ML20085K218

Ro:On 731016,during Sys Test,Core Spray Sys I Bypass Valve 1402-38A Failed to Open.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Switch Reset

ML20085K218
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden
Issue date:	11/15/1973
From:	Worden W COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	Giambusso A US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
References
847-73, NUDOCS 8310200355
Download: ML20085K218 (2)

Text

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One Elth Edison Plaza. Chicago. Ilknois

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i Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767 Chicago, !!!inois 60690 50-249 WPW Ltr.d847-73 Dresden Nuclear Power Station .

, R. R. #1 Morris, Illinois 60450 November 15, 1973 .

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6 8 Mr. A. Giambusso 2 kOf  ?

Deputy Director for Reactor Projects 9; 4 ,. /S T Directorate of Licensing p,;,,g* g U. S. Atomic Energy C,mnission g 4 g"/ g,7 -

Washington, D. C. 20545 T4

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SUBJECT:

LICENSE DPR-25. DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT #3, Ot SECTION 6.6.B.2 0F THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

MALFUN_ C TION OF CORE SPRAY SYSTEM M.O. VALVE 1402-38A.

Reference:

1) Dwgs: P & ID M-358.

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Dear Mr. Giambus.,

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This letter is to report a condition relating to the operation of the unit at about 0300 hours0.00347 days <br />0.0833 hours <br />4.960317e-4 weeks <br />1.1415e-4 months <br /> en October 16, 1973. At this time, Core Spray System I bypass valve 1402-38A failed to open during a system test.

This malfunction is contrary to section 3.5.A.1 of the Technical Specifications which requires that core spray components shall be operable when irradiated fuel is in the reactor.

PROBLEM Valve 1402-38A is in the minimum flow bypass piping for Core Spray System pump 2A. The function of the valve is to allow adequate pump flow, which prevent pump damage when the core spray system is operating at less than minimum pump flow. This valve is actuated by flow switch DP 1464A. The function of this switch is to monitor core spray flow, and provide an open signal to valve 1402-38A, if flow is less than 300 GPM. When ficw is above this value, the flow switch provides a close signal to the valve. On October 16, 1973 during a test of the Unit 3 Core Spray System, bypass valve 1402-38A failed to open due to the failure of flow switch DP 1464A.

INVESTICATION Flow switch DP 1464A was tested and found to be inoperable.

The switch was recalibrated and then found to operate properly. The switch is a Barton Model 288 and has a history of setpoint drif t in both the increasing and decreasing direction.

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Mr. A. Giambu(sJ)o November 15, 1973 On November 1, 1973 the switch was inspected by a Barton field -

representative. The following observations were noted.

1. The plunger which actuates the micro switch was very loose.

! 2. The roller on the actuator arm would not roll freely.

3. The range of the switch is too large for the setpoint.

During the investigation it was also noted that a procedure revision is needed to provide more exact instructions when calibrating the flow switch .

4 CORRECTIVE ACTION The immediate corrective action was to tighten the plunger screw, free the actuator arm roller, and reset the switch. Future corrective action will be to replace the switch with one having a smaller range, and to develop a program to inspect critical cooponents on Barton switches on I a regular schedule.

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EVALUATIONS The failure of valve 1402-38A in no way impaired the availability 1

of the Core Spray System. Therefore, it is concluded that the safety of the station personnel and the general public was not compromised as a result of this switch failure.

Investigations into the drifting of instrument setpoints is continuing. Dresden has consulted with instrument manufacturers and is obtaining recommendations for corrective action. Critical instruments with a history of drif ting setpoints are being checked on a more frequent interval. Setpoints have been moved to more conservative value where warranted. These actions have insured continued safe operation of the reactor.

Sincerely, hk S. M W. P. Worden Superintendent

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• Dresden Nuclear Power Station R. R. #1 Forris, Illinois 60450 December 11, 1974 Fr. E. C. Case Directorate of Licensing [ (([ j _

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SUUJDCT: Corrective Action for Barton Instrument Setpoint Drift V !C /

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References:

Letter 176574 to Fr. J. F. O' Leary from Mr. W. P. Worden -

dated January 30, 1974 -

Incident D2-73-1 reported to Mr. Giambasso in letter #41-73 dated January 15, 1973 -

Dear 16. Case:

The above referenced letter outlined a three step program to reduce setpoint drift in 2arton differential pressure switches used at Dresden Station.

This letter is to infom the co=:.ission of the progress of the procram.

Step #1: Analysis of pressure switches by Barten representative to detemine an;r application problemc on Fachmical defects.

Switch application evaluation was perfomed by Fr. Roger Smallwood of Stallings & Co. The following =isapplications were identified.

Switch No. Function Problem 261-34 AECD Jet Pump High Oscillation Riser DP High Range DP 302-52 Drive Water High Oscillation

, Filter DP t

DP 261-35 Recire Pu=p DP High Range

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1751'A & L Offgas Pressure High Range 1464 A & B Core Spray 111Ch Range High Flow 2352, 53 HPCI Steam Line Low Range High Flow 2ero Center es: ,s' - nn b4d 6 O dh[ /Y 12G87

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ber 11, 1974 ya . E. D. Ccas ,

Step #2: Factory representative to conduct a maintenance training seminar to assure no proble=s are caused by improper maintenance.

Barton factory representative I'.r. Peter Elderton conducted a one week Maintenance Seminar begining September 1, 1974. All Barton differential pressure switches were inspected during September and October of 1974 using a checklist @ich was developed during the training seminar.

Step #3: Replacement or repair of all pressure switches when deemed necessary by the manufacturer.

Modifications have been initiated for the switches identified in Step #1.

However, the original co=pletion date of January 1,1975 will not be met.

The estimated completion date for Step #3 is June of 1975.

Respectfully, -

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NOV f) 1973 H. D. Thornburg, Chief Field Support & Enforcement Branch, RO BARTON 288 PRESSURE SWITQI Attached are two abnormal occurrence reports concerning setpoint drift on the same basic instrument (Barton 288). The letter from Dresden states that the locking device they installed in February did not work. The letter from Browns Ferry says they are going to get and install a locking device, that, if the Dresden experience is correct, will not do them a bit of good. Since these come from dif ferent Regions, I suggest you might alert Region II to this possible waste of effort. /

2. Abam R. A. Hartfield i Office of Operations 0E valuation

Attachment:

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. , ng One First fut.onal P:na. Chican, Illinois S V '?7 Address Peo v to. Post Ottce Box 767 / '

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l WPU Ltr.0797-73 Dresden Nucicar Power Station R. R. #1 Horris, Illinois 60450 "gi m,f October 24, 1973 b l'

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• Hr. A. Giambusso l 2-3 Gg 0 Deputy Director for Reactor Projects 4 [ 4 29)*3 e

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Directorate of Licensing 69 U. S. Atomic Energy Conraission Unshington, D. C. 20545 l --- '

SUBJECT:

_L_ICENSE DPR-25, DRESDEN NUCL'AR PO'a*ER STATION, UNIT #3, SECTION 6.6. C.1 C ? ~~.*~ TEC":ICAL SPECITICATIC"S.

i HPCI STEAM LINZ HICH FLC'1 S'.JITCH OUT OF CALIBRATION.

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References:

1) Dwgs: P&ID H-51. S&L 12E2527

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Dear Mr. Giambusso:

Thic 1ceter is to report c condition relating to the operation of the unit at about 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br /> on September 25, 1973. At this ti=e high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) flow switch DPIS 3-2353 was found to have a trip cetpoint of 152.0" H 0. This setpoint is contrary to Tabic 2

3.2.1 of the Technical Specifications which require a setpoint of ,y 150" MgO.

PROBLEM ,

At the ti=e of the occurrence, Unit 3 was operating in a steady state condition with a thermal load of 2295 MWe, Routine surveillance was being performed by the Instru=ent Department when HPCX flow switch DPIS3-2353 was found to have a setpoint of 152" H 20. The switch was ic: mediately reset.to 148" H 2 0.. The function of DPIS-3-2353 is to isolate the HPCI ,

steat:rsupply 'line 'in the event of a brdak 'in the st' am c ' piping.

• INVESTIC,\ TION The subject flow switch is a Barten model 288 differential pressure ,

sensor. This switch has had a tendency to drift in both the EcTEasirifahd' l decreasing direction. A locking device was installed on the switch in February of 1973 fn an attemot to eliminate the~ dHf t tendencyuAt. thT~

_present time, the data from previous curveillances reveals that the_ locking  ;

_ device has not solved the drift problem. The overall probicm of instrument i setpoint drift is presently under investigatien. The problem has plagued  ;

the station since its beginning, and no adequate corrective action has been determined at this time. '

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Octcbar 24, 1973 The most recent approach to the problem has been to solicit aid from the manufacturera of the various drif ting sensors. In the case of the Barton model 288, the factory representative has recommended that a field service engineer visit the station and analyse Barton switches with regard to application, factory adjusteents, and calibration technique. The Barton representative has visited the Station and we are now awaiting his recommenda-tions. i I

CORRECTIVE ACTION The immediate ccrrective action was to change the setpoint of DPIS-3-2353 to bring it within-the Technical Specifications. The calibra-tion frequency for this switch will be increased to once per month until such time as this switch has dc=onstrated its reliability. Additional corrective action will be based on reco=mendations made by the Barton field service engineer.

EVALUATION

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Flow switch DPIS-3-2353 is one of two flow switches that isolate the HPCI steem line in the event of a break in the steam piping. The second switch is DPIS-3-2352, and its setpoint at the time of the occurrence was 146" H2 0. Therefore, it is concluded that in the event of a break in the HPCI steam line piping, isolation would have occurred well within the Technical Specifications, and thus the safety of the station personnel and the general public was in no way conpremised. The continued operation of the unit was considered safe.

o Sincerely,

. hb W. P. Worden Superintendent  ;

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,! I. 0073 u. c:m01973>. ng y( i,s Office of Regulation ()A N x.4 gn,j,yg,p If l U.S. Atomic Energy Cc=nission N,:) f, Washington, DC 20545 '

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Dear Mr. O'Imary:

! TEICISSSEE VAll2,Y AUTECRI'IT - BRC'. INS FER3Y I;L'CIIAR PLAIC U LIT 1 -

DoCKsT ::0 50-259 - FACILI'lY OPERATI::G LICE:iSE DPR AB30FMAL l OCCURRE! ICE REPO?Tf BFAO-732TJ The purpose of this report is to provide details concerning t,he l malfunction of recirculation jet punp riser d/p switch PdIS-68-24 in unit 1 at Browns Ferry Iiuclear Plant on October 16, 1973 This occurrence was reported by telegram on Cetober 17 to the Region II Directorate of Regulatcry Operations, Atlanta, Georgia.

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D2scription of the Incident -

l During routine sttrveillance testing on October 16, recirculation jet pump riser d/p sditch PdIS-68-24 was found to operate outside the

• technical specification setpoint of greater than 0 5 but less than 1 5 psid as specified in table 3 2.B. The as-found setpoint was 1.8 psid.

l g Investigation and Corrective Action i '

Each of the four differential pressure switches operate relays whose contacts are arranged in a one out of two taken tvice logic in the RER injection circuit. The minimum number of channels recuired for each

, trip system is two. The other tuo channels were tested, found to

[ operate satisfactorily, and, if recuired, would have perfonned their l

intended function. The reactor was in the hot standby condition. .

.These switches are Barton model 288 differential _ pressure svitches. h l !

' l The switch nochanisms vere inspected for binding misalign: cat of other

, irregularities. Iione was found. The critches were recall' crated and j then functionally tested several times to ensure repeatability. A l l functional testing frequency of once every 2 vechs has been initiated l l 1 geSq ).

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o-I Mr. John F. O' Leary -

,. October 26, 1973 TEICTESSEE V. LLEY AUTEORITY - ERO'.!:S FERRY !!UCLEAR Fill.f UUlT 1 -

DOCKET IIO. 50-259 - F.".CILITY OPEETII!G LICENSE DPR ABUOMAL OCCURRE:;CE h7Ao-732TJ

'for all four switches and vill be continued until three consecutive tests prove satisfactory performance. At that tiac, the original test schedule of once a month will be recumed. We intend to install,_as j soon as possible upon receipt, nev locking; cuitchp g asser.blics /

recently made available_,gthe_ vendor,grevent_ setpoint drift.___

Very truly yours, * "" T '

TEmiESSES VALLTl NJTEORITY -

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& E. F. Tho=as i

8 Director of Pcyer Production ,

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CC: Mr. Hornan C. !!oscley, Director Region II Regulatory Cperations Cffice, USAEC -

230 Peachtree Street, IT4 j Atlanta, Georgia 30303 i.

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