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| {{#Wiki_filter:~0- f9AcreUNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001September 18, 1998NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 98-36: INADEQUATE OR POORLY CONTROLLED, NON-SAFETY-RELATED MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIESUNNECESSARILY CHALLENGED SAFETY SYSTEMSAddresseeAll holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors.purposeThe U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to alertaddressees to several recent events in which inadequate or poorly controlled, non-safety-related maintenance activities resulted in unnecessary challenges to safety systems. It isexpected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consideraction, as appropriate to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in thisinformation notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written responseis required. | | {{#Wiki_filter:~0- f 9 Acre UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY |
|
| |
|
| ==Description of Circumstances==
| | COMMISSION |
| BRAIDWOOD UNIT 2On January 18, 1996, with Braidwood Unit 2 operating at full power, .offsite power was lost.Inadequately secured roofing repair materials located on the roof of the adjacent servicebuilding were blown off the roof during a rain storm, causing a phase-to-ground arc on one oftwo station auxiliary transformers (SATs). As designed, the second SAT tripped when the firstSAT failed. Both emergency diesel generators (EDGs) automatically started and all safe-shutdown loads automatically sequenced on to the engineered safety feature (ESF) buses. Allautomatic bus transfers occurred as designed, maintaining power to non-ESF buses from theunit auxiliary transformers (UATs). The reactor remained stable at full power throughout theevent. To restore offsite power to Unit 2, the licensee cross-tied both Unit 2 ESF buses to therespective ESF buses of Unit 1, which also remained at full power throughout the event.Inspection of the faulted SAT revealed damage to (1) the Phase B and C bushings and (2) agas detector relay on top of the transformer where heavy arcing occurred. The licenseedetermined that the Initiating event was a Phase C arc-to-ground, followed by a Phase B tovNOrT g NO -98T- goz 98 0e 8<9809 td n
| |
|
| |
|
| f IN 98-36September 18, 1998 Phase C arc. A 345-kilovolt switchyard breaker, Which connected the SAT to the switchyardring bus, was also damaged. Approximately one square foot of the Phase B bushing wasblown out.BYRON UNIT IOn May 23, 1996, with the Unit 1 reactor shut down In excess of a month for a refueling outage,offsite power was lost when one of the two Unit I SATs Isolated because of a Phase A toPhase B current differential relay operation. The second SAT tripped as designed when thefirst SAT failed. Both EDGs automatically started and all safe-shutdown loads automaticallysequenced on to the ESF buses. Because the reactor was shut down, power to non-ESFbuses was lost and two service water pumps and a station air compressor common to bothByron units tripped. Without the service water pumps, Unit 2, which was operating at fullpower, had no cooling water to many loads, including the main generator auxiliaries, station aircompressors, condensate pumps, and condensate booster pumps. Subsequently, Unit 2 wasmanually tripped.The licensee determined that the SAT that initially tripped underwent a phase-to-ground fault ona Phase B insulator. The failed insulator was located outdoors, about halfway between the SATand the auxiliary building. After Initiating, the arc continued down the bus bar, Increasing inwidth until It involved the other two phases. Air and water present in the bus bar duct washeated by the arc and resulted in pressurization of the duct.Chronic water leakage through inadequately caulked Insulator mounting holes and through animproperly compressed gasket caused degradation of the insulator metal inserts and Insulatormaterial between these inserts. Eventually, the bus flashed to ground through the degradedinsulator and initiated the transient.PERRYOn June 5, 1997, Perry was operating at full power when an automatic reactor scram occurredfollowing a three-phase fault in one of two high-voltage secondary winding terminationcompartments of the UAT. The fault resulted in the actuation of the auxiliary transformer phasedifferential relay, a main generator lockout, a main turbine trip, and fast closure of the turbinecontrol valves.At the time of the transient, safety-related electrical loads were being supplied by the in-servicestartup transformer. The non-safety-related electrical loads supplied by the transformerautomatically transferred to the startup transformer except for the bus that was faulted.Operators stabilized the plant without major complication.The licensee determined that the fault had developed as a result of an accumulation of moistureand dust that had entered the termination compartment housing where a 2-Inch-long piece ofgasket material was missing from the compartment housing-to-transformer sealing surface.The missing piece of gasket material may have been lost during work performed when
| | ===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION=== |
| | WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 September |
|
| |
|
| K>1IN 98-36September 18, 1998 replacing the auxiliary transformer following failure of the transformer on May 30, 1996. Thecause of that failure was attributed to Inadequate original design or poor assembly practices orboth.POINT BEACH UNIT IDuring a severe storm on January 8, 1998, a ground In the low-voltage-side bus duct causedthe failure of the Unit I SAT. This failure and a failure of the 13.8-kilovolt automatic bus transferto the Unit 2 SAT resulted in the loss of normal power to the Unit I safeguards buses. TheEDGs subsequently started and restored power to the buses. Unit I remained at 98 percentpower throughout the transient. Unit 2 was in cold shutdown.The licensee attributed the failure of the transformer to the buildup of condensation internal tothe buses and long-term insulation degradation In the bus duct on the low-voltage side of thetransformer. Before the transformer failed, the circuit breaker for a heater designed to keep thebus duct dry would not remain closed. Consequently, in August 1996, the licensee left thecircuit breaker open and wrote a work order for its repair. However, work schedulers did notrecognize that the bus duct heater was inoperable with the circuit breaker open, and the workorder was erroneously classified as "minor maintenance" and given low priority. At the time thetransformer failed, the work order was in the "backlog' of maintenance Items. In addition to theinoperable heater, the:licensee determined that the lack of a routine inspection program for thebus ducts may have contributed to the event. Inspection of the bus ducts after the transformerfailed revealed insulation breakdown that would likely have been Identified through a periodicInspection program.DiscussionThese events illustrate the potentially significant consequences of inadequate or poorlyperformed maintenance activities on non-safety-related plant components. Unnecessarychallenges to plant safety systems or control room operators or both could result frominadequate control or inattention to detail during non-safety-related maintenance activities. Thepotential impact on safety systems of such activities as the re-roofing of nuclear power plantsupport buildings, the Installation of gaskets, or the caulking of outdoor components, couldeasily be overlooked. In addition, several of the events discussed here highlight the need forlicensees to have better control over the maintenance activities of contractor and non-stationutility employees, and the need for thorough periodic walkdowns or preventive maintenance onauxiliary transformers and the associated outdoor bus ducts.
| | 18, 1998 NRC INFORMATION |
|
| |
|
| IN 98-36September 18, 1998 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. However, recipients arereminded that they are required to consider Industry-wide operating experience (including NRCINs) where practical, when setting goals and performing periodic evaluations under Section50.65, "Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear PowerPlants," of Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations. If you have any questionsabout the information In this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed below orthe appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.eJack , Acting DirectorDivision of Reactor Program ManagementOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts: Mike Kunowski, Region IlIl John Neisler, Region IlIl630-829-9816 630429-9718E-mail: mak3@nrc.gov E-mail: jhn@nrc.govAttachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
| | NOTICE 98-36: INADEQUATE |
|
| |
|
| A,(ttachment 1IN 98-36September 18, 1998 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESInformationNotice No.Date ofIssuanceSubject98-35Threat Assessments andConsideration of HeightenedPhysical Protection Measures914/98Issued toAll U.S. NRC fuel cycle facilitiespower and non-power reactorlicensees (Safeguard issues, notfor public disclosure.)98-3498-3398-3298-31NRC Configuration ControlErrorsNRC Regulations ProhibitAgreements that restrict orDiscourage an Employee fromParticipating In Protected ActivitiesProblems Associated with Post-Fire Safe-Shutdown CircuitAnalyses8/28/9881281988126198All holders of Operating licensesfor nuclear power reactors, exceptfor those who have ceasedoperations and have certified thatfuel has been permanentlyremoved from the reactor vesselAll holders of a U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC)license.All holders of operating licensesfor nuclear power reactors, exceptthose who have permanentlyceased operations and havecertified that fuel has beenpermanently removed form thereactorAll holders of operating licencesfor nuclear power reactors, exceptthose licensees that havepermanently ceased operationsand have certified that fuel hasbeen permanently removed fromthe reactor vessel.Fire Protection System Design 8/26/98Deficiencies and Common-ModeFlooding of Emergency Core CoolingSystem Rooms at Washington NuclearProject Unit 2OL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit
| | OR POORLY CONTROLLED, NON-SAFETY-RELATED |
|
| |
|
| -IN 98-36September 18, 1998 IN 98-xxSeptember xx, 1998 I
| | MAINTENANCE |
|
| |
|
| }} | | ACTIVITIES |
| | |
| | UNNECESSARILY |
| | |
| | CHALLENGED |
| | |
| | SAFETY SYSTEMS Addressee All holders of operating |
| | |
| | licenses for nuclear power reactors.purpose The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory |
| | |
| | Commission (NRC) is issuing this information |
| | |
| | notice (IN) to alert addressees |
| | |
| | to several recent events in which inadequate |
| | |
| | or poorly controlled, non-safety- related maintenance |
| | |
| | activities |
| | |
| | resulted in unnecessary |
| | |
| | challenges |
| | |
| | to safety systems. It is expected that recipients |
| | |
| | will review the information |
| | |
| | for applicability |
| | |
| | to their facilities |
| | |
| | and consider action, as appropriate |
| | |
| | to avoid similar problems. |
| | |
| | However, suggestions |
| | |
| | contained |
| | |
| | in this information |
| | |
| | notice are not NRC requirements; |
| | therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description |
| | |
| | of Circumstances |
| | |
| | BRAIDWOOD |
| | |
| | UNIT 2 On January 18, 1996, with Braidwood |
| | |
| | Unit 2 operating |
| | |
| | at full power, .offsite power was lost.Inadequately |
| | |
| | secured roofing repair materials |
| | |
| | located on the roof of the adjacent service building were blown off the roof during a rain storm, causing a phase-to-ground |
| | |
| | arc on one of two station auxiliary |
| | |
| | transformers (SATs). As designed, the second SAT tripped when the first SAT failed. Both emergency |
| | |
| | diesel generators (EDGs) automatically |
| | |
| | started and all safe-shutdown loads automatically |
| | |
| | sequenced |
| | |
| | on to the engineered |
| | |
| | safety feature (ESF) buses. All automatic |
| | |
| | bus transfers |
| | |
| | occurred as designed, maintaining |
| | |
| | power to non-ESF buses from the unit auxiliary |
| | |
| | transformers (UATs). The reactor remained stable at full power throughout |
| | |
| | the event. To restore offsite power to Unit 2, the licensee cross-tied |
| | |
| | both Unit 2 ESF buses to the respective |
| | |
| | ESF buses of Unit 1, which also remained at full power throughout |
| | |
| | the event.Inspection |
| | |
| | of the faulted SAT revealed damage to (1) the Phase B and C bushings and (2) a gas detector relay on top of the transformer |
| | |
| | where heavy arcing occurred. |
| | |
| | The licensee determined |
| | |
| | that the Initiating |
| | |
| | event was a Phase C arc-to-ground, followed by a Phase B to vNOrT g NO -98T- goz 98 0e 8<9809 td n |
| | |
| | f IN 98-36 September |
| | |
| | 18, 1998 Phase C arc. A 345-kilovolt |
| | |
| | switchyard |
| | |
| | breaker, Which connected |
| | |
| | the SAT to the switchyard |
| | |
| | ring bus, was also damaged. Approximately |
| | |
| | one square foot of the Phase B bushing was blown out.BYRON UNIT I On May 23, 1996, with the Unit 1 reactor shut down In excess of a month for a refueling |
| | |
| | outage, offsite power was lost when one of the two Unit I SATs Isolated because of a Phase A to Phase B current differential |
| | |
| | relay operation. |
| | |
| | The second SAT tripped as designed when the first SAT failed. Both EDGs automatically |
| | |
| | started and all safe-shutdown |
| | |
| | loads automatically |
| | |
| | sequenced |
| | |
| | on to the ESF buses. Because the reactor was shut down, power to non-ESF buses was lost and two service water pumps and a station air compressor |
| | |
| | common to both Byron units tripped. Without the service water pumps, Unit 2, which was operating |
| | |
| | at full power, had no cooling water to many loads, including |
| | |
| | the main generator |
| | |
| | auxiliaries, station air compressors, condensate |
| | |
| | pumps, and condensate |
| | |
| | booster pumps. Subsequently, Unit 2 was manually tripped.The licensee determined |
| | |
| | that the SAT that initially |
| | |
| | tripped underwent |
| | |
| | a phase-to-ground |
| | |
| | fault on a Phase B insulator. |
| | |
| | The failed insulator |
| | |
| | was located outdoors, about halfway between the SAT and the auxiliary |
| | |
| | building. |
| | |
| | After Initiating, the arc continued |
| | |
| | down the bus bar, Increasing |
| | |
| | in width until It involved the other two phases. Air and water present in the bus bar duct was heated by the arc and resulted in pressurization |
| | |
| | of the duct.Chronic water leakage through inadequately |
| | |
| | caulked Insulator |
| | |
| | mounting holes and through an improperly |
| | |
| | compressed |
| | |
| | gasket caused degradation |
| | |
| | of the insulator |
| | |
| | metal inserts and Insulator material between these inserts. Eventually, the bus flashed to ground through the degraded insulator |
| | |
| | and initiated |
| | |
| | the transient. |
| | |
| | PERRY On June 5, 1997, Perry was operating |
| | |
| | at full power when an automatic |
| | |
| | reactor scram occurred following |
| | |
| | a three-phase |
| | |
| | fault in one of two high-voltage |
| | |
| | secondary |
| | |
| | winding termination |
| | |
| | compartments |
| | |
| | of the UAT. The fault resulted in the actuation |
| | |
| | of the auxiliary |
| | |
| | transformer |
| | |
| | phase differential |
| | |
| | relay, a main generator |
| | |
| | lockout, a main turbine trip, and fast closure of the turbine control valves.At the time of the transient, safety-related |
| | |
| | electrical |
| | |
| | loads were being supplied by the in-service |
| | |
| | startup transformer. |
| | |
| | The non-safety-related |
| | |
| | electrical |
| | |
| | loads supplied by the transformer |
| | |
| | automatically |
| | |
| | transferred |
| | |
| | to the startup transformer |
| | |
| | except for the bus that was faulted.Operators |
| | |
| | stabilized |
| | |
| | the plant without major complication. |
| | |
| | The licensee determined |
| | |
| | that the fault had developed |
| | |
| | as a result of an accumulation |
| | |
| | of moisture and dust that had entered the termination |
| | |
| | compartment |
| | |
| | housing where a 2-Inch-long |
| | |
| | piece of gasket material was missing from the compartment |
| | |
| | housing-to-transformer |
| | |
| | sealing surface.The missing piece of gasket material may have been lost during work performed |
| | |
| | when |
| | |
| | K>1 IN 98-36 September |
| | |
| | 18, 1998 replacing |
| | |
| | the auxiliary |
| | |
| | transformer |
| | |
| | following |
| | |
| | failure of the transformer |
| | |
| | on May 30, 1996. The cause of that failure was attributed |
| | |
| | to Inadequate |
| | |
| | original design or poor assembly practices |
| | |
| | or both.POINT BEACH UNIT I During a severe storm on January 8, 1998, a ground In the low-voltage-side |
| | |
| | bus duct caused the failure of the Unit I SAT. This failure and a failure of the 13.8-kilovolt |
| | |
| | automatic |
| | |
| | bus transfer to the Unit 2 SAT resulted in the loss of normal power to the Unit I safeguards |
| | |
| | buses. The EDGs subsequently |
| | |
| | started and restored power to the buses. Unit I remained at 98 percent power throughout |
| | |
| | the transient. |
| | |
| | Unit 2 was in cold shutdown.The licensee attributed |
| | |
| | the failure of the transformer |
| | |
| | to the buildup of condensation |
| | |
| | internal to the buses and long-term |
| | |
| | insulation |
| | |
| | degradation |
| | |
| | In the bus duct on the low-voltage |
| | |
| | side of the transformer. |
| | |
| | Before the transformer |
| | |
| | failed, the circuit breaker for a heater designed to keep the bus duct dry would not remain closed. Consequently, in August 1996, the licensee left the circuit breaker open and wrote a work order for its repair. However, work schedulers |
| | |
| | did not recognize |
| | |
| | that the bus duct heater was inoperable |
| | |
| | with the circuit breaker open, and the work order was erroneously |
| | |
| | classified |
| | |
| | as "minor maintenance" and given low priority. |
| | |
| | At the time the transformer |
| | |
| | failed, the work order was in the "backlog' |
| | of maintenance |
| | |
| | Items. In addition to the inoperable |
| | |
| | heater, the:licensee |
| | |
| | determined |
| | |
| | that the lack of a routine inspection |
| | |
| | program for the bus ducts may have contributed |
| | |
| | to the event. Inspection |
| | |
| | of the bus ducts after the transformer |
| | |
| | failed revealed insulation |
| | |
| | breakdown |
| | |
| | that would likely have been Identified |
| | |
| | through a periodic Inspection |
| | |
| | program.Discussion |
| | |
| | These events illustrate |
| | |
| | the potentially |
| | |
| | significant |
| | |
| | consequences |
| | |
| | of inadequate |
| | |
| | or poorly performed |
| | |
| | maintenance |
| | |
| | activities |
| | |
| | on non-safety-related |
| | |
| | plant components. |
| | |
| | Unnecessary |
| | |
| | challenges |
| | |
| | to plant safety systems or control room operators |
| | |
| | or both could result from inadequate |
| | |
| | control or inattention |
| | |
| | to detail during non-safety-related |
| | |
| | maintenance |
| | |
| | activities. |
| | |
| | The potential |
| | |
| | impact on safety systems of such activities |
| | |
| | as the re-roofing |
| | |
| | of nuclear power plant support buildings, the Installation |
| | |
| | of gaskets, or the caulking of outdoor components, could easily be overlooked. |
| | |
| | In addition, several of the events discussed |
| | |
| | here highlight |
| | |
| | the need for licensees |
| | |
| | to have better control over the maintenance |
| | |
| | activities |
| | |
| | of contractor |
| | |
| | and non-station |
| | |
| | utility employees, and the need for thorough periodic walkdowns |
| | |
| | or preventive |
| | |
| | maintenance |
| | |
| | on auxiliary |
| | |
| | transformers |
| | |
| | and the associated |
| | |
| | outdoor bus ducts. |
| | |
| | IN 98-36 September |
| | |
| | 18, 1998 This information |
| | |
| | notice requires no specific action or written response. |
| | |
| | However, recipients |
| | |
| | are reminded that they are required to consider Industry-wide |
| | |
| | operating |
| | |
| | experience (including |
| | |
| | NRC INs) where practical, when setting goals and performing |
| | |
| | periodic evaluations |
| | |
| | under Section 50.65, "Requirements |
| | |
| | for Monitoring |
| | |
| | the Effectiveness |
| | |
| | of Maintenance |
| | |
| | at Nuclear Power Plants," of Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations. |
| | |
| | If you have any questions about the information |
| | |
| | In this notice, please contact one of the technical |
| | |
| | contacts listed below or the appropriate |
| | |
| | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.eJack , Acting Director Division of Reactor Program Management |
| | |
| | ===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation=== |
| | Technical |
| | |
| | contacts: |
| | Mike Kunowski, Region IlIl John Neisler, Region IlIl 630-829-9816 |
| | 630429-9718 E-mail: mak3@nrc.gov |
| | |
| | E-mail: jhn@nrc.gov |
| | |
| | Attachment: |
| | List of Recently Issued NRC Information |
| | |
| | Notices |
| | |
| | A,(ttachment |
| | |
| | 1 IN 98-36 September |
| | |
| | 18, 1998 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION |
| | |
| | ===NOTICES Information=== |
| | Notice No.Date of Issuance Subject 98-35 Threat Assessments |
| | |
| | and Consideration |
| | |
| | of Heightened |
| | |
| | Physical Protection |
| | |
| | Measures 914/98 Issued to All U.S. NRC fuel cycle facilities |
| | |
| | power and non-power |
| | |
| | reactor licensees (Safeguard |
| | |
| | issues, not for public disclosure.) |
| | 98-34 98-33 98-32 98-31 NRC Configuration |
| | |
| | Control Errors NRC Regulations |
| | |
| | Prohibit Agreements |
| | |
| | that restrict or Discourage |
| | |
| | an Employee from Participating |
| | |
| | In Protected |
| | |
| | Activities |
| | |
| | Problems Associated |
| | |
| | with Post-Fire Safe-Shutdown |
| | |
| | Circuit Analyses 8/28/98 8128198 8126198 All holders of Operating |
| | |
| | licenses for nuclear power reactors, except for those who have ceased operations |
| | |
| | and have certified |
| | |
| | that fuel has been permanently |
| | |
| | removed from the reactor vessel All holders of a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory |
| | |
| | Commission (NRC)license.All holders of operating |
| | |
| | licenses for nuclear power reactors, except those who have permanently |
| | |
| | ceased operations |
| | |
| | and have certified |
| | |
| | that fuel has been permanently |
| | |
| | removed form the reactor All holders of operating |
| | |
| | licences for nuclear power reactors, except those licensees |
| | |
| | that have permanently |
| | |
| | ceased operations |
| | |
| | and have certified |
| | |
| | that fuel has been permanently |
| | |
| | removed from the reactor vessel.Fire Protection |
| | |
| | System Design 8/26/98 Deficiencies |
| | |
| | and Common-Mode |
| | |
| | Flooding of Emergency |
| | |
| | Core Cooling System Rooms at Washington |
| | |
| | Nuclear Project Unit 2 OL = Operating |
| | |
| | License CP = Construction |
| | |
| | Permit |
| | |
| | -IN 98-36 September |
| | |
| | 18, 1998 This information |
| | |
| | notice requires no specific action or written response. |
| | |
| | However, recipients |
| | |
| | are reminded that they are required to consider industry-wide |
| | |
| | operating |
| | |
| | experience (including |
| | |
| | NRC INs) where practical, when setting goals and performing |
| | |
| | periodic evaluations |
| | |
| | under Section 50.65, "Requirements |
| | |
| | for Monitoring |
| | |
| | the Effectiveness |
| | |
| | of Maintenance |
| | |
| | at Nuclear Power Plants," of Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations. |
| | |
| | If you have any questions about the information |
| | |
| | in this notice, please contact one of the technical |
| | |
| | contacts listed below or the appropriate |
| | |
| | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Jack W. Roe, Acting Director Division of Reactor Program Management |
| | |
| | ===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation=== |
| | Technical |
| | |
| | contacts: |
| | Mike Kunowski, Region IlIl 630-829-9816 E-mail: mak3@nrc.gov |
| | |
| | John Neisler, Region IlIl 630-829-9718 E-mail: jhn@nrc.gov |
| | |
| | Attachment: |
| | List of Recently Issued NRC Information |
| | |
| | Notices*See previous concurrence |
| | |
| | C,,tt & e.**E-mail concurrence |
| | |
| | c<f()DOCUMENT NAME: G:\NICK\REGION.IN |
| | |
| | To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box C=Copy wlo attachment/enclosure |
| | |
| | E=Copy with attachmentlenclosure |
| | |
| | N = No copy OFFICE PECB I Tech Ed I Reg III Reg [ il I PECB I C:PECB l_ji D M NAME NFields* RSanders* |
| | MKunowski** |
| | JNeisler** |
| | RDennig* JStolz* JRo DATE 09/03/98 08/26/98 09/03/98 Ii09/03/98 |
| | 09/14/98 J 09/14/98 \/98 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY |
| | |
| | IN 98-xx September |
| | |
| | xx, 1998 This information |
| | |
| | notice requires no specific action or written response. |
| | |
| | However, recipie are reminded that they are required to consider industry-wide |
| | |
| | operating |
| | |
| | experience (includ g NRC INs) where practical, when setting goals and performing |
| | |
| | periodic evaluations |
| | |
| | under ection 50.65, "Requirements |
| | |
| | for Monitoring |
| | |
| | the Effectiveness |
| | |
| | of Maintenance |
| | |
| | at Nuclea ower Plants," of Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations. |
| | |
| | If you have ny questions about the information |
| | |
| | in this notice, please contact one of the technical |
| | |
| | con cts listed below or the appropriate |
| | |
| | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project man er.Jack W. Roe, Acting irector Division of Reactor rogram Management |
| | |
| | ===Office of Nuclea eactor Regulation=== |
| | Technical |
| | |
| | contacts: |
| | Mike Kunowski, Region IlIl Joh eisler, Region IlIl 630-829-9816 |
| | 63 -829-9718 E-mail: mak3@nrc.gov -mail: jhn@nrc.gov |
| | |
| | Attachment: |
| | List of Recently Issued NRC Info tion Notices DOCUMENT NAME: G:\NICK\REGION.IN |
| | |
| | To receive a copy of this document, Indicate in the box C=Copy wlo attachmentenclosure |
| | |
| | E=Copy with attachmentlenclosure |
| | |
| | N = No copy OFFICE PECB. I _ Tech Ed I _ Reg I _I lI Reg 11 l 1/E "ECB (A)D:DRPM |
| | |
| | lNAME NFiells' { RSanders MKu owsk Jeisler ennig l l JRoel DATE /3/98 1SW98 17/3/98 15/3198 lH/ 48 q/l98 l I /98 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY I}} |
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| |
|
| {{Information notice-Nav}} | | {{Information notice-Nav}} |
Inadequate or Poorly Controlled, Non-Safety-Related Maintenance Activities Unnecessarily Challenged Safety SystemsML031040558 |
Person / Time |
---|
Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant ![Entergy icon.png](/w/images/7/79/Entergy_icon.png) |
---|
Issue date: |
09/18/1998 |
---|
From: |
Roe J W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
---|
To: |
|
---|
References |
---|
IN-98-036, NUDOCS 9809210079 |
Download: ML031040558 (7) |
|
Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Category:NRC Information Notice
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Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination2006-07-13013 July 2006 E-mail from M. Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>. |
~0- f 9 Acre UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 September
18, 1998 NRC INFORMATION
NOTICE 98-36: INADEQUATE
OR POORLY CONTROLLED, NON-SAFETY-RELATED
MAINTENANCE
ACTIVITIES
UNNECESSARILY
CHALLENGED
SAFETY SYSTEMS Addressee All holders of operating
licenses for nuclear power reactors.purpose The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
notice (IN) to alert addressees
to several recent events in which inadequate
or poorly controlled, non-safety- related maintenance
activities
resulted in unnecessary
challenges
to safety systems. It is expected that recipients
will review the information
for applicability
to their facilities
and consider action, as appropriate
to avoid similar problems.
However, suggestions
contained
in this information
notice are not NRC requirements;
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description
of Circumstances
BRAIDWOOD
UNIT 2 On January 18, 1996, with Braidwood
Unit 2 operating
at full power, .offsite power was lost.Inadequately
secured roofing repair materials
located on the roof of the adjacent service building were blown off the roof during a rain storm, causing a phase-to-ground
arc on one of two station auxiliary
transformers (SATs). As designed, the second SAT tripped when the first SAT failed. Both emergency
diesel generators (EDGs) automatically
started and all safe-shutdown loads automatically
sequenced
on to the engineered
safety feature (ESF) buses. All automatic
bus transfers
occurred as designed, maintaining
power to non-ESF buses from the unit auxiliary
transformers (UATs). The reactor remained stable at full power throughout
the event. To restore offsite power to Unit 2, the licensee cross-tied
both Unit 2 ESF buses to the respective
ESF buses of Unit 1, which also remained at full power throughout
the event.Inspection
of the faulted SAT revealed damage to (1) the Phase B and C bushings and (2) a gas detector relay on top of the transformer
where heavy arcing occurred.
The licensee determined
that the Initiating
event was a Phase C arc-to-ground, followed by a Phase B to vNOrT g NO -98T- goz 98 0e 8<9809 td n
f IN 98-36 September
18, 1998 Phase C arc. A 345-kilovolt
switchyard
breaker, Which connected
the SAT to the switchyard
ring bus, was also damaged. Approximately
one square foot of the Phase B bushing was blown out.BYRON UNIT I On May 23, 1996, with the Unit 1 reactor shut down In excess of a month for a refueling
outage, offsite power was lost when one of the two Unit I SATs Isolated because of a Phase A to Phase B current differential
relay operation.
The second SAT tripped as designed when the first SAT failed. Both EDGs automatically
started and all safe-shutdown
loads automatically
sequenced
on to the ESF buses. Because the reactor was shut down, power to non-ESF buses was lost and two service water pumps and a station air compressor
common to both Byron units tripped. Without the service water pumps, Unit 2, which was operating
at full power, had no cooling water to many loads, including
the main generator
auxiliaries, station air compressors, condensate
pumps, and condensate
booster pumps. Subsequently, Unit 2 was manually tripped.The licensee determined
that the SAT that initially
tripped underwent
a phase-to-ground
fault on a Phase B insulator.
The failed insulator
was located outdoors, about halfway between the SAT and the auxiliary
building.
After Initiating, the arc continued
down the bus bar, Increasing
in width until It involved the other two phases. Air and water present in the bus bar duct was heated by the arc and resulted in pressurization
of the duct.Chronic water leakage through inadequately
caulked Insulator
mounting holes and through an improperly
compressed
gasket caused degradation
of the insulator
metal inserts and Insulator material between these inserts. Eventually, the bus flashed to ground through the degraded insulator
and initiated
the transient.
PERRY On June 5, 1997, Perry was operating
at full power when an automatic
reactor scram occurred following
a three-phase
fault in one of two high-voltage
secondary
winding termination
compartments
of the UAT. The fault resulted in the actuation
of the auxiliary
transformer
phase differential
relay, a main generator
lockout, a main turbine trip, and fast closure of the turbine control valves.At the time of the transient, safety-related
electrical
loads were being supplied by the in-service
startup transformer.
The non-safety-related
electrical
loads supplied by the transformer
automatically
transferred
to the startup transformer
except for the bus that was faulted.Operators
stabilized
the plant without major complication.
The licensee determined
that the fault had developed
as a result of an accumulation
of moisture and dust that had entered the termination
compartment
housing where a 2-Inch-long
piece of gasket material was missing from the compartment
housing-to-transformer
sealing surface.The missing piece of gasket material may have been lost during work performed
when
K>1 IN 98-36 September
18, 1998 replacing
the auxiliary
transformer
following
failure of the transformer
on May 30, 1996. The cause of that failure was attributed
to Inadequate
original design or poor assembly practices
or both.POINT BEACH UNIT I During a severe storm on January 8, 1998, a ground In the low-voltage-side
bus duct caused the failure of the Unit I SAT. This failure and a failure of the 13.8-kilovolt
automatic
bus transfer to the Unit 2 SAT resulted in the loss of normal power to the Unit I safeguards
buses. The EDGs subsequently
started and restored power to the buses. Unit I remained at 98 percent power throughout
the transient.
Unit 2 was in cold shutdown.The licensee attributed
the failure of the transformer
to the buildup of condensation
internal to the buses and long-term
insulation
degradation
In the bus duct on the low-voltage
side of the transformer.
Before the transformer
failed, the circuit breaker for a heater designed to keep the bus duct dry would not remain closed. Consequently, in August 1996, the licensee left the circuit breaker open and wrote a work order for its repair. However, work schedulers
did not recognize
that the bus duct heater was inoperable
with the circuit breaker open, and the work order was erroneously
classified
as "minor maintenance" and given low priority.
At the time the transformer
failed, the work order was in the "backlog'
of maintenance
Items. In addition to the inoperable
heater, the:licensee
determined
that the lack of a routine inspection
program for the bus ducts may have contributed
to the event. Inspection
of the bus ducts after the transformer
failed revealed insulation
breakdown
that would likely have been Identified
through a periodic Inspection
program.Discussion
These events illustrate
the potentially
significant
consequences
of inadequate
or poorly performed
maintenance
activities
on non-safety-related
plant components.
Unnecessary
challenges
to plant safety systems or control room operators
or both could result from inadequate
control or inattention
to detail during non-safety-related
maintenance
activities.
The potential
impact on safety systems of such activities
as the re-roofing
of nuclear power plant support buildings, the Installation
of gaskets, or the caulking of outdoor components, could easily be overlooked.
In addition, several of the events discussed
here highlight
the need for licensees
to have better control over the maintenance
activities
of contractor
and non-station
utility employees, and the need for thorough periodic walkdowns
or preventive
maintenance
on auxiliary
transformers
and the associated
outdoor bus ducts.
IN 98-36 September
18, 1998 This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
However, recipients
are reminded that they are required to consider Industry-wide
operating
experience (including
NRC INs) where practical, when setting goals and performing
periodic evaluations
under Section 50.65, "Requirements
for Monitoring
the Effectiveness
of Maintenance
at Nuclear Power Plants," of Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
If you have any questions about the information
In this notice, please contact one of the technical
contacts listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.eJack , Acting Director Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contacts:
Mike Kunowski, Region IlIl John Neisler, Region IlIl 630-829-9816
630429-9718 E-mail: mak3@nrc.gov
E-mail: jhn@nrc.gov
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices
A,(ttachment
1 IN 98-36 September
18, 1998 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
NOTICES Information
Notice No.Date of Issuance Subject 98-35 Threat Assessments
and Consideration
of Heightened
Physical Protection
Measures 914/98 Issued to All U.S. NRC fuel cycle facilities
power and non-power
reactor licensees (Safeguard
issues, not for public disclosure.)
98-34 98-33 98-32 98-31 NRC Configuration
Control Errors NRC Regulations
Prohibit Agreements
that restrict or Discourage
an Employee from Participating
In Protected
Activities
Problems Associated
with Post-Fire Safe-Shutdown
Circuit Analyses 8/28/98 8128198 8126198 All holders of Operating
licenses for nuclear power reactors, except for those who have ceased operations
and have certified
that fuel has been permanently
removed from the reactor vessel All holders of a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC)license.All holders of operating
licenses for nuclear power reactors, except those who have permanently
ceased operations
and have certified
that fuel has been permanently
removed form the reactor All holders of operating
licences for nuclear power reactors, except those licensees
that have permanently
ceased operations
and have certified
that fuel has been permanently
removed from the reactor vessel.Fire Protection
System Design 8/26/98 Deficiencies
and Common-Mode
Flooding of Emergency
Core Cooling System Rooms at Washington
Nuclear Project Unit 2 OL = Operating
License CP = Construction
Permit
-IN 98-36 September
18, 1998 This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
However, recipients
are reminded that they are required to consider industry-wide
operating
experience (including
NRC INs) where practical, when setting goals and performing
periodic evaluations
under Section 50.65, "Requirements
for Monitoring
the Effectiveness
of Maintenance
at Nuclear Power Plants," of Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
If you have any questions about the information
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
contacts listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Jack W. Roe, Acting Director Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contacts:
Mike Kunowski, Region IlIl 630-829-9816 E-mail: mak3@nrc.gov
John Neisler, Region IlIl 630-829-9718 E-mail: jhn@nrc.gov
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices*See previous concurrence
C,,tt & e.**E-mail concurrence
c<f()DOCUMENT NAME: G:\NICK\REGION.IN
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box C=Copy wlo attachment/enclosure
E=Copy with attachmentlenclosure
N = No copy OFFICE PECB I Tech Ed I Reg III Reg [ il I PECB I C:PECB l_ji D M NAME NFields* RSanders*
MKunowski**
JNeisler**
RDennig* JStolz* JRo DATE 09/03/98 08/26/98 09/03/98 Ii09/03/98
09/14/98 J 09/14/98 \/98 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
IN 98-xx September
xx, 1998 This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
However, recipie are reminded that they are required to consider industry-wide
operating
experience (includ g NRC INs) where practical, when setting goals and performing
periodic evaluations
under ection 50.65, "Requirements
for Monitoring
the Effectiveness
of Maintenance
at Nuclea ower Plants," of Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
If you have ny questions about the information
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
con cts listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project man er.Jack W. Roe, Acting irector Division of Reactor rogram Management
Office of Nuclea eactor Regulation
Technical
contacts:
Mike Kunowski, Region IlIl Joh eisler, Region IlIl 630-829-9816
63 -829-9718 E-mail: mak3@nrc.gov -mail: jhn@nrc.gov
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Info tion Notices DOCUMENT NAME: G:\NICK\REGION.IN
To receive a copy of this document, Indicate in the box C=Copy wlo attachmentenclosure
E=Copy with attachmentlenclosure
N = No copy OFFICE PECB. I _ Tech Ed I _ Reg I _I lI Reg 11 l 1/E "ECB (A)D:DRPM
lNAME NFiells' { RSanders MKu owsk Jeisler ennig l l JRoel DATE /3/98 1SW98 17/3/98 15/3198 lH/ 48 q/l98 l I /98 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY I
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list | - Information Notice 1998-01, Thefts of Portable Gauges (15 January 1998, Topic: Shutdown Margin, Moisture Density Gauge, Stolen)
- Information Notice 1998-02, Nuclear Power Plant Cold Weather Problems and Protective Measures (21 January 1998)
- Information Notice 1998-03, Inadequate Verification of Overcurrent Trip Setpoints in Metal-Clad, Low-Voltage Circuit Breakers (21 January 1998)
- Information Notice 1998-04, 1997 Enforcement Sanctions for Deliberate Violations of NRC Employee Protection Requirements (9 February 1998)
- Information Notice 1998-05, Criminal History Record Information (11 February 1998)
- Information Notice 1998-06, Unauthorized Use of License to Obtain Radioactive Materials, and Its Implication Under the Expanded Title 18 of the U.S. Code (19 February 1998)
- Information Notice 1998-07, Offsite Power Reliability Challenges from Industry Deregulation (27 February 1998)
- Information Notice 1998-08, Information Likely to Be Requested If an Emergency is Declared (2 March 1998)
- Information Notice 1998-08, Information Likely to Be Requested If an Emergency Is Declared (2 March 1998)
- Information Notice 1998-09, Collapse of an Isocam II, Dual-Headed Nuclear Medicine Gamma Camera (5 March 1998)
- Information Notice 1998-10, Probable Misadministrations Occurring During Intravascular Brachytherapy with Novoste Beta-cath System (9 March 1998, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1998-11, Cracking of Reactor Vessel Internal Baffle Former Bolts in Foreign Plants (25 March 1998, Topic: Fire Barrier, Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1998-12, Licensees' Responsibilities Regarding Reporting & Follow-up Requirements for Nuclear-Powered Pacemakers (3 April 1998, Topic: Fire Barrier, Brachytherapy, Stolen)
- Information Notice 1998-13, Post-Refueling Outage Reactor Pressure Vessel Leak Testing Before Core Criticality (20 April 1998, Topic: Fire Barrier, VT-2, Pressure Boundary Leakage, Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1998-14, Undocumented Changes to Non-Power Reactor Safety System Wiring (20 April 1998, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1998-15, Integrity of Operator Licensing Examinations (20 April 1998, Topic: Fire Barrier, Job Performance Measure)
- Information Notice 1998-16, Inadequate Operational Checks of Alarm Ratemeters (30 April 1998, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1998-17, Federal Bureau of Investigation'S (FBI) Awareness of National Security Issues and Response (ANSIR) Program (7 May 1998)
- Information Notice 1998-17, Federal Bureau of Investigation'S (FBI) Awareness of National Security Issues and Response (Ansir) Program (7 May 1998, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1998-18, Recent Contamination Incidences Resulting from Failure to Perform Adequate Surveys (13 May 1998, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1998-19, Shaft Binding in General Electric Type Sbm Control Switches (3 June 1998)
- Information Notice 1998-20, Problems with Emergency Preparedness Respiratory Protection Programs (3 June 1998, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1998-21, Potential Deficiency of Electrical Cable/Connection Systems (4 June 1998)
- Information Notice 1998-22, Deficiencies Identified During NRC Design Inspections (17 June 1998, Topic: Stroke time, Tornado Missile)
- Information Notice 1998-23, Crosby Relief Valve Setpoint Drift Problems Caused by Corrosion of Guide Ring (23 June 1998, Topic: Loop seal, Condition Adverse to Quality)
- Information Notice 1998-25, Loss of Inventory from Safety-Related Closed-Loop Cooling Water Systems (8 July 1998, Topic: Ultimate heat sink)
- Information Notice 1998-26, Settlement Monitoring and Inspection of Plant Structures Affected by Degradation of Porous Concrete Subfoundations (24 July 1998, Topic: Condition Adverse to Quality)
- Information Notice 1998-27, Steam Generator Tube End Cracking (24 July 1998)
- Information Notice 1998-28, Development of Systematic Sample Plan for Operator Licensing Examinations (31 July 1998)
- Information Notice 1998-29, Predicted Increase in Fuel Rod Cladding Oxidation (3 August 1998, Topic: Fuel cladding)
- Information Notice 1998-30, Effect of Year 2000 Computer Problem on NRC Licensees and Certificate Holders (12 August 1998, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1998-31, Fire Protection System Design Deficiencies and Common-Mode Flooding of Emergency Core Cooling System Rooms at Washington Nuclear Project Unit 2 (18 August 1998)
- Information Notice 1998-33, NRC Regulations Prohibit Agreements That Restrict or Discourage an Employee from Participating in Protected Activities (28 August 1998, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1998-34, Configuration Control Errors (28 August 1998)
- Information Notice 1998-36, Inadequate or Poorly Controlled, Non-Safety-Related Maintenance Activities Unnecessarily Challenged Safety Systems (18 September 1998)
- Information Notice 1998-37, Eligibility of Operator License Applicants (1 October 1998)
- Information Notice 1998-38, Metal-Clad Circuit Breaker Maintenance Issues Identified by NRC Inspections (15 October 1998, Topic: Overtravel)
- Information Notice 1998-39, Summary of Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Reports for Calendar Years 1996 and 1997 (30 October 1998, Topic: Fitness for Duty)
- Information Notice 1998-40, Design Deficiencies Can Lead to Reduced ECCS Pump Net Positive Suction Head During Design-Basis Accidents (26 October 1998)
- Information Notice 1998-41, Spurious Shutdown of Emergency Diesel Generators From Design Oversight (20 November 1998)
- Information Notice 1998-41, Spurious Shutdown of Emergency Diesel Generators from Design Oversight (20 November 1998)
- Information Notice 1998-42, Implementation of 10 CFR 55.55a(g) Inservice Inspection Requirements (1 December 1998)
- Information Notice 1998-43, Leaks in Emergency Diesel Generator Lubricating Oil & Jacket Cooling Water Piping (4 December 1998)
- Information Notice 1998-44, Ten-Year Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program Update for Licensees That Intend to Implement Risk-Informed ISI of Piping (10 December 1998, Topic: Probabilistic Risk Assessment)
- Information Notice 1998-45, Cavitation Erosion of Letdown Line Orifices Resulting in Fatigue Cracking of Pipe Welds (15 December 1998)
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