ML17263A812

LER 94-011-00:on 940917,indicating Lamp on B Train Safeguards Initiation Cabinet Failed.Caused by Loss of 125 Vdc Control Power.Burned Out Indicating Lamp & Blown Fuse replaced.W/941017 Ltr

ML17263A812
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	10/17/1994
From:	Mecredy R, St Martin J ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	Andrea Johnson NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LER-94-011, LER-94-11, NUDOCS 9410270370
Download: ML17263A812 (13)

Text

j.Mj.~kc.j.I'Y<Accr LERATr D RIDs proc!'.sslic REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9410270370 DOC.DATE: 94/10/17 NOTARIZED:

NO FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION ST MARTIN,J.T.

Rochester Gas&Electric Corp.MECREDY,R.C.

Rochester Gas&Electric Corp.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET 05000244 P

SUBJECT:

LER 94-011-00:on 940917,indicating lamp on"B" train safeguards initiation cabinet failed.Caused by loss of 125 VDC control power.Burned out indicating lamp&blown fuse replaced.W/941017 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED: LTR I ENCL i SIZE: l TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).

R 05000244 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD1-3 PD INTERNA EOD/~OA'B/D FILE CMTER 02 E EMEB NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DSSA/SPLB NRR/PMAS/IRCB-E RGN1 FILE 01 EXTERNAL EG&G BRYCE I J~H NOAC MURPHY,G.A NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME JOHNSON,A AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/EELB NRR/DORS/OEAB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRSS/PRPB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RES/DSIR/EIB L ST LOBBY WARD NOAC POORE,W.NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 D~ff z-o745/2~~U YOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO RFDUCE iVASTE!CONTACT'I'I IE DOCl'iIEiT CONTROL DESk.ROOXI Pl-37 (EXT.504-20S3)TO FLIXIliATE O'OI:R XAXILZ FROiI DISTRIBUTION LIS'I'S I'OR l)OCl iIEi'I'S 5'OL')Oi"IL'I'.II)!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 26 ENCL 26

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~89-EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER N.Y.14649.0001 ROBERTC MECRfOY Vice President Cinna Nuclear Producrion TELEPHONE AREA CODE 716 546 2700 October 17, 1994 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Attn: Allen R.Johnson PWR Project Directorate I-3 Washington, D.C.20555

Subject:

LER 94-011, Short Circuit in Indicating Lamp Causes Blown Fuse, Resulting in Disabling of Automatic Actuation of Engineered Safety Features Actuation System for"B" Safeguards Logic Train Components R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No.50-244 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(i)(B), which requires a report of,"any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications", the attached Licensee Event Report LER 94-011 is hereby submitted.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.Very truly yours, Robert C.Me edy xc: U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Ginna USNRC Senior Resident Inspector svrQ L)~~gir7~Z O~p>r>4@~9410270370 941017 PDR ADDCK 05000244 S PDR NRC FORH 366 (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 BR'ORWARD COMHENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORHATIOH AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150.0104), OFFICE OF HANAGEHENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (1)R.E~Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUMBER (2)05000244 PAGE (3)1 OF 9 TITLE (4)Short Circuit in Indicating Lamp Causes Blown Fuse, Resulting in Disabling of Automatic Actuation of Engineered Safety Features Actuation System for"B" Safeguards Logic Train Components MONTH DAY YEAR EVENT DATE (5)YEAR LER NUHBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUHBER REVISION NUHBER MONTH DAY YEAR REPORT DATE (7)OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)DOCKET HUHBER FACILITY NAHE 09 17 94 94--011--00 10 17 94 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUHBER OPERATING HODE (9)POMER LEVEL (10)N 098 THIS REPORT IS SUBMIlTED PURSUANT 20.402(b)20.405(a)(l)(i)20.405(a)(1)(ii) 20.405(a)(l)(iii) 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 20.405(c)50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(b)73.71(c)50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(I) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(x)

OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)TO THE RE UIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more)(11)LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)~NAHE John T.St.Hartin-Director, Operating Experience TELEPHONE NUHBER (Include Area Code)(315)524-4446 COHPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COHPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)CAUSE SYSTEH COMPONENT HANUFACTURER XOOO REPORTABLE TO NPRDS CAUSE SYSTEM COHPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBHISSION DATE).X NO EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)MONTH DAY YEAR ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)(16)On September 17, 1994, at approximately 1224 EDST, with the reactor at approximately 98%steady state power, an indicating lamp on the"B" train safeguards initiation cabinet failed in a manner that caused a short circuit that blew a 10 ampere fuse in the 125 VDC control power circuit.This disabled the automatic actuation of"B" train safeguards components.

Immediate corrective action was to replace the burned out indicating lamp and blown fuse.The underlying cause of the event was determined to be a shorting out of the low resistance leads that connect the indicating lamp base to the lamp filaments.

This event is NUREG-1022 Cause Code"B".Corrective action to preclude repetition is outlined in Section V.B.NRC FORM 366 (5-92)

NRC FORH 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OHB NO.3150-0104 EXP I RES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 NRS.FORWARD COHMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE INFORHATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.ST NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3110-0104), OFFICE OF HANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAHE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant'OCKET NUHBER (2)05000244 LER NUHBER (6)YEAR E 94--011--REVISION 00 PAGE (3)2 OF 9 TEXT (tf more space is required, use additionat copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS The plant was at approximately 98~steady state reactor power with no major operational activities in progress.While making a routine tour of the Relay Room, a licensed reactor operator observed that a normally lit indicating lamp for"Safeguard DC Failure", on the"Safeguards Initiation SI-B2" cabinet, was extinguished.

He noted that another normally lit indicating lamp on this cabinet was illuminated, and concluded that power was still available to this cabinet.Since replacement of burned out light bulbs for these indicating lamps is a normal responsibility of the licensed operators, he made preparations to replace the lamp.II.DESCRIPTION OF EVENT A.DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES OF MAJOR OCCURRENCES:

o September 17, 1994, 1224 EDST: Event date and time.0 September 17, 1994, 1224 EDST: Discovery date and time.li September 17, 1994, 1346 EDST: Indicating lamp and fuses replaced and"B" train of Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)components restored to operable status.B.EVENT: On September 17, 1994, at approximately 1224 EDST, with the reactor at approximately 98%steady state reactor power, the licensed reactor operator had returned to the Relay Room with a new indicating lamp for replacement of the burned out lamp.As he unscrewed the burned out lamp from the'socket, he observed a flash.He also saw that the other indicating lamp (that had been illuminated) was now extinguished.

He immediately proceeded to the Control Room.NRC FORH 366A (5-92)

NRC FORM 366A (5.92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OHB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS IHFORHATIOH COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COHHEHTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE INFORHATIOH AHD RECORDS HAHAGEHEHT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTIOH PROJECT (3140-0104), OFFICE OF HANAGEHENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAHE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUHBER (2)YEAR 05000244 94 LER NUHBER (6)SEQUENTIAL 011 REVISION 00 PAGE (3)3 OF 9 TEXT (tf more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)The Control Room operators were immediately made aware of the problem when Main Control Board (MCB)Annunciator L-31,"Safeguard DC Failure", alarmed.The Control Room operators immediately performed the appropriate actions of Alarm Response procedure AR-L-31, and also reviewed appropriate electrical drawings to determine the effect on the plant.They concluded that 125 VDC control power had been lost to a part of the"Safeguards Initiation SI-B2" cabinet.Loss of this DC control power resulted in the disabling of the"B" safeguards logic train, which would prevent the automatic actuation of engineered safety features (ESF)components for the"B" safeguards logic train.However, the components remained capable of being manually operated by operator action at the Main Control Board or by local operator action in the field.The plant's Technical Specifications (TS)were reviewed, and the Control Room operators did not locate an applicable specification or Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)that had been exceeded.However, the Control Room operators recognized that LCOs existed for components which are actuated by ESFAS signals.The Shift Supervisor then made a conservative decision to enter TS 3.0', and directed that actions be initiated to place the plant in hot shutdown.An Instrument and Control (IIC)technician responded to the announcement of the event.The ISC technician and Shift Technical Advisor assisted the Control Room operators in troubleshooting the event.Operations procedure P-ll,"Electrical Distribution Panel Reference Manual", was consulted, and the Control Room operators also referred to Equipment Restoration procedure ER-ELEC.2,"Recovery From Loss of A or B DC Bus", for guidance.It was determined'hat a 125 VDC 10 ampere fuse (FUSIB1/SIBF1-P on the positive leg of the DC circuit)had blown.This fuse caused the disabling of 125 VDC control power to the"B" safeguards logic train.The burned out lamp was replaced, and the blown fuse (and the other 10 ampere fuse FUSIB1/SIBF2-N on the negative leg of the DC circuit)was replaced.When the fuses were replaced, Annunciator L-31 cleared.The"B" train of ESFAS components was restored to operable status at approximately 1346 EDST.NRC FORH 366A (5-92)

NRC FORH 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OHB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COHMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE IHFORHATION AHD RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (HHBB 7l'14), U-S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSIOH, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AHD TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3140-0104), OFFICE OF HANAGEHENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAHE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUHBER (2)05000244 YEAR 94 011 00 LER NUMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL REVISION PAGE (3)4 OF 9 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A)(17)C INOPERABLE STRUCTURES I COMPONENTS I OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT: None D.OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED: Train"B" ESFAS components would not actuation signals from approximately September 17, 1994.However, manual components by Control Room operators and local operation of components in have actuated from ESF 1224 EDST to 1346 EDST on" operation of individual at the Main Control Board the field was not affected.E.METHOD OF DISCOVERY:

This event was immediately apparent to the Control Room operators due to receipt of Annunciator L-31,"Safeguard DC Failure".F.OPERATOR ACTION: The Control Room operators responded to Annunciator L-31 and performed the actions of Alarm Response procedure AR-L-31.The Control Room operators reviewed'he TS and did not locate an applicable specification or LCO that had been exceeded.However, the Control Room operators recognized that LCOs existed for components which are actuated by ESFAS signals.The Shift Supervisor made a conservative decision to enter TS 3.0.1, and directed that actions be initiated to place the plant in hot shutdown prior to 1924 EDST on September 17, 1994, as required by TS 3.0.1.The Control Room operators consulted Operations procedure P-11 for the effect of the blown fuse on the plant.Equipment Restoration procedure ER-ELEC.2 was referred to for additional guidance.HRC FORH 366A (5-92)

NRC FORM 366A (5.92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY CONIISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150~0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORHARD COMMENTS REGARDIHG BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRAHCH (MHBB 7714), UPS.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, llASHIHGTON, DC 20555-0001 AHD TO THE PAPERHORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3140 0104), OFFICE OF MAHAGEHEHT AND BUDGET llASHIHGTOH DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUMBER (2)05000244 YEAR 94 LER NUMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL

--011--REVISION 00 PAGE (3)5 OF 9 TEXT (If more space is required, use additionaL copies of HRC Form 366A)(17)When the cause of Annunciator L-31 was determined and corrective actions to replace the fuse were in progress, the Shift Supervisor discussed the situation with plant management.

A decision was made to continue to take appropriate actions to place the plant in hot shutdown by 1924 EDST, but actual reduction of reactor power was deferred, pending the imminent replacement of the fuses.At approximately 1545 EDST on September 16, 1994, the Shift Supervisor notified the NRC per 10CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iii)(D).G.SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES:

None III.CAUSE OF EVENT A.IMMEDIATE CAUSE: The immediate cause of the disabling of the"B" safeguards logic train from any ESF actuation signal was loss of 125 VDC control power due to a blown fuse in the 125 VDC control power circuit.B.INTERMEDIATE CAUSE: The intermediate cause of the blown fuse was a short circuit in the burned out indicating lamp.HRC FORM 366A (5-92) ll NRC FORH 366A (5.92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OHB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEH PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATIOH COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS~FORWARD COMHENTS REGARDIHG BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE INFORHATIOH AND RECORDS HAHAGEMENT BRANCH (MHBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHMISSION, WASNIHGTOH, DC 20555-0001 AHD TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3140-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHIHGTOH DC 20503.FACILITY NAHE (1)DOCKET NUHBER (2)LER NUHBER (6)YEAR SEQUEHTIAL REVISION PAGE (3)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 94 011--00 6 OF 9 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A)(17)C.ROOT CAUSE: The underlying cause of the short circuit in the burned out indicating lamp was the internal shorting out of the low resistance leads that connect the lamp base to the lamp filament.This occurred when the licensed operator was removing the burned out lamp from the socket.The low resistance caused increased current in the lamp, which resulted in sufficient current to blow the 10 ampere fuse.This event is NUREG-1022 Cause Code"B", Design, Manufacturing, Construction

/Installation.

This loss of power does not meet the NUMARC 93-01,"Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants", definition of a"Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure".IV.ANALYSIS OF EVENT: This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(i)(B), in'that the disabling of the automatic actuation of ESF components for the"B" safeguards logic train resulted in two HEPA filter units and associated recirculation fan coolers being inoperable, which is more than allowed by the LCO for TS 3'.2.2.a.This is a condition prohibited by TS 3.3.2.2.An assessment was performed considering both the safety consequences and-implications of this event with the following results and conclusions:

o During this event, automatic actuation of ESF components for the"B" safeguards logic train was disabled.However, the components were still capable of being manually operated by operator action at the Main Control Board and also locally in the field at the appropriate Motor Control Center and/or 480 Volt bus.HRC FORM 366A (5-92)

NRC FORH 366A (5-92).S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSIOH PROVED BY OHB NO.3150~0104 EXPIRES 5/3'I/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS IHFORHATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 NRS.FORWARD COHHEHTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE INFORHATION AHD RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.ST NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3140-0104), OFFICE OF HANAGEHENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION PAGE (3)DOCKET NUHBER (2)LER NUHBER (6)REVISION SEQUENTIAL YEAR pp 7 OF 9 05000244 94--011--FACILITY NAHE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A)(17)0 The ESFAS is intended to provide protection against the release of radioactive materials in the event of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA)or secondary line break.The ESFAS provides actuation of the following functions (or components):

safety injection (SI), containment (CNMT)isolation, CNMT spray, auxiliary feedwater (AFW), diesel generators, and main steam and main feedwater isolation.

The loss of'fuse FUSIBl/SIBF1-P caused the loss of automatic actuation of the following items: o SI train"B" o CNMT spray train"B" o CNMT isolation train"B" 0 0 o Main steam and main feedwater isolation (one of two channels for each isolation and/or bypass valve)The"B" Emergency diesel generator (D/G)and"B" motor-driven AFW pump train would still actuate from signals such as undervoltage or low steam generator level.However, the loss of automatic actuation of SI train"B" prevented the"B" Emergency D/G and"B" motor-driven AFW pump train from starting due to an SI signal.As shown above, the loss of fuse FUSIB1/SIBF1-P resulted in the loss of one multi-function train;however, the redundant train was available if an accident were to occur during the approximately one and one half hours that the single train'was inoperable.

The loss of a single train is considered in the design of the ESFAS, which utilizes independent trains and channels for each function.This independence is maintained from the process sensors to the signal output relays and includes the channel power supplies.Thus, no single failure can cause the loss of function.0 The Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse reactors (NUREG-1431) allows six hours to restore an inoperable channel to operable status before requiring a plant shutdown.Entering TS 3.0~1 is more conservative than following the requirements of NUREG-1431, since the redundant trains were available to perform their intended function.Based on the above, it can be concluded that the public's health and safety was assured at all times.NRC FORH 366A (5 92)

NRC FORM 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150.0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPOHSE TO COMPLY IIITN THIS INFORHATIOH COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0 MRS'ORHARD COHHEHTS REGARDIHG BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHEHT BRANCH (HHBB 7714), U.ST NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, IIASHINGTOH, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3140-0104), OFFICE OF HAHAGEHEHT AND BUDGET IIASHIHGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAHE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUHBER (2)05000244 YEAR 94--011--00 LER NUHBER (6)SEQUENTIAL REVISION PAGE (3)8 OF 9 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A)(17)V.CORRECTIVE ACTION A.ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS: o The burned out indicating lamp was replaced.o The blown fuse (and associated negative fuse)were replaced.B.ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

o Operations supervision notified all operations personnel not to change any indicating lamps on the cabinets in the Relay Room.Operators are to submit a trouble report for IEC to change the lamps.o All 120 Volt indicating lamps on site are being replaced with 155 Volt lamps.When a 120 Volt lamp requires replacement, it will be replaced with a 155 Volt lamp.This is intended to increase the life of these lamps, and decrease the frequency of replacement.

o NRC Information Notice 94-68,"Safety-Related Equipment Failures Caused by Faulted Indicating Lamps", will be assessed as part of the Operational Assessment program.VI.ADDITIONAL INFORMATION A.FAILED COMPONENTS:

The burned out indicating lamp was a Sylvania incandescent lamp, Model 6S6 120V, with a design rating of 6 watts.HRC FORM 366A (5-92)

NRC FORH 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OHB NO.3150.0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORHATIOH COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COHHENTS REGARDIHG BURDEH ESTIHATE TO THE INFORHATIOH AHD RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (MHBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHIHGTON, DC 20555-0001 AHD TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31/0-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET'WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (I)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUMBER (2)05000244 94 011 00 LER NUHBER (6 YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION PAGE (3)9 OF 9 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A)(17)B.PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS: A similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results: No documentation of similar LER events with the same root cause at Ginna Nuclear Power Plant could be iden-tified.C.SPECIAL COMMENTS: This event of September 17, 1994 is similar to events described in NRC Information Notice 94-68, which is dated September 27, 1994, and was received by Rochester Gas 6 Electric on October 4, 1994.HRC FORM 366A (5-92)