IR 05000272/2018007

Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 05000272/2018007 and 05000311/2018007

ML18099A086
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	04/09/2018
From:	Dentel G T Engineering Region 1 Branch 2
To:	Sena P P Public Service Enterprise Group
References
IR 2018007
Download: ML18099A086 (19)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 2100 RENAISSANCE BOULEVARD, SUITE 100 KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406

-2713 April 9, 2018 Mr. Peter P. Sena, III President and Chief Nuclear Officer PSEG Nuclear LLC

- N09 P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038

SUBJECT: SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2

- TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000 272/20 18007 AND 05000311/20 18007

Dear Mr. Sena:

On March 2, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Salem Nuclear Generating Stations (Salem), Units 1 and 2

. The NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Paul Davison, Vice President of Nuclear Engineering, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report. NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. Additionally, NRC inspectors documented a licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance in this report.

The NRC is treating these violation s as non-cited violations (NCV s) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violations or significance of these NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555

-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Salem. In addition, if you disagree with th e cross-cutting aspect assignment of the finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control De sk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Resident Inspector at Salem. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading

-rm/adams.html and the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR ), Part 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,/RA/ Glenn T. Dentel, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos.

50-272 and 50

-311 License Nos.

DPR-70 and DPR

-75

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000272/2018007 and 05000311/2018007 cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ

ML18099A086 SUNSI Review Non-Sensitive Sensitive Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available OFFICE RI/DRS RI/DRP RI/DRS RI/DRDS NAME EDiPaolo FBower w/comments CCahill FArner GDentel DATE 3/16/18 3/24/18 3/27/18 4/9/18 1 Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Inspection Report Docket Number s: 50-272 and 50

-311 License Number s: DPR-70 and DPR

-75 Report Number s: 05000272/2018007 and 05000311/201 8007 Enterprise Identifier:

I-20 18-00 7-0005 Licensee: PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG)

Facility: Salem Nuclear Generating Station (Salem), Units 1 and 2 Location: Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 Inspection Dates: February 12, 2018 to March 2, 2018 Inspectors:

E. DiPaolo, Senior Reactor Inspector (Team Leader) A. Patel, Senior Resident Inspector L. Dumont, Reactor Inspector C. Hobbs, Reactor Inspector Observer: E. Rosenfeld, Nuclear Engineer, New Jersey, Department of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Nuclear Engineering Approved By:

Glenn T. Dentel

, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety 2

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring

PSEG's performance at Salem Units 1 and 2 by conducting the triennial fire protection team inspection in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC and self-revealed findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below. Licensee-identified non-cited violations (NCVs) are documented in report Section 71111.05T.

List of Findings and Violations Failure to Perform Testing of Emergency Diesel Generator Bypass Switches Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000272, 05000311/2018007

-01 Closed P.2 - Problem Identification and Resolution, Evaluation 71111.05T The team identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) involving an NCV of Salem Unit 1 License Condition 2.C.(5) and Salem Unit 2 License Condition 2.C.(10) of the respective facility operating licenses for failure to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved Fire Protection Program.

Specifically, PSEG did not periodically test or check the EDG bypass switches to verify that they were capable of performing their intended design functions during safe shutdown operation in the event of a significant fire.

INSPECTION SCOPE

S This inspection was conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedure (IP) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading

-rm/doc-collections/insp

-manual/inspection

-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter 2515, "Light

-Water Reactor Inspection Program

- Operations Phase."

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards."

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.05T

- Fire Protection (Triennial)

The inspectors evaluated the following from February 12, 2018 to March 2, 2018

Fire Protection Inspection Requirements (4 Samples) The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected fire areas:

(1) 1FA-AB-100A, Unit 1 Relay Room, Elevation 100'

(2) 1FA-AB-64B, Unit 1 Reactor Plant Auxiliary Equipment Area, Elevation 64'

(3) 2FA-EP-78C, Unit 2 Lower Electrical Penetration Area, Elevation 78'

(4) 2FA-AB-84A, Unit 2 460 Volt Switchgear Room, Elevation 84' In performing this review, the inspectors performed an analysis of the following electrical circuits:

(1) 2CV175, Unit 2 Borate Line Isolation Valve

(2) 1RH1, Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal (RHR)/Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Inside Isolation Valve

(3) 1RH2, Unit 1 RHR/RCS Outside Isolation Valve

(4) 1AFE6, Unit 1 Steam Driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pump 13

(5) 2PR6, Unit 2 Pressurizer Power

-Operated Relief Valve Isolation Valve

(6) 1PT534, Unit 1 Steam Generator 13 Pressure Instrument B.5.b Inspection Activities (3 Samples) The inspectors evaluated feasibility of the following B.5.b Mitigating Strategies:

(1) SC.OP-AM.TSC-0003, Alternate Power Supply to Battery Chargers

(2) SC.OP-AM.TSC-0008, Emergency Fill to Spent Fuel Pool

(3) SC.OP-AM.TSC-0009, Flooding Containment Utilizing Portable Diesel Driven Pump

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Perform Testing of Emergency Diesel Generator Bypass Switches Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000272,05000311/2018007

-01 Closed P.2 - Problem Identification and Resolution, Evaluation 71111.05T The team identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) involving an NCV of Salem Unit 1 License Condition 2.C.(5) and Salem Unit 2 License Condition 2.C.(10) of the respective facility operating licenses for failure to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved Fire Protection Program.

Specifically, PSEG did not periodically test or check the EDG bypass switches to verify that they were capable of performing their intended design functions during safe shutdown operation in the event of a significant fire.

Description

On January 12, 2018, PSEG completed a focused self

-assessment of the Salem's fire protection program. During the self

-assessment, an extent

-of-condition review was performed on an NRC-identified NCV identified during the 2016 Hope Creek triennial fire protection inspection documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000354/2016007 (ML16116A301). The NCV was associated with the failure to establish and perform periodic testing to verify the transfer or isolation functions of the EDG normal

-emergency takeover switches. On January, 31, 2018, PSEG staff generated Notification (NOTF) 20785891, because no periodic testing was performed on the equivalent EDG bypass switches at Salem. The function of the EDG bypass switches are to isolate the EDGs from Control Room and Relay Room circuitry in the event of a fire in these areas. PSEG concluded that there were no existing requirements to test the switches based on a review of the safe shutdown analysis, the Technical Specifications, and the Updated Final Safety Analysis (UFSAR). However, because the switches were not tested since they were installed in 1984, the NOTF recommended an enhancement to periodically test the switches. The NOTF was given a "routine" priority (>20 weeks) to implement routine testing of the switches.

On February 12, 201 8, the team reviewed NOTF 20785891 and the Salem licensing basis and determined that the EDG bypass switches were required to be periodically tested in accordance with the Facility Operating License condition to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the UFSAR. Therefore, NOTF 20785891 should have received a higher priority for resolution in the corrective action program. In addition, the team determined that a functionality assessment was warranted because the EDG bypass switches had not been tested since they were installed in 1984 and could have degraded over time.

Based on the inspectors

' value added, this issue was determined to be NRC identified.

Corrective Action(s): On February 28, 2018, PSEG staff completed a functionality evaluation for the EDG bypass switches and concluded that the EDG bypass switches were considered functional and capable of performing their post fire safe shutdown functions.

Furthermore, two recommended actions were added to NOTF 20785891: 1) to complete an extent of condition review to determine whether any similar switches associated with fire safe shutdown from outside the control room have testing inadequacies; and 2) implement routine testing of the EDG bypass switches.

Corrective Action Reference(s): NOTF 20785891 Performance Assessment

Performance Deficiency: The team determined that PSEG's failure to establish periodic testing of the EDG safe shutdown bypass switches, as required by the Salem fire protection program, was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within PSEG's ability to foresee and prevent, and should have been corrected. Specifically, PSEG failed to periodically verify or demonstrate that EDG bypass switches would perform their intended safe shutdown functions in the event of a significant fire.

Screening:

This performance deficiency is more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external factors (fire) attribute of the Mitigating System cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of the EDG during a post fire safe shutdown event. Specifically, failure to periodically test the EDG bypass switches to demonstrate that the y will perform satisfactory in service could affect their availability, reliability, and capability due to degradation over time

.

Significance: The team assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, "Fire Protection SDP." This issue screened to very low safety significance (Green) in Phase 1, Task 1.4.5, Post-fire Safe-shutdown , because it did not affect the ability to reach and maintain a stable plant condition within the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of a fire event. This was based on a functionality evaluation performed by PSEG for the EDG bypass switches that concluded that the switches were considered functional and capable of performing their post fire safe shutdown function. The conclusion was based on the construction of the switch, the capability to monitor certain failures during normal plant operations, and the mild environment where they are installed.

Cross-cutting Aspect: The team determined that this finding had a cross

-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Evaluation, because PSEG did not thoroughly evaluate the issue of not periodically testing the EDG bypass switches, which are required to operate during post fire safe shutdown operation, to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance. [P.2]

Enforcement

Violation:

Salem Unit 1 License Condition 2.C.(5) and Salem Unit 2 License Condition 2.C.(10), in part, require PSEG to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the UFSAR. UFSAR Section 9.5.1.1.5, Quality Assurance Program for Fire Protection, states that the Quality Assurance Program at Salem assures that the requirements for design, procurement, installation, testing, and administrative controls for the fire protection program for safety related areas are satisfied. UFSAR Section 17.2 states that the Quality Assurance Topical Report (QATR) describes how the Quality Assurance Program is to be functionally implemented at Salem.

The QATR is the highest tiered document that assigns major quality assurance functional responsibilities for Salem Unit 1 and Unit 2. QATR Chapter 11, Test Control, Section 2.1.1 states that a documented test program shall be established to assure that all testing required demonstrating that the structures, systems, and components within the scope of this Quality Assurance Program will perform satisfactory in service. In addition, the test program includes, as appropriate, procedures to ensure those structures, systems, and components will perform in service at the Salem Generating Station. CC

-AA-211, Fire Protection Program, Revision 5, describes the provisions for post fire safe shutdown. CC

-AA-211 , Step 4.1.3.3 states that equipment and components required to perform various manual actions needed for fire safe shutdown are checked periodically to verify they are available to meet the manual action steps during fire safe shutdown operation.

Contrary to the above, since 1984, when the EDG bypass switches were installed and placed in operation, PSEG had not established or performed periodic testing, or checking on the EDG bypass switches of both units to verify that they will be available to meet manual action steps during fire safe shutdown operation.

Disposition:

This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy

.

Licensee Identified Non

-Cited Violation 71111.05T This violation of very low safety significant was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as an NCV , consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Violation:

Salem Unit 2 Facility Operating License Condition 2

.(C).(10), in part, requires PSEG to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the fire protection program as described in the UF SAR, as approved by the NRC.

SC.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3, Salem Fire Protection Report

-Safe Shutdown Analysis, Revision 0, establishes the basis for demonstrating a capability to achieve and maintain post

-fire safe shutdown as described in the UFS A R, Section 9.5.1.1, Fire Protection Program. SC.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3 states that 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R

,Section III.L describes the safe shutdown requirements when an alternate or dedicated shutdown capability is provided as required in Appendix R,Section III.G.3. Appendix R,Section III.L.3, states, in part, that alternative shutdown capability shall be independent of the specific fire area.

SC.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3 designates Fire Areas 2FA-AB-84A and 2FA

-AB-64A as alternative shutdown areas.

Contrary to the above, as of January 10, 2018, PSEG identified that the power cable that supplies power to both the Nuclear Instrumentation System Wide Range Amplifier Panel 962 and Signal Processor Panel 964 is routed through Fire Areas 2FA

-AB-84A and 2FA

-AB-64A without a required fire barrier and, therefore, was not independent of the specific fire area. A s a result, for a fire event in either of these alternative shutdown areas, the power supply to the Unit 2 Hot Shutdown Panel Source Range and Power Range monitor could be lost and result in the loss of the neutron monitoring function. PSEG promptly implemented compensatory measures for this deficiency that included establishing a fire watch for the affected area. Because this violation was of very low safety significance (Green) and was entered into PSEG's Corrective Action Program (NOTF 20785256), this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

Significance/Severity Level: The team performed a Phase 1 Significance Determination Process (SDP) screening, in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, "Fire Protection SDP," Task 1.4.5:

Post-fire Safe-shutdown. This issue screened to very low safety significance (Green) because it did not affect the ability to reach and maintain a stable plant condition within the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of a fire event. Specifically, the Hot Shutdown Panel Source Range and Power Range monitor only provide s a process monitoring function for reactivity control and safe shutdown actions would be determined using reactor coolant system chemistry sampling for boron concentration.

Corrective Action Reference

NOTF

EXIT MEETING S AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report

.

On March 2, 2018, the inspector presented the triennial fire protection team inspection results to Mr. Paul Davison, Vice President of Nuclear Engineering, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

71111.05T Fire Protection Licensing and Design Basis Documents

DE-PS.ZZ-0001(Q)-A4-SSC, Salem Fire Protection Report Safe Shutdown Cables, Revision 5

NC.DE-PS.ZZ-0001(Q), Programmatic Standard for Fire Protection, Revision 3

NC.DE-PS.ZZ-0001(Q)-A1, Salem Fire Protection Report

- Technical Standard General, Revision 2

NC.DE-PS.ZZ-0001-A6-GEN, Comparison of Salem Fire Program to BTP 9.5

-1 Appendix

A, Revision 2

NC.DE-PS.ZZ-0001-A6-GEN, Salem Fire Protection Report

-General, Revision

NRC Branch Technical Position

(BTP) APCSB 9.5

-1 and Appendix A, Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants

NRC Safety Evaluation Report, dated 1/7/04

NRC Safety Evaluation Report, dated 11/20/79

S1.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(006), Salem Fire Protection Report

- Safe Shutdown Analys is Volume 6, Reactor Plant Auxiliary Building

Elevation 64, 1FA

-AB-64B, dated 3/16/16 S1.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(045), Salem Fire Protection Report

- Safe Shutdown Analysis, Volume 45, Diesel Generator Room 1A, 1FA

-DG-100D, Diesel Generator Control Room 1A, 1FA-DG-100D1, dated 3/16/16 S1.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(047), Salem Fire Protection Report

- Safe Shutdown Analysis, Volume 47, Diesel Generator Room 1B, 1FA

-DG-100E, Diesel Generator Control Room 1B, 1FA-DG-100E1, dated 3/16/16

S1.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(049), Salem Fire Protection Report

- Safe Shutdown Analysis, Volume 49, Diesel Generator Room 1C, 1FA

-DG-100F, Diesel Generator Control Room 1C, 1FA-DG-100F1, dated 3/17/16

S1.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(053), Salem Fire Protection Report

- Safe Shutdown Analysis, Volume 53, Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Room 11, 1FA

-DG-84D, Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Room 12, FA-DG-84E, CO2 Equipment Room, 1FA

-DG-84F, Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Pump Transfer Room 11, 1FA

-DG-84G, Diesel Fuel Oil Pump Transfer Room 12, 1FA-DG-84H, dated 3/17/16

S1.ER-PS.FP-001-A3(059), Salem Fire Protection Report

- Safe Shutdown Analysis, Volume 59, Control Room Complex 12FA

-AB-122A, Unit 1 Relay Room, 1FA

-AB-100A, Unit 1 Battery Rooms, 1FA

-AB-100B-1, B-2, and B-1, dated 3/17/16

S2.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(024), Salem Fire Protection Report - Safe Shutdown Analysis, Volume 24, 460V/230V Switchgear Room Elevation 84, 2FA

-AB-84A, dated 5/8/16

S2.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(032), Salem Fire Protection Report

- Safe Shutdown Analysis, Volume 32, Lower Electrical Penetration Area Elevation 78, 2FA

-AB-78C, dated 5/8/16

Salem Unit 1 Facility Operating License

Salem Unit 1 Technical Specification

Salem Unit 2 Facility Operating License

Salem Unit 2 Technical Specification

SC.ER-PS.FP-0001-A2, Salem Fire Protection Report

- Fire Hazards Analysis, dated 12/2/11 SC.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(003), Safe Shutdown Manual Action Feasibility Assessment, Revision

SC.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(001), Salem Fire Protection Report

-Safe Shutdown Analysis Volume 1 Safe Shutdown Equipment List, dated

3/16/16 SC.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(002), Technical Standard SFPR

-SSA Safe Shutdown Fault Three, dated 3/16/16

SC.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(006), Technical Standard Salem Fire Protection Report

-Safe Shutdown Analysis, 12FA-AB-122A, 1FA-AB-100A, dated 2/5/18

SC.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(032), Technical Standard Salem Fire Protection Report

-Safe Shutdown Analysis, 2FA

-EP-78C, dated 5/8/16

SC.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3, Salem Fire Protection Report

- Safe Shutdown Analysis, dated 2/2/18

SC.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3, Salem Fire Protection Report

- Safe Shutdown Manual Action Feasibility Assessment, dated 8/17/17

SC.ER-PS.FP-0001-A4, Fire Events in Maintenance Rule (a)(4) Risk Evaluations, Revision 0

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Salem Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection, Revision

Calculations, Analysis, and Engineering Evaluations

DE-PS.ZZ-0001-A3-SSA, Salem Fire Protection Report

- Safe Shutdown Analysis, Revision 5

DE-PS.ZZ-0001-A3-SSAR(042), Safe Shutdown Analysis 12FA

-AB-100A, Revision 0

Generating Station Unit 1 and Unit 2, Revision

S1.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(006), Safe Shutdown Analysis Reactor Plant Auxiliary Building

1FA-AB-64B, Revision 0

S-1-FP-MDC-2333, Salem Unit 1 Main Power Transformers Fire Suppression System Hydraulic Calculations, Revision 0

S2.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(024), Safe Shutdown Analysis 460

Volt/230Volt Switchgear Room

2FA-AB-84A, Revision 0

S2.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(032), Safe Shutdown Analysis Lower Electrical Penetration Area, 2FA-AB-78C, Revision 0

S-2-FP-FEE-1988, Fire Suppression System Performance Capability Evaluation for

FA-EP-78C, Revision 0

S-2-FP-FEE-1989, Fire Suppression System Performance Capability Evaluation for

2FA-AB-84A, Revision 0

S-2-FP-MDC-2331, Salem Unit 2 Main Power Transformers Fire Suppression System Hydraulic Calculations, Revision 0

SC.ER-PS.FP-0001-A3(003), Safe Shutdown Manual Action Feasibility Assessment, Revision 1

S-C-ABV-MDC-1881, Salem Units 1 and 2 Auxiliary Building Ventilation

Gothic Appendix R Scenarios, Revision 1

S-C-ABV-MEE-1472, Effect of the Loss of Auxiliary Building Ventilation on Appendix R Safe Shutdown Electrical Equipment and the Heat Stress of the Capacity to Perform Manual Actions, Revision 1

S-C-CAV-MDC-1583, Salem Generating Station

- Compensatory Actions for Appendix R & IPEE Loss of Ventilation Scenarios, Revision 5

S-C-FB W-FEE-1553, Evaluation of Fire Wrap Requirements for Supports in 1(2)-78C, Revision 1 S-C-FP-FEE-1888, Relay Room Halon System Acceptance Test Review, Revision 0

S-C-ZZ-EEE-1430, Loss of Offsite Power Evaluation for a Postulated Appendix R Fire at Salem

Generating Station Units 1 & 2, Revision 2

S-C-ZZ-NDS-0387, Design Specification Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier Systems Salem Generating Station Units 1 & 2, Revision 1

S-C-ZZ-SDC-1203, Moderate Energy Pipe Break Analysis (Reconstitution) for Salem

Technical Evaluation 40198737

-0030, Functionality Evaluation for the Emergency Diesel Generator Bypass Switches, dated 2/28/18

Technical Evaluation 70061473

-0075, Evaluation of Salem Generating Station Post Fire Safe Shutdown Manual Action, dated 1/6/09

Drawings and Wiring Diagrams

153441, Drawing No. M

-03, PSE&G Salem Station Halon 1301 Cylinder Foundation and Weighing Rack Unit 1, Revision D

153442, Drawing No. M

-04, Sheet 1, PSE&G Salem Station Halon 1301 Piping Unit 1, Revision D 153442, Drawing No. M

-04, Sheet 2, PSE&G Salem Station Halon 1301 Piping Unit 1, Revision D 153443, Drawing No. M

-06, PSE&G Salem Station Halon 1301 Actuation Details Unit 1, Revision A

203767, A 1364

-17, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No. 1 Unit Fire Protection Smoke & Fire Detectors, Revision 17

205826, A 8775

-30, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No. 1 Unit Auxiliary Building

Conduits & Trays below EL 84'

-0", Revision 30

205827, A 8775

-32, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No. 1 Unit Auxiliary Building

Conduits & Trays below EL

84'-0", Revision 32

207095, A 8798

-41, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No.1 & 2 Units Auxiliary Building

Exterior and Interior Door Schedule, Revision 41

605501 A-00, Sht. 1, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No. 2 Unit

- Electrical Penetration Elevation 78' Details S2FBW

-2EP78C-07, Revision 0

605501 A-00, Sht. 2, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No. 2 Unit

- Electrical Penetration Elevation 78' Details S2FBW

-2EP78C-07, Revision 0

605508 A-00, Sht. 10, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No. 2 Unit - Electrical Penetration Elevation 78' Details S2FBW

-2EP78C-03, Revision 0

605508 A-00, Sht. 8, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No. 2 Unit

- Electrical Penetration Elevation 78' Details S2FBW

-2EP78C-03, Revision 0

605508 A-00, Sht. 9, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No. 2 Unit

- Electrical Penetration Elevation 78' Details S2FBW

-2EP78C-03, Revision 0

605811, A

-0, Salem Nuclear Generating Station Units 1 & 2 Combustible Control Zones Auxiliary Building

Elevation 64', Revision 0

605812, A-0, Salem Nuclear Generating Station Units 1 & 2 Combustible Control Zones Auxiliary Building Elevation 78', Elevation 84' & Service Water Pipe Tunnel Elevation 88'-8" Location, Revision 0

605813, A-0, Salem Nuclear Generating Station Units 1 & 2 Combustible Control Zones Auxiliary Building and Containment Elevation 100', Revision 0

605819, A-0, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No.1 & 2 Unit Auxiliary Building Boundary Locations

Floor Plan Elevation 64'-0", Revision 0

605820, A-0, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No.1 & 2 Unit Auxiliary Building

Boundary Locations Floor Plan Elevation 78'-0" & Elevation 84'-0", Revision 0

605821, A-1, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No.1 & 2 Unit Auxiliary Building

Boundary Locations Floor Plan Elevation 100'-0" & Elevation 110'-0", Revision 1

605822, A-0, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No.1 & 2 Unit Auxiliary Building

Boundary Locations Floor Plan Elevation 122'-0", Revision 0

Drawing No. FA

-01, Detection Design Layout 480V Switchgear Room Unit

No. 2 Elevation 84', Revision 0

Drawing No. FA

-01, Detection Design Layout Electrical Penetration Room Unit No. 2

Elevation 78', Revision 0

Drawing No. FP

-01, Sprinkler Design Layout 480V Switchgear Room Unit No. 2 Elevation 84', Revision 0 Drawing No. FP

-01, Sprinkler Design Layout Electrical Penetration Room Unit No. 2

Elevation 78', Revision 0 203000, No. 1 & No. 2 Units Generators & Main Transformers, One Line Control, Revision 69

203002, No. 1 Unit, 4160

Volt Vital Buses One Line, Revision 35 203007, No.1 Unit 125 Volt Direct Current

One Line, Revision 31 203061, No. 2 Unit 4160

Volt Vital Buses One Line, Revision 35 211357, Sheet 1, No.1 Unit, 28 Volt Direct Current

One Line, Revision 15 211357, Sheet 2, No.2 Unit, 28 Volt Direct Current

One Line, Revision 13 223720, No. 2 Unit, 125 Volt Direct Current

One Line, Revision 34 211364, Unit 1 Control Area No.1A 115 Volt. Vital instrument Bus, Revision 26 220105, No. 1

& 2 Units - Control Room Area, Reactor Protection Channel I Rack 5, Revision 14 203319. No. 1 Unit

- Auxiliary Feedwater System, No 13 Aux. Feed Pump & Turbine, Revision 24 203464, No. 1 Unit Reactor Containment Pressurizer & Pressurizer Relief Tank Valves and

Temperatures, Revision 39 203318, No. 1 & 2 Units

- Auxiliary Feedwater System, No. 13 & 23 Auxiliary Feed Pumps &

Turbines, Revision

203414, No. 1 & 2 Units

- Auxiliary Feedwater System No

. 11, 12,13,14, 21, 22, 23 & 24 Auxiliary Feedwater Inlet Valves, Revision 2 203377, No.1 & 2 Units

- Turbine Generator Area, Feedwater Flow &

Pressure Transmitters, Revision 21 211505, Sheet 1, No. 1 Unit

- Residual Heat Removal Sys. No. 11SJ44, 11RH4 & 1RH2, Suction Isolation Valves, Revision 31 211506, Sheet 1, No. 1 Unit

- Residual Heat Removal Sys. No. 12SJ44, 12RH4 & 1RH1, Suction Isolation Valves, Revision 11 211507, Sheet 1, No. 1 Unit

- Residual Heat Removal Sys. No. 12SJ44, 12RH4 & 1RH1, Suction Isolation Valves, Revision 35 224389, Sheet 1, No. 1 Unit

-Residual Heat Removal System, No.11SJ44, 11RH4, 1RH2, Suction Isolation Valves, Revision 9 224390, Sheet 1, No. 1 Unit

-Residual Heat Removal System, No.12SJ44, 12RH4, 1RH1 , Suction Isolation Valves, Revision 9 224321, No. 1&2 Units

- Control Room Area, Solid State Reactor Protection System Train B

Input Cabinet 35, Revision 15 224445, No. 1& 2 Unit 2 HS67 Batching System

Inlet Valves ICV175 & 2CV175 Rapid Borate

Stop Valves. Revision 4 244083, No.2 Unit Pressurizer, Pressurizer Power Relief & Stop Valves and Overpressure Protection System

Channel 1 , Revision 18 218858, No. 2 Unit

-Chemical and Volume Control System, No. ECV175 Rapid Borate Stop Valve, Revision 8

231356, No. 1 & 2 Units

- Pressurizer 1PR6 2PR6, 1PR7 Pressurizer Relief Stop Valves, Revision 5

231448, No.1 & 2 Units Auxiliary Feedwater System No. 13 & 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps, Revision 8 219456, No. 1 & 2 Units

- Auxiliary Building Elevation 84'-0", Hot Shutdown Station, Revision 0

606356A, NSR Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1AFE12, Revision 0

Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams

205222, A 8760

-61, Sheer 3, Salem Nuclear Generating

Station No. 1 & No. 2 Units Fire Protection, Revision 61

205222, A 8760

-64, Sheet 2, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No. 1 & No. 2 Units Fire Protection, Revision 64

205222, A 8760

-65, Sheet 1, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No. 1 & No. 2 Units Fire

Protection, Revision 65

205222, A 8760

-66, Salem Nuclear Generating Station, No. 1 & 2 Units Fire Protection, Revision 66

205222, A 8760

-7, Sheet 7, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No. 1 & No. 2 Units Fire Protection, Revision 7

205222, SIMP

-0, Salem Nuclear Generating Station Fire Protection, Revision 0

205232, No. 1 Unit, Residual Heat Removal Simplified Piping and Instrumentation Diagram, Revision 1

205232, Sheet 1, No. 1 Unit Residual Heat Removal, Revision 43

205232, Sheet 2, No. 1 Unit Residual Heat Removal, Revision 40

205236, No. 1 Unit, Auxiliary Feedwater System Simplified Piping and Instrumentation Diagram, Revision 1

205236, Sheet 1, No. 1 Unit Auxiliary Feedwater, Revision 62

205328, Sheet 1, No. 2 Chemical & Volume Control Operation, Revision

205328, Sheet 2, No. 2 Chemical & Volume Control Operation, Revision 70

205328, Sheet 3, No. 2 Chemical & Volume Control Operation, Revision 41

205332, No. 2 Unit, Residual Heat Removal Simplified Piping and Instrumentation Diagram, Revision 2

205332, Sheet 1, No. 2 Unit Residual Heat Removal, Revision 38

205332, Sheet 2, No. 2 Unit Residual Heat Removal, Revision 33

207574, A 8802

-36, Sheet 1, Salem Nuclear Generating Station Yard Fresh Water and Fire Protection Piping, Revision 36

218723, A 8921

-17, Sheet 2, Salem Nuclear Generating Station Yard Fresh Water and Fire Protection Piping, Revision 17

600256, A 8703

-20, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No. 2 Unit Carbon Dioxide Fire Protection System, Revision 20

600256, A 8703

-21, Salem Nuclear Generating Station No. 1 Unit Carbon Dioxide Fire Protection System, Revision 21

Revision 21

Large Fires and Explosions Mitigation Strategies Documents

HC.FP-PT.KC-0025(Z), Non

-Class 1 Fire Hose Station Hydrostatic Test performed on 7/11/2015 Long Range

Training Plan 17

-18, Revision 2

Memorandum of Understanding between PSEG, LLC and Township of Lower Alloways Creek, dated January 6, 2014

OP-SA-108-115-1001, Operability Assessment and Equipment Control Program, Revision 10

Order 30315018 , B.5.b Equipment

Inventory

Order 80096177, Operation 0030, B.5.b Scenario Calculation, Revision 3

SC.OP-AM.TSC.1001, Salem Extensive Damage Mitigating Guideline Initial Plant Assessment, Revision 0

SC.OP-AM.TSC-0001, Manually Depressurizing Steam Generators Utilizing MS10s, Revision 2

SC.OP-AM.TSC-0003, Alternate Power Supply to Battery Chargers, Revision 3

SC.OP-AM.TSC-0008, Emergency Fill to Spent Fuel Pool, Revision 11

SC.OP-AM.TSC-0009, Flooding Containment Utilizing Portable Diesel Driven Pump, Revision 2

SC.OP-AM.TSC-1000, Salem Extensive Damage Mitigating Guideline Initial Plant Response, Revision 1

SC.OP-PT.SF-0001(Q), Portable Spent Fuel Pit Pump Operability Test, Revision 12

SH.OP-AM.TSC-0002, Remote Response Center Operations, Revision 2

Fire Protection Evaluations of Modifications and Design Changes

70178658-0260, GL 86

-10 Evaluation for Converting the Automatic CO2 Fire Suppression Systems in Salem Diesel Generator Areas to Manual Operation, Completed 9/9/15

70179579-0210, Generic Letter 86

-10 Evaluation for Spurious Operation of Pressurizer Relief Valves PR1 and PR2, Completed 7/14/16

80108570, Replace Sprinkler Heads on #11 and #12 Feedwater Pumps & #1, 2, 3 SAC Deluge System, Revision 0

80108571, Replace Sprinkler Heads on #21 and 22 Feedwater Pump Deluge System, Revision 0 80109928-0744, GL 86

-10 Evaluation for Reduction of Hose Stream Allowance from 1000 GPM to 500 GPM, Completed 3/2/15

80110341-1555, Generic Letter 86

-10 Evaluation for Separation of MS

-10 Valves in the Inner and Outer Penetration Fire Areas, Completed 9/30/15

80120910, Unit 1 FP Zone 84 Thermal Detectors Design Equivalent Change, Revision 0

Quality Assurance Audits and Self Assessments

Fire Protection Audit Report, Audit NOSA

-HPC-16-07 (80117974) Hope Creek and Salem Stations, 9/6/16 to 9/23/16

Order 80121006, Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Self

-Assessment Report, Focused Area Self-Assessment, dated 1/12/18

Procedures

CC-AA-211, Fire Protection Program, Revision 5

CC-AA-211, Fire Protection Program, Revision 5

CC-AA-211-1001, Generic Letter 86010 Evaluations, Revision 1

FP-AA-002, Fire Protection Impairment Program, Revision 3

FP-AA-005, Fire Protection Surveillance and Periodic Test Program, Revision 3

FP-AA-006, Tracking Incomplete Testing of Fire Protection Equipment, Revision 1

FP-AA-008, Fire Prevention for Hot Work, Revision 9

FP-AA-011, Control of Transient Combustible Material, Revision 4

FP-AA-014, Fire Protection Training Program, Revision 4

FP-AA-015, Compensatory Measure Firewatch Program, Revision 9

FP-AA-024, Fire Drill Performance, Revision 1

FP-SA-003, Actions for Inoperable Fire Protection, Revision 5

NC.FP-ST.FS-0005(Q), Fire Engine Operability Test and Firefighting Equipment Inventory, Revision 10

OP-AA-101-111-1003, Use of Procedures, Revision

S2.FP-ST.FS-0009(Q), #2 Diesel Fire Pump Operability Test, Revision 24

S2.OP-AB.CAV-0001, Loss of Unit 2 Control Area HVAC, Revision 5

S2.OP-AB.CR-0002, Control Room Evacuation Due to Fire in the Control Room, Relay Room, 460V/230V Switchgear Room, or 4KV Switchgear Room, Revision 31

S2.OP-AB.FIRE-0001, Control Room Fire Response, Revision 11

S2.OP-AB.FIRE-0002, Fire Damage Mitigation, Revision 8

SC.DE.PS.ZZ

-0051(Q), Fuse Control Program for Salem Generating Station Unit 1, 2, &3, dated 6/3/99

SC.MD-AB.ZZ-0001, Installation of Temporary 4KV Power Cables to CCW and RHR Motors, Revision 7

Penetration Seal Documents

CALC S-1-CAN-SDC-1055, Seismic II / I Evaluation of Penetration Seals, 8/6/92

VTD 309896, Penetration Seal Detail SE

-Foam with Cable Thru

Fire and / or Pressure Barrier, 8/20/92 VTD 309914, Pen Seal Detail Pipe or Conduit Thru Fire and / or Pressure Barrier, 8/21/92

VTD 312303, SF

-60 in Spare Penetrations Thru Fire Barrier, 8/28/92

VTD 431198, Bisco Fire Test Report No. 748

-175 for SF

-60 with Pipe Thru Blockout, 2/1/85

VTD PA-400F-0140, Bisco Product Equivalency Test for SF

-20 and SE-Foam Test Report 748

-134, 10/29/85

VTD PA-400F-0229, Three Hour Fire Test of Multiple Penetration Seal Configurations, PSEG Test 89-004,89-006 (Bisco Fire Test 748-237), 4/8/10

Fire Fighting Strategies (i.e., Pre

-Fire Plans

) FP-SA-1532, U/1 Monitor Tank Area, Laundry Area El. 64, Revision 0

FP-SA-1533, U/1 Waste Hold

-up Tank Area, El. 64, Revision 0

FP-SA-1534, U/1 CVCS Hold

-up Tank Area, El. 64, Revision 0

FP-SA-1551, U/1 Relay & Battery Room Corridor, El. 100, Revision 0

FP-SA-1555, U/1 Diesel Generator Area, El. 100, Revision 0

FP-SA-1651, U/1 Service Water Intake Structure, Revision 0

FP-SA-2541, U/2 460V Switchgear Rooms & Corridors, El. 84, Revision 0

FP-SA-2546, U/2 Electrical Penetration Area, El. 78, Revision 0

FP-SA-2555, U/2 Diesel Generator Area, El. 100, Revision 0

Fire Brigade Training

PSEG Fire Department Annual Training Record, 2/14/18

PSEG Fire Department Lesson Plan, Confined Space and Rope Rescue Training, April 2017

PSEG Fire Department Lesson Plan, Hazardous Material Requalification, April 2017

PSEG Fire Department Lesson Plan, Live Fire Training, April 2017

PSEG Fire Protection Operator Training Plan, 1

st Quarter 2018

TQ-AA-170, PSEG Fire Department Qualification Guide, Fire Barrier Inspection, Revision 0

TQ-AA-170, PSEG Fire Department Qualification Guide, Fire Protection Operator

-Basic, Revision 0

TQ-AA-170, PSEG Fire Department Qualification Guide, Fire Protection Operator

-Electrical Tasks, Revision 0

TQ-AA-170, PSEG Fire Department Qualification Guide, Fire Protection Operator

-Industrial Safety Tasks, Revision 0

TQ-AA-170, PSEG Fire Department Qualification Guide, Fire Protection Operator

-Water Systems, Revision 0

TQ-AA-170, PSEG Fire

Department Qualification Guide, Fire Pump Operation and Testing, Revision 0

Fire Brigade Drills and Critiques

FP-AA-024, Fire Drill Record, Salem Service Water Bay 1 Pump Room Announced Drill, Completed 2/28/18

Transient Combustible, Hot Work, and Ignition Source Permits and Evaluations

Hot Work Authorization Log, Permit Numbers SA

18001 - SA 18006, 1/23/18

Transient Combustible Permit Log, Permit Numbers 270

- 337, 1/23/18

Completed Tests and Surveillances

NC.FP-PM.ZZ-0001(Z), Ambulance and Medical

Inventory Inspection, completed 12/15/17

NC.FP-PM.ZZ-0007(Z), Firefighting and Rescue Equipment Inventory, completed 1/10/18

NC.FP-ST.FS-0005(Q), Fire Engine Operability Test and Firefighting Equipment Inventory, completed 12/24/17

S1.FP-ST.FBR-0028(Q), Class 1 Fire Damper Operability Test, completed 10/15/15

S1.FP-ST.FBR-0028(Q), Class 1 Fire Damper Operability Test, completed 10/8/16

S1.FP-ST.FD-0029(Q), Functional Test of Class 1 Smoke and Thermal Detectors, completed 5/9/17

S1.FP-ST.FD-0029(Q), Functional Test of Class 1 Smoke and Thermal Detectors, completed 9/7/15

S1.FP-ST.FS-0009(Q), #1 Diesel Fire Pump Operability Test, completed 12/28/17

S1.FP-ST.FS-0009(Q), #1 Diesel Fire Pump Operability Test, completed 1/11/18

S1.FP-ST.FS-0024(Q), Class 1 Fire

Hose Station Flow Verification, Completed 7/22/16

S1.FP-ST.FS-0025(Q), Triennial Fire Hose Service Test, completed 12/26/14

S1.FP-SV.FBR-0005(Q), Fire Wrapped Cable, Conduit, and Cable Tray Inspection, completed 7/23/15

S1.FP-SV.FBR-0005(Q), Fire Wrapped Cable, Conduit, and Cable Tray Inspection, completed 1/4/17

S1.FP-SV.FBR-0027(Q), Class 1 Fire Door Inspection and Operability Test, completed 2/16/17

S1.FP-SV.FBR-0027(Q), Class 1 Fire Door Inspection and Operability Test, completed 8/17/17

S1.FP-SV.FBR-0031(Q), Class 1 Fire Damper Visual Inspection, completed 7/14/14

S1.FP-SV.FBR-0031(Q), Class 1 Fire Damper Visual Inspection, completed 10/13/15

S1.FP-SV.FBR-0031(Q), Class 1 Fire Damper Visual Inspection, completed 2/27/17 S1.FP-SV.FBR-0049(Q), Ventilation Duct Fire Wrap Inspection, completed 12/31/15

S1.FP-SV.FBR-0049(Q), Ventilation Duct Fire Wrap Inspection, completed 7/6/17

S1.FP-SV.FS-0023(Q), Class 1 Fire Hose Station Detailed Inspection, completed 10/28/17

S1.OP-PT.HSD-002(Q), Hot Shutdown Panel / Local Pane Functional Test, completed 7/5/16

S2.FP-PM.FS-0023(Z), Fire Hose Station Detailed Inspection, completed 12/23/17

S2.FP-ST.FBR-0028(Q), Class 1 Fire Damper Operability Test, completed 10/19/15

S2.FP-ST.FBR-0028(Q), Class 1 Fire Damper Operability Test, completed 11/13/16

S2.FP-ST.FBR-0028(Q), Class 1 Fire Damper Operability Test, completed 1/24/16

S2.FP-ST.FD-0029(Q), Functional Test of Class 1 Smoke and Thermal Detectors, completed 6/20/17

S2.FP-ST.FD-0029(Q), Functional Test of Class 1 Smoke and Thermal Detectors, completed 10/3/15

S2.FP-ST.FS-0009(Q), #2 Diesel Fire Pump Operability Test, completed 12/21/17

S2.FP-ST.FS-0009(Q), #2 Diesel Fire Pump Operability Test, completed 1/4/18

S2.FP-ST.FS-0024(Q), Class 1 Fire Hose Station Flow Verification, completed 10/18/15

S2.FP-ST.FS-0025(Q), Triennial Fire Hose Service Test, completed 1/20/18

S2.FP-SV.FBR-0005(Q), Fire Wrapped Cable, Conduit, and Cable Tray Inspection, completed 7/14/15

S2.FP-SV.FBR-0005(Q), Fire Wrapped Cable, Conduit, and Cable Tray Inspection, completed 1/18/17

S2.FP-SV.FBR-0027(Q), Class 1 Fire Door Inspection and Operability Test, completed 6/29/17

S2.FP-SV.FBR-0027(Q), Class 1 Fire Door Inspection and Operability Test, completed 1/1/18

S2.FP-SV.FBR-0031(Q), Class 1 Fire Damper Visual Inspection, completed 2/16/16

S2.FP-SV.FBR-0049(Q), Ventilation Duct Fire Wrap Inspection, completed 12/21/15

S2.FP-SV.FBR-0049(Q), Ventilation Duct Fire Wrap Inspection, completed 5/25/17

S2.FP-SV.FBR-0071(Q), Inspection of Marinite Boards, completed 3/23/15

S2.FP-SV.FBR-0071(Q), Inspection of Marinite Boards, completed 8/3/16

S2.OP-PT.HSD-0003(Q), Alternate Shutdown and appendix "R" Equipment Storage Cabinet Inventory, completed 11/20/17

S2.OP-PT.HSD-002(Q), Hot Shutdown Panel / Local Pane Functional Test, completed 4/27/17

SC.FP.SO.FP

-0001(Q), Fire Protection Water Suppression Systems Operation, completed 8/10/13 SC.FP.SO.FP

-0001(Q), Fire Protection Water Suppression Systems Operation, completed 8/27/16 SC.FP-ST.FS-0004(Q), Fire Suppression Water System Flush, completed 6/26/16 SC.FP-ST.FS-0006(Q), Fire Pump Capacity Test, completed 10/7/15

SC.FP-ST.FS-0006(Q), Fire Pump Capacity Test, completed 8/18/16

SC.FP-ST.FS-0008(Q), Fire Main Flow Test, completed 8/10/13 SC.FP-ST.FS-0008(Q), Fire Main Flow Test, completed 8/27/16

SC.FP-SV.FBR-0026(Q), Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection, completed 2/1/18

SC.FP-TI.FP-0002(Q), Fire Protection Equipment / Systems Contingency Plans, completed 10/29/17 Notifications

(NOTFs) [ADD * when NOTF was written as a result of the NRC inspection]

296479 20623627 20634568 20665975 20678200 20678644 20679351 20713638 20717822 20718940 20724851 20726884 2 0727500 20733631 20738186 20741786 20741790 20742653 20742722 20749724 20749737 20754597 20754599 20754616 20766638 20772169 20775730 20776681 20777139 20777139 20779801 20779856 20780489 20782444 20782463 20782505 20783306 20784313 20784785 20784984 20785058 20785118 20785155 20786393 20787393 20787819 20785915* 20786350* 20786351* 20786610* 20786817* 20787012* 20787384* 20787392* 20787402* 20787509* 20787538* 20787539* 20787908* 20788027* 20788028* 20788031* 20788152* 20788158* 20788184* 20788254* 20788274* 20788275* 20788277* 20788278* 20788279* 20788933* 20788934* Orders 70061473 70196898

Work Orders

30172211 30185833 30186636 30216393 30233213 30240577 30247387 30261021 30261024 30264931 30265720 30266048 30266284 30266508 30266731 30269608 30270442 30271293 30272696 30273404 30274092 30278480 30281599 30286545 30286867 30288987 30289278 30289510 30290034 30290198 30292533 30292723 30295542 30296777 30299128 30300636 30301587 30304872 30305973 30307756 30312517 30315730 30316975 3 0317321 30317845 30318096 30318351 30318469 50118083 50141309 50145650 60114632 60125598 60133930 80115237 Vendor Manuals

BNZ R-3261-W, BNZ Materials Inc. Marinite 1 Fire Resistant Thermal / Structural Insulation, 11/97 VTD 172432, Ansul Halon 1301 Fire Suppression System, 10/1/78

VTD 304068, Prefco 11/2 Hour Rated Fire and Smoke Dampers, 4/25/86

VTD 306353, Fire Damper Model Numbers FD

-100 V/H, FD

-200 V/H, FD

-400 V, 7/31/87

VTD 306384, Qualification Fire Test of a Protective Envelope System, 11/6/89

VTD 316651, Installation Booklet for 3M Interam E54A Fire Protection Mat 1 Hour Wrap System for HVAC Duct Work, 8/12/93

VTD 317518. Type E50 Endothermic Mat in 3 Hour Rated Electrical Circuit Protective Systems for Cable Tray and Conduit Systems, 5/8/86

VTD 325338, Omega Point Laboratories 1 Hour E50 Mat Cable Tray Fire Test with Appurtenances, 4/8/02

Miscellaneous Documents

Salem/Common

- Fire Protection

System Health Report, 4th Quarter 2017, 1st Quarter 2018

S-C-M500-EEE-1636, Availability of the UHF Radio Systems Following an Appendix R Fire, Revision 0

NRC Generic Letter 81

-12, Fire Protection Rule, dated 2/20/81

Reportability Evaluation for Notification 2078602, dated 1/10/18

Fire Protection Impairment Tracking Report, 1/22/18

Daily Firewatch Inspection Log, 2/14/18