (MMI). At the present time MMI deficiencies i

at local control station designs exist. There are no human engineering standards in control room stations. Work in this area for advanced technologies is ongoing.

. Management and Organization (M&O). NRR has established a regulatory position on M&O for operating reactors. This position is in agreement with NUMARC.

F. Rowsome, NRR, reviewed the HFPP, Rev. 2. The principal differences between Rev. i and 2 of the HFPP are as follows:

. Budget cuts have resulted in the elimination of human factors work by RES. PRA-related human reliability work is ongoing at a reduced level.

. Conformance with the Commission's PPG and policy statements of shifting the emphasis or requirements development to auditing and encouraging industry self-improvement.

1

.-, .~ - , . _ _ - - . , , - - - , , , , , - . . . , - . - . ~ . - ,-

5 HUMAN FACTORS 14 March 19-20, 1986 Meeting

. Revision 2 is aimed at a broader audience, and detailed program schedules and milestones are omitted.

The HFPP resources for FY 1986 will include 9 DHF and 3 training professional staff years. The total technical assistance budget for FY 1986 is about $1.34 million of which $175,000 is for the NAS panel, as compared with about $5.3 million for FY 1985. Aside from the NAS panel, only training, operator licensing, procedures and MMI are being funded in FY 1986.

J. Bongorra, Jr., NRR discussed the status of the E0P upgrade program.

The objectives of the upgrade program are as follows:

. Review origin of E0P upgrade program

. Review the concept of the procedures generation package (PGP)

. Discuss Staff PGP-E0P audits

. Discuss results of the E0P upgrade program

. Review some options for improving the E0P upgrade program.

The requirements for upgrading E0Ps are based, in part, on TMI action plans (NUREG-0660 and -0737), guidelines for the preparation of E0Ps (NUREG-0899) and Generic Letter 82-33.

It was stated that the PGPs consist of plant-specific technical guidelines, writers guide, description of validation / verification programs and a brief description of the training program. The PGP-EOP audits were performed to check if PGP has been properly implemented and to determine if PGP is an effective method of review. A few plants have been audited with PNL assisting. Results from the plants audited to date are disappointing and several Staff assumptions appear to be not .

valid. There seems to be little or no coordination of PGP with detailed control room design review, and having an approved PGP does not ensure it is ueed. Evidently in some cases E0Ps were written before the PGPs

HUMAN FACTORS 15 March 19-20, 1986 Meeting were prepared. Further, the most frequent problems with E0Ps are with the wtiter'sguide.

J. Bangarra, NRC stated that the options to the E0P upgrade program are as follows:

. PGP submittals should be accompanied by sample of E0Ps

. PGP-E0P audits should be mandatory, not voluntary

. Accelerate PGP audit and review schedule

. Increase dialogue with industry.

R. Knoble, Knobel & Associates, Inc., under contract to Georgia Power (Hatch), discussed a symptom-based decision tree approach to BWR emergency operating procedures (E0P). A movie was first shown of the use of a symptom-oriented, fully-integrated (S0FI) flow chart in the Hatch simulator for a complete loss of plant service water.

R. Knobel stated that the need was to create symptom-based E0P from BWROG symptom-based emergency procedure guidelines. With help from Essex Corp., Knobel and Asso identified deficiencies in TMI E0Ps, as listed:

. Single event oriented

. Confusion as to which procedures apply ,

l

. Excessive burden on operator memory I

. System response seldom indicated l

. Deficient in diagnostic information I

. Contained many cross references

. Generally contained no charts or graphs

. Usability with multiple failure poor

. Operator awareness of total plant conditions questionable. ,

As a consequence, the operators do what they think is appropriate in multiple event failures.

l 1

l l

, ,,. _3 _. . ; - - - - -

e*

• e HUMAN FACTORS 16 March 19-20, 1986 Meeting As a result, R. Knobel stated that a completely integrated all current E0Ps and sympton-based emergency guidelines into flow charts are used for immediate actions c:.d prose for subsequent actions. At least two plants, Hatch and Brunswick, use this method.

i W. Williamson, TVA, discussed Browns Ferry implemenfation of upgraded E0Ps in a single column instruction format. He stated that emergency procedure guidelines in the single column instruction format exist for RPV control, primary containment control, secondary containment control and radiation release control. ATWS emergency procedure guidelines are still event based. The advantages of the single column format are as follows:

. Easiest to write

. Most familiar to the operator

. Allows the writer choice of methods for identification of equipment controls and displays

. Implicit is less training required.

Its disadvantages are that it could 1) require more pages to present the necessary information and 2) be difficult to present contingency actions. It was stated that at TVA the operators write the emergency guideline procedures.

The subcommittee stated that under pressure the operator may not be able to cope with the difficult cross-referencing and its high order of subheading.

Future Subcommittee Activities A subcommittee report to the full ACRS is planned for the April 1986 meeting.

NOTE: A transcript of the meeting is available in the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H St., N.W., Washington, D.C., or can be purchased from ACE-Federal Reporters, 444 N. Capitol Street.

Wasnington, D.C. 20001(202)347-3700.

L;MMKR; y m m e- m ., _ _ _ y 3.n g. g. . g .- ____ ,

&266 Federal Register / Vol. 51. No. 46 / Monday. March 10. 1980 / Notices -

l l

'I the proposed determination functions in nuclear power plants to annual rniew, all petitions to modify ames final. an opportunity for a relieve the burden on plant operators the list of articles eligible for duty. free anng will be published in the Federal and enhance safety. (2) review 1985 treatment under the Generalized System Register at a later date and any hearing prrntress on the ilumen Factors Program of Preferences (CSP) and requests to request will not delay the effectis e date Pfan, and (3) be briefed on the status of review the CSP status of any beneficiary of the amendment. EOP Implementation.- developing country must be received no If the Commission decides in its final Oral statements may be presented by . later than the close of business.

determination that the amendment does members of the publ,ic mth the Monday. June 2.1986. The CSP provides involve a siemficant hazards concurrence of the Subcommittee for the dutpfree importation of Chairrnan written staternents will be

~

consideration. a notice of opportunity qualifying eligible articles when for a prior hearing will be published in accepted and made available to the imported from designated beneficiary the Federal Register and,if a heanng is Committee. Recordings will be permitted developing countries. The GSP is granted,it will be held before any only during those portions of the authorized by Title V of the Trade Act cmendment is issued. meeting when a transcript is being kept of1974. as amended and has been and questions may be asked only bY implemented by Excect.tive Order 11888 The Commission is seeking publ.ic members of the Subcommittee,its comments on this proposed of November 24.1975, and mofified by consultants and Staft Persons desiring subsequen! Executive Orders and determinanon of no significant hazards to make oral statements should notify casideration. Comments on the Presidential Proclamations-the ACRS staff member named below as proposed determination may be interested parties or foreign far in advance as is practicab!e so that telephoned to Elinor C. Adensam. appropriate arrangements can be made. g vernments may submit petitions (1) to Director of BWR Project Directorate No. During the initial portion of the designate additional articles as eligible

3. by collect call to (301) 492-8150 or meeting. the Sabcommitte, along with for the CSP; or (2) to withdraw. Suspend any of its consultants who may be or limit GSP duty. free treattnent g submitted in wrihng to the Secretary of the Commission. U S. Nuclear present, reay exchange preliminary acentded eder to dig:ble ardeles under

.Aegdatory Commission. Washington. views regarding matters to be the GSP or to mdivide il beneficsary DC 2555. Attn: Docketing and Service considered during the balance of the developing countnes with respect to Branch. All comments received by mee;ing. specific CSP eligible articles; or (3) to March 14,1985. mll be considered in The Subcommittee will then hear otherwise modify CSP coverage, Also. i reaching a final determination. A copy presentations by and hold discussions any person rney file a request to have

! cf the application may be examined at with representatives of the NRC Staff. the GSP status of any eligible l

the Commissien's Public Document its consultants. and other interested beneficiary developing country i f ' lI w.1717 H Street. NW. Washington.

and at the Leest Public Decument persons regarding this review.

Further information regarding topics reviewed with respect to any of the dasignation critieria listed in

...,om. Richland Public Library. Swift to be discussed. whether the meeting subsections 502(b)or502(c)of the Act cnd Northgate Streets. Richland. has been caocelled or rescheduled. the (19 U.S. 2662 (b) and (c)).

Weshington 99352. Chairman's ruling on requests for the Petitions and requests to modify CSP opportunity to present oral statemerfs treatment should be submitted In Dated Bethsda. Maryland. tbs 4th day of ud b Um ddd bMM m W h@h b M gh 6 m&My WW obtained by a prepaid telephone call to regulations codified in 15 CFR. Chapter

] Fw die Ndear Regatory Commisuon.

the cognitant ACRS staff member.Mr. XX. especia!!y Part 2007 and addressed

! EEnor G. Adensam. John Sdnffgens (telephone 202/634- to the Chairman. CSP Subcommittee.

! Dhec' tor. S n71 fwei Directorate .W .L 14141 between &15 A.M. and $100 P.M. Trade Policy StaU Committee. Of! Ice of

( ; Division ofan7t Licenswg Persons planning to attend this meetmg the United States Trade Representative.

are urged to centset the above named Room $17. 600 Seventeenth Street NW.,

int Doc. 86-316a Filed 1-7-M e 45 a ml . mdividual one or two days before the

- 8'*"G C ""'* "" Washington. DC 20506. Further scheduled meeting to be advised of anY information may be obtained by calling

,7 changes in schedule, etc., which may the GSP Information Center at (202) 395- i y Advisory Committee on Reactor have occurred. 8973, j g Safeguards, Subcommittee on Human Dated Wrch 4.1968. Prospective petitioners and requestors Factors; Meeting Mortes W. !Aarkin. are strongly advised to review the CSP A ssis tant Enscu tive Duwetorfar Project regulations published in the Federal

,i ne AChtS Subcommitfee en Human Reusw. Register on Tuesday. February 11.1986. l Factors will hold a rueeting on March 19 [nt Doc. auta3 Ftled 3-7-46. t45 aml . (51 FR 5035). Petitions and requests that I

. and 20.1988. Room 1018.1717 H Street, e,w coonw e do not conforrn ta the requirements of l {

NW Washington.DC. these regulations wdf not be accepted '

i The roeetina wel be open to pubhc .

for review.

attendance. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES Notice ofisetitions and requests

' TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

( He agenda for subjecf meeting shall accepted for review will be published in .

! be as follows: Trade Policy Staff Comrn!ttee- the Federal Register on or about 5, e wu Wednesday. March 19.1988-B.30 A M. Generalized Systam of Prefer'ences [g",',sda (GSP); Deadline for Acceptance of pg y 9 g, until the conclusion of business.

opPodunily for inWed paes to

%rusday. March 2D.1986-8.30 A.M. Pet 2tfons Requesting Modif1 cation of lg unitt the conclusion of business. et Efl le Duty Free ,',d r few g[ ,

The uremm;ttee willa at to:(1) .

bearings and written submissions. Any J. . amine the.9otenttC for . .. ma t:r - -

"stice ; hereb; . 'ves ht. le oeder to~ moddestions to the G5P reeutting fmm ..-.-

g (s err of the muitor/ ; an.: cmtrol bmasF 'sd do ye %:4 CSP . , . ,the it *e CSP rianual review will be .,y

/ - -

A 7"7 M C g m .a. q. 7 e .- _ _ _ _ _ _ _

~-~

n. .

.i March 12C1986 REVISION" 4 PROPOSED SCHEDULE FOR THE MARCH 19-20, 1986 MEETING OF THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN FACTORS Wednesday, March 19, 1986 8:30am Opening Statement D. Ward 10 min 35 V 8:40 NRC Attitudes Toward Automation

- Past and Present Comments on the 9/8-12/85 Pasco Topical on Computer Appl-ications for NPP Operation g. . )

and Control S. Weiss ' 35 ED r sa w u d b ec Pf( il-

< 9:15 Summary of SRP Presentation to the NRC Staff on Advanced /

Control Room Design L. Beltracchi 30 ProAC M Summary of NASA Presentation to the NRC Staff on NASA's N W. Kennedy /

4.0 Experience with Automation 30 10 : M NRC Attitudes Toward Automation

- Future W. Kennedy 30 22,

- 10 : %. BREAK 15 '

m IW10 Cognitive Allocation and the n Control Room (U. Ill./SRL) M. Paradies / 45

u 3*ce6 / '-

Research Activities -

F

/mbedded .

Train . ..g with Automated B. ones -

Systems (U. Ill.) C. Hopkins 30

\ '.\ C 12.15 LUNCH 60 kTTNC#?/'/

1

SCHEDULE / HUMAN FACTORS March 12, 1986 MEETING -

MARCH 19-20, 1986 REVISION 4

~

. ?_: ss Mpm Advanced Control Room Design J. Carrera/ 60 min .

. and Evolution for Current J. Easter , l

~~

Control Rooms (Westinghouse) %

• Supervisory Inforiration a j Management .!

• Alarm Management

• Automated Procedures - Normal and Emergency 2:15 Ho to Incorpo at Automat n i to a N w P1 t Des an (G ner Electr Pug 6

-3.15- BREAK 15 32 GLE 3:30 Research on Automating Monitoring e and Control Functions of NPPs (EPRI) R. Duffey 60

1. - [

• Procedure Tracking Qqg

• Feedwater Control 0

• Core Monitoring N Computers in NPPs (Energy Inc.) G. Niederauer/ 75

• An Overview W. Bertch

• Automating Control Functions

• Use of " Artificial Intelligence" and " Expert Systems" I

@* U N b den 5."Sym [ Esab) ADJOURN

,g

, p' f.

• U %/ t. .

Thursday, March 20, 1986 Qam.dt.  %

[8:30am Review of 1985 Progress on HFPP . '.

.ea ::: 60 Discussion of " Ongoing" HFPP F. Rowsome 60

\0107 10 ' lf t 10.00 BREAK ,

15

10. & Status of E0P Implementation J. Bongarro 60 ll4T

• Reviews of PGPs

• Results of Staff E0P Audits

• Discussion of Approaches

-b G

..g & .

March 12, 1986 SCHEDULE / HUMAN FACTORS MEETING - MARCH 19-20, 1986 REVISION 4 Taken to EOPs

.* EOP Contents / Formats i

12' SO p LUNCH 80 min 1:40 J. Springer /

ms EOPs " Flowchart" Format (GPC)

R. Knobel 120

• > '-l $~ '

6 pm BREAK 15

~5 %

EOPs " Single Column" Format (TVA) W. Williamson 60 4 S.2 0 - SJe d g a u.ss t en

440 ADJOURN s',50 9

"~ .

[~~

t .-

r

..a_;.  :. --_ - .,,; .

ATTACHMENT C LIST OF HANDOUTS ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN FACTORS MARCH 19-20, 1986 MEETING WASHINGTON, D.C. .

1.a S. Weiss, NRC, Regulatory Criteria for Use of Computers in Nuclear Power Plants 1.b S. Weiss, IE Information Notice 86-10 Safety Parameter Display System Malfunctioning

2. L. Beltracchi NRC, Survey of Advanced Control Room Design

3. W. G. Kennedy, NRC, Summary of NASA Presentation to the NRC Staff on NASA's Experience with Automation -

4. W. G. Kennedy, NRC, NRC Staff Attitudes Toward Automation - Future ,

5. M. W. Paradies, U. of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. A Cognitive Allocation to Improve Nuclear Power Plant Performance; also Cognitive Allocation and the Control Room

6. B. G. Jones, U. of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Studies of Improved Operational Safety and Performance of Nuclear Power Plants

7. J. R. Easter, Westinghouse, Advanced in Nuclear Power' Plant Automation: A View from Westinghouse

8. R. B. Duffey, EPRI, Research on Monitoring and Control Functions

9. W. J. Bertch. Energy Incorporated, The Potential for and Use of Artificial Intelligence ,

~

10.a D. B. Jones, NRC, Review of 1985 Progress on Human Factors Program Plan (HFPP) 10.b D. B. Jones Specialized Educational Programs' for Nuclear Reactor Operators

11. F. H. Rowsome, NRC, Human Factors Program Plan, Revision 2

12. J. P. Bongarra, Status of the E0P Upgrade Program

13. R. Knobel, Knobel Assoc., and J. Springer, Georgia Power, bse of Symptom Oriented Fully Integrated (SOFI) Flow Charts in Hatch Simulator for Complete Loss of Plant Service Water; Emergency

.-Procedure Guideline Implementation Program, E. I. Hatch Nuclear .

Plant 14.a W. Williamson, TVA, Implementation of Upgraded Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) in Single Column Instruction Format 14.b RPV Control E01-1 ATTACHMENT C .

-*