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{{#Wiki_filter:X 71 C sa'UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001February 27, 1998NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 98-07: OFFSITE POWER RELIABILITY CHALLENGES FROMINDUSTRY DEREGULATION
{{#Wiki_filter:X 71 C sa'UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
 
COMMISSION
 
===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION===
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 February 27, 1998 NRC INFORMATION
 
NOTICE 98-07: OFFSITE POWER RELIABILITY
 
CHALLENGES
 
===FROM INDUSTRY DEREGULATION===


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors except those who have ceasedoperations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the vessel.
All holders of operating
 
licenses for nuclear power reactors except those who have ceased operations
 
and have certified
 
that fuel has been permanently
 
removed from the vessel.


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alertaddressees to a potential concern relating to electric power industry deregulation that couldadversely affect the reliability of offsite power sources, i.e., power from the transmission systemgrid to nuclear power plants. It is expected that recipients will review the information forapplicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate. However, suggestionscontained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action orwritten response to this notice is required.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 
Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
 
notice to alert addressees
 
to a potential
 
concern relating to electric power industry deregulation
 
that could adversely
 
affect the reliability
 
of offsite power sources, i.e., power from the transmission
 
system grid to nuclear power plants. It is expected that recipients
 
will review the information
 
for applicability
 
to their facilities
 
and consider actions, as appropriate.
 
===However, suggestions===
contained
 
in this information
 
notice are not NRC requirements;  
therefore, no specific action or written response to this notice is required.Description
 
of Circumstances
 
On July 11, 1989, safety systems at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station experienced
 
a sustained degraded voltage condition
 
and as a result the safety buses were automatically
 
transferred
 
from the offsite power system to onsite standby diesel generators.
 
The degraded condition
 
was caused by a turbine trip and deficiencies
 
in the offsite power system's transmission
 
network equipment.
 
The transfer of power supplies was initiated
 
by operation
 
of degraded voltage protective
 
relays, as designed.
 
Non-safety
 
system loads remained operable while being powered for approximately
 
1 hour from the degraded offsite power source. (LER 50-395/89-012)
On November 5, 1991, the licensee for Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 reported that, had its 500kV auto-transformer
 
been lost during summer peak conditions, the 161kV system might not have been able to maintain adequate voltages to support the operation
 
of the safety system loads of both units. (LER 50-313/91-010)
On April 15, 1992, Northeast
 
Nuclear Energy Company reported that under certain operating conditions
 
of the transmission
 
network (i.e., during heavy load conditions), a failure of transmission
 
system equipment
 
may cause a trip of all three Millstone
 
units and a loss of offsite power to the station. This operating
 
condition
 
was precipitated
 
by the economic displacement
 
of oil-fired
 
generating
 
units by non-utility
 
generators
 
and by the addition of other generating
 
capacity (Seabrook
 
and Hydro-Quebec)
to the transmission
 
network. (LER 50-245/92-020)
?PD 1re-F Normf, 1g-0o7 80a.2 7 q ~ r 1l~lill~lill~lill~lililuill1!\i
 
IN -07 February 27, 1998 On April 14, 1993, Wisconsin
 
Public Service Corporation
 
reported that under certain transmission
 
line contingencies, a potential
 
existed for the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant grid to become unstable and cause all offsite power sources into the plant to trip. (Ref: LER 50-305/93-010)
On December 30, 1993, Northeast
 
Nuclear Energy Company reported that under certain operating
 
conditions
 
of the transmission
 
network (i.e., Millstone
 
Units 2 and 3 off line), the transmission
 
network may not have sufficient
 
capacity to permit the continued
 
operation
 
of safety system loads from offsite sources following
 
a trip of Millstone
 
Unit 1. (LER 50-245/94-001)
On August 8, 1995, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) reported that under certain operating
 
conditions (i.e., a high system load with a specific 230kV transmission
 
line out of service), the transmission
 
network may not have sufficient
 
capacity to permit the continued operation
 
of the safety system loads from offsite sources following
 
a trip of one of the two Diablo Canyon units. (Ref: LER 50-275/95-007)
On August 10, 1996, a transmission
 
line sagged into a tree in Oregon creating a ground fault that progressed
 
into a major fault on the western Interconnection.
 
The subsequent
 
transient
 
resulted in the tripping of both Diablo Canyon, Units 1 and 2 (LER 50-275/96-012)
and Palo Verde, Units 1 and 3 (LER 50-528/004).
 
During the summer of 1997, concerns were expressed
 
about the impact of electric peak conditions
 
on the offsite power sources for nuclear power plants located in the Midwest and New England. In addition, the licensee for Clinton nuclear station sought an exemption
 
from offsite power regulatory
 
requirements
 
because of its analysis that offsite power would become inadequate
 
under certain summer peak conditions
 
following
 
the loss of the nuclear unit.Recent NRC inspection
 
findings and Licensee Event Reports have indicated
 
instances
 
when grid stability
 
analyses had not been updated by the licensees
 
to reflect changes in the grid power system. Office for Analysis and Evaluation
 
of Operational
 
Data study C97-01, "Grid Performance
 
Factors" dated March 20, 1997, identified
 
a Oneed to monitor grid conditions
 
on a regular basis." Discussion
 
In 1988, NRC issued the station blackout (SBO) rule. The requirements
 
of 10 CFR 50.63, "Loss of All Alternating
 
Current Power," specify that each light-water-cooled
 
nuclear power plant be able to withstand
 
and recover from an SBO (i.e., a loss of offsite and onsite emergency
 
ac power sources) for a specified
 
period. The NRC review of licensees'
analyses to assess the vulnerability
 
of offsite power and the time required for recovery indicated
 
that for most nuclear power plant sites the grid was stable and reliable.Historically, grid control is decentralized
 
and each utility or a small group of utilities
 
forms a control area containing
 
customers
 
for which it Is jurisdictionally
 
responsible.
 
The control areas form reliability
 
councils that establish
 
operating
 
standards
 
by consensus.
 
These agreements, in turn, became the factors that determine
 
the reliability
 
of the grid and the bases for the availability
 
of the offsite power system. Although the grid operating
 
standards
 
that evolved in the past provided reasonable
 
grid reliability, events like those discussed
 
herein reveal vulnerabilities
 
of the electrical
 
grid either through actual challenges
 
or through licensee's
 
analyses to assess the adequacy of the offsite power system.
 
INS '7 Feb,--dry
 
27, 1998 The present grid management
 
may be dismantled
 
or restructured
 
by two factors that are emerging:
non-utility
 
generation
 
and deregulation.
 
It Is anticipated
 
that in the future, power suppliers, whether utilities
 
or independent
 
power producers, will actively compete for sales to customers
 
who may be located anywhere on the power grid. This option creates multiple combinations
 
of generating
 
units going on and off the grid based on economic and performance
 
related consequences.
 
Regional grid control could be the responsibility
 
of centralized
 
independent
 
system operators (ISOs). The responsibilities
 
and authority
 
of an ISO are yet to be defined, but It is expected that the ISO, or a similar entity, will be charged with maintaining
 
grid reliability
 
to facilitate
 
the marketing
 
of power. It is uncertain
 
how the historic mechanisms
 
for reliable operation
 
will change under the new grid operational
 
structure.
 
The Department
 
of Energy has sponsored
 
a Task Force on Electric System Reliability
 
to examine the implications
 
of industry deregulation
 
on the Nation's electric power supply.The capacity and capability
 
of the offsite power system for each nuclear power plant could be significantly
 
influenced
 
by the decisions
 
emerging from these forthcoming
 
changes. Since the capability
 
of the offsite power cannot be tested except when challenged
 
in an actual event, the design bases of the offsite power can only be assured through an enveloping
 
analysis that accounts for the full spectrum of grid loading and transient
 
conditions
 
that support the operability
 
of safety systems. The NRC Standard Review Plan Section 8.2 provides current guidance for assessing
 
the adequacy of the offsite power system. It addresses
 
grid analyses that demonstrate
 
acceptable
 
voltage and frequency
 
when subjected
 
to scenarios
 
involving
 
loss of nuclear unit generation, loss of the largest other unit, or loss of the most critical transmission
 
line.Although the above events discussed
 
may not demonstrate
 
present generic weaknesses
 
in licensees'
processes, it is vital that licensees
 
continue to ensure that the design bases with respect to the reliability
 
and stability
 
of the offsite power sources do not degrade during the life of the nuclear facility.
 
The capacity and capability
 
of the offsite power system for nuclear power plants are important
 
elements to be factored into the management
 
of the changes resulting
 
from industry deregulation.
 
This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions about the information
 
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
 
contacts listed below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.orig /s/'d by Jack W. Roe, Acting Director Division of Reactor Program Management
 
===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Technical
 
Contacts:
Ronaldo V. Jenkins, NRR Thomas Koshy, NRR 301415-2985
301415-1 176 E-Mail: rvj2nrc.gov
 
E-Mail: txk@nrc.gov
 
A-1T E~A FiL ;1 JAckETF Attachment:
Ust of recently issued Information
 
Notices OGC Concurrence (R. K Hoefling)
214198, PGEB Id 2/17198 (T. Essig), AEOD Idc 2/12/98 (E.Rossi)
& Tech Editor 1/27/98 DOCUMENT NAME: S:%DRPM SEC\98-07.IN
 
-SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
 
To receive a copy of Nhis document, Indicate In the box C=Copy wlo attachmentlenclosure
 
E=Copy with attachmenUendosure
 
N = No copy l OFFICE PECB I EELB I IEELB I PECB L PECB I DRPM A NAME TKoshy* RJenkins*
JCalvo* RDennig* SRichards*
JRoe*DATE 2/2/98 j 2/2/98 j 2/2/98 2/10/98 2/11/98 2/17/98 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
 
Attachment
 
IN 98-07 February 27, 1998 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
 
NOTICES Information
 
Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 98-06 Unauthorized
 
Use of Ucense to 2/19198 All NRC licensees
 
authorized
 
to Obtain Radioactive
 
Materials, And Its Implications
 
Under The Expanded Title 18 of the U.S. Code Environmental
 
===Qualification===
Deficiency
 
for Cables and Containment
 
Penetration
 
Pigtails possess licensed material 97-45, Supp. 1 2/17/98 All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors except those licensees who have permanently
 
ceased operations
 
and have certified
 
that the fuel has been permanently
 
removed from the reactor vessel 98-05 98-04 98-03 98-02 98-01 97-91 97-90 Criminal History Record Information
 
1997 Enforcement
 
Sanctions
 
for deliberate
 
Violations
 
of NRC Employee Protection
 
requirements
 
Inadequate
 
Verification
 
of Overcurrent
 
Trip Setpoints
 
in Metal-Clad, Low-Voltage
 
Circuit Breakers Nuclear Power Plant Cold Weather Problems and Protective
 
Measures Thefts of Portable Gauges Recent Failures of Control Cables Used on Amersham Model 660 Posilock Radiography
 
===Systems Use of Nonconservative===
Acceptance
 
Criteria in Safety-Related
 
Pump Surveillance
 
Tests 2111/98 2/9/98 1/21/98 1/21/98 1/15/98 12/31/97 12/30/97 All holders of operating licenses for power reactors All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 
Commission
 
licensees All holders of operating
 
licenses for nuclear power reactors All holders of operating
 
licenses for nuclear power reactors All portable gauge licensees All industrial
 
radiography
 
licensees All holders of OLs for nuclear power reactors except those who have ceased operations
 
and have certified
 
that fuel has been permanently
 
removed from the vessel OL = Operating
 
License CP = Construction
 
Permit
 
IN9' Y , Feb~Uyxx, 1998 The present grid management
 
may be dismantled
 
or restructured
 
by two factors that are emerging:
non-utility
 
generation
 
and deregulation.
 
It Is anticipated
 
that in the future, power suppliers, whether utilities
 
or independent
 
power producers, will actively compete for sales to customers
 
who may be located anywhere on the power grid. This option creates multiple combinations
 
of generating
 
units going on and off the grid based on economic and performance
 
related consequences.
 
Regional grid control could be the responsibility
 
of centralized
 
independent
 
system operators (ISOs). The responsibilities
 
and authority
 
of an ISO are yet to be defined, but it Is expected that the ISO, or a similar entity, will be charged with maintaining
 
grid reliability
 
to facilitate
 
the marketing
 
of power. It is uncertain
 
how the historic mechanisms
 
for reliable operation
 
will change under the new grid operational
 
structure.
 
The Department
 
of Energy has sponsored
 
a Task Force on Electric System Reliability
 
to examine the implications
 
of industry deregulation
 
on the Nation's electric power supply.The capacity and capability
 
of the offsite power system for each nuclear power plant could be significantly
 
influenced
 
by the decisions
 
emerging from these forthcoming
 
changes. Since the capability
 
of the offsite power cannot be tested except when challenged
 
in an actual event, the design bases of the offsite power can only be assured through an enveloping
 
analysis that accounts for the full spectrum of grid loading and transient
 
conditions
 
that support the operability
 
of safety systems. The NRC Standard Review Plan Section 8.2 provides current guidance for assessing
 
the adequacy of the offsite power system. It addresses
 
grid analyses that demonstrate
 
acceptable
 
voltage and frequency
 
when subjected
 
to scenarios
 
Involving
 
loss of nuclear unit generation, loss of the largest other unit, or loss of the most critical transmission
 
line.Although the above events discussed
 
may not demonstrate
 
present generic weaknesses
 
in licensees'
processes, it is vital that licensees
 
continue to ensure that the design bases with respect to the reliability
 
and stability
 
of the offsite power sources do not degrade during the life of the nuclear facility.
 
The capacity and capability
 
of the offsite power system for nuclear power plants are important
 
elements to be factored into the management
 
of the changes resulting
 
from industry deregulation.
 
This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions about the information
 
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
 
contacts listed below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Jack W. Roe, Acting Director Division of Reactor Program Management
 
===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Technical
 
Contacts:
Ronaldo V. Jenkins, NRR Thomas Koshy, NRR 301-415-2985
301-415-1176 E-Mail: rvjenrc.gov
 
E-Mail: txk@nrc.gov
 
Attachment:
List of recently issued Information
 
Notices OGC Concurrence (R. K Hoefling)
2/4198 DOCUMENT NAME: G:ITXK\GRIDIN2.1WPD
 
-'SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
 
To receive a copy of this document indicate In the box C=Copy wlo aftachmentlenclosure
 
E d: .ATo osure N = No copy[OFFICE lPECB lI EELB 1 _ EELB l PECB lI PECB I DRPM NAME TKoshy* RJenkins*
JCalvo* RDennig* lSRichards'Jle
 
l DATE j 2/2/98 [2/2/98 2/2/98 j 2/10/98 l- ;1 /98 1/ 1/98_J___A_ 18- .8--OFFICIAL RECORD COPY t CM I Tre
 
ING' x Febkty xx, 1998 The present grid management
 
may be dismantled
 
or restructured
 
by two factors that are emerging:
non-utility
 
generation
 
and deregulation.
 
It is anticipated
 
that in the future, power suppliers, whether utilities
 
or Independent
 
power producers, will a6tively compete for sales to customers
 
who may be located anywhere on the power grid. This option creates multiple combinations
 
of generating
 
units going on and off the grid based on economic and performance
 
related consequences.
 
Regional grid control could be the responsibility
 
of centralized
 
independent
 
system operators (ISOs). The responsibilities
 
and authority
 
of an ISO are yet to be defined, but it is expected that the ISO, or a similar entity, will be charged with maintaining
 
grid reliability
 
to facilitate
 
the marketing
 
of power. It is uncertain
 
how the historic mechanisms
 
for reliable operation
 
will change under the new grid operational
 
structure.
 
The Department
 
of Energy has sponsored
 
a Task Force on Electric System Reliability
 
to examine the implications
 
of industry deregulation
 
on the Nation's electric power supply.The capacity and capability
 
of the offsite power system for each nuclear power plant could be significantly
 
influenced
 
by the decisions
 
emerging from these forthcoming
 
changes. Since the capability
 
of the offsite power cannot be tested except when challenged
 
in an actual event, the design bases of the offsite power can only be assured through an enveloping
 
analysis that accounts for the full spectrum of grid loading and transient
 
conditions
 
that support the operability
 
of safety systems. The NRC Standard Review Plan Section 8.2 provides current guidance for assessing
 
the adequacy of the offsite power system. It addresses
 
grid analyses that demonstrate
 
acceptable
 
voltage and frequency
 
when subjected
 
to scenarios
 
involving
 
loss of nuclear unit generation, loss of the largest other unit, or loss of the most critical transmission
 
line.Although the above events discussed
 
may not demonstrate
 
present generic weakness in licensees'
process, it is vital that licensees
 
continue to ensure that the design bases with respect to the reliability
 
and stability
 
of the offsite power sources do not degrade during the life of the nuclear facility.
 
The capacity and capability
 
of the offsite power system for nuclear power plants are important
 
elements to be factored into the management
 
of the changes resulting
 
from industry deregulation.
 
This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions about the information
 
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
 
contacts listed below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Jack W. Roe, Acting Director Division of Reactor Program Management
 
===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Technical
 
Contacts:
Ronaldo V. Jenkins, NRR Thomas Koshy, NRR 301-415-2985
301-415-1176 E-Mail: rvjenrc.gov
 
E-Mail: txk@nrc.gov
 
Attachment:
List of recently issued Information
 
Notices OGC Concurrence (R. K Hoefling)
2/4/98 DOCUMENT NAME: G:ITXK\GRIDIN2.1WPD
 
-SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
 
To receive a copy of this document, idicate hi the box C=Copy wlo attachmentlenclosure
 
E=Copy with attachmentlenclosure
 
N = No copylOFFICE PECB I EELB _L EELB I -PECB l- DRPM_NAME TKoshyl RJenkins*
JCalvo* g ~ nig SRichards
 
JRoel DATE I /== 2/2/9f 1 2/219 i ,I °B9% l I / I9t OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
 
IN "x February xx, 1998 This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
 
contacts listed below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Jack W. Roe, Acting Director Division of Reactor Program Management
 
===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Technical
 
Contacts: Ronaldo V. Jenkins, NRR 301-415-2985 E-Mail: rvjenrc.gov


==Description of Circumstances==
Thomas Koshy, NRR 301-415-1176 E-Mail: txkenrc.gov
On July 11, 1989, safety systems at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station experienced a sustaineddegraded voltage condition and as a result the safety buses were automatically transferred fromthe offsite power system to onsite standby diesel generators. The degraded condition wascaused by a turbine trip and deficiencies in the offsite power system's transmission networkequipment. The transfer of power supplies was initiated by operation of degraded voltageprotective relays, as designed. Non-safety system loads remained operable while being poweredfor approximately 1 hour from the degraded offsite power source. (LER 50-395/89-012)On November 5, 1991, the licensee for Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 reported that, hadits 500kV auto-transformer been lost during summer peak conditions, the 161kV system mightnot have been able to maintain adequate voltages to support the operation of the safety systemloads of both units. (LER 50-313/91-010)On April 15, 1992, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company reported that under certain operatingconditions of the transmission network (i.e., during heavy load conditions), a failure oftransmission system equipment may cause a trip of all three Millstone units and a loss of offsitepower to the station. This operating condition was precipitated by the economic displacementof oil-fired generating units by non-utility generators and by the addition of other generatingcapacity (Seabrook and Hydro-Quebec) to the transmission network. (LER 50-245/92-020)?PD 1re-F Normf, 1g-0o7 80a.2 7q ~ r 1l~lill~lill~lill~lililuill1!\i


IN -07February 27, 1998 On April 14, 1993, Wisconsin Public Service Corporation reported that under certain transmissionline contingencies, a potential existed for the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant grid to becomeunstable and cause all offsite power sources into the plant to trip. (Ref: LER 50-305/93-010)On December 30, 1993, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company reported that under certainoperating conditions of the transmission network (i.e., Millstone Units 2 and 3 off line), thetransmission network may not have sufficient capacity to permit the continued operation of safetysystem loads from offsite sources following a trip of Millstone Unit 1. (LER 50-245/94-001)On August 8, 1995, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) reported that under certainoperating conditions (i.e., a high system load with a specific 230kV transmission line out ofservice), the transmission network may not have sufficient capacity to permit the continuedoperation of the safety system loads from offsite sources following a trip of one of the two DiabloCanyon units. (Ref: LER 50-275/95-007)On August 10, 1996, a transmission line sagged into a tree in Oregon creating a ground fault thatprogressed into a major fault on the western Interconnection. The subsequent transient resultedin the tripping of both Diablo Canyon, Units 1 and 2 (LER 50-275/96-012) and Palo Verde, Units 1and 3 (LER 50-528/004).During the summer of 1997, concerns were expressed about the impact of electric peakconditions on the offsite power sources for nuclear power plants located in the Midwest andNew England. In addition, the licensee for Clinton nuclear station sought an exemption fromoffsite power regulatory requirements because of its analysis that offsite power would becomeinadequate under certain summer peak conditions following the loss of the nuclear unit.Recent NRC inspection findings and Licensee Event Reports have indicated instances when gridstability analyses had not been updated by the licensees to reflect changes in the grid powersystem. Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data study C97-01, "Grid PerformanceFactors" dated March 20, 1997, identified a Oneed to monitor grid conditions on a regular basis."DiscussionIn 1988, NRC issued the station blackout (SBO) rule. The requirements of 10 CFR 50.63, "Lossof All Alternating Current Power," specify that each light-water-cooled nuclear power plant beable to withstand and recover from an SBO (i.e., a loss of offsite and onsite emergency ac powersources) for a specified period. The NRC review of licensees' analyses to assess thevulnerability of offsite power and the time required for recovery indicated that for most nuclearpower plant sites the grid was stable and reliable.Historically, grid control is decentralized and each utility or a small group of utilities forms acontrol area containing customers for which it Is jurisdictionally responsible. The control areasform reliability councils that establish operating standards by consensus. These agreements, inturn, became the factors that determine the reliability of the grid and the bases for the availabilityof the offsite power system. Although the grid operating standards that evolved in the pastprovided reasonable grid reliability, events like those discussed herein reveal vulnerabilities ofthe electrical grid either through actual challenges or through licensee's analyses to assess theadequacy of the offsite power system.
Attachment:  
List of recently issued Information


INS '7Feb,--dry 27, 1998 The present grid management may be dismantled or restructured by two factors that areemerging: non-utility generation and deregulation. It Is anticipated that in the future, powersuppliers, whether utilities or independent power producers, will actively compete for sales tocustomers who may be located anywhere on the power grid. This option creates multiplecombinations of generating units going on and off the grid based on economic and performancerelated consequences. Regional grid control could be the responsibility of centralizedindependent system operators (ISOs). The responsibilities and authority of an ISO are yet to bedefined, but It is expected that the ISO, or a similar entity, will be charged with maintaining gridreliability to facilitate the marketing of power. It is uncertain how the historic mechanisms forreliable operation will change under the new grid operational structure. The Department ofEnergy has sponsored a Task Force on Electric System Reliability to examine the implications ofindustry deregulation on the Nation's electric power supply.The capacity and capability of the offsite power system for each nuclear power plant could besignificantly influenced by the decisions emerging from these forthcoming changes. Since thecapability of the offsite power cannot be tested except when challenged in an actual event, thedesign bases of the offsite power can only be assured through an enveloping analysis thataccounts for the full spectrum of grid loading and transient conditions that support the operabilityof safety systems. The NRC Standard Review Plan Section 8.2 provides current guidance forassessing the adequacy of the offsite power system. It addresses grid analyses thatdemonstrate acceptable voltage and frequency when subjected to scenarios involving loss ofnuclear unit generation, loss of the largest other unit, or loss of the most critical transmission line.Although the above events discussed may not demonstrate present generic weaknesses inlicensees' processes, it is vital that licensees continue to ensure that the design bases withrespect to the reliability and stability of the offsite power sources do not degrade during the life ofthe nuclear facility. The capacity and capability of the offsite power system for nuclear powerplants are important elements to be factored into the management of the changes resulting fromindustry deregulation.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questionsabout the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed below orthe appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.orig /s/'d byJack W. Roe, Acting DirectorDivision of Reactor Program ManagementOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical Contacts: Ronaldo V. Jenkins, NRR Thomas Koshy, NRR301415-2985 301415-1 176E-Mail: rvj2nrc.gov E-Mail: txk@nrc.govA-1T E~A FiL ;1 JAckETFAttachment: Ust of recently issued Information NoticesOGC Concurrence (R. K Hoefling) 214198, PGEB Id 2/17198 (T. Essig),AEOD Idc 2/12/98 (E.Rossi) & Tech Editor 1/27/98DOCUMENT NAME: S:%DRPM SEC\98-07.IN -SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCETo receive a copy of Nhis document, Indicate In the box C=Copy wlo attachmentlenclosure E=Copy with attachmenUendosure N = No copylOFFICE PECB I EELB I IEELB I PECB L PECB I DRPM ANAME TKoshy* RJenkins* JCalvo* RDennig* SRichards* JRoe*DATE 2/2/98 j 2/2/98 j 2/2/98 2/10/98 2/11/98 2/17/98OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Notices DOCUMENT NAME: G:\TXKAGRIDIN2.1WPD


AttachmentIN 98-07February 27, 1998 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to98-06 Unauthorized Use of Ucense to 2/19198 All NRC licensees authorized toObtain Radioactive Materials,And Its Implications Under TheExpanded Title 18 of theU.S. CodeEnvironmental QualificationDeficiency for Cables andContainment PenetrationPigtailspossess licensed material97-45, Supp. 12/17/98All holders of operatinglicenses for nuclear powerreactors except those licenseeswho have permanently ceasedoperations and have certified thatthe fuel has been permanentlyremoved from the reactor vessel98-0598-0498-0398-0298-0197-9197-90Criminal History RecordInformation1997 Enforcement Sanctions fordeliberate Violations of NRCEmployee Protection requirementsInadequate Verification ofOvercurrent Trip Setpoints inMetal-Clad, Low-VoltageCircuit BreakersNuclear Power Plant ColdWeather Problems andProtective MeasuresThefts of Portable GaugesRecent Failures of ControlCables Used on AmershamModel 660 Posilock RadiographySystemsUse of NonconservativeAcceptance Criteria inSafety-Related PumpSurveillance Tests2111/982/9/981/21/981/21/981/15/9812/31/9712/30/97All holders of operatinglicenses for power reactorsAll U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission licenseesAll holders of operating licensesfor nuclear power reactorsAll holders of operating licensesfor nuclear power reactorsAll portable gauge licenseesAll industrial radiographylicenseesAll holders of OLs for nuclearpower reactors except thosewho have ceased operationsand have certified that fuel hasbeen permanently removed fromthe vesselOL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box C=Copy wlo atachment/enclosure


IN9' Y, Feb~Uyxx, 1998 The present grid management may be dismantled or restructured by two factors that areemerging: non-utility generation and deregulation. It Is anticipated that in the future, powersuppliers, whether utilities or independent power producers, will actively compete for sales tocustomers who may be located anywhere on the power grid. This option creates multiplecombinations of generating units going on and off the grid based on economic and performancerelated consequences. Regional grid control could be the responsibility of centralizedindependent system operators (ISOs). The responsibilities and authority of an ISO are yet to bedefined, but it Is expected that the ISO, or a similar entity, will be charged with maintaining gridreliability to facilitate the marketing of power. It is uncertain how the historic mechanisms forreliable operation will change under the new grid operational structure. The Department ofEnergy has sponsored a Task Force on Electric System Reliability to examine the implications ofindustry deregulation on the Nation's electric power supply.The capacity and capability of the offsite power system for each nuclear power plant could besignificantly influenced by the decisions emerging from these forthcoming changes. Since thecapability of the offsite power cannot be tested except when challenged in an actual event, thedesign bases of the offsite power can only be assured through an enveloping analysis thataccounts for the full spectrum of grid loading and transient conditions that support the operabilityof safety systems. The NRC Standard Review Plan Section 8.2 provides current guidance forassessing the adequacy of the offsite power system. It addresses grid analyses thatdemonstrate acceptable voltage and frequency when subjected to scenarios Involving loss ofnuclear unit generation, loss of the largest other unit, or loss of the most critical transmission line.Although the above events discussed may not demonstrate present generic weaknesses inlicensees' processes, it is vital that licensees continue to ensure that the design bases withrespect to the reliability and stability of the offsite power sources do not degrade during the life ofthe nuclear facility. The capacity and capability of the offsite power system for nuclear powerplants are important elements to be factored into the management of the changes resulting fromindustry deregulation.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questionsabout the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed below orthe appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Jack W. Roe, Acting DirectorDivision of Reactor Program ManagementOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical Contacts: Ronaldo V. Jenkins, NRR Thomas Koshy, NRR301-415-2985 301-415-1176E-Mail: rvjenrc.gov E-Mail: txk@nrc.govAttachment: List of recently issued Information NoticesOGC Concurrence (R. K Hoefling) 2/4198DOCUMENT NAME: G:ITXK\GRIDIN2.1WPD -'SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCETo receive a copy of this document indicate In the box C=Copy wlo aftachmentlenclosure E d: .ATo osure N = No copy[OFFICE lPECB lI EELB 1 _ EELB l PECB lI PECB I DRPMNAME TKoshy* RJenkins* JCalvo* RDennig* lSRichards'Jlel DATE j 2/2/98 [2/2/98 2/2/98 j 2/10/98 l- ;1 /98 1/ 1/98_J___A_ 18- .8--OFFICIAL RECORD COPY t CM ITre
E=Copy with attachment/enclosure


ING' xFebkty xx, 1998 The present grid management may be dismantled or restructured by two factors that areemerging: non-utility generation and deregulation. It is anticipated that in the future, powersuppliers, whether utilities or Independent power producers, will a6tively compete for sales tocustomers who may be located anywhere on the power grid. This option creates multiplecombinations of generating units going on and off the grid based on economic and performancerelated consequences. Regional grid control could be the responsibility of centralizedindependent system operators (ISOs). The responsibilities and authority of an ISO are yet to bedefined, but it is expected that the ISO, or a similar entity, will be charged with maintaining gridreliability to facilitate the marketing of power. It is uncertain how the historic mechanisms forreliable operation will change under the new grid operational structure. The Department ofEnergy has sponsored a Task Force on Electric System Reliability to examine the implications ofindustry deregulation on the Nation's electric power supply.The capacity and capability of the offsite power system for each nuclear power plant could besignificantly influenced by the decisions emerging from these forthcoming changes. Since thecapability of the offsite power cannot be tested except when challenged in an actual event, thedesign bases of the offsite power can only be assured through an enveloping analysis thataccounts for the full spectrum of grid loading and transient conditions that support the operabilityof safety systems. The NRC Standard Review Plan Section 8.2 provides current guidance forassessing the adequacy of the offsite power system. It addresses grid analyses thatdemonstrate acceptable voltage and frequency when subjected to scenarios involving loss ofnuclear unit generation, loss of the largest other unit, or loss of the most critical transmission line.Although the above events discussed may not demonstrate present generic weakness inlicensees' process, it is vital that licensees continue to ensure that the design bases with respectto the reliability and stability of the offsite power sources do not degrade during the life of thenuclear facility. The capacity and capability of the offsite power system for nuclear power plantsare important elements to be factored into the management of the changes resulting fromindustry deregulation.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questionsabout the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed below orthe appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Jack W. Roe, Acting DirectorDivision of Reactor Program ManagementOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical Contacts: Ronaldo V. Jenkins, NRR Thomas Koshy, NRR301-415-2985 301-415-1176E-Mail: rvjenrc.gov E-Mail: txk@nrc.govAttachment: List of recently issued Information NoticesOGC Concurrence (R. K Hoefling) 2/4/98DOCUMENT NAME: G:ITXK\GRIDIN2.1WPD -SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCETo receive a copy of this document, idicate hi the box C=Copy wlo attachmentlenclosure E=Copy with attachmentlenclosure N = No copylOFFICE PECB I EELB _L EELB I -PECB l- DRPM_NAME TKoshyl RJenkins* JCalvo* g ~ nig SRichards JRoel DATE I /== 2/2/9f 1 2/219 i ,I °B9% l I / I9tOFFICIAL RECORD COPY
N = No copy OFFICE l PECB lEELB EELB I El PECB I PECB l lDRPMl NAME s RJenkins JCalvo /1 RDennig SRichards


IN "xFebruary xx, 1998 
JRoel DATE 121249 I L,-,9l 212/t9 I / , I I,9 , / W OFFICIAL RECORD COPY}}
}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Revision as of 14:10, 31 August 2018

Offsite Power Reliability Challenges from Industry Deregulation
ML031050278
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 02/27/1998
From: Roe J W
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-98-007, NUDOCS 9802240067
Download: ML031050278 (7)
v • d • e


X 71 C sa'UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 February 27, 1998 NRC INFORMATION

NOTICE 98-07: OFFSITE POWER RELIABILITY

CHALLENGES

FROM INDUSTRY DEREGULATION

Addressees

All holders of operating

licenses for nuclear power reactors except those who have ceased operations

and have certified

that fuel has been permanently

removed from the vessel.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice to alert addressees

to a potential

concern relating to electric power industry deregulation

that could adversely

affect the reliability

of offsite power sources, i.e., power from the transmission

system grid to nuclear power plants. It is expected that recipients

will review the information

for applicability

to their facilities

and consider actions, as appropriate.

However, suggestions

contained

in this information

notice are not NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action or written response to this notice is required.Description

of Circumstances

On July 11, 1989, safety systems at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station experienced

a sustained degraded voltage condition

and as a result the safety buses were automatically

transferred

from the offsite power system to onsite standby diesel generators.

The degraded condition

was caused by a turbine trip and deficiencies

in the offsite power system's transmission

network equipment.

The transfer of power supplies was initiated

by operation

of degraded voltage protective

relays, as designed.

Non-safety

system loads remained operable while being powered for approximately

1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> from the degraded offsite power source. (LER 50-395/89-012)

On November 5, 1991, the licensee for Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 reported that, had its 500kV auto-transformer

been lost during summer peak conditions, the 161kV system might not have been able to maintain adequate voltages to support the operation

of the safety system loads of both units. (LER 50-313/91-010)

On April 15, 1992, Northeast

Nuclear Energy Company reported that under certain operating conditions

of the transmission

network (i.e., during heavy load conditions), a failure of transmission

system equipment

may cause a trip of all three Millstone

units and a loss of offsite power to the station. This operating

condition

was precipitated

by the economic displacement

of oil-fired

generating

units by non-utility

generators

and by the addition of other generating

capacity (Seabrook

and Hydro-Quebec)

to the transmission

network. (LER 50-245/92-020)

?PD 1re-F Normf, 1g-0o7 80a.2 7 q ~ r 1l~lill~lill~lill~lililuill1!\i

IN -07 February 27, 1998 On April 14, 1993, Wisconsin

Public Service Corporation

reported that under certain transmission

line contingencies, a potential

existed for the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant grid to become unstable and cause all offsite power sources into the plant to trip. (Ref: LER 50-305/93-010)

On December 30, 1993, Northeast

Nuclear Energy Company reported that under certain operating

conditions

of the transmission

network (i.e., Millstone

Units 2 and 3 off line), the transmission

network may not have sufficient

capacity to permit the continued

operation

of safety system loads from offsite sources following

a trip of Millstone

Unit 1. (LER 50-245/94-001)

On August 8, 1995, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) reported that under certain operating

conditions (i.e., a high system load with a specific 230kV transmission

line out of service), the transmission

network may not have sufficient

capacity to permit the continued operation

of the safety system loads from offsite sources following

a trip of one of the two Diablo Canyon units. (Ref: LER 50-275/95-007)

On August 10, 1996, a transmission

line sagged into a tree in Oregon creating a ground fault that progressed

into a major fault on the western Interconnection.

The subsequent

transient

resulted in the tripping of both Diablo Canyon, Units 1 and 2 (LER 50-275/96-012)

and Palo Verde, Units 1 and 3 (LER 50-528/004).

During the summer of 1997, concerns were expressed

about the impact of electric peak conditions

on the offsite power sources for nuclear power plants located in the Midwest and New England. In addition, the licensee for Clinton nuclear station sought an exemption

from offsite power regulatory

requirements

because of its analysis that offsite power would become inadequate

under certain summer peak conditions

following

the loss of the nuclear unit.Recent NRC inspection

findings and Licensee Event Reports have indicated

instances

when grid stability

analyses had not been updated by the licensees

to reflect changes in the grid power system. Office for Analysis and Evaluation

of Operational

Data study C97-01, "Grid Performance

Factors" dated March 20, 1997, identified

a Oneed to monitor grid conditions

on a regular basis." Discussion

In 1988, NRC issued the station blackout (SBO) rule. The requirements

of 10 CFR 50.63, "Loss of All Alternating

Current Power," specify that each light-water-cooled

nuclear power plant be able to withstand

and recover from an SBO (i.e., a loss of offsite and onsite emergency

ac power sources) for a specified

period. The NRC review of licensees'

analyses to assess the vulnerability

of offsite power and the time required for recovery indicated

that for most nuclear power plant sites the grid was stable and reliable.Historically, grid control is decentralized

and each utility or a small group of utilities

forms a control area containing

customers

for which it Is jurisdictionally

responsible.

The control areas form reliability

councils that establish

operating

standards

by consensus.

These agreements, in turn, became the factors that determine

the reliability

of the grid and the bases for the availability

of the offsite power system. Although the grid operating

standards

that evolved in the past provided reasonable

grid reliability, events like those discussed

herein reveal vulnerabilities

of the electrical

grid either through actual challenges

or through licensee's

analyses to assess the adequacy of the offsite power system.

INS '7 Feb,--dry

27, 1998 The present grid management

may be dismantled

or restructured

by two factors that are emerging:

non-utility

generation

and deregulation.

It Is anticipated

that in the future, power suppliers, whether utilities

or independent

power producers, will actively compete for sales to customers

who may be located anywhere on the power grid. This option creates multiple combinations

of generating

units going on and off the grid based on economic and performance

related consequences.

Regional grid control could be the responsibility

of centralized

independent

system operators (ISOs). The responsibilities

and authority

of an ISO are yet to be defined, but It is expected that the ISO, or a similar entity, will be charged with maintaining

grid reliability

to facilitate

the marketing

of power. It is uncertain

how the historic mechanisms

for reliable operation

will change under the new grid operational

structure.

The Department

of Energy has sponsored

a Task Force on Electric System Reliability

to examine the implications

of industry deregulation

on the Nation's electric power supply.The capacity and capability

of the offsite power system for each nuclear power plant could be significantly

influenced

by the decisions

emerging from these forthcoming

changes. Since the capability

of the offsite power cannot be tested except when challenged

in an actual event, the design bases of the offsite power can only be assured through an enveloping

analysis that accounts for the full spectrum of grid loading and transient

conditions

that support the operability

of safety systems. The NRC Standard Review Plan Section 8.2 provides current guidance for assessing

the adequacy of the offsite power system. It addresses

grid analyses that demonstrate

acceptable

voltage and frequency

when subjected

to scenarios

involving

loss of nuclear unit generation, loss of the largest other unit, or loss of the most critical transmission

line.Although the above events discussed

may not demonstrate

present generic weaknesses

in licensees'

processes, it is vital that licensees

continue to ensure that the design bases with respect to the reliability

and stability

of the offsite power sources do not degrade during the life of the nuclear facility.

The capacity and capability

of the offsite power system for nuclear power plants are important

elements to be factored into the management

of the changes resulting

from industry deregulation.

This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.orig /s/'d by Jack W. Roe, Acting Director Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contacts:

Ronaldo V. Jenkins, NRR Thomas Koshy, NRR 301415-2985

301415-1 176 E-Mail: rvj2nrc.gov

E-Mail: txk@nrc.gov

A-1T E~A FiL ;1 JAckETF Attachment:

Ust of recently issued Information

Notices OGC Concurrence (R. K Hoefling)

214198, PGEB Id 2/17198 (T. Essig), AEOD Idc 2/12/98 (E.Rossi)

& Tech Editor 1/27/98 DOCUMENT NAME: S:%DRPM SEC\98-07.IN

-SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

To receive a copy of Nhis document, Indicate In the box C=Copy wlo attachmentlenclosure

E=Copy with attachmenUendosure

N = No copy l OFFICE PECB I EELB I IEELB I PECB L PECB I DRPM A NAME TKoshy* RJenkins*

JCalvo* RDennig* SRichards*

JRoe*DATE 2/2/98 j 2/2/98 j 2/2/98 2/10/98 2/11/98 2/17/98 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

Attachment

IN 98-07 February 27, 1998 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION

NOTICES Information

Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 98-06 Unauthorized

Use of Ucense to 2/19198 All NRC licensees

authorized

to Obtain Radioactive

Materials, And Its Implications

Under The Expanded Title 18 of the U.S. Code Environmental

Qualification

Deficiency

for Cables and Containment

Penetration

Pigtails possess licensed material 97-45, Supp. 1 2/17/98 All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors except those licensees who have permanently

ceased operations

and have certified

that the fuel has been permanently

removed from the reactor vessel 98-05 98-04 98-03 98-02 98-01 97-91 97-90 Criminal History Record Information

1997 Enforcement

Sanctions

for deliberate

Violations

of NRC Employee Protection

requirements

Inadequate

Verification

of Overcurrent

Trip Setpoints

in Metal-Clad, Low-Voltage

Circuit Breakers Nuclear Power Plant Cold Weather Problems and Protective

Measures Thefts of Portable Gauges Recent Failures of Control Cables Used on Amersham Model 660 Posilock Radiography

Systems Use of Nonconservative

Acceptance

Criteria in Safety-Related

Pump Surveillance

Tests 2111/98 2/9/98 1/21/98 1/21/98 1/15/98 12/31/97 12/30/97 All holders of operating licenses for power reactors All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

licensees All holders of operating

licenses for nuclear power reactors All holders of operating

licenses for nuclear power reactors All portable gauge licensees All industrial

radiography

licensees All holders of OLs for nuclear power reactors except those who have ceased operations

and have certified

that fuel has been permanently

removed from the vessel OL = Operating

License CP = Construction

Permit

IN9' Y , Feb~Uyxx, 1998 The present grid management

may be dismantled

or restructured

by two factors that are emerging:

non-utility

generation

and deregulation.

It Is anticipated

that in the future, power suppliers, whether utilities

or independent

power producers, will actively compete for sales to customers

who may be located anywhere on the power grid. This option creates multiple combinations

of generating

units going on and off the grid based on economic and performance

related consequences.

Regional grid control could be the responsibility

of centralized

independent

system operators (ISOs). The responsibilities

and authority

of an ISO are yet to be defined, but it Is expected that the ISO, or a similar entity, will be charged with maintaining

grid reliability

to facilitate

the marketing

of power. It is uncertain

how the historic mechanisms

for reliable operation

will change under the new grid operational

structure.

The Department

of Energy has sponsored

a Task Force on Electric System Reliability

to examine the implications

of industry deregulation

on the Nation's electric power supply.The capacity and capability

of the offsite power system for each nuclear power plant could be significantly

influenced

by the decisions

emerging from these forthcoming

changes. Since the capability

of the offsite power cannot be tested except when challenged

in an actual event, the design bases of the offsite power can only be assured through an enveloping

analysis that accounts for the full spectrum of grid loading and transient

conditions

that support the operability

of safety systems. The NRC Standard Review Plan Section 8.2 provides current guidance for assessing

the adequacy of the offsite power system. It addresses

grid analyses that demonstrate

acceptable

voltage and frequency

when subjected

to scenarios

Involving

loss of nuclear unit generation, loss of the largest other unit, or loss of the most critical transmission

line.Although the above events discussed

may not demonstrate

present generic weaknesses

in licensees'

processes, it is vital that licensees

continue to ensure that the design bases with respect to the reliability

and stability

of the offsite power sources do not degrade during the life of the nuclear facility.

The capacity and capability

of the offsite power system for nuclear power plants are important

elements to be factored into the management

of the changes resulting

from industry deregulation.

This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Jack W. Roe, Acting Director Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contacts:

Ronaldo V. Jenkins, NRR Thomas Koshy, NRR 301-415-2985

301-415-1176 E-Mail: rvjenrc.gov

E-Mail: txk@nrc.gov

Attachment:

List of recently issued Information

Notices OGC Concurrence (R. K Hoefling)

2/4198 DOCUMENT NAME: G:ITXK\GRIDIN2.1WPD

-'SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

To receive a copy of this document indicate In the box C=Copy wlo aftachmentlenclosure

E d: .ATo osure N = No copy[OFFICE lPECB lI EELB 1 _ EELB l PECB lI PECB I DRPM NAME TKoshy* RJenkins*

JCalvo* RDennig* lSRichards'Jle

l DATE j 2/2/98 [2/2/98 2/2/98 j 2/10/98 l- ;1 /98 1/ 1/98_J___A_ 18- .8--OFFICIAL RECORD COPY t CM I Tre

ING' x Febkty xx, 1998 The present grid management

may be dismantled

or restructured

by two factors that are emerging:

non-utility

generation

and deregulation.

It is anticipated

that in the future, power suppliers, whether utilities

or Independent

power producers, will a6tively compete for sales to customers

who may be located anywhere on the power grid. This option creates multiple combinations

of generating

units going on and off the grid based on economic and performance

related consequences.

Regional grid control could be the responsibility

of centralized

independent

system operators (ISOs). The responsibilities

and authority

of an ISO are yet to be defined, but it is expected that the ISO, or a similar entity, will be charged with maintaining

grid reliability

to facilitate

the marketing

of power. It is uncertain

how the historic mechanisms

for reliable operation

will change under the new grid operational

structure.

The Department

of Energy has sponsored

a Task Force on Electric System Reliability

to examine the implications

of industry deregulation

on the Nation's electric power supply.The capacity and capability

of the offsite power system for each nuclear power plant could be significantly

influenced

by the decisions

emerging from these forthcoming

changes. Since the capability

of the offsite power cannot be tested except when challenged

in an actual event, the design bases of the offsite power can only be assured through an enveloping

analysis that accounts for the full spectrum of grid loading and transient

conditions

that support the operability

of safety systems. The NRC Standard Review Plan Section 8.2 provides current guidance for assessing

the adequacy of the offsite power system. It addresses

grid analyses that demonstrate

acceptable

voltage and frequency

when subjected

to scenarios

involving

loss of nuclear unit generation, loss of the largest other unit, or loss of the most critical transmission

line.Although the above events discussed

may not demonstrate

present generic weakness in licensees'

process, it is vital that licensees

continue to ensure that the design bases with respect to the reliability

and stability

of the offsite power sources do not degrade during the life of the nuclear facility.

The capacity and capability

of the offsite power system for nuclear power plants are important

elements to be factored into the management

of the changes resulting

from industry deregulation.

This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Jack W. Roe, Acting Director Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contacts:

Ronaldo V. Jenkins, NRR Thomas Koshy, NRR 301-415-2985

301-415-1176 E-Mail: rvjenrc.gov

E-Mail: txk@nrc.gov

Attachment:

List of recently issued Information

Notices OGC Concurrence (R. K Hoefling)

2/4/98 DOCUMENT NAME: G:ITXK\GRIDIN2.1WPD

-SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

To receive a copy of this document, idicate hi the box C=Copy wlo attachmentlenclosure

E=Copy with attachmentlenclosure

N = No copylOFFICE PECB I EELB _L EELB I -PECB l- DRPM_NAME TKoshyl RJenkins*

JCalvo* g ~ nig SRichards

JRoel DATE I /== 2/2/9f 1 2/219 i ,I °B9% l I / I9t OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

IN "x February xx, 1998 This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Jack W. Roe, Acting Director Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contacts: Ronaldo V. Jenkins, NRR 301-415-2985 E-Mail: rvjenrc.gov

Thomas Koshy, NRR 301-415-1176 E-Mail: txkenrc.gov

Attachment:

List of recently issued Information

Notices DOCUMENT NAME: G:\TXKAGRIDIN2.1WPD

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N = No copy OFFICE l PECB lEELB EELB I El PECB I PECB l lDRPMl NAME s RJenkins JCalvo /1 RDennig SRichards

JRoel DATE 121249 I L,-,9l 212/t9 I / , I I,9 , / W OFFICIAL RECORD COPY


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