Information Notice 1998-20, Problems with Emergency Preparedness Respiratory Protection Programs
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 June 3, 1998 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 98-20: PROBLEMS WITH EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
RESPIRATORY PROTECTION PROGRAMS
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors; non-power reactors; all fuel cycle
and material licensees required to have an NRC-approved emergency plan.
purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Is Issuing this Information notice to alert
addressees to multiple generic weaknesses in respiratory protection programs supporting
emergency preparedness (EP). It Is expected that recipients will review the Information for
applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
However, suggestions contained In this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response Is required.
Background
NRC Information Notice (IN) 97-66, uFailure To Provide Special Lenses for Operators Using
Respirator or Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) During Emergency Operations," was
issued on August 20, 1997. That notice alerted licensees to a generic problem In which some
licensed operators had not been provided required lenses for vision correction while wearing
SCBA. A lack of required vision correction could hamper the control room operator's
performance of licensed duties, including timely and effective response to emergencies.
Subsequent to the Issuance of IN 97-66, follow up by licensees and NRC inspectors Identified
numerous problems and deficiencies In the respiratory protection programs supporting licensee
emergency response programs.
Description of Circumstances
The 12 event summaries (Attachment 1) detail a broad spectrum of EP respirator program
weaknesses. The discussion below focuses on these problems In generic functional areas.
During the NRC's review of emergency plan changes made by the licensees of the McGuire
and Summer plants under 10 CFR 50.54(q), the staff found that both plants had significantly
reduced or eliminated the respiratory protection capability during emergencies. The NRC
98052809 rV#
June 3, 1998
- informed licensees of both facilities that these changes had reduced the EP effectiveness.
In response to the NRC findings, the plants reinstated effective EP respirator programs. Given
the potential radiological hazards and potentially more hazardous Immediately dangerous to life
or health (IDLH) nonradiological airborne environments (e.g., toxic gases, oxygen deficiency, smoke), the NRC staff found It unacceptable to weaken or remove a vital protective function for
emergency response workers (and the plant).
Another important area involved Inadequate or incomplete evaluations of emergency situations
and their impact on control room operators. The licensee for the Calvert Cliffs facility had not
developed or implemented a procedure for handling an onsite spill of ammonia - no plans had
been made that specified needed protective actions for workers on the scene or for the control
room operators. At the Enrico Fermi plant during a self-Initiated engineering review follow up, the licensee identified the need to stage dedicated SCBA In the auxiliary building to ensure that
operators could Implement the dedicated shutdown (remote) procedure. At San Onofre Nuclear
Generating Station, In response to an NRC Inspection, the licensee Initiated a self-assessment
that identified the need to develop a plan to provide for refilling and transporting SCBA air
bottles to and from the control room during emergency situations.
Several shortcomings In the training area were noted throughout the Industry. Most significant
was the failure to provide control room operators with periodic, hands-on training and practice
with donning and wearing SCBA. Additionally, operators were not trained to change out bottles, nor, In some cases, did they know where the spare charged bottles were stored for their
emergency use.
A number of facilities had allowed on-shift, operating personnel, who would be required to wear
a SCBA during certain emergencies, to have beards. When the NRC Inspector discussed the
problems that a beard could cause to respirator performance (fit degradations, Interference with
proper operation of the SCBA, shortened period of air supply, degraded operator emergency
response), all licensees initiated timely action to meet the technical specification requirements
in having sufficient number of clean-shaven operating crew.
Several licensees had no established effective oversight or controls for tracking and maintaining
operators', and other workers' required periodic retraining and SCBA fit testing. This
programmatic deficiency led to numerous failures to maintain timely emergency worker
qualification. At one facility, only 81 of the 235 members of the emergency response
organization met the requirements of the station and 10 CFR Part 20 for worker training and fit
testing at the time of the Inspection.
Discussion
Since the major revision of 10 CFR Part 20, effective in 1993, licensees have significantly
reduced the numbers of respirators used by orders of magnitude during normal plant operations
and maintenance outages. This significant shift away from the use of respirators is a result of
better job planning, more effective use of work area decontamination, and close-capture
containments. This shift resulted from the new Part 20 requirement to maintain the total
effective dose equivalent as low as reasonably achievable.
June 3,1998 Optimization of the internal and external doses often results In the determination that the use of
respirators to avoid a small intake can result in a larger external dose as a result of worker
inefficiency.
However, it appears that this de-emphasis of respiratory protection for normal operations may
have contributed to a potential decrease In the effectiveness of emergency response
capabilities involving respiratory protection. Along with this de-emphasis, the ongoing
restructuring and downsizing of the electric utility Industry places significant emphasis on cost
savings efforts. While no area of nuclear plant operation is Immune from this cost scrutiny, licensees need to ensure that the effectiveness of EP response capabilities are maintained. As
previously discussed, plant operators and emergency response workers can face not only
radiological airborne hazards, but, In many cases, are challenged by unknown and potentially
IDLH conditions. Maintaining an adequate respiratory program Is vital to their safety and, thus, to their ability to respond In a timely fashion to emergencies.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contacts listed below
or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager or appropriate
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) Project Manager.
orig AN by o-ig /s/'d b D.1 litthes FOR
Elizabeth Q. Ten Eyck, Director Jack W. Roe, Acting Director
Division of Fuel Cycle Division of Reactor Program Management
Safety and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Office of Nuclear Material
Safety and Safeguards
Technical contacts: James E. Wigginton, NRR Lawrence K. Cohen, NRR
301-415-1059 301415-2923 E-mail: Jew2@nrc.gov E-mail:lkc@nrc.gov
Michael A. Lamastra, NMSS
301-415-8139 E-mail: mxl2@nrc.gov
Attachments:
1. Event Summaries
2. Ust of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices v 4TA it's-1.
3. Ust of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices.47T7#CH1 U V 7AF, L E&D LM
See previous concurrence DOCUMENT NAME: G:lTXKAINRESPAI.con
To receive a coov of this docrnent Indicate In the box C=Coov wlo attachmentlenclosure EsCooy with attachmentlencfosure N = No coDY
OFFICE PECB _ PERB IE C:PECB I NMSSJ I D:DRPM
NAME TKoshy CMiIler* JStolz JRoe*
DATE 04130/98 05105/98 05113/98 198 _0512298 ech Ed Concurred an 4/2/98 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Attachment I
June 3, 1998 EVENT SUMMARIES
McGuire The letter of February 6. 1996. to Duke Power Company
Accession Number (AN) 9602210358 The licensee made changes to its emergency plan under 10 CFR 50.54(q) and deleted the
requirement for members of the emergency response organization (ERO) to be qualified to use
respirators. The follow up NRC review found that this change constituted a decrease In EP
effectiveness, and the licensee reinstated the respiratory requirements. In its review and
justification, the NRC cited 50.47(b)(8), which requires adequate emergency equipment to
support EP response, Including respirator protection equipment (NUREG-0654, Revision I
Sections lI.H.9 and J.6).
Calvert Cliffs Inspection Report(IR) Nos. 50-317/97-06 and 50-318197-06 AN 9712170365 The NRC inspectors found numerous weaknesses in the control room operators capability to
effectively use self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). Following a postulated ammonia
spill on site, no procedure had been formalized to direct response activities, Including control
room ventilation alignment and the need to don SCBA. Some operators had facial hair and
some did not know the location of SCBA designated for emergency use. Other than those
designated as fire brigade members, operators had had no practical hands-on training with
SCBA for 5 years. As a result, the licensee established an Improved, practical training plan on
SCBA for the operators.
SONGS IR Nos. 50-361/97-20 and 26 and 50-362/97-20 and 26 ANs 9712110162 and 9801070286 The NRC Inspectors noted that some shift technical advisors had not kept their respirator
qualifications current. In response to Information Notice 97-66, the licensee determined that
approximately 25 licensed operators who required corrective lenses either did not have special
frames or did not have current lens prescriptions. Some operators had beards despite the need
to don and wear SCBA within 2 minutes after the Initiation of an emergency. In response, the
licensee issued station-wide Instructions that required personnel filling minimum staffing
requirements to be cdean shaven.
Washington Nuclear IR Nos. 50-397/97-014 Prolect-2 AN 970919Q17 NRC Inspectors noted that the air cylinder pressure for all SCBA was not in accordance with
industry standards which was a final safety analysis report commitment. The required
pressure should be at least 90 percent of the rated cylinder pressure. Several air cylinders, staged for service, were found at pressures less than 4000 psig. Instead of the acceptable
minimum pressure of about 4000 psig, the licensee's minimum acceptable pressure was only
Attachment 1 IN 98-20
-June 3, 1998 3500 psig. At this lower pressure, the rated use-time Is only about 23 minutes, Instead of the
rated normal 30-minute air supply. Appendix R of 10 CFR Part 50, requires SCBA rated for at
least 30 minutes of air supply. The licensee responded by changing procedures, retraining
workers, and ensuring all In-service cylinders were charged to at least 4000 psig.
Fermi 2 Licensee Event Report No. U7-0029. Rev. I
AN 9705190046 The licensee discovered during an engineering review that, assuming a design-basis fire and
loss of offsite power, certain areas In the auxiliary building could become uninhabitable, immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH) due to loss of power resulting In failed open
smokelCO 2 dampers. Access to these affected areas may be necessary to complete the
shutdown procedures during plant accidents. Plant procedures and SCBA are now In place to
provide timely worker protection and access and to Implement necessary shutdown actions.
D.C.Cook IR Nos. 50-315197015 & 97018 ANs 9711040026 and 9801210199 During the follow up In response to an industry generic communication, the licensee discovered
that a number of operators were not provided corrective lens Inserts for respirator use. The
licensee broadened Its Investigation and found that the respirator program contained no
provisions for tracking worker qualification. Of the 234 ERO, only 81 of the members had
maintained their qualifications (annual fit testing and medical evaluations). The licensee
Initiated proper short-term corrective actions and the Inspectors noted that no respirators had
been Issued to unqualified ERO members.
Kewaunee IR Nos. 50-305/97015 AN 8801020145 In response to an NRC Inspection finding of failure to provide annual fit testing requalification (in
two cases, no testing had been performed since 1994), the licensee Identified 21 plant staff and
24 security contractors had not received periodic fit testing. In these cases, all staff members
had completed their training and medical evaluations. Other than some fire brigade members
who wore respirators during required training exercises, no worker with out-of-date fit testing
had been required to wear a respirator. As part of the licensee corrective action follow up, the
licensee determined that the primary causes of the program weaknesses were (1) program
responsibility was not assigned to a single person or group and (2) the plant lacked an
administrative control procedure to track qualification.
Waterrord IR No.50-38219803 AQ803230145 The NRC Identified that the licensee had not maintained an adequate supply of properly sized
SCBA face pieces for the operating staffs for the control room and the technical support center.
Aside from being uncomfortable to the user, wearing a grossly mis-sized face piece could
reduce the duration of the rated air supply. The licensee promptly corrected this deficiency.
Attachment I
June 3,1998 Prairie Island IR Nos. 50-282 & 306197-018 AN 9711250332 NRC Inspectors noted that annual retraining for operators In the donning and use of SCBA did
not require each operator to experience hands-on training. As a result, except for fire brigade
members, few operators had donned SCBA for several years.
RierBend IR Nos. 50-458197-010
AN 9709100212 During an NRC Inspection, the inspectors noted that the licensee had failed to develop a formal
Issue and tracking process to ensure that corrective lenses (of the appropriate type) for SCBA
use were provided to licensed operators. Although a procedure had been In place to require
either contact lenses or prescription spectacle kits (specific to the SCOA type), this procedure
was revised to ensure that personnel will be Issued corrective lenses.
South Texas Project IR No. 50-498 and 499/97-13 AN 9 101 302 The NRC inspector discovered that control room operators had not been trained to change out
SCBA air cylinders while wearing a SCBA In a hostile environment. The inability to effectively
change out an air bottle during a toxic gas accident could hamper operator response to the
emergency. Although members of the fire brigade were trained on change-out procedures, the
licensee initiated an evaluation to Identify needed improvements In the respiratory training
program.
Grand Gulf Station IR No. 50-416197-15 AN 971 016011 While observing a full-scale, biennial EP exercise, the NRC Inspectors identified a weakness In
the plant's ability to monitor and maintain adequate supplies of SCBA (air bottles and face
pieces) for the operations support center over the long term. This weakness could jeopardize
the licensee's ability to provide continued respiratory protection for the response teams
dispatched Into the plant. Critical remediation actions related to worker and plant safety could
be seriously hampered unless air bottles are recharged on a timely basis.
I>
Attachment 2 IN 98-20
June 3, 1998 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NMSS INFORMATION NOTICES
Information no_
Udle OT
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to
98-18 issuance- Isue tn
Recent Contamination Incidences IW
o3f Part 35 Medical Licensees
Resulting from Failure to Perform
Adequate Surveys
98-17 Federal Bureau of Investigations 5/7/98 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
(FBI) Awareness of National Commission fuel cycle and power
Security Issues and Responses and non-power reactor licensees
(ANSIR) Program
98-16 Inadequate Operational Checks 4130/98 All Industrial Radiography
of Alarm Ratemeters Licensees
98-12 Licensees' Responsibilities 413/1998 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Regarding Reporting and Commission nuclear pacemaker
Follow-up Requirements for licensees
Nuclear-Powered Pacemakers
98-10 Probable Misadministrations 4/3/98 All Medical Licensees
Occurring During Intravascular
Brachytherapy With The
Novoste Beta-Cath System
98-09 Collapse of an Isocam II, Dual- 3/5/98 All medical licensees
Headed Nuclear Medicine Gamma
Camera
98-08 Information Likely to be Requested 3/3/98 All parts 30, 40, 70, 72 and 76 If an Emergency Is Declared licensees and certificate holders
required to have a Nuclear
Regulatory Commission approved
98-06 Unauthorized use of License 219198 All NRC Licensees authorized
to Obtain Radioactive Materials, to Possess Licensed Materials
and its Implications Under The
Expanded Title 18 of the JU-S. Code
98-04 1997 Enforcement Sanctions for 2/9/98 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Deliberate Violations of NRC Commission licensees.
Employee Protection
Requirements
Attachment 3 IN 98-20
June 3, 1998 Page 1 of I
LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to
98-19 Shaft Binding In General Electric 613198 All holders of operating licenses
Type SBM Control Switches for nuclear power reactors
98-18 Recent Contamination Incidences 5/13/98 Part 35 Medical Licensees
Resulting from Failure to Perform
Adequate Surveys
98-17 Federal Bureau of Investigations 5)7/98 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
(FBI) Awareness of National Commission fuel cycle and power
Security Issues and Responses and non-power reactor licensees
(ANSIR) Program
98-16 Inadequate Operational Checks 4/30/98 All Industrial Radiography
of Alarm Ratemeters Licensees
98-15 Intergrity of Operator Ucensing 4120198 All holder of operating licenses
Examinations for nuclear power reactors except
those that have permanently
ceased operations and have
certified that fuel has been
permanently removed from the
reactor vessel
98-14 Undocumented Changes to 4/20/98 All holders of operating licenses
Non-Power Reactor Safety or construction permits for test
System Wiring research reactors
98-13 Post-Refueling Outage Reactor 4120/98 All holders of operating licenses
Pressure Vessel Leak Testing for nuclear power reactors except
Before Core Criticality those that have permanently
ceased operations and have
certified that fuel has been
permanently removed from the
reactor vessel
OL = Operating Ucense
CP = Construction Permit
June 3, 1998 Optimization of the internal and external doses often results in the determination that the use of
respirators to avoid a small intake can result in a larger external dose as a result of worker
inefficiency.
However, it appears that this de-emphasis of respiratory protection for normal operations may
have contributed to a potential decrease in the effectiveness of emergency response
capabilities involving respiratory protection. Along with this de-emphasis, the ongoing
restructuring and downsizing of the electric utility Industry places significant emphasis on cost
savings efforts. While no area of nuclear plant operation is immune from this cost scrutiny, licensees need to ensure that the effectiveness of EP response capabilities are maintained. As
previously discussed, plant operators and emergency response workers can face not only
radiological airborne hazards, but, in many cases, are challenged by unknown and potentially
IDLH conditions. Maintaining an adequate respiratory program is vital to their safety and, thus, to their ability to respond in a timely fashion to emergencies.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contacts listed below
or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager or appropriate
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) Project Manager.
orig /s/'d by arig /s/'d by D.B Mathews FOR
Elizabeth Q. Ten Eyck, Director Jack W. Roe, Acting Director
Division of Fuel Cycle Division of Reactor Program Management
Safety and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Office of Nuclear Material
Safety and Safeguards
Technical contacts: James E. Wigginton, NRR Lawrence K. Cohen, NRR
301-415-1059 301-415-2923 E-mail: jew2@nrc.gov E-mail:lkc@nrc.gov
Michael A. Lamastra, NMSS
301-415-8139 E-mail: mxl2@nrc.gov
Attachments:
1. Event Summaries
2. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices
3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
- See previous concurrence DOCUMENT NAME: G:\TXK\INRESPAl.con
To receive a copy of this document, indicate Inthe box C=Copy wlo attachmentlenclosure E=Copy with attachmentlenclosure N = No copy
OFFICE IPECB I C:PERB lIE C:PECB I NIVS~i l D:DRPMll
NAME TKoshy* _ CMiller*JStolz* yc JRoe*
DATE 04/30/98 j 05/05/98 [05/13/98 5 g /98 05/22/98
_EdjICOP
_nr
1 _/-c - =_ A RE __ _
Tech La Loalrde On 4/Z/9% OFFICIAL RECORD COQPY
IN 98-xx
May xx, 1998 Optimization of the internal and external doses often results in the determination that the use of
respirators to avoid a small intake can result in a larger external dose as a result of worker
inefficiency.
However, it appears that this de-emphasis of respiratory protection for normal operations may
have contributed to a potential decrease in the effectiveness of emergency response
capabilities involving respiratory protection. Along with this de-emphasis, the ongoing
restructuring and downsizing of the electric utility industry places significant emphasis on cost
savings efforts. While no area of nuclear plant operation is immune from this cost scrutiny, licensees need to ensure that the effectiveness of EP response capabilities are maintained. As
previously discussed, plant operators and emergency response workers can face not only
radiological airborne hazards, but, in many cases, are challenged by unknown and potentially
IDLH conditions. Maintaining an adequate respiratory program is vital to their safety and, thus, to their ability to respond in a timely fashion to emergencies.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contacts listed below
or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager or appropriate
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) Project Manager.
Elizabeth Q. Ten Eyck, Director Jack W. Roe, Acting Director
Division of Fuel Cycle Division of Reactor Program Management
Safety and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Office of Nuclear Material
Safety and Safeguards
Technical contacts: James E. Wigginton, NRR Lawrence K. Cohen, NRR
301-415-1059 301-415-2923 E-mail: jew2@nrc.gov E-mail:lkc~nrc.gov
Michael A. Lamastra, NMSS
301-415-8139 E-mail: mxl2@nrc.gov
^ Attachments:
1. Event Summaries
2. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices
3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
- See orevious concurrence DOCUMENT NAME: G:\TXK\INRESPAl.con l
To receive a copy of this document, Indicate Inthe box C=Copy wlo attachmnentlenclosure E=Copy with attachmentlenclzse N = No copy
OFFICE I IPECB I QPRBII EIIECB Il NMSS IlD[ D:4 L1 I
NAME TKoshy* CMiller* J EEyck - JRl V
DATE 04/30/98 05/05/98 - J.$/ 4/ /98 8 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
K>
IN98-xx
May xx, 1998 Optimization of the internal and external doses often results in the determination that the use of
respirators to avoid a small intake can result in a larger external dose as a result of worker
inefficiency.
However, it appears that this de-emphasis of respiratory protection for normal operations may
have contributed to a potential decrease in the effectiveness of emergency response
capabilities involving respiratory protection. Along with this de-emphasis, the ongoing
restructuring and downsizing of the electric utility industry places significant emphasis on cost
savings efforts. While no area of nuclear plant operation is immune from this cost scrutiny, licensees need to ensure that the effectiveness of EP response capabilities are maintained. As
previously discussed, plant operators and emergency response workers can face not only
radiological airborne hazards, but, in many cases, are challenged by unknown and potentially
IDLH conditions. Maintaining an adequate respiratory program is vital to their safety and, thus, to their ability to respond in a timely fashion to emergencies.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contacts listed below
or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager or appropriate
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) Project Manager.
Elizabeth Q. Ten Eyck, Director Jack W. Roe, Acting Director
Division of Fuel Cycle Division of Reactor Program Management
Safety and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Office of Nuclear Material
Safety and Safeguards
Technical contacts: James E.*Wigginton, NRR Lawrence Kt-Cohen, NRR
301-415-1059 301-415-2923 E-mail: jew2@nrc.gov E-mail:lkc@nrc.gov
Michael A.fLamastra, NMSS
301-415-8139 E-mail: mxl2@nrc.gov jkL1t p fl
Attachments: 1. Event Summaries ) , Lt
=List of Recently 1Ised NRC Information Notices
-fee previous concurrence DOCUMENT NAME: G:\TXK\INRESPAI.con
To receive a copy of this document, indicate inthe box C=Copy w/o attachment/enclosure E=Copy with attachment/enclosure N = No copy
OFFICE PECB l PERB lZE C:PECB NMSS D:DRPM
NAME TKoshy* CMiller* JStolz EEyck JRoe
l DATE 04/30/98 05/05/98 04/ /98 4/ /98 04/ /98 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
IN 98-xx
May o 1998 Optimization of the internal and external doses often results in the determination that the use of
respirators to avoid a small intake can result in a larger external dose as a result of worker
inefficiency.
However, it appears that this de-emphasis of respiratory protection for normal operations may
have contributed to a potential decrease in the effectiveness of emergency response
capabilities involving respiratory protection. Along with this de-emphasis, the ongoing
restructuring and downsizing of the electric utility industry places significant emphasis on cost
savings efforts. While no area of nuclear plant operation is immune from this cost scrutiny, licensees need to ensure that the effectiveness of.EP response capabilities are maintained. As
previously discussed, plant operators and emergency response workers can face not only
radiological airborne hazards, but, in many cases, are challenged by unknown and potentially
IDLH conditions. Maintaining an adequate respiratory program is vital to their safety and, thus, to their ability to respond in a timely fashion to emergencies.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contacts listed below
or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager or appropriate
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) Project Manager.
Elizabeth Q. Ten Eyck, Director Jack W. Roe, Acting Director
Division of Fuel Cycle Division of Reactor Program Management
Safety and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Office of Nuclear Material
Safety and Safeguards
Technical contacts: James E. Wigginton, NRR Lawrence K. Cohen, NRR
301-415-1059 301-415-2923 E-mail: jew2@nrc.gov E-mail:lkc@nrc.gov
Michael A. Lamastra, NMSS
301-415-8139 E-mail: mxl2@nrc.gov
Attachments: 1. Event Summaries
2. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices
3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
- See previous concurrence DOCUMENT NAME: G:\TXK\INRESPAI.con
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box C=Copy wlo attachmentlenclosure E=Copy with attachment/endosure N =No copy
[ OFFICE
NAME
l DATE
PECB
TKoshy*
04/30/98 I C:PERB
CMiller*
05/05/98 I Q PECB
JStolz
j 04/ /98 I NIiSS
EEych
4/ /98 I
ID:DRPM
JRoe
04/ /98 I
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
IN 98-xx
April xx, 1998 Optimization of the internal and external doses often results in the determination that the use of
respirators to avoid a small intake can result in a larger external dose as a result of worker
inefficiency.
However, it appears that this de-emphasis of respiratory protection for normal operations may
have contributed to a potential decrease in the effectiveness of emergency response
capabilities involving respiratory protection. Along with this de-emphasis, the ongoing
restructuring and downsizing of the electric utility industry places significant emphasis on cost
savings efforts. While no area of nuclear plant operation is immune from this cost scrutiny, licensees need to ensure that the effectiveness of EP response capabilities are maintained. As
previously discussed, plant operators and emergency response workers can face not only
radiological airborne hazards, but, in many cases, are challenged by unknown and potentially
IDLH conditions. Maintaining an adequate respiratory program is vital to their safety and, thus, to their ability to respond in a timely fashion to emergencies.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contacts listed below
or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager or appropriate
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) Project Manager.
Elizabeth 0. Ten Eyck, Director Jack W. Roe, Acting Director
Division of Fuel Cycle Division of Reactor Program Management
Safety and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Office of Nuclear Material
Safety and Safeguards
Technical contacts: James E. Wigginton, NRR Lawrence K. Cohen, NRR
301-415-1059 301-415-2923 E-mail: jew2@nrc.gov E-mail:lkc@nrc.gov
Michael A. Lamastra, NMSS
301-415-8139 E-mail: mxl2@nrc.gov
Attachments: 1. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
2 .Event Summaries
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\TXK\INRESPAI.EP2 To receive a copy of this document, Indicate in the box C=Copy w/o attachmentlenclosure E=Copy with attachmentlenclosure N = No copy
OFFICE PECB lC:PERB C:PECB NMSS lD:DRPMl
NAME TKoshy I CMiller Cp JStolz EEych JRoe
DATE 04/Y98 527/98 04/ /98 4/ /98 04/ /98 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY