Information Notice 1998-34, Configuration Control Errors
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001
August 28, 1998
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 98-34: CONFIGURATION CONTROL ERRORS
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, except for those who have ceased
operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.
purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Is Issuing this information notice to alert
addressees to recent inspection findings related to configuration control of safety-related
equipment. Although the examples discussed In this Information notice are related to the
emergency diesel generator (EDG) system, the potential exists for similar problems to occur in
other systems. It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their
facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions
contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or
written response is required.
Description of Circumstances
Recent inspections conducted by NRC inspectors have found a number of configuration control
issues at various sites. The relevant findings associated with these concerns are
discussed below.
Mispositioned EDG Output Breaker Control Switch
During a routine plant walkdown at H. B. Robinson Nuclear Station, an Inspector noted that the
EDG output breaker control switch, located on the local EDG generator control panel, was In
the PULL-OUT position, rather than the normal NEUTRAL position (Inspection Reports 50-
261/97-09 and 50-261/97-10 [Accessions 9710100035 and 9711190153]). There were no
alarms present at the EDG control panel or at the control room indicating the abnormal switch
position. In the PULL-OUT position, the EDG output breaker was Incapable of performing its
design closing function, thus making the EDG Inoperable.
The output breaker control switch is a four-position, spring return to normal, T-handle switch.
When manipulated to the TRIP or CLOSE position, the switch is designed to spring return to the
NEUTRAL position upon release of the handle. By moving the switch to the TRIP position and
then pulling the handle outward from the switch face and moving It counter-clockwise, the
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IN 98-34 August 28, 1998 switch can be placed in the PULL-OUT position. The licensee postulated that the switch may
have been mispositioned as a result of an Inadvertent bumping of the handle. There were
some maintenance-related activities conducted in the EDG room preceding the discovery of the
mispositioned switch. The switch had been manipulated during a scheduled surveillance test
approximately two weeks before to the discovery of the mispositioning. However, procedural
controls were not in place to confirm proper switch position following these manipulations. The
switch was not checked during periodic operator rounds, although the switch affected the
operability of the EDG.
Mispositioned Voltage Regulator Potentiometers
In 1993, at H. B. Robinson, both EDGs were rendered inoperable during painting activities.
During these activities, the voltage regulator potentiometers for both EDGs were erroneously
adjusted to approximately 440 volts from the required 480 volts when painters bumped into
them (Inspection Report 50-261/93-35 [Accession 9401040383]). As in the case above, there
were no alarms indicating the inappropriate settings, and the potentiometers were not checked
during periodic operator rounds.
Mispositioned EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Switches
At Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, during a routine tour of the EDG building, an inspector discovered
that the fuel oil transfer pump control switches for an EDG were in the off, instead of the
required automatic position (Inspection Report 50-390/97010 [Accession 9802040123]). The
control switches had been manipulated earlier, during a required surveillance test of the fuel oil
transfer pumps. Further review showed that the test method used by the operators was not in
accordance with procedures, which may have contributed to the switches being left In the off
position. With the switches In the off position, the automatic fill capability to the EDG day tank
would not have been accomplished following an EDG start, resulting in the inoperability of the
EDG. There were no audible alarms indicating the abnormal switch position, but there were
indicating lights at the local panel. However, the switch positions were not periodically verified
during operator rounds.
Discussion
The configuration control errors discussed in this information notice resulted in mispositioned
components that were not annunciated to alert the operators to their abnormal position, yet they
could render the EDG inoperable. Further, the verification of the component's configuration
was not specifically prescribed In the checklist for the non-licensed operator rounds. The
corrective actions taken by the licensees as a result of the problems discussed above, included
installing a protective barrier to preclude inadvertent bumps to switches; better procedural
guidance on switch manipulations and post-surveillance-testing restoration verification, and
inclusion of safety-related switches in the non-licensed operator rounds to positively verify
position. Additionally, the licensees reviewed other safety-related switches to determine if other
similar unmonitored control switches existed.
IN 98-34 August 28, 1998 The preceding examples highlight the need for continued attention to configuration control for
components that may render a system Inoperable, but that are not provided with alarms.
Further, it illustrates configuration control vulnerabilities that were not Identified by non-licensed
operator plant tours, because the components were not specifically listed In their verification
checklists.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. However, recipients are
reminded that they are required to consider Industry-wide operating experience (including NRC
information notices) where practical, when setting goals and performing periodic evaluations
under Section 50.65, "Requirement for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear
power plants," to Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations.) If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed
below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
4ck W. Roe, Acting Director
'9vision of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Binoy B. Desai, Rgn II
Kim VanDoom, Rgn II
843-383-4571
423-365-5487 E-mail: bbd@nrc.gov
E-mail: pkv@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
-I
Attachment
August 28, 1998 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Information
Date of
Notice No.
Subject
Issuance
Issued to
98-33
98-32
NRC Regulations Prohibit
Agreements that restrict or
Discourage an Employee from
Participating in Protected Activities
8/28/98
All holders of a U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC)
license.
Problems Associated with Post- Fire Safe-Shutdown Circuit
Analyses
8/26/98
98-31
98-29 Fire Protection System Design
8/26/98 Deficiencies and Common-Mode
Flooding of Emergency Core Cooling
System Rooms at Washington Nuclear
Project Unit 2
All holders of operating licenses
for nuclear power reactors, except
those who have permanently
ceased operations and have
certified that fuel has been
permanently removed form the
reactor
All holders of operating licences
for nuclear power reactors, except
those licensees that have
permanently ceased operations
and have certified that fuel has
been permanently removed from
the reactor vessel.
All holders of operating licenses
for nuclear power reactors, except
those licensees who have
permanently ceased operations
and have certified that fuel has
been permanently removed from
the reactor vessel.
All holders of operating licenses
for nuclear power plants
Predicted increase in Fuel Rod
Cladding Oxidation
Development of Systematic
Sample Plan for Operator
Licensing Examinations
8/3/98
8/3/98
98-28 OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
IN 94 August 28, 1998 The preceding examples highlight the need for continued attention to configuration control for
components that may render a system inoperable, but that are not provided with alarms.
Further, it illustrates configuration control vulnerabilities that were not identified by non-licensed
operator plant tours, because the components were not specifically listed in their verification
checklists.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. However, recipients are
reminded that they are required to consider industry-wide operating experience (including NRC
information notices) where practical, when setting goals and performing periodic evaluations
under Section 50.65, Requirement for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear
power plants," to Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations.) If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed
below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
[OginalsLgned by]
Jack W. Roe, Acting Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Binoy B. Desai, Rgn II
Kim VanDoom, Rgn II
843-383-4571
423-365-5487 E-mail: bbd@nrc.gov
E-mail: pkv@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\TAG\\INEDG
- See previous concurrence
- Concurred by e-mail
To receive a coDy of this document, indicate in the box C=Copy w/o attachmentfencosure E=Copy with attachment/encosure NNo copy
OFFICE
PECB:DRPM I E
Tech Editor
lIN
RGN-11:DRP
I C
RGN-11:DRP
I C
NAME
T. Greene*
R. Sanders*
B. Desai**
P. K. VanDoorn**
DATE
08/19/98
07/30/98
08/17/98 j
08/17/98
-
-
I
OFFICE I DC/PECB:DRPM I I C/PECB:DRPM I I D/DRPM
I
NAME
R. Dennig*
J. Stolz*
J. Roe*
DATE
08/19/98
08/19/98
08/24/98
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
IN 98-xx
August xx, 1998 The preceding examples highlight the need for continued attention to configuration control for
components that may render a system inoperable, but that are not provided with alarms.
Further, it illustrates configuration control vulnerabilities that were not identified by non-licensed
operator plant tours, because the components were not specifically listed in their verification
checklists.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. However, recipients are
reminded that they are required to consider industry-wide operating experience (including NRC
information notices) where practical, when setting goals and performing periodic evaluations
under Section 50.65, "Requirement for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear
power plants," to Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations.) If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed
below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Jack W. Roe, Acting Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Binoy B. Desai, Rgn II
843-383-4571 E-mail: bbd@nrc.gov
Kim VanDoom, Rgn II
423-365-5487 E-mail: pkv@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\TAG\\INEDG
- See previous concurrence
- Concurred by e-mail
,nnv nf fhiq dMmcimpnt IndictA in the box C=Cony wlo attachment/enclosure E=CoDv with attachmentlenclosure N = No copy
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NAME
T. Greene
R. Sanders*
B. Desai**
P. K. VanDoom**
DATE
? 1/7 /98
07/30/98
08/17/98
08/17/98
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illustrates configuration contrLIlnerabilities that were not identified 1.6-Aon-licensed operator
plant tours, because the components were not specifically listed in their verification checklists.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. However, recipients are
reminded that they are required to consider industry-wide operating experience (including NRC
information notices) where practical, when setting goals and performing periodic evaluations
under Section 50.65, "Requirement for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear
power plants," to Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Reaulations.) If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contac listed below
or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Jack W. Roe, Acting Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Binoy B. Desai, Rgn II
Kim VanDoom, Rgn II
843-383-4571
423-365-5487 E-mail: bbdenrc.gov
E-mail: pkv@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box C=Copy wlo attachmentlenclosure E=Copy with attachmentlenclosure N = No copy
[OFFICE
PECB:DRPM I E
Tech Editor
I N
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NAME
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P. K. VanDoomr
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DATE
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