ML15203A970

McGuire 2015-301 Draft Simulator Scenarios

ML15203A970
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	07/22/2015
From:	NRC/RGN-II
To:	Duke Energy Carolinas
References
Download: ML15203A970 (320)

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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Final (Rev_030215) Facility:

McGuire Scenario No.:

1 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Examiners:

Operators:

(SRO) (RO) (BOP) Initial Conditions:

The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Turnover:

The following equipment is Out

-Of-Service: The TD CA Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5 ACTION B. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance. 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD

-9, E-2, "B COLD LEG ACCUMULATOR ABNORMAL PRESSURE," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating). The crew will perform PT/1/A/4600/001, "RCCA Movement Test" upon taking the shift.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*

Event Description 1 LOA HW012 C-RO C-SRO RCCA Withdrawal Test/1C3 HDP Trip 2 PLP 089 C-BOP C(TS)-SRO RCS High Activity due to Crud Burst 3 REM NV0035A C-BOP C-SRO Letdown Valve 1NV

-35A fails CLOSED 4 PLP 014 C-RO C-SRO Electrical Grid Voltage Oscillations 5 NA N(TS)-SRO Real Time Contingency 6 LOA IPB001 IPB002 R-RO N-BOP N-SRO IPB Fan Failure/Rapid Downpower 7 MAL DCS1418 DCS1479 DEH003A DEH003B M-RO M-BOP M-SRO Both CF Pumps Roll Back to Low Speed/Turbine fails to Trip in AUTO and MANUAL 8 MAL IPE004H SM004A NA C-9 fails to Actuate/1A Safety Valve Sticks OPEN 9 MAL CA004A EP008B NA 1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO/Man/1ETB Lockout 10 MAL SM007D NA 1D Steam Break in Containment 11 NA NA TD CA Pump is Restored

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Final (Rev_030215) McGuire 2015 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The following equipment is Out

-Of-Service: The TD CA Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5 ACTION B. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance.

1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD

-9, E-2, "B COLD LEG ACCUMULATOR ABNORMAL PRESSURE," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating). The crew will perform PT/1/A/4600/001, "RCCA Movement Test" upon taking the shift.

Shortly after taking the watch, the crew will perform PT/1/A/4600/001, "RCCA Movement Test." During the course of the surveillance, the 1C3 Heater Drain Pump will trip. The operator will restore any individual rod bank to its initial position, place control rods in manual (and/or AUTO), and use the "Control Room Expectation Manual," to immediately reduce Turbine load as needed to maintain Rx power less than pre

-transient condition.

As a result of the plant transient, a Crud Burst will occur and 1EMF48, "Reactor Coolant Water Radiation Monitor," will alarm. The operator will respond in accordance with ARP1RAD

-2/C-3, "1EMF 48 Reactor Coolant Hi Rad," and implement AP/1/A/5500/18, "High Activity in Reactor Coolant." The operator will raise Letdown flow at the request of Chemistry and address Technical Specification 3.4.16, RCS Specific Activity."

Next, 1NV

-35, Variable Flow Letdown Orifice Isolation Valve, will fail Closed. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/12, "Loss of Letdown, Charging or Seal Injection,"

and establish Excess Letdown.

Subsequently, electrical disturbances cause grid voltage to drop to 216 KV. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/05, "Generator Voltage and Electrical Grid Disturbances," and make adjustments of Main Generator voltage.

Shortly afterwards, TCC will call and report that Real Time Contingency Analysis indicates that 230KV Switchyard Voltage would not be adequate should Unit 1 trip. The operator will go to Enclosure 3 (RTCA Actions with Unit One On

-line), and enter Technical Specification 3.0.3, "Applicability." The operator will also need to evaluate Technical Specification 3.8.1, "AC Sources

- Operating."

While implementing Enclosure 3, both IPB Fans will fail. The crew will respond in accordance with ARP1AD-11/J5, IPB AIR FLOW TROUBLE, and perform a rapid downpower in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/04, "Rapid Downpower."

During the downpower, both CF Pumps will rollback to LOW Speed causing a low level condition in all Steam Generators. On the ensuing Rx Trip, the Main Turbine will fail to trip in both Auto and Manual, and the operator will need to manually close the Governor Valves. On the trip, the Steam Dumps will fail to actuate due to a C

-9 failure and the SG PORVs will open to control steam pressure. Since the 1A SG PORV is isolated, a 1A SG Safety Valve will open instead, and stick about 60%

open. Simultaneously, a lockout will occur on 1ETB and the 1A MDCA Pump will fail to start either automatically or manually and result in a total loss of CA flow. 30 seconds later a Major Steam Line Break will occur on the 1D Steamline in Containment.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Final (Rev_030215) The operator will enter EP/1/A/5000/E

-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and verify reactor trip and Safety Injection actuation; and then transition to EP/1/A/5000/FR

-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink," based on no CA flow. When 3 of 4 Steam Generator Wide Range levels are < 36%), the operator will initiate NCS Feed and Bleed.

Once NCS Feed and Bleed is established, the TDCA Pump will be returned to service, and the operator will restore CA flow to the 1B and/or 1C Steam Generator per Step 7 of FR

-H.1. The scenario will terminate at Step 39 of FR

-H.1, with the crew feeding at least one Steam Generator to restore Wide Range Level to > 12% (17% ACC).

Critical Tasks:

Manually trip the Main Turbine prior to completing the Immediate Actions of E

-0 Safety Significance: Failure to trip the Main Turbine when required causes a challenge to the Subcriticality/Integrity Critical Safety Function that otherwise would not or may not exist. This mis

-operation by the operator necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates an inability by the operator to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation of the RPS.

Establish RCS Bleed and Feed before all four Steam Generator Wide Range Levels reach 0%, and the NCS temperature and/or pressure increases.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish RCS Bleed and Feed before automatic opening of the PORVs (due to plant heatup) reduces the probability of success to establish a heat sink for the core. This constitutes a "Significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario." Establishing feedwater flow into the Steam Generators offers the most effective recovery action to restore the heat sink. If all attempts to initiate feedwater flow fail, the crew must establish bleed and feed to cool the core. This is accomplished by manually initiating SI, and then manually opening the PORVs. The lower NCS pressure allows a greater ECCS flow to recover NCS inventory and force flow through the core. If this action is to be successful, it must be started before SG dryout. SG dryout would cause NC temperature to increase, increasing NC Pressure and forcing open the PORVs automatically. If NCS pressure is at the PORV setpoint due to NCS heatup, the operator action of opening the PORVs manually may not be successful in lowering NCS pressure and increasing ECCS flow. Ultimately, the core could uncover.

Establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator before transition out of FR-H.1.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator results in the crew having to rely upon the lower

-priority action of having to remain in RCS Bleed and Feed to minimize the possibility of core uncovery.

Failure to perform this task, when able to do so, constitutes incorrect performance that leads to degradation of the RCS and/or fuel cladding fission product barriers.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Final (Rev_030215) Facility:

McGuire Scenario No.:

2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Examiners:

Operators:

(SRO) (RO) (BOP) Initial Conditions:

The plant is at 75% power (MOL

). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Turnover:

The following equipment is Out

-Of-Service: The 1B MDCA Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5 ACTION B. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance.

1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-3, F-5, "BB DEMIN PNL TRBL," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed OFF (IAE is investigating).

The crew will raise power to 100% after taking the shift.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*

Event Description 1 NA R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Power Increase w/Simple Dilute 2 MAL DCS1214 C-RO C-SRO Uncontrolled outward Rod Motion in AUTO 3 REM RN0018B C-BOP C(TS)-SRO 1B RN Pump Suction Valve inadvertently CLOSES 4 MAL DCSSLIM06D/G C-BOP C(TS)-SRO Pzr Spray Valve (1NC

-27) Controller fails OPEN 5 MAL LF003B IRE009 SG001A C-RO C-BOP C-SRO 1B CF Pump Trip/SGTL/Turbine Runback w/rods in Manual 6 REM SM007AB MAL IPE001A/B IPE002A/B SG001A SM004A M-RO M-BOP M-SRO 1A MSIV fails CLOSED/ 1A SG SV fails OPEN/ATWS/SGTR 7 MAL CA004A CA005 C-BOP C-SRO TD CA Pump Overspeed Trip/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Final (Rev_030215) McGuire 2015 NRC Scenario #

2 The plant is at 75% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The following equipment is Out

-Of-Service: The 1B MDCA Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5 ACTION B. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance. 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD

-3, F-5, "BB DEMIN PNL TRBL," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed OFF (IAE is investigating). The crew will raise power to 100% after taking the shift.

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100% starting with Step 3.37.10 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, "Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation." The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with .

19, "Simple Dilution," of OP/1/A/6150/009, "Boron Concentration Control," and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/1/A/6300/001 A, "Turbine

-Generator Load Change."

After the load increase is started, the Control Rods will fail such that rods are moving outward in AUTO. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/14, "Rod Control Malfunction." The control rods will subsequently remain in MANUAL.

After this, the 1B RN Pump Suction Isolation valve will inadvertently CLOSE. The operator will respond using one or more Annunciator Response Procedures and ultimately enter AP/1/A/5500/

20, "Loss of RN,

" to place the standby train in service. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, "Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS)," and LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources

- Operating."

Next, the Pzr Spray Valve Controller, 1NC

-27C A Spray, demand will fail to full output. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/11, "Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies." The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, "RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits." Subsequently, the 1B CF Pump will trip causing the turbine to automatically runback to 55%. Simultaneously, a 1 gpm Steam Generator Tube Leak will occur in the 1A Steam Generator. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500/03, "Load Rejection." During the runback the operator will need to drive rods in manually.

After this, the 1A MSIV will inadvertently CLOSE, and the Reactor will fail to trip automatically and manually. Additionally, the low set Safety Valve on the 1A Steam Generator will lift and stick fully OPEN. Additionally, the TD CA Pump will trip on overspeed on auto start, and the 1A MDCA Pump will fail to start automatically. The operator will enter EP/1/A/5000/E

-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection,

" and then transition to EP/1/A/5000/FR-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS." During the performance of FR

-S.1, the operator will continuously drive rods in manually, successfully trip the Reactor locally, and manually start the 1A MDCA Pump and establish 450 gpm of flow the Steam Generators.

The Steam Generator Tube Leak will degrade to a tube rupture in the 1A Steam Generator when the reactor is locally tripped.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Final (Rev_030215) After completion of FR

-S.1, the operator will transition back to E

-0, and then to EP/1/A/5000/E

-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation." After the 1A Steam Generator is isolated, the operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/E

-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant," and then, upon diagnosing the tube rupture, to EP/1/A/5000/E

-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture."

The scenario will terminate at Step 6 of E

-3 after the operator has transitioned to EP/1/A/5000/ECA

-3.1, "SGTR with Subcooled Recovery Desired," or at Step 9 of E

-3 upon initiating an NCS cooldown.

Critical Tasks:

1945 psig.

Safety Significance: failure to close the Spray Valve and stop the pressure transient, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the pressure transient

. A failure to stabilize the pressure transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis

-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect NCS pressure control. Manually drive rods inward before completing the immediate actions of FR

-S.1 (Step 2).

Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical or returns to a critical condition. Performance of the critical task would move the reactor towards a subcritical condition to prevent a subsequent return to criticality. A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis

-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control.

Start the 1A MD CA Pump before transition out of FRS-.1, unless the transition is made to EP/1/A/5000/FR

-H.1, and then before the NCPs are manually tripped to limit heat input to the RCS. Safety Significance: Failure to establish a Secondary Heat Sink through the initiation of CA flow unnecessarily challenges both the HEAT SINK and the CORE COOLING Critical Safety Functions. Additionally, the FSAR Safety Analysis results are predicated on the assumption that at least one train of safeguards actuates and delivers a minimum amount of AFW flow to the Steam Generators. Failure to perform this task, when the ability to do so exists, results in a violation of the Facility License Condition and places the plant in an unanalyzed condition.

Isolate CA flow to the Faulted Steam Generator before an unwarranted Red Path occurs on Subcriticality or NCS Integrity

. Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a Faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to the Critical Safety Functions that may not otherwise occur. Failure to isolate flow could result in an unwarranted Orange or Red Path condition on NC Integrity and/or Subcriticality (if cooldown is allowed to continue uncontrollably).

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Final (Rev_030215) Facility:

McGuire Scenario No.:

3 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Examiners:

Operators:

(SRO) (RO) (BOP) Initial Conditions:

The plant is at 40% power (MOL

). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Turnover:

The following equipment is Out

-Of-Service: The 1A EDG is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 ACTION B. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance.

1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD

-12, E-2, "A RN PUMP ABNORMAL FLOW," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating). The crew will raise power to 100% after taking the shift.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*

Event Description 1 NA R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Power Increase w/Alternate Dilute 2 MAL IRE009 C-RO C-SRO Control Rods fail to Move in Auto 3 REM NV0461 C-BOP C-SRO 1B NCP Standpipe Low Level Alarm 4 MAL SM001D C-RO C(TS)-SRO SG 1D PORV fails OPEN 5 MAL NCP008B C-BOP C(TS)-SRO #1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP 6 MAL LT002 C-RO C-SRO Turbine Low Lube Oil Pressure/Turbine Trip 7 MAL NCP008B NCP016C NCP015C M-RO M-BOP M-SRO #1 Seal Leak on 1 B NCP Degrades 8 MAL IRE010 C-BOP C-SRO 4 Control Rods fail to Fully Insert on Rx Trip 9 MAL EP002A EP002B DG001B M-RO M-BOP M-SRO Loss of Switchyard to Unit 1/1B EDG fails to START

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Final (Rev_030215) McGuire 2015 NRC Scenario #

3 The plant is at 40% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The following equipment is Out

-Of-Service: The 1A EDG is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 ACTION B. The 1A SG PORV is leaking and isolated. The PORV has been declared inoperable and maintenance is being planned. 1KFP

-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD

-12, E-2, "A RN PUMP ABNORMAL FLOW," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating). The crew will raise power to 100% after taking the shift.

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100% starting with Step 3.35.19 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, "Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation." The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with Enclosure 4.

4, "Alternate Dilute," of OP/1/A/6150/009, "Boron Concentration Control," and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/1/A/6300/001 A, "Turbine

-Generator Load Change."

During the power increase, the operator will discover that the Control Rods will not respond in AUTO. The crew will enter AP/1/A/5500/14, "Rod Control Malfunction," and control rods in MANUAL.

Because the crew may control the power increase such that an auto rod demand does not occur, this event may not be diagnosed until later.

Shortly after starting the power increase, AD-7/B-2, "NC Pump B No. 2 Seal S-Pipe Lo Level," will alarm. The operator will address the Annunciator Response Procedure, and then use Enclosure 4.3, "Filling and Draining NC Pump Standpipe," of OP/1/A/6150/002A, "Reactor Coolant Pump Operation," to refill the standpipe.

After this, the 1D Steam Generator PORV will fail OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/01, "Steam Leak," and isolate the PORV. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4, "Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs)," and may enter LCO 3.4.1, "RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits." Subsequently, a #1 seal leak will develop on the 1 A NCP such that #1 Seal leakoff flow is 5.

0-5.5 gpm. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/0 8, "Malfunction of NC Pump,

" and address Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.7, "Standby Shutdown System." The control operators will be directed on the action to take should the #1 Seal Leakoff flow degrade to > 6 gpm (which will occur subsequently).

Shortly afterwards, a low lube oil pressure condition will develop on the Main Turbine eventually causing the Main Turbine to trip. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/02, "Turbine Generator Trip."

The RO will need to operate the control rods manually.

While the crew is in AP

-2, the 1B Hi Vibration alarm will occur and the #1 seal leak flow on the 1 B NCP will rise to 6 gpm. The operator go back to Step 8 of AP

-8 (Continuous Action Step), and close the 1B NCP Pzr Spray Valve, manually trip the reactor and stop the 1 B NCP when reactor power is < 5%. The crew will perform Enclosure 2

, "NC Pump Post Trip Actions For #1 Seal Failure

," of AP8, while subsequently performing E-0.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Final (Rev_030215) The operator will enter EP/1/A/5000/E

-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and verify reactor trip

. On the reactor trip four control rods will fail to fully insert.

The operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response," and emergency borate per AP/1/A/5500/38, "Emergency Boration And Response To Inadvertent Dilution."

Immediately following the initiation of Emergency Boration, a loss of the Unit 1 Switchyard will occur

, and the 1B Emergency Diesel Generator will fail to start. The operator will immediately transition to EP/1/A/5000/ECA

-0.0, "Loss of All AC Power." The operator will restore power to 1ETA per Unit 2 6900V busses through SATA or SATB per Enclosure 9 "Energizing Unit 1 4160V Bus From Unit 2

- SATA or SATB."

The scenario will terminate at Step 40 of ECA-0.0, with the crew preparing to re

-load the energized ESF Bus. Critical Tasks:

Trip the Reactor prior to stopping the NCP during a high vibration condition, and trip the NCP only after Reactor power level has dropped to less than 5%.

Safety Significance: The P-8 interlock allows one NCP to be stopped less than 48% power. If a NCP is stopped in Mode 1 or 2, Tech Spec 3.4.4 requires the unit to be in Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. In addition, T

-ave for the idle loop may violate Tech Spec 3.4.2, minimum temperature for criticality. In this case, the unit must be sub

-critical within 30 minutes. The transient placed on the unit when a NCP is secured at power can challenge both reactor protection and control systems. Furthermore, an added burden is placed on the operator to stabilize the unit and shut down within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (possibly 30 minutes) to comply with Tech Specs. Even though the plant is designed and analyzed to operate in this configuration for a short time, station management has decided that the conservative approach to dealing with this transient is to trip the reactor anytime a NCP malfunction warrants stopping a pump in Mode 1 or 2. Guidance is given to wait until reactor power is less than 5% before stopping the NC pump. This will ensure the NC pump will provide adequate flow/core cooling until reactor power is sufficiently low enough to preclude a challenge to fuel integrity. If the action can be taken, and is not taken, this demonstrates "mis

-operation" or incorrect operation that could unnecessarily challenge a fission product barrier (NCS).

Close the #1 Seal Return Valve for the 1B NCP prior to failure of the #2 Seal as indicated by a rise and subsequent substantial lowering of #1 Seal Leakoff Flow.

Safety Significance:

According to Enclosure 2 of AP-8, the Seal Water Return Valve must be closed within 3-5 minutes after stopping the NCP. If the valve is NOT closed, the NCS leak will continue until isolated, and could degrade the #2 and 3 Seals. According to the AP8 Background Document, closing the seal return valve within 3 to 5 minutes during a #1 seal failure event does not meet the criteria of "high PRA values" as determined by the Severe Accident Analysis Group. For McGuire, this corresponds to a Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) greater than or equal to 1.04. PIP M 1992 documents the events that meet these criteria. As such this action is not a McGuire 'time critical action', but is a management expectation and prudent action to prevent damage to the #2 and #3 seals. If the action can be taken, and is not taken, this demonstrates "mis

-operation" or incorrect operation that could unnecessarily challenge a fission product barrier (NCS).

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Final (Rev_030215) Energize at least one AC Emergency Bus From Unit 2

. Safety Significance: Failure to energize an AC Emergency Bus when able to do so constitutes "mis

-operation" or incorrect performance which leads to degraded emergency power capacity. Failure to perform the Critical Task may result in a needless challenge and/or degradation of a fission product barrier at the point of the remaining intact RCP Seals, and will result in the inability to add inventory through the ECCS during the existing and potentially subsequent small break LOCA(s). Since the conditions existed to re-energize an ESF Bus from Unit 2 via the SATA or SATB, not taking this action constitutes incorrect performance that leads to degradation of the RCS and/or fuel cladding fission product barriers

.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Final (Rev_030515) Facility:

McGuire Scenario No.:

4 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Examiners:

Operators:

(SRO) (RO) (BOP) Initial Conditions:

The plant is at 4% power (

BOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Turnover:

The following equipment is Out

-Of-Service: The 1A CM Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance.

1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-1, F-9, "DEH/MSR SYSTEM MALFUNCTION," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating).

The crew will raise power to 12

-18% and stabilize reactor power, and making preparations to synch the Turbine to the Grid while maintenance is completed.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*

Event Description 1 NA R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Raise Power from 4% to 12-18% 2 MAL KC010B C-BOP C(TS)-SRO 1A2 KC Pump trip 3 MAL EDA350 I(TS)-SRO DRPI Failure 4 MAL EMF-34L LOA BB019 I-RO I-SRO 1EMF-34 fails HIGH/Failure of SG Blowdown Flow Control Valve to Auto CLOSE 5 MAL NV019B C-BOP C(TS)-SRO Letdown Line Leak Outside Containment 6 MAL IRE006B6 IRE006P10 C-RO C-SRO Sequentially Dropped Rods 7 MAL ISE001B M-RO M-BOP M-SRO Inadvertent Train B SI Actuation 8 MAL NI033 NA 1NI-10B fails to CLOSE

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Final (Rev_030515) McGuire 2015 NRC Scenario #

4 The plant is at 4% power (

BOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The following equipment is Out

-Of-Service: The 1A CM Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance.

1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD

-1, F-9, "DEH/MSR SYSTEM MALFUNCTION," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating). The crew will raise power to 12

-18% and stabilize reactor power, and making preparations to synch the Turbine to the Grid while maintenance is completed.

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 12-18% starting with Step 3.25 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, "Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation."

Next, the 1A2 KC Pump will trip. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/21, "Loss of KC or KC System Leakage." The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6, "Component Cooling Water (CCW) System."

Just after this, the DRPI for Control Rod M

-12 will fail and indicate the rod on the bottom. The operator will respond in accordance with 1AD

-2/D-10, "RPI Urgent Failure," and address Technical Specification LCO 3.1.7, "Rod Position Indication."

Subsequently, 1EMF

-34, S/G Sample Radiation Monitor, will fail HIGH, however, one of the SG Blowdown Control Valves will NOT automatically close. The operator will respond in accordance with OP/1/A/6100/010 Q, "Annunciator Response for 1RAD

-1," C3, 1EMF 34 S/G SAMPLE HI RAD

, and manually close the valve. The operator may enter Case I of AP/1/A/5500/10, "NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps." The crew will determine that the alarm is due to a failure, and NOT an actual high radioactivity condition.

Shortly afterwards, a 50

-75 gpm leak will occur on the Letdown Line, in the Aux Building, upstream of the Letdown Heat Exchanger.

The operator will enter Case II of AP/1/A/5500/10, "NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps." The operator will place the Outside Air Pressure Filter Train in service per Enclosure 4.4 of OP/0/A/6450/011, "Control Area Ventilation/Chilled Water System." The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.13, "RCS Operational Leakage," and Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.7, "Standby Shutdown System."

Just after the leak isolation, one Control Bank D Control Rod will drop into the core. The operator will respond in accordance with ARP1AD

-2/D-9, "RPI at Bottom Rod Drop" and will implement AP/1/A/5500/14, "Rod Control Malfunction." Shortly after this, a second Control Rod will drop requiring that the operator manually trip the reactor.

Upon the reactor trip, the B Train of Safety Injection will inadvertently actuate. The operator will enter EP/1/A/5000/E

-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and verify reactor trip and Safety Injection actuation, actuating the A Train of SI in the process. The crew will reset SI and stop all ECCS Pumps except for one NV Pump within 15 minutes.

When the crew attempts to close 1NI

-10B, "Unit 1 NV Pumps To NC Cold Legs Cont Outside Isol," it will be discovered that the valve will not close. The operator will be required to dispatch an operator to locally close 1NI

-10B.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Final (Rev_030515) Ultimately, the crew will transition to step 9 of EP/1/A/5000/ES

-1.1, "Safety Injection Termination."

The scenario will terminate in EP/1/A/5000/ES

-1.1 at Step 14.m RNO after the CRS determines to establish Excess Letdown.

Critical Tasks:

Trip the Reactor upon recognition of the second dropped rod

. Safety Significance: Multiple dropped control rods are a significant reactivity transient that can have a serious effect on plant parameters under certain operating conditions, and may result in power distribution limits being exceeded. The guidance to trip the reactor is a conservative action to prevent the plant form challenging the Pzr low pressure trip setpoint, etc.; and is consistent with the conservative nature of the industry. PT/0/A/4600/113, Enclosure 13.19 states that it is a management expectation that the operator trip the reactor within 30 seconds of a second dropped rod. Terminate SI by closing 1NI

-9A and dispatching an operator to locally close 1NI

-10B within 15 minutes of SI actuation

. Safety Significance: An inadvertent SI rapidly injects inventory into the NCS causing Pzr Level, and correspondingly, Pzr Pressure to increase. Prolonged recovery unnecessarily challenges the Pzr Code Safety valves. PT/0/A/4600/113, Enclosure 13.6 states that when at NOP/NOT conditions, the FSAR commitment is to have SI terminated within 15 minutes (The Safety Analysis CANNOT credit the cycling of the Pzr PORVs since auto PORV operation can only be assured during LTOP Operation). The Safety Analysis assumes that the Pzr Code Safeties will lift and reseat ONLY if they are cycled for a short time and Pzr liquid temperature remains > 500 oF. If this action is not taken, the conclusions of the Safety Analysis are invalid, and violates a License Condition.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Final (Rev_030515) Facility:

McGuire Scenario No.:

5 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Examiners:

Operators:

(SRO) (RO) (BOP) Initial Conditions:

The plant is at 100% power (MOL

). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Turnover:

The following equipment is Out

-Of-Service:

1A RV Pump is OOS for motor replacement. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance.

1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD

-1, F-9, "DEH/MSR SYSTEM MALFUNCT," has failed to OFF (IAE is investigating).

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*

Event Description 1 REM SA0048 ABC C-BOP C(TS)-SRO TDCA Pump starts inadvertently 2 MAL DCS17E/G C-RO C-SRO FRV Controller and Bypass Valve Failure 3 MAL NC007D C-BOP C(TS)-SRO NCS Leak 4 NA R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Rapid Downpower 5 MAL DEH008B C-RO C-SRO Turbine Control Unit fails to MANUAL 6 MAL NC005D4 M-RO M-BOP M-SRO Rod Ejection/SB LOCA 7 MAL NV029B NA 1B NV Pump Trip 8 MAL EQB001A NA EDG A Sequencer Failure 9 MAL NI001B C-BOP C-SRO 1B NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO 10 MAL NC005F14 NA 2nd Rod Ejection/SB LOCA

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Final (Rev_030515) McGuire 2015 NRC Scenario #

5 The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The following equipment is Out

-Of-Service: 1A RV Pump is OOS for motor replacement. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance.

1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD

-1, F-9, "DEH/MSR SYSTEM MALFUNCT," has failed to OFF (IAE is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, the Turbine Driven CA Pump will inadvertently start causing the plant to cooldown and reactor power to rise. The crew will recognize that the pump should not be running and stop the pump using OP/1/A/6250/002, "Auxiliary Feedwater System." The operator may use AP/1/A/5500/1, "Steam Leak," to diagnose the failure. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.5, "Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System," and SLC 16.9.7, "Standby Shutdown System."

Next, the 1B SG FRV Controller will fail to MANUAL and the FRV Bypass valve will fail fully open resulting in the Feedwater Control Valve for the 1B SG closing and causing SG Level to lower. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/0 6, "S/G Feedwater Malfunction," and control the 1B SG Level manually

. Following this, a 70-90 gpm leak will develop on the reactor head from a Control Rod Guide Tube. The crew will implement AP/1/A/5500/10, "NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps." The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.13, "RCS Operational Leakage

." Ultimately, the crew will enter AP/1/A/5500/4, "Rapid Downpower."

During the downpower, a failure will occur in the Turbine Control Unit causing the unit to shift from Operator Auto to Manual control. The operator will address 1AD

-1/F-4, TURBINE IN MANUAL, and control the Turbine manually during the downpower in accordance with OP/1/A/6300/001A, Enclosure 4.1, "Turbine Generator Load Change."

After this, Control Rod D

-4 will be ejected from the core causing a 1000 gpm Small Break LOCA. The operator will trip the Reactor and actuate Safety Injection, and then enter EP/1/A/5000/E

-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." On the Safety Injection actuation the EDG A Sequencer will fail to automatically sequence, and the operator will need to manually start ECCS loads. Additionally, the 1 B NV Pump will trip, and the 1 B NI Pump will fail to start automatically. The operator will be required to start the 1 B NI Pump manually.

Upon completion of E

-0, the operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/E

-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant." At that time a second Control Rod (F

-14) will be ejected from the core causing the Small Break LOCA to degrade to the point at which the NC Pumps will need to be tripped. The scenario will terminate at Step 9 of E-1, after the crew has been directed to return back to the beginning of E

-1.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Final (Rev_030515) Critical Tasks:

Establish flow from at least one high

-head ECCS Pump before transition out of E

-0. Safety Significance:

Failure to establish flow from the NV System after failure of the automatic actuation constitutes a demonstrated inability by the operator to recognize a failure and/or correct a failure of an ESF System or component. The FSAR analyses of response to high energy line breaks assume that at least one train of safeguards actuates. If the minimum assumed ESF components are NOT actuated the Safety Analyses results are invalid. Because compliance with the assumptions in the FSAR is part of the facility license, failure to comply constitutes a violation of the license condition.

Trip NC Pumps within 5 minutes of loss of SCM (4600/113/E13.1)

Safety Significance: Failure to trip all NCPs on a loss of subcooled margin can lead to core uncovery and to fuel temperatures in excess of 2200 oF. PT/0/A/4600/113, Enclosure 13.1 states that McGuire is committed to having NC Pumps tripped within 5 minutes of a loss of subcooling. The Safety Analysis recommends that the NC Pumps be tripped within 2 minutes to limit the depth and duration of core uncovery. It is a management expectation that the NC Pumps be tripped as quickly as possible, but within 5 minutes of a loss of subcooling. Failure to take this action represents mis

-operation by the operator which leads to degradation of the fuel cladding fission produce barrier, and a violation of a license condition.

PROGRAM: McGuire Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 31 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N15-1-1 REFERENCES

1. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4, "Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs)" (Amendment 221/203) 2. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5, "Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System" (Amendment 221/203) 3. PT/1/A/4600/001, "RCCA Movement Test" (Rev 46) 4. Control Room Crew Expectations Manual (Rev 8/8/12) 5. OP/1/A/6100/010 R " Annunciator Response for Panel 1RAD-2" (Rev 39) 6. AP/1/A/5500/18, "High Activity in Reactor Coolant" (Rev

5) 7. OP/1/A/6200/001 A, "Chemical and Volume Control System Letdown" (Rev

53) 8. Technical Specification 3.4.16, RCS Specific Activity" (Amendment 266/246)

9. AP/1/A/5500/12, "Loss of Letdown, Charging or Seal Injection" (Rev 24)

10. AP/1/A/5500/05, "Generator Voltage and Electrical Grid Disturbances" (Rev 12) 11. Technical Specification 3.0

, "Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Applicability" (Amendment 238/220)

12. Technical Specification 3.8.1, "AC Sources

- Operating" (Amendment 221/203)

13. OP/1/A/6100/010L " Annunciator Response for Panel 1AD

-11" (Rev 78) 14. AP/1/A/5500/04, "Rapid Downpower

" (Rev 26) 15. OP/1/A/6150/009, "Boron Concentration Control" (Rev 126)

16. EP/1/A/5000/E

-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection" (Rev 34) 17. EP/1/A/5000/

FR-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink

" (Rev 17) Validation Time:

132 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Essential Training & Consulting, LLC

Facility Review:

________________________

Rev. 030215 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Facility:

McGuire Scenario No.:

1 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Examiners:

Operators:

(SRO) (RO) (BOP) Initial Conditions:

The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Turnover:

The following equipment is Out

-Of-Service: The TD CA Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5 ACTION B. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance. 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD

-9, E-2, "B COLD LEG ACCUMULATOR ABNORMAL PRESSURE," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating). The crew will perform PT/1/A/4600/001, "RCCA Movement Test" upon taking the shift.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*

Event Description 1 LOA HW012 C-RO C-SRO RCCA Withdrawal Test/1C3 HDP Trip 2 PLP 089 C-BOP C(TS)-SRO RCS High Activity due to Crud Burst 3 REM NV0035A C-BOP C-SRO Letdown Valve 1NV

-35A fails CLOSED 4 PLP 014 C-RO C-SRO Electrical Grid Voltage Oscillations 5 NA N(TS)-SRO Real Time Contingency 6 LOA IPB001 IPB002 R-RO N-BOP N-SRO IPB Fan Failure/Rapid Downpower 7 MAL DCS1418 DCS1479 DEH003A DEH003B M-RO M-BOP M-SRO Both CF Pumps Roll Back to Low Speed/Turbine fails to Trip in AUTO and MANUAL 8 MAL IPE004H SM004A NA C-9 fails to Actuate/1A Safety Valve Sticks OPEN 9 MAL CA004A EP008B NA 1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO/Man/1ETB Lockout 10 MAL SM007D NA 1D Steam Break in Containment 11 NA NA TD CA Pump is Restored

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 McGuire 2015 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The following equipment is Out

-Of-Service: The TD CA Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5 ACTION B. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance. 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-9, E-2, "B COLD LEG ACCUMULATOR ABNORMAL PRESSURE," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating). The crew will perform PT/1/A/4600/001, "RCCA Movement Test" upon taking the shift.

Shortly after taking the watch, the crew will perform PT/1/A/4600/001, "RCCA Movement Test." During the course of the surveillance, the 1C3 Heater Drain Pump will trip. The operator will restore any individual rod bank to its initial position, place control rods in manual (and/or AUTO), and use the "Control Room Expectation Manual," to immediately reduce Turbine load as needed to maintain Rx power less than pre

-transient condition.

As a result of the plant transient, a Crud Burst will occur and 1EMF48, "Reactor Coolant Water Radiation Monitor," will alarm. The operator will respond in accordance with ARP1RAD

-2/C-3, "1EMF 48 Reactor Coolant Hi Rad," and implement AP/1/A/5500/18, "High Activity in Reactor Coolant." The operator will raise Letdown flow at the request of Chemistry and address Technical Specification 3.4.16, RCS Specific Activity."

Next, 1NV

-35, Variable Flow Letdown Orifice Isolation Valve, will fail Closed. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/12, "Loss of Letdown, Charging or Seal Injection," and establish Excess Letdown. Subsequently, electrical disturbances cause grid voltage to drop to 216 KV. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/05, "Generator Voltage and Electrical Grid Disturbances," and make adjustments of Main Generator voltage.

Shortly afterwards, TCC will call and report that Real Time Contingency Analysis indicates that 230KV Switchyard Voltage would not be adequate should Unit 1 trip. The operator will go to Enclosure 3 (RTCA Actions with Unit One On-line), and enter Technical Specification 3.0.3, "Applicability." The operator will also need to evaluate Technical Specification 3.8.1, "AC Sources

- Operating."

While implementing Enclosure 3, both IPB Fans will fail. The crew will respond in accordance with ARP1AD

-11/J5, IPB AIR FLOW TROUBLE, and perform a rapid downpower in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/04, "Rapid Downpower."

During the downpower, both CF Pumps will rollback to LOW Speed causing a low level condition in all Steam Generators. On the ensuing Rx Trip, the Main Turbine will fail to trip in both Auto and Manual, and the operator will need to manually close the Governor Valves. On the trip, the Steam Dumps will fail to actuate due to a C

-9 failure and the SG PORVs will open to control steam pressure. Since the 1A SG PORV is isolated, a 1A SG Safety Valve will open instead, and stick about 60% open. Simultaneously, a lockout will occur on 1ETB and the 1A MDCA Pump will fail to start either automatically or manually and result in a total loss of CA flow. 30 seconds later a Major Steam Line Break will occur on the 1D Steamline in Containment.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 The operator will enter EP/1/A/5000/E

-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and verify reactor trip and Safety Injection actuation; and then transition to EP/1/A/5000/FR

-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink," based on no CA flow. When 3 of 4 Steam Generator Wide Range levels are < 36%), the operator will initiate NCS Feed and Bleed.

Once NCS Feed and Bleed is established, the TDCA Pump will be returned to service, and the operator will restore CA flow to the 1B and/or 1C Steam Generator per Step 7 of FR

-H.1. The scenario will terminate at Step 39 of FR

-H.1, with the crew feeding at least one Steam Generator to restore Wide Range Level to > 12% (17% ACC).

Critical Tasks:

Manually trip the Main Turbine prior to completing the Immediate Actions of E

-0 Safety Significance: Failure to trip the Main Turbine when required causes a challenge to the Subcriticality/Integrity Critical Safety Function that otherwise would not or may not exist. This mis

-operation by the operator necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates an inability by the operator to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation of the RPS.

Establish RCS Bleed and Feed before all four Steam Generator Wide Range Levels rea ch 0%, and the NCS temperature and/or pressure increases.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish RCS Bleed and Feed before automatic opening of the PORVs (due to plant heatup) reduces the probability of success to establish a heat sink for the core. This constitutes a "Significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario." Establishing feedwater flow into the Steam Generators offers the most effective recovery action to restore the heat sink. If all attempts to initiate feedwater flow fail, the crew must establish bleed and feed to cool the core. This is accomplished by manually initiating SI, and then manually opening the PORVs. The lower NCS pressure allows a greater ECCS flow to recover NCS inventory and force flow through the core. If this action is to be successful, it must be started before SG dryout. SG dryout would cause NC temperature to increase, increasing NC Pressure and forcing open the PORVs automatically. If NCS pressure is at the PORV setpoint due to NCS heatup, the operator action of opening the PORVs manually may not be successful in lowering NCS pressure and increasing ECCS flow. Ultimately, the core could uncover.

Establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator before transition out of FR

-H.1. Safety Significance: Failure to establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator results in the crew having to rely upon the lower

-priority action of having to remain in RCS Bleed and Feed to minimize the possibility of core uncovery. Failure to perform this task, when able to do so, constitutes incorrect performance that leads to degradation of the RCS and/or fuel cladding fission product barriers.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Sim. Setup Rod Step On Reset to Temp IC 238 (Originally 39)

. T = 0 Malfunctions (From IC-39): Insert REM-SA0001 = 0 (Close 1SA

-1 [1C S/G SM Supply to TDCA Pump]

) Insert REM

-SA0002 = 0 (Close 1SA

-2 [1B S/G SM Supply to TDCA Pump]

) Insert REM

-SV0027 = 0 (Close 1SV

-27 [1A S/G PORV Isolation]

) Insert LOA

-SV001= Racked_Out (SG PORV Breaker Racked Out)

H_X02_087_3 = 0 (1A PORV Controller LEFT lamp) H_X02_087_4 = 0 (1A PORV Controller RIGHT lamp) Insert LOA

-SV014=0 (SM PORV A LOCAL OPERATION

) insert XMT- KFTT5130 = 0 (Spent Fuel Pool Temperature Failure) insert OVR

-1AD9_E02 = ON (MCB Annunciator 1AD9/E2) From IC-238 Per Lesson Plan 2015 NRC Exam Scenario 1 insert MAL

-DEH003A = True (Failure of Auto Turbine Trip Signal) insert MAL

-DEH003B = True (Failure of Manual Turbine Trip Signal)

MAL-IPE004H = True cd='H_X01_094_2 EQ 1' delay=0 (C-9 fails Conditional on Rx Trip)

MAL-SM004A1 = 60 cd='H_X01_094_2 EQ 1' delay=0 (1A SG Safety Valve Conditional on Rx Trip) MAL-CA004A = BOTH cd='H_X01_094_2 EQ 1' delay=0 (1A MDCA Pump fails to start Conditional on Rx Trip)

MAL-EP008B =

ACTIVE cd='H_X01_094_2 EQ 1' delay=0 (1ETB Lockout Conditional on Rx Trip)

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION insert MAL

-SM007D = 2021250 No Ramp, Delay = 30 seconds, cd='H_X01_094_2 EQ 1' delay=0 (SLB in Containment Conditional on Rx Trip)

RUN Reset all SLIMs Place Tagout/O-Stick on:

TDCA Pump (Tagout) 1SV-27 (Tagout) 1KFP-5130 (O-Stick) MCB Annunciator 1AD-9, E-2 (O-stick) Update Status Board, Setup OAC NOTE: RMWST DO = <1000 ppb. Freeze. Update Fresh Tech. Spec. Log.

Fill out the AO's Available section of Shift Turnover Info.

Prior to Crew Briefing RUN Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Crew Briefing

1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements

2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3. Provide crew with a copy of PT/1/A/4600/001 marked up for scenario as follows:

Step 7.1 initialed.

Step 8.1 Initialed.

Step 8.2 initialed.

Step 8.3 NA initialed.

Note prior to Step 12 checked.

Step 12.1 Checkbox checked.

Step 12.2 initialed.

Step 12.3 NA initialed.

Step 12.4 Person Notified is John Weber.

Step 12.5 Section 12.6 Checkbox is checked.

4. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

5. Retain a copy of OP/1/A/6200/001A which will need to be provided to the crew during Event 2.

T-0 Begin Familiarization Period At direction of examiner Execute Lesson Plan for Simulator Scenario N15-1-1. At direction of examiner Event 1 insert LOA-HW012 = Racked_Out insert H_X13_059_3=1 Conditional to HW012 RCCA Withdrawal Test/1C3 HDP Trip At direction of examiner Event 2 insert PLP-089 = 300 RCS High Activity due to Crud Burst NOTE: This malfunction requires 2-3 minutes to build in, prior to the first indication.

At direction of examiner Event 3 insert REM-NV0035A = 0.0 Ramp = 10 seconds Letdown Valve 1NV

-35A fails CLOSED At direction of examiner Event 4 insert PLP-014=480 delay=0 ramp=120 seconds Electrical Grid Voltage Oscillations

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION At direction of examiner Event 5 Real Time Contingency At direction of examiner Event 6 insert LOA-IPB001 = OFF insert LOA-IPB002 = OFF IPB Fan Failure/Rapid Downpower At direction of examiner Event 7 insert MAL-DCS1418 insert MAL-DCS1479 insert MAL

-DEH003A insert MAL

-DEH003B Both CF Pumps Roll Back to Low Speed

/Turbine fails to Trip in AUTO and MANUAL Note: These malfunctions are inserted at T=0 Post-Rx Trip Event 8 insert MAL-IPE004H = True insert MAL-SM004A =

60 C-9 fails to Actuate/1A Safety Valve sticks OPEN Note: These malfunctions are inserted at T=0, conditional on Rx trip.

Post-Rx Trip Event 9 insert MAL-CA004A = True insert MAL-EP008B = True 1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO/Man/1ETB Lockout Note: These malfunctions are inserted at T=0, conditional on Rx trip.

Post-Rx Trip Event 10 insert MAL

-SM007D 2021250.000000 No Ramp, Delay = 30 seconds 1D Steam Break in Containment Note: These malfunctions are inserted at T=0, conditional on Rx trip.

After Bleed and Feed is initiated Event 11 TD CA Pump is Restored Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 1 Page 9 of 63 Event

Description:

RCCA Withdrawal Test/1C3 HDP Trip Shortly after taking the watch, the crew will perform PT/1/A/4600/001, "RCCA Movement Test." During the course of the surveillance, the 1C3 Heater Drain Pump will trip

. The operator will restore any individual rod bank to its initial position, place control rods in manual (and/or AUTO), and use the "Control Room Expectation Manual,"

to immediately reduce Turbine load as needed to maintain Rx power less than pre

-transient condition.

Booth Operator Instructions:

WHEN SD Bank B has been inserted 10 steps insert LOA-HW012 = Racked_Out (See Page 1 1-12) Indications Available:

Turbine load starts to lower.

OAC Alarm 1HW45, 1C3 Heater Drain Tank Hi Level Dump Not Closed 1C3 HDP Green status light is LIT.

1C3 HDP amps indicates 0 NIS power slightly higher than 100%.

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments PT/1/A/4600/001, RCCA MOVEMENT TEST RO (Step 12.6) Rod Movement Surveillance in Modes 1 or 2 RO (Step 12.6.1) IF AT ANY TIME it becomes necessary to move rods to stabilize the plant, complete the following:

NOTE: The RO will perform this ACTION after the secondary plant transient occurs. (Step 12.6.1.1) Restore any individual bank to initial position.

(Step 12.6.1.2) Select "MANUAL" with "CRD Bank Select".

RO (Step 12.6.2) Record position of Shutdown Bank A demand step counters.

NOTE: The RO will record 225. (Step 12.6..2.1) Select "SDA" with "CRD Bank Select". (Pause between each bank selected).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 1 Page 10 of 63 Event

Description:

RCCA Withdrawal Test/1C3 HDP Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 12.6.2.2) Check lit "GRP SELECT C" on the following:

NOTE: The RO will contact IAE. Booth Instructor:

as IAE, acknowledge, and report that required lights are LIT.

Power Cabinet 2AC RO Power Cabinet 1AC (Step 12.6.2.3) IF Rod Control Cabinet "GRP SELECT C" dark, stop- (Step 12.6.2.4) Insert rods at least 10 steps as shown on demand step counters.

NOTE: The RO will insert the Control Rods.

(Step 12.6.2.5) IF required to reposition rods due to misalignment-.

(Step 12.6.2.6) Check each individual rod responded to control signal by checking position against DRPI and OAC DRPI and record data on Enclosure 13.1 (Control Rod Drive Movement Data Sheet).

(Step 12.6.2.7) Restore rods to position recorded in Step 12.6.2 and check individual rods follow dema nd. NOTE: The RO will withdrawal the control rods.

RO (Step 12.6.3)

Record position of Shutdown Bank B demand step counters.

NOTE: The RO will record 225. (Step 12.6.3.1) Select "SDB" with "CRD Bank Select" (Step 12.6.3.2) Check lit "GRP SELECT C" on the following:

NOTE: The RO will contact IAE. Booth Instructor:

as IAE, acknowledge, and report that required lights are LIT.

Power Cabinet 2BD Power Cabinet 1BD (Step 12.6.3.3) IF Rod Control Cabinet "GRP SELECT C" dark-

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 1 Page 11 of 63 Event

Description:

RCCA Withdrawal Test/1C3 HDP Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 12.6.3.4) Insert rods at least 10 steps as shown on demand step counters.

NOTE: The RO will insert the Control Rods.

Booth Operator Instructions:

AFTER the RO has inserted Shutdown Bank B 10 steps into the core, insert LOA-HW012 = Racked_Out CONTROL ROOM CREW EXPECTATIONS MANUAL RO Transient load changes: Manual is preferred

- immediately reduce 20MWe and then reduce as needed to maintain Rx power less than pre-transient condition. After the initial 20 MWe load reduction, it is preferred that the operators use multiple and diverse indications to determine how much more load should be reduced.

TPBE on the OAC updates once per minute. Other indications (PR meters and Delta T meters) will indicate reactor response more quickly and will enable the operators to control the plant even more precisely. (This combines the Operator Fundamentals of Conservatism and Controlling Plant Evolutions Precisely).

NOTE: The RO will restore any individual rod bank to its initial position, place control rods in manual (and/or AUTO)

. NOTE: The crew may diagnose an overpower condition and adjust turbine load per the Crew Expectation Manual. NOTE: The CRS may dispatch a n AO to investigate the HDP. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report Pump is stopped and hotter than the others

. If the crew investigates further and dispatches an AO to Switchgear, acknowledge as AO, and report A Breaker Overcurrent relay has operated.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 1 Page 12 of 63 Event

Description:

RCCA Withdrawal Test/1C3 HDP Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the HDP.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief

. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Examiner Note: The Event 2 malfunction 2-3 minutes to build in, prior to the first indication.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 2 Page 13 of 63 Event

Description:

RCS High Activity due to Crud Burst As a result of the plant transient, a Crud Burst will occur and 1EMF48, "Reactor Coolant Water Radiation Monitor," will alarm. The operator will respond in accordance with ARP1RAD-2/C-3, "1EMF 48 Reactor Coolant Hi Rad," and implement AP/1/A/5500/18, "High Activity in Reactor Coolant." The operator will raise Letdown flow at the request of Chemistry and address Technical Specification 3.4.16, RCS Specific Activity."

Booth Operator Instructions:

insert PLP-089 = 300 (This Malfunction 2-3 minutes to build in, prior to the first indication.

) Indications Available:

1EMF-48 in TRIP 2 Subsequently, 1EMF

-18 in TRIP 2 MCB Annunciator 1RAD

-2/C-3 1EMF 48 REACTOR COOLANT HI RAD MCB Annunciator 1RAD

-3/C-3 1EMF 18 REACTOR COOLANT FILTER 1A Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The BOP may address either or both ARPs, prior to entering AP18.

OP/1/A/6100/010 R, ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE FOR PANEL 1RAD

-2 C-3, 1EMF 48 REACTOR COOLANT HI RAD CRS (Step 1) Go To AP/1/A/5500/018 (High Activity in Reactor Coolant).

(Step 2) Notify Chemistry.

(Step 3) Notify RP. NOTE: The CRS will enter AP

-18. OP/1/A/6100/010 S, ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE FOR PANEL 1RAD

-3 D-3, 1EMF 18 REACTOR COOLANT FILTER 1A CRS (Step 1) If an expected alarm or testing in progress, no further action required.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 2 Page 14 of 63 Event

Description:

RCS High Activity due to Crud Burst Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 2) IF a valid alarm:

Notify RP.

IF conditions warrant, evacuate area.

Monitor area EMFs.

CRS (Step 3) IF primary system leak,-

NOTE: There is no NC System leak. CRS (Step 4) IF high activity in reactor coolant, go to AP/1/A/5500/018 (High Activity in Reactor Coolant).

CRS (Step 5) IF NC filter high radiation,-

NOTE: The CRS will enter AP

-18. AP/1/A/5500/18, HIGH ACTIVITY IN REACTOR COOLANT BOP (Step 1) Place one Outside Pressure Filter train in service PER Enclosure 1 (Pressurizing the Control Room).

NOTE: The CRS may assign the BOP to perform this action.

If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 1.

Other Examiners follow AP18 Actions, Step 2, on Page 16. AP/1/A/5500/18, HIGH ACTIVITY IN REACTOR COOLANT ENCLOSURE 1, PRESSURIZING THE CONTROL ROOM BOP (Step 1) Pressurize Control Room using Outside Air Pressure Fans as follows:

Examiner NOTE: Follow the actions associated with Enclosure 1 if BOP is assigned by CRS to perform.

Ensure at least one of the following groups of air intake valves are OPEN:

Unit 1 air intake valves:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 2 Page 15 of 63 Event

Description:

RCS High Activity due to Crud Burst Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 1VC-1A (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol From Unit 1) 1VC-2A (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol From Unit 1) 1VC-3B (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol From Unit 1) 1VC-4B (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol From Unit 1)

OR Unit 2 air intake valves:

1VC-9A (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol From Unit 2) 1VC-10A (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol From Unit 2) 1VC-11B (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol From Unit 2) 1VC-12B (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol From Unit 2)

BOP (Step 2) IF A train VC/YC selected,

-.. NOTE: The B Train of VC/YC is selected.

BOP (Step 3) IF B train VC/YC selected, THEN place "B TRAIN CR OUTSIDE AIR PRESS FAN" to "ON".

BOP (Step 4) Depress "MAN" for the following:

"#1 CRA OUTSD AIR FAN"

"#2 CRA OUTSD AIR FAN" BOP (Step 5) Depress "OFF" for the following:

CRA-OAD-4 (CR Area Otsd Fans Damper) CRA-OAD-3 (CR Area Otsd Fans Damper)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 2 Page 16 of 63 Event

Description:

RCS High Activity due to Crud Burst Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP/1/A/5500/18, HIGH ACTIVITY IN REACTOR COOLANT Examiner NOTE:

Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE. BOP/RO (Step 2) Check 1NV

-127A (L/D Hx Outlet 3

-Way Temp Cntrl)

- ALIGNED TO DEMIN.

CRS (Step 3) Check Dose Equivalent Iodine

- PREVIOUSLY DETERMINED TO EXCEED ACTION LEVEL 3 LIMIT PER NSD 306, NUCLEAR FUEL RELIABILITY.

CRS (Step 3 RNO) GO TO Step 5.

CRS (Step 5) Determine cause of high activity as follows: NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/Chemistry to address the cause of high activity.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/Chemistry.

As Chemistry (Time Compression) report that you suspect a Crud Burst, but DEI Request Chemistry to check decontamination factor of mixed bed demineralizer.

Notify Chemistry to perform an NC System isotopic analysis to determine if high activity is from a crud burst or failed fuel. Booth Instructor As Chemistry (Time Compression) report that you suspect a Crud Burst, but DEI

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 2 Page 17 of 63 Event

Description:

RCS High Activity due to Crud Burst Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 6) IF AT ANY TIME it is determined that high activity is from crud burst, THEN raise letdown flow to 120 GPM PER OP/1/A/6200/001 A (Chemical and Volume Control System Letdown), Enclosure 4.5 (Establishing Maximum Normal Letdown).

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

NOTE: The CRS may assign the BOP to perform this action.

If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 4.5.

Other Examiners follow AP18 Actions, Step 7, on Page 19. Floor Instructor: Provide a previously prepared copy of OP/1/A/6200/001A to BOP after BOP locates Simulator Copy of procedure.

OP/1/A/6200/001 A, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM LETDOWN ENCLOSURE 4.5, ESTABLISHING MAXIMUM NORMAL LETDOWN Examiner NOTE: Follow the actions associated with Enclosure 4.5 if BOP is assigned by CRS to perform.

CRS/BOP (Step 3.1) Evaluate all outstanding R&Rs that may impact performance of this procedure.

NOTE: The CRS/BOP may call WCC to address the R&Rs. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC, and report none.

BOP (Step 3.2) Notify RP that Letdown is being changed and may affect dose rates in affected areas.

NOTE: The CRS/BOP may call WCC/RP to address letdown flowrate change.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/RP.

BOP (Step 3.3) IF Cation Bed Demineralizer is service,-

NOTE: The Cation Bed Demineralizer is NOT in service.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 2 Page 18 of 63 Event

Description:

RCS High Activity due to Crud Burst Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3.4) Evaluate NC Filter P prior to increasing letdown flow.

NOTE: The BOP may contact the AO to evaluate filter P. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report P normal (

5-15 psid), and acceptable to raise flow.

BOP (Step 3.5) Perform the following sections applicable:

Section 3.6, Increasing Normal Letdown to less than or equal to 120 gpm using 1NV-459 (Variable L/D Orifice Outlet Flow Cntrl)

BOP (Step 3.6) Increasing Normal Letdown to less than or equal to 120 gpm using 1NV

-459 (Variable L/D Orifice Outlet Flow Cntrl)

BOP IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to manually control charging flow, place 1NV

-238 (Charging Line Flow Control) in manual.

BOP IF AT ANY TIME it is desired, place 1KC

-132 (U1 LD Hx KD Otlt Temp Cntrl) manual loader to manual and control temperature as required.

BOP IF 1NV-459 (Variable L/D Orifice Outle t Flow Cntrl) NOT in service-NOTE: 1NV-459 is in service.

BOP Place 1NV-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) in manual.

BOP Adjust 1NV

-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) to reduce letdown pressure to 150-250 psig.

BOP Perform the following concurrently:

Slowly open 1NV

-459 ((Variable L/D Orifice Outlet Flow Cntrl) increasing letdown flow to desired flow rate.

Adjust 1NV

-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) to maintain letdown pressure less than 500 psig.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 2 Page 19 of 63 Event

Description:

RCS High Activity due to Crud Burst Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP Adjust 1NV

-241 (Seal Injection Flow Control) to maintain NC Pump Seal Injection flow.

BOP IF NC System at normal operating temperature and pressure, adjust 1NV

-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) to maintain 200-375 psig letdown pressure.

NOTE: NC System is at normal operating temperature and pressur

e. Ensure 1NV

-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) setpoint at actual letdown pressure.

Place 1NV

-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) in auto.

BOP IF NC System at reduced temperature and pressure,-

NOTE: NC System is at normal operating temperature and pressure.

BOP IF 1NV-238 (Charging Line Flow Control) in manual,-

NOTE: 1NV-238 is in AUTO.

Ensure 1KC

-132 (U1 LD Hx KC Otlt Temp Cntrl) manual loader adjusted to desired setpoint and in auto.

AP/1/A/5500/18, HIGH ACTIVITY IN REACTOR COOLANT Examiner NOTE:

Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE. CRS (Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME it is determined that high activity is from failed fuel,-

NOTE: The high activity is NOT from failed fuel.

CRS (Step 8) Notify Radwaste to ensure VCT H 2 purge flow is established.

CRS (Step 9) REFER TO Tech Spec 3.4.16 (RCS Specific Activity).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 2 Page 20 of 63 Event

Description:

RCS High Activity due to Crud Burst Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 10) WHEN station management determines Control Room pressurization no longer required, THEN secure PER OP/1/A/6450/011 (Control Area Ventilation/Chilled Water System), Enclosure 4.4 (Control Room Atmosphere Pressurization During Abnormal Conditions).

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.16, RCS SPECIFIC ACTIVITY CRS LCO 3.4.16 The specific activity of the reactor coolant shall be within limits.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, and 2.

CRS ACTIONS CRS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION A must be entered.

A. DEI-131 not within limit.

A.1 Verify DEI-131 60µCi/gm. AND A.2 Restore DEI-131 to within limit. Once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />

48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 3 Page 21 of 63 Event

Description:

Letdown Valve 1NV

-35 fails CLOSED Next, 1NV-35, Variable Flow Letdown Orifice Isolation Valve, will fail Closed. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/12, "Loss of Letdown, Charging or Seal Injection," and establish Excess Letdown.

Booth Operator Instructions:

insert REM-NV0035A = 0.0 (Ramp = 10 seconds) Indications Available:

Letdown flow (1NVP5530) indicates 0 gpm.

1NV-35A Green status light is LIT.

Pzr Level trending upward.

Charging flow (1NVP5630) starts to lower.

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS will enter AP

-12. AP/1/A/5500/12, LOSS OF LETDOWN, CHARGING OR SEAL INJECTION BOP (Step 1) Check if charging is aligned to Regenerative Hx as follows:

Charging flow

- GREATER THAN 20 GPM NOTE: The BOP may take MANUAL control of 1NV

-238 to control Charging flow.

1NV-241 (U1 Seal Water Inj Flow Control)

- THROTTLED OPEN 1NV-244A (U1 Charging Hdr Cont Outside Isol)

- OPEN 1NV-245B (U1 Charging Hdr Cont Outside Isol)

- OPEN. BOP (Step 2) Check Pzr Level

- LESS THAN 96%. CRS (Step 3) Stop any power or temperature changes in progress.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 3 Page 22 of 63 Event

Description:

Letdown Valve 1NV

-35 fails CLOSED Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO/ BOP (Step 4) Announce occurrence on paging system. NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

CRS (Step 5) IF this AP entered due to loss of letdown only, THEN GO TO Step 37.

BOP (Step 37) Ensure the following valves are CLOSED: 1NV-458A (U1 75 GPM L.D Orifice Otlt Cont Isol) 1NV-457A (U1 45 GPM L/D Orifice Otlt Cont Isol) 1NV-35A (U1 Variable L/D Orifice Otlt Cont Isol).

NOTE: 1NV-35 has failed CLOSED. BOP (Step 38) Ensure NC System makeup controller is auto.

BOP (Step 39) Ensure charging flow going down to maintain Pzr at program level.

NOTE: The BOP may take MANUAL control of 1NV

-238 to control Charging flow.

BOP (Step 40) Check "LETDN RELIEF HI TEMP" alarm (1AD

-7, I-4) - HAS REMAINED DARK.

BOP (Step 41) Check 1NV

-21A (U1 NV Supply to U1 Aux PZR Spray Isol)

- CLOSED. BOP (Step 42) Operate Pzr heaters as follows:

Check A, B, and D Pzr heater group supply breakers on vertical board

- CLOSED. Check normal Pzr spray

- AVAILABLE.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 3 Page 23 of 63 Event

Description:

Letdown Valve 1NV

-35 fails CLOSED Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Place the following Pzr heater groups in manual and "ON" to maximize spray flow:

A B D BOP (Step 43) Check the following valves

- OPEN: 1NV-1A (U1 NC L/D Isol To Regenerative Hx) 1NV-2A (U1 NC L/D Iso l To Regenerative Hx).

CRS (Step 44) GO TO Step 49.

BOP (Step 49) Establish normal letdown as follows: NOTE: Although attempts will be made, Normal Letdown will NOT be able to be established.

Ensure 1NV

-459 (U1 Variable L/D Orifice Outlet Flow Cntrl) is CLOSED.

Place 1NV

-124 (U1 Letdown Press Control) in manual with output between 40-45% OPEN.

Check OAC

- IN SERVICE.

Check valve position on OAC for 1NV

-124 - INDICATING THROTTLED.

Check the following valves

- OPEN: 1NV-1A (U1 NC L/D Isol To Regenerative Hx) 1NV-2A (U1 NC L/D Iso l To Regenerative Hs).

Establish cooling to Regenerative Hx by performing the following concurrently:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 3 Page 24 of 63 Event

Description:

Letdown Valve 1NV

-35 fails CLOSED Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Establish at least 65 GPM charging flow by THROTTLING OPEN 1NV

-238 (U1 Charging Hdr Control) or raising PD pump speed.

NOTE: The BOP will take MANUAL control of 1NV

-238 to control Charging flow.

THROTTLE 1 NV-241 (U1 Seal Water Inj Flow Control) to establish approximately 8 GPM seal injection flow to each NC pump.

OPEN letdown line isolation valves as follows: OPEN 1NV-7B (U1 Letd own Cont Outside Isol).

OPEN 1NV-1A (U1 NC L/D Isol To Regenerative Hx).

OPEN 1NV-2A (U1 NC L/D Isol To Regenerative Hx).

OPEN 1NV-35A (U1 Variable L/D Orifice Otlt Cont Isol).

NOTE: 1NV-35A cannot be opened. CRS (Step 49g RNO) GO TO Step 52 NOTE: Although attempts will be made, Normal Letdown will NOT be able to be established.

BOP (Step 52) Establish excess letdown as follows: Adjust charging to minimum while maintaining the following:

NOTE: The BOP will take MANUAL control of 1NV

-238 to control Charging flow.

NC pump seal injection flow greater that 6 GPM

. Pzr level at program level.

IF AT ANY TIME excess letdown cannot be established, THEN observe Note prior to Step 53 and GO TO Step 53 to establish letdown using R x Vessel Head Vents. OPEN the following valves:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 3 Page 25 of 63 Event

Description:

Letdown Valve 1NV

-35 fails CLOSED Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 1KC-315B (U1 Excess L/D Hx KC Ret Hdr Cont Otsd Isol).

1KC-305B (U1 KC To Excess L/D Hx Cont Outside Isol).

BOP Ensure 1NV

-27B (U1 Excess L/D Hx Outlet 3-Way Cntrl) selected to "VCT" position.

OPEN 1NV-26B (U1 Excess L/D Hx Outlet Cntrl Wait 2 minutes.

CLOSE 1NV

-26B (U1 Excess L/D Hx Outlet Cntrl).

Check the following valves

- OPEN: 1NV-94AC (U1 NC Pumps Seal Water Return Cont Inside Isol) 1NV-95B (U1 NC Pumps Seal Water Return Cont Outside Isol).

OPEN 1NV-24B (1C NC Loop To Excess L/D Hx Isol).

OPEN 1NV-25B (1C NC Loop To Excess L/D Hx Isol).

Check the following:

Reactor - CRITICAL 1NV-27B - ALIGNED TO VCT.

RO Closely monitor reactor response once excess letdown is in service.

Slowly OPEN 1NV

-26B while maintaining excess letdown Hx temperature less than 200°F. CRS GO TO Step 52.r.

Notify Primary Chemistry that excess letdown is in service.

NOTE: The CRS may call Chemistry.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry.

Adjust charging flow as desired while maintaining the following:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 3 Page 26 of 63 Event

Description:

Letdown Valve 1NV

-35 fails CLOSED Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NC pump seal injection flow greater than 6 GPM Pzr level at program level.

Operate Pzr heaters as desired.

BOP WHEN time allows, THEN notify engineering to document the following transients:

NOTE: The CRS may call Engineering

. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Engineering

. Letdown isolation Potential charging nozzle transient IF NV Aux Spray was in service-Check 1NV

-27B (U1 Excess L/D Hx Outlet 3-Way Cntrl) = ALIGNED TO "VCT". IF AT ANY TIME VCT level needs to be lowered-.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

WHEN normal letdown available-NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

WHEN desired to isolate excess letdown- NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

RETURN TO procedure and step in effect. NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the failed valve. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief

. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #

4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 4 Page 27 of 63 Event

Description:

Electrical Grid Voltage Oscillations Subsequently, electrical disturbances cause grid voltage to drop to 216 KV. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/05, "Generator Voltage and Electrical Grid Disturbances," and make adjustments of Main Generator voltage.

Booth Operator Instructions:

insert PLP

-014 = 480, delay=0 ramp=

120 (Grid Disturbance)

Indications Available:

OAC Alarm: U1 GENERATOR X PHASE AMPS OAC Alarm: U1 GENERATOR Y PHASE AMPS OAC Alarm: U1 GENERATOR Z PHASE AMPS OAC Alarm: 230 KV Y BUS VOLTS OAC Alarm: 230 KV R BUS VOLTS Main Generator MVARs rise to outside of Generator Capability Curve MCB Annunciator 1AD-1/C-5, EXCITATION LIMITER IN ACTION (5 minutes after event)

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP/1/A/5500/05, GENERATOR VOLTAGE AND ELECTRICAL GRID DISTURBANCES CRS (Step 1) Announce occurrence on page.

NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

CRS (Step 2) Ensure dispatcher is aware of problem. NOTE: The CRS/BOP will contact SOC.

Booth Instructor: as SOC, acknowledge.

As SOC, Booth Instructor report Electrical Grid voltage disturbances are occurring.

CRS (Step 3) Notify Unit 2 to evaluate implementing AP/2/A/5500/05 (Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances).

Floor Instructor:

As U2 RO, acknowledge.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 4 Page 28 of 63 Event

Description:

Electrical Grid Voltage Oscillations Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 4) Check Unit 1 Generator

- TIED TO GRID. CRS (Step 5) IF AT ANY TIME reactor power is greater than 100%, THEN reduce turbine load to maintain reactor power less than 100%. NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. RO (Step 6) Check Unit 1 Generator frequency

- GREATER THAN 58.5 Hz.

RO (Step 7) Monitor Generator Capability Curve as follows:

NOTE: The RO or BOP will most likely place Curve on OAC Screen.

Check Generator voltage

- LESS THAN 24 KV. NOTE: The Generator voltage will be 22 KV. Check OAC

- IN SERVICE.

Monitor Generator Capability Curve PER OAC turn on code "GENCAP".

RO (Step 8) Check Generator MVARs

- WITHIN LIMITS OF GENERATOR CAPABILITY CURVE. NOTE: The MVARs will NOT be within the capability curve

(or they will be ONLY because the limiting circuit is functioning)

. CRS (Step 8 RNO) GO TO Step 11.

RO (Step 11) Adjust MVARs to within the capability curve by performing one of the following:

Depress "LOWER" on the "VOLTAGE ADJUST" to reduce lagging MVARs. NOTE: This adjustment may or may NOT be effective at controlling MVARs, depending on whether or not 1AD1, C

-5 is in alarm (Indicative of limiting circuit). OR Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 4 Page 29 of 63 Event

Description:

Electrical Grid Voltage Oscillations Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Depress "RAISE" on the "VOLTAGE ADJUST" to reduce leading MVARs.

RO (Step 12) Check Generator MVARs

- WITHIN LIMITS OF GENERATOR CAPABILITY CURVE.

NOTE: IF 1AD1 C

-5 is DARK, The MVARs will be within the capability curve (If so, go to Step 13). RO (Step 12 RNO) IF actions in Step 11 do not restore MVARs, THEN perform the following:

IF voltage regulator in "AUTO", THEN perform the following:

Place voltage regulator in "MAN".

Adjust MVARs to within the capability curve.

IF unable to maintain MVARs within curve, - NOTE: IF needed, the MVARs will be able to be adjusted with the Voltage Regulator in MANUAL. RO (Step 13) Monitor Generator frequency as follows: Check generator frequency

- BETWEEN 59.9 - 60.1 Hz. IF AT ANY TIME generator frequency is abnormal OR TCC/SOC reports abnormal grid frequency condition, THEN GO TO Step 13d.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

CRS GO TO Step 16.

RO (Step 16) Check if voltage regulator malfunction has occurred:

Generator MVARs

- FLUCTUATED WITHOUT A KNOWN GRID DISTURBANCE IN EFFECT

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 4 Page 30 of 63 Event

Description:

Electrical Grid Voltage Oscillations Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OAC turn on code "MAINGEN"

- INDICATES PROBLEM WITH VOLTAGE REGULATOR "VOLTAGE REGULATOR COMMON TROUBLE" alarm (1AD

-1, D-4) - LIT. CRS (Step 16 RNO) GO TO Step 20.

CRS (Step 20) Check if TCC or SOC has reported any of the following:

"Real Time Contingency Analysis" (RTCA) indicated that switchyard voltage would not be adequate should the unit trip. OR "Real Time Contingency Analysis" (RTCA) indicates that switchyard voltage would not be adequate if further grid degradation occurs

. OR Red grid condition exists or is predicted within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

OR Degraded 230 KV switchyard (grid) voltage or frequency condition exists.

NOTE: if NOT already done, As SOC, Booth Instructor report Electrical Grid voltage disturbances are occurring

. CRS (Step 21) Notify Work Window Manager or STA to perform the following in electronic risk assessment tool:

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC to address the Voltage regulator failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

Enter PRA code OSSA_GRID for expected duration of event.

Evaluated results.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 4 Page 31 of 63 Event

Description:

Electrical Grid Voltage Oscillations Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 22) Evaluate rescheduling work on the following equipment during degraded grid condition time frame:

NOTE: The CRS will determine that there are no effects on this equipment.

Emergency D/Gs Vital or Aux Control Power Systems SSF equipment CRS (Step 23) Evaluate the following:

Stopping any ongoing surveillance testing. Stopping any ongoing maintenance activities.

Returning systems to normal/functional status. NOTE: The CRS will determine that there are no activities or tests that need to be stopped.

The CRS may call WCC on expediting 1EMF27 Radiation Monitor return to normal.

RO (Step 24) Check Unit 1 Generator

- TIED TO GRID. CRS/RO (Step 25) IF AT ANY TIME TCC reports that "Real Time Contingency Analysis" (RTCA) indicates 230 KV switchyard (grid) voltage would not be adequate should Unit 1 trip, THEN GO TO Enclosure 3 (RTCA Actions with Unit One On

-line). NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

CRS (Step 26) IF AT ANY TIME offsite power is inoperable, THEN REFER TO the following Tech Specs:

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

CRS (Step 27) WHEN conditions return to normal, THEN perform the following:

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 4 Page 32 of 63 Event

Description:

Electrical Grid Voltage Oscillations Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Check Generator frequency

- HAS REMAINED GREATER THAN 58.5 HZ.

Check Unit 1 Generator

- TIED TO GRID. Ensure Unit 1 Generator Bus Voltage is adjusted PER Data Book, Enclosure 4.3, Table 3.1.3, "Generator Voltage Operating Schedule", including any operational restrictions.

CRS Exit this AP.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief

. NOTE: It is possible that the crew will initiate a down power to clear the high Generator Amperage alarms on the OAC

. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #

5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 5 Page 33 of 63 Event

Description:

Real Time Contingency Shortly afterwards, TCC will call and report that Real Time Contingency Analysis indicates that 230KV Switchyard Voltage would not be adequate should Unit 1 trip. The operator will go to Enclosure 3 (RTCA Actions with Unit One On

-line), and enter Technical Specification 3.0.3, "Applicability

." The operator will also need to evaluate Technical Specification 3.8.1, "AC Sources

- Operating."

Booth Operator Instructions:

As TCC, call and report that Real Time Contingency Analysis indicates that 230KV Switchyard Voltage would not be adequate should Unit 1 trip.

Indications Available:

NA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS will implement Continuous Action Step 25 of AP5, and perform Enclosure 3 of AP5.

AP/1/A/5500/05, GENERATOR VOLTAGE AND ELECTRICAL GRID DISTURBANCES ENCLOSURE 3, RTCA ACTIONS WITH UNIT ONE ON

-LINE BOP (Step 1) Check 1ETA and 1ETB

- BOTH SUPPLIED FROM UNIT OFFSITE POWER.

CRS/BOP (Step 2) Start a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> timer from time of receiving notification from TCC that switchyard voltage (grid) is degraded.

CRS (Step 3) Enter L.C.O 3.0.3, due to both trains of ECCS inoperable (Tech Spec 3.5.2).

Comply with L.C.O 3.0.3, but minimize the load reduction during the first three hours. (reducing load aggravates the grid disturbance).

NOTE: The CRS will prepare for the load reduction, but delay this action.

CRS (Step 4) Declare both Unit 1 offsite power sources inoperable per Tech Spec 3.8.1.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 5 Page 34 of 63 Event

Description:

Real Time Contingency Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 5) IF the normal power source is inoperable for both trains of shared systems (shared RN valves, VC,YC,VA), THEN perform the following:

Enter L.C.O 3.0.3 for RN, VC, YC, and AC Sources (Tech Specs 3.7.7, 3.7.9, 3.7.10, 3.8.1).

Comply with L.C.O 3.0.3, but minimize the load reduction during the first three hours. (reducing load aggravate s the grid disturbance).

NOTE: The CRS will prepare for the load reduction, but delay this action.

Enter appropriate required action for VA (Tech Spec 3.7.11). Notify Regulatory Compliance to evaluate requesting a NOED (Notice of Enforcement Discretion) due to loss of normal power source to shared systems.

NOTE: The CRS may call Regulatory Compliance to address the RTCA.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Regulatory Compliance.

IF operable offsite power source becomes available, THEN evaluate realigning shared systems to operable source. Examiner NOTE:

The assessment of LCO 3.0.3 and 3.8.1 may be delayed until after the exam.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0.3, APPLICABILITY CRS LCO 3.0.3 When an LCO is not met and the associated ACTIONS are not met, an associated ACTION is not provided, or if directed by the associated ACTIONS, the unit shall be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable. Action shall be initiated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to place the unit, as applicable, in:

MODE 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />; MODE 4 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />; and MODE 5 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br />.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 5 Page 35 of 63 Event

Description:

Real Time Contingency Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.

Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation in accordance with the LCO or ACTIONS, completion of the actions required by LCO 3.0.3 is not required.

CRS LCO 3.0.3 is only applicable in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

NOTE: The CRS will determine that the LCO 3.0.3 ACTION must be entered.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.1, AC SOURCES

- OPERATING

. CRS LCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:

Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power System; and Two diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power Systems; AND The automatic load sequencers for Train A and Train B shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 CRS ACTIONS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 5 Page 36 of 63 Event

Description:

Real Time Contingency Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME CRS A. One offsite circuit inoperable.

A.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for OPERABLE offsite circuit.

AND A.2 Declare required feature(s) with no offsite power available inoperable when it's redundant required feature(s) is inoperable.

AND A.3 Restore offsite circuit to OPERABLE status. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> AND Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> form discovery of no offsite power to ne train concurrent with inoperability of redundant required feature(s) 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> AND 6 days form discovery of failure to meet LCO C. Two offsite circuits inoperable.

C.1 Declare required feature(s) inoperable when its redundant required feature(s) is inoperable.

AND C.2 Restore one offsite circuit to OPERABLE status. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> from discovery of Condition C concurrent with inoperability of redundant required feature(s) 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION A &

C of LCO 3.8.1 must be entered.

After Evaluation of Technical Specification 3.8.1, or at the discretion of the Lead Examiner, move to Event #

6.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 6 Page 37 of 63 Event

Description:

IPB Fan Failure/Rapid Downpower While implementing Enclosure 3, both IPB Fans will fail. The crew will respond in accordance with ARP1AD

-11/J5, IPB AIR FLOW TROUBLE, and perform a rapid downpower in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/04, "Rapid Downpower."

Booth Operator Instructions:

Insert LOA

-IPB001 and IPB002

= OFF Indications Available:

MCB Annunciator 1AD11/I

-5; IPB TROUBLE MCB Annunciator 1AD11/J

-5; IPB AIR FLOW TROUBLE OAC Alarm 1A IPB Blower OFF OAC Alarm 1B IPB Blower OFF Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments ARP1AD-11/J5, IPB AIR FLOW TROUBLE CRS (Step 1) IF load rejection-NOTE: A load rejection is NOT occurring.

CRS/BOP (Step 2) Send operator to IPB Alarm Panel to determine and acknowledge the alarm.

BOP (Step 3) IF a zone lockout occurred, -.

NOTE: A Zone Lockout has NOT occurred.

BOP (Step 4) IF both fans off, perform the following within 15 minutes:

NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO to take this action.

Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge. Within 2 min report that neither IPB Fan will start

. Place fan in "AUTO" to "MAN".

IF neither fan will start, go to AP/1/A/5000/004 (Rapid Down Power) and reduce Turbine Generator until the following obtained:

20,000 amps for double Busline (Approximately 700 MWs, 58% RTP)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 6 Page 38 of 63 Event

Description:

IPB Fan Failure/Rapid Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 10,000 amps for single Busline (approximately 350 MWs, 30% RTP)

NOTE: The CRS will transition to AP-4. AP/1/A/5500/04, RAPID DOWNPOWER RO/ BOP (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

CRS (Step 2) Announce occurrence on page.

NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 3) Check turbine control

- IN AUTO. RO (Step 4) Check "MW LOOP"

- IN SERVICE.

RO (Step 4 RNO) Depress "MW IN/MW OUT" pushbutton.

CRS (Step 5) Check shutdown to Mode 3

- DESIRED. CRS (Step 5 RNO) Observe Note prior to Step 8 and GO TO Step 8.

CRS (Step 8) Determine the required power reduction rate (MW/min).

NOTE: The CRS will reduce load at 30-60 MWe/minute.

RO (Step 9) Check control rods

- IN AUTO. NOTE: The Control Rods may or may not be in AUTO. If not, the RO will perform the Step 9 RNO and place the Control Rods in AUTO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 6 Page 39 of 63 Event

Description:

IPB Fan Failure/Rapid Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 9 RNO) Perform the following:

IF auto control available, THEN perform the following:

Place control rods in auto.

GO TO Step 10.

BOP (Step 10) Notify SOC of load reduction (red dispatcher phone).

Booth Instructor: as SOC, acknowledge.

RO (Step 11) Initiate turbine load reduction to desired load at desired rate.

BOP (Step 12) Borate NC System as follows:

Energize all backup Pzr heaters.

CRS Check unit to be shutdown

- VIA REACTOR TRIP FROM 15% POWER.

NOTE: It is normal practice to shut down the reactor by driving rods, rather than tripping from 15%

. CRS (Step 12b. RNO) GO TO Step 12.d.

BOP Determine boration amount based on the following:

Power Reduction Rate (MW/min)

Present NC System Boron Concentration (ppm) Total Power change (%).

Record calculated boration amount:

NOTE: Based on the rate of load reduction the total boration is 500-600 gallons. RO Check auto or manual rod control

- AVAILABLE.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 6 Page 40 of 63 Event

Description:

IPB Fan Failure/Rapid Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP Perform boration in 4 equal additions during load reduction PER OP/1/A/6150/009 (Boron Concentration Control), Enclosure 4.7 (Boration Using 1NV-265B (Boric Acid to NV Pumps)).

NOTE: The CRS may assign the BOP to perform this action.

If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 4.7.

Other Examiners follow AP-4 Actions, Step 13, on Page 41. OP/1/A/6150/009 BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ENCLOSURE 4.7 BORATION USING 1NV-265B (BORIC ACID TO NV PUMPS) BOP (Step 3.1) Evaluate all outstanding R&Rs that may impact performance of this procedure.

BOP (Step 3.2) Evaluate energizing additional pressurizer heaters per OP/1/A/6100/003 (Controlling Procedure For Unit Operation) to enhance system mixing when changing NC System boron concentration. (R.M.)

BOP (Step 3.3) Perform following sections, as applicable:

Section 3.6, Adding Greater Than 20 Gallons of Boric Acid BOP (Step 3.6) Adding Greater Than 20 Gallons of Boric Acid Ensure one of the following running:

1A BA Trans Pump OR 1B BA Trans Pump Determine length of time 1NV

-265B (U1 NV Pump Boric Acid Sup Isol) full open as follows: (R.M.)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 6 Page 41 of 63 Event

Description:

IPB Fan Failure/Rapid Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP IF using Table 4.7

-1 (Time 1NV

-265B Full Open With One BAT Pump Running), record time 1NV

-265B full open from table:_____sec.

IF using equation, perform the following:

Calculate time 1NV-265 is to to be Full Open.

Open 1NV-265B (U1 NV Pump Boric Acid Sup Isol). (R.M.)

HOLD until 1NV

-265B (U1 NV Boric Acid Sup Isol) full open time elapsed, THEN close 1NV

-265B (U1 NV Pump Boric Acid Sup Isol). (R.M.)

IF 1NV-265B (U1 NV Boric Acid Sup Isol) will NOT close-IF BA Trans Pump started in Step 3.6.1, perform the following:

Ensure the following off:

1A BA Trans Pump 1B BA Trans Pump Ensure one of the following selected to "AUTO":

1A BA Trans Pump OR 1B BA Trans Pump AP/1/A/5500/04, RAPID DOWNPOWER Examiner NOTE:

Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE. RO (Step 13) Check control rods

- MOVING IN AS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN T

-AVG AT T-REF.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 6 Page 42 of 63 Event

Description:

IPB Fan Failure/Rapid Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 14) Di splay Rod Insertion Limits on OAC by entering turn on code "RIL".

CRS (Step 15)

IF AT ANY TIME "CONTROL ROD BANK LO LO LIMIT" alarm (1AD

-2, B-9) is lit, THEN perform one of the following to comply with Tech Spec 3.1.6 (Control Bank Insertion Limits)

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Ensure alarm clears within one hour as Xenon builds in.

OR Initiate boration as necessary within one hour to restore control rods above insertion limits.

CRS (Step 16)

IF AT ANY TIME during this procedure C

-7A is received, THEN ensure Transient Monitor freeze is triggered.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

CRS (Step 17)

REFER TO the following:

NOTE: The CRS may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

RP/0/A/5700/000 (Classification of Emergency)

RP/0/A/5700/010 (NRC Immediate Notification Requirements).

CRS (Step 18)

Notify Reactor Engineer on duty of load reduction.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/RE to address the load reduction.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/RE.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 6 Page 43 of 63 Event

Description:

IPB Fan Failure/Rapid Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner NOTE: The CRS may proceed past Step 18 of AP4 while wait ing for the BOP to complete the first boration.

If so, wait until the BOP is complete with the first boration an them proceed to the next event. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #7-11.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 7, 8, 9, 10

& 11 Page 44 of 63 Event

Description:

Both CF Pumps Roll Back to Low Speed/Turbine fails to Trip in AUTO and MANUAL/ C

-9 fails to Actuate/1A Safety Valve Sticks OPEN/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO/Man/1ETB Lockout/1D Steam Break in Containment/ TD CA Pump is Restored During the downpower, both CF Pumps will rollback to LOW Speed causing a low level condition in all Steam Generators. On the ensuing Rx Trip, the Main Turbine will fail to trip in both Auto and Manual, and the operator will need to manually close the Governor Valves. On the trip, the Steam Dumps will fail to actuate due to a C

-9 failure and the SG PORVs will open to control steam pressure. Since the 1A SG PORV is isolated, a 1A SG Safety Valve will open instead, and stick about 60% open. Simultaneously, a lockout will occur on 1ETB and the 1A MDCA Pump will fail to start either automatically or manually and result in a total loss of CA flow. 30 seconds later a Major Steam Line Break will occur on the 1D Steamline in Containment. The operator will enter EP/1/A/5000/E

-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and verify reactor trip and Safety Injection actuation; and then transition to EP/1/A/5000/FR

-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink," based on no CA flow. When 3 of 4 Steam Generator Wide Range levels are < 36%), the operator will initiate NCS Feed and Bleed. Once NCS Feed and Bleed is established, the TDCA Pump will be returned to service, and the operator will restore CA flow to the 1B and/or 1C Steam Generator per Step 7 of FR

-H.1. The scenario will terminate at Step 39 of FR

-H.1, with the crew feeding at least one Steam Generator to restore Wide Range Level to > 12% (17% ACC).

Booth Operator Instructions:

insert MAL

-DCS1418 insert MAL

-DCS1479 Indications Available:

Feed Flow indication on all SGs less than S team Flow indication.

MCB Annunciator 1AD4

-C1(-4), S/G A(-D) FLOW MISMATCH LO CF FLOW 1A CF Pump speed is lowering.

1B CF Pump speed is lowering.

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments EP/1/A/5000/E

-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO/ BOP (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of E

-0, prior to the CRS addressing the EP. RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip:

Immediate Action All rod bottom lights

- LIT Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 7, 8, 9, 10

& 11 Page 45 of 63 Event

Description:

Both CF Pumps Roll Back to Low Speed/Turbine fails to Trip in AUTO and MANUAL/ C

-9 fails to Actuate/1A Safety Valve Sticks OPEN/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO/Man/1ETB Lockout/1D Steam Break in Containment/ TD CA Pump is Restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Reactor trip and bypass breakers

- OPEN I/R power - GOING DOWN.

RO (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip:

Immediate Action All throttle valves

- CLOSED. RO (Step 3 RNO) Perform the following:

Immediate Action Trip turbine IF turbine will not trip, THEN perform the following:

Place turbine in manual.

CLOSE governor valves in fast action. IF governor valves will not close, THEN-. Critical Task

Manually trip the Main Turbine prior to completing the Immediate Actions of E

-0 Safety Significance: Failure to trip the Main Turbine when required causes a challenge to the Subcriticality/Integrity Critical Safety Function that otherwise would not or may not exist. This mis

-operation by the operator necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates an inability by the operator to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation of the RPS.

BOP (Step 4) Check 1ETA and 1ETB

- ENERGIZED.

Immediate Action BOP (Step 4) Perform the following:

IF both busses deenergized, THEN-. NOTE: Bus 1ETA is energized.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 7, 8, 9, 10

& 11 Page 46 of 63 Event

Description:

Both CF Pumps Roll Back to Low Speed/Turbine fails to Trip in AUTO and MANUAL/ C

-9 fails to Actuate/1A Safety Valve Sticks OPEN/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO/Man/1ETB Lockout/1D Steam Break in Containment/ TD CA Pump is Restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments WHEN time allows, THEN try to restore power to deenergized bus PER AP/1/A/5500/07 (Loss of Electrical Power) while continuing with this procedure.

RO/ BOP (Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated:

Immediate Action "SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED" status light (1SI

-18) - LIT. Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1SI

-14) - LIT. CRS/RO/ BOP Foldout Page:

NC Pump Trip Criteria CA Suction Sources Position Criteria for 1NV150B and 1NV151A (U1 NV Pump Recirc Isol)

Ruptured S/G Aux Feedwater Isolation Criteria Faulted S/G Aux Feedwater Isolation Criteria CRS (Step 6) Announce "Unit 1 Safety Injection".

NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

BOP (Step 7) Check all Feedwater Isolation status lights (1SI

-4) - LIT.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 7, 8, 9, 10

& 11 Page 47 of 63 Event

Description:

Both CF Pumps Roll Back to Low Speed/Turbine fails to Trip in AUTO and MANUAL/ C

-9 fails to Actuate/1A Safety Valve Sticks OPEN/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO/Man/1ETB Lockout/1D Steam Break in Containment/ TD CA Pump is Restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 8) Check Phase A "RESET" lights

- DARK. BOP (Step 9) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on Energized train(s):

Groups 1, 2, 5

- DARK. Group 3 - LIT. Group 4 - LIT AS REQUIRED. Group 6 - LIT. CRS GO TO Step 10.

RO/ BOP (Step 10) Check proper CA pump status:

MD CA pumps

- ON. NOTE: Both MD CA Pumps are OFF, and cannot be started. RO/ BOP (Step 10.a RNO) Start pumps.

NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO to evaluate the MD CA Pumps.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.

Wait 3 Minutes and report that neither pump is running

. RO/ BOP N/R level in at least 3 S/Gs

- GREATER THAN 17%.

RO/ BOP (Step 10.b RNO) Ensure TD CA pump on.

NOTE: The TD CA Pump is OOS. BOP (Step 11) Check all KC pumps

- ON.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 7, 8, 9, 10

& 11 Page 48 of 63 Event

Description:

Both CF Pumps Roll Back to Low Speed/Turbine fails to Trip in AUTO and MANUAL/ C

-9 fails to Actuate/1A Safety Valve Sticks OPEN/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO/Man/1ETB Lockout/1D Steam Break in Containment/ TD CA Pump is Restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 11 RNO) Perform the following:

Start pumps. IF all KC pumps running, THEN-. IF any NC pump KC low flow annunciator lit on 1AD6, THEN stop all NC pumps.

NOTE: The BOP will stop the NCPs.

BOP (Step 12) Check both RN pumps

- ON. BOP (Step 12 RNO) Perform the following:

Start pump(s).

IF any RN pump off, THEN perform the following:

IF 1A RN pump is off, THEN-.. CRS IF affected train is deenergized, AND its D/G is off, THEN GO TO Step 13. CRS (Step 13) Notify Unit 2 to perform the following:

Floor Instructor:

As U2 RO report "2A RN Pump is running."

Start 2A RN pump.

THROTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum for existing plant condition.

Booth Instructor:

insert LOA

-RN087 (Start 2A RN Pump) insert LOA

-RN083 8050.000000 delay=0 ramp=10 (Unit 2 Train A Demand Flow)

RO (Step 14) Check all S/G pressures

- GREATER THAN 775 PSIG.

NOTE: The 1D S/G as a minimum will be < 775 psig.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 7, 8, 9, 10

& 11 Page 49 of 63 Event

Description:

Both CF Pumps Roll Back to Low Speed/Turbine fails to Trip in AUTO and MANUAL/ C

-9 fails to Actuate/1A Safety Valve Sticks OPEN/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO/Man/1ETB Lockout/1D Steam Break in Containment/ TD CA Pump is Restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 14 RNO) Perform the following:

Check the following valves closed:

All MSIVs All MSIV Bypass Valves All SM PORVs.

IF any valve open, THEN-- BOP (Step 15) Check Containment Pressure

- HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG.

NOTE: Containment Pressure is > 3 psig. BOP (Step 15 RNO) Perform the following:

Check Monitor Light Panel Group 7 lit IF Group 7 window is dark on energized train(s), THEN-.. Stop all NC pumps while maintaining seal injection flow.

Ensure all RV pumps are in manual and off. Energize H2 Igniters by depressing "ON" and "OVERRIDE".

Dispatch operator to stop all Unit 1 NF AHUs PER EP/1/A/5000/G1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 28 (Deenergizing Ice Condenser AHUs).

NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use LOA-NF016 = STOP

. WHEN time allows, THEN check Phase B HVAC equipment PER Enclosure 2 (Phase B HVAC Equipment).

NOTE: The CRS may direct the U2 BOP to perform this.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 BOP.

BOP (Step 16) Check S/I flow:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 7, 8, 9, 10

& 11 Page 50 of 63 Event

Description:

Both CF Pumps Roll Back to Low Speed/Turbine fails to Trip in AUTO and MANUAL/ C

-9 fails to Actuate/1A Safety Valve Sticks OPEN/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO/Man/1ETB Lockout/1D Steam Break in Containment/ TD CA Pump is Restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Check "NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW" gauge

- INDICATING FLOW.

Check NC pressure

- LESS THAN 1600 PSIG. BOP (Step 16b RNO) Perform the following:

Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running pump(s) OPEN: 1ND-68A (1A ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol)

CRS IF valve(s) open on all running ND pumps, THEN GO TO Step 1

7. CRS (Step 17) Notify OSM or other SRO to perform EP/1/A/5000/G

-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions Following an S/I) within 10 minutes.

NOTE: The CRS may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

RO/ BOP (Step 18) Check CA flow:

Total CA flow

- GREATER THAN 450 GPM. NOTE: There is NO CA flow. RO/ BOP (Step 18 RNO) Perform the following:

IF N/R level in all S/Gs is less than 11% (32% ACC), THEN perform the following:

Ensure correct valve alignment.

Start CA pumps.

IF N/R level in all S/Gs is less than 11% (32% ACC) AND feed flow greater than 450 GPM cannot be established, THEN perform the following:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 7, 8, 9, 10

& 11 Page 51 of 63 Event

Description:

Both CF Pumps Roll Back to Low Speed/Turbine fails to Trip in AUTO and MANUAL/ C

-9 fails to Actuate/1A Safety Valve Sticks OPEN/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO/Man/1ETB Lockout/1D Steam Break in Containment/ TD CA Pump is Restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Implement EP/1/A/5000/F0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).

GO TO EP/1/A/5000/FRH.1 (Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink).

NOTE: The CRS will transition to FR

-H.1. EP/1/A/5000/

FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK CRS (Step 1) IF total feed flow is less than 450 GPM due to operator action, THEN RETURN TO procedure and step in effect.

RO/ BOP (Step 2) Check if secondary heat sink is required:

NC pressure

- GREATER THAN ANY NON

-FAULTED S/G PRESSURE.

Any NC T-Hot - GREATER THAN 350°F (347°F ACC).

RO/ BOP (Step 3) Monitor Foldout Page.

NC System Feed and Bleed Criteria (Applies after Step 2 in the body of the procedure)

IF W/R level in at least 3 S/Gs goes below 24% (36% ACC), THEN GO TO Step 22 in the body of the procedure.

NOTE: This Criteria will most likely apply at this time.

Cold Leg Recirc Switchover Criteria CA Suction Sources

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 7, 8, 9, 10

& 11 Page 52 of 63 Event

Description:

Both CF Pumps Roll Back to Low Speed/Turbine fails to Trip in AUTO and MANUAL/ C

-9 fails to Actuate/1A Safety Valve Sticks OPEN/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO/Man/1ETB Lockout/1D Steam Break in Containment/ TD CA Pump is Restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 4) Check at least one of the following NV pumps

- AVAILABLE:

1A NV pump OR 1B NV pump RO/ BOP (Step 5) Check if NC System feed and bleed should be initiated:

Check W/R level in at least 3 S/Gs LESS THAN 24% (36% ACC).

CRS GO TO Step 22. NOTE: This Criteria will most likely apply at this time.

CRS (Step 22)

Perform Steps 23 through 27 quickly to establish NC heat removal by NC feed and bleed.

BOP (Step 23)

Ensure all NC pumps

- OFF. NOTE: The NCPs should be OFF at this time.

BOP (Step 24)

Initiate S/I.

NOTE: SI is already actuated.

BOP (Step 25)

Check "NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW" - INDICATING FLOW.

BOP (Step 26)

Establish NC System bleed path as follows:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 7, 8, 9, 10

& 11 Page 53 of 63 Event

Description:

Both CF Pumps Roll Back to Low Speed/Turbine fails to Trip in AUTO and MANUAL/ C

-9 fails to Actuate/1A Safety Valve Sticks OPEN/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO/Man/1ETB Lockout/1D Steam Break in Containment/ TD CA Pump is Restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Check all Pzr PORV isolation valves

- OPEN. NOTE: There is no power available to the Train B PORV Isolation valves, however each of these valves were OPEN prior to the loss of power to 1ETB (OAC will indicate that ALL PORV isolation valves are OPEN). Select "OPEN" on two Pzr PORVs that have an open Pzr PORV isolation valve.

Align N2 to Pzr PORVs by OPENING the following valves:

1NI-430A (Emerg N2 From CLA To 1NC-34A) 1NI-431B (Emerg N2 From CLA To 1NC-32B & 36B).

Check power to all Pzr PORV isolation valves

- AVAILABLE.

NOTE: There is no power available to the Train B PORV Isolation valves.

BOP (Step 26.d RNO) Perform the following:

Evaluate cause of power loss and initiate actions to restore power to affected isolation valve(s)

. WHEN power is restored, THEN perform the following:

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

OPEN Pzr PORV isolation valves.

Ensure two Pzr PORVs that have an open Pzr PORV isolation valve are OPENED. BOP (Step 27)

Check two Pzr PORVs and associated isolation valves

- OPEN.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 7, 8, 9, 10

& 11 Page 54 of 63 Event

Description:

Both CF Pumps Roll Back to Low Speed/Turbine fails to Trip in AUTO and MANUAL/ C

-9 fails to Actuate/1A Safety Valve Sticks OPEN/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO/Man/1ETB Lockout/1D Steam Break in Containment/ TD CA Pump is Restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task

Establish RCS Bleed and Feed before all four Steam Generator Wide Range Levels reach 0%, and the NCS temperature and/or pressure increases.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish RCS Bleed and Feed before automatic opening of the PORVs (due to plant heatup) reduces the probability of success to establish a heat sink for the core. This constitutes a "Significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario." Establishing feedwater flow into the Steam Generators offers the most effective recovery action to restore the heat sink. If all attempts to initiate feedwater flow fail, the crew must establish bleed and feed to cool the core. This is accomplished by manually initiating SI, and then manually opening the PORVs. The lower NCS pressure allows a greater ECCS flow to recover NCS inventory and force flow through the core. If this action is to be successful, it must be started before SG dryout. SG dryout would cause NC temperature to increase, increasing NC Pressure and forcing open the PORVs automatically. If NCS pressure is at the PORV setpoint due to NCS heatup, the operator action of opening the PORVs manually may not be successful in lowering NCS pressure and increasing ECCS flow. Ultimately, the core could uncover.

BOP (Step 28)

Isolate NV Recirc flowpath as follows: CLOSE the following valves:

1NV-150B (U1 NV Pump Recirc Isol) 1NV-151A (U1 NV Pump Recirc Isol).

Maintain NV recirc valves closed unless directed to open by subsequent steps.

RO/ BOP (Step 29)

Establish containment H2 mitigation as follows:

Check EP/1/A/5000/FR

-S.1 (Response To Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS)

- HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN IMPLEMENTED.

CRS (Step 29.a RNO) GO TO Step 29.c.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 7, 8, 9, 10

& 11 Page 55 of 63 Event

Description:

Both CF Pumps Roll Back to Low Speed/Turbine fails to Trip in AUTO and MANUAL/ C

-9 fails to Actuate/1A Safety Valve Sticks OPEN/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO/Man/1ETB Lockout/1D Steam Break in Containment/ TD CA Pump is Restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO/ BOP Check EP/1/A/5000/FR

-C.1 (Response To Inadequate Core Cooling)

- HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN IMPLEMENTED.

CRS (Step 29.c RNO) GO TO Step 29.e

. BOP (Step 30)

Ensure Pzr heaters remain off as follows: Place A, B, and D Pzr heaters in manual and off. Open "C PZR HTR GRP SUP BKR".

BOP Energize H2 Igniters by depressing "ON" and "OVERRIDE".

Dispatch operator to stop all Unit 1 NF AHUs PER EP/1/A/5000/G

-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 28 (De

-energizing Ice Condenser AHUs).

NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use LOA-NF016 = STOP

. RO/ BOP (Step 31)

Have another licensed operator check S/I equipment PER Enclosure 15 (Subsequent S/I Actions) while continuing with this procedure.

NOTE: The CRS may assign the RO to perform this action.

If so, RO Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 15.

Other Examiners follow FR-H.1 Actions, Step 32, on Page 58. EP/1/A/5000/

FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK ENCLOSURE 15, SUBSEQUENT S/I ACTIONS RO/ BOP (Step 1) Check 1ETA and 1ETB

- ENERGIZED.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 7, 8, 9, 10

& 11 Page 56 of 63 Event

Description:

Both CF Pumps Roll Back to Low Speed/Turbine fails to Trip in AUTO and MANUAL/ C

-9 fails to Actuate/1A Safety Valve Sticks OPEN/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO/Man/1ETB Lockout/1D Steam Break in Containment/ TD CA Pump is Restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments IF both busses de

-energized, THEN WHEN time allows, THEN try to restore power to de

-energized bus PER AP/1/A/5500/07 (Loss of Electrical Power) while continuing with this procedure.

RO/ BOP (Step 2) Check Phase A "RESET" lights

- DARK. RO/ BOP (Step 3) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s):

Groups 1, 2, 5

- DARK. Group 3 - LIT. Group 4 - LIT AS REQUIRED.

Group 6 - LIT. GO TO Step 4.

RO/ BOP (Step 4) Check all KC pumps

- ON. RO/ BOP (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following:

Start pumps.

IF all KC pumps running, THEN-. IF any NC pump KC low flow annunciator lit on 1AD6, THEN stop all NC pumps.

NOTE: All NCPs are OFF.

RO/ BOP (Step 5) Check both RN pumps

- ON.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 7, 8, 9, 10

& 11 Page 57 of 63 Event

Description:

Both CF Pumps Roll Back to Low Speed/Turbine fails to Trip in AUTO and MANUAL/ C

-9 fails to Actuate/1A Safety Valve Sticks OPEN/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO/Man/1ETB Lockout/1D Steam Break in Containment/ TD CA Pump is Restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO/ BOP (Step 5 RNO) Perform the following:

Start pump(s).

IF any RN pump off, THEN perform the following:

IF 1A RN pump is off, THEN-.. IF affected train is deenergized, AND its D/G is off, THEN GO TO Step 6. RO/ BOP (Step 6) Notify Unit 2 to perform the following:

Start 2A RN pump.

NOTE: The RO/BOP will ask the U2 operator to report the status of the U2 RN System.

Floor Instructor:

Report the 2A RN Pump is running, and that flow has been throttled to MINIMUM.

THROTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum for existing plant conditions.

RO/ BOP (Step 7) Check all S/G pressures

- GREATER THAN 775 PSIG.

RO/ BOP (Step 7 RNO) Perform the following:

Check the following valves closed:

All MSIVs All MSIV Bypass Valves All SM PORVs.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 7, 8, 9, 10

& 11 Page 58 of 63 Event

Description:

Both CF Pumps Roll Back to Low Speed/Turbine fails to Trip in AUTO and MANUAL/ C

-9 fails to Actuate/1A Safety Valve Sticks OPEN/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO/Man/1ETB Lockout/1D Steam Break in Containment/ TD CA Pump is Restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments IF any valve open, THEN-- RO/ BOP (Step 8) Reset Phase A Isolation.

RO/ BOP (Step 9) Notify OSM or other SRO to perform EP/1/A/5000/G

-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions Following an S/I). EP/1/A/5000/

FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK Examiner NOTE:

Examiners following the CRS/BOP continue HERE. BOP (Step 32)

Maintain NC System heat removal by performing the following:

Maintain S/I flow.

Maintain two Pzr PORV flowpaths

- OPEN. BOP (Step 33) Reset the following:

S/I. Sequencers.

IF AT ANY TIME a B/O signal occurs, THEN restart S/I equipment previously on. NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

BOP (Step 34)

Check containment pressure:

Pressure

- HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG. BOP (Step 34.a RNO) Perform the following:

Check Monitor Light Panel Group 7 lit.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 7, 8, 9, 10

& 11 Page 59 of 63 Event

Description:

Both CF Pumps Roll Back to Low Speed/Turbine fails to Trip in AUTO and MANUAL/ C

-9 fails to Actuate/1A Safety Valve Sticks OPEN/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO/Man/1ETB Lockout/1D Steam Break in Containment/ TD CA Pump is Restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments IF Group 7 window is dark on energized train(s), THEN-.. Reestablish VI to containment as follows:

Ensure Phase B reset.

OPEN the following valves:

NOTE: These valves are powered by B Train and have no power. However, the valves were open prio r

to the Loss of Power, and VI header pressure is normal.

1VI-129B (VI Supply to A Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol) 1VI-160B (VI Supply to B Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol) 1VI-150B (Lwr Cont Non

-Ess Cont Outside Isol).

IF VI header pressure is less than 85 PSIG, THEN-. IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure a Phase B reoccurs, THEN perform the following:

Reset Phase B.

OPEN 1VI-129B (VI Supply to A Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol).

OPEN 1VI-160B (VI Supply to B Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol).

OPEN 1VI-150B (Lwr Cont Non

-Ess Cont Outside Isol).

Ensure all RV pumps are in manual and off. Check Phase B HVAC equipment PER Enclosure 16 (Phase B HVAC Equipment).

IF AT ANY TIME containment pressure is greater than 20 PSIG-..

CRS GO TO Step 36 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 7, 8, 9, 10

& 11 Page 60 of 63 Event

Description:

Both CF Pumps Roll Back to Low Speed/Turbine fails to Trip in AUTO and MANUAL/ C

-9 fails to Actuate/1A Safety Valve Sticks OPEN/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO/Man/1ETB Lockout/1D Steam Break in Containment/ TD CA Pump is Restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Booth Operator Instructions:

As WCCS call the CRS and report that the TD CA Pump is ready for return to operation, and personnel are standing by to lift the Tags, and start the pump When directed by CRS, REMOVE REM-SA0001 and REM

-SA0002. THEN, re-insert REM

-SA0001 = 100, Ramped over 30 seconds.

BOP (Step 36) Check containment H2 concentration:

Ensure Operator dispatched to stop Unit 1 NF AHUs PER EP/1/A/5000/G

-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 28 (De

-energizing Ice Condenser AHUs).

NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use LOA-NF016 = STOP

. Check H2 analyzers

- IN SERVICE.

CRS (Step 36.b RNO) Perform the following:

Dispatch operator to place H2 analyzers in service PER EP/1/A/5000/G

-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 5 (Placing H2 Analyzers In Service).

NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.

WHEN H2 analyzers in service, THEN complete Steps 36.c and 36.d.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

GO TO Step 37. BOP (Step 37)

Align CA control valves as follows, to ensure flow will be reestablished in a controlled manner:

Reset CA modulating valves.

CLOSE all CA flow control valves from MD and TD CA pumps.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 7, 8, 9, 10

& 11 Page 61 of 63 Event

Description:

Both CF Pumps Roll Back to Low Speed/Turbine fails to Trip in AUTO and MANUAL/ C

-9 fails to Actuate/1A Safety Valve Sticks OPEN/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO/Man/1ETB Lockout/1D Steam Break in Containment/ TD CA Pump is Restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 38)

Continue attempts to establish secondary heat sink in at least one S/G:

CA flow PER Step 7 NOTE: The CRS attempt to start the TD CA Pump using Step 7. RO/ BOP (Step 7) Attempt to establish CA flow to at least one S/G as follows:

Check power to both MD CA pumps

- AVAILABLE.

IF 1ETA OR 1ETB deenergized, THEN restore power to the affected essential bus PER AP/1/A/5500/07 (Loss of Electrical Power).

IF the essential bus is energized, THEN dispatch operator to determine cause of breaker failure. NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.

Ensure control room CA valves aligned PER Enclosure 4 (CA Valve Alignment).

Start all available CA pumps.

Check TD CA pump

- RUNNING. NOTE: The CRS will coordinate with the WCCS to start the TDCA Pump.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCCS

. When directed by CRS, REMOVE REM-SA0001 and REM-SA0002. THEN, re-insert REM

-SA0001 = 100, Ramped over 30 seconds.

Check total flow to S/G(s)

- GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

CRS (Step 7.e RNO) Perform the following:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

1 Event # 7, 8, 9, 10

& 11 Page 62 of 63 Event

Description:

Both CF Pumps Roll Back to Low Speed/Turbine fails to Trip in AUTO and MANUAL/ C

-9 fails to Actuate/1A Safety Valve Sticks OPEN/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO/Man/1ETB Lockout/1D Steam Break in Containment/ TD CA Pump is Restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments IF only one MD CA pump is on,-..

IF any CA pump is started, AND Step 37 has been implemented, THEN GO TO Step 7.h.

RO/ BOP Check any S/G W/R level

- LESS THAN 12% (17% ACC). Check core exit T/Cs

- STABLE OR GOING DOWN.

NOTE: It is likely that CETs are rising.

Perform the following:

THROTTLE OPEN CA control valve to one S/G to establish flow rate required to lower core exit T/Cs.

IF core exit T/Cs continue to go up, THEN THROTTLE OPEN CA control valve to feed another S/G as required to lower core exit T/Cs.

Critical Task

Establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator before transition out of FR-H.1. Safety Significance: Failure to establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator results in the crew having to rely upon the lower

-priority action of having to remain in RCS Bleed and Feed to minimize the possibility of core uncovery. Failure to perform this task, when able to do so, constitutes incorrect performance that leads to degradation of the RCS and/or fuel cladding fission product barriers.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

UNIT 1 STATUS:

Power Level:

100% NCS [B] 935 ppm Pzr [B]: 935 ppm Xe: Per OAC Power History:

At this power level for 1 78 days Core Burnup:

250 EFPDs CONTROLLING PROCEDURE:

OP/1/A/6100/0 03 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME T HE SHIFT: The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The following equipment is Out

-Of-Service:

The TD CA Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5 ACTION B.

The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance

. 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating)

. MCB Annunciator 1AD

-9, E-2, "B COLD LEG ACCUMULATOR ABNORMAL PRESSURE," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating).

Crew Directions:

The crew will perform PT/1/A/4600/001, "RCCA Movement Test" upon taking the shift

, starting with the movement of Shutdown Bank A and continuing in the order identified in Section 12.6 of PT/1/A/4600/001

. IAE Technician Ralph is standing by at the Rod Control Power Cabinets to assist at X2608.

Work Control SRO/Offsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe (FB) NLO's AVAILABLE Unit 1 Unit 2 Aux Bldg. John Aux Bldg. Chris Turb Bldg. Bob (FB)

Turb Bldg. Mike (FB) 5th Rounds. Carol Extra(s)

Bill (FB) Ed (FB) Wayne (FB) Tanya Gus (RW)

PROGRAM: McGuire Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 31 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N15-1-2 REFERENCES

1. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4, "Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs)" (Amendment 221/203)

2. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5, "Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System" (Amendment 221/203) 3. OP/1/A/6100/003, "Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation" (Rev 194) 4. OP/1/A/6150/009, "Boron Concentration Control" (Rev 126) 5. OP/1/A/6300/001A, "Turbine Generator Load Change" (Rev 12

) 6. AP/1/A/5500/1 4, "Rod Control Malfunction" (Rev 16) 7. AP/1/A/5500/20, "Rod Control Malfunction" (Rev 33)

8. Technical Specification 3.7.7, "Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS)

" (Amendment 184/166) 9. Technical Specification 3.8.1, "AC Sources

- Operating" (Amendment 184/166)

10. AP/1/A/5500/1 1, "Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies" (Rev 11) 11. Technical Specification 3.4.1, "RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits

" (Amendment 2 19/201) 12. AP/1/A/5500/0 3, "Load Rejection

" (Rev 30) 13. EP/1/A/5000/E

-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection" (Rev 34) 14. EP/1/A/5000/FR

-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS" (Rev 15) 15. EP/1/A/5000/E

-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation

" (Rev 10) 16. EP/1/A/5000/E

-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant" (Rev 16)

17. EP/1/A/5000/E

-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture" (Rev 24)

Validation Time:

108 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Essential Training & Consulting, LLC

Facility Review:

________________________

Rev. 030215 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Facility:

McGuire Scenario No.:

2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Examiners:

Operators:

(SRO) (RO) (BOP) Initial Conditions:

The plant is at 75% power (MOL

). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Turnover:

The following equipment is Out

-Of-Service: The 1B MDCA Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5 ACTION B. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance.

1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-3, F-5, "BB DEMIN PNL TRBL," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed OFF (IAE is investigating).

The crew will raise power to 100% after taking the shift.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*

Event Description 1 NA R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Power Increase w/Simple Dilute 2 MAL DCS1214 C-RO C-SRO Uncontrolled outward Rod Motion in AUTO 3 REM RN0018B C-BOP C(TS)-SRO 1B RN Pump Suction Valve inadvertently CLOSES 4 MAL DCSSLIM06D/G C-BOP C(TS)-SRO Pzr Spray Valve (1NC

-27) Controller fails OPEN 5 MAL LF003B IRE009 SG001A C-RO C-BOP C-SRO 1B CF Pump Trip/SGTL/Turbine Runback w/rods in Manual 6 REM SM007AB MAL IPE001A/B IPE002A/B SG001A SM004A M-RO M-BOP M-SRO 1A MSIV fails CLOSED/ 1A SG SV fails OPEN/ATWS/SGTR 7 MAL CA004A CA005 C-BOP C-SRO TD CA Pump Overspeed Trip/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 McGuire 2015 NRC Scenario #

2 The plant is at 75% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The following equipment is Out

-Of-Service: The 1B MDCA Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5 ACTION B. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance.

1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD

-3, F-5, "BB DEMIN PNL TRBL," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed OFF (IAE is investigating). The crew will raise power to 100% after taking the shift.

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100% starting with Step 3.37.10 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, "Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation." The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with Enclosure 4.

19, "Simple Dilution," of OP/1/A/6150/009, "Boron Concentration Control," and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/1/A/6300/001 A, "Turbine

-Generator Load Change."

After the load increase is started, the Control Rods will fail such that rods are moving outward in AUTO. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/14, "Rod Control Malfunction." The control rods will subsequently remain in MANUAL.

After this, the 1B RN Pump Suction Isolation valve will inadvertently CLOSE. The operator will respond using one or more Annunciator Response Procedures and ultimately enter AP/1/A/5500/

20, "Loss of RN,

" to place the standby train in service. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, "Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS)," and LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating."

Next, the Pzr Spray Valve Controller, 1NC

-27C A Spray, demand will fail to full output. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/11, "Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies." The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, "RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits." Subsequently, the 1B CF Pump will trip causing the turbine to automatically runback to 55%. Simultaneously, a 1 gpm Steam Generator Tube Leak will occur in the 1A Steam Generator. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500/03, "Load Rejection." During the runback the operator will need to drive rods in manually.

After this, the 1A MSIV will inadvertently CLOSE, and the Reactor will fail to trip automatically and manually. Additionally, the low set Safety Valve on the 1A Steam Generator will lift and stick fully OPEN. Additionally, the TD CA Pump will trip on overspeed on auto start, and the 1A MDCA Pump will fail to start automatically. The operator will enter EP/1/A/5000/E

-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection,

" and then transition to EP/1/A/5000/FR-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS." During the performance of FR

-S.1, the operator will continuously drive rods in manually, successfully trip the Reactor locally, and manually start the 1A MDCA Pump and establish 450 gpm of flow the Steam Generators.

The Steam Generator Tube Leak will degrade to a tube rupture in the 1A Steam Generator when the reactor is locally tripped

.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 After completion of FR

-S.1, the operator will transition back to E

-0, and then to EP/1/A/5000/E

-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation." After the 1A Steam Generator is isolated, the operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/E

-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant," and then, upon diagnosing the tube rupture, to EP/1/A/5000/E

-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture."

The scenario will terminate at Step 6 of E

-3 after the operator has transitioned to EP/1/A/5000/ECA

-3.1, "SGTR with Subcooled Recovery Desired," or at Step 9 of E

-3 upon initiating an NCS cooldown.

Critical Tasks:

Manually close the Failed OPEN Pzr Spray Valve before the Pressurizer pressure drops to Safety Significance: failure to close the Spray Valve and stop the pressure transient, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the pressure transient. A failure to stabilize the pressure transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis

-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect NCS pressure control.

Manually drive rods inward before completing the immediate actions of FR

-S.1 (Step 2).

Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical or returns to a critical condition. Performance of the critical task would move the reactor towards a subcritical condition to prevent a subsequent return to criticality. A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control.

Start the 1A MD CA Pump before transition out of FRS-.1, unless the transition is made to EP/1/A/5000/FR

-H.1, and then before the NCPs are manually tripped to limit heat input to the RCS. Safety Significance: Failure to establish a Secondary Heat Sink through the initiation of CA flow unnecessarily challenges both the HEAT SINK and the CORE COOLING Critical Safety Functions. Additionally, the FSAR Safety Analysis results are predicated on the assumption that at least one train of safeguards actuates and delivers a minimum amount of AFW flow to the Steam Generators. Failure to perform this task, when the ability to do so exists, results in a violation of the Facility License Condition and places the plant in an unanalyzed condition.

Isolate CA flow to the Faulted Steam Generator before an unwarranted Red Path occurs on Subcriticality or NCS Integrity

. Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a Faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to the Critical Safety Functions that may not otherwise occur. Failure to isolate flow could result in an unwarranted Orange or Red Path condition on NC Integrity and/or Subcriticality (if cooldown is allowed to continue uncontrollably).

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Sim. Setup Rod Step On Reset to Temp IC 239 (Originally 37). T = 0 Malfunctions (From IC-37): insert LOA-CA010 = RACKED OUT; insert LOA-CA010A = RACKED OUT; (1B MDCA Pump is OOS

) Insert REM

-SV0027 = 0 (Close 1SV

-27 [1A S/G PORV Isolation]

) Insert LOA

-SV001= Racked_Out (SG PORV Breaker Racked Out)

H_X02_087_3 = 0 (1A PORV Controller LEFT lamp) H_X02_087_4 = 0 (1A PORV Controller RIGHT lamp) Insert LOA

-SV014=0 (SM PORV A LOCAL OPERATION

) insert XMT- KFTT5130 = 0 (Spent Fuel Pool Temperature Failure

) insert OVR

-1AD3_F05 =

OFF (MCB Annunciator 1AD3/F5)

From IC-239 Per Lesson Plan 2015 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Insert MAL-IPE001A = TRUE (ATWS)

Insert MAL-IPE001B = TRUE (ATWS)

Insert MAL-IPE002A = TRUE (ATWS)

Insert MAL-IPE002B = TRUE (ATWS) insert MAL

-CA004A = AUTO (1A MDCA Pump Start Failure

[auto]) insert MAL

-CA005 TRIP cd='H_X0 2_094_2 EQ 1' delay=0 (TDCA Overspeed Trip occurs on Reactor Trip Breaker Open Indicating Light) insert SM004A3 = 100 cd='H_X02_070_3 EQ 1' delay=0 (Safety Valve on 1A SG sticks OPEN on A MSIV CLOSE Indicating Light) insert MAL

-SG001A = 300 cd='H_X01_094_2 EQ 1' delay=0 (300 gpm SGTR occurs on 1A SG on Reactor Trip Breaker Open Indicating Light)

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION RUN Reset all SLIMs Place Tagout/O-Stick on:

1B MDCA Pump (Tagout) 1SV-27 (Tagout) 1KFP-5130 (O-Stick) MCB Annunciator 1AD

-3, F-5 (O-stick) Update Status Board, Setup OAC NOTE: RMWST DO =

>1000 ppb. Freeze. Update Fresh Tech. Spec. Log.

Fill out the AO's Available section of Shift Turnover Info.

Prior to Crew Briefing RUN Crew Briefing

1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements

2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3. Provide Enclosure 4.1 of OP/1/A/6100/003 marked up as follows:

Step 2.3 initialed.

Note prior to Step 3.1 checked.

Step 3.1 Checkbox is checked.

Step 3.2 initialed.

Step 3.3 initialed.

Step 3.3.1 Checkbox is checked.

Step 3.3.2 Checkbox is checked, Step 3.3 7.10 is entered.

Step 3.3.3 Checkbox is checked.

Step 3.3.4 Initialed.

Step 3.37.12 is NA.

Step 3.37.13 is NA.

4. Provide the crew with OP/1/A/6150/009 (Boron Concentration Control) and OP/1/A/6300/1 A (Turbine-Generator Load Change

). 5. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION T-0 Begin Familiarization Period At direction of examiner Execute Lesson Plan for Simulator Scenario N15-1-2. At direction of examiner Event 1 Power Increase w/Simple Dilute At direction of examiner Event 2 insert MAL-DCS1214 = TRUE Uncontrolled outward Rod Motion in AUTO At direction of examiner Event 3 insert REM-RN0018B_1=0, Ramp = 30 seconds 1B RN Pump Suction Valve inadvertently CLOSES At direction of examiner Event 4 insertMAL

-DCSSLIM06G BUTTON_DEPRESSED insertMAL

-DCSSLIM06D BUTTON_DEPRESSED deleteMAL

-DCSSLIM06G = 2, delay 10 seconds deleteMAL

-DCSSLIM06D = 2, delay = 30 seconds Pzr Spray Valve (1NC

-27) Controller fails OPEN At direction of examiner Event 5 insert MAL-LF003B = TRUE insert MAL

-IRE009 = FAIL_OF_AUTO insert MAL

-SG001A = 1, Ramp = 600 seconds 1B CF Pump Trip/SGTL/Turbine Runback w/rods in Manual

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION At direction of examiner Event 6 insert REM-SM007AB =0.0 Ramp = 10 seconds insert: MAL-IPE001A MAL-IPE001B MAL-IPE002A MAL-IPE002B insert MAL-SM004A = 1 Insert MAL

-SG001A =

300 1A MSIV fails CLOSED/ 1A SG SV fails OPEN/ATWS/SGTR

Note: Malfunctions inserted at T = 0.

Post-Rx Trip Event 7 TD CA Pump Overspeed Trip/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO Note: Malfunctions inserted at T = 0.

Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 1 Page 9 of 64 Event

Description:

Power Increase w/Simple Dilute Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100% starting with Step 3.37.10 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, "Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation." The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with Enclosure 4.

19, "Simple Dilution," of OP/1/A/6150/009, "Boron Concentration Control," and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/1/A/6300/001 A, "Turbine

-Generator Load Change."

Booth Operator Instructions:

NA Indications Available:

NA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OP/1/A/6100/003, CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATIONS ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE CRS (Step 3.37.10) Prior to increasing to greater than 75% RTP, check all governor valves open. NOTE: The power increase will be at 2 MWe/minute.

RO/ BOP (Step 3.37.11) WHEN 77

-80% RTP, enable, OTDT DCS alarming as follows:

NOTE: Based on the extent of the power increase, this action may or may not be taken.

On DCS graphics, select "MAINTENANCE MENU".

Select "TAVG, DELTA T INPUTS & ALARM CHECKING" graphic.

Select "ON" for the following:

NCAA 5422 NCAA 5462 NCAA 5502 NCAA 5542 OTDELTAT-FAIL (Step 3.37.12) IF startup from refueling outage-..

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 1 Page 10 of 64 Event

Description:

Power Increase w/Simple Dilute Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 3.37.13) IF performing Generator/Automatic Voltage Regulator (AVR) testing at 78% RTP-OP/1/A/6150/009, BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ENCLOSURE 4.19, SIMPLE DILUTE BOP (Step 3.1) Evaluate all outstanding R&Rs that may impact performance of this procedure.

NOTE: The BOP may repeat this task as needed during the power increase.

BOP (Step 3.2) Evaluate energizing additional pressurizer heaters per OP/1/A/6100/003 (Controlling Procedure For Unit Operation) to enhance system mixing when changing NC System boron concentration. (R.M.)

BOP (Step 3.5) Set Total Make Up Flow Counter to value determined in Step 3.

3. (R.M.) BOP (Step 3.6) Select "DILUTE" on "NC Sys M/U Controller".

BOP (Step 3.7) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to lower VCT level, perform the following:

(Step 3.7.1) Monitor Letdown Pressure.

(Step 3.7.2) Select "HUT" on 1NV

-137A (U1 NC Filters Otlt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Contrl). NOTE: The BOP may do this at any time to lower VCT level

. (Step 3.7.3) IF Letdown Pressure increases greater than 20 psig, notify CRS.

(Step 3.7.4) AFTER desired level achieved, select "AUTO" on 1NV

-137A (U1 NC Filters Otlt to VCT 3

-Way Diversion Cntrl).

BOP (Step 3.8) IF AT ANY TIME plant parameters require termination of dilution, perform the following:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 1 Page 11 of 64 Event

Description:

Power Increase w/Simple Dilute Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 3.8.1) Place "NC System Make Up" to "STOP". (R.M.)

(Step 3.8.2) IF 1NV

-137A (U1 NC Filters Otlt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl) was placed to HUT, place to "AUTO".

BOP (Step 3.9) Momentarily select "START" on "NC System Make Up". (R.M.)

BOP (Step 3.10) Check "NC System Make Up" red light lit.

BOP (Step 3.11) Check 1NV

-175A (U1 Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control) open.

BOP (Step 3.12) Check 1NV

-252A (Rx M/U Water Supply To U1 BA Blender Cntrl) open or throttled as required.

BOP (Step 3.13) Check Rx M/U Water Pump starts. BOP (Step 3.14) Monitor Total Make Up Flow Counter. (R.M.)

BOP (Step 3.15) HOLD until one of the following occurs: Amount of reactor makeup water recorded per Step 3.6 added OR Reactor makeup water addition manually terminated BOP (Step 3.16) Ensure dilution terminated as follows: (R.M.)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 1 Page 12 of 64 Event

Description:

Power Increase w/Simple Dilute Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 3.16.1) IF in "AUTO", ensure the following off:

1A Rx M/U Water Pump 1B Rx M/U Water Pump BOP (Step 3.16.2) Ensure the following closed:

1NV-171A (U1 Boric Acid Blender To VCT Inlet Control) 1NV-252A (RX M/U Water Supply To U1 BA Blender Cntrl)

BOP (Step 3.17) Ensure 1NV

-137A (U1 NC Filters Otlt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl) in "AUTO". BOP (Step 3.18) IF desired to flush blender-.

NOTE: It is NOT desired to flush the blender

. BOP (Step 3.19) Select "AUTO" for "NC Sys M/U Controller".

BOP (Step 3.20) Momentarily select "START" on "NC System Make Up".

BOP (Step 3.21) Check "NC System Make Up" red light lit.

BOP (Step 3.22) Ensure the following reset to zero: (R.M.)

Total Make Up Flow Counter Boric Acid Flow Counter BOP (Step 3.23) Record in Narrative Log that final blender content is Rx Makeup Water.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 1 Page 13 of 64 Event

Description:

Power Increase w/Simple Dilute Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OP/1/A/6300/001A, TURBINE

-GENERATOR STARTUP/SHUTDOWN ENCLOSURE 4.1, TURBINE-GENERATOR LOAD CHANGE RO (Step 3.5.

1) IF Turbine in "OPERATOR AUTO", perform the following:

(Step 3.5.

1.1) Ensure desired change within "Calculated Capability Curve".

(Step 3.5.

1.2) IF turbine load will increase or decrease more than 10 MWs, notify Dispatcher of expected load change. (Step 3.5.

1.3) Depress "LOAD RATE".

(Step 3.5.2.4) Enter desired load rate in "VARIABLE DISPLAY".

NOTE: the RO will select 2 MWe/Min loading rate.

(Step 3.5.

1.5) Depress "ENTER".

(Step 3.5.

1.6) Depress "REFERENCE".

(Step 3.5.

1.7) Enter desired load in "VARIABLE DISPLAY".

(Step 3.5.

1.8) Depress "ENTER".

(Step 3.5.

1.9) Depress "GO" (Step 3.5.

1.10) Check load changes at selected rate.

OP/1/A/6100/003, CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATIONS ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE CRS (Step 3.37.13) Continue power increase to 95% RTP. NOTE: The power increase will be at 2 MWe/minute. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 2 Page 14 of 64 Event

Description:

Uncontrolled outward Rod Motion in AUTO After the load increase is started, the Control Rods will fail such that rods are moving outward in AUTO

. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/14, "Rod Control Malfunction." The control rods will subsequently remain in MANUAL.

Booth Operator Instructions:

insert MAL

-DCS1214 = TRUE Indications Available:

Rods stepping out continuously with no demand

. Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: When the malfunction is diagnosed the CRS may go to HOLD on the Turbine.

AP/1/A/5500/14, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION RO (Step 1) IF two or more rods are either dropped or misaligned by greater than 24 steps, THEN-..

Immediate Action NOTE: No control rods dropped during this event.

RO (Step 2) Place control rods in manual.

Immediate Action RO (Step 3) Check rod movement

- STOPPED. Immediate Action NOTE: There was no rod motion when the Rods were taken to Manual.

RO (Step 4) Check all rods

- ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK.

RO (Step 5) Check "ROD CONTROL URGENT FAILURE" alarm (1AD

-2, A-10) - DARK. RO (Step 6) Check "T

-AVG/T-REF FAILURE ROD STOP" alarm (1AD

-2, B-7) - DARK. RO (Step7) IF this AP entered due to unwarranted rod insertion or withdrawal, THEN GO TO Enclosure 3 (Response to Continuous Rod Movement).

NOTE: The SRO will transition to AP-14, Enclosure 3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 2 Page 15 of 64 Event

Description:

Uncontrolled outward Rod Motion in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP/1/A/5500/14, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION ENCLOSURE 3, RESPONSE TO CONTINUOUS ROD MOVEMENT CRS (Step 1) Announce occurrence on paging system. NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

CRS (Step 2) Notify IAE to investigate problem.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the Rod Control malfunction.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

RO (Step 3) Evaluate the following prior to any control rod withdrawal:

Ensure no inadvertent mode change will occur Ensure control rods are withdrawn in a deliberate manner, while closely monitoring the reactor's response.

RO (Step 4) Check T

-Ref indication

- NORMAL. RO (Step 5) Do not move rods until IAE determines rod motion is permissible.

RO (Step 6) Maintain T

-Avg within 1

°F of programmed T

-Ref as follows:

Adjust Turbine load NOTE: The RO will adjust Turbine Load as needed to maintain T

-avg. OR Borate/dilute NC System.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 2 Page 16 of 64 Event

Description:

Uncontrolled outward Rod Motion in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME a runback occurs while in this procedure, THEN observe the following guidance:

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

IF IAE has determined that it is permissible to move rods, THEN respond to the runback PER AP/1/A/5500/03 (Load Rejection).

For all other circumstances, assume rod control is not available and respond to the runback as follows:

Trip Reactor.

GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E

-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

RO (Step 8) IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure a unit shutdown is required AND rods cannot be moved, THEN perform the following:

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. Borate as required during shutdown to maintain T

-Avg at T-Ref. Monitor AFD during load reduction.

IF AT ANY TIME AFD reaches Tech Spec limit AND reactor power is greater than 50%, THEN perform the following:

Trip Reactor.

GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E

-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC. After 5 minutes, report that the Control Rods must be kept in MANUAL, and that they can move rods in MANUAL as needed.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 2 Page 17 of 64 Event

Description:

Uncontrolled outward Rod Motion in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 9) WHEN problem is repaired, THEN perform the following:

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief

. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 3 Page 18 of 64 Event

Description:

1B RN Pump Suction Valve inadvertently CLOSES After this, the 1B RN Pump Suction Isolation valve will inadvertently CLOSE. The operator will respond using one or more Annunciator Response Procedures and ultimately enter AP/1/A/5500/

20, "Loss of RN,

" to place the standby train in service. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, "Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS)," an d LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources

- Operating."

Booth Operator Instructions:

insert REM-RN0018B_1 = 0, Ramped = 30 seconds Indications Available:

OAC Alarm M1Q0180, 1RN18B RN PUMP SUCTION ISOL, alarms.

Numerous MCB Annunciator 1AD12 alarms associated with RN.

1RN-18B Green status light is LIT.

Low flow in RN header.

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: If the load increase has been restarted, the RO will likely stop the load increase.

AP/1/A/5500/

20, LOSS OF RN CASE I, LOSS OF OPERATING RN TRAIN BOP (Step 1) Check for potential loss of LLI as follows: Check Unit 2 RN pump(s) that are aligned to LLI

- OPERATING PROPERLY.

Floor Instructor:

If asked, As U2 RO report "2A RN Pump is running properly."

Check suction flowpath

- AVAILABLE.

NOTE: The crew should recognize that the LLI flowpath is available, but that the Suction Valve to the 1B RN Pump has closed, and continue to Step 2.

CRS (Step 2) Announce occurrence on page.

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement that AP-20 has been entered.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 3 Page 19 of 64 Event

Description:

1B RN Pump Suction Valve inadvertently CLOSES Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3) Check Any RN pump

- ON. NOTE: The crew should recognize that the 1B RN Pump is operating with its suction valve closed and stop the pump. This will result in both RN pumps being OFF.

BOP (Step 3 RNO) Perform the following:

IF strainer fouling has not occurred, THEN GO TO Step 6. BOP (Step 6) Place RN train in service as follows:

Check both RN pumps OFF. Check idle RN train

- AVAILABLE TO START. NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as the AO.

Start one train of RN as follows:

To start 1A RN pump perform the following:

Ensure flowpath available.

Place manual loader for 1RN

-89A (RN to A KC Hx Control) to 10% OPEN.

Start 1A RN pump.

NOTE: The BOP will start the 1A RN Pump.

Ensure the following valve for train being started

- OPEN. 1RN-86A (A KC Hx Inlet Isol).

Check the following cross

-tie valves

- OPEN: 1RN-40A (Train A To Non Ess Hdr Isol) 1RN-41B (Train B TO Non Ess Hdr Isol)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 3 Page 20 of 64 Event

Description:

1B RN Pump Suction Valve inadvertently CLOSES Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 1RN-43A (Train B To Non Ess Hdr Isol).

Ensure malfunctioning RN pump is off. BOP Check if local venting of RN pump has been performed PER one of the following:

NOTE: Local venting of RN pump has NOT been performed.

Enclosure 5 (1A RN Pump Venting) OR Enclosure 6 (1B RN Pump Venting).

CRS (Step 6.g RNO) GO TO Step 6.

i. BOP Check Enclosure 7 (NV Pump Cooling Via Gravity Drain To Sump)

- HAS BEEN PERFORMED.

NOTE: Enclosure 8 has NOT been performed.

CRS (Step 6.i RNO) GO TO Sep 6.k BOP Check Case II (Loss of Low Level or RC Supply Crossover)

- HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED.

NOTE: Case II has NOT been performed.

CRS (Step 6.kj RNO) GO TO Step 7.

BOP (Step 7) Ensure cooling to KC as follows:

BOP Check 1A KC pump(s)

- RUNNING. NOTE: The B Train of KC is operating.

CRS (Step 7.a RNO) GO TO Step 7.h.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 3 Page 21 of 64 Event

Description:

1B RN Pump Suction Valve inadvertently CLOSES Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP Check 1B KC pump(s)

- RUNNING. BOP Ensure 1B KC pumps aligned to reactor bldg non essential header as follows:

OPEN the following valves:

1KC-18B (Trn B Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

1KC-228B (Trn B Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol). CLOSE the following valves:

1KC-230A (Trn A Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).

1KC-3A (Trn A Rx bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

BOP Check 1B RN pump

- OFF. BOP Check 1RN

-187B (B KC Hx Inlet Isol) - LOCALLY THROTTLED DURING THIS PROCEDURE.

NOTE: 1RN-187B has NOT been locally throttled.

BOP (Step 7.k RNO) Perform the following:

IF VI header pressure is less than 60 PSIG, THEN-. Place 1RN

-187B "MODE SELECT" switch to manual.

OPEN 1RN-187B (B KC Hx Inlet Isol).

THROTTLE 1RN89A (RN to A KC Hx Control) to maintain 1A RN pump discharge pressure greater than 50 PSIG. IF 1A RN pump discharge pressure is greater than 50 PSIG, THEN GO TO Step 8. BOP (Step 8) Maintain RN flow within operating limits as follows:

Check VI header pressure GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.

Check 1A RN pump RUNNING Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 3 Page 22 of 64 Event

Description:

1B RN Pump Suction Valve inadvertently CLOSES Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments THROTTLE 1RN89A (RN to A KC Hx Control) to maintain 1A RN pump discharge pressure greater than 50 PSIG. Check 1A RN pump flow LESS THAN 14,000 GPM.

Check 1B RN pump RUNNING. BOP (Step 8.e) GO TO Step 9. BOP/CRS (Step 9) Investigate reason for loss of RN train as follows:

Dispatch operator to check RN pump.

Dispatch operator to check RN pump breaker. Check suction flowpath alignment.

Check discharge flowpath alignment.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the Pump malfunction, and request that the 1B RN Pump Breaker be racked out

. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC, and indicate that the 1B RN Pump Breaker will be Racked Out

. Use: LOA-RN006 = Racked_Out (1B RN Pump BKR)

LOA-RN006A = Racked_Out (1B RN Pump Cntrl Pwr)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 3 Page 23 of 64 Event

Description:

1B RN Pump Suction Valve inadvertently CLOSES Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 10) Ensure Control Room Area Chiller in service PER Enclosure 3 (VC/YC Operation).

NOTE: The CRS may assign the RO to perform this action, or have the BOP perform these actions prior to continuing with Step 11.

If actions are performed in parallel, Appropriate Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 3.

Other Examiners follow AP-20 Actions, Step 11, below. AP/1/A/5500/20, LOSS OF RN ENCLOSURE 3, VC/YC OPERATION Examiner NOTE: Follow the actions associated with Enclosure 3 if RO is assigned by CRS to perform.

RO/ BOP (Step 1) Check train selected Control Room Area Chiller

- ON. NOTE: The Chiller is expected to be ON. If not, the RO/BOP will take action per the RNO to restart the Chiller.

AP/1/A/5500/

20, LOSS OF RN CASE I, LOSS OF OPERATING RN TRAIN Examiner NOTE:

Examiners following the CRS/BOP continue HERE. BOP (Step 11) Align operating train of equipment with running RN pump as follows:

Check 1A RN pump

- ON. Check the following equipment

- ON: 1A1 and 1A2 KC pumps

- ON CRS (Step 11.b RNO) GO TO Step 11.i

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 3 Page 24 of 64 Event

Description:

1B RN Pump Suction Valve inadvertently CLOSES Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 11.i) Perform one of the following as necessary to align operating RN train with train of equipment cooled by RN:

Swap operating equipment to opposite train as follows:

IF desired to swap KC trains, THEN perform Enclosure 1 (Shifting KC Trains).

NOTE: The CRS will transition to Enclosure

1. AP/1/A/5500/

20, LOSS OF RN ENCLOSURE 2, SHIFTING KC TRAINS BOP (Step 1) Limit KC flow to 4000 GPM per operating KC pump in subsequent steps.

BOP (Step 2) Check the following:

1RN-40A (Train A To Non Ess Hdr Isol)

- OPEN 1RN-41B (Train B To Non Ess Hdr Isol)

- OPEN 1RN-43A (Train B To Non Ess Hdr Isol)

- OPEN Any KC pump

- RUNNING. NOTE: The B Train KC Pumps are operating

. CRS (Step 3) GO TO Step 5.

BOP (Step 5) Check both ND pumps

- OFF. CRS (Step 6) Perform the following:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 3 Page 25 of 64 Event

Description:

1B RN Pump Suction Valve inadvertently CLOSES Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments IF shifting from 1A KC Train to 1B KC Train,- NOTE: The crew will be shifting from 1B KC Train to 1A KC Train

. OR IF shifting from 1B KC Train to 1A KC Train, THEN GO TO Step 2

2. BOP (Step 22) THROTTLE OPEN 1RN

-89A (RN to A KC Hx Control) to establish desired flow to 1A KC Hx, while maintaining 1A RN pump discharge pressure greater than 50 psig.

BOP (Step 23) Place control switch for 1KC

-51A (Train A Recirc Isol) in the "AUTO" position.

BOP (Step 24) Ensure 1KC

-51A OPENS.

BOP (Step 25) Start 1A1 KC pump.

NOTE: The CRS may contact the AO to start the pumps.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as the AO.

BOP (Step 26) Start 1A2 KC pump.

BOP (Step 27) Align Reactor Bldg header to 1A Train as follows:

OPEN the following valves:

1KC-3A (Trn A Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol) 1KC-230A (Trn A Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol). CLOSE the following valves:

1KC-228B (Trn B Rx Bldg non Ess Sup Isol)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 3 Page 26 of 64 Event

Description:

1B RN Pump Suction Valve inadvertently CLOSES Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 1KC-18B (Trn B Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

BOP (Step 28) Check both ND pumps

- OFF. BOP (Step 29) Place 1RN

-187B "MODE SELECT" switch to auto.

BOP (Step 30) Check 1RN

-187B (B KC Hx Inlet Isol) - CLOSED. BOP (Step 31) WHEN RN flow through the 1B KC Hx begins to go down, THEN THROTTLE OPEN 1RN-89A (RN to A KC Hx Control) to achieve desired flow rate while maintaining the following

1A RN pump discharge pressure GREATER THAN 50 PSIG 1A RN pump flow LESS THAN 14,000 GPM. BOP (Step 32) Place 1KC

-54B (Train B Recirc Isol) in "CLOSE".

BOP (Step 33) Ensure 1KC

-54B is CLOSED.

BOP (Step 34) Stop the following pumps: 1B1 KC pump 1B2 KC pump.

BOP (Step 35) Ensure NC pump thermal barrier isolation valves are OPEN.

BOP (Step 36) RETURN TO step in effect in body of this procedure.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 3 Page 27 of 64 Event

Description:

1B RN Pump Suction Valve inadvertently CLOSES Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS will return to the main body of AP

-20. Examiner NOTE:

Because there are still AP

-related actions to take with this procedure, the CRS may NOT address the TS at the time. Consequently, it may be necessary to move to next event, and address the TS after the scenario.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.7, NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CRS 3.7.7 Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS)

CRS LCO 3.7.7 Two NSWS trains shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

CRS ACTIONS CRS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION A.1 must be entered.

A. One NSWS train inoperable.

A.1 Restore NSWS train to OPERABLE status. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.1, AC SOURCES

- OPERATING CRS 3.8.1 AC Source

- Operating CRS LCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 3 Page 28 of 64 Event

Description:

1B RN Pump Suction Valve inadvertently CLOSES Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power System AND Two diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power Systems AND The automatic load sequencers for Train A and Train B shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

CRS ACTIONS CRS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION B.1, B.2, B3.1 or B.3.2 and B.4 must be entered.

B. One DG inoperable.

B.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for the offsite circuit(s).

AND B.2 Declare required feature(s) supported by the inoperable DG inoperable when its required redundant feature(s) is inoperable.

AND B.3.1 Determine OPERABLE DG is not inoperable due to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> AND Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> from discovery of Condition B concurrent with inoperability of redundant required feature(s)

24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 3 Page 29 of 64 Event

Description:

1B RN Pump Suction Valve inadvertently CLOSES Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments common cause failure.

OR B.3.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 for OPERABLE DG. AND B.4 Restore DG to OPERABLE status. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 72 hours

• AND 6 days from discovery of failure to meet LCO

• At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #

4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 4 Page 30 of 64 Event

Description:

Pzr Spray Valve (1NC

-27) Controller fails OPEN Next, the Pzr Spray Valve Controller, 1NC

-27C A Spray, demand will fail to full output. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/11, "Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies." The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, "RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits."

Booth Operator Instructions:

insertMAL

-DCSSLIM06G BUTTON_DEPRESSED insertMAL

-DCSSLIM06D BUTTON_DEPRESSED deleteMAL

-DCSSLIM06G = 2, delay 10 seconds deleteMAL

-DCSSLIM06D = 2, delay 30 seconds Indications Available:

NCS/Pzr pressure lowers OAC Alarm: U1 PZR PRESS I through IV 1NC-27C SLIMs LS indication 50 or 100%

MCB Annunciator 1AD6/C

-6 PZR LO PRESS CONTROL Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The BOP may take all the necessary actions in the Immediate Actions, before CRS reads AOP.

AP/1/A/5500/11, PRESSURIZER PRESSURE ANOMALIES BOP (Step 1) Check Pzr pressure

- HAS GONE DOWN. Immediate Action BOP (Step 2) Check Pzr PORVs

- CLOSED. Immediate Action BOP (Step 3) Check Pzr spray valves

- CLOSED Immediate Action BOP (Step 3 RNO) CLOSE Pzr spray valve(s).

NOTE: The BOP will recognize that the SLIMs is NOT effective at controlling the valve, and operate the EMERG SWITCH.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 4 Page 31 of 64 Event

Description:

Pzr Spray Valve (1NC

-27) Controller fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task

Manually close the Failed OPEN Pzr Spray Valve before the Pressurizer pressure Safety Significance: failure to close the Spray Valve and stop the pressure transient

, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the pressure transient. A failure to stabilize the pressure transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis

-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect NCS pressure control. BOP (Step 4) Check Pzr PORVs

- CLOSED. BOP (Step 5) Check Pzr spray valves

- CLOSED. NOTE: IF the BOP has already used the EMERG SWITCH, the CRS may answer YES, and continue to Step 6.

If NOT, the Step 5 RNO will be performed.

CRS (Step 6) Announce occurrence on page.

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

BOP (Step 7) Check 1NV

-21A (NV Spray to PZR Isol) - CLOSED. BOP (Step 8) Check the following Pzr heaters

- ON: 1A 1B 1D BOP (Step 9) Check 1C Pzr heaters

- ON.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 4 Page 32 of 64 Event

Description:

Pzr Spray Valve (1NC

-27) Controller fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 10) Check "PZR PRESS MASTER"

- IN AUTO. BOP (Step 11) Check "1NC

-27 PRESSURIZER SPRAY EMERGENCY CLOSE" switch

- SELECTED TO "NORMAL".

NOTE: In order to close the malfunctioning Spray Valve, the BOP had to take the EMERG SWITCH to CLOSE.

CRS (Step 11 RNO) Notify station management to ensure switch restored to "NORMAL" once spray valve is repaired.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/Station Management to address the switch position.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

BOP (Step 12) Check "1NC-29 PRESSURIZER SPRAY EMERGENCY CLOSE" switch

- SELECTED TO "NORMAL".

BOP (Step 13) Check Pzr pressure

- GOING UP TO DESIRED PRESSURE.

CRS (Step 14) Exit this procedure.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the valve failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief

. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1, RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, AND FLOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING (DNB) LIMITS CRS LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for pressurizer pressure, RCS average temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be within the limits specified in Table 3.4.1

-1. NOTE: If NC System Pressure drops to < 2216 psig on the failure, then TS 3.4.1 might be entered and exited during the transient.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 4 Page 33 of 64 Event

Description:

Pzr Spray Valve (1NC

-27) Controller fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Pressurizer pressure or RCS average temperature DNB parameters not within limits. A.1 Restore DNB parameter(s) to within limit.

2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #

5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 5 Page 34 of 64 Event

Description:

1B CF Pump Trip/SGTL/Turbine Runback w/rods in Manual Subsequently, the 1B CF Pump will trip causing the turbine to automatically runback to 55%. Simultaneously, a 1 gpm Steam Generator Tube Leak will occur in the 1A Steam Generator. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500/03, "Load Rejection." During the runback the operator will need to drive rods in manually.

Booth Operator Instructions:

insert MAL

-LF003B = TRUE Insert MAL

-IRE009 = FAIL_OF_AUTO Insert MAL

-SG001A = 1 Indications Available:

1B CF Pump Trips.

MCB Annunciator 1AD

-1, D6, DEH TURBINE RUNBACK, alarms.

Turbine Generator MWe lowering.

MCB Annunciator 1RAD

-1, C-1, 1EMF 71 S/G A LEAKAGE HI RAD MCB Annunciator 1RAD

-1, D-1, 1EMF 72 S/G B LEAKAGE HI RAD MCB Annunciator 1RAD

-1, D-2, 1EMF 73 S/G C LEAKAGE HI RAD MCB Annunciator 1RAD

-1, D-3, 1EMF 74 S/G D LEAKAGE HI RAD Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP/1/A/5500/03, LOAD REJECTION RO (Step 1) Ensure control rods in auto.

Immediate Action NOTE: Rods are in MANUAL from a previous malfunction and will NOT work in AUTO. RO (Step 2) Check Turbine Generator response as follows:

Check Generator

- TIED TO GRID.

Check Generator output

- GOING DOWN AS REQUIRED.

RO (Step 3) Check control rod response as follows: Check control banks

- MOVING IN AS REQUIRED.

NOTE: Rods are in MANUAL from a previous malfunction and will NOT work in AUTO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 5 Page 35 of 64 Event

Description:

1B CF Pump Trip/SGTL/Turbine Runback w/rods in Manual Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 3a RNO) IF no rods will move in auto; THEN perform the following:

Place Control Rods in manual.

Insert rods to reduce T

-avg equal to programmed T

-Ref. If no rods will move, THEN-..

NOTE: The Control Rods will move in MANUAL.

RO Check all rods

- ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK.

RO (Step 3b RNO) IF two or more control rods are misaligned greater that 24 steps-BOP (Step 4) Check CM system response as follows: Standby Hotwell and Condensate Booster pumps

- RUNNING. 1CM-420 (Unit 1 Generator Load Rejection Bypass control)

- OPEN. RO (Step 5) IF runback to 56% power in effect, THEN ensure turbine inlet pressure going down to less than or equal to 500 PSIG.

CRS (Step 6) Announce: "UNIT 1 LOAD REJECTION, NON

-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL STAY OUT OF UNIT 1 TURBINE BLDG".

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement that AP-3 has been entered.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 7) Check P/R meters

- LESS THAN 20%.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 5 Page 36 of 64 Event

Description:

1B CF Pump Trip/SGTL/Turbine Runback w/rods in Manual Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS / RO (Step 7 RNO) Perform the following:

Designate an operator to continuously monitor reactor power.

IF AT ANY TIME reactor power is less than 20%, THEN perform Step 8 to stabilize reactor power.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will designate the RO to observe this action.

CRS GO TO Step 9.

RO (Step 9) Check condenser dump valves

- MODULATING OPEN.

BOP (Step 10) Check "IPB AIR FLOW TROUBLE" alarm (1AD

-11, J-5) - DARK. BOP (Step 11) Check Pzr pressure control response as follows:

Ensure Pzr heater are in auto.

Ensure Pzr spray control valves are in auto. Check Pzr PORVs

- CLOSED. Check Pzr spray control valves

- CLOSED RO (Step 12) Check load rejection

- DUE TO LOSS OF CF PUMP.

NOTE: The load rejection was due to a Loss of CF Pump.

CRS (Step 13) Dispatch operator as necessary to determine cause of CF pump trip.

NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as the AO.

BOP (Step 14) Ensure in service CF pump properly responds in auto as follows:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 5 Page 37 of 64 Event

Description:

1B CF Pump Trip/SGTL/Turbine Runback w/rods in Manual Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Monitor in service CF pump discharge pressure.

"1A CF PUMP DISCHARGE PRESS" (OAC point M1A1108).

OR "1B CF PUMP DISCHARGE PRESS" (OAC point M1A1114).

Monitor S/G N/R Levels.

IF AT ANY TIME any of the following occurs: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

"CF PUMP DISCHARGE HI PRESS" 1AD8, A4 alarms (Setpoint at 1335 PSIG), OR S/G N/R level approaches Hi Hi level (83%), OR S/G N/R level approaches Lo Lo level (17%).

THEN take manual control of in service CF pump as follows:

Place low pressure governor control in manual.

Place high pressure governor control in manual Adjust CF pump speed to maintain CF header pressure 100120 PSIG above steam header pressure.

Do not continue until the following are satisfied:

In service CF pump discharge pressure is stable.

S/G levels are at setpoint.

RO (Step 15) Check turbine inlet pressure

- LESS THAN 3 40 PSIG. RO (Step 15 RNO) Perform the following:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 5 Page 38 of 64 Event

Description:

1B CF Pump Trip/SGTL/Turbine Runback w/rods in Manual Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments IF AT ANY TIME turbine inlet pressure drops to less than 340 PSIG, THEN GO TO Step 16.

CRS GO TO Step 19.

RO (Step 19) Check Main Generator as follows:

Check Generator Breakers

- EITHER GENERATOR BREAKERS CLOSED.

Check Generator

- TIED TO GRID. Check generator power factor

- 0.9 TO 1.0 LAGGING.

CRS GO TO Step 20.

CRS (Step 20) Ensure the following have been implemented:

NOTE: The CRS may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

RP/0/A/5700/000 (Classification of Emergency)

RP/0/A/5700/010 (NRC Immediate Notification Requirements).

RO (Step 21) WHEN transient is over, THEN perform the following:

Check reactor power

- GREATER THAN 40%. Check the following on in service CF pump(s): Low pressure governor control

- IN AUTO High pressure governor control

- IN AUTO. Check SM flow on all S/Gs

- LESS THAN 75%.

NOTE: SM flow is 60%.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 5 Page 39 of 64 Event

Description:

1B CF Pump Trip/SGTL/Turbine Runback w/rods in Manual Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Check SM flow on all S/Gs

- LESS THAN 25%.

NOTE: SM flow is 60%. RO (Step 21d RNO) Perform the following:

Check the following CF control bypass valves - CLOSED: 1CF-104AB (1A S/G CF Control Bypass) - CLOSED 1CF-105AB (1B S/G CF Control Bypass) - CLOSED 1CF-106AB (1C S/G CF Control Bypass) - CLOSED 1CF-107AB (1D S/G CF Control Bypass) - CLOSED RO IF any CF control bypass valve is open-NOTE: All CF control bypass valves are closed.

CRS GO TO Step 21.f.

BOP Slowly CLOSE 1CM

-420 (Unit 1 Generator Load Rejection Bypass Control) while monitoring Condensate Booster pump suction pressure.

NOTE: The BOP will close 1CM-420. WHEN 1CM-420 is closed, THEN check load rejection signal reset (OAC turn on code "CM").

Reposition manual loader for 1CM

-420 to 100% OPEN.

NOTE: The BOP will open 1CM-420. IF thermal power is greater than 15%, THEN within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of reaching stable conditions, ensure each power range channel is within 2% of heat balance.

Check T-Avg - GREATER THAN 561

°F. Check "CONTROL ROD BANK LO LO LIMIT" alarm (1AD

-2, B-9) - DARK.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 5 Page 40 of 64 Event

Description:

1B CF Pump Trip/SGTL/Turbine Runback w/rods in Manual Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Check "CONTROL ROD BANK LO LIMIT" alarm (1AD

-2, A-9) - DARK. NOTE: 1AD-2, A-9 may be LIT. If so, the operator will perform Step 21.I RNO.

RO (Step 21.l RNO) Ensure the "CONTROL ROD BANK LO LIMIT" alarm clears as Xenon builds in.

RO (Step 22) Check load rejection

- DUE TO LOSS OF CF PUMP.

NOTE: The load rejection was NOT due to a Loss of CF Pump. CRS (Step 22 RNO) GO TO Step 24.

BOP (Step 24) Shutdown unnecessary running plant equipment as follows:

BOP Condensate Booster pumps and place in auto. NOTE: The BOP may stop one Condensate Booster Pump. Hotwell pumps and place in auto.

NOTE: The BOP may stop one Hotwell Pump.

IF desired to secure, THEN dispatch operator to shutdown PER OP/1/B/6250/004 (Feedwater Heater Vents, Drains and Bleed System) Enclosure 4.2 (System Shutdown) the following:

NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as the AO.

Unit 1 C Heater Drain Tank pumps Unit 1 G Heater Drain Tank pumps.

CRS (Step 25) IF power change greater than 15% in one hour, THEN notify Primary Chemistry to perform required Tech Spec sampling.

NOTE: The CRS may call Chemistry to address the power decrease.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 5 Page 41 of 64 Event

Description:

1B CF Pump Trip/SGTL/Turbine Runback w/rods in Manual Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 26) WHEN condenser dump valves closed AND no longer required for temperature control, THEN reset C

-7A using "STEAM DUMP SELECT" switch.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, move to Event s #6-7.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 6 & 7 Page 42 of 64 Event

Description:

1A MSIV fails CLOSED/ 1A SG SV fails OPEN/ATWS/SGTR/ TD CA Pump Overspeed Trip/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO After this, the 1A MSIV will inadvertently CLOSE, and the Reactor will fail to trip automatically and manually. Additionally, the low set Safety Valve on the 1A Steam Generator will lift and stick fully OPEN. Additionally, the TD CA Pump will trip on overspeed on auto start, and the 1A MDCA Pump will fail to start automatically. T he operator will enter EP/1/A/5000/E

-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection,

" and then transition to EP/1/A/5000/FR

-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS." During the performance of FR

-S.1, the operator will continuously drive rods in manually, successfully trip the Reactor locally, and manually start the 1A MDCA Pump and establish 450 gpm of flow the Steam Generators. The Steam Generator Tube Leak will degrade to a tube rupture in the 1A Steam Generator when the reactor is locally tripped.

After completion of FR

-S.1, the operator will transition back to E

-0, and then to EP/1/A/5000/E

-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation." After the 1A Steam Generator is isolated, the operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/E

-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant," and then, upon diagnosing the tube rupture, to EP/1/A/5000/E

-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture." The scenario will terminate at Step 6 of E

-3 after the operator has transitioned to EP/1/A/5000/ECA

-3.1, "SGTR with Subcooled Recovery Desired," or at Step 9 of E

-3 upon initiating an NCS cooldown.

Booth Operator Instructions:

Insert REM-SM007AB (MSIV Closure) Insert MAL

-SG001A 300 delay=20 ramp=60 (S/G 1A Tube Rupture) Indications Available:

1SM7AB Green status light is LIT.

1A SG Steam Flow lowering.

1A SG Feedflow lowering.

1A SG Narrow Range Level is lowering.

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments EP/1/A/5000/E

-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO/ BOP (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of E

-0, prior to the CRS addressing the EP. RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip:

Immediate Action All rod bottom lights

- LIT Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 6 & 7 Page 43 of 64 Event

Description:

1A MSIV fails CLOSED/ 1A SG SV fails OPEN/ATWS/SGTR/ TD CA Pump Overspeed Trip/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Reactor trip and bypass breakers

- OPEN I/R amps

- GOING DOWN.

RO (Step 2 RNO) Perform the following:

Immediate Action Trip reactor.

RO IF reactor will not trip, THEN perform the following:

NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO to locally trip the reactor.

If so, Booth Instructor After 30 seconds insert: LOA-IPE011=TRIP (Rx Trip Bkr 1A) LOA-IPE012=TRIP (Rx Trip Bkr 1B) As an Alternate Insert:

LOA-IRE001A = OPEN (MG Set 1A Gen Output Bkr)

LOA-IRE002A = OPEN (MG Set 1B Gen Output Bkr)

Implement EP/1/A/5000/F

-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).

CRS GO TO EP/1/A/5000/FR

-S.1 (Response To Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS).

NOTE: The CRS will transition to FR

-S.1. EP/1/A/5000/FR

-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS RO (Step 1) Check Reactor Trip:

Immediate Action All rod bottom lights

- LIT Reactor trip and bypass breakers

- OPEN I/R amps

- GOING DOWN.

RO (Step 1 RNO) Perform the following:

Immediate Action

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 6 & 7 Page 44 of 64 Event

Description:

1A MSIV fails CLOSED/ 1A SG SV fails OPEN/ATWS/SGTR/ TD CA Pump Overspeed Trip/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Trip the reactor.

IF reactor will not trip, THEN manually insert rods.

NOTE: The RO will manually drive Rods inward.

Critical Task

Manually drive rods inward before completing the immediate actions of FR

-S.1 (Step 2).

Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical or returns to a critical condition. Performance of the critical task would move the reactor towards a subcritical condition to prevent a subsequent return to criticality. A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis

-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control.

BOP (Step 2) Check Turbine Trip:

All throttle valves

- CLOSED. RO/ BOP (Step 3) Monitor Foldout page.

Cold Leg Recirc Switchover Criteria CA Suction Sources Position Criteria for 1NV150B and 1NV151A (U1 NV Pump Recirc Isol)

BOP (Step 4) Check proper CA pump status:

MD CA pumps

- ON. NOTE: The 1B MDCA Pump is OOS. The 1A MDCA Pump has failed to AUTO start. BOP (Step 4.a RNO) Start pumps.

NOTE: The BOP will start the 1A MDCA Pump

.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 6 & 7 Page 45 of 64 Event

Description:

1A MSIV fails CLOSED/ 1A SG SV fails OPEN/ATWS/SGTR/ TD CA Pump Overspeed Trip/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP Check N/R Level in at least 3 S/Gs

- GREATER THAN 17%.

Critical Task

Start the 1A MD CA Pump before transition out of FRS

-.1, unless the transition is made to EP/1/A/5000/FR

-H.1, and then before the NCPs are manually tripped to limit heat input to the RCS.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish a Secondary Heat Sink through the initiation of CA flow unnecessarily challenges both the HEAT SINK and the CORE COOLING Critical Safety Functions. Additionally, the FSAR Safety Analysis results are predicated on the assumption that at least one train of safeguards actuates and delivers a minimum amount of AFW flow to the Steam Generators. Failure to perform this task, when the ability to do so exists, results in a violation of the Facility License Condition and places the plant in an unanalyzed condition.

BOP (Step 5) Initiate emergency boration of NC System as follows:

Ensure one NV pump

- ON Align boration flowpath as follows:

Open 1NV-265B (Boric Acid To NV Pumps). Start both boric acid transfer pumps. Check emergency boration flow

- GREATER THAN 30 GPM.

Check if NV flowpath aligned to NC System: 1NV-244A (Charging Line Cont Outside Isol)

- OPEN. 1NV-245B (Charging Line Cont Outside Isol)

- OPEN. Ensure charging flow is greater than emergency Boration flow.

Check Pzr pressure

- LESS THAN 2335 PSIG.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 6 & 7 Page 46 of 64 Event

Description:

1A MSIV fails CLOSED/ 1A SG SV fails OPEN/ATWS/SGTR/ TD CA Pump Overspeed Trip/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 6) Close the following VQ valves:

CLOSE 1VQ

-1A (U1 Cont Air Release Inside Isol)

CLOSE 1VQ

-6A (U1 Cont Air Addition Inside Isol)

CLOSE 1VQ

-2B (U1 Cont Air Release Outside Isol)

CLOSE 1VQ

-5B (U1 Cont Air Addition Outside Isol)

BOP (Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure an S/I signal exists or occurs, THEN perform the following:

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Have another Licensed Operator check S/I equipment PER Enclosure 3 (Subsequent S/I Actions).

CRS Continue with this procedure.

RO (Step 8) Check if the following trips have occurred:

Reactor trip.

Turbine trip.

RO (Step 9) Check reactor subcritical:

P/R channels

- LESS THAN 5%

W/R Neutron Flux

- LESS THAN 5%

I/R SUR - NEGATIVE.

CRS (Step 10 ) GO TO Step 17.

RO (Step 17) Ensure adequate shutdown margin as follows:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 6 & 7 Page 47 of 64 Event

Description:

1A MSIV fails CLOSED/ 1A SG SV fails OPEN/ATWS/SGTR/ TD CA Pump Overspeed Trip/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Obtain current NC boron concentration from Primary Chemistry.

NOTE: The CRS/RO may call Chemistry.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry.

WHEN current NC boron concentration is obtained, THEN perform shutdown margin calculation PER OP/0/A/6100/006 (Reactivity Balance Calculation).

NOTE: The CRS may ask the U2 RO to perform this action. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

WHEN following conditions satisfied, THEN NC System boration may be stopped: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Adequate shutdown margin is obtained.

Uncontrolled cooldown has been stopped. CRS (Step 18) REFER TO the following:

NOTE: The CRS may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

RP/0/A/5700/000 (Classification of Emergency).

RP/0/A/5700/010 (NRC Immediate Notification Requirements).

CRS (Step 19) RETURN TO procedure and step in effect.

NOTE: The CRS will transition back to E

-0. EP/1/A/5000/E

-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO/ BOP (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of E

-0, prior to the CRS addressing the EP. RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip:

Immediate Action

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 6 & 7 Page 48 of 64 Event

Description:

1A MSIV fails CLOSED/ 1A SG SV fails OPEN/ATWS/SGTR/ TD CA Pump Overspeed Trip/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments All rod bottom lights

- LIT Reactor trip and bypass breakers

- OPEN I/R amps

- GOING DOWN.

RO (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip:

Immediate Action All throttle valves

- CLOSED. BOP (Step 4) Check 1ETA and 1ETB

- ENERGIZED.

Immediate Action RO/ BOP (Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated:

Immediate Action "SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED" status light (1SI

-18) - LIT. Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1SI

-14) - LIT. Examiner NOTE:

SI will most likely NOT be actuated at this time, however, plant conditions will not permit SI to be avoided.

If the crew transitions to ES

-0.1, observe crew activities and continue with the script when SI is actuated.

RO/ BOP Foldout Page NC Pump Trip Criteria CA Suction Sources Position Criteria for 1NV150B and 1NV151A (U1 NV Pump Recirc Isol)

Ruptured S/G Aux Feedwater Isolation Criteria Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 6 & 7 Page 49 of 64 Event

Description:

1A MSIV fails CLOSED/ 1A SG SV fails OPEN/ATWS/SGTR/ TD CA Pump Overspeed Trip/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Faulted S/G Aux Feedwater Isolation Criteria NOTE: The BOP will diagnose that 1A S/G is faulted and isolate CA flow to the S/G.

IF all of the following conditions met, THEN stop CA flow to affected S/G:

S/G pressure going down in an uncontrolled manner or completely depressurized Only one S/G is diagnosed as faulted Secondary heat sink:

N/R level in at least one S/G GREATER THAN 11%(32% ACC)

OR Total feed flow to S/Gs GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

CRS (Step 6) Announce "Unit 1 Safety Injection".

NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

BOP (Step 7) Check all Feedwater Isolation status lights (1SI

-4) - LIT. BOP (Step 8) Check Phase A "RESET" lights

- DARK. BOP (Step 9) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on Energized train(s):

Groups 1, 2, 5

- DARK. Group 3 - LIT. Group 4 - LIT AS REQUIRED. Group 6 - LIT.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 6 & 7 Page 50 of 64 Event

Description:

1A MSIV fails CLOSED/ 1A SG SV fails OPEN/ATWS/SGTR/ TD CA Pump Overspeed Trip/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS GO TO Step 10.

RO (Step 10) Check proper CA pump status:

MD CA pumps

- ON. BOP (Step 10.a) Start pumps.

NOTE: The BOP will start the 1A MDCA Pump.

BOP N/R level in at least 3 S/Gs

- GREATER THAN 17%.

BOP (Step 11) Check all KC pumps

- ON. BOP (Step 12) Check both RN pumps

- ON. NOTE: The 1B RN Pump may have been rendered inoperable due to a previous malfunction

. If not, the CRS may contact the WCCS/dispatch an AO to stop the pump by opening the breaker.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC, and indicate that the 1B RN Pump Breaker will be Racked Out

. Use: LOA-RN006 = Racked_Out (1B RN Pump BKR)

LOA-RN006A = Racked_Out (1B RN Pump Cntrl Pwr)

BOP (Step 12 RNO) Perform the following:

Start pump(s).

IF 1A RN pump is off, THEN-. IF affected train is deenergized, AND it's D/G is off, THEN--

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 6 & 7 Page 51 of 64 Event

Description:

1A MSIV fails CLOSED/ 1A SG SV fails OPEN/ATWS/SGTR/ TD CA Pump Overspeed Trip/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Reset the following on affected train:

S/I. Sequencer.

Dispatch operator to stop affected D/G using emergency stop pushbutton.

NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as the AO, and use LOA-DG004 = STOP_DG to stop the 1B D/G. Monitor affected RN cooled components and shut down as necessary.

CRS (Step 13) Notify Unit 2 to perform the following:

Floor Instructor:

As U2 RO report "2A RN Pump is running."

Start 2A RN pump.

THROTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum for existing plant condition.

Booth Instructor:

insert LOA

-RN087 (Start 2A RN Pump) insert LOA

-RN083 8050.000000 delay=0 ramp=10 (Unit 2 Train A Demand Flow)

RO (Step 14) Check all S/G pressures

- GREATER THAN 775 PSIG.

NOTE: 1A S/G is faulted, and may be less than 775 psig (Crew may perform RNO). BOP (Step 15) Check Containment Pressure

- HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG.

NOTE: Containment Pressure is normal.

BOP (Step 16) Check S/I flow:

Check "NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW" gauge

- INDICATING FLOW.

Check NC pressure

- LESS THAN 1600 PSIG.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 6 & 7 Page 52 of 64 Event

Description:

1A MSIV fails CLOSED/ 1A SG SV fails OPEN/ATWS/SGTR/ TD CA Pump Overspeed Trip/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 16b RNO) Perform the following:

Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running pump(s) OPEN: 1ND-68A (1A ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol) 1ND-67B (1B ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol).

CRS IF valve(s) open on all running ND pumps, THEN GO TO Step 1

7. CRS (Step 17) Notify OSM or other SRO to perform EP/1/A/5000/G

-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions Following an S/I) within 10 minutes.

NOTE: The CRS may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

RO/ BOP (Step 18) Check CA flow:

Total CA flow

- GREATER THAN 450 GPM. RO/ BOP (Step 18.a RNO) Perform the following:

IF N/R level in all S/Gs is less than 11% (32% ACC), THEN-.. BOP Check VI header pressure

- GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.

RO/ BOP WHEN each S/G N/R level is greater than 11% (32% ACC), THEN control CA flow to maintain that S/G N/R level between 11% (32% ACC) and 50%.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

RO (Step 19) Check NC temperatures:

IF any NC pumps on

- OR Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 6 & 7 Page 53 of 64 Event

Description:

1A MSIV fails CLOSED/ 1A SG SV fails OPEN/ATWS/SGTR/ TD CA Pump Overspeed Trip/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments IF all NC pumps off, THEN check NC T-Colds - STABLE OR TRENDING TO 557°F. (Step 19 RNO) Perform the following based on plant conditions:

IF temperature less than 557

°F AND going down, THEN attempt to stop Cooldown PER Enclosure 3 (Uncontrolled NC System Cooldown).

NOTE: The CRS may assign the RO (BOP) to perform this action.

If so, RO (BOP) Examiner follow actions of Enclosure

3. Other Examiners follow E-0 Actions, Step 20, on Page 55. EP/1/A/5000/E

-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ENCLOSURE 3, UNCONTROLLED NC SYSTEM COOLDOWN RO/ (BOP) (Step 1) Check steam dump valves

- CLOSED. RO/ (BOP) (Step 2) Check all SM PORVs

- CLOSED. RO/ (BOP) (Step 3) Check MSR "RESET" light

- LIT RO/ (BOP) (Step 4) Check any NC pump

- ON. RO/ (BOP) (Step 5) Check NC TAvg GOING DOWN.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 6 & 7 Page 54 of 64 Event

Description:

1A MSIV fails CLOSED/ 1A SG SV fails OPEN/ATWS/SGTR/ TD CA Pump Overspeed Trip/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO/ (BOP) (Step 6) Control feed flow as follows:

IF S/G N/R level is less than 11% (32% ACC) in all S/Gs, -

WHEN N/r level is greater than 11%

(32% ACC) in at least one S/G, THEN THROTTLE feed flow further to:

Minimize cooldown Maintain at least one S/G N/R level greater than 11% (32%ACC).

RO/ (BOP) (Step 7) Check MSIVs

- ANY OPEN.

RO/ (BOP) (Step 8) CLOSE 1SM

-15 (U1 SM to MSR 2 nd Stg Tube Bundles Isol).

RO/ (BOP) (Step 9) Check any NC pump

- ON. RO/ (BOP) (Step 10) Check NC TAvg STABLE. RO/ (BOP) (Step 10 RNO) IF cooldown continues, THEN CLOSE the following valves:

All MSIVs All MSIV Bypass Valves.

RO/ (BOP) (Step 11) Notify Control Room Supervisor of the following:

NC temperature trend Status of MSIV and Bypass Valves.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 6 & 7 Page 55 of 64 Event

Description:

1A MSIV fails CLOSED/ 1A SG SV fails OPEN/ATWS/SGTR/ TD CA Pump Overspeed Trip/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner NOTE:

Examiners following the CRS/RO(BOP) continue HERE. EP/1/A/5000/E

-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION BOP (RO) (Step 20) Check Pzr PORV and spray valves: All Pzr PORVs

- CLOSED. Normal Pzr spray valves

- CLOSED. NOTE: 1NC-27 is stopped using the Emergency CLOSE Switch.

BOP (RO) (Step 20.b) IF Pzr pressure is less than 2100 PSIG, THEN perform the following:

CLOSE spray valve(s)

IF spray valve(s) cannot be closed, THEN-.. BOP (RO) At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve

-OPEN. BOP (RO) (Step 21) Check NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs

- GREATER THAN 0°F.

BOP (RO) (Step 22) Check if main steamlines intact:

All S/G pressures

- STABLE OR GOING UP All S/Gs

- PRESSURIZED.

CRS (Step 22 RNO) IF any S/G is faulted, THEN perform the following:

NOTE: The 1A S/G is faulted. Implement EP/1/A/5000/F

-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 6 & 7 Page 56 of 64 Event

Description:

1A MSIV fails CLOSED/ 1A SG SV fails OPEN/ATWS/SGTR/ TD CA Pump Overspeed Trip/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E

-2 (Faulted Steam Generator Isolation).

NOTE: The CRS will transition to E

-2. EP/1/A/5000/

E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION RO/ BOP (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

Cold Leg Recirc Switchover Criteria CA Suction Sources Position Criteria for 1NV

-150B and 1NV

-151A (U1 NV Pump Recirc Isol)

CRS (Step 2) Maintain any faulted S/G or secondary break isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for NC System cooldown.

RO (Step 3) Check the following

- CLOSED: All MSIVs All MSIV bypass valves.

RO (Step 4) Check at least one S/G pressure

- STABLE OR GOING UP.

NOTE: Although all SG pressures may be decreasing slowly, the operator will report stable based on plant conditions (i.e. faulted SG). Otherwise a transition to ECA

-2.1 will be made. RO/ BOP (Step 5) Identify faulted S/G(s):

NOTE: The 1A SG is Faulted. Any S/G pressure

- GOING DOWN IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 6 & 7 Page 57 of 64 Event

Description:

1A MSIV fails CLOSED/ 1A SG SV fails OPEN/ATWS/SGTR/ TD CA Pump Overspeed Trip/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OR Any S/G - DEPRESSURIZED.

RO (Step 6) Maintain at least one S/G available for NC System cooldown in subsequent steps. RO (Step 7) Check faulted S/G(s) SM PORV

- CLOSED. BOP (Step 8) Reset CA modulating valves.

RO/ BOP (Step 9) Isolate faulted S/G(s) as follows:

RO/ BOP For 1A S/G:

Check "S/G A FDW ISOLATED" status light (1SI

-4) - LIT. Close 1CA

-66AC (U1 TD CA Pump Disch To 1A S/G Isol).

Close 1CA

-62A (1A CA Pump Disch To 1A S/G Isol).

Check BB valves

- CLOSED: 1BB-1B (1A S/G Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) 1BB-5A (A S/G BB Cont Inside Isol). Close 1SM

-83 (A SM Line Drain Isol).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 6 & 7 Page 58 of 64 Event

Description:

1A MSIV fails CLOSED/ 1A SG SV fails OPEN/ATWS/SGTR/ TD CA Pump Overspeed Trip/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task

Isolate CA flow to the Faulted Steam Generator before an unwarranted Red Path occurs on Subcriticality or NCS Integrity

. Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a Faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to the Critical Safety Functions that may not otherwise occur. Failure to isolate flow could result in an unwarranted Orange or Red Path condition on NC Integrity and/or Subcriticality (if cooldown is allowed to continue uncontrollably).

RO (Step 10) Close 1AS

-12 (U1 SM To AS Hdr Control Inlet Isol).

RO/ BOP (Step 11) Check S/G tubes intact as follows:

Check the following EMF's

- NORMAL: NOTE: SGTL Rad Monitors have been in alarm.

1EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust) 1EMF-24 (S/G A) 1EMF-25 (S/G B) 1EMF-26 (S/G C) 1EMF-27 (S/G D). CRS GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E

-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture)

NOTE: The CRS will transition to E

-3. EP/1/A/5000/E

-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE RO/ BOP (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

NC Pump Trip Criteria S/I Reinitiation Criteria Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 6 & 7 Page 59 of 64 Event

Description:

1A MSIV fails CLOSED/ 1A SG SV fails OPEN/ATWS/SGTR/ TD CA Pump Overspeed Trip/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Secondary Integrity Criteria Cold Leg Switchover Criteria CA Suction Sources Multiple Tube Rupture Criteria:

Position Criteria for 1NV

-150B and 1NV

-151A (NV Pumps Recirculation)

BOP (Step 2) Identify ruptured S/G(s):

Any S/G N/R level

- GOING UP IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR Chemistry or RP has determined ruptured S/G.

NOTE: The CRS may contact Chemistry for sampling.

Booth Instructor:

Acknowledge as appropriate.

OR Any of the following EMFs

- ABOVE NORMAL: 1EMF-24 (S/G A) 1EMF-25 (S/G B) 1EMF-26 (S/G C) 1EMF-27 (S/G D)

RO (Step 3) Check at least one S/G

- AVAILABLE FOR NC SYSTEM COOLDOWN.

RO (Step 4) Isolate flow from ruptured S/G(s) as follows: Check ruptured S/G(s) PORV

- CLOSED. Check S/Gs 1B and 1C

- INTACT. NOTE: The 1A SG is NOT Intact.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 6 & 7 Page 60 of 64 Event

Description:

1A MSIV fails CLOSED/ 1A SG SV fails OPEN/ATWS/SGTR/ TD CA Pump Overspeed Trip/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO Check blowdown isolation valves on ruptured S/G/(s)

- CLOSED. For 1A S/G:

1BB-1B (1A S/G Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) 1BB-5A (A S/G BB Cont Inside Isol).

BOP CLOSE steam drain on ruptured S/G(s) 1SM-83 (A SM Line Drain Isol)

RO CLOSE the following valves on ruptured S/G(s): MSIV MSIV bypass valve.

RO (Step 5) Control ruptured S/G(s) level as follows: Check ruptured S/G(s) N/R level

- GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC).

BOP Isolate feed flow to ruptured S/G(s):

BOP (Step 5.a) Perform the following:

IF any ruptured S/G is also faulted, THEN do not establish feed flow to the ruptured S/G unless needed for NC System cooldown.

NOTE: The 1A S/G is NOT needed for cooldown.

IF any ruptured S/G is nonfaulted OR is required for cooldown, THEN-. CRS GO TO Step 6.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 6 & 7 Page 61 of 64 Event

Description:

1A MSIV fails CLOSED/ 1A SG SV fails OPEN/ATWS/SGTR/ TD CA Pump Overspeed Trip/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 6) Check ruptured S/G(s) pressure

- GREATER THAN 280 PSIG.

Examiner NOTE: The 1A S/G may be less than 280 psig. IF so, the crew will transition to ECA

-3.1, at which time the Exam should be terminated.

If not, continue in E

-3 until the NCS cooldown is started. BOP (Step 7) Check any NC pump

- RUNNING. BOP (Step 8) Check Pzr pressure

- GREATER THAN 1955 PSIG.

RO (Step 9) Initiate NC System cooldown as follows: CRS Determine required core exit temperature based on lowest ruptured S/G pressure:

300 - 399 psig - 362°F 280 - 299 psig - 353°F NOTE: The CRS will likely determine the target temperature to be 362 or 353oF. RO Check the following valves on ruptured S/G(s) - CLOSED: MSIV MSIV bypass valve.

RO Check ruptured S/G(s) SM PORV

- CLOSED. RO Check S/G(s) 1B and 1C

- INTACT. NOTE: The 1A SG is ruptured.

RO (Step 9.e) Check condenser available:

"C-9 COND AVAILABLE FOR STEAM DUMP" status light (1SI

-18) - LIT MSIV on intact S/G(s) OPEN.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 6 & 7 Page 62 of 64 Event

Description:

1A MSIV fails CLOSED/ 1A SG SV fails OPEN/ATWS/SGTR/ TD CA Pump Overspeed Trip/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 9.e RNO

) GO TO RNO for Step 9.h.

CRS (Step 9.h RNO)

Perform the following:

BOP Ensure at least one Pzr PORV isolation valve is OPEN IF VI is lost, OR a Phase B Isolation has occurred, THEN-.. NOTE: VI is NOT lost.

IF Pzr pressure is greater than 1955 PSIG, THEN depressurize to 1900 PSIG using Pzr PORV.

NOTE: Pzr pressure may be greater than 1955 psig. If NOT, not depressurization will be made.

Depress "BLOCK" on Low Pressure Steamline Isolation block switches.

Maintain NC pressure less than 1955 PSIG. Ensure Main Steam Isolation reset.

Ensure SM PORVs reset.

IF any intact S/G SM PORV isolation valve is closed, AND associated SM PORV is operable, THEN perform the following:

OPEN SM PORV isolation valve. IF isolation valve will not open,-- Dump steam using all intact S/G(s) SM PORVs at maximum rate as follows:

CLOSE SM PORV manual loader on ruptured S/G(s).

Place intact S/G SM PORV manual loaders at 50%.

Select "MANUAL" on "SM PORV MODE SELECT".

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

2 Event # 6 & 7 Page 63 of 64 Event

Description:

1A MSIV fails CLOSED/ 1A SG SV fails OPEN/ATWS/SGTR/ TD CA Pump Overspeed Trip/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Adjust manual loaders on intact S/G SM PORVs as required to control intact S/G depressurization rate at approximately 2 PSIG per second. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

UNIT 1 STATUS:

Power Level:

75% NCS [B] 1036 ppm Pzr [B]: 1036 ppm Xe: Per OAC Power History:

At this power level for 4 days Core Burnup:

250 EFPDs CONTROLLING PROCEDURE:

OP/1/A/6100/0 03 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME THE SHIFT: The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The following equipment is Out

-Of-Service:

The 1B MDCA Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5 ACTION B.

The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance.

1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating).

MCB Annunciator 1AD

-3, F-5, "BB DEMIN PNL TRBL," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed OFF (IAE is investigating).

MCB Annunciator 1AD

-3, F-2, KG PANEL TBL, is in alarm due to a filed local panel alarm relay. Crew Directions:

The crew will raise power to 100% after taking the shift, starting with Step 3.37.10 of OP/1/A/6100/03

. Raise Turbine load at 2MWe/minute.

RE has recommended a 200 gallon initial Simple Dilution. Work Control SRO/Offsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe (FB)

NLO's AVAILABLE Unit 1 Unit 2 Aux Bldg. John Aux Bldg. Chris Turb Bldg. Bob (FB)

Turb Bldg. Mike (FB) 5th Rounds. Carol Extra(s)

Bill (FB) Ed (FB) Wayne (FB) Tanya Gus (RW)

PROGRAM: McGuire Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 31 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N15-1-3 REFERENCES

1. Technical Specification 3.8.1, "AC Sources

- Operating" (Amendment 221/203)

2. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4, "Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs)" (Amendment 221/203)

3. OP/1/A/6100/003, "Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation" (Rev 194) 4. OP/1/A/6150/009, "Boron Concentration Control" (Rev 126) 5. OP/1/A/6300/001A, "Turbine Generator Load Change" (Rev 12

) 6. AP/1/A/5500/14, "Rod Control Malfunction" (Rev 16)

7. OP/1/A/6100/010 H "Annunciator Response For Panel 1AD

-7" (Rev 65)

8. OP/1/A/6150/002A, "Reactor Coolant Pump Operation" (Rev 63)

9. AP/1/A/5500/01, "Steam Leak" (Rev 18)

10. Technical Specification 3.4.1, "RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits

" (Amendment 219/201) 11. AP/1/A/5500/

08, "Malfunction of NC Pump" (Rev 14) 12. Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.7, "Standby Shutdown System" (Rev 145) 13. AP/1/A/5500/0 2, "Turbine Generator Trip

" (Rev 27) 14. EP/1/A/5000/E

-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection" (Rev 34) 15. EP/1/A/5000/E S-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response

" (Rev 39) 16. AP/1/A/5500/38, "Emergency Boration And Response To Inadvertent Dilution

" (Rev 11) 17. EP/1/A/5000/ECA-0.0, "Loss of All AC Power

" (Rev 34) Validation Time:

145 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Essential Training & Consulting, LLC Facility Review:

________________________

Rev. 030215 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Facility:

McGuire Scenario No.:

3 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Examiners:

Operators:

(SRO) (RO) (BOP) Initial Conditions:

The plant is at 40% power (MOL

). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Turnover:

The following equipment is Out

-Of-Service: The 1A EDG is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 ACTION B. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance. 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD

-12, E-2, "A RN PUMP ABNORMAL FLOW," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating). The crew will raise power to 100%

after taking the shift.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*

Event Description 1 NA R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Power Increase w/Alternate Dilute 2 MAL IRE009 C-RO C-SRO Control Rods fail to Move in Auto 3 REM NV0461 C-BOP C-SRO 1B NCP Standpipe Low Level Alarm 4 MAL SM001D C-RO C(TS)-SRO SG 1D PORV fails OPEN 5 MAL NCP008B C-BOP C(TS)-SRO #1 Seal Leak on 1 B NCP 6 MAL LT002 C-RO C-SRO Turbine Low Lube Oil Pressure/Turbine Trip 7 MAL NCP008B NCP016C NCP015C M-RO M-BOP M-SRO #1 Seal Leak on 1 B NCP Degrades 8 MAL IRE010 C-BOP C-SRO 4 Control Rods fail to Fully Insert on Rx Trip 9 MAL EP002A EP002B DG001B M-RO M-BOP M-SRO Loss of Switchyard to Unit 1/1B EDG fails to START

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 McGuire 2015 NRC Scenario #

3 The plant is at 40% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The following equipment is Out

-Of-Service: The 1A EDG is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 ACTION B. The 1A SG PORV is leaking and isolated. The PORV has been declared inoperable and maintenance is being planned. 1KFP

-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD

-12, E-2, "A RN PUMP ABNORMAL FLOW," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating). The crew will raise power to 100% after taking the shift.

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100% starting with Step 3.35.19 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, "Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation." The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with Enclosure 4.

4, "Alternate Dilute," of OP/1/A/6150/009, "Boron Concentration Control," and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/1/A/6300/001 A, "Turbine-Generator Load Change."

During the power increase, the operator will discover that the Control Rods will not respond in AUTO. The crew will enter AP/1/A/5500/14, "Rod Control Malfunction," and control rods in MANUAL. Because the crew may control the power increase such that an auto rod demand does not occur, this event may not be diagnosed until later.

Shortly after starting the power increase, AD-7/B-2, "NC Pump B No. 2 Seal S

-Pipe Lo Level," will alarm. The operator will address the Annunciator Response Procedure, and then use Enclosure 4.3, "Filling and Draining NC Pump Standpipe," of OP/1/A/6150/002A, "Reactor Coolant Pump Operation," to refill the standpipe.

After this, the 1D Steam Generator PORV will fail OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/01, "Steam Leak," and isolate the PORV. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4, "Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs)," and may enter LCO 3.4.1, "RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits."

Subsequently, a #1 seal leak will develop on the 1A NCP such that #1 Seal leakoff flow is 5.

0-5.5 gpm. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/0 8, "Malfunction of NC Pump,

" and address Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.7, "Standby Shutdown System." The control operators will be directed on the action to take should the #1 Seal Leakoff flow degrade to > 6 gpm (which will occur subsequently).

Shortly afterwards, a low lube oil pressure condition will develop on the Main Turbine eventually causing the Main Turbine to trip. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/02, "Turbine Generator Trip."

The RO will need to operate the control rods manually.

While the crew is in AP

-2, the 1B Hi Vibration alarm will occur and the #1 seal leak flow on the 1 B NCP will rise to 6 gpm. The operator go back to Step 8 of AP

-8 (Continuous Action Step), and close the 1 B NCP Pzr Spray Valve, manually trip the reactor and stop the 1 B NCP when reactor power is < 5%. The crew will perform Enclosure 2, "NC Pump Post Trip Actions For #1 Seal Failure," of AP8, while subsequently performing E-0.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 The operator will enter EP/1/A/5000/E

-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and verify reactor trip. On the reactor trip four control rods will fail to fully insert. The operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/ES

-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response," and emergency borate per AP/1/A/5500/38, "Emergency Boration And Response To Inadvertent Dilution."

Immediately following the initiation of Emergency Boration, a loss of the Unit 1 Switchyard will occur, and the 1B Emergency Diesel Generator will fail to start. The operator will immediately transition to EP/1/A/5000/ECA

-0.0, "Loss of All AC Power." The operator will restore power to 1ETA per Unit 2 6900V busses through SATA or SATB per Enclosure 9 "Energizing Unit 1 4160V Bus From Unit 2

- SATA or SATB."

The scenario will terminate at Step 40 of ECA

-0.0, with the crew preparing to re

-load the energized ESF Bus. Critical Tasks:

Trip the Reactor prior to stopping the NCP during a high vibration condition, and trip the NCP only after Reactor power level has dropped to less than 5%.

Safety Significance: The P-8 interlock allows one NCP to be stopped less than 48% power. If a NCP is stopped in Mode 1 or 2, Tech Spec 3.4.4 requires the unit to be in Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. In addition, T

-ave for the idle loop may violate Tech Spec 3.4.2, minimum temperature for criticality. In this case, the unit must be sub

-critical within 30 minutes. The transient placed on the unit when a NCP is secured at power can challenge both reactor protection and control systems. Furthermore, an added burden is placed on the operator to stabilize the unit and shut down within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (possibly 30 minutes) to comply with Tech Specs. Even though the plant is designed and analyzed to operate in this configuration for a short time, station management has decided that the conservative approach to dealing with this transient is to trip the reactor anytime a NCP malfunction warrants stopping a pump in Mode 1 or 2. Guidance is given to wait until reactor power is less than 5% before stopping the NC pump. This will ensure the NC pump will provide adequate flow/core cooling until reactor power is sufficiently low enough to preclude a challenge to fuel integrity. If the action can be taken, and is not taken, this demonstrates "mis

-operation" or incorrect operation that could unnecessarily challenge a fission product barrier (NCS).

Close the #1 Seal Return Valve for the 1B NCP prior to failure of the #2 Seal as indicated by a rise and subsequent substantial lowering of #1 Seal Leakoff Flow.

Safety Significance: According to Enclosure 2 of AP

-8, the Seal Water Return Valve must be closed within 3-5 minutes after stopping the NCP. If the valve is NOT closed, the NCS leak will continue until isolated, and could degrade the #2 and 3 Seals. According to the AP8 Background Document, closing the seal return valve within 3 to 5 minutes during a #1 seal failure event does not meet the criteria of "high PRA values" as determined by the Severe Accident Analysis Group. For McGuire, this corresponds to a Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) greater than or equal to 1.04.

PIP M-03-1992 documents the events that meet these criteria. As such this action is not a McGuire 'time critical action', but is a management expectation and prudent action to prevent damage to the #2 and #3 seals.

If the action can be taken, and is not taken, this demonstrates "mis-operation" or incorrect operation that could unnecessarily challenge a fission product barrier (NCS).

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Energize at least one AC Emergency Bus From Unit 2

. Safety Significance: Failure to energize an AC Emergency Bus when able to do so constitutes "mis-operation" or incorrect performance which leads to degraded emergency power capacity. Failure to perform the Critical Task may result in a needless challenge and/or degradation of a fission product barrier at the point of the remaining intact RCP Seals

, and will result in the inability to add inventory through the ECCS during the existing and potentially subsequent small break LOCA(s). Since the conditions existed to re

-energize an ESF Bus from Unit 2 via the SATA or SATB, not taking this action constitutes incorrect performance that leads to degradation of the RCS and/or fuel cladding fission product barriers

.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Sim. Setup Rod Step On Reset to Temp IC 240 (Originally 18). T = 0 Malfunctions (From IC-18): insert MAL

-EPQ001A ACTIVE (Loss of D/G A Control Power)

insert LOA

-DG020 RACKED_OUT (1A D/G Output Breaker Control Power Fuses) insert LOA

-DG011 RACKED_OUT (1A D/G Output Breaker Racked Out)

Insert REM

-SV0027 = 0 (Close 1SV

-27 [1A S/G PORV Isolation]

) Insert LOA

-SV001= Racked_Out (SG PORV Breaker Racked Out)

H_X02_087_3 = 0 (1A PORV Controller LEFT lamp) H_X02_087_4 = 0 (1A PORV Controller RIGHT lamp) Insert LOA

-SV014=0 (SM PORV A LOCAL OPERATION

) insert XMT- KFTT5130 = 0 (Spent Fuel Pool Temperature Failure

) From IC-240 Per Lesson Plan 2015 NRC Exam Scenario 3 insert MAL-IRE010N9 (Shutdown Bank B

-3 Stuck at original position) insert MAL

-IRE010N11 (Shutdown Bank D-3 Stuck at original position) insert MAL

-IRE010P10 Control Bank B

-3 Stuck at original position) insert MAL

-IRE010P12 Shutdown Bank A

-3 Stuck at original position)

RUN Reset all SLIMs Place Tagout/O-Stick on:

1A EDG (Tagout) 1SV-27 (Tagout) 1KFP-5130 (O-Stick) MCB Annunciator 1AD

-12, E-2 (O-stick) Update Status Board, Setup OAC NOTE: RMWST DO =

<1000 ppb.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Freeze. Update Fresh Tech. Spec. Log.

Fill out the AO's Available section of Shift Turnover Info.

Prior to Crew Briefing RUN Crew Briefing

1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements

2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3. Provide Enclosure 4.1 of OP/1/A/6100/003 marked up as follows:

Step 2.3 initialed.

Note prior to Step 3.1 checked.

Step 3.1 Checkbox is checked.

Step 3.2 initialed.

Step 3.3 initialed.

Step 3.3.1 Checkbox is checked.

Step 3.3.2 Checkbox is checked, Step 3.35.14 is entered.

Step 3.3.3 Checkbox is checked.

Step 3.3.4 Initialed.

Step 3.35 circled.

Step 3.35.1 Checkbox is checked.

Note prior to Step3.35.2 is checked.

Step 3.35.2 Checkbox is checked.

Step 3.35.3 is NA.

Step 3.35.4 is initialed (Person Notified/Today's time and date filled in).

Step 3.35.5 is circled.

Step 3.35.6 is initialed (Person Notified/Today's time and date filled in). Step 3.35.7 Checkbox is checked.

Step 3.35.8 Checkbox is checked.

Step 3.35.9 All four bullets initiale

d. Step 3.35.10 Initialed, all three Checkboxes checked

. Step 3.35.10.1 Checkbox checked.

Step 3.35.10.2 Checkbox checked.

Step 3.35.11 Initialed. Step 3.35.12 Initialed Step 3.35.13 is initialed.

Step 3.35.13.1 Initialed, A&B Checkboxes checked, C initialed.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Step 3.35.13.2 Checkbox checked.

Note prior to Step 3.35.14 is checked.

Step 3.35.14 Initialed, all four Checkboxes checked (Person Notified/Today's time and date filled in).

Step 3.35.15 Initialed Step 3.35.15.1 Checkbox is checked.

Step 3.35.15.2 Both Checkboxes checked.

Step 3.35.15.3 Checkbox is checked.

Step 3.35.15.4 Initialed.

Note prior to Step 3.35.15.5 is checked.

Step 3.35.15.5 Initialed.

Step 3.35.15.6 Initialed.

Step 3.35.15.7 Initialed.

Step 3.35.15.8 Initialed.

Notes prior to Step 3.35.15.9 are checked.

Caution prior to Step 3.35.15.9 is checked.

Step 3.35.15.9 A Three Checkboxes are checked.

Step 3.35.15.9 B Initialed.

Step 3.35.15.9 C Initialed.

Note prior to Step 3.35.15.10 is checked.

Step 3.35.15.10 LP GOV CNTRL is fully open Checkbox is checked.

Step 3.35.15.11 Initialed.

Step 3.35.15.11 A Initialed.

Step 3.35.15.11 B NA'd.

Step 3.35.15.12 NA'd.

Step 3.35.16 Initiale

d. Caution prior to Step 3.35.17 is checked.

Step 3.35.15.17 NA'd.

Step 3.35.15.18 NA'd.

4. Provide the crew with OP/1/A/6150/009 (Boron Concentration Control) and OP/1/A/6300/1 A (Turbine-Generator Load Change

). 5. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

T-0 Begin Familiarization Period At direction of examiner Execute Lesson Plan for Simulator Scenario N15-1-3. At direction of examiner Event 1 Power Increase w/Alternate Dilute At direction of examiner Event 2 insert MAL-IRE009 = FAIL_OF_AUTO Control Rods fail to Move in Auto

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION At direction of examiner Event 3 insertREM

-NV0461 = 1.0 (Open Standpipe Drain Valve) delIA REM-NV0461 = 0.0 cd 'cd 'x10_152_5 =1 delay = 60 seconds (Closed Standpipe Drain Valve when MCB Annunciator 1AD

-7 B-2L is LIT) 1B NCP Standpipe Low Level Alarm At direction of examiner Event 4 insert MAL

-SM001D = 100, ramp=10 SG 1D PORV fails OPEN At direction of examiner Event 5 insertMAL

-NCP008B=12, Ramp = 10 minutes

1. 1 Seal Leak on 1 B NCP At direction of examiner Event 6 Insert MAL-LT002 = 6.0, Ramp = 120 Turbine Low Lube Oil Pressure/Turbine Trip Note: This malfunction takes 2

-3 minutes to develop At direction of examiner Event 7 Change Severity MAL-NCP008B=15 Ramp = 120 seconds insertMAL

-NCP016C = 16 Ramp = 120 seconds (1B NCP Hi Vibration) insertMAL

-NCP015C = 11 Ramp = 120 seconds (1B NCP Hi Vibration)

H_X10_171_3 EQ1 (NCP 1B Breaker Green Status light ON),

delIA MAL

-NCP016C and 015C #1 Seal Leak on 1 B NCP Degrades Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Rx Trip Event 8 Insert MAL-IRE010N9 MAL-IRE010N11 MAL-IRE010P10 MAL-IRE010P12 4 Control Rods fail to Fully Insert on Rx Trip These malfunctions are inserted at T=0.

Post-Immediate Boration Event 9 Insert MAL

-EP002 AND EP002B = TRIP Insert MAL

-DG001B = TRUE Loss of Switchyard to Unit 1/1B EDG fails to START Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 1 Page 11 of 63 Event

Description:

Power Increase w/Alternate Dilute Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100% starting with Step 3.35.19 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, "Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation." The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with Enclosure 4.

4, "Alternate Dilute," of OP/1/A/6150/009, "Boron Concentration Control," and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/1/A/6300/001 A, "Turbine

-Generator Load Change."

Booth Operator Instructions:

NA Indications Available:

NA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OP/1/A/6100/003, CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATIONS ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE CRS (Step 3.35) Increase power to 50% RTP.

NOTE: The power increase will be at 2 Mwe/minute.

RO/ BOP (Step 3.35.1

9) Prior to 50% RTP, perform the following concurrently:

Ensure proper secondary water chemistry for operation greater than 50% RTP. Evaluate air ejector off gas and nozzle operation per OP/1/B/6300/006 (Main Vacuum and Vacuum Priming System).

Record highest value:

1A Main Generator Breaker Air Compressor Pilot Valve Counter 1B Main Generator Breaker Air Compressor Pilot Valve Counter Date/Time of counter readings Notify Engineering to calculate Main Generator Breaker air leakage using counter readings from Step 3.33.19 and Step 3.35.19.3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 1 Page 12 of 63 Event

Description:

Power Increase w/Alternate Dilute Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Notify TCC (Transmission Control Center) (382

-9401 or 382

-9402) to check amperage output balanced on both busses to switchyard.

Maintain AFD within target band per OP/1/A/6100/022 (Unit 1 Data Book), Enclosure 4.3, Graph(s) 1.1.

IF Power Range detectors have been replaced-..

IF Initial Cycle Startup,-..

IF NOT Initial Cycle Startup, check QPTR less than or equal to 1.02.

Check "P-8 Hi Pwr Lo Flo Reactor Trip Blocked" dark. (1SI

-18). Booth Operator Instructions

After the first Alternate Dilute and the Turbine is being loaded, insert MAL

-IRE009 = FAIL_OF_AUTO OP/1/A/6150/009, BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ENCLOSURE 4.4, ALTERNATE DILUTE NOTE: The BOP may repeat this task as needed during the power increase.

BOP (Step 3.6) Determine amount of reactor makeup water needed to obtain desired boron concentration using McGuire Data Book, OAC, Reactor Group Guidance, or plant parameters (T

-Ave, Steam Pressure, Xenon worth, etc.). (R.M.)

Total Reactor Makeup Water:

NOTE: Total makeup is 200 gallons. BOP (Step 3.7) Ensure the following reset to zero: (R.M.) Total Make Up Flow Counter Boric Acid Flow Counter BOP (Step 3.8) Set Total Make Up Flow Counter to value determined in Step 3.6. (R.M.)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 1 Page 13 of 63 Event

Description:

Power Increase w/Alternate Dilute Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3.9) Select "ALTERNATE DILUTE" on "NC Sys M/U Controller".

BOP (Step 3.10) IF desired to makeup only through 1NV

-175A (U1 Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control), select "CLOSED" on 1NV-171A (U1 Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control). BOP (Step 3.11) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to adjust reactor makeup water flow, adjust "Rx M/U Water Flow Control" setpoint to achieve desired flowrate.

NOTE: It is NOT desired to adjust reactor makeup water flow. BOP (Step 3.12) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to manually adjust reactor makeup water flow, perform the following:

(Step 3.12.1) Place "Rx M/U Water Flow Control" in manual.

(Step 3.12.2) Adjust "Rx M/U Water Flow Control" output to control reactor makeup water flowrate.

BOP (Note prior to Step 3.13)

IF desired to dilute with a constant flow rate as advised by engineering to minimize VCT

+temperature decrease, it is preferred to allow 1NV

-137A (U1 NC Filter Otlt to VCT 3

-Way Diversion Cntrl) to auto divert on high level.

BOP (Step 3.13) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to lower VCT level, perform the following:

(Step 3.13.1) Monitor Letdown Pressure.

(Step 3.13.2) Select "HUT" on 1NV

-137A (U1 NC Filters Otlt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Contrl). NOTE: The BOP may do this at any time to lower VCT level

. (Step 3.13.3) IF Letdown Pressure increases greater than 20 psig, notify CRS.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 1 Page 14 of 63 Event

Description:

Power Increase w/Alternate Dilute Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 3.13.4) AFTER desired level achieved, select "AUTO" on 1NV

-137A (U1 NC Filters Otlt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl).

BOP (Step 3.14) IF AT ANY TIME plant parameters require termination of dilution, perform the following:

(Step 3.14.1) Place "NC System Make Up" to "STOP". (R.M.)

(Step 3.14.2) IF 1NV

-137A (U1 NC Filters Otlt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl) was placed to HUT, place to "AUTO".

BOP (Step 3.15) Momentarily select "START" on "NC System Make Up". (R.M.)

BOP (Step 3.16) Check "NC System Make Up" red light lit.

BOP (Step 3.17) Check 1NV

-175A (U1 Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control) open.

BOP (Step 3.18) Check 1NV

-252A (Rx M/U Water Supply To U1 BA Blender Cntrl) open or throttled as required.

BOP (Step 3.19) IF 1NV

-171A (U1 Boric Acid Blender To VCT Inlet Control) in "AUTO", check 1NV

-171A (U1 Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control) open.

NOTE: 1NV-171A is NOT in AUTO. BOP (Step 3.20) Check Rx M/U Water Pump starts. BOP (Step 3.21) Monitor Total Make Up Flow Counter. (R.M.)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 1 Page 15 of 63 Event

Description:

Power Increase w/Alternate Dilute Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3.22) HOLD until one of the following occurs: Amount of reactor makeup water recorded per Step 3.6 added OR Reactor makeup water addition manually terminated BOP (Step 3.23) Ensure dilution terminated as follows: (R.M.)

(Step 3.23.1) IF in "AUTO", ensure the following off:

1A Rx M/U Water Pump 1B Rx M/U Water Pump BOP (Step 3.23.2) Ensure the following closed:

1NV-175A (U1 Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control) 1NV-252A (RX M/U Water Supply To U1 BA Blender Cntrl) 1NV-171A (U1 Boric Acid Blender To VCT Inlet Control)

BOP (Step 3.24) Ensure 1NV

-171A (U1 Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control) in "AUTO".

BOP (Step 3.25) Ensure "Rx M/U Water Flow Control" in "AUTO". (R.M.)

BOP (Step 3.26) IF "Rx M.U Water Flow Control" adjusted per Step 3.11-NOTE: The Rx M.U Water Flow Control was NOT adjusted. BOP (Step 3.27) Ensure 1NV

-137A (U1 NC Filters Otlt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl) in "AUTO".

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 1 Page 16 of 63 Event

Description:

Power Increase w/Alternate Dilute Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3.28) IF desired to flush blender-.

NOTE: It is NOT desired to flush the blender

. BOP (Step 3.29) Select "AUTO" for "NC Sys M/U Controller".

BOP (Step 3.30) Momentarily select "START" on "NC System Make Up".

BOP (Step 3.31) Check "NC System Make Up" red light lit.

BOP (Step 3.3

2) Ensure the following reset to zero: (R.M.)

Total Make Up Flow Counter Boric Acid Flow Counter BOP (Step 3.33) Record in Auto Log that final blender content is Rx Makeup Water.

OP/1/A/6300/001A, TURBINE

-GENERATOR STARTUP/SHUTDOWN ENCLOSURE 4.1, TURBINE-GENERATOR LOAD CHANGE RO (Step 3.5) Changing Turbine Load (Step 3.5.1) IF Turbine in "OPERATOR AUTO", perform the following:

(Step 3.5.1.1) Ensure desired change within "Calculated Capability Curve".

(Step 3.5.1.2) IF turbine load will increase or decrease more than 10 MWs, notify Dispatcher of expected load change. (Step 3.5.1.3) Depress "LOAD RATE".

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 1 Page 17 of 63 Event

Description:

Power Increase w/Alternate Dilute Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 3.5.1.4) Enter desired load rate in "VARIABLE DISPLAY".

NOTE: the RO will select 2 Mwe/Min loading rate.

(Step 3.5.1.5) Depress "ENTER".

(Step 3.5.1.6) Depress "REFERENCE".

(Step 3.5.1.7) Enter desired load in "VARIABLE DISPLAY".

(Step 3.5.1.8) Depress "ENTER".

(Step 3.5.1.9) Depress "GO" (Step 3.5.1.10) Check load changes at selected rate.

WHEN the Auto Rod Control Failure is diagnosed, move to Event 2 OR, At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #

3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 2 Page 18 of 63 Event

Description:

Control Rods fail to Move in Auto During the power increase, the operator will discover that the Control Rods will not respond in AUTO. The crew will enter AP/1/A/5500/14, "Rod Control Malfunction," and control rods in MANUAL. Because the crew may control the power increase such that an auto rod demand does not occur, this event may not be diagnosed until later.

Booth Operator Instructions:

insert MAL-IRE009 = FAIL_OF_AUTO Indications Available:

White "RODS OUT" Rod Control Status light is LIT Outward Rod direction arrow on the rod motion demand signal indicator.

OAC Alarm M1P1367, U1 TAVG

-Tref HI 1.5°F Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The RO may go to HOLD on the Turbine.

AP/1/A/5500/14, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION RO (Step 1) IF two or more rods are either dropped OR misaligned by greater than 24 steps, THEN--

Immediate Action NOTE: No control rods dropped or mialigned during this event.

RO (Step 2) Place control rods in manual.

Immediate Action NOTE: The RO placed the rods in manual during the downpower when the malfunction occurred.

RO (Step 3) Check rod movement

- STOPPED. Immediate Action RO (Step 4) Check all rods

- ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK.

RO (Step 5) Check "ROD CONTROL URGENT FAILURE" alarm (1AD

-2, A-10) - DARK. RO (Step 6) Check "T

-AVG/T-REF FAILURE ROD STOP" alarm (1AD

-2, B-7) - DARK.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 2 Page 19 of 63 Event

Description:

Control Rods fail to Move in Auto Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 7) IF this AP entered due to unwarranted rod insertion or withdrawal, THEN-. NOTE: The CRS entered AP14 because the Rods were NOT moving when required.

CRS (Step 8) IF this AP entered due to a failure of rods to withdraw or insert when required, THEN GO TO Enclosure 2 (Failure Of Rods To Move On Demand).

NOTE: The CRS will transition to AP

-14, Enclosure

2. AP/1/A/5500/14, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION ENCLOSURE 2, FAILURE OF RODS TO MOVE ON DEMAND CRS (Step 1) Announce occurrence on paging system. NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 2) Maintain T

-Avg within 1

°F of T-Ref using any of the following methods:

NOTE: The RO will adjust Turbine Load to maintain Temperature and/or perform additional Alternate Dilutions

. Later, after IAE has permitted the use of Manual Rod Control, the Crew will use a combination of Rods, Alternate Dilute and Turbine adjustments to maintain Tavg

-Tref within the 1.5

°F band. Borate/dilute NC System OR Adjust Turbine load.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 2 Page 20 of 63 Event

Description:

Control Rods fail to Move in Auto Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 3) Notify IAE to investigate problem.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the Rod Control malfunction.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

RO (Step 4) Check if rod control system failure has occurred as follows:

'ROD CONTROL URGENT FAILURE" alarm (1AD

-2, A-10) - LIT. NOTE: The Urgent Failure light is DARK.

RO (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following:

If Manual Rod Control available, THEN rods can be used to maintain T

-avg within 1oF of T-Ref. Booth Instructor: as IAE, report that the use of Manual Rod Control ONLY is permitted.

IF AT ANY TIME control rods do not move correctly in manual, THEN GO TO Step 5. NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

CRS GO TO Step 8. CRS (Step 8) Check if reactor control system failure has occurred as follows:

"T-AVG/T-REF FAILURE ROD STOP" alarm (1AD

-2, B-7) - LIT. CRS (Step 8.a RNO) GO TO Step 9.

CRS (Step 9) WHEN rod control problem is repaired, OR Engineering determines that rod control malfunction will not affect auto rod motion, THEN

-- Examiner NOTE: IAE will NOT be able to fix the Auto Rod Control Malfunction

. The rods will remain in MANUAL throughout the remainder of the scenario

. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #

3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 3 Page 21 of 63 Event

Description:

1B NCP Standpipe Low Level Alarm Shortly after starting the power increase, AD-7/B-2, "NC Pump B No. 2 Seal S

-Pipe Lo Level," will alarm. The operator will address the Annunciator Response Procedure, and then use Enclosure 4.3, "Filling and Draining NC Pump Standpipe," of OP/1/A/6150/002A, "Reactor Coolant Pump Operation," to refill the standpipe.

Booth Operator Instructions:

insertREM

-NV0461 = 1.0 (Open Standpipe Drain Valve) (will take 3-4 min, to alarm) delIA REM-NV0461 = 0.0 cd 'x10_152_5 =1 delay = 60 seconds (Closed Standpipe Drain Valve when MCB Annunciator 1AD

-7 B-2L is LIT)

Indications Available:

OAC Alarm: 1B NC Pump Standpipe Level Low MCB Annunciator 1AD

-7/B-2L NC PUMP B NO.2 SEAL S

-PIPE LOW LEVEL Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OP/1/A/6100/010 H, ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE FOR PANEL 1AD

-7 B2, NC PUMP B NO. 2 SEAL S

-PIPE LO LVL BOP (Step 1) IF drain was inadvertently opened, ensure it is closed.

BOP (Step 2) Check the following NC pump parameters stable:

Lower bearing Temperature Number 1 seal outlet temperature Number 1 seal leakoff flow BOP (Step 3) IF any NC pump parameter listed in Step 2 abnormal,-

NOTE: All listed parameters are normal.

(Step 4) Make up to standpipe as necessary per OP/1/A/6150/002A (Reactor Coolant Pump Operation).

NOTE: The CRS will transition to the OP to refill the standpipe.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 3 Page 22 of 63 Event

Description:

1B NCP Standpipe Low Level Alarm Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OP/1/A/6150/002 A, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP OPERATION BOP (Step 3.1) Evaluate all outstanding R&Rs that may impact performance of the procedure.

BOP (Step 3.2) Perform the following sections, as applicable:

Section 3.3, Filling NC Pump Standpipes BOP (Step 3.3) Filling NC Pump Standpipes Check Reactor Makeup Water System aligned per OP/1/A/6200/012 (Reactor Makeup Water System).

Check 1NC

-56B (PRT Spray Cont Outside Isol) open.

Open Applicable valve(s):

1NV-55B (B NC Pump Standpipe Fill) IF required, start one of the following:

NOTE: It is likely that the BOP will need to start a Rx M/U Water Pump.

1A Rx M/U Water Pump OR 1B Rx M/U Water Pump WHEN applicable "NC Pump No. 2 Seal S-pipe Lo Lvl" alarm clears, perform the following:

IF pump started in Step 3.3.4, stop applicable pump:

1A Rx M/U Water Pump OR 1B Rx M/U Water Pump Close applicable valve.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 3 Page 23 of 63 Event

Description:

1B NCP Standpipe Low Level Alarm Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 1NV-55B (B NC Pump Standpipe Fill) NOTE: The CRS may call WCC to address the failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief

. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #

4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 4 Page 24 of 63 Event

Description:

SG 1D PORV fails OPEN After this, the 1D Steam Generator PORV will fail OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/01, "Steam Leak," and isolate the PORV. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4, "Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs)," and may enter LCO 3.4.1, "RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits."

Booth Operator Instructions:

insert MAL

-SM001D 100 delay=0 ramp=10 (S/G PORV 1SV1 SGD fails OPEN)

Indications Available:

1SV-1AB Red status light LIT 1SV-1AB Black needle indication at 100%

OAC Alarm: TM FREEZE

- MID3478-VLVSV1D SM PORV OPEN OAC Alarm: U1 SV

-PORV/SAFETY VLV OPEN

-T/D CA PMP ON OAC Alarm: 1SV

-1AB 1D SM PORV Core Ts rising Rx Power rising Steam flow on 1D steam line rising Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: It is likely that the operator will take actions to isolate the 1D SG PORV prior to being directed by the CRS.

(Step 13)

CONTROL ROOM CREW EXPECTATIONS MANUAL RO Transient load changes: Manual is preferred

- immediately reduce 20Mwe and then reduce as needed to maintain Rx power less than pre-transient condition. After the initial 20 Mwe load reduction, it is preferred that the operators use multiple and diverse indications to determine how much more load should be reduced.

NOTE: The crew may diagnose an overpower condition and adjust turbine load per the Crew Expectation Manual. AP/1/A/5500/01, STEAM LEAK CRS (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

NOTE: Manual Reactor Trip Criteria is NOT expected to be utilized.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 4 Page 25 of 63 Event

Description:

SG 1D PORV fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 2) Reduce turbine load to maintain the following:

Excore NI's

- LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%. NC Loop D/T's

- LESS THAN 60°F D/T T-Avg - AT T-REF. CRS (Step 3) Check containment entry

- IN PROGRESS.

NOTE: A Containment Entry is NOT in progress.

CRS (Step 3 RNO) GO TO Step 5.

BOP (Step 5) Check Pzr pressure prior to event

- GREATER THAN P

-11 (1955 PSIG).

BOP (Step 6) Check Pzr level - STABLE OR GOING UP.

BOP (Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure Pzr level cannot be maintained stable, THEN RETURN TO Step 6.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

CRS (Step 8) GO TO Step 12.

CRS (Step 12) Announce occurrence on paging system. NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement that AP-1 has been entered.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 13) Identify and isolate leak on Unit 1 as follows:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 4 Page 26 of 63 Event

Description:

SG 1D PORV fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 13a) Check SM PORVs

- CLOSED. NOTE: The 1D SG PORV is Open. RO (Step 13a RNO) IF S/G pressure is less than 1092 PSIG, THEN perform the following:

Close affected S/G SM PORV manual loader. NOTE: Closing the Manual Loader will have no effect

. IF SM PORV is still open, THEN perform the following:

NOTE: The 1D SG PORV Isolation Valve will need to be closed. Close SM PORV isolation valve.

IF SM PORV isolation valve still open-- NOTE: The PORV Isolation valve is closed. RO (Step 13.b) Check condenser dump valves - CLOSED. BOP (Step 13.c) Check containment conditions

- NORMAL: Containment temperature Containment pressure Containment humidity Containment floor and equipment sump level.

RO / BOP (Step 13.d) Check TD CA pump

- OFF. BOP (Step 13.e) Check valves on "STEAM LINE DRAIN VALVES" board (1MC

-9) - CLOSED. NOTE: One or more of these valves may be cycling. The RNO will direct closing the valves. CRS (Step 13.f) Check opposite Unit (Unit 2) "STEAM HEADER PRESSURE"

- GREATER THAN 200 PSIG.

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO for AS Header pressure.

If so, Floor Instructor report as U2 RO that U2 Steam Header pressure is 1000 psig.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 4 Page 27 of 63 Event

Description:

SG 1D PORV fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 13.g) Dispatch operator to check for leaks.

NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO to look for leaks

. If so, Floor Instructor:

acknowledge.

Booth Instructor:

Report back in 3

-5 minutes that there are no leaks.

NOTE: The CRS may NOT dispatch AOs to look for leaks because it is understood that the SM PORV opening was the reason that AP

-1 was entered. BOP (Step 14) Check UST level

- STABLE OR GOING UP.

CRS (Step 15) Evaluate unit shutdown as follows:

Check unit status

- IN MODE 1 OR 2.

Determine if unit shutdown or load reduction is warranted based on the following criteria:

NOTE: CRS may call WCC/Management to address the startup.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

Size of leak Location of leak Rate of depletion of secondary inventory IF steam is leaking from a secondary heater relief OR MSR relief valve-IF turbine trip will isolate steam leak (such as feedwater heater leak or MSR leak-Check unit shutdown or load reduction

- REQUIRED.

NOTE: Shutdown/Load Reduction will NOT be required.

CRS (Step 15.c RNO) Perform the following:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 4 Page 28 of 63 Event

Description:

SG 1D PORV fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Maintain present plant conditions until leak can be isolated or repaired.

Exit this procedure.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the Valve failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC, and using Time Compression report that 1SV1AB is stuck fully open (and cannot be moved even using the Manual handwheel).

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief

. NOTE: The CRS will address Tech Specs based on plant response.

Booth Operator Instructions

While the CRS is checking Tech Specs, insertMAL

-NCP008B=12 Ramp = 10 minutes (NOTE: The malfunction for Event 5 takes several minutes to develop)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.4, STEAM GENERATOR POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES (SG PORVs)

CRS LCO 3.4.7 Three SG PORV lines shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODE 4 when steam generator is relied upon for heat removal.

CRS ACTIONS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 4 Page 29 of 63 Event

Description:

SG 1D PORV fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: After evaluation, the CRS will determine that two PORVs are inoperable and Action A must be entered

. A. One required SG PORV line inoperable.

A.1 Restore required SG PORV line to OPERABLE status. 7 days TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1, RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, AND FLOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING (DNB) LIMITS CRS LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for pressurizer pressure, RCS average temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be within the limits specified in Table 3.4.1

-1. NOTE: If NC System Pressure drops to < 2216 psig on the failure, then TS 3.4.1 might be entered and exited during the transient.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Pressurizer pressure or RCS average temperature DNB parameters not within limits. A.1 Restore DNB parameter(s) to within limit.

2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> NOTE: The CRS may determine that ACTION A.1 must be entered.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #

5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 5 Page 30 of 63 Event

Description:

1. 1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Subsequently, a #1 seal leak will develop on the 1A NCP such that #1 Seal leakoff flow is 5.0-5.5 gpm. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/0 8, "Malfunction of NC Pump,

" and address Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.7, "Standby Shutdown System." The control operators will be directed on the action to take should the #1 Seal Leakoff flow degrade to >

6 gpm (which will occur subsequently).

Booth Operator Instructions:

insertMAL

-NCP008B=1 2 Ramp = 10 minutes (NOTE: This malfunction was mostly likely inserted during the completion of Event 4).

Indications Available:

1B NC Pump #1 Seal leakoff flow is rising on the OAC.

OAC Alarm: 1B NCP Seal Flow > SSF Limit.

MCB Annunciator 1AD

-7/E3, NCP PMP CNTRL LEKAGE HI FLOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP/1/A/5500/08, MALFUNCTION OF NC PUMP CASE I, NC PUMP SEAL OR PUMP LOWER BEARING MALFUNCTION BOP (Step 1) Check abnormal NC pump parameter

- KNOWN TO BE VALID.

NOTE: The operator may address Enclosure 1 per the RNO. BOP (Step 2) Check NC pump parameters within operating limits:

All NC pump lower radial bearing temperatures

- LESS THAN 225°F All NC pump number 1 seal outlet temperatures

- LESS THAN 235°F All NC pump number 1 seal D/Ps

- GREATER THAN 200 PSID.

BOP (Step 3) IF AT ANY TIME, any operating limit in Step 2 is exceeded, THEN GO TO Step

5. NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

CRS (Step 4) GO TO Step 6.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 5 Page 31 of 63 Event

Description:

1. 1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 6) Check if seal cooling available to affected pump:

Seal injection established (Normal or SSF Supply)

KC to Thermal Barrier established.

BOP (Step 7) Check any NC pump number 1 seal leakoff - GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 6 GPM. NOTE: It is likely that by the time the crew arrives at this step the leakoff flow will be rising, but will NOT have exceeded 6 GPM.

BOP (Step 7 RNO) Perform the following:

IF seal leakoff slowly going up, THEN contact station management for further guidance.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/SM to address the seal failure with station management.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/SM.

Continue to monitor NC pump seal leakoff flow.

CRS IF AT ANY TIME seal leakoff flow goes up to 6 GPM, THEN GO TO Step 8.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

CRS GO TO Step

9. BOP (Step 9) Check affected NC pump(s) seal return valve

- OPEN: 1NV-50B (B NC Pump Seal Return Isol)

BOP (Step 10) Check NC pressure

- GREATER THAN 2000 PSIG.

BOP (Step 11) Check any NC Pump number one seal leakoff

- LESS THAN 0.8 GPM.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 5 Page 32 of 63 Event

Description:

1. 1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 11 RNO) Perform the following:

IF seal leakoff slowly going down, THEN-. Continue to monitor NC Pump seal leakoff flow.

IF AT ANY TIME seal leakoff flow goes below 0.8 GPM, THEN RETURN TO Step 10. NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

CRS GO TO Step 17. BOP (Step 17)

Check for number two seal failure without a number one seal failure as follows:

Number one seal leakoff

- LESS THAN NORMAL OR GOING DOWN.

NOTE: #1 Seal Leak off Flow is higher than Normal.

CRS (Step 17 RNO) GO TO Step 18. CRS (Step 18)

Check for number three seal failure as follows:

High number three seal leakoff as indicated by frequent filling of seal standpipe with standpipe drains closed.

Assume number three seal failure.

Monitor NC Pump parameters.

Continue NC Pump operations.

Repair seal as soon as practical.

CRS (Step 19)

Announce occurrence on paging system. NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

BOP (Step 20)

Check NC Pumps

- ANY RUNNING. NOTE: All NCPs are running.

BOP (Step 21)

Check the following NC Pump temperatures

- STABLE OR GOING DOWN:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 5 Page 33 of 63 Event

Description:

1. 1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments All NC Pump lower radial bearing temperatures All NC Pump number one seal outlet temperatures.

CRS (Step 22)

Have another SRO evaluate if leakage exceeds SLC 16.9.7 Condition C limit and immediately notify security if SSF is inoperable.

NOTE: The CRS may ask the OSM to evaluate SLC 16.9.7.

If so, Floor Instructor, indicate that another SRO is NOT available.

SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENT 16.9.7, STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM CRS COMMITMENT The Standby Shutdown System (SSS) shall be operable.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

CRS REMEDIAL ACTIONS The SRO should ensure that security is notified 10 minutes prior to declaring the SSS inoperable. Immediately upon discovery of the SSS inoperability, Security must be notified to implement compensatory measures within 10 minutes of discovery.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 5 Page 34 of 63 Event

Description:

1. 1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME The CRS will identify that Actions C.1 and C.2 must be taken immediately; and that C.2 requires Actions A.1 and A.2. C. Total Unidentified LEAKAGE, Identified LEAKAGE, and reactor coolant pump seal leakoff > 20 gpm. OR Total reactor coolant pump seal leakoff > 16.3 gpm.

OR Any reactor coolant pump No. 1 seal leakoff > 4.0 gpm. C.1 Declare the Standby Makeup Pump inoperable.

AND C.2 Enter Condition A.

Immediately A. One or more required SSS components identified in Table 16.9.7

-1. A.1 Verify the FUNCTINALITY of fire detection and suppression systems in the associated areas identified in Table 16.9.7

-1 AND A.2 Restore the component to FUNCTIONAL status. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />

7 days At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, move to Event #6.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 6 Page 35 of 63 Event

Description:

Turbine Low Lube Oil Pressure/Turbine Trip Shortly afterwards, a low lube oil pressure condition will develop on the Main Turbine eventually causing the Main Turbine to trip. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/02, "Turbine Generator Trip." The RO will need to operate the control rods manually.

Booth Operator Instructions:

MAL-LT002 = 6.0, Ramp = 2 min (This Malfunction will take 3

-4 minutes to develop).

Indications Available:

MCB Annunciator 1AD8, C

-4, TURB ROOM UNIT 1 HI

-HI LEVEL MCB Annunciator 1AD-1/E-5, EMERGENCY OIL PUMP RUNNING MCB Annunciator 1AD

-1/A-9 LO TURB BRG OIL PRESS TURB TRIP Turbine Trip Valves closed Turbine Governor Valves closed Rx does NOT trip (Rx Trip Breakers closed)

Steam Dump Valves open Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: If an AO is dispatched to investigate:

Booth Operator: Wait 3 min, then report there is a large oil leak on the discharge of the Main Turbine Oil Tank Eductor. NOTE: The CRS will enter AP-02. AP/1/A/500/02, TURBINE GENERATOR TRIP RO (Step 1) Check Turbine Trip:

All throttle valves

- CLOSED. RO (Step 2) Check P/R meters

- LESS THAN 20%. NOTE: PR indication is > 20%. RO (Step 2 RNO) Perform the following:

Ensure control rods moving in to reduce T-Avg. NOTE: The rods must be moved in MANUAL.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 6 Page 36 of 63 Event

Description:

Turbine Low Lube Oil Pressure/Turbine Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Designate an operator to continuously monitor reactor power.

NOTE: The CRS will designate the RO.

WHEN reactor power is less than 20%, THEN perform the following:

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Place control rods in manual.

Perform Step 3 to stabilize reactor power. NOTE: The RO will stabilize reactor power at about 12

-15%. CRS GO TO Step 4.

RO (Step 4) IF AT ANY TIME reactor power goes below 5%, THEN perform the following:

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

RO Do not pull control rods.

Insert control rods as necessary to maintain negative SUR on I/R startup rate meters.

RO (Step 5) Check "C

-9 COND AVAILABLE FOR STEAM DUMP" status light (1SI

-18) - LIT. BOP (Step 6) Check any CF pump

- IN SERVICE.

NOTE: The 1A CF Pump is in service. RO (Step 7) Check both generator breakers

- OPEN. RO (Step 8) Check "EXCITATION"

- OFF. RO (Step 9) IF AT ANY TIME T

-Avg is less than 551°F AND going down, THEN perform the following:

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Trip reactor.

GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E

-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 6 Page 37 of 63 Event

Description:

Turbine Low Lube Oil Pressure/Turbine Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 10) Check all control rods

- ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK.

RO (Step 11) Check MSR "RESET" light

- LIT. CRS (Step 12) Announce the following: "Unit 1 Turbine trip, non

-essential personnel stay out of Unit 1 turbine bldg".

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 13) Check "UNBLOCK" light for "AMSAC ACTUATION BLOCK/UNBLOCK" switch (1MC

-2) - DARK. RO (Step 14) Check condenser dump valves

- MODULATING OPEN.

BOP (Step 15) Check Pzr pressure control response:

Ensure Pzr heaters are in auto.

Ensure Pzr spray control valves are in auto. Check Pzr PORVs

- CLOSED. Check Pzr spray control valves

- CLOSED. BOP (Step 16) Check Pzr level

-TRENDING TO PROGRAM. RO (Step 17) Ensure Bearing Lift pump in "AUTO". RO (Step 18) WHEN bearing oil pressure goes down to 11

-12 PSIG, THEN ensure AC Bearing Oil pump starts.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 6 Page 38 of 63 Event

Description:

Turbine Low Lube Oil Pressure/Turbine Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 19) Perform applicable steps of OP/1/A/6300/001 (Turbine Generator Startup/Shutdown), Enclosure 4.3 (Shutdown).

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event s #7-9.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 39 of 63 Event

Description:

1. 1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Degrades/4 Control Rods fail to Fully Insert on Rx Trip/Loss of Switchyard to Unit 1/1B EDG fails to START While the crew is in AP

-2, the 1B Hi Vibration alarm will occur and the #1 seal leak flow on the 1B NCP will rise to 6 gpm. The operator go back to Step 8 of AP

-8 (Continuous Action Step), and close the 1 B NCP Pzr Spray Valve, manually trip the reactor and stop the 1B NCP when reactor power is < 5%. The crew will perform Enclosure 2, "NC Pump Post Trip Actions For #1 Seal Failure," of AP8, while subsequently performing E-0. The operator will enter EP/1/A/5000/E

-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and verify reactor trip. On the reactor trip four control rods will fail to fully insert. The operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/ES

-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response," and emergency borate per AP/1/A/5500/38, "Emergency Boration And Response To Inadvertent Dilution."

Immediately following the initiation of Emergency Boration, a loss of the Unit 1 Switchyard will occur, and the 1B Emergency Diesel Generator will fail to start. The operator will immediately transition to EP/1/A/5000/ECA

-0.0, "Loss of All AC Power." The operator will restore power to 1ETA per Unit 2 6900V busses through SATA or SATB per Enclosure 9 "Energizing Unit 1 4160V Bus From Unit 2

- SATA or SATB." The scenario will terminate at Step 40 of ECA

-0.0, with the crew preparing to re

-load the energized ESF Bus.

Booth Operator Instructions:

insertMAL

-NCP008B = 1 5, Ramp = 120 seconds (1B NCP #1 Seal Failure) insertMAL

-NCP016C = 16 Ramp = 120 seconds (1B NCP Hi Vibration

) insertMAL

-NCP015C = 11 Ramp = 120 seconds (1B NCP Hi Vibration

) Indications Available:

MCB Annunciator 1AD6/E-11, NC PUMP HI VIBRATION 1B NC Pump #1 Seal leakoff flow is rising on the OAC to 6 gpm.

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS will go back and implement Step 8 of AP-8. AP/1/A/5500/08, MALFUNCTION OF NC PUMP CASE I, NC PUMP SEAL OR PUMP LOWER BEARING MALFUNCTION CRS (Step 8) Stop affected NC pump as follows:

IF A or B NC pump is the affected pump, Then CLOSE associated spray valve:

BOP 1NC-29C (B NC Loop PZR Spray Control).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 40 of 63 Event

Description:

1. 1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Degrades/4 Control Rods fail to Fully Insert on Rx Trip/Loss of Switchyard to Unit 1/1B EDG fails to START Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS Have any available RO perform Enclosure 2 (NC Post Trip Actions for #1 Seaal Failure as crew performs the following steps:

NOTE: The CRS may direct the Unit 2 BOP to perform this action.

If so, Floor Instructor

report that the U2 BOP (or any other RO) is NOT available.

Check unit status

- IN MODE 1 OR 2.

RO Trip reactor BOP WHEN reactor power less than 5%, THEN stop affected NC pump.

Critical Task

Trip the Reactor prior to stopping the NCP during a high vibration condition, and trip the NCP only after Reactor power level has dropped to less than 5%.

Safety Significance: The P-8 interlock allows one NCP to be stopped less than 48% power. If a NCP is stopped in Mode 1 or 2, Tech Spec 3.4.4 requires the unit to be in Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. In addition, T

-ave for the idle loop may violate Tech Spec 3.4.2, minimum temperature for criticality. In this case, the unit must be sub

-critical within 30 minutes. The transient placed on the unit when a NCP is secured at power can challenge both reactor protection and control systems. Furthermore, an added burd en is placed on the operator to stabilize the unit and shut down within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (possibly 30 minutes) to comply with Tech Specs. Even though the plant is designed and analyzed to operate in this configuration for a short time, station management has decided that the conservative approach to dealing with this transient is to trip the reactor anytime a NCP malfunction warrants stopping a pump in Mode 1 or 2. Guidance is given to wait until reactor power is less than 5% before stopping the NC pump. This will ensure the NC pump will provide adequate flow/core cooling until reactor power is sufficiently low enough to preclude a challenge to fuel integrity. If the action can be taken, and is not taken, this demonstrates "mis

-operation" or incorrect operation that could unnecessarily challenge a fission product barrier (NCS).

NOTE: The CRS will direct the BOP to perform Enclosure 2, and continue in AP-8 with the RO.

If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 2.

Other Examiners follow AP-8 Actions on Page 41.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 41 of 63 Event

Description:

1. 1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Degrades/4 Control Rods fail to Fully Insert on Rx Trip/Loss of Switchyard to Unit 1/1B EDG fails to START Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP/1/A/5500/08, MALFUNCTION OF NC PUMP ENCLOSURE 2, NC PUMP POST TRIP ACTIONS FOR #1 SEAL FAILURE Examiner NOTE: Follow the actions associated with Enclosure 2 if BOP is assigned by CRS to perform. BOP (Step 1) Record time of NC pump shutdown.

BOP (Step 2) Check if seal cooling available to affected pump:

Seal injection established (Normal or SSF Supply)

KC to Thermal Barrier established.

BOP (Step 3) Check if any NC Pump number 1 seal leakoff flow - GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 6 GPM.

BOP (Step 4) Maintain seal injection flow greater than 9 GPM to affected pump(s).

BOP (Step 5) WHEN affected NC pump has been off 3 minutes, THEN immediately perform the following:

CLOSE affected NC pump seal return valve: 1NV-50B (B NC Pump Seal Return Isol) NOTE: The BOP will close this valve approximately three minutes after stopping the 1B NC Pump.

OPEN all of the following valves:

OPEN 1KC-394A (A NC Pump Therm Bar Otlt)

OPEN 1KC-345A (C NC Pump Therm Bar Otlt)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 42 of 63 Event

Description:

1. 1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Degrades/4 Control Rods fail to Fully Insert on Rx Trip/Loss of Switchyard to Unit 1/1B EDG fails to START Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OPEN 1KC-364B (B NC Pump Therm Bar Otlt)

OPEN 1KC-413B (D NC Pump Therm Bar Otlt)

Critical Task

Close the #1 Seal Return Valve for the 1B NCP prior to failure of the #2 Seal as indicated by a rise and subsequent substantial lowering of #1 Seal Leakoff Flow.

Safety Significance: According to Enclosure 2 of AP

-8, the Seal Water Return Valve must be closed within 3

-5 minutes after stopping the NCP. If the valve is NOT closed, the NCS leak will continue until isolated, and could degrade the #2 and 3 Seals. According to the AP8 Background Document, closing the seal return valve within 3 to 5 minutes during a #1 seal failure event does not meet the criteria of "high PRA values" as determined by the Severe Accident Analysis Group. For McGuire, this corresponds to a Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) greater than or equal to 1.04. PIP M 1992 documents the events that meet these criteria. As such this action is not a McGuire 'time critical action', but is a management expectation and prudent action to prevent damage to the #2 and #3 seals.

If the action can be taken, and is not taken, this demonstrates "mi s-operation" or incorrect operation that could unnecessarily challenge a fission product barrier (NCS).

AP/1/A/5500/08, MALFUNCTION OF NC PUMP CASE I, NC PUMP SEAL OR PUMP LOWER BEARING MALFUNCTION Examiner NOTE:

Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE. CRS Continue with this AP as time allows.

CRS GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E

-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

EP/1/A/5000/E

-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 43 of 63 Event

Description:

1. 1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Degrades/4 Control Rods fail to Fully Insert on Rx Trip/Loss of Switchyard to Unit 1/1B EDG fails to START Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO/ BOP (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of E

-0, prior to the CRS addressing the EP. RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip:

Immediate Action All rod bottom lights

- LIT NOTE: There will be four rods that failed to fully insert on the Rx Trip

. Reactor trip and bypass breakers

- OPEN I/R amps

- GOING DOWN.

RO (Step 2 RNO) Perform the following:

Trip reactor.

IF reactor will not trip-NOTE: The reactor will trip manually. RO (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip:

Immediate Action All throttle valves - CLOSED. BOP (Step 4) Check 1ETA and 1ETB

- ENERGIZED.

Immediate Action RO/ BOP (Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated:

Immediate Action "SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED" status light (1SI

-18) - LIT. NOTE: SI will NOT be actuated. Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1SI

-14) - LIT. RO/ BOP (Step 5 RNO) Perform the following:

Immediate Action Check if S/I is required:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 44 of 63 Event

Description:

1. 1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Degrades/4 Control Rods fail to Fully Insert on Rx Trip/Loss of Switchyard to Unit 1/1B EDG fails to START Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Pzr pressure less than 1845 PSIG OR Containment pressure greater than 1 PSIG. IF S/I is required,-..

NOTE: SI will NOT be required. RO/ BOP IF S/I is not required, THEN perform the following:

Implement EP/1/A/5000/F

-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).

CRS GO TO EP/1/A/5000/ES

-0.1 (Reactor Trip Response).

NOTE: The CRS will transition to ES

-0.1. EP/1/A/5000/E S-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE RO/ BOP (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

S/I Actuation Criteria CA Suction Sources BOP (Step 2) Check the following:

VI pressure

- GREATER THAN 85 PSIG.

Any Unit 1 6900V bus

- ENERGIZED.

CRS (Step 3) Announce: "Unit 1 Reactor trip, non

-essential personnel stay out of Unit 1 turbine bldg". NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 4) Check any NC Pump ON. NOTE: The 1A, 1C and 1D NCPs will be ON.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 45 of 63 Event

Description:

1. 1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Degrades/4 Control Rods fail to Fully Insert on Rx Trip/Loss of Switchyard to Unit 1/1B EDG fails to START Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 5) Check NC temperatures as follows

IF any NC Pump on, THEN check NC TAvg STABLE OR TRENDING TO 557°F. RO (Step 6) Continue to monitor NC temperature as follows:

Check any NC Pump ON. NOTE: The 1A, 1C and 1D NCPs will be ON.

IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure either of the following occurs, THEN perform Step 5:

NC TAvg is less than 557°F and going down OR NC TAvg is greater than 557°F and going up.

CRS (Step 7) REFER TO the following:

NOTE: The CRS may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

RP/0/A/5700/000 (Classification of Emergency)

RP/0/A/5700/010 (NRC Immediate Notification Requirements).

RO (Step 8) Check Main Generator as follows:

Check both generator breakers OPEN. Check "EXCITATION" OFF. RO (Step 9) Check MSR "RESET" light LIT. RO (Step 10) Check NC TAvg GREATER THAN 553°F.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 46 of 63 Event

Description:

1. 1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Degrades/4 Control Rods fail to Fully Insert on Rx Trip/Loss of Switchyard to Unit 1/1B EDG fails to START Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 11)

Check feedwater status:

Check any CA Pump ON. Check total feed flow to S/Gs GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

CRS (Step 12)

WHEN time and manpower allow, THEN dispatch operator to perform Enclosure 5 (MSR Second Stage Drain Tank Isolation).

NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO to look for leaks. If so, Floor Instructor:

acknowledge.

RO (Step 13)

Check if shutdown margin adequate:

All control rods FULLY INSERTED.

NOTE: There will be four rods that failed to fully insert on the Rx Trip

. BOP (Step 13 RNO)

Perform the following:

IF all rod position indication is lost, OR greater than 5 rods not fully inserted, THEN-.. IF 2 to 5 rods not fully inserted, THEN emergency borate 2300 gallons of 7000 PPM boron solution for each rod not fully inserted PER AP/1/A/5500/38 (Emergency Boration And Response To Inadvertent Dilution).

NOTE: The BOP will borate 9200 gallons of Boric Acid per AP/1/A/5500/38, while the crew continues with ES

-0.1. NOTE: The CRS may assign the BOP to perform this action.

If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Enclosure AP38.

Other Examiners follow ES-0.1 Actions, Step 13.b, on Page 48. AP/1/A/5500/38, EMERGNCY BORATION AND RESPONSE TO INADVERTENT DILUTION

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 47 of 63 Event

Description:

1. 1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Degrades/4 Control Rods fail to Fully Insert on Rx Trip/Loss of Switchyard to Unit 1/1B EDG fails to START Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner NOTE: Follow the actions associated with AP38 if BOP is assigned by CRS to perform.

BOP (Step 1) Check if boron dilution

- SUSPECTED.

BOP (Step 1 RNO) Perform the following:

IF unit in Mode 1 or 2, THEN-.. GO TO Step 12. BOP (Step 12) Initiate emergency boration as follows: Check 1A or 1B NV pump

- AVAILABLE.

Check any NV pump

- ON. Check the following boric acid system components

- AVAILABLE.

Boric Acid Storage Tank BOP Boric Acid Transfer pump.

OPEN 1NV-265B (U1 NV Pump Boric Acid Sup Isol).

Ensure a boric acid transfer pump is running. Check boration flow using one of the following methods:

IF 1NV-265B is open, THEN check "EMERGENCY BORATION FLOW"

- ESTABLISHED.

OR IF 1NV-269 is open, THEN-.. BOP (Step 13) IF AT ANY TIME boration no longer required, THEN GO TO Step 20.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 48 of 63 Event

Description:

1. 1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Degrades/4 Control Rods fail to Fully Insert on Rx Trip/Loss of Switchyard to Unit 1/1B EDG fails to START Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 14) IF AT ANY TIME a higher boration flowrate is desired, THEN evaluate performing the following as required:

Start a second boric acid transfer pump.

Align NV pump suction to FWST as follows: OPEN the following valves:

1NV-221A (U1 NV Pump Suct From FWST Isol) 1NV-222B (U1 NV Pump Suct From FWST Isol).

CLOSE the following valves:

1NV-141A (U1 VCT Outlet Isol) 1NV-142B (U1 VCT Outlet Isol).

BOP (Step 15) Align Normal Charging flowpath as follows: Ensure one of the following NC loop isolation valves is OPEN:

1NV-13B (U1 NV Supply To 1A NC Loop Isol)

OR 1NV-16A (U1 NV Supply To 1D NC Loop Isol).

Check both of the following valves

- OPEN: 1NV-244A (U1 Charging Hdr Cont Outside Isol) 1NV-245B (U1 Charging Hdr Cont Outside Isol).

BOP (Step 16) Establish desired charging flowrate to the NC System as follows:

THROTTLE OPEN 1NV

-238 (U1 Charging Hdr Control) and 1NV

-241 (U1 Seal Water Inj Flow Control) to establish desired charging flow, not to exceed 200 GPM.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 49 of 63 Event

Description:

1. 1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Degrades/4 Control Rods fail to Fully Insert on Rx Trip/Loss of Switchyard to Unit 1/1B EDG fails to START Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments IF required to compensate for higher charging flowrate, THEN raise letdown to a maximum of 120 GPM.

BOP (Step 17) Check if boric acid flow to NC System is adequate:

Reactor power

- STABLE OR GOING DOWN NC temperature

- STABLE OR GOING DOWN Control Rods

- STABLE OR STEPPING OUT. BOP (Step 18) Check NV pump suction

- ALIGNED TO VCT.

BOP (Step 19) IF AT ANY TIME VCT level approaches water solid, THEN evaluate performing the following:

Raise charging flow.

Raise letdown flow as required to compensate for higher charging flow.

Ensure 1NV

-137A (U1 NC Filter Otlt To VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl) diverts to the RHT as required.

BOP (Step 20) WHEN emergency boration no longer required, THEN--

EP/1/A/5000/E S-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE Examiner NOTE:

Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE. RO (Step 13.b

-d) Stop any dilutions in progress.

Check all NC TColds GREATER THAN 538°F.

IF AT ANY TIME any NC TCold goes below 538°F, THEN perform Step 13.c.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make the RO aware.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 50 of 63 Event

Description:

1. 1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Degrades/4 Control Rods fail to Fully Insert on Rx Trip/Loss of Switchyard to Unit 1/1B EDG fails to START Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 14) Check Pzr level control:

Check VI pressure GREATER THAN 60 PSIG. Pzr level GREATER THAN 17%.

Check charging and letdown IN SERVICE. Check Pzr level trending to program "PZR LEVEL SETPOINT".

RO (Step 15) Check Pzr pressure GREATER THAN 1845 PSIG.

RO (Step 16) Check both 1A and 1B NC Pumps ON. RO (Step 17) Check Pzr pressure STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG.

RO (Step 18) Control S/G levels as follows:

Check N/R level in any S/G GREATER THAN 11%.

THROTTLE feed flow to maintain S/G N/R levels between 11% and 50%. Booth Operator Instructions:

Insert MAL

-EP002 AND EP002B

= TRIP Insert MAL

-DG001B = TRUE Indications Available:

Control Room lights dim.

1B EDG does NOT start as required.

NOTE: The CRS will transition to ECA

-0.0. EP/1/A/5000/ECA

-0.0, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 51 of 63 Event

Description:

1. 1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Degrades/4 Control Rods fail to Fully Insert on Rx Trip/Loss of Switchyard to Unit 1/1B EDG fails to START Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of ECA

-0.0, prior to the CRS addressing the EP

. CRS (Step 1) CSF Status trees should be monitored for information only. EPs referenced by them should not be implemented.

RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip:

IMMEDIATE ACTION All rod bottom lights

- LIT NOTE: DRPI is NOT available on the LOOP

. Reactor trip and bypass breakers

- OPEN I/R amps

- GOING DOWN.

RO (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip:

IMMEDIATE ACTION All throttle valves

- CLOSED. CRS (Step 4) Establish NC pump seal injection from the SSF as follows:

CRS Immediately dispatch operator to SSF to perform the following:

NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO to complete Enclosure

2. Booth Instructor acknowledge as appropriate, after ten minutes insert ECA-0.0 (Enclosure 2 SSF Actions)

and report that Enclosure 2 is complete

. Obtain Brown Folder at SSF and complete Enclosure 2 (Unit 1 SSF

- ECA-0.0 Actions).

CRS Dispatch operator to 1ETA room as follows:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 52 of 63 Event

Description:

1. 1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Degrades/4 Control Rods fail to Fully Insert on Rx Trip/Loss of Switchyard to Unit 1/1B EDG fails to START Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Check if operator will enter aux bldg

- FROM MG SET ROOM.

Give operator dosimeter from Unit 2 SRO desk.

CRS Dispatch operator to perform Enclosure 3 (Unit 1 ETA And ETB Rooms - ECA-0.0 Actions).

NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO to complete Enclosure

3. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as appropriate.

Booth Instructor:

wait 2 minutes, then insert ECA-0.0 ENCLOSURE 3, then report that Enclosure 3 is complete.

CRS Use any of the following to notify security to immediately dispatch officer with key to SSF to ensure operator can access SSF: NOTE: The CRS will dispatch a Security Officer to the SSF.

Booth Instructor:

Acknowledge as Security.

Security ringdown phone (located on Unit 2 SRO desk) 2688 4900. Floor Instructor:

If asked, U2 does NOT have normal power, and both DGs are running. RO/ BOP (Step 5) Monitor Foldout Page Alternate Low Pressure Feedwater (applies after Step 8 in body of the procedure)

Loss of Vital Instrumentation or Control Power Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 53 of 63 Event

Description:

1. 1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Degrades/4 Control Rods fail to Fully Insert on Rx Trip/Loss of Switchyard to Unit 1/1B EDG fails to START Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Low Decay Heat Temperature Control CA Suction Sources (applies after Step 11 in body of the procedure)

BOP (Step 6) Check NC System

- ISOLATED:

BOP Check the following letdown orifice isolation valves

- CLOSED. 1NV-458A (U1 75 GPM L/D Orifice Outlet Cont Isol).

1NV-457A (U1 45 GPM L/D Orifice Outlet Cont Isol).

1NV-35A (U1 Variable L/D Orifice Outlet Cont Isol).

BOP CLOSE the following valves:

1NV-1A (U1 NC L/D Isol To Regenerative Hx) 1NV-2A (U1 NC L/D Isol To Regenerative Hx).

BOP Check Pzr PORVs

- CLOSED. BOP Check the following excess letdown isolation valves

- CLOSED: 1NV-24B (1C NC Loop To Excess L/D Hx Isol) 1NV-25B (1C NC Loop To Excess L/D Hx Isol).

BOP Check 1NV

-121 (U1 ND Letdown Control)

- CLOSED. RO (Step 7) Check total CA flow

- GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

BOP (Step 8) Try to restore power to 1ETA or 1ETB as follows:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 54 of 63 Event

Description:

1. 1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Degrades/4 Control Rods fail to Fully Insert on Rx Trip/Loss of Switchyard to Unit 1/1B EDG fails to START Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Place both trains D/G mode select switches to control room.

Perform the following for any D/G(s) that are off: Depress, then release, "RESET" on sequencer.

Start D/G.

Check both D/Gs

- RUNNING. BOP (Step 8.c RNO) Perform the following:

Initiate S/I Notify Unit 2 to immediately ensure flow path for 2B RN pump PER Enclosure 5 (Unit 2 Actions).

NOTE: The CRS will notify U2. Floor Instructor:

Acknowledge as U2 RO.

CRS IF at least one D/G starts, THEN

- NOTE: The 1A D/G is OOS, and the 1B D/G will NOT start. CRS GO TO Step 9 CRS (Step 9) Ensure the following have been implemented:

NOTE: The CRS may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

RP/0/A/5700/000 (Classification of Emergency)

RP/0/A/5700/010 (NRC Immediate Notification Requirements).

RO/ BOP (Step 10)

Control intact S/G levels as follows:

Check N/R level in any intact S/G

- GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 55 of 63 Event

Description:

1. 1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Degrades/4 Control Rods fail to Fully Insert on Rx Trip/Loss of Switchyard to Unit 1/1B EDG fails to START Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments THROTTLE CA control valves to maintain all intact S/G N/R levels between 11% (32% ACC) and 50%.

IF AT ANY TIME CA flow control is lost, THEN perform RNO for Step 10.b NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

CRS (Step 11)

Monitor CA Storage Tank (water tower) level and ensure CA suction source as follows:

Check if external event that has the potential to damage CA Storage Tank (water tower) (such as seismic or tornado) HAS OCCURRED.

CRS (Step 11.a RNO) Observe Note prior to Step 11.c and GO TO Step 11.c.

BOP (Step 11.c

-e) Monitor CA Storage Tank (water tower) level using available Control Room indication.

IF AT ANY TIME CA Storage Tank (water tower) level indication is lost (invalid reading), THEN dispatch operator to locally monitor level PER EP/1/A/5000/G1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 31 (Local CA Storage Tank (Water Tower) Level Monitoring).

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Ensure CA Suction Sources is monitored on Foldout Page.

CRS (Step 12)

Have Unit 2 perform Enclosure 5 (Unit 2 Actions).

NOTE: The CRS will ask U2 to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 BOP.

RO (Step 13)

Check unit status IN MODE 3.

RO/ BOP (Step 14)

Stabilize S/G pressures using SM PORVs as follows:

NOTE: Only the 1B and 1C SG PORVs are available.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 56 of 63 Event

Description:

1. 1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Degrades/4 Control Rods fail to Fully Insert on Rx Trip/Loss of Switchyard to Unit 1/1B EDG fails to START Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Reset Main Steam Isolation.

Reset SM PORVs. Close all SM PORV manual loaders.

Place SM PORVs in manual.

Control S/G pressure between 1000 and 1100 PSIG using SM PORVs.

BOP (Step 15)

Ensure VC/YC cooling available as follows: Check VC/YC alignment using Unit 1 status board AT LEAST ONE OPERABLE VC/YC TRAIN ALIGNED TO AN ENERGIZED UNIT 2 4160V BUS.

Notify an available operator to initiate EP/1/A/5000/G1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 13 (VC and VA System Operation) within 30 minutes of loss of power. NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO.

Booth Instructor:

as AO, acknowledge CRS (Step 16)

IF event has occurred that could have caused damage to mechanical systems internal to plant (seismic, tornado, etc), THEN-. NOTE: No such event has occurred.

RO/ BOP (Step 17)

Check if S/I is actuated as follows:

NOTE: SI was actuated in an attempt to start the 1B D/G. "SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED" status light (1SI18) LIT. Reset S/I.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 57 of 63 Event

Description:

1. 1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Degrades/4 Control Rods fail to Fully Insert on Rx Trip/Loss of Switchyard to Unit 1/1B EDG fails to START Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 18)

Dispatch operator to open the following breakers to sequencer DC control power: NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as appropriate, after ten minutes insert MAL-EQB002A and EQB002B = FAILURE and report that the Sequence r DC Control Breakers have been opened. A Train 1EVDA Breaker 6 B Train 1EVDD Breaker 8.

CRS (Step 19)

IF AT ANY TIME operator dispatched to perform Enclosure 3 (Unit 1 ETA And ETB Rooms ECA0.0 Actions) determines that lockout exists, THEN perform the following:

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Have IAE clear or isolate fault from bus.

WHEN fault cleared or isolated from bus, THEN reset lockout.

CRS (Step 20)

Restore power to 1ETA or 1ETB using any of the following while continuing with this procedure:

Local reset and start of D/G PER Enclosure 12 (Energizing Unit 1 4160V Bus With D/G)

OR Unit 1 offsite power PER Enclosure 13 (Energizing Unit 1 4160V Bus From Unit 1) OR Unit 2 6900V busses through SATA or SATB PER Enclosure 14 (Energizing Unit 1 4160V Bus From Unit 2 SATA or SATB). NOTE: This is the only option for re

-powering either 1ETA or 1ETB.

The CRS will address 4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 58 of 63 Event

Description:

1. 1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Degrades/4 Control Rods fail to Fully Insert on Rx Trip/Loss of Switchyard to Unit 1/1B EDG fails to START Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments EP/1/A/5000/ECA

-0.0, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER ENCLOSURE 14, ENERGIZING UNIT 1 4160V BUS FROM UNIT 2

- SATA OR SATB CRS (Step 1) Perform one of the following:

IF 1ETA is to be energized from Unit 2, THEN observe Note prior to Step 22 and GO TO Step 22. OR IF 1ETB is to be energized from Unit 2, THEN observe Note prior to Step 2 and GO TO Step 2. BOP (Step 22)

Ensure SATA is not supplying Unit 2 2ETA. NOTE: The CRS/BOP will ask U2 to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 BOP, and report that Unit 2 SATA Feeder Breaker is not supplying Unit 2 2ETA.

BOP (Step 23)

Check the following 4160V breakers OPEN. 1ETA Normal Breaker 1ETA Standby Breaker 1ETA Emergency Breaker.

CRS (Step 24) Have Unit 2 RO check Unit 2 SATA Feeder Breaker CLOSED. NOTE: The CRS will ask U2 to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 BOP, and report that Unit 2 SATA Feeder Breaker is CLOSED

. CRS (Step 25)

GO TO Step 28.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 59 of 63 Event

Description:

1. 1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Degrades/4 Control Rods fail to Fully Insert on Rx Trip/Loss of Switchyard to Unit 1/1B EDG fails to START Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 28) Dispatch operator to 1ETA room to perform the following:

NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as appropriate, after ten minutes insert ECA

-0.0 (Enclosure

14) and report that 1ETA-1 has been racked out, and 1ETA

-2 has been racked in

. Obtain a copy of OP/0/A/6350/008 (Operation of Station Breakers), .2 (Operation of 4.16KV Essential Switchgear Breakers) to bring to 1ETA room.

Check 1ETA1 (Incoming Breaker Fed From Norm Transf. No. 1ATC) RACKED IN.

Rack out 1ETA1 PER OP obtained in Step 28.a.

Remove kirkkey from 1ETA1 as follows: Push plunger (located below kirkkey) toward back of cubicle and hold.

Rotate kirkkey to extend bolt.

Remove kirkkey. Release plunger.

Insert kirkkey (removed from 1ETA1) into 1ETA2 (Incoming Breaker Fed From Stby. Transf. No. SATA),

making sure number on key matches number on lock. Check kirkkeys in 1ETA2 TWO INSERTED.

Operate kirkkey device inside 1ETA2 as follows:

Push plunger (located below kirkkeys) toward back of cubicle and hold. Rotate both kirkkeys to retract bolt.

Release plunger and allow it to move outward.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 60 of 63 Event

Description:

1. 1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Degrades/4 Control Rods fail to Fully Insert on Rx Trip/Loss of Switchyard to Unit 1/1B EDG fails to START Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Pull plunger outward as necessary to ensure fully extended.

Rack in 1ETA2 breaker PER OP obtained in step 28.a.

CRS (Step 29)

Do not continue until the following is performed:

Ensure Steps 22 through 28 are completed.

Ensure operators are away from breakers.

CRS (Step 30)

Have Unit 2 RO check Unit 2 SATA Feeder Breaker CLOSED. NOTE: The CRS will ask U2 to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 BOP, and report that Unit 2 SATA Feeder Breaker is CLOSED

. BOP (Step 31)

Check if S/I is actuated as follows:

"SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED" status light (1SI18) LIT. NOTE: SI was previously reset. CRS (Step 31.a RNO) GO TO Step 32. CRS (Step 32)

Check "SEQ A LOSS OF CONTROL PWR" alarm (1AD11, B2) LIT. BOP (Step 33)

Open 1A CA pump breaker. RO/ BOP (Step 34)

Open the remaining pump breakers:

1A NV pump 1A ND pump 1A NI pump

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 61 of 63 Event

Description:

1. 1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Degrades/4 Control Rods fail to Fully Insert on Rx Trip/Loss of Switchyard to Unit 1/1B EDG fails to START Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 1A1 KC pump 1A2 KC pump 1A RN pump 1A KF pump 1A NS pump BOP (Step 35)

Open the following 600 V essential load center feeder breakers:

1ELXA 1ELXC 1ELXE BOP (Step 36)

Check 1A D/G Mode Select switch IN CONTROL ROOM POSITION.

BOP (Step 37)

Close 1ETA Standby Breaker.

BOP (Step 38)

Place 1A D/G Mode Select switch to "AUTO" position.

BOP (Step 39)

Check 1ETA bus ENERGIZED.

BOP (Step 40)

Notify Control Room Supervisor to GO TO Step 47 in body of this procedure.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 62 of 63 Event

Description:

1. 1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Degrades/4 Control Rods fail to Fully Insert on Rx Trip/Loss of Switchyard to Unit 1/1B EDG fails to START Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task

Energize at least one AC Emergency Bus From Unit 2

. Safety Significance: Failure to energize an AC Emergency Bus when able to do so constitutes "mis

-operation" or incorrect performance which leads to degraded emergency power capacity. Failure to perform the Critical Task may result in a needless challenge and/or degradation of a fission product barrier at the point of the remaining intact RCP Seals, and will result in the inability to add inventory through the ECCS during the existing and potentially subsequent small break LOCA(s)

. Since the conditions existed to re

-energize an ESF Bus from Unit 2 via the SATA or SATB, not taking this action constitutes incorrect performance that leads to degradation of the RCS and/or fuel cladding fission product barriers

. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

UNIT 1 STATUS: Power Level:

40% NCS [B] 1900 ppm Pzr [B]: 1900 ppm Xe: Per OAC Power History:

At this power level for 3 days Core Burnup:

25 EFPDs CONTROLLING PROCEDURE:

OP/1/A/6100/0 03 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME T HE SHIFT: The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

MCB Annunciator 1AD

-1, E-1, GENERATOR AUXILIARY PANEL TROUBLE, is in alarm due to a GENERATOR HYDROGEN PRESSURE

- LOW alarm at the local panel.

MCB Annunciator 1AD

-1, F-9, DEH/MSR SYSTEM MALFUNCTION, is in alarm due to low power and transient conditions.

The following equipment is Out

-Of-Service:

The 1A EDG is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 ACTION B.

The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance. 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating).

MCB Annunciator 1AD

-12, E-2, "A RN PUMP ABNORMAL FLOW," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

MCB Annunciator 1AD

-1, F-2, KG PANEL TROUBLE, is in alarm due to a failed local panel alarm relay. Crew Directions:

The off-going BOP is performing a 60 gallon Alternate Dilute every 10 minutes to maintain current plant conditions

. The crew will raise power to 100% after taking the shift, starting from Step 3.35.19 of Enclosure 4.1 of OP/1/A/6100/003

. Raise power at 2MWe/minute.

The RE recommends that the BOP perform a 200 gallon Alternate Dilute to initiate the power increase.

Work Control SRO/Offsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe (FB) NLO's AVAILABLE Unit 1 Unit 2 Aux Bldg. John Aux Bldg. Chris Turb Bldg. Bob (FB)

Turb Bldg. Mike (FB) 5th Rounds. Carol Extra(s)

Bill (FB) Ed (FB) Wayne (FB) Tanya Gus (RW)

PROGRAM: McGuire Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 31 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N15-1-4 REFERENCES

1. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4, "Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs)" (Amendment 221/203)

2. OP/1/A/6100/003, "Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation" (Rev 194) 3. AP/1/A/5500/21, "Loss of KC or KC System Leakage" (Rev 10)

4. Technical Specification 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System" (Amendment 184/166) 5. OP/1/A/6100/010 C, "Annunciator Response For Panel 1AD

-2" (Rev 64)

6. Technical Specification 3.1.7, "Rod Position Indication

" (Amendment 184/166) 7. OP/1/A/6100/010 Q, "Annunciator Response For Panel 1RAD

-1" (Rev 66) 8. AP/1/A/5500/1 0, "NC System Leakage Within The Capacity Of Both NV Pumps" (Rev 23) 9. OP/0/A/6450/011

, "Control Area Ventilation/Chilled Water System

" (Rev 98) 10. Technical Specification 3.4.13, "RCS Operational Leakage

" (Amendment 23 7/219) 11. Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.7, "Standby Shutdown System" (Rev 145)

12. AP/1/A/5500/14, "Rod Control Malfunction

" (Rev 16) 13. EP/1/A/5000/E

-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection" (Rev 34) 14. EP/1/A/5000/E S-1.1, "Safety Injection Termination

" (Rev 26) Validation Time:

136 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Essential Training & Consulting, LLC

Facility Review:

________________________

Rev. 030515 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Facility:

McGuire Scenario No.:

4 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Examiners:

Operators:

(SRO) (RO) (BOP) Initial Conditions:

The plant is at 4% power (

BOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Turnover:

The following equipment is Out

-Of-Service: The 1A CM Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance.

1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-1, F-9, "DEH/MSR SYSTEM MALFUNCTION," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating).

The crew will raise power to 12

-18% and stabilize reactor power, and making preparations to synch the Turbine to the Grid while maintenance is completed.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*

Event Description 1 NA R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Raise Power from 4% to 12-18% 2 MAL KC010B C-BOP C(TS)-SRO 1A2 KC Pump trip 3 MAL EDA350 I(TS)-SRO DRPI Failure 4 MAL EMF-34L LOA BB019 I-RO I-SRO 1EMF-34 fails HIGH/Failure of SG Blowdown Flow Control Valve to Auto CLOSE 5 MAL NV019B C-BOP C(TS)-SRO Letdown Line Leak Outside Containment 6 MAL IRE006B6 IRE006P10 C-RO C-SRO Sequentially Dropped Rods 7 MAL ISE001B M-RO M-BOP M-SRO Inadvertent Train B SI Actuation 8 MAL NI033 NA 1NI-10B fails to CLOSE

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 McGuire 2015 NRC Scenario #

4 The plant is at 4% power (

BOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The following equipment is Out

-Of-Service: The 1A CM Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance.

1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD

-1, F-9, "DEH/MSR SYSTEM MALFUNCTION," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating). The crew will raise power to 12

-18% and stabilize reactor power, and making preparations to synch the Turbine to the Grid while maintenance is completed.

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 12-18% starting with Step 3.25 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, "Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation."

Next, the 1A2 KC Pump will trip. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/21, "Loss of KC or KC System Leakage." The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6, "Component Cooling Water (CCW) System."

Just after this, the DRPI for Control Rod M

-12 will fail and indicate the rod on the bottom. The operator will respond in accordance with 1AD

-2/D-10, "RPI Urgent Failure," and address Technical Specification LCO 3.1.7, "Rod Position Indication."

Subsequently, 1EMF

-34, S/G Sample Radiation Monitor, will fail HIGH, however, one of the SG Blowdown Control Valves will NOT automatically close. The operator will respond in accordance with OP/1/A/6100/010 Q, "Annunciator Response for 1RAD

-1," C3, 1EMF 34 S/G SAMPLE HI RAD, and manually close the valve. The operator may enter Case I of AP/1/A/5500/10, "NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps."

The crew will determine that the alarm is due to a failure, and NOT an actual high radioactivity condition.

Shortly afterwards, a 50

-75 gpm leak will occur on the Letdown Line, in the Aux Building, upstream of the Letdown Heat Exchanger.

The operator will enter Case II of AP/1/A/5500/10, "NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps." The operator will place the Outside Air Pressure Filter Train in service per Enclosure 4.4 of OP/0/A/6450/011, "Control Area Ventilation/Chilled Water System." The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.13, "RCS Operational Leakage," and Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.7, "Standby Shutdown System."

Just after the leak isolation, one Control Bank D Control Rod will drop into the core. The operator will respond in accordance with ARP1AD

-2/D-9, "RPI at Bottom Rod Drop" and will implement AP/1/A/5500/14, "Rod Control Malfunction." Shortly after this, a second Control Rod will drop requiring that the operator manually trip the reactor.

Upon the reactor trip, the B Train of Safety Injection will inadvertently actuate. The operator will enter EP/1/A/5000/E

-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and verify reactor trip and Safety Injection actuation, actuating the A Train of SI in the process. The crew will reset SI and stop all ECCS Pumps except for one NV Pump within 15 minutes.

When the crew attempts to close 1NI

-10B, "Unit 1 NV Pumps To NC Cold Legs Cont Outside Isol," it will be discovered that the valve will not close. The operator will be required to dispatch an operator to locally close 1NI

-10B.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Ultimately, the crew will transition to step 9 of EP/1/A/5000/ES

-1.1, "Safety Injection Termination." The scenario will terminate in EP/1/A/5000/ES

-1.1 at Step 14.m RNO after the CRS determines to establish Excess Letdown.

Critical Tasks:

Trip the Reactor upon recognition of the second dropped rod

. Safety Significance: Multiple dropped control rods are a significant reactivity transient that can have a serious effect on plant parameters under certain operating conditions, and may result in power distribution limits being exceeded. The guidance to trip the reactor is a conservative actio n to prevent the plant form challenging the Pzr low pressure trip setpoint, etc.; and is consistent with the conservative nature of the industry. PT/0/A/4600/113, Enclosure 13.19 states that it is a management expectation that the operator trip the reactor within 30 seconds of a second dropped rod. Terminate SI by closing 1NI

-9A and dispatching an operator to locally close 1NI

-10B within 15 minutes of SI actuation

. Safety Significance: An inadvertent SI rapidly injects inventory into the NCS causing Pzr Level, and correspondingly, Pzr Pressure to increase. Prolonged recovery unnecessarily challenges the Pzr Code Safety valves. PT/0/A/4600/113, Enclosure 13.6 states that when at NOP/NOT conditions, the FSAR commitment is to have SI terminated within 15 minutes (The Safety Analysis CANNOT credit the cycling of the Pzr PORVs since auto PORV operation can only be assured during LTOP Operation). The Safety Analysis assumes that the Pzr Code Safeties will lift and reseat ONLY if they are cycled for a short time and Pzr liquid temperature remains > 500 oF. If this action is not taken, the conclusions of the Safety Analysis are invalid, and violates a License Condition.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Sim. Setup Rod Step On Reset to Temp IC 241 (Originally 13). T = 0 Malfunctions (From IC-13): insert LOA

-CM056 = Racked Out; insert LOA

-CM056A = Racked Out; (1A Hotwell Pump is OOS) Insert REM

-SV0027 = 0 (Close 1SV

-27 [1A S/G PORV Isolation]

) Insert LOA

-SV001= Racked_Out (SG PORV Breaker Racked Out)

H_X02_087_3 = 0 (1A PORV Controller LEFT lamp) H_X02_087_4 = 0 (1A PORV Controller RIGHT lamp) Insert LOA

-SV014=0 (SM PORV A LOCAL OPERATION

) insert XMT- KFTT5130 = 0 (Spent Fuel Pool Temperature Failure) insert OVR

-1AD1_F09 = ON (MCB Annunciator 1AD1/F9) From IC-241 Per Lesson Plan 2015 NRC Exam Scenario 4 insert MAL-ISE001B cd=X01_099_2

=1 (Train B SI triggered off of Reactor Trip Breaker OPEN light) insert LOA-NI033 = RACKED_OUT cd = X01_010G02_1

= 1 (1NI-10B fails to CLOSE triggered off SI Train B actuation) insert H_X11_092_4

=1 Delay 60 seconds RUN Reset all SLIMs Place Tagout/O-Stick on:

1A Hotwell Pump (Tagout) 1SV-27 (Tagout) 1KFP-5130 (O-Stick) MCB Annunciator 1AD

-1, F-9 (O-stick) Update Status Board, Setup OAC NOTE: RMWST DO = <1000 ppb.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Freeze. Update Fresh Tech. Spec. Log.

Fill out the AO's Available section of Shift Turnover Info.

Prior to Crew Briefing RUN Crew Briefing

1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements

2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3. Provide crew with Enclosure 4.8 of OP/1/A/6100/003 (Blank).

4. Provide crew with Enclosure 4.14 of OP/1/A/6100/003 (Blank). 5. Provide crew with Enclosure 4.5 of OP/1/A/6100/SU-19 (Blank).

6. Provide Enclosure 4.1 of OP/1/A/6100/003, marked up as follows:

Step 2.2 - Initialed.

Step 3.1

- Checkbox checked.

Step 3.2

- Initialed.

Step 3.3

-Initialed.

Step 3.3.1

- Checkbox checked.

Step 3.3.2

- Record 3.25.

Step 3.3.3

- Checkbox checked. Step 3.4

- NA/Initialed.

Step 3.5

- Initialed.

7. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

T-0 Begin Familiarization Period At direction of examiner Execute Lesson Plan for Simulator Scenario

N15-1-4.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION At direction of examiner Event 1 Raise Power from 4% to 12-18% At direction of examiner Event 2 Insert MAL-KC010B = TRUE 1A2 KC Pump trip At direction of examiner Event 3 insert MAL-EDA350 = 1 DRPI Failure At direction of examiner Event 4 insert MAL-EMF-34L = 107 insert LOA

-BB019 = TRUE insert: REM-BB0123=0 delay = 2 seconds REM-BB0124=0 delay = 2 seconds REM-BB0125=0 delay = 2 seconds 1EMF-34 fails HIGH/Failure of SG Blowdown Flow Control Valve to Auto CLOSE At direction of examiner Event 5 insert MAL

-NV019B =

50 Letdown Line Leak Outside Containment

At direction of examiner Event 6 insertMAL

-IRE006B6 STATIONARY_GRPPR insertMAL

-IRE006P10 STATIONARY_GRPPR, delay = 45 seconds Sequentially Dropped Rods On Rx Trip Event 7 insert MAL-ISE001B Inadvertent Train B SI Actuation This malfunction is inserted at T=0.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Post-SI Actuation Event 8 insert MAL-NI033 1NI-10B fails to CLOSE This malfunction is inserted at T=0

. Note: To subsequently close this locally, insert CLOSE 1NI

-10B LOCALLY (See Page 55)

Insert REM

-NI0010B = 0 Ramp =30 seconds Insert LOA

-NI033 = RACKED_IN delay = 2 seconds delIA H_X11_092_4 = 2 seconds Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 1 Page 9 of 61 Event

Description:

Raise Power from 4% to 12-18% Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 12-18% starting with Step 3.25 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, "Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation."

Booth Operator Instructions:

NA Indications Available:

NA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OP/1/A/6100/003, CONTROLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATION ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE BOP (Step 3.2

5) WHEN at 4%, perform the following:

(Step 3.2 5.1) HOLD at 4% RTP (3.5

-4.0%) for a minimum of 10 minutes.

Examiner NOTE: The plant has been at 4% power for 30 minutes. If the crew wants to conduct a 10

- minute HOLD, use Time Compression and tell the CRS that when he is comfortable with plant conditions, he may move on in the procedure.

(Step 3.2 5.2) Using "Plant Mode Change & Alarm Look Ahead", change the OAC to "Mode 1."

(Step 3.2 5.3) On the DCS Workstation, change the DCS Modal Alarming to Mode 1 as follows:

(Step 3.2 5.3.1) Access DCS "PLANT MODE SELECTION" Screen (6012).

(Step 3.2 5.3.2) Select "MODE 1."

(Step 3.2 5.3.3) Select "ACCEPT MODE." (Step 3.2 5.3.4) Check "MODE 1 is displayed in "CURRENT PLANT MODE."

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 1 Page 10 of 61 Event

Description:

Raise Power from 4% to 12-18% Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 3.2

6) Increase reactor power to 6% RTP (6.0-6.5%). RO (Step 3.27) HOLD at 6% RTP (6.0

- 6.5%) for a minimum of 10 minutes.

Examiner NOTE: Use Time Compression and tell the CRS that when he is comfortable with plant conditions, he may move on in the procedure.

BOP (Step 3.28) WHEN any S/G CF Control Bypass Valve demand (output) indicates between 50

- 60% open, place the associated S/G CF Cntrl Valve in service as follows: NOTE: It is expected to reach these conditions before moving on to event 2.

BOP Ensure the following S/G CF Control Bypass valves in auto:

1CF-104AB (1A S/G CF Control Bypass) 1CF-105AB (1B S/G CF Control Bypass) 1CF-106AB (1C S/G CF Control Bypass) 1CF-107AB (1D S/G CF Control Bypass) BOP IF AT ANY TIME all of the following conditions exist, isolate the associated S/G CF Control Valve being placed in service and notify CRS:

S/G CF Control Bypass Valve in auto S/G CF Control Bypass Valve demand at 0%

S/G CF Control Valve demand at 0%

S/G level increasing BOP WHEN A S/G CF Control Bypass Valve demand at 50

-60 %, perform the following:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 1 Page 11 of 61 Event

Description:

Raise Power from 4% to 12-18% Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Refer to OP/1/A/6100/SU

-19 (Heatup to 557°F), Enclosure 4.5 (Determining S/G CF Control Valve Leak-by While in Mode 3), Table 4.5

-1(S/G CF Control Bypass Valve Demand Difference) for information regarding potential S/G CF Control Valve Leak

-by. Ensure 1CF

-32AB (1A S/G CF Control) in manual and closed.

Check 1CF

-33 (A S/G CF Cntrl Outlet Isol) open.

Open 1CF-31 (A S/G CF Cntrl Inlet Isol). Check 1A S/G level stable.

Place 1CF

-32AB (1A S/G CF Control) in auto.

BOP WHEN B S/G CF Control Bypass Valve demand at 50

-60 %, perform the following:

Refer to OP/1/A/6100/SU

-19 (Heatup to 557°F), Enclosure 4.5 (Determining S/G CF Control Valve Leak-by While in Mode 3), Table 4.5

-1(S/G CF Control Bypass Valve Demand Difference) for information regarding potential S/G CF Control Valve Leak

-by. Ensure 1CF

-23AB (1B S/G CF Control) in manual and closed.

Check 1CF

-24 (B S/G CF Cntrl Outlet Isol) open.

Open 1CF-22 (B S/G CF Cntrl Inlet Isol). Check 1B S/G level stable.

Place 1CF

-23AB (1B S/G CF Control) in auto.

BOP WHEN C S/G CF Control Bypass Valve demand at 50

-60 %, perform the following:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 1 Page 12 of 61 Event

Description:

Raise Power from 4% to 12-18% Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Refer to OP/1/A/6100/SU

-19 (Heatup to 557°F), Enclosure 4.5 (Determining S/G CF Control Valve Leak-by While in Mode 3), Table 4.5

-1(S/G CF Control Bypass Valve Demand Difference) for information regarding potential S/G CF Control Valve Leak

-by. Ensure 1CF

-20AB (1C S/G CF Control) in manual and closed.

Check 1CF

-21 (C S/G CF Cntrl Outlet Isol) open.

Open 1CF-19 (C S/G CF Cntrl Inlet Isol). Check 1C S/G level stable.

Place 1CF

-20AB (1C S/G CF Control) in auto.

BOP WHEN D S/G CF Control Bypass Valve demand at 50

-60 %, perform the following:

Refer to OP/1/A/6100/SU

-19 (Heatup to 557°F), Enclosure 4.5 (Determining S/G CF Control Valve Leak-by While in Mode 3), Table 4.5

-1(S/G CF Control Bypass Valve Demand Difference) for information regarding potential S/G CF Control Valve Leak

-by. Ensure 1CF

-17AB (1D S/G CF Control) in manual and closed.

Check 1CF

-16 (D S/G CF Cntrl Inlet Isol) open.

Open 1CF-18 (D S/G CF Cntrl Outlet Isol). Check 1D S/G level stable.

Place 1CF

-17AB (1D S/G CF Control) in auto.

RO (Step 3.29) Increase Rx Power to 8% RTP (8.0 - 8.5%).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 1 Page 13 of 61 Event

Description:

Raise Power from 4% to 12-18% Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 3.30) WHEN at 8% RTP (8.0

- 8.5%), perform the following:

HOLD at 8% RTP (8.0

- 8.5%) for a minimum of 10 minutes.

Examiner NOTE: Use Time Compression and tell the CRS that when he is comfortable with plant conditions, he may move on in the procedure.

Notify Secondary Chemistry to verify secondary water chemistry acceptable for operation to 15% RTP.

IF required for S/G cleanup,-..

CRS (Step 3.31) Resume cycling of 1HM

-45 (Unit 1 HM System Piping Drain Control to Condenser) as follows: Cycle 1HM

-45 (Unit 1 HM System Piping Drain Control to Condenser) per OP/1/A/6250/006 (Main Steam System), Enclosure 4.7 (Manual Operation of 1HM-45 (Unit 1 HM System Piping Drain Control to Condenser)).

WHEN all of the following are greater than 100 psig, secure cycling of 1HM-45 (Unit 1 HM System Piping Drain Control to Condenser):

M1A1388 (1A2 MSR 2nd Stage Press) M1A1400 (1B2 MSR 2nd Stage Press) M1A1412 (1C2 MSR 2nd Stage Press) RO (Step 3.32) Increase Reactor Power to 10

- 12% RTP as follows:

Begin power increase to 10

- 12% RTP. WHEN Reactor Power reaches 10% RTP, perform the following:

Check on 1SI

-18:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 1 Page 14 of 61 Event

Description:

Raise Power from 4% to 12-18% Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments "P-10 Nuclear at Power" lit "P-7 Lo Power Reactor Trips Blocked" dark Block the IR high level trip and rod stop by depressing both "Intermediate Range Block" pushbuttons.

Check lit on 1SI

-18: I/R Train A Trip Blocked I/R Train B Trip Blocked Block PR low setpoint trip by depressing both "Power Range Block" pushbuttons.

Check lit on 1SI

-18: P/R Lo Setpoint Train A Trip Blocked P/R Lo Setpoint Train B Trip Blocked At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 2 Page 15 of 61 Event

Description:

1A2 KC Pump trip Next, the 1A2 KC Pump will trip. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/21, "Loss of KC or KC System Leakage." The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6, "Component Cooling Water (CCW) System."

Booth Operator Instructions:

insert MAL

-KC010B Indications Available:

1A2 KC Pump Green Status light LIT 1A2 KC Pump amps go to 0 MCB Annunciator 1AD

-6, B1 through B4, A (B, C, and D) NC PUMP UPPER MTR BRG LO KC FLO, alarms MCB Annunciator 1RAD1 1EMF 46A, LOSS OF TRN A KC SAMPLE FLO (Delayed)

MCB Annunciator 1RAD1 1EMF 46B, LOSS OF TRN B KC SAMPLE FLO (Delayed)

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO to check out the 1A2 KC Pump.

If so, Booth Instructor, wait 3 minutes, and then report that the 1A2 KC Pump Breaker shows a 51/50 Relay has operated, and the pump is NOT running

. NOTE: The CRS will transition to AP-21. AP/1/A/5500/21, LOSS OF KC OR KC SYSTEM LEAKAGE BOP (Step 1) Check any KC pump

- ON. NOTE: The 1A1 KC Pump is ON, and running properly.

RO/ BOP (Step 2) Monitor Foldout page.

KC header isolation criteria (KC Surge Tank level goes below 2 ft due to KC System leak

- Not expected

) NC Pump trip criteria (NC Pump motor bearing temperature reaches 195°F

- Not expected)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 2 Page 16 of 61 Event

Description:

1A2 KC Pump trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments ND Pump trip and flow isolation criteria (Applies if ND aligned for RHR) (ND Pumps OFF - Not expected)

KC Pump trip criteria (KC Surge Tank level goes below 0.5 ft and valid

- Not expected

) VCT high temperature (

IF "VCT HI TEMP" alarm (1AD

-7, D-1) is received

- Not expected) BOP (Step 3) Secure any dilution in progress.

BOP (Step 4) Check ND

- IN RHR MODE.

NOTE: ND is NOT in the RHR Mode. CRS (Step 4 RNO) GO TO Step 7.

CRS (Step 7) Announce occurrence on paging system. NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement that AP

-21 has been entered.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

BOP (Step 8) Check both train's KC Surge Tank level - STABLE OR GOING UP.

BOP (Step 9) Start standby KC train as follows: Check standby KC train

- AVAILABLE TO START.

Check standby KC Surge Tank Level

- GREATER THAN 2 FT.

Start standby KC train PER one of the following enclosures:

To start 1B Train, GO TO Enclosure 5 (Startup of 1B KC Train).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 2 Page 17 of 61 Event

Description:

1A2 KC Pump trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP/1/A/5500/21, LOSS OF KC OR KC SYSTEM LEAKAGE ENCLOSURE 5, STARTUP OF 1B KC TRAIN BOP (Step 1) Check 1KC

-81B (1B ND Hx KC Inlet Isol) - CLOSED. BOP (Step 2) Check 1KC

-56A (1A ND Hx KC Inlet Isol) - CLOSED. BOP (Step 3) Check 1A Train KC pumps

- OFF. NOTE: The 1A1 KC Pump is ON, and running properly.

CRS (Step 3 RNO) GO TO Step 5.

BOP (Step 5) Check 1B Train KC pumps

- OFF. BOP (Step 6) IF voiding of 1B KC Train is suspected-.

NOTE: Voiding is NOT suspected.

BOP (Step 7) Close the following:

1KC-53B (Trn B Aux Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol). 1KC-2B (Trn B Aux Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol). 1KC-228B (Trn B Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol). 1KC-18B (Trn B Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol). BOP (Step 8) Start 1 B RN pump.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 2 Page 18 of 61 Event

Description:

1A2 KC Pump trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 9) Ensure 1RN

-187B (B KC Hx Inlet Isol) OPENS. BOP (Step 10) Place control switch for 1KC

-54B (Train B Recirc Isol) in the "AUTO" position

. BOP (Step 11) Ensure 1KC

-54B (Train B Recirc Isol) OPENS. BOP (Step 12) Start 1 B1 KC pump.

BOP (Step 13) Check 1KC

-12 (1B1 KC Pump Disch Isol)

- LOCALLY THROTTLED IN STEP 6. NOTE: 1KC-12 was NOT locally throttled in Step 6.

BOP (Step 13 RNO) Perform the following:

NOTE: The CRS/BOP may dispatch an AO to check out the B Train KC Pumps.

If so, Booth Instructor, as AO report that both pumps are operating normally

. Start 1B2 KC pump.

CRS GO TO Step 17.

BOP (Step 17) Check ND pumps

- ANY ON PRIOR TO ENTERING THIS PROCEDURE.

NOTE: BOTH ND Pumps are and have been OFF.

CRS (Step 17 RNO) GO TO Step 20.

BOP (Step 20) Check KC leak

- HAS OCCURRED.

NOTE: A KC System Leak has NOT occurred.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 2 Page 19 of 61 Event

Description:

1A2 KC Pump trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 20 RNO) Perform the following:

Limit KC pump flow to 4000 GPM per operating KC pump in next step.

OPEN the following valves:

1KC-18B (Trn B Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

1KC-228B (Trn B Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).

CLOSE the following valves:

1KC-230A (Trn A Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol). 1KC-3A (Trn A Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol). Open the following valves:

1KC-2B (Trn B Aux Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

1KC-53B (Trn B Aux Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).

CRS GO TO Step 25.

BOP (Step 25) Check 1 A ND pump - OFF. BOP (Step 26) Check 1KC

-56A (1A ND Hx KC Inlet Isol

) - CLOSED. BOP (Step 27) Place control switch for 1KC

-51A (Train A Recirc Isol) in the "CLOSE" position.

BOP (Step 28) Ensure 1KC

-51A (Train A Recirc Isol) closes.

BOP (Step 29) Stop 1 A1 and 1A2 Pumps. NOTE: The BOP will stop the 1A1 KC Pump.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 2 Page 20 of 61 Event

Description:

1A2 KC Pump trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 30) Check KC flow

- LESS THAN 4000 GPM PER OPERATING KC PUMP.

BOP (Step 31) Check ND pumps

- ANY ON PRIOR TO ENTERING THIS PROCEDURE.

NOTE: BOTH ND Pumps are and have been OFF. CRS (Step 31 RNO) GO TO Step 37.

BOP (Step 37) Check KC System leak

- HAS OCCURRED.

NOTE: A KC System Leak has NOT occurred.

CRS (Step 37 RNO) GO TO Step 41 in body of this procedure.

AP/1/A/5500/21, LOSS OF KC OR KC SYSTEM LEAKAGE BOP (Step 41) Check any letdown path

- IN SERVICE. NOTE: Normal Letdown is in service. BOP (Step 42) Check NC pump thermal barrier valves - OPEN: 1KC-394A (A NC Pump Therm Bar Otlt) 1KC-345A (C NC Pump Therm Bar Otlt) 1KC-364B (B NC Pump Therm Bar Otlt) 1KC-413B (D NC Pump Therm Bar Otlt).

BOP (Step 43) Check KC to Aux Bldg Non

-essential header

- ESTABLISHED.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 2 Page 21 of 61 Event

Description:

1A2 KC Pump trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 44) Check NM valves (on 1MC

-8) - PREVIOUSLY CLOSED BY THIS PROCEDURE.

NOTE: NM Valves have NOT been previously Closed by this procedure.

CRS (Step 44 RNO) GO TO Step 46.

CRS (Step 46) Check KC Surge Tank makeup

- HAS BEEN INITIATED.

NOTE: KC System makeup has NOT occurred.

(Step 46 RNO) GO TO Step 48.

NOTE: There is NO NEED for KC System Feed and Bleed.

BOP (Step 48) Check both trains RN suction

- ALIGNED TO LLI.

CRS (Step 49) RETURN TO procedure and step in effect.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the Pump malfunction, and request that the 1A2 KC Pump Breaker be racked out.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC, and indicate that the 1A2 KC Pump Breaker will be Racked Out.

Use: LOA-KC026A = Racked_Out (1A2 KC Pump BKR)

LOA- KC026B = Racked_Out (1A2 KC Pump Cntrl Pwr)

NOTE: The CRS will likely address Technical Specifications

. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.6, COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 2 Page 22 of 61 Event

Description:

1A2 KC Pump trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS LCO 3.7.6 Two CCW trains shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION A.1 must be entered.

A. One CCW train inoperable.

A.1 Restore CCW train to OPERABLE status. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 3 Page 23 of 61 Event

Description:

DRPI Failure Just after this, the DRPI for Control Rod M

-12 will fail and indicate the rod on the bottom. The operator will respond in accordance with 1AD

-2/D-10, "RPI Urgent Failure," and address Technical Specification LCO 3.1.7, "Rod Position Indication."

Booth Operator Instructions:

Insert MAL

-EDA350 =

1 Indications Available:

1AD-2/D-9, "RPI at Bottom Rod Drop."

1AD-2/E-10, "RPI Non-Urgent Failure."

M-12 Red Bar on DRPI, with DRPI Screen flashing.

No accompanying NCS Temperature Change.

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS may go to AP-14. If so, this procedure will indicate that it will not handle RPI problems.

OP/1/A/6100/010C, ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE FOR PANEL 1AD

-2 D10, RPI URGENT FAILURE RO (IA Step 1)

Check to see which rod(s) is affected.

NOTE: Rod M-12 is affected.

CRS (IA Step 2) IF Unit is in Mode 2 (pulling rods toward criticality), 3, 4, or 5-NOTE: Unit is in Mode 1, CRS recognizes NOT applicable.

CRS (IA Step 3) IF actual rod misalignment exists or rod control system malfunctions, go to AP/1/A/5500/014 (Rod Control Malfunction).

NOTE: Actual Rod Misalignment does NOT exist.

Examiner NOTE:

If the crew misdiagnoses and goes to AP14, allow crew time to determine that they do NOT have a Dropped Rod.

If crew goes to AP14, when RE asked to conduct Flux Map, Booth Instructor:

report as RE, a Rod has NOT dropped. CRS (IA Step 4) IF in Mode 1

-2:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 3 Page 24 of 61 Event

Description:

DRPI Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments IF failure on only one Data train (either Data A or Data B)-

NOTE: The failure has affected BOTH Trains.

NOTE: CRS will refer to TS 3.1.7. NOTE: CRS may call WCC/SE to address.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/SE as appropriate.

CRS (IA Step 5) IF both channels of DRPI and OAC Rods indication lost, refer to TS 3.1.7.

NOTE: CRS will refer to TS 3.1.7. NOTE: CRS may call WCC/IAE to address.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/IAE as appropriate.

NOTE: CRS may call WCC/RE to address.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/RE as appropriate.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.1.7, ROD POSITION INDICATION CRS 3.1.7 Rod Position Indication CRS LCO 3.1.7 The Digital Rod Position Indication (DRPI) System and the Demand Position Indication System shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLCIABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

CRS ACTIONS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 3 Page 25 of 61 Event

Description:

DRPI Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION A must be entered.

A. One DRPI per group inoperable for one or more groups. A.1 Verify the position of the rods with in-operable position indicators by using movable incore detectors.

OR A.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER to 50% RTP. Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #

4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 4 Page 26 of 61 Event

Description:

1EMF-34 fails HIGH/Failure of SG Blowdown Flow Control Valve to Auto CLOSE Subsequently, 1EMF

-34, S/G Sample Radiation Monitor, will fail HIGH, however, one of the SG Blowdown Control Valves will NOT automatically close. The operator will respond in accordance with OP/1/A/6100/010 Q, "Annunciator Response for 1RAD

-1," C3, 1EMF 34 S/G SAMPLE HI RAD, and manually close the valve. The operator may enter Case I of AP/1/A/5500/10, "NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps."

The crew will determine that the alarm is due to a failure, and NOT an actual high radioactivity condition.

Booth Operator Instructions:

insert MAL

-EMF-34L = 107 insert LOA-BB019 = TRUE insert: REM-BB0123=0 delay = 2 seconds REM-BB0124=0 delay = 2 seconds REM-BB0125=0 delay = 2 seconds Indications Available:

MCB Annunciator 1RAD1/C

-3, 1EMF SG SAMPLE HI RAD, alarms MCB Annunciator 1RAD1/F

-2, 1EMF34 LOSS OF S/G SAMPLE FLOW, alarms 1EMF 34 Amber TRIP 1 light is LIT 1EMF 34 Red TRIP 2 light is LIT 1EMF 34 indication off

-scale high Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OP/1/A/6100/010 Q

, ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE FOR 1RAD

-1 C-3, 1EMF 34 S/G SAMPLE HI RAD RO (IA Step 1)

Ensure blowdown flow secured.

NOTE: The RO will report that SG Blowdown should be secured, but it is NOT.

RO (IA Step 2)

Close the following manual loaders: 1BB-123 (1A S/G BB Flow Control) 1BB-124 (1B S/G BB Flow Control) 1BB-125 (1C S/G BB Flow Control) 1BB-126 (1D S/G BB Flow Control)

NOTE: The RO will close the Manual Loader to stop Blowdown flow.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 4 Page 27 of 61 Event

Description:

1EMF-34 fails HIGH/Failure of SG Blowdown Flow Control Valve to Auto CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (IA Step 3)

Notify the following of possible S/G Tube Leakage. Inform them of EMF in alarm and to implement their Response Procedure.

RP Shift NOTE: The CRS may call RP to address the Rad Monitor failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as RP.

Primary Chemistry NOTE: The CRS may call Primary Chemistry to address the Rad Monitor failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Primary Chemistry.

Secondary Chemistry NOTE: The CRS may call Secondary Chemistry to address the Rad Monitor failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Secondary Chemistry.

CRS (IA Step 4)

Contact Secondary Chemistry to secure blowdown to HR Tank by closing 1BB-194 (1BB Flow to Heater Tank).

NOTE: The CRS may call Secondary Chemistry to secure blowdown.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Secondary Chemistry.

AP/1/A/5500/10, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF BOTH NV PUMPS, CASE I BOP (Step 1) Check Pzr level

- STABLE OR GOING UP.

NOTE: Pzr level will bbe stable.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 4 Page 28 of 61 Event

Description:

1EMF-34 fails HIGH/Failure of SG Blowdown Flow Control Valve to Auto CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS/BOP (Step 2) IF AT ANY TIME Pzr level goes down in an uncontrolled manner OR cannot be maintained greater than 4%, THEN perform Step 1.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

RO/ BOP (Step 3) Identify affected S/G as follows: Any S/G N/R level

- GOING UP IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER.

NOTE: No SG level will be rising uncontrollably.

OR Check any of the following EMFs

- ABOVE NORMAL:

NOTE: No increase in radiation level will be indicated on any of these radiation monitors.

1EMF-24 (S/G A Steamline Hi Rad) 1EMF-25 (S/G B Steamline Hi Rad) 1EMF-26 (S/G C Steamline Hi Rad) 1EMF-27 (S/G D Steamline Hi Rad) 1EMF 71 (S/G A Leakage Hi Rad) 1EMF 72 (S/G B Leakage Hi Rad) 1EMF 73 (S/G C Leakage Hi Rad) 1EMF 74 (S/G D Leakage Hi Rad)

OR Check CF Flow

- LOWER IN ANY S/G COMPARED TO ALL.

NOTE: No SGTL will be indicated.

OR Secondary Chemistry or RP has determined affected S/G by sampling or evaluation of available EMF data.

NOTE: The CRS may call Secondary Chemistry/RP to evaluate data.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Secondary Chemistry and RP. OR Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 4 Page 29 of 61 Event

Description:

1EMF-34 fails HIGH/Failure of SG Blowdown Flow Control Valve to Auto CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Notify RP to frisk all Unit 1 S/G cation columns (CT Lab) to determine if activity level is significantly higher for any S/G.

NOTE: The CRS may call RP to evaluate data.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as RP

. After 2 minutes report that there is no higher radioactivity on any cation column

. CRS (Step 4) Announce occurrence on page.

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

CRS (Step 5) REFER TO the following:

RP/0/A/5700/000 (Classification of Emergency)

RP/0/A/5700/010 (NRC Immediate Notification Requirements).

CRS (Step 6) IF AT ANY TIME NC leakage exceeds Tech Spec limits, THEN perform the following:

NOTE: The CRS may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

Ensure Outside Air Pressure Filter Train in service PER OP/0/A/6450/011 (Control Area Ventilation/Chilled Water System), Enclosure 4.4 (Control Room Atmosphere Pressurization During Abnormal Conditions).

Have another SRO evaluate if leakage exceeds SLC 16.9.7 condition C limits and immediately notify Security if SSF is inoperable.

CRS (Step 7) Check if unit shutdown or reactor trip required as follows:

Check VCT makeup

- IN PROGRESS.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 4 Page 30 of 61 Event

Description:

1EMF-34 fails HIGH/Failure of SG Blowdown Flow Control Valve to Auto CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 7.a RNO)

GO TO Step 7.c.

BOP (Step 7.c)

Check S/G tube leak size

- LESS THAN 90 GPM.

Leakage in one S/G

- GREATER THAN 125 GPD (GALLON PER DAY).

CRS (Step 7.d RNO)

Perform the following:

IF unit shutdown required per PT/1/A/4150/001C (Primary to Secondary Leakage Monitoring), THEN-- IF station management desires to exit procedure, THEN exit procedure at this time. NOTE: The CRS may call WCCS/SM to evaluate the plant data.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCCS/SM, and report that AP10 should be exited

. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #

5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 5 Page 31 of 61 Event

Description:

Letdown Line Leak Outside Containment Shortly afterwards, a 50

-75 gpm leak will occur on the Letdown Line, in the Aux Building, upstream of the Letdown Heat Exchanger.

The operator will enter Case II of AP/1/A/5500/10, "NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps." The operator will place the Outside Air Pressure Filter Train in service per Enclosure 4.4 of OP/0/A/6450/011, "Control Area Ventilation/Chilled Water System." The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.13, "RCS Operational Leakage," and Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.7, "Standby Shutdown System."

Booth Operator Instructions:

insert MAL

-NV019B = 50 Indications Available:

MCB Annunciator 1RAD2/A

-2, 1EMF36 UNIT VENT GAS HI RAD, alarms 1EMF36(L) Red TRIP 2 light is LIT 1EM36(H) Amber TRIP 1 light is LIT MCB Annunciator 1RAD 1/B-3, EMF41 AUX BLDG VENT HI RAD, alarms Letdown flow lowers to 0 gpm with normal letdown isolation valves OPEN.

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The crew may address one or more Annunciator Response Procedures prior to entering AP10.

NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO to the Aux Building to look for leaks.

Booth Instructor:

as AO, acknowledge, wait 5 minutes and report that there is a leak in the Aux Building.

If CRS requests location of the leak, report that the location cannot be determined due to steam in the building.

AP/1/A/5500/10, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF BOTH NV PUMPS, CASE II BOP (Step 1) Check leak

- KNOWN TO BE IN THE AUX BUILDING.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 5 Page 32 of 61 Event

Description:

Letdown Line Leak Outside Containment Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 2) Check Pzr level

- STABLE OR GOING UP.

NOTE: Pzr level will be lowering.

BOP (Step 2 RNO) Perform the following as required to maintain level:

Maintain charging flow less than 200 GPM at all times in subsequent steps.

Ensure 1NV

-238 (U1 Charging Hdr Control) OPENING.

OPEN 1NV-241 (U1 Seal Water Inj Flow Control) while maintaining NC Pump seal flow greater than 6 GPM.

BOP Reduce or isolate letdown.

NOTE: Letdown flow has lowered to 0 gpm, because the leak is downstream of the pressure control valve

. Start additional NV Pump.

IF Pzr level cannot be maintained greater than 4%, OR Pzr level going down with maximum charging flow, THEN perform the following:

IF in mode 3 or above, with CLAs in service (aligned to NC System), THEN perform the following:

Trip reactor.

WHEN reactor tripped OR auto S/I setpoint reached, THEN ensure S/I initiated.

GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E

-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

IF in mode 3 with CLAs isolated-IF T-Avg is less than 200

°F- CRS (Step 3) IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure Pzr level cannot be maintained stable, THEN perform Step 2.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 5 Page 33 of 61 Event

Description:

Letdown Line Leak Outside Containment Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 4) Check Pzr pressure

- STABLE OR TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG.

RO (Step 5) Check main steam line intact as follows: Reactor power

- AT TURBINE POWER. NOTE: The Turbine is not synched to the Electrical Grid yet. NC Loop T

-Avg - STABLE. CRS (Step 6) Announce occurrence on page.

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO/ BOP (Step 7) Estimate leak rate using any of the following methods:

NOTE: The leak may no longer be present. If it is the estimate will be 30

-90 gpm. Monitor OAC NV graphic OR Compare charging flow to letdown flow plus seal return flow OR Monitor VCT level trend (OAC point M1P1271).

CRS (Step 8) REFER TO the following:

NOTE: The CRS may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

RP/0/A/5700/000 (Classification of Emergency)

RP/0/A/5700/010 (NRC Immediate Notification Requirements).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 5 Page 34 of 61 Event

Description:

Letdown Line Leak Outside Containment Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 9) IF AT ANY TIME NC leakage exceeds Tech Spec limits, THEN perform the following:

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Ensure Outside Air Pressure Filter Train in service PER OP/0/A/6450/011 (Control Area Ventilation/Chilled Water System). Enclosure 4.4 (Control Room Atmosphere Pressurization During Abnormal Conditions).

NOTE: The CRS may elect to take this action even if the leak has been isolated, or it may have already been performed in an ARP

. Have another SRO evaluate if leakage exceeds SLC 16.9.7 condition C limits and immediately notify security if SSF is inoperable.

NOTE: The CRS may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

NOTE: The CRS may assign the BOP to perform this action.

If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 4.4.

Other Examiners follow AP10 Actions, Step 10, on Page 35. OP/0/A/6450/011, CONTROL AREA VENTILATION/CHILLED WATER SYSTEM ENCLOSURE 4.4, CONTROL ROOM ATMOSPHERE PRESSURIZATION DURING ABNORMAL CONDITIONS Examiner NOTE: Follow the actions associated with .4 if BOP is assigned by CRS to perform.

BOP (Step 3.1) Evaluate all outstanding R&Rs that may impact performance of this procedure.

BOP (Step 3.2) Perform the following sections as applicable:

Section 3.3, Pressurize Control Room Using Outside Air Pressure Fans Section 3.4, Securing Pressurization of Control Room BOP (Step 3.3) Pressurize Control Room using Outside Air Pressure Fans as follows:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 5 Page 35 of 61 Event

Description:

Letdown Line Leak Outside Containment Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3.3.1) Ensure at least one of the following groups of intake valves open:

1VC-1A (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 1) 1VC-2A (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 1) 1VC-3B (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 1) 1VC-4B (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 1) OR BOP 1VC-9A (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 2) 1VC-10A (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 2) 1VC-11B (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 2) 1VC-12B (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 2)

BOP (Step 3.3.2) IF A Train VC/YC operating, place "A Train CR Outside Air Press Fan" to "ON". BOP (Step 3.3.3) IF B Train VC/YC operating, place "B Train CR Outside Air Press Fan" to "ON". BOP (Step 3.3.4) Depress "MAN" for the following (to ensure fans off):

1. 1 CRA Otsd Air Fan

1. 2 CRA Otsd Air Fan BOP (Step 3.3.5) Depress "OFF" for the following:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 5 Page 36 of 61 Event

Description:

Letdown Line Leak Outside Containment Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRA-OAD-4 (CR Area Otsd Air Fans Damper) CRA-OAD-3 (CR Area Otsd Air Fans Damper) RO/ BOP (Step 3.3.6) Check the following dark:

CRA-OAD-4 (CR Area Otsd Air Fans Damper) "OPEN" light.

CRA-OAD-3 (CR Area Otsd Air Fans Damper) "OPEN" light.

AP/1/A/5500/10, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF BOTH NV PUMPS, CASE II BOP/RO (Step 10) IF AT ANY TIME VCT level goes below 16% ("VCT ABNORMAL LEVEL" alarm (1AD

-7, D-3) low setpoint), THEN align NV Pump suction to FWST as follows:

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

OPEN 1NV-221A (U1 NV Pump Suct From FWST Isol).

OPEN 1NV-222B (U1 NV Pump Suct From FWST Isol).

CLOSE 1NV

-141A (U1 VCT Outlet Isol).

CLOSE 1NV

-142B (U1 VCT Outlet Isol).

Check Reactor Trip Breakers

- OPEN. BOP/RO (Step 11) IF AT ANY TIME Containment pressure exceeds Tech Spec limit (0.3 PSIG), THEN evaluate placing all 4 VL AHU mode select switches in "HIGH" to prevent them from cycling around 0.5 PSIG.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

BOP/RO (Step 12) Check seal leakoff on all NC Pumps - LESS THAN 6 GPM.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 5 Page 37 of 61 Event

Description:

Letdown Line Leak Outside Containment Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP/RO (Step 13) Check NC Pump Thermal Barriers intact as follows:

NOTE: The CRS may recognize that this step is trying to identify a leak in the Thermal Barrier and NOT take the RNO action. All NC Pump Thermal Barrier Outlet Valves - OPEN. NC Pump Thermal Barrier KC outlet flows and temperatures on OAC KC graphic - NORMAL (flow and temperature should be similar for all 4 NC Pumps)

KC Surge Tank level rates on OAC KC graphic - NORMAL KC Surge Tank level

- NORMAL 1EMF-46A (Train A Component Cooling)- NORMAL 1EMF-46B (Train B Component Cooling)

- NORMAL. . CRS (Step 14) GO TO Step 16 BOP/RO (Step 16) Check leak

- SUSPECTED ON LETDOWN LINE NEAR DEMINERALIZERS.

NOTE: A leak is NOT suspected near the Demineralizers.

CRS (Step 16 RNO) GO TO Step 18.

BOP/RO (Step 18) Check leak

- KNOWN TO BE ON NORMAL LETDOWN LINE.

NOTE: A leak is known to be on the Normal Letdown Line.

BOP (Step 19)

Isolate leak as follows:

Check leak

- KNOWN TO BE DUE TO a. Observe Note prior to Step 19.f and GO LETDOWN LINE RELIEF OPEN.

NOTE: The leak is NOT due to a Letdown Line Relief Valve.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 5 Page 38 of 61 Event

Description:

Letdown Line Leak Outside Containment Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 19.a RNO)

Observe Note prior to Step 19.f and GO TO Step 19.f.

CRS/ BOP (Step 19.f)

Check letdown isolation

- DESIRED. NOTE: Normal Letdown Line isolation is desired.

BOP (Step 19.g)

CLOSE the following letdown isolation valves:

1NV-458A (U1 75 GPM L/D Orifice Otlt Cont Isol).

1NV-457A (U1 45 GPM L/D Orifice Otlt Cont Isol).

1NV-35A (U1 Variable L/D Orifice Otlt Cont Isol).

BOP (Step 19.h)

Check leak

- ISOLATED.

NOTE: The Letdown Line leak is isolated with the valves CLOSED. BOP (Step 19.i)

Ensure charging flow going down to maintain Pzr at program level.

BOP (Step 19.j)

IF tube leak is suspected on Letdown Hx, THEN-. NOTE: A Letdown HX Tube Leak is NOT suspected.

BOP (Step 19.k)

Check leak

- ISOLATED.

NOTE: The Letdown Line leak is isolated.

BOP (Step 19.l)

Place 1NV

-137A (U1 NC Filter Otlt To VCT 3

-Way Diversion Cntrl) to "HUT" to ensure VCT is isolated from leak.

BOP (Step 19.m)

Establish excess letdown PER EP/1/A/5000/G

-1 (Generic Enclosures),Enclosure 2 (Establishing Excess Letdown).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 5 Page 39 of 61 Event

Description:

Letdown Line Leak Outside Containment Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS may assign the BOP to perform this action, while the crew continues with AP-10. If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 2.

Other Examiners follow AP-10 Actions, Step 19.n, on Page 40. EP/1/A/5000/G

-1, GENERIC ENCLOSURES ENCLOSURE 2, ESTABLISHING EXCESS LETDOWN Examiner NOTE: Follow the actions associated with if BOP is assigned by CRS to perform.

BOP (Step 1) Check KC System alignment:

Containment pressure

- HAS REMAINED BELOW 3 PSIG.

All KC pumps

- ON. NOTE: The 1A2 KC Pump has previously tripped.

BOP (Step 1.b RNO) IF either train KC pumps off, THEN perform the following:

NOTE: The A Train KC Pumps are OFF. CLOSE from Control Room or dispatch operator to CLOSE the following valves on idle train:

A Train: 1KC230A (Trn A Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol) (aux bldg, 750+12, JJ55, above north end of KC HX 1A).

1KC3A (Trn A Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol) (aux bldg,733+8, HH55, north of column HH55). WHEN idle train isolated from reactor bldg header per step above, THEN OPEN the following valves on operating train: B Train: 1KC18B (Trn B Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 5 Page 40 of 61 Event

Description:

Letdown Line Leak Outside Containment Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 1KC228B (Trn B Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol). BOP Do not continue until KC aligned to reactor bldg header.

BOP OPEN 1KC305B (U1 KC To Excess L/D Hx Cont Outside Isol).

Check KC Surge Tank levels STABLE. OPEN 1KC315B (U1 Excess L/D Hx KC Ret Hdr Cont Otsd Isol).

BOP Check containment pressure

- HAS REMAINED BELOW 3 PSIG.

BOP (Step 2) Pressurize excess letdown line as follows: Place 1NV

-27B (U1 Excess L/D Hx Outlet 3-Way Cntrl) to "VCT" position.

OPEN 1NV-26B (U1 Excess L/D Hx Outlet Cntrl).

Wait 2 minutes. CLOSE 1NV

-26B (U1 Excess L/D Hx Outlet Cntrl).

BOP (Step 3) Check the following valves

- CLOSED: 1NV-94AC (U1 NC Pumps Seal Water Return Cont Inside Isol) 1NV-95B (U1 NC Pumps Seal Water Return Cont Outside Isol).

BOP (Step 3 RNO) IF both valves open, THEN GO TO Step 10.

BOP (Step 10) Check reactor

- SUBCRITICAL.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 5 Page 41 of 61 Event

Description:

Letdown Line Leak Outside Containment Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 10 RNO) IF reactor critical, THEN perform the following:

Closely monitor reactor response once excess letdown is in service.

BOP (Step 11) OPEN the following valves:

1NV-24B (1C NC Loop To Excess L/D Hx Isol) 1NV-25B (1C NC Loop To Excess L/D Hx Isol).

BOP (Step 12) Slowly OPEN 1NV

-26B (U1 Excess L/D Hx Outlet Cntrl) while maintaining Excess letdown Hx temperature less than 200

°F. BOP (Step 13) Check the following valves

- CLOSED. 1NI-185A (1A ND Pump Suction From Cont Sump Isol) 1NI-184B (1B ND Pump Suction From Cont Sump Isol).

BOP (Step 14) Notify Chemistry that excess letdown is in service.

BOP (Step 15) WHEN time allows, THEN notify engineering to document transients on letdown and charging.

AP/1/A/5500/10, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF BOTH NV PUMPS, CASE II Examiner NOTE:

Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE. CRS (Step 19.n)

Power operation may continue as long as NC System activity and chemistry requirements are met.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 5 Page 42 of 61 Event

Description:

Letdown Line Leak Outside Containment Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 19.o)

GO TO Step 29. CRS (Step 29) Ensure RP is notified of location and size of leak.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/RP to address the leak.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/RP.

RO (Step 30) Check normal letdown

- IN SERVICE. CRS (Step 30 RNO)

IF normal letdown must remain isolated for greater than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, THEN notify Primary Chemistry to ensure zinc addition is secured.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/Chemistry to address Normal Letdown OOS

. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/Chemistry.

CRS (Step 31) Contact station management to evaluate need to shutdown.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/Station Management to address the leak.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/Station Management.

CRS (Step 32)

Check unit shutdown

- REQUIRED.

CRS (Step 35)

WHEN leak less than Tech Spec limits, THEN perform the following:

Check VCT

- INTACT. Check NV Pump suction

- ALIGNED TO

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 5 Page 43 of 61 Event

Description:

Letdown Line Leak Outside Containment Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments IF Outside Air Pressure Filter Train in service, THEN contact station management to evaluate securing filter train PER OP/0/A/6450/011 (Control Area Ventilation/Chilled Water System), Enclosure 4.4 (Control Room Atmosphere Pressurization During Abnormal Conditions).

IF VL AHU mode select switches were placed to "HIGH" in Step 11, THEN-.. Examiner NOTE:

Based on the transient nature of evaluating this TS, the Examiner may need to question the CRS after the scenario.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1 3, RCS OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE CRS LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:

10 gpm identified LEAKAGE CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 CRS ACTIONS CRS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will recognize that during this event the plant was in Action A.1 when the leak was occurring, and out of this Action when the leak was isolated.

A. RCS Operational LEAKAGE not within limits for reasons other than pressure boundary LEAKAGE or primary to secondary LEAKAGE. A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE to within limits.

4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENT 16.9.7, STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 5 Page 44 of 61 Event

Description:

Letdown Line Leak Outside Containment Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS COMMITMENT The Standby Shutdown System (SSS) shall be operable.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

CRS REMEDIAL ACTIONS The SRO should ensure that security is notified 10 minutes prior to declaring the SSS inoperable. Immediately upon discovery of the SSS inoperability, Security must be notified to implement compensatory measures within 10 minutes of discovery.

CRS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will recognize that during this event the plant was in Action C.1 and C.2 when the leak was occurring, and out of this Action when the leak was isolated.

C. Total Unidentified LEAKAGE, Identified LEAKAGE, and reactor coolant pump seal leakoff >

20 gpm. OR Total reactor coolant pump seal leakoff > 16.3 gpm.

OR Any reactor coolant pump No. 1 seal leakoff > 4.0 gpm. C.1 Declare the Standby Makeup Pump inoperable.

AND C.2 Enter Condition A.

Immediately At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, move to Event #

6.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 6 Page 45 of 61 Event

Description:

Sequentially Dropped Rods Just after the leak isolation, one Control Bank D Control Rod will drop into the core. The operator will respond in accordance with ARP1AD

-2/D-9, "RPI at Bottom Rod Drop" and will implement AP/1/A/5500/14, "Rod Control Malfunction." Shortly after this, a second Control Rod will drop requiring that the operator manually trip the reactor.

Booth Operator Instructions:

insertMAL

-IRE006B6 STATIONARY_GRPPR insertMAL

-IRE006P10 STATIONARY_GRPPR (45 Seconds Delayed) Indications Available:

MCB Annunciator 1AD

-2, B-10, ROD CONTROL NON

-URGENT FAILURE, alarms.

MCB Annunciator 1AD

-2, D-9, RPI AT BOTTOM ROD DROP, alarms.

MCB Annunciator 1AD

-2, D-10, RPI URGENT FAILURE, alarms.

MCB Annunciator 1AD

-2, E-9, RPI AT BOTTOM > 1 ROD DROPPED, alarms.

DRPI indication that Control Rod B6 is on the bottom.

Subsequently:

DRPI indication that Control Rod P10 is on the bottom. Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP/1/A/5500/14, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION RO (Step 1) IF more than one rod dropped, OR misaligned by greater than 24 steps, THEN perform the following:

Immediate Action Trip Reactor.

NOTE: The rods will drop sequentially so the action of tripping the reactor will be delayed, but Immediate upon observation.

GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E

-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

RO (Step 2) Place control rods in manual.

Immediate Action RO (Step 3) Check rod movement

- STOPPED. Immediate Action

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 6 Page 46 of 61 Event

Description:

Sequentially Dropped Rods Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 4) Check all rods

- ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK, (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following:

IF misaligned rod(s) due to DRPI indication failure only, THEN exit this procedure.

IF T-Avg has gone down, THEN lower Turbine load as necessary to restore T

-Avg to T-Ref. GO TO Enclosure 1 (Response To Dropped or Misaligned Rod).

NOTE: Upon recognition of the 2nd dropped rod, the RO will perform Step 1 which now applies. RO (Step 1) IF two or more rods are either dropped OR misaligned by greater than 24 steps, THEN perform the following:

Immediate Action Trip Reactor.

NOTE: The rods will drop sequentially so the action of tripping the reactor will be delayed, but Immediate upon observation.

GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E

-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 6 Page 47 of 61 Event

Description:

Sequentially Dropped Rods Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task

Trip the Reactor upon recognition of the second dropped rod Safety Significance: Multiple dropped control rods are a significant reactivity transient that can have a serious effect on plant parameters under certain operating conditions, and may result in power distribution limits being exceeded. The guidance to trip the reactor is a conservative action to prevent the plant form challenging the Pzr low pressure trip setpoint, etc.; and is consistent with the conservative nature of the industry. PT/0/A/4600/113, Enclosure 13.19 states that it is a management expectation that the operator trip the reactor within 30 seconds of a second dropped rod.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event s #7-8.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 7 & 8 Page 48 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Train B SI Actuation/1NI

-10B fails to CLOSE Upon the reactor trip, the B Train of Safety Injection will inadvertently actuate. The operator will enter EP/1/A/5000/E

-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and verify reactor trip and Safety Injection actuation, actuating the A Train of SI in the process. The crew will reset SI and stop all ECCS Pumps except for one NV Pump within 15 minutes. When the crew attempts to close 1NI

-10B, "Unit 1 NV Pumps To NC Cold Legs Cont Outside Isol," it will be discovered that the valve will not close. The operator will be required to dispatch an operator to locally close 1NI

-10B. Ultimately, the crew will transition to step 9 of EP/1/A/5000/ES

-1.1, "Safety Injection Termination." The scenario will terminate in EP/1/A/5000/ES

-1.1 at Step 14.m RNO after the CRS determines to establish Excess Letdown.

Booth Operator Instructions:

insert MAL

-ISE001B (Occurs on Rx Trip) insert MAL

-NI033 (Occurs on SI Actuation)

Indications Available:

SI actuation light is LIT on the B Train Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner NOTE:

Mark Time of SI Actuation (To the Minute):

____________

NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of E

-0, prior to the CRS addressing the EP. E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION CRS (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip:

Immediate Action All rod bottom lights

- LIT Reactor trip and bypass breakers

- OPEN I/R amps

- GOING DOWN.

RO (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip:

Immediate Action

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 7 & 8 Page 49 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Train B SI Actuation/1NI

-10B fails to CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments All throttle valves

- CLOSED. BOP (Step 4) Check 1ETA and 1ETB

- ENERGIZED.

Immediate Action RO / BOP (Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated:

Immediate Action "SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED" status light (1SI

-18) - LIT. Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1SI

-14) - LIT. NOTE: Only the B Train LOCA Sequencer Actuated status light is LIT.

RO/ BOP (Step 5.b RNO) Initiate S/I.

Foldout Page NC Pump Trip Criteria CA Suction Sources Position Criteria for 1NV150B and 1NV151A (U1 NV Pump Recirc Isol)

Ruptured S/G Aux Feedwater Isolation Criteria Faulted S/G Aux Feedwater Isolation Criteria CRS (Step 6) Announce "Unit 1 Safety Injection".

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 7) Check all Feedwater Isolation status lights (1SI

-4) - LIT BOP (Step 8) Check Phase A "RESET" lights

- DARK.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 7 & 8 Page 50 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Train B SI Actuation/1NI

-10B fails to CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 9) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s):

Groups 1,2,5

- DARK. Group 3 - LIT. Group 4 - LIT AS REQUIRED.

Group 6 - LIT. RO / BOP (Step 10) Check proper CA pump status:

MD CA pumps

- ON. N/R level in at least 3 S/Gs

- GREATER THAN 17%.

BOP (Step 11) Check all KC pumps ON. NOTE: The 1A2 KC Pump has previously tripped.

BOP (Step 11 RNO) Perform the following:

Start pumps.

IF all KC pumps running, THEN-. IF any NC pump KC low flow annunciator lit on 1AD6, THEN- BOP (Step 12)

Check both RN pumps

- ON. CRS (Step 13) Notify Unit 2 to perform the following:

Floor Instructor:

As U2 RO report "2A RN Pump is running."

Start 2A RN pump.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 7 & 8 Page 51 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Train B SI Actuation/1NI

-10B fails to CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments THROTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum for existing plant conditions.

Booth Instructor:

insert LOA

-RN087 (Start 2A RN Pump) insert LOA

-RN083 8050.000000 delay=0 ramp=10 (Unit 2 Train A Demand Flow)

RO (Step 14) Check all S/G pressures

- GREATER THAN 775 psig.

BOP (Step 15) Check Containment Pressure

- HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG.

NOTE: Containment Pressure is 0.15 psig.

BOP (Step 16) Check S/I flow:

Check "NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW" gauge

- INDICATING FLOW.

NOTE: NV Flow is 320 gpm. Check NC pressures

- LESS THAN 1600 PSIG.

NOTE: NC System pressure is 2250 psig, and the Pzr PORVs may be lifting. BOP (Step 16b RNO) Perform the following:

Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running pump(s) open:

1ND-68A (1A ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol) 1ND-67B (1B ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol).

CRS IF valve(s) open on all running ND pumps, THEN GO TO Step 17.

CRS (Step 17) Notify OSM or other SRO to perform EP/1/A/5000/G

-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM actions Following an S/I) within 10 minutes.

NOTE: CRS may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 7 & 8 Page 52 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Train B SI Actuation/1NI

-10B fails to CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO / BOP (Step 18) Check CA flow:

Total CA flow

- GREATER THAN 450 GPM. Check VI header pressure

- GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.

WHEN each S/G N/R level is greater than 11% (32% ACC), THEN control CA flow to maintain that S/G N/R level between 11% (32% ACC) and 50%.

RO (Step 19) Check NC temperatures:

IF any NC pump on, THEN check NC T-Avg - STABLE OR TRENDING TO 557°F NOTE: All NC Pumps will be ON. BOP (Step 20) Check Pzr PORV and spray valves: All Pzr PORVs

- CLOSED. Normal Pzr spray valves

- CLOSED. NOTE: depending on NC System pressure the Spray Valve may be OPEN.

BOP At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve

- OPEN. BOP (Step 21) Check NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs

- GREATER THAN 0°F.

NOTE: NC System Subcooling will be 80-90oF. RO (Step 22) Check if main steamlines intact:

All S/G pressure

- STABLE OR GOING UP NOTE: All SG Pressures are 1100psig.

All S/Gs

- PRESSURIZED.

BOP (Step 23) Check if S/G tubes intact:

NOTE: 1EMF34(L) has previously failed, however, no other indications of a SGTR exist

.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 7 & 8 Page 53 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Train B SI Actuation/1NI

-10B fails to CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments The following secondary EMFs

- NORMAL: 1EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust) 1EMF-34(L) (S/G Sample (Lo Range)) 1EMF-24 (S/G A) 1EMF-25 (S/G B) 1EMF-26 (S/G C) 1EMF-27 (S/G D)

S/G levels

- STABLE OR GOING UP IN A CONTROLLED MANNER.

BOP (Step 24) Check if NC System intact:

NOTE: All EMF instrumentation reads normal. 1EMF-38(L) (Containment Particulate (LR))

- NORMAL 1EMF-39(L) (Containment Gas (Lo Range)) - NORMAL 1EMF-40 (Containment Iodine)

- NORMAL Check containment pressure

- LESS THAN 1 PSIG NOTE: Containment Pressure is 0.20 psig.

Check containment sump level

- NORMAL. RO / BOP (Step 25) Check S/I termination criteria:

NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs

- GREATER THAN 0°F.

Secondary heat sink:

N/R level in at least one S/G - GREATER THAN 11%

OR Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 7 & 8 Page 54 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Train B SI Actuation/1NI

-10B fails to CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Total feed flow to S/Gs

- GREATER THAN 450 gpm.

NC Pressure

- STABLE OR GOING UP.

Pzr level

- GREATER THAN 11%.

BOP (Step 26) Reset the following:

S/I Sequencers.

BOP (Step 27) Stop all but one NV pump.

BOP (Step 28) Check NC pressure

- STABLE OR GOING UP.

BOP (Step 29) Isolate NV S/I flowpath as follows:

Check NV pumps miniflow valves

- OPEN: 1NV-150B (U1 NV Pump Recirc Isol) 1NV-151A (U1 NV Pump Recirc Isol). CLOSE the following valves:

1NI-9A (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV) 1NI-10B (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV).

BOP (Step 29.b RNO) Perform the following:

IF S/I is reset on affected train, THEN perform the following:

IF 1NI9A closed and reopened, THEN-.. IF 1NI10B closed and reopened, THEN-.. NOTE: 1NI-10B has NOT closed and re

-opened. IF S/I reset light is dark on affected train, THEN-.. NOTE: The SI Reset light on the B Train is LIT.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 7 & 8 Page 55 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Train B SI Actuation/1NI

-10B fails to CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments IF EP/1/A/5000/G1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 23 (Local Reset of S/I Signal) initiated, THEN-.. NOTE: Generic Enclosure 23 has NOT been initiated.

Dispatch operator to CLOSE affected valve(s):

1NI10B (aux bldg, 733+4, JJ51, room 730, VCT hallway 1 ft south of JJ51). NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO.

Booth Instructor:

as AO, acknowledge

. After 2 Minutes, insert CLOSE 1NI

-10B LOCALLY

, and report that 1NI

-10B has been closed locally.

Do not continue until both 1NI9A and 1NI10B are closed.

Examiner NOTE:

Mark Time of 1NI

-9A Closure and the dispatch of the AO to close 1NI

-10B (To the Minute):

____________

Critical Task

Terminate SI by closing 1NI

-9A and dispatching an operator to locally close 1NI

-10B within 15 minutes of SI actuation

. Safety Significance: An inadvertent SI rapidly injects inventory into the NCS causing Pzr Level, and correspondingly, Pzr Pressure to increase. Prolonged recovery unnecessarily challenges the Pzr Code Safety valves. PT/0/A/4600/113, Enclosure 13.6 states that when at NOP/NOT conditions, the FSAR commitment is to have SI terminated within 15 minutes (The Safety Analysis CANNOT credit the cycling of the Pzr PORVs since auto PORV operation can only be assured during LTOP Operation). The Safety Analysis assumes that the Pzr Code Safeties will lift and reseat ONLY if they are cycled for a short time and Pzr liquid temperature remains > 500 oF. If this action is not taken, the conclusions of the Safety Analysis are invalid, and violates a License Condition.

BOP (Step 30) Establish charging as follows:

Check VI header pressure

- GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 7 & 8 Page 56 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Train B SI Actuation/1NI

-10B fails to CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments THROTTLE 1NV

-238 (U1 Charging Hdr Control) to maintain 6

-10 GPM seal injection flow to each NC pump.

BOP Close 1NV

-241 (U1 Seal Water Inj Flow Control).

Check one of the following valves

- OPEN: 1NV-13B (U1 NV Supply to 1A NC Loop Isol).

NOTE: 1NV-13B is OPEN.

OR 1NV-16A (U1 NV Supply to 1D NC Loop Isol).

Check 1NV

-21A (U1 NV Spray to U1 Aux PZR Spray Isol) - CLOSED. Open the following valves:

1NV-244A (Charging Hdr Cont Outside Isol) 1NV-245B (Charging Hdr Cont Outside Isol).

CRS WHEN controlling NV flow in subsequent steps, THEN maintain flow within the following limits while THROTTLING charging and seal injection control valves: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Charging flow

- LESS THAN 200 GPM. Seal injection flow to each NC pump 10 GPM. BOP (Step 31) Control charging flow as follows:

Control charging flow as required to maintain Pzr level stable.

Check Pzr level

- STABLE OR GOING UP. BOP (Step 32) Reset the following:

Phase A Isolation

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 7 & 8 Page 57 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Train B SI Actuation/1NI

-10B fails to CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Phase B Isolation.

BOP (Step 33) Establish VI to containment as follows: OPEN the following valves:

1VI-129B (VI Supply to A Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol).

1VI-160B (VI Supply to B Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol).

1VI-150B (Lwr Cont Non

-Ess Cont Outside Isol).

Check VI header pressure

- GREATER THAN 85 PSIG. CRS (Step 34) Implement EP/1/A/5000/F

-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).

NOTE: The CRS will direct the STA to implement this action. Floor Instructor:

As STA, acknowledge.

CRS (Step 35) WHEN EP/1/A/5000/ES

-1.1 (Safety Injection Termination) is implemented in next step, THEN monitor its Foldout page.

CRS (Step 35) GO TO Step 9 of EP/1/A/5000/ES

-1.1 (Safety Injection Termination).

NOTE: The CRS will transition to ES

-1.1 Step 9.

ES-1.1, SAFETY INJECTION TERMINATION BOP (Step 9) Check if NI pumps should be stopped: Examiner NOTE:

After transition to ES

-1.1, terminate Exam at Lead Examiner discretion.

BOP Check NC pressure

- STABLE OR GOING UP.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 7 & 8 Page 58 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Train B SI Actuation/1NI

-10B fails to CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments GREATER THAN 1600 PSIG.

Stop NI pumps.

CRS GO TO Step 10.

BOP (Step 10) Check if ND pumps should be stopped: Check any ND pump

- ON. Check running ND pumps suction

- ALIGNED TO FWST.

Stop ND pumps.

RO (Step 11) Check S/I flow not required:

NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs

- GREATER THAN 0°F.

NOTE: NC System Subcooling will be 65-85oF. BOP Pzr level

- GREATER THAN 11% (29% ACC). NOTE: Pzr Level will be 60

-90%. RO (Step 12) Check steam dumps:

Check condenser available as follows:

"C-9 COND AVAILABLE FOR STEAM DUMP" status light (1SI

-18) - LIT. MSIVs on intact S/Gs

- OPEN. Perform the following to place steam dumps in steam pressure mode:

Place "STM PRESS CONTROLLER" in manual.

Adjust "STM PRESS CONTROLLER" output to equal "STEAM DUMP DEMAND" signal.

Place "STEAM DUMP SELECT" in steam pressure mode.

Check "P-12 LO-LO TAVG" status light (1SI-18) - DARK.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 7 & 8 Page 59 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Train B SI Actuation/1NI

-10B fails to CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Control steam dumps to maintain NC T

-Hots - STABLE. RO IF AT ANY TIME "STEAM HEADER PRESSURE" is between 1090

-1095 PSIG AND auto control desired, THEN perform the following:

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Ensure "STM PRESS CONTROLLER" setpoint at 1090-1095 PSIG.

Place "STM PRESS CONTROLLER" in auto. Ensure steam dumps control steam header pressure between 1090

-1095 PSIG. CRS GO TO Step 13.

RO (Step 13) Check NC T

-Hots - STABLE. RO/ BOP (Step 14) Check if letdown can be established:

Check VI header pressure

- GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.

Pzr level

- GREATER THAN 25%

Check ND pumps

- OFF. OPEN the following valves:

1KC-1A (Trn A Aux Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

1KC-2B (Trn B Aux Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

Monitor the following while aligning KC to aux bldg non essential header:

KC surge tank levels KC System flow.

Place the following in "AUTO" for the operating KC train(s):

1KC-54B (Train B Recirc Isol).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

4 Event # 7 & 8 Page 60 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Train B SI Actuation/1NI

-10B fails to CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Check 1KC

-1A - OPEN. Perform the following concurrently:

CLOSE 1KC

-56A (1A ND Hx KC Inlet Isol)

As flow goes down, OPEN 1KC

-50A (Trn A Aux Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).

Check 1KC

-2B - OPEN. BOP Perform the following concurrently:

CLOSE 1KC

-81B (1B ND Hx KC Inlet Isol)

As flow goes down, OPEN 1KC

-53B (Trn B Aux Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).

Reset modulating valves using reset buttons on RN control board.

Check the following:

1EMF-51A (Containment Train A (Hi Range)) - LESS THAN 25 R/HR 1EMF-51B (Containment Train B (Hi Range)) - LESS THAN 25 R/HR.

Establish letdown PER EP/1/A/5000/G

-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 1 (Establishing Normal Letdown) while continuing in procedure.

NOTE: The CRS will recognize that Normal Letdown previously had a leak, and proceed to the RNO to establish Excess Letdown. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

UNIT 1 STATUS:

Power Level:

4% NCS [B] 1988 ppm Pzr [B]: 1988 ppm Xe: Per OAC Power History:

At this power level for 30 minutes Core Burnup:

25 EFPDs CONTROLLING PROCEDURE:

OP/1/A/6100/0 03 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME T HE SHIFT: The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The following equipment is Out

-Of-Service:

The 1A Hotwell Pump is OOS for bearing replacement.

The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance.

1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating)

. MCB Annunciator 1AD

-1, F-9, "DEH/MSR SYSTEM MALFUNCTION," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating).

MCB Annunciator 1AD

-1, F-2, KG PANEL TROUBLE, is in alarm due to a f ailed local panel alarm relay.

Crew Directions:

The plant has been stabilized at 4% power for 30 minutes.

The crew will raise power to 12

-18% and stabilize reactor power, and mak e preparations to synch the Turbine to the Grid while maintenance is completed; starting with Step 3.25 of Enclosure 4.1 of OP/1/A/6100/003

. There are no fuel conditioning limitations

. Work Control SRO/Offsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe (FB)

NLO's AVAILABLE Unit 1 Unit 2 Aux Bldg. John Aux Bldg. Chris Turb Bldg. Bob (FB)

Turb Bldg. Mike (FB) 5th Rounds. Carol Extra(s)

Bill (FB) Ed (FB) Wayne (FB) Tanya Gus (RW)

PROGRAM: McGuire Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 31 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N15-1-5 REFERENCES

1. OP/1/A/6250/002, "Auxiliary Feedwater System" (Rev 125)

2. AP/1/A/5500/01, "Steam Leak" (Rev 18) 3. Technical Specification 3.7.5, "Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System" (Amendment 221/203) 4. Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.7, "Standby Shutdown System" (Revision 1

45) 5. AP/1/A/5500/0 6, "S/G Feedwater Malfunction

" (Rev 18) 6. AP/1/A/5500/10, "NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps" (Rev 2

3) 7. Technical Specification 3.4.13, "RCS Operational Leakage." (Amendment 237/219)

8. AP/1/A/5500/04, "Rapid Downpower" (Rev 2

6) 9. OP/1/A/6300/001A, "Turbine Generator Load Change" (Rev 12)

10. EP/1/A/5000/E

-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection" (Rev 34) 11. EP/1/A/5000/E

-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant" (Rev 16) Validation Time:

91 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Essential Training & Consulting, LLC Facility Review:

________________________

Rev. 030515 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Facility:

McGuire Scenario No.:

5 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Examiners:

Operators:

(SRO) (RO) (BOP) Initial Conditions:

The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Turnover:

The following equipment is Out

-Of-Service:

1A RV Pump is OOS for motor replacement. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance.

1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD

-1, F-9, "DEH/MSR SYSTEM MALFUNCT," has failed to OFF (IAE is investigating).

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*

Event Description 1 REM SA0048 ABC C-BOP C(TS)-SRO TDCA Pump starts inadvertently 2 MAL DCS17E/G C-RO C-SRO FRV Controller and Bypass Valve Failure 3 MAL NC007D C-BOP C(TS)-SRO NCS Leak 4 NA R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Rapid Downpower 5 MAL DEH008B C-RO C-SRO Turbine Control Unit fails to MANUAL 6 MAL NC005D4 M-RO M-BOP M-SRO Rod Ejection/SB LOCA 7 MAL NV029B NA 1B NV Pump Trip 8 MAL EQB001A NA EDG A Sequencer Failure 9 MAL NI001B BOP 1B NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO 10 MAL NC005F14 NA 2nd Rod Ejection/SB LOCA * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 McGuire 2015 NRC Scenario #

5 The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The following equipment is Out

-Of-Service: 1A RV Pump is OOS for motor replacement. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance.

1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD

-1, F-9, "DEH/MSR SYSTEM MALFUNCT," has failed to OFF (IAE is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, the Turbine Driven CA Pump will inadvertently start causing the plant to cooldown and reactor power to rise. The crew will recognize that the pump should not be running and stop the pump using OP/1/A/6250/002, "Auxiliary Feedwater System." The operator may use AP/1/A/5500/1, "Steam Leak," to diagnose the failure. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.5, "Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System," and SLC 16.9.7, "Standby Shutdown System."

Next, the 1B SG FRV Controller will fail to MANUAL and the FRV Bypass valve will fail fully open resulting in the Feedwater Control Valve for the 1B SG closing and causing SG Level to lower. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/0 6, "S/G Feedwater Malfunction," and control the 1B SG Level manually

. Following this, a 70

-90 gpm leak will develop on the reactor head from a Control Rod Guide Tube. The crew will implement AP/1/A/5500/10, "NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps." The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.13, "RCS Operational Leakage."

During the downpower, a failure will occur in the Turbine Control Unit causing the unit to shift from Operator Auto to Manual control. The operator will address 1AD

-1/F-4, TURBINE IN MANUAL, and control the Turbine manually during the downpower in accordance with OP/1/A/6300/001A, Enclosure 4.1, "Turbine Generator Load Change."

After this, Control Rod D

-4 will be ejected from the core causing a 1000 gpm Small Break LOCA. The operator will trip the Reactor and actuate Safety Injection, and then enter EP/1/A/5000/E

-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." On the Safety Injection actuation the EDG B Sequencer will fail to automatically sequence, and the operator will need to manually start ECCS loads. Additionally, the 1A NV Pump will trip, and the 1A NI Pump will fail to start automatically. The operator will be required to start the 1A NI Pump manually.

Upon completion of E

-0, the operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/E

-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant." At that time a second Control Rod (F

-14) will be ejected from the core causing the Small Break LOCA to degrade to the point at which the NC Pumps will need to be tripped. The scenario will terminate at Step 9 of E-1, after the crew has been directed to return back to the beginning of E

-1. Critical Tasks:

Establish flow from at least one high

-head ECCS Pump before transition out of E

-0. Safety Significance:

Failure to establish flow from the NV System after failure of the automatic actuation constitutes a demonstrated inability by the operator to recognize a failure and/or correct a failure of an ESF System or component. The FSAR analyses of response to high energy line breaks assume that at least one train of safeguards actuates. If the minimum assumed ESF components are NOT actuated the Safety

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Analyses results are invalid. Because compliance with the assumptions in the FSAR is part of the facility license, failure to comply constitutes a violation of the license condition.

Trip NC Pumps within 5 minutes of loss of SCM (4600/113/E13.1)

Safety Significance: Failure to trip all NCPs on a loss of subcooled margin can lead to core uncovery and to fuel temperatures in excess of 2200 oF. PT/0/A/4600/113, Enclosure 13.1 states that McGuire is committed to having NC Pumps tripped within 5 minutes of a loss of subcooling. The Safety Analysis recommends that the NC Pumps be tripped within 2 minutes to limit the depth and duration of core uncovery. It is a management expectation that the NC Pumps be tripped as quickly as possible, but within 5 minutes of a loss of subcooling. Failure to take this action represents mis

-operation by the operator which leads to degradation of the fuel cladding fission produce barrier, and a violation of a license condition.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Sim. Setup Rod Step On Reset to Temp I/C 244 (Originally IC-39). T = 0 Malfunctions:

(From IC-39) insert LOA

-RV005 = RACKED_OUT (

RV Pump 1A Breaker Rackout)

Insert H_X1L_367_5=0 (RV Pump 1A OFF Lamp) Insert REM

-SV0027 = 0 (Close 1SV

-27 [1A S/G PORV Isolation]

) Insert LOA

-SV001= Racked_Out (SG PORV Breaker Racked Out)

H_X02_087_3 = 0 (1A PORV Controller LEFT lamp) H_X02_087_4 = 0 (1A PORV Controller RIGHT lamp) Insert LOA

-SV014=0 (SM PORV A LOCAL OPERATION

) insert XMT- KFTT5130 = 0 (Spent Fuel Pool Temperature Failure

) insert H_X01_001F09_1

= 0 = OFF (1AD-1/F-9 failed OFF) From IC-244: Per Lesson Plan 201 5 NRC Exam Scenario 5 Insert MAL

-DEH008B= TRUE (Turbine Fails to MAN) cd=H_X01_280_4 = 1 (MOV

-265 OPEN)

Insert MAL-NV029B = TRUE (NV Pump B Trips on Overcurrent) cd = H_X01_094_2 = 1 (Rx Trip Breaker Open Light) insert MAL

-EQB001A = 0_1 (EDG A Sequencer Failure) insert MAL

-NI001B = AUTO (1B NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO

) RUN Reset all SLIMs Place Tagout/O-Stick on:

1A RV Pump (Tagout) 1SV-27 (Tagout) 1KFP-5130 (O-Stick) MCB Annunciator 1AD-1/F-9 (O-stick)

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Update Status Board, Setup OAC NOTE: RMWST DO = <1000 ppb. Freeze. Update Fresh Tech. Spec. Log.

Fill out the AO's Available section of Shift Turnover Info.

Prior to Crew Briefing RUN Crew Briefing

1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements

. 2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

T-0 Begin Familiarization Period At direction of examiner Execute Lesson Plan for Simulator Scenario N15-1-5. At direction of examiner Event 1 insert REM-SA0048ABC = 1.0 TDCA Pump starts inadvertently

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION At direction of examiner Event 2 InsertMAL-DCSSLIM17G BUTTON_

DEPRESSED

Delete 1A MAL-DCSSLIM17G = 2

InsertMAL-DCSSLIM17E BUTTON_ DEPRESSED

Delete 1A MAL

-DCSSLIM17E = 2 insertREM-CF0105AB = 1 FRV Controller and Bypass Valve Failure NOTE: This malfunction will take about 2

-3 minutes to develop. At direction of examiner Event 3 insert MAL-NC007D = 0.33 NCS Leak Upon direction in AP-10 Event 4 Rapid Downpower MOV-265 is OPEN Event 5 Insert MAL

-DEH008B= TRUE Turbine Control Unit fails to MANUAL This malfunction is in at T=0 Post-Rx Trip Event 6 insert MAL

-NC005D4 =

1000 delay=0 ramp=0 Rod Ejection/SB LOCA Post-Rx Trip Event 7 1B NV Pump Trip This malfunction is in at T=0

. Post-SI Act Event 8 EDG A Sequencer Failure This malfunction is in at T=0.

Post-SI Act Event 9 1B NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO This malfunction is in at T=0.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Transition to E-1 Event 10 insert MAL

- NC005F14 = 2000 2nd Rod Ejection/SB LOCA This malfunction will occur on Transition to E

-1. Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 1 Page 9 of 53 Event

Description:

TDCA Pump starts inadvertently Shortly after taking the watch, the Turbine Driven CA Pump will inadvertently start causing the plant to cooldown and reactor power to rise. The crew will recognize that the pump should not be running and stop the pump using OP/1/A/6250/002, "Auxiliary Feedwater System." The operator may use AP/1/A/5500/1, "Steam Leak," to diagnose the failure. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.5, "Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System," and SLC 16.9.7, "Standby Shutdown System."

Booth Operator Instructions:

insert REM

-SA0048ABC = 1.0 Indications Available:

1SA48ABC Red status light is LIT.

TDCA Pump Turbine Speed rising MCB Annunciator 1AD

-5/F1 TURBINE DRIVEN CA PUMP LO SUCTION PRESSURE Reactor power starts to rise Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONTROL ROOM EXPECTATIONS MANUAL RO/ BOP CA Operation above 10% power.

IF CA Auto start at greater than 3% power and Main Feedwater is providing flow to the steam generators, then CA flow should be throttled/isolated as soon as practical. This will make the affected CA pumps inoperable due to the control valve not being fully open above 10% as required by the CA Surveillance Requirements.

NOTE: The BOP will throttle CA flow from the TDCA Pump, rendering the CA Pumps inoperable.

AP/1/A/5500/01, STEAM LEAK CRS (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

RO (Step 2) Reduce turbine load to maintain the following:

NOTE: The RO will need to reduce load to limit reactor power. Excore NI's

- LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%. NC Loop D/T's

- LESS THAN 60°F D/T

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 1 Page 10 of 53 Event

Description:

TDCA Pump starts inadvertently Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments T-Avg - AT T-REF. CRS (Step 3) Check containment entry - IN PROGRESS.

NOTE: A Containment Entry is NOT in progress.

CRS (Step 3 RNO) GO TO Step 5.

BOP (Step 5) Check Pzr pressure prior to event

- GREATER THAN P

-11 (1955 PSIG).

BOP (Step 6) Check Pzr level

- STABLE OR GOING UP.

NOTE: Pzr level is expected to be stable, however, it may be lowering. If so, perform Step 6 RNO. Otherwise continue with Step 7. BOP (Step 6 RNO) Perform the following as required to maintain level:

Maintain charging flow less than 200 GPM at all times in subsequent steps.

Ensure 1NV

-238 (U1 Charging Hdr Control) OPENING.

OPEN 1NV-241 (U1 Seal Water Inj Flow Control) while maintaining NC pump seal flow greater than 6 GPM.

Reduce or isolate letdown.

Start additional NV pump.

IF Pzr level going down with maximum charging flow-NOTE: It is expected that the BOP will be able to control Pzr level. BOP (Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure Pzr level cannot be maintained stable, THEN RETURN TO Step 6.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

CRS (Step 8) GO TO Step 12.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 1 Page 11 of 53 Event

Description:

TDCA Pump starts inadvertently Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 12) Announce occurrence on paging system. NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 13) Identify and isolate leak on Unit 1 as follows:

(Step 13a) Check SM PORVs

- CLOSED. RO (Step 13.b) Check condenser dump valves - CLOSED. (Step 13.b RNO) IF steam dumps required to be closed-NOTE: The Steam Dumps are likely to be closed.

BOP (Step 13.c) Check containment conditions

- NORMAL: Containment temperature Containment pressure Containment humidity Containment floor and equipment sump level.

RO / BOP (Step 13.d) Check TD CA pump

- OFF. NOTE: The TDCA Pump is running. (Step 13.d RNO) IF operation of TD CA pump is causing uncontrolled cooldown

AND flow from TD CA pump not required, THEN stop TD CA pump PER OP/1/A/6250/002 (Auxiliary Feedwater System) Enclosure 4.4 (Manual Operation of #1 TD CA Pump)

Examiner NOTE:

CRS may direct that the TDCA Pump be stopped per the OP.

If so, continue as scripted. If NOT, continue with the remaining steps of AP-1 on Page 13. NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief

.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 1 Page 12 of 53 Event

Description:

TDCA Pump starts inadvertently Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS may address Tech Specs based on plant response.

OP/1/A/6250/002, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM ENCLOSURE 4.4, MANUAL OPERATION OF #1 TD CA PUMP BOP (Step 3.1) Evaluate all outstanding R&Rs that may impact performance of this procedure.

NOTE: The CRS/BOP may call WCC/IAE to address the R&Rs on the TDCA Pump.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC, and report none exist.

BOP (Step 3.2) Ensure that a pre

-job briefing has been performed that includes discussion of reactivity management concerns with this procedure.

BOP (Step 3.3) IF #1 TD CA Pump to be operated locally- NOTE: The pump is NOT to be operated locally.

BOP (Step 3.4) Perform the following sections, as applicable:

Section 3.6, Stopping #1 TD CA Pump BOP (Step 3.6) Stopping #1 TD CA Pump IF stopping pump following EP/AP, check "TURB" depressed on the following:

NOTE: The CRS may decide to take this action if the OP was entered from AP1.

CA Modulating Valves Reset Train A CA Modulating Valves Reset Train B IF operating #1 TD CA Pump locally-NOTE: The pump is NOT to be operated locally.

BOP Ensure the following closed:

1CA-64AB (U1 TD CA Pump Disch to 1A S/G Control)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 1 Page 13 of 53 Event

Description:

TDCA Pump starts inadvertently Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 1CA-52AB (U1 TD CA Pump Disch to 1B S/G Control) 1CA-48AB (U1 TD CA Pump Disch to 1C S/G Control) 1CA-36AB (U1 TD CA Pump Disch to 1D S/G Control)

BOP Ensure "RESET" lit on "TD CA Pump Auto Start Reset.

BOP Place "#1 TD CA Pump" in "STOP".

Ensure the following closed:

1SA-48ABC (1C S/G SM Supply To U1 TD CA Pump Turb Isol)

NOTE: The CRS will recognize that 1SA

-48ABC has failed OPEN.

Because of this the CRS may dispatch an AO to locally close the upstream isolation valve 1SA-1. The only other choice is to leave the TDCA Pump running. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as AO. Booth Instructor: Wait 3 minutes and Insert REM

-SA0001 = 0.0; then call as AO and report that 1SA

-1 is CLOSED. 1SA-49AB (1B S/G SM Supply To U1 TD CA Pump Turb Isol)

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief

. AP/1/A/5500/01, STEAM LEAK Examiner NOTE: Continue here if the OP is NOT used to stop TDCA Pump.

BOP (Step 13.e) Check valves on "STEAM LINE DRAIN VALVES" board (1MC

-9) - CLOSED. NOTE: One or more of these valves may be cycling. The RNO will direct closing the valves.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 1 Page 14 of 53 Event

Description:

TDCA Pump starts inadvertently Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 13.f) Check opposite Unit (Unit 2) "STEAM HEADER PRESSURE"

- GREATER THAN 200 PSIG.

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO for AS Header pressure.

If so, Floor Instructor report as U2 RO that U2 Steam psig. (Step 13.g) Dispatch operator to check for leaks.

NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO to look for leaks.

If so, Floor Instructor:

acknowledge

. Booth Instructor: Report back in 3

-5 minutes that there are no leaks.

NOTE: The CRS may NOT dispatch AOs to look for leaks because it is understood that the Steam Dump valve opening was the reason that AP-1 was entered.

BOP (Step 14) Check UST level

- STABLE OR GOING UP.

CRS (Step 15) Evaluate unit shutdown as follows:

Check unit status

- IN MODE 1 OR 2.

Determine if unit shutdown or load reduction is warranted based on the following criteria:

NOTE: CRS may call WCC/Management to address the startup.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC. Size of leak Location of leak Rate of depletion of secondary inventory IF steam is leaking from a secondary heater relief OR MSR relief valve, THEN reducing turbine load-.

NOTE: No Relief Valve is leaking. IF turbine trip will isolate steam leak (such as feedwater heater leak or MSR leak)-

NOTE: A Turbine Trip is NOT needed to isolate the steam leak.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 1 Page 15 of 53 Event

Description:

TDCA Pump starts inadvertently Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Check unit shutdown or load reduction

- REQUIRED.

NOTE: Shutdown/Load Reduction will NOT be required.

CRS (Step 15.c RNO) Perform the following:

Maintain present plant conditions until leak can be isolated or repaired.

Exit this procedure.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

NOTE: The CRS may address Tech Specs based on plant response.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.5, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW) SYSTEM CRS LCO 3.7.5 Three AFW trains shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, 2, And 3, MODE 4 when steam generator is relied upon for heat removal.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One steam supply to turbine driven AFW pump inoperable A.1 Restore steam supply to OPERABLE status. 7 days AND 10 days form discovery of failure to meet the LCO NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION A Only if 1SA-1 has been isolated and flow control valves have been re-opened. B. One AFW train inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3 for reasons other than Condition A.

B.1 Restore AFW train to OPERABLE status. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> AND 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION B Only if 1SA-1 remains OPEN (TDCA Pump remains running), and flow control valves have been closed

.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 1 Page 16 of 53 Event

Description:

TDCA Pump starts inadvertently Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENT 16.9.7, STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM CRS COMMITMENT The Standby Shutdown System (SSS) shall be FUNCTIONAL.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

CRS REMEDIAL ACTIONS The SRO should ensure that security is notified 10 minutes prior to declaring the SSS inoperable. Immediately upon discovery of the SSS inoperability, Security must be notified to implement compensatory measures within 10 minutes of discovery.

CRS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that SLC 16.9.7 ACTION A is applicable.

A. One or more required SSS components identified in Table 16.9.7

-1 non-functional.

A.1 Verify the FUNCTIONALITY of fire detection and suppression systems in the associated areas identified in Table16.9.7

-1. AND A.2 Restore the component to FUNCTIONAL status. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />

7 days At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 2 Page 17 of 53 Event

Description:

FRV Controller and Bypass Valve Failure Next, the 1B SG FRV Controller will fail to MANUAL and the FRV Bypass valve will fail fully open resulting in the Feedwater Control Valve for the 1B SG closing and causing SG Level to lower. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/0 6, "S/G Feedwater Malfunction," and control the 1B SG Level manually

. Booth Operator Instructions:

InsertMAL

-DCSSLIM17G BUTTON_ DEPRESSED Delete 1A MAL

-DCSSLIM17G = 2 InsertMAL

-DCSSLIM17E BUTTON_ DEPRESSED Delete 1A MAL

-DCSSLIM17E = 2

insertREM

-CF0105AB = 1 Indications Available:

DCS Computer Alarm: S/G B FCV IN MANUAL MODE 1B SG Feed Flow lowers 1B FCV starts to close 1B FCV Bypass Valve fully opens Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP/1/A/5500/6

, S/G FEEDWATER MALFUNCTION RO (Step 1) Check all CF control and bypass valves - OPERATING PROPERLY.

NOTE: The 1B FRV is NOT operating properly in AUTO.

RO (Step 1 RNO) IF valve has failed, THEN perform the following:

NOTE: The RO will place the 1B FRV in MANUAL and restore level to program.

Place affected valve(s) in manual.

Restore S/G level to program.

RO (Step 2) Check both CF pumps

- OPERATING PROPERLY.

RO (Step 3) Check unit status as follows:

Reactor trip breakers

- CLOSED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 2 Page 18 of 53 Event

Description:

FRV Controller and Bypass Valve Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Pzr pressure

- GREATER THAN P

-11 (1955 PSIG).

CRS (Step 4) IF AT ANY TIME S/G N/R level approaches 17% OR 83%, THEN perform the following:

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Trip reactor GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E

-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

CRS (Step 5) Announce occurrence on page.

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 6) Check reactor power

- GREATER THAN 3%. RO (Step 7) Check CM/CF

- PRESENTLY FEEDING S/Gs.

RO (Step 8) Check S/G levels

- STABLE OR TRENDING TO PROGRAM LEVEL.

RO (Step 9) Check NC temperature as follows:

IF any NC pump on, THEN check NC T

-Avg - STABLE OR TRENDING TO DESIRED TEMPERATURE.

RO (Step 10) Check all S/G CF control valves

- IN AUTO. NOTE: The 1B FRV will be in MANUAL. NOTE: The 1B FRV will remain in MANUAL throughout the remainder of the scenario.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 2 Page 19 of 53 Event

Description:

FRV Controller and Bypass Valve Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 10 RNO) WHEN automatic control desired AND affected S/G level(s) at program level, THEN place affected CF control valve(s) in automatic.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

RO (Step 11) Check all S/G CF control bypass valves - IN AUTO. RO (Step 12) Check the following on running CF pumps: On DCS workstation, Feedpump Overview graphic, check "AUTO" (located below "AUTO/SPD" select button on running CF pump(s))

- INDICATED CF pump low pressure governor control

- IN AUTO CF pump high pressure governor control

- IN AUTO. RO (Step 13) Check all CA pumps

- OFF. NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the failed controller

. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief

. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 3 Page 20 of 53 Event

Description:

NCS Leak Following this, a 70-90 gpm leak will develop on the reactor head from a Control Rod Guide Tube. The crew will implement AP/1/A/5500/10, "NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps." The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.13, "RCS Operational Leakage."

Booth Operator Instructions:

insert MAL

-NC007D = 0.3 3 Indications Available:

1AD-13/B-3, CONT PRESS ALERT HI.

1RAD-1/E-2, 1EMF CONTAINMENT PARTS.

Containment Pressure increases.

Pzr Level decreases.

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP/1/A/5500/10, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF BOTH NV PUMPS CASE II, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE BOP (Step 1) Check leak

- KNOWN TO BE IN THE AUX BUILDING.

NOTE: The NCS leak is NOT known to be in the Aux Building.

SRO (Step 1 RNO) Perform the following:

IF containment entry is in progress,

-. NOTE: A Containment Entry is NOT in progress.

IF in Modes 1

-4, OR no-mode, THEN GO TO Step 2.

BOP (Step 2) Check Pzr level

- STABLE OR GOING UP.

BOP (Step 2 RNO) Perform the following as required to maintain level:

BOP Maintain charging flow less than 200 GPM at all times in subsequent steps.

Ensure 1NV

-238 (Charging Line Flow Control) opening.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 3 Page 21 of 53 Event

Description:

NCS Leak Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Open 1NV-241 (U1 Seal Water Inj Flow Control) while maintaining NC pump seal flow greater than 6 GPM.

Reduce or isolate letdown.

NOTE: The BOP may reduce letdown flow to 45 gpm, or isolate it altogether.

Start additional NV pump.

NOTE: The BOP will NOT need to start an additional NV Pump. BOP IF Pzr level cannot be maintained greater than 4%, OR Pzr level going down with maximum charging flow-.

NOTE: The Pzr level is NOT < 4%, or decreasing with maximum Charging flow.

BOP (Step 3) IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure Pzr level cannot be maintained stable, -... NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

BOP (Step 4) Check Pzr pressure

- STABLE OR TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG.

RO (Step 5) check main steam line intact:

Reactor power

- AT TURBINE POWER NC Loop T

-Avg - STABLE. SRO (Step 6) Announce occurrence on page.

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO / BOP (Step 7) Estimate leak rate using any of the following methods:

Monitor OAC NV graphic OR Compare charging flow to letdown flow plus seal return flow OR Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 3 Page 22 of 53 Event

Description:

NCS Leak Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Monitor VCT level trend (OAC point M1P1271).

NOTE: The leak should be estimated to be 30

-90 gpm. CRS (Step 8) REFER TO RP/0/A/5700/000 (Classification of Emergency).

NOTE: CRS may ask OSM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

CRS (Step 9) IF AT ANY TIME NC leakage exceeds Tech Spec limits, THEN perform the following:

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Ensure Outside Air Pressure Filter train in service PER OP/0/A/6450/011 (Control Area Ventilation/Chilled Water System), Enclosure 4.4 (Control Room Atmosphere Pressurization During Abnormal Conditions).

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 BOP to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 BOP.

Examiner NOTE: The CRS may assign the BOP to perform this action.

If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of OP/0/A/6450/011 Enclosure 4.4.

Other Examiners follow AP-10 Actions, Step 10, on Page 24. Have another SRO evaluate if leakage exceeds SLC 16.9.7 condition C limits and immediately notify security if SSF is inoperable.

NOTE: CRS may ask OSM to address, OR call Security on their own If OSM is asked, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM. If the CRS calls Security, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Security.

OP/1/A/6450/011, CONTROL AREA VENTILATION/CHILLED WATER SYSTEM ENCLOSURE 4.4, CONTROL ROOM ATMOSPHERE PRESSURIZATION DURING ABNORMAL CONDITIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 3 Page 23 of 53 Event

Description:

NCS Leak Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3.1) Evaluate all outstanding R&Rs that may impact performance of this procedure.

BOP (Step 3.2) Perform the following sections as applicable:

Section 3.3, Pressurize Control Room Using Outside Air Pressure Fans Section 3.4, Securing Pressurization of Control Room BOP (Step 3.3) Pressurize Control Room using Outside Air Pressure Fans as follows:

BOP (Step 3.3.1) Ensure at least one the following groups of intake valves open:

1VC-1A (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 1) 1VC-2A (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 1) 1VC-3B (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 1) 1VC-4B (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 1)

OR 1VC-9A (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 2) 1VC-10A (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit

2) 1VC-11B (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit

2) 1VC-12B (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit

2) BOP (Step 3.3.2) IF A Train VC / YC operating, place "A Train CR Outside Air Press Fan" to "ON". BOP (Step 3.3.3) IF B Train VC / YC operating, place "B Train CR Outside Air Press Fan" to "ON".

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 3 Page 24 of 53 Event

Description:

NCS Leak Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3.3.4) Depress "MAN" for the following (to ensure fans off):

1. 1 CRA Otsd Air Fan

1. 2 CRA Otsd Air Fan BOP (Step 3.3.5) Depress "OFF" for the following:

CRA-OAD-4 (CR Area Otsd Air Fans Damper) CRA-OAD-3 (CR Area Otsd Air Fans Damper) BOP (Step 3.3.6) Check the following dark:

CRA-OAD-4 (CR Area Otsd Air Fans Damper) "OPEN" light CRA-OAD-3 (CR Area Otsd Air Fans Damper) "OPEN" light Examiner NOTE:

Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE. AP/1/A/5500/10, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF BOTH NV PUMPS CASE II, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE SRO (Step 10) IF AT ANY TIME VCT level goes below 16% ("VCT ABNORMAL LEVEL" alarm (1AD

-7, D-3) low setpoint), THEN align NV pump suction to FWST NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

BOP (Step 11) IF AT ANY TIME Containment pressure exceeds Tech Spec limit (0.3 PSIG), THEN evaluate placing all 4 VL AHU mode select switches in "H IGH" to prevent them from cycling around 0.5 PSIG.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

BOP (Step 12) Check seal leakoff on all NC pumps - LESS THAN 6 GPM.

BOP (Step 13) Check NC pump thermal barriers intact as follows:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 3 Page 25 of 53 Event

Description:

NCS Leak Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NC pump thermal barrier KC outlet flows and temperatures on OAC KC graphic NORMAL (flow and temperature should be similar for all 4 NC pumps).

KC surge tank level rates on OAC KC graphic - NORMAL. KC Surge Tank level

- NORMAL. 1EMF-46A (Train A Component Cooling)

- NORMAL. 1EMF-46B (Train B Component Cooling)

- NORMAL. CRS (Step 14) GO TO Step 16.

BOP (Step 16) Check leak

- SUSPECTED ON LETDOWN LINE NEAR DEMINERALIZERS.

NOTE: The NCS leak is NOT suspected to be on the Letdown Line near the Demineralizers.

CRS (Step 16 RNO) GO TO Step 18.

BOP (Step 18) Check leak

- KNOWN TO BE ON NORMAL LETDOWN LINE.

NOTE: The NCS leak is NOT known to be on the Normal Letdown Line.

CRS (Step 18 RNO) GO TO Step 20.

BOP (Step 20) Check leak

- KNOWN TO BE ON VCT. NOTE: The NCS leak is NOT known to be on the VCT.

CRS (Step 20 RNO) GO TO Step 22.

BOP (Step 22) Check leak

- KNOWN TO BE ON NORMAL CHARGING LINE DOWNSTREAM OF 1NV-244A (Charging Line Cont Outside Isol). NOTE: The NCS leak is NOT known to be on the Normal Charging Line downstream of 1NV-244A.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 3 Page 26 of 53 Event

Description:

NCS Leak Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 22 RNO) GO TO Step 24.

BOP (Step 24) Check the following indications

- NORMAL: Pzr safeties:

"PZR RELIEF VALVE TEMP" "PZR RELIEF LINE NO FLOW" acoustic indication light.

Pzr PORVs:

"PZR RELIEF VALVE TEMP".

PRT conditions:

Pressure Level Temperature BOP (Step 25) check all CLA levels

- NORMAL. BOP (Step 26) Check the following NCDT parameters:

Level - NORMAL Temperature

- NORMAL "PUMP FLOW"

- AT "RECIRC FLOW".

BOP (Step 27) Check Containment floor and equipment sumps

- NORMAL. BOP (Step 27 RNO) IF level going up AND Containment is accessible, THEN check inputs to CFAE sumps per PT/1/A/4150/001D (identifying sump leakage).

NOTE: CRS may call WCC to address. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC, and respond as appropriate.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 3 Page 27 of 53 Event

Description:

NCS Leak Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 28) Check leak location

- HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED.

NOTE: The NCS leak location has NOT been identified.

CRS (Step 28 RNO) Perform the following steps as necessary to identify location of leak:

IF leak is inside containment, THEN evaluate isolating letdown and charging PER Steps 19 and 23 to see if leak exists on these headers.

NOTE: Letdown is likely isolated.

Notify WCC SRO to review recent changes in plant status:

NOTE: CRS may call WCC to address the leak.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC, and respond as appropriate.

Any equipment removed from service Any equipment returned to service Any venting or draining in progress.

BOP Notify Radwaste Chemistry to check the following tanks and sumps for excessive input: NOTE: CRS may call RW to address the leak.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as RW, and respond as appropriate.

ND/NS sump RHT Waste Drain Tank WEFT FDT Spent Resin Storage Tank.

IF affected tank or sump readily identified,--

NOTE: The NCS leak location has NOT been identified.

BOP IF affected tank or sump not identified, THEN check all tanks and sumps in next steps. Check inputs to desired tanks and sumps PER PT/1/A/4150/001D (Identifying NC System Leakage).

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 BOP to perform.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 BOP.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 3 Page 28 of 53 Event

Description:

NCS Leak Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP IF necessary to check inputs to FDT or WEFT, THEN --..

NOTE: The NCS leak location is known to be in the Containment.

IF leakage suspected through 1NV

-137A (NC Filters Otlt 3

-Way Cntrl) to RHT, THEN --- NOTE: The NCS leak location is known to be in the Containment.

CRS IF leak possibly going to Unit 1 BAT, THEN --..

NOTE: The NCS leak location is known to be in the Containment.

CRS (Step 29) Ensure RP is notified of location and size of leak.

NOTE: CRS may call WCC/RP to address the NCS leak. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/RP.

BOP (Step 30) Check normal letdown

- IN SERVICE. NOTE: Letdown is likely isolated.

CRS (Step 30 RNO) IF normal letdown must remain isolated for greater than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, THEN notify Primary Chemistry to ensure zinc addition is secured.

NOTE: CRS may call WCC/Primary Chemistry to address the letdown isolation.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/Primary Chemistry

. CRS (Step 31) Contact station management to evaluate need to shutdown.

NOTE: CRS may call WCC to contact management.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC, and as Station Management direct that the plant be taken off

-line within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />

. CRS (Step 32) Check unit shutdown

- REQUIRED.

CRS (Step 33) Shutdown PER one of the following:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 3 Page 29 of 53 Event

Description:

NCS Leak Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OP/1/A/6100/003 (Controlling Procedure For Unit Operation), Enclosure 4.2 (Power Reduction)

OR AP/1/A/5500/04 (Rapid Downpower).

NOTE: The CRS will transition to AP-4. NOTE: It is likely that the CRS will acknowledge that the Technical Specification for leakage has been exceeded, but not stop to assess.

Examiner NOTE:

May seek to discuss with CRS after the scenario.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.13, RCS OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE CRS 3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE CRS LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:

No pressure boundary LEAKAGE; 1 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE; 10 gpm identified LEAKAGE; 389 gallons per day total primary to secondary LEAKAGE through steam generators (SGs); and 135 gallons per day primary to secondary LEAKAGE through any one steam generator (SG).

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, AND 4.

CRS ACTIONS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 3 Page 30 of 53 Event

Description:

NCS Leak Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS will determine that LCO 3.4.13 is NOT met, and that Condition A is applicable, during the course of the transient.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. RCS Operational LEAKAGE not within limits for reasons other than pressure boundary LEAKAGE or primary to secondary LEAKAGE. A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE within limits. 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENT 16.9.7 STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM CRS 16.9.7 Standby Shutdown System CRS COMMITMENT: The Standby Shutdown System (SSS) shall be operable.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

CRS REMEDIAL ACTIONS:

The SRO should ensure that security is notified 10 minutes prior to declaring the SSS inoperable. Immediately upon discovery of the SSS inoperability, Security must be notified to implement compensatory measures within 10 minutes of the discovery.

NOTE: The CRS may have already handed this off the OSM, however, the remedial action of notifying Security within 10 minutes must be identified by the CRS.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 3 Page 31 of 53 Event

Description:

NCS Leak Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments If inoperable SSS component is located inside containment, repairs shall be made at the first outage which permits containment access.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Total Unidentified LEAKAGE, Identified LEAKAGE, and reactor coolant pump seal leakoff > 20 gpm. OR Total reactor coolant pump seal leakoff > 16.3 gpm.

C.1 Declare the Standby Makeup Pump inoperable.

AND C.2 Enter Condition A. Immediately When directed to perform a shutdown in AP

-10 move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 4 Page 32 of 53 Event

Description:

Rapid Downpower Ultimately, the crew will enter AP/1/A/5500/4, "Rapid Downpower."

Booth Operator Instructions:

NA Indications Available:

NA. Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP/1/A/5500/04, RAPID DOWNPOWER RO/ BOP (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

CRS (Step 2) Announce occurrence on page.

NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 3) Check turbine control

- IN AUTO. RO (Step 4) Check "MW LOOP"

- IN SERVICE.

RO (Step 4 RNO) Depress "MW IN/MW OUT" pushbutton.

CRS (Step 5) Check shutdown to Mode 3

- DESIRED. CRS (Step 6) Check if "Shutdown Via Reactor Trip from 15% Power" appropriate:

Shutdown Via Reactor Trip from 15% Power

- DESIRED At least two CA pumps

- OPERABLE.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 4 Page 33 of 53 Event

Description:

Rapid Downpower CRS (Step 7) Enter target load of 180 MW in turbine control panel.

CRS (Step 8) Determine the required power reduction rate (MW/min).

NOTE: The CRS will reduce load at 15-30 MWe/minute.

RO (Step 9) Check control rods

- IN AUTO. BOP (Step 10) Notify SOC of load reduction (red dispatcher phone).

Booth Instructor: as SOC, acknowledge.

RO (Step 11) Initiate turbine load reduction to desired load at desired rate.

BOP (Step 12) Borate NC System as follows:

Energize all backup Pzr heaters.

CRS Check unit to be shutdown

- VIA REACTOR TRIP FROM 15% POWER.

NOTE: It is normal practice to shut down the reactor by driving rods, rather than tripping from 15%

. CRS (Step 12b. RNO) GO TO Step 12.d.

BOP Determine boration amount based on the following:

Power Reduction Rate (MW/min)

Present NC System Boron Concentration (ppm)

Total Power change (%).

Record calculated boration amount:

NOTE: Based on the rate of load reduction the total boration is 800-1100 gallons.

RO Check auto or manual rod control

- AVAILABLE.

BOP Perform boration in 4 equal additions during load reduction PER OP/1/A/6150/009 (Boron Concentration Control), Enclosure 4.7 (Boration Using 1NV-265B (Boric Acid to NV Pumps)).

NOTE: The CRS may assign the BOP to perform this action.

If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 4.7.

Other Examiners follow AP-4 Actions, Step 13, on Page 35.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 4 Page 34 of 53 Event

Description:

Rapid Downpower OP/1/A/6150/009 BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ENCLOSURE 4.7 BORATION USING 1NV

-265B (BORIC ACID TO NV PUMPS)

BOP (Step 3.1) Evaluate all outstanding R&Rs that may impact performance of this procedure.

BOP (Step 3.2) Evaluate energizing additional pressurizer heaters per OP/1/A/6100/003 (Controlling Procedure For Unit Operation) to enhance system mixing when changing NC System boron concentration. (R.M.)

BOP (Step 3.3) Perform following sections, as applicable:

Section 3.6, Adding Greater Than 20 Gallons of Boric Acid BOP (Step 3.6) Adding Greater Than 20 Gallons of Boric Acid Ensure one of the following running: 1A BA Trans Pump OR 1B BA Trans Pump Determine length of time 1NV

-265B (U1 NV Pump Boric Acid Sup Isol) full open as follows: (R.M.)

BOP IF using Table 4.7

-1 (Time 1NV

-265B Full Open With One BAT Pump Running), record time 1NV

-265B full open from table:_____sec.

IF using equation, perform the following:

Calculate time 1NV

-265 is to to be Full Open.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 4 Page 35 of 53 Event

Description:

Rapid Downpower Open 1NV-265B (U1 NV Pump Boric Acid Sup Isol). (R.M.)

Examiner NOTE: When MOV-265 is OPEN, the Turbine will shift to MANUAL. Move forward to Event 5.

HOLD until 1NV

-265B (U1 NV Boric Acid Sup Isol) full open time elapsed, THEN close 1NV

-265B (U1 NV Pump Boric Acid Sup Isol). (R.M.)

IF 1NV-265B (U1 NV Boric Acid Sup Isol) will NOT close-IF BA Trans Pump started in Step 3.6.1, perform the following:

Ensure the following off:

1A BA Trans Pump 1B BA Trans Pump Ensure one of the following selected to "AUTO":

1A BA Trans Pump OR 1B BA Trans Pump AP/1/A/5500/04, RAPID DOWNPOWER Examiner NOTE:

Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE. RO (Step 13) Check control rods

- MOVING IN AS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN T

-AVG AT T-REF. RO (Step 14) Display Rod Insertion Limits on OAC by entering turn on code "RIL".

CRS (Step 15) IF AT ANY TIME "CONTROL ROD BANK LO LO LIMIT" alarm (1AD

-2, B-9) is lit, THEN perform one of the following to comply with Tech Spec 3.1.6 (Control Bank Insertion Limits)

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 4 Page 36 of 53 Event

Description:

Rapid Downpower Ensure alarm clears within one hour as Xenon builds in.

OR Initiate boration as necessary within one hour to restore control rods above insertion limits.

CRS (Step 16) IF AT ANY TIME during this procedure C

-7A is received, THEN ensure Transient Monitor freeze is triggered.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

CRS (Step 17)

REFER TO the following:

NOTE: The CRS may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

RP/0/A/5700/000 (Classification of Emergency)

RP/0/A/5700/010 (NRC Immediate Notification Requirements).

CRS (Step 18) Notify Reactor Engineer on duty of load reduction.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/RE to address the load reduction.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/RE.

Examiner NOTE: The CRS may proceed past Step 18 of AP4 while waiting for the BOP to complete the first boration.

If so, wait until the BOP is complete with the first boration an then proceed to the next event. When The Turbine fails to MANUAL, move to Event #

5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 5 Page 37 of 53 Event

Description:

Turbine Control Unit fails to MANUAL During the downpower, a failure will occur in the Turbine Control Unit causing the unit to shift from Operator Auto to Manual control. The operator will address 1AD

-1/F-4, TURBINE IN MANUAL, and control the Turbine manually during the downpower in accordance with OP/1/A/6300/001A, Enclosure 4.1, "Turbine Generator Load Change."

Booth Operator Instructions:

(Turbine Control Fails to MANUAL) Set in initial conditions. Triggered from 1NV

-265B open light ON.

Indications Available:

Turbine MWe indication stabilizes MCB Annunciator 1AD

-1/F-4, TURBINE IN MANUAL Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS will continue in AP-4 while the ARP/OP are addressed.

MCB ANNUNCIATOR 1AD

-1/F4, TURBINE IN MANUAL RO Immediate Action: Ensure Turbine/Generator operation stabilizes in either Load or Speed Modes of operation.

NOTE: The Turbine will stabilize in LOAD Mode.

CRS (Step 1) Determine cause and effect, then notify IAE of any malfunction.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the Turbine Control failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

RO (Step 2) Refer to OP/1/A/6300/001 A (Turbine-Generator Load Change) for manual operation of Turbine Generator.

NOTE: The RO will continue the load reduction in MANUAL.

CRS (Step 3) WHEN available and desired, return DEH to "OPER AUTO".

OP/1/A/6300/001 A, TURBINE

-GENERATOR LOAD CHANGE ENCLOSURE 4.1, TURBINE

-GENERATOR LOAD CHANGE

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 5 Page 38 of 53 Event

Description:

Turbine Control Unit fails to MANUAL Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 3.5) Changing Turbine Load RO (Step 3.5.1) IF Turbine in "OPERATOR AUTO"- RO (Step 3.5.3) IF Turbine in "MANUAL" perform the following:

Ensure desired change within "Calculated Capability Curve".

If turbine load will increase or decrease more than 10 MWs, notify Dispatcher of expected load change.

IF raising load, -

IF decreasing load, depress "GV LOWER". Examiner NOTE: The CRS may be at any one of the following AP4 steps after addressing the Turbine in MANUAL event

. AP/1/A/5500/04, RAPID DOWNPOWER RO (Step 13) Check control rods

- MOVING IN AS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN T

-AVG AT T-REF. RO (Step 14) Display Rod Insertion Limits on OAC by entering turn on code "RIL".

CRS (Step 15) IF AT ANY TIME "CONTROL ROD BANK LO LO LIMIT" alarm (1AD

-2, B-9) is lit, THEN perform one of the following to comply with Tech Spec 3.1.6 (Control Bank Insertion Limits)

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Ensure alarm clears within one hour as Xenon builds in.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 5 Page 39 of 53 Event

Description:

Turbine Control Unit fails to MANUAL Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OR Initiate boration as necessary within one hour to restore control rods above insertion limits.

CRS (Step 16) IF AT ANY TIME during this procedure C

-7A is received, THEN ensure Transient Monitor freeze is triggered.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

CRS (Step 17)

REFER TO the following:

NOTE: The CRS may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

RP/0/A/5700/000 (Classification of Emergency)

RP/0/A/5700/010 (NRC Immediate Notification Requirements).

CRS (Step 18) Notify Reactor Engineer on duty of load reduction.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/RE to address the load reduction.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/RE.

(Step 19) Check target load

- LESS THAN 1000 MW. (Step 20) Check Unit 2 available to supply aux steam as follows:

Unit 2 Reactor power

- GREATER THAN 15% NOTE: CRS will ask U2 RO for status.

Floor Instructor: Report as U2 RO that Unit 2 is at 100% power.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 5 Page 40 of 53 Event

Description:

Turbine Control Unit fails to MANUAL Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Unit 2 AS

-12 (U2 SM to AS Hdr Control Inlet Isol)

- OPEN NOTE: CRS will ask U2 RO for valve position.

Floor Instructor: Report as U2 RO that Unit 2 AS

-12 is OPEN. Unit 2 - AVAILABLE TO SUPPLY AS HEADER. NOTE: CRS will ask U2 RO for AS availability.

Floor Instructor: Report as U2 RO that Unit 2 is available to supply AS Header.

(Step 21) Check SM flow on all S/Gs

- GREATER THAN 25%.

(Step 22) WHEN all SM flows are less than 75%, THEN ensure the following valves ramp CLOSED:

1CF-104AB (1A S/G CF Control Bypass) 1CF-105AB (1B S/G CF Control Bypass) 1CF-106AB (1C S/G CF Control Bypass) 1CF-107AB (1D S/G CF Control Bypass)

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, move to Event s #6-10.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 41 of 53 Event

Description:

Rod Ejection/SB LOCA/1B NV Pump Trip/EDG A Sequencer Failure/1 B NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO/2 nd Rod Ejection/SB LOCA After this, Control Rod D

-4 will be ejected from the core causing a 1000 gpm Small Break LOCA. The operator will trip the Reactor and actuate Safety Injection, and then enter EP/1/A/5000/E

-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." On the Safety Injection actuation the EDG A Sequencer will fail to automatically sequence, and the operator will need to manually start ECCS loads. Additionally, the 1B NV Pump will trip, and the 1B NI Pump will fail to start automatically. The operator will be required to start the 1B NI Pump manually. Upon completion of E

-0, the operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/E

-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant." At that time a second Control Rod (F

-14) will be ejected from the core causing the Small Break LOCA to degrade to the point at which the NC Pumps will need to be tripped. The scenario will terminate at Step 9 of E-1, after the crew has been directed to return back to the beginning of E

-1. Booth Operator Instructions:

insert NC005D4 (1000 gpm)

Indications Available:

Control Rod D

-4 Red Rod Bottom Light flashes on DRPI Containment Pressure starts to rise Charging flow starts to increase Pzr level starts to lower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of E

-0, prior to the CRS addressing the EP. EP/1/A/5000/E

-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO/ BOP (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip:

Immediate Action All rod bottom lights

- LIT NOTE: The Ejected Rod does NOT indicate on the Bottom. Reactor trip and bypass breakers

- OPEN I/R amps

- GOING DOWN.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 42 of 53 Event

Description:

Rod Ejection/SB LOCA/1B NV Pump Trip/EDG A Sequencer Failure/1 B NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO/2 nd Rod Ejection/SB LOCA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 2 RNO) Perform the following:

Immediate Action Trip reactor.

IF reactor will not trip, -

RO (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip:

Immediate Action All throttle valves

- CLOSED. BOP (Step 4) Check 1ETA and 1ETB

- ENERGIZED.

Immediate Action RO/ BOP (Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated:

Immediate Action "SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED" status light (1SI

-18) - LIT. Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1SI

-14) - LIT. RO/ BOP Foldout Page NC Pump Trip Criteria NOTE: It is expected that NCP Trip Criteria will eventually apply.

CA Suction Sources Position Criteria for 1NV150B and 1NV151A (U1 NV Pump Recirc Isol)

Ruptured S/G Aux Feedwater Isolation Criteria Faulted S/G Aux Feedwater Isolation Criteria

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 43 of 53 Event

Description:

Rod Ejection/SB LOCA/1B NV Pump Trip/EDG A Sequencer Failure/1 B NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO/2 nd Rod Ejection/SB LOCA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 6) Announce "Unit 1 Safety Injection".

NOTE: The CRS may ask the U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 7) Check all Feedwater Isolation status lights (1SI

-4) - LIT. NOTE: The 1B FRV Bypass Valve is OPEN.

RO (Step 7 RNO) Initiate Feedwater Isolation.

BOP (Step 8) Check Phase A "RESET" lights

- DARK. BOP (Step 9) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s):

Groups 1, 2, 5

- DARK. Group 3 - LIT. Group 4 - LIT AS REQUIRED.

NOTE: Several lights will be DARK (1B NV Pump has tripped, 1 B NI Pump has failed to start, EDG A Sequencer has failed to operate).

The BOP will need to manually start train A equipment and the 1 B NI Pump. (Step 9.c RNO) Align or start components as required.

Group 6 - LIT. NOTE: The 1B FRV Bypass Valve is OPEN (Step 9.d RNO) GO TO Step 9.f.

Check the following:

OAC IN SERVICE

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 44 of 53 Event

Description:

Rod Ejection/SB LOCA/1B NV Pump Trip/EDG A Sequencer Failure/1 B NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO/2 nd Rod Ejection/SB LOCA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments LOCA Sequencer Actuated status light (1SI14) on energized train(s) LIT. Perform the following on energized train(s):

Check OAC Monitor Light Program ("MONL") for Group 6 windows that are dark.

Align valves as required, while continuing in this EP.

Critical Task

Establish flow from at least one high

-head ECCS Pump before transition out of E-0. Safety Significance:

Failure to establish flow from the NV System after failure of the automatic actuation constitutes a demonstrated inability by the operator to recognize a failure and/or correct a failure of an ESF System or component. The FSAR analyses of response to hig h energy line breaks assume that at least one train of safeguards actuates. If the minimum assumed ESF components are NOT actuated the Safety Analyses results are invalid. Because compliance with the assumptions in the FSAR is part of the facility license, failure to comply constitutes a violation of the license condition.

BOP (Step 10) Check proper CA pump status:

MD CA pumps

- ON NOTE: The 1A MDCA will need to be manually started (Step 10.a RNO) Start pumps.

N/R level in at least 3 S/Gs - GREATER THAN 17%.

BOP (Step 11) Check all KC pumps

- ON BOP (Step 12) Check both RN pumps

- ON. CRS (Step 13) Notify Unit 2 to start 2A RN pump.

Floor Instructor:

As U2 RO report "2A RN Pump is running."

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 45 of 53 Event

Description:

Rod Ejection/SB LOCA/1B NV Pump Trip/EDG A Sequencer Failure/1 B NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO/2 nd Rod Ejection/SB LOCA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Start 2A RN pump.

THROTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum for existing plant conditions.

Booth Instructor:

insert LOA

-RN087 (Start 2A RN Pump) insert LOA

-RN083 8050.000000 delay=0 ramp=10 (Unit 2 Train A Demand Flow)

RO (Step 14) Check all S/G pressures

- GREATER THAN 775 PSIG.

BOP (Step 15) Check Containment Pressure

- HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG.

NOTE: Containment pressure is 2.5 psig, and slowly rising due to the LOCA. BOP (Step 16) Check S/I flow:

BOP Check "NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW" gauge - INDICATING FLOW.

Check NC pressure

- LESS THAN 1600 PSIG. NOTE: NCS pressure could be greater than or less than 1600 psig. If pressure is greater than 1600 psig, then perform RNO.

BOP (Step 16.b RNO) Perform the following:

Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running pump(s) open:

1ND-68A (1A ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol) 1ND-67B (1B ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol).

CRS IF valve(s) open on all running ND pumps, THEN GO TO Step 1

7.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 46 of 53 Event

Description:

Rod Ejection/SB LOCA/1B NV Pump Trip/EDG A Sequencer Failure/1 B NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO/2 nd Rod Ejection/SB LOCA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 17) Notify OSM or other SRO to perform EP/1/A/5000/G

-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions Following an S/I) within 10 minutes.

NOTE: The CRS may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

BOP (Step 18) Check CA flow:

Total CA flow

- GREATER THAN 450 GPM. Check VI header pressure

- GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.

WHEN each S/G N/R level is greater than 11% (32% ACC), THEN control CA flow to maintain that S/G N/R levels between 11% (32% ACC) and 50%.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

NOTE: The use of adverse Containment numbers is required if Containment Pressure is > 3 psig.

RO (Step 19) Check NC temperatures:

IF all NC pumps off, THEN check NC T

-Avg - STABLE OR TRENDING TO 557ºF. BOP (Step 20) Check Pzr PORV and spray valves: All Pzr PORVs

- CLOSED. Normal Pzr spray valves

- CLOSED At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve

- OPEN. RO (Step 21) Check NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs

- GREATER THAN 0ºF.

RO (Step 22) Check if main steamlines intact:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 47 of 53 Event

Description:

Rod Ejection/SB LOCA/1B NV Pump Trip/EDG A Sequencer Failure/1 B NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO/2 nd Rod Ejection/SB LOCA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments All S/G pressures

- STABLE OR GOING UP All S/Gs

- PRESSURIZED.

RO/ BOP (Step 23) Check if S/G tubes intact:

The following secondary EMFs

- NORMAL: 1EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust) 1EMF-34(L) (S/G Sample (Lo Range)) 1EMF-24 (S/G A) 1EMF-25 (S/G B) 1EMF-26 (S/G C) 1EMF-27 (S/G D)

S/G levels

- STABLE OR GOING UP IN A CONTROLLED MANNER. RO/ BOP (Step 24) Check if NC System intact as follows: NOTE: 1EMF-38L is in TRIP 2. 1EMF-38(L) (Containment Particulate (LR))

- NORMAL 1EMF-39(L) (Containment Gas (Lo Range)) - NORMAL 1EMF-40 (Containment Iodine)

- NORMAL Check containment pressure

- LESS THAN 1 PSIG Check containment sump level

- NORMAL Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 48 of 53 Event

Description:

Rod Ejection/SB LOCA/1B NV Pump Trip/EDG A Sequencer Failure/1 B NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO/2 nd Rod Ejection/SB LOCA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 24 RNO) Perform the following:

IF H2 Igniters are off, THEN perform the following:

NOTE: The H2 Igniters are OFF. Energize H 2 Igniters by depressing "ON" and "OVERRIDE".

Dispatch operator to stop all Unit 1 NF AHUs PER EP/1/A/5000/G

-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 28 (De-energizing Ice Condenser AHUs). NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor:

as AO, acknowledge insert LOA

-NF016 STOP (Ice Condenser AHU Start/Stop)

CRS IF AT ANY TIME both of the following conditions exist, THEN perform Enclosure 4 (VX Manual Start And Isolating RV Cooling

). NOTE: These conditions may exist. If so, it is likely that the CRS will assign the BOP to perform Enclosure 4.

Containment pressure has remained less than 3 PSIG

. Containment pressure is between 1 PSIG and 3 PSIG

. Implement EP/1/A/5000/F

-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees),

GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E

-1 (Loss Of Reactor Or Secondary Coolant).

NOTE: CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief

. Booth Operator Instructions:

insert MAL

- NC005F14 = 2000 Indications Available:

Control Rod F

-14 Red Rod Bottom Light flashes on DRPI Containment Pressure starts to rise again Charging flow starts to increase.

Pzr level starts to lower.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 49 of 53 Event

Description:

Rod Ejection/SB LOCA/1B NV Pump Trip/EDG A Sequencer Failure/1 B NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO/2 nd Rod Ejection/SB LOCA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner NOTE:

NC Subcooling will be lost on this 2nd SBLOCA. The five minute Clock to stop the NC Pumps should start WHEN subcooling is 0°F/NEGATIVE.

Record Time: __________

EP/1/A/5000/E

-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT RO/ BOP (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

RO (Step 2) Check NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs

- GREATER THAN 0°F.

RO (Step 3) Check if main steamlines intact:

All S/G pressures

- STABLE OR GOING UP All S/Gs

- PRESSURIZED.

(Step 4) Control intact S/G levels:

RO Check N/R level in any intact S/G

- GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC).

NOTE: Adverse Containment Numbers may be used. BOP Check VI header pressure

- GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.

RO THROTTLE feed flow to maintain all intact S/G N/R levels between 11% (32% ACC) and 50%.

NOTE: Adverse Containment Numbers may be used. CRS (Step 5) Check secondary radiation normal as follows:

Check all S/Gs

- INTACT.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 50 of 53 Event

Description:

Rod Ejection/SB LOCA/1B NV Pump Trip/EDG A Sequencer Failure/1 B NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO/2 nd Rod Ejection/SB LOCA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Notify RP to perform the following:

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/RP to address the switch position.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/RP.

Frisk all Unit 1 S/G cation columns to determine if activity level is significantly higher for any S/G.

Notify Control Room of survey results. CRS WHEN survey results reported, THEN perform the following:

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Check all S/G(s) activity levels

- NORMAL. BOP Check secondary EMFs

- NORMAL: 1EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust) 1EMF-34(L) (S/G Sample (Lo Range)) 1EMF-24 (S/G A) 1EMF-25 (S/G B) 1EMF-26 (S/G C) 1EMF-27 (S/G D). BOP (Step 6) Check Pzr PORVs and isolation valves: Power to all Pzr PORV isolation valves

- AVAILABLE.

All Pzr PORVs

- CLOSED. At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve

- OPEN. IF AT ANY TIME any Pzr PORV opens due to high pressure, THEN after pressure goes below 2315 PSIG, ensure PORV closes or is isolated.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 51 of 53 Event

Description:

Rod Ejection/SB LOCA/1B NV Pump Trip/EDG A Sequencer Failure/1 B NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO/2 nd Rod Ejection/SB LOCA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO/ BOP (Step 7) Check S/I termination criteria:

NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs

- GREATER THAN 0°F.

NOTE: The NCS is NOT subcooled.

Critical Task

Trip NC Pumps within 5 minutes of loss of SCM (4600/113/E13.1)

Safety Significance: Failure to trip all NCPs on a loss of subcooled margin can lead to core uncovery and to fuel temperatures in excess of 2200 oF. PT/0/A/4600/113, Enclosure 13.1 states that McGuire is committed to having NC Pumps tripped within 5 minutes of a loss of subcooling. The Safety Analysis recommends that the NC Pumps be tripped within 2 minutes to limit the depth and duration of core uncovery. It is a management expectation that the NC Pumps be tripped as quickly as possible, but within 5 minutes of a loss of subcooling. Failure to take this action represents mis

-operation by the operator which leads to degradation of the fuel cladding fission produce barrier, and a violation of a license condition.

Record Pump Stop Time: __________

subtract time recorded at time of the loss SCM on page 49 _____ = _____ minutes.

BOP (Step 7.a RNO) GO TO Step 7.f.

RO/ BOP Monitor S/I termination criteria PER Enclosure 2 (S/I Termination Criteria) while in the procedure.

IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure S/I termination criteria is met, THEN RETURN TO Step 7.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

BOP (Step 8) Check if N D pump should be stopped: NC pressure

- GREATER THAN 275 PSIG. NOTE: The ND Pumps are both ON. NC pressure

- STABLE OR GOING UP.

NOTE: The NCS pressure is likely rising at this time.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N15-1 Scenario #

5 Event # 6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 52 of 53 Event

Description:

Rod Ejection/SB LOCA/1B NV Pump Trip/EDG A Sequencer Failure/1 B NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO/2 nd Rod Ejection/SB LOCA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Any ND pump ON. Running ND pumps suction ALIGNED TO FWST. Reset the following:

S/I. Sequencers.

Stop ND pumps. IF AT ANY TIME a B/O signal occurs, THEN restart S/I equipment previously on. NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

IF AT ANY TIME NC pressure goes below 275 PSIG in an uncontrolled manner, THEN restart ND pumps.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

BOP (Step 9) Check NC and S/G pressures:

All S/G pressure

- STABLE OR GOING UP. NC pressure

- STABLE OR GOING DOWN. NOTE: The NCS pressure is likely rising at this point, and the CRS will return to Step

1. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

UNIT 1 STATUS:

Power Level:

100% NCS [B] 935 ppm Pzr [B]: 935 ppm Xe: Per OAC Power History:

At this power level for 178 days Core Burnup:

250 EFPDs CONTROLLING PROCEDURE:

OP/1/A/6100/0 03 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME T HE SHIFT: The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The following equipment is Out

-Of-Service:

1A RV Pump is OOS for motor replacement.

The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance.

1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating)

. MCB Annunciator 1AD

-1, F-9, "DEH/MSR SYSTEM MALFUNCT," has failed to OFF (IAE is investigating)

. Crew Directions:

Maintain present power level.

Work Control SRO/Offsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe (FB) NLO's AVAILABLE Unit 1 Unit 2 Aux Bldg. John Aux Bldg. Chris Turb Bldg. Bob (FB)

Turb Bldg. Mike (FB) 5th Rounds. Carol Extra(s)

Bill (FB) Ed (FB) Wayne (FB) Tanya Gus (RW)