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{{#Wiki_filter: | {{#Wiki_filter:ATTACHMENT 2ATOAEP,:NRC:1322 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGESMARKEDTOSHOWPROPOSEDCHANGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT13/48-9B3/48-1990423012T 9904i9PDRADOCK05000815PPDR ELECTRIchL POVZRSYSTEMSLIMXTIHQCOHDXTIOH FOROPERATION aminimumthefollovingA.C.electrical poversourcesshallbeOPERABLZ; a.Onecircuitbetveentheoffsitetransmission netvorkaadtheonsiteClass1Edistribution system,andb.Onedieselgenerator vith:l.Adayfueltankcontaiaiag aminimumof70gallonsoffuel,2.Afuelstoragesystemcontaining aminimumindicated volumeof46,000gallonsoffuel,aad3.Afueltransferpump.hPPLIChBILXTT: | ||
'EY~CTRICALPOtrEltSYST.SSHUTDOwNLI' | MODES5aad6.hCTZON:WithlessthantheaboveminimumrequiredA.C.electrical rsourcesOPERhBLE, suspendalloperations involving COREhLTERATXOHS positivereactivity changes+uatiltheminimumrequiredA.C.electrical poversourcesarerestoredtoOPERhBLEstatus.SURVEILLhHCE REUIR1DKHTS 4.8.1.2TheaboverequiredA.C.electrical poversourcesshallbedemonstrated OPERhBLEbytheperfozmaace ofeachoftheSurveillance Requirements of4.8.1.1.1 aad4.$.1.1.2exceptforrequirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.5.'Por purposesofthisspecification, additionofvaterfromtheNSTdoesnotconstitute apositivereactivity additionprovidedtheboronconcentration intheRUSTisgreaterthantheminimumrequiredbySpecification 3.1.2.7.b.2. | ||
3/4BASES3/4. | Commencing in1999duringtheextendedshutdowninitiated in1997,the18-monthsurveillance requirements 4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a) andb);4.8.1.1.2.e.6.a), | ||
3/ | b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.8; 4.8.1.1.2.e.9.a), | ||
b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e. | |||
~Cfl Ci~ | 10.a)andb);and4.8.1.1.2.e.11, maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theshutdown. | ||
COOKNUCLEhRPLhNT-UHIT13/48-9hM1BRMENT NO.$25,445 3/4BASES3/4.8ELECTRICAL POWERSYSTEMS\TheOPERABILITY oftheA.C.andD.Cpowersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringoperation ensuresthatsufficient powerwillbeavailable tosupplythesafetyrelatedequipment requiredfor1)thesafeshutdownofthefacilityand2)themitigation andcontrolofaccidentconditions withinthefacility. | |||
Theminimumspecified independent andredundant A.C.andD.C.powersourcesanddistribution systemssatisfytherequirements ofGeneralDesignCriteria17ofAppendixA"to10CFR50.TheACTIONrequirements specified forthelevelsofdegradation ofthepowersourcesproviderestriction uponcontinued facilityoperation commensurate withthelevelofdegradation. | |||
TheOPERABILITY ofthepowersourcesareconsistent withtheinitialcondition assumptions oftheaccidentanalysesandarebaseduponmaintaining atleastoneofeachoftheonsiteA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsOPERABLEduringaccidentconditions coincident withanassumedlossofoffsitepowerandsinglefailureoftheotheronsiteA.C.sollrce.TheOPERABILITY oftheminimumspecified A.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringshutdownandrefueling ensuresthat1)thefacilitycanbemaintained intheshutdownorrefueling condition forextendedtimeperiodsand2)sufficient instrumentation andcontrolcapability isavailable formonitoring andmaintaining thefacilitystatus.rTheABandCDstationbatterysystemsprovideareliablesourceofcontinuous powerforsupplyandcontrolofplantloadssuch'asswitchgear andannunciator controlcircuits, staticinverters, valvecontrolcenters,emergency lightingandmotorcontrolcenters.Thedesigndutycyclesofthesebatteries arecomposite loadprofilesresulting fromthecombination ofthethreehourLossOfCoolantAccident/Loss OfOffsitePowerbatteryloadprofilesandthefourhourStationBlackoutbatteryloadprofiles. | |||
ThetrainNstationbatterysystemprovidesanindependent 250voltDCpowersupplyforpowerandcontroloftheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrain.Thelimitingconditions ofoperation forthetrainNbatteryareconsistent withtherequirements oftheauxiliaiy feedwater system.Thesurveillance requirements forthetrainNbatterysystemareconsistent withtherequirements oftheABandCDstationbatteries. | |||
ThetrainNbatteryloadsarederivedfmmequipment intheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrainandbatterysizingisconsistent withthefunctional requirements ofthesecomponents. | |||
Simulated loadsforbatterytestsareloadsequivalent tomeasuredactualloads.Specificsurveillance requirements (SRs)ofSR4.8.1.2maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theextendedoutagethatcommenced in1997.Thedelayispermitted torecognize thesignificant ongoingmaintenance tosafetysystemsandcomponents thatwouldberequiredtobeOPERABLEsolelytosupportthereferenced surveillances. | |||
Thedelayrecognizes thereduceddecayheatloadandfissionproductactivities resulting fromtheextendedshutdownandconsequently thesmallbenefitfromperforming thesurveillances priortothenextentryintoMODE4.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet,butactualperformance isnotrequireduntiltherequiredsafetysystemsarereadytosupportentryintoMODE4.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1PageB3/48-1 sh ATTACHHENT 2BTOAEP:NRC:1322 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGESMARKEDTOSHOWPROPOSEDCHANGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT23/48-9B3/48"1 E1~ | |||
'EY~CTRICALPOtrEltSYST.SSHUTDOwNLI'MITING CONDTIONFOR0ERATION3.8.1.2Asaminimum,thefollowing A.C.electrical powersourcessnailoeOPERABL:-: | |||
Onecircuitbetweentheoffsitetransmission networkandtheonsiteClasslEdistribution system,andb.Onedieselgenerator with:1.Adayfueltankcontaining aminimumof70gallonsoffuel,2.Afuelstoragesystemcontainistg aminimumindicated volumeof46,000gallonsoffuel,and3.Afueltransferpump.'ODES5'and6;ACTION:WithlessthantheaboveminimumrequiredA.C.electrical power"sources | |||
: OPERABLE, suspendalloperations involving COREALTERATIONS orpositivereactivity changes*untiltheminimumrequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesarerestoredtoOP~LEstatus.SURVEILr<8ICEREUIBAHTS4.8.1.2TheaboverequiredA.C.electrical po~ersourcesshallbedemonstrated OPERABLEbytheperformance ofeachoftheSurveillance Requiretaencn of4.8.1.1.1 and4.8.1.1.2 exceptforrequirexenu 4.8.1.1.2.e.g~ | |||
*Forpurposesofthisspecification, additionofwaterfromtheRWSTdoesnotconstitute apositivereactivity additionprovidedtheboronconcentration intheRWSTisgreaterthantheminimumrequiredbySpecification 3.1.2.7.b | |||
.2.P"Commencing ini999duringtheextendedshutdowninitiated in1997,thelg-monthsurveillance requirements 4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a) andb);4.8.1.1.2.e.6.a), | |||
b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.8; | |||
~"4.8.1.1.2.e.9.a), | |||
b)andc);4.8.1.l.2.e.10.a) andb);and4.8.1.1.2.e.11, maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theshutdown. | |||
COOKNUCLMPLANT-UNIT23/48-9AMENDKEZZ NO. | |||
3/4BASES3/4.8ELECTRICAL POWZRYSTEMSTheOPERABILITY oftheA.C.andD.Cpowersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringoperation ensuresthatsufficient powerwillbeavailable tosupplythesafetyrelatedequipment requiredfor1)thesafeshutdownofthefacilityand2)themitigation andcontrolofaccidentconditions withinthefacility. | |||
Theminimumspecified independent andredundant A.C.andD.C.powersourcesanddistribution systemssatisfytherequirements ofGeneralDesignCriteria17ofAppendix"A"to10CFR50.TheACTIONrequirements specified forthelevelsofdegradation ofthepowersourcesproviderestriction uponcontinued facilityoperation commensurate withthelevelofdegradation. | |||
TheOPERABILITY ofthepowersourcesareconsistent withtheinitialcondition assumptions oftheaccidentanalysesandarebaseduponmaintaining atleastoneofeachoftheonsiteA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsOPERABLEduringaccidentconditions coincident withanassumedlossofoffsitepowerandsinglefailureoftheotheronsiteA.C.source.TheOPERABILITY oftheminimumspecified A.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringshutdownandrefueling ensuresthat1)thefacilitycanbemaintained intheshutdownorrefueling condition forextendedtimeperiodsand2)sufficient instrumentation andcontrolcapability isavailable formonitoring andmaintaining thefacilitystatus.TheABandCDstationbatterysystemsprovideareliablesourceofcontinuous powerforsupplyandcontrolofplantloadssuchasswitchgear andannunciator controlcircuits, staticinverters, valvecontrolcenters,emergency lightingandmotorcontrolcenters.Thedesigndutycyclesofthesebatteries arecomposite loadprofilesresulting fromthecombination ofthethreehourLossOfCoolantAccident/Loss OfOffsitePowerbatteryloadprofilesandthefourhourStationBlackoutbatteryloadprofiles. | |||
ThetrainNstationbatterysystemprovidesanindependent 250voltDCpowersupplyforpowerandcontroloftheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrain.Thelimitingconditions ofoperation forthetrainNbatteryareconsistent withtherequirements oftheauxiliary feedwater system.Thesurveillance requirements forthetrainNbatterysystemareconsistent withtherequirements oftheABandCDstationbatteries. | |||
ThetrainNbatteryloadsarederivedfromequipment intheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrainandbatterysizingisconsistent withthefunctional requirements ofthesecomponents. | |||
Simulated loadsforbatterytestsareloadsequivalent tomeasuredactualloads.Specificsurveillance requirements (SRs)ofSR4.8.1.2maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theextendedoutagethatcommenced in1997.Thedelayispermitted torecognize thesignificant ongoingmaintenance tosafetysystemsandcomponents thatwouldberequiredtobeOPERABLEsolelytosupportthereferenced surveillances. | |||
Thedelayrecognizes thereduceddecayheatloadandreducedfissionproductactivities resulting fromtheextendedshutdownandconsequently thesmallbenefitfromperforming thesurveillances priortothenextentryintoMODE4.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet,butactualperformance isnotrequireduntiltherequiredsafetysystemsarereadytosupportentryintoMODE4.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2PageB3/48-1 ATTACHMENT 3ATOAEP:NRC:1322 PROPOSEDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT13/48-9B3/48-1 C | |||
3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONS I<OROPERATION ANDSURVEILLANCE REQUIIK<MENTS 3/4.8ELE<CTRICAL POWERSYSTEMSSHUTDOWNLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION 3.8.1.2Asaminimum,thefollowing A.C.electrical powersourcesshallbeOPERABLE: | |||
Onecircuitbetweentheoffsitetransmission networkandtheonsiteClass1Edistribution system,andOnedieselgenerator with:Adayfueltankcontaining aminimumof70gallonsoffuel,Afuelstoragesystemcontaining aminimumindicated volumeof46,000gallonsoffuel,andAPPLICABILITY: | |||
3.Afueltransferpump.MODES5and6.ACTION:WithlessthantheaboveminimumrequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesOPERABLE, suspendalloperations involving COREALTERATIONS orpositivereactivity changes'ntil theminimumrequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesarerestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.SURVEILLANCE REUIREMENTS 4.8.1.2TheaboverequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesshallbedemonstrated OPERABLEbytheperformance ofeachoftheSurveillance Requirements of4.8.1.1.1 and4.8.1.1.2 exceptforrequirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.5. | |||
Commencing in1999duringtheextendedshutdowninitiated in1997,the18-monthsurveillance requirements 4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a) andb);4.8.1.1.2.e.6.a), | |||
b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.8; 4.8.1.1.2.e.9.a), | |||
b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.10.a) andb);and4.8.1.1.2.e. | |||
11,maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theshutdown. | |||
'Forpurposesofthisspecification, additionofwaterfromtheRWSTdoesnotconstitute apositivereactivity additionprovidedtheboronconcentration intheRWSTisgreaterthantheminimum,requiredbySpecification 3.1.2.7.b.2. | |||
COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1Page3/48-9AMENDMENT 425,445" r)4~~'/4BASES3/4.8ELE<CTRICAL POWI<.RSYSTE<MSTheOPERABILITY oftheA.C.andD.Cpowersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringoperation ensuresthatsufficient powerwillbeavailable tosupplythesafetyrelatedequipment requiredfor1)thesafeshutdownofthefacilityand2)themitigation andcontrolofaccidentconditions withinthefacility. | |||
Theminimumspecified independent andredundant A.C.andD.C.powersourcesanddistribution systemssatisfytherequirements ofGeneralDesignCriteria17ofAppendix"A"to10CFR50.TheACTIONrequirements specified forthelevelsofdegradation ofthepowersourc'esproviderestriction uponcontinued facilityoperation commensurate withthelevelofdegradation. | |||
TheOPERABILITY ofthepowersourcesareconsistent withtheinitialcondition assumptions oftheaccidentanalysesandarebaseduponmaintaining atleastoneofeachoftheonsiteA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsOPERABLEduringaccidentconditions coincident withanassumedlossofoffsitepowerandsinglefailureoftheotheronsiteA.C.source.TheOPERABILITY oftheminimumspecified A.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringshutdownandrefueling ensuresthatI)thefacilitycanbemaintained intheshutdownorrefueling condition forextendedtimeperiodsand2)sufficient instrumentation andcontrolcapability isavailable formonitoring andmaintaining thefacilitystatus.Specificsurveillance requirements (SRs)ofSR4.8.1.2maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theextendedoutagethatcommenced in1997.Thedelayispermitted torecognize thesignificant ongoingmaintenance tosafetysystemsandcomponents thatwouldberequiredtobeOPERABLEsolelytosupportthereferenced surveillances. | |||
Thedelayrecognizes thereduceddecayheatloadandfissionproductactivities resulting fromtheextendedshutdownandconsequently thesmallbenefitfromperforming thesurveillances priortothenextentryintoMODE4.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet,butactualperformance isnotrequireduntiltherequiredsafetysystemsarereadyto'support entryintoMODE4.TheABandCDstationbatterysystemsprovideareliablesourceofcontinuous powerforsupplyandcontrolofplantloadssuchasswitchgear andannunciator controlcircuits, staticinverters, valvecontrolcenters,emergency lightingandmotorcontrolcenters.Thedesigndutycyclesofthesebatteries arecomposite load'profiles resulting fromthecombination ofthethreehourLossOfCoolantAccident/Loss OfOffsitePowerbattery'oad profilesandthefourhourStationBlackoutbatteryloadprofiles. | |||
ThetrainNstationbatterysystemprovidesanindependent 250voltDCpowersupplyforpowerandcontroloftheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrain.Thelimitingconditions ofoperation forthetrainNbatteryareconsistent withtherequirements oftheauxiliary fecdwater system.Thesurveillance requirements forthetrainNbatterysystemareconsistent withtherequirements oftheABandCDstationbatteries. | |||
ThetrainNbatteryloadsarederivedfromequipment in'theturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrainandbatterysizingisconsistent withthefunctional requirements ofthesecomponents. | |||
Simulated loadsforbatterytestsareloadsequivalent tomeasuredactualloads.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1PageB3/48-1AMENDMENT 86,498 ATTACHMENT 3BTOAEP:NRC:1322 PROPOSEDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT23/48-9B3/48-1 ff~0l 3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOROPERATION ANDSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3'/4.8ELECTRICAL POWERSYSTEMSSHUTDOWNLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION 3.8.1.2Asaminimum,thefollowing A.C.electrical powersourcesshallbeOPERABLE: | |||
a.Onecircuitbetweentheoffsitetransmission networkandtheonsiteClass1Edistribution system,andb.Onedieselgenerator with:1.Adayfueltankcontaining aminimumof70gallonsoffuel,Afuelstoragesystemcontaining aminimumindicated volumeof46,000gallonsoffuel,andAPPLICABILITY: | |||
3.Afueltransferpump.MODES5and6.ACTION:WithlessthantheaboveminimumrequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesOPERABLE, suspendalloperations involving COREALTERATIONS orpositivereactivity changes'ntil theminimumrequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesarerestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.SURVEILLANCE REUIREMENTS 4.8.1.2TheaboverequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesshallbedemonstrated OPERABLEbytheperformance ofeachoftheSurveillance Requirements of4.8.1.1.1'nd 4.8.1.1.2 exceptforrequirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.5. | |||
Commencing in1999duringtheextendedshutdowninitiated in1997,'the 18-monthsurveillance requirements 4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a) andb);4.8.1.1.2.e.6.a), | |||
b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.8; 4.8.1.1.2.e.9.a), | |||
b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.10.a) andb);and4.8.1.1.2.e. | |||
II,maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theshutdown. | |||
'Forpurposesofthisspecification, additionofwaterfromtheRWSTdoesnotconstitute apositivereactivity additionprovidedtheboronconcentration intheRWSTisgreaterthantheminimumrequiredbySpecification 3.1.2.7.b.2. | |||
COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2Page3/48-9AMENDMENT 448,483,459 3/4BASES314.8ELECTRICAL POWERSYSTEMSTheOPERABILITY oftheA.C.andD.Cpowersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringoperation ensuresthatsufficient powerwillbeavailable tosupplythesafetyrelatedequipment requiredforI)thesafeshutdownofthefacilityand2)themitigation andcontrolofaccidentconditions withinthefacility. | |||
Theminimumspecified independent andredundant A.C.andD.C.powersourcesanddistribution systemssatisfytherequirements ofGeneralDesignCriteria17ofAppendix"A"to10CFR50.TheACTIONrequirements specified forthelevelsofdegradation ofthepowersourcesproviderestriction uponcontinued facilityoperation commensurate withthelevelofdegradation. | |||
TheOPERABILITY ofthepowersourcesareconsistent withtheinitialcondition assumptions oftheaccidentanalysesandarebaseduponmaintaining atleastoneofeachoftheonsiteA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsOPERABLEduringaccidentconditions coincident withanassumedlossofoffsitepowerandsinglefailureoftheotheronsiteA.C.source.TheOPERABILITY oftheminimumspecified A.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringshutdownandrefueling ensuresthat1)thefacilitycanbemaintained intheshutdownorrefueling condition forextendedtimeperiodsand2)sufficient instrumentation andcontrolcapability isavailable formonitoring andmaintaining thefacilitystatus.Specificsurveillance requirements (SRs)ofSR4.8.1.2maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theextendedoutagethatcommenced in1997.Thedelayispermitted torecognize thesignificant ongoingmaintenance tosafetysystemsandcomponents thatwouldberequiredtobeOPERABLEsolelytosupportthereferenced surveillances. | |||
Thedelayrecognizes thereduceddecayheatloadandreducedfissionproductactivities resulting fromtheextendedshutdownandconsequently thesmallbenefitfromperforming thesurveillances priortothenextentryintoMODE4.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet.butactualperformance isnotrequireduntiltherequiredsafetysystemsarcreadytosupportentryintoMODE4.TheABandCDstationbatterysystemsprovideareliablesourceofcontinuous powerforsupplyandcontrolofplantloadssuchasswitchgear andannunciator controlcircuits, staticinverters, valvecontrolcenters,emergency lightingandmotorcontrolcenters.Thedesigndutycyclesofthesebatteries arecomposite load,"profiles resulting fromthecombination ofthethreehourLossOfCoolantAccident/Loss OfOffsitePowerbatteryloadprofilesandthefourhourStationBlackoutbatteryloadprofiles. | |||
ThetrainNstationbatterysystemprovidesanindependent 250voltDCpowersupplyforpowerandcontroloftheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrain.Thelimitingconditions ofoperation forthetrainNbatteryareconsistent withtherequirements oftheauxiliary feedwater system.Thesurveillance requirements forthetrainNbatterysystemareconsistent withtherequirements oftheABandCDstationbattcrics. | |||
ThetrainNbatteryloadsarederivedfromequipment intheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrainandbatterysizingisconsistent withthefunctional requirements ofthesecomponents. | |||
Simulated loadsforbatterytestsareloadsequivalent tomeasuredactualloads.lCOOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2Page83/48-1AMENDMENT VB,483 ATTACHMENT 4TOAEP:NRC:1322 NOSIGNIFICANT HAZARDSCONSIDERATION EVALUATION 1AI'I4. | |||
Attachment 4TOAEP:NRC:1322 Page1NoSinificantHazardsConsideration Evaluation I&Mhasevaluated thisproposedamendment anddetermined thatitinvolvesnosignificant hazardsconsideration. | |||
According to10CFR50.92(c), | |||
aproposedamendment toanoperating licenseinvolvesnosignificant hazardsconsideration ifoperation ofthefacilityinaccordance withtheproposedamendment wouldnot:1.involveasignificant increaseintheprobability ofoccurrence orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated; 2.createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously analyzed; or3.involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.I&MproposestoreviseT/S3/4.8.1.2, "Electrical PowerSystems,Shutdown," | |||
anditsassociated basestoprovideaone-timeextension ofthe18-monthsurveillance intervalforspecificsurveillance requirements (SRs).Inaddition, forunit2only,aminoradministrative changeisincludedtodeleteareference toT/S4.0.8thatisnolongerapplicable. | |||
Forunit1only,aneditorial correction ismade.Thedetermination thatthecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92aremetforthisamendment requestisindicated below.1.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability ofoccurrence orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated? | |||
Adiscussion ofeachoftheapplicable accidents follows.FuelhandlinaccidentTheonlytimeafuelhandlingaccidentcouldoccurisduringthehandlingofafuelassembly. | |||
Thedesignoffuelhandlingequipment issuchthataninterruption ofA.C.powerwouldnotcauseafuelelementtobeinadvertently dropped.Therefore, aninterruption orlossofA.C.powerdoesnotsignificantly increasetheprobability ofafuelhandlingaccident. | |||
Atpresent,fissionproductactivities inthefuelassemblypellet-to-cladding gapsaregreatlyreduced.Thefuelhandlingaccidentanalysisconsiders thethyroiddoseatthesiteboundaryandinthelowpopulation zone.Thisdoseisdominated bytheisotopeiodine131,whichalsodecaysmoreslowlythantheotheriodinecontributors tothedose.Theactivityofiodine131decreases byone-halfevery8.05days.Thecurrentshutdownperiodofapproximately 18monthsrepresents over70half-lives. | |||
Activityofaradioactive materialisgenerally considered tobenegligible after7half-lives (areduction inactivityof1/128).Bycontrast, theaccidentanalysisassumesaniodinereduction oflessthan1/10(fromactivated charcoalfiltration) inthefuelhandlingbuilding, andnoreduction inthecontainment, priortorelease.Therefore, theconsequences ofafuelhandling Attachment 4TOAEP:NRC:1322 Page2accidentareclearlyboundedbytheexistingsafetyanalysiswithouttakingcreditforanyiodineremovalbycharcoalfiltration. | |||
Thegreatlyreducedfissionproductactivityatthecurrenttimeprovidesassurance thattheconsequences ofthiseventareboundedbytheexistinganalysis. | |||
Therefore, theconsequences arenotsignificantly increased. | |||
Accidental releaseofradioactive liuidsTheinadvertent releaseofradioactive liquidwastestotheenvironment wasevaluated forthewasteevaporator condensate andmonitortanks,condensate storagetank,primarywaterstoragetank,refueling waterstoragetank(RWST),theauxiliary buildingstoragetanksandthechemicalandvolumecontrolsystem(CVCS)holduptanks.Itwasconcluded, intheUFSARChapter14evaluation, thatlossofliquidfromthesetankstotheenvironment isnotacredibleaccident. | |||
Thisconclusion doesnotdependonoperating mode,hence,furtherevaluation ofthiseventisnotrequired. | |||
WasteasreleaseRadioactive gasesareintroduced intothereactorcoolantbytheescapeoffissionproductsifdefectsexistinthefuelcladding. | |||
Theprocessing ofthereactorcoolantbyauxiliary systemsresultsintheaccumulation ofradioactive gasesinvarioustanks.Thetwomainsourcesofanysignificant gaseousradioactivity thatcouldoccurwouldbethevolumecontroltank(VCT)andthegasdecaytanks.Itisassumedthat'atankrupturesbyanunspecified mechanism afterthereactorhasbeenoperating foronecorecyclewith1%defectsinthefuelcladding. | |||
Thereisnoidentified mechanism bywhichaninterruption orlossofpowercouldresultinatankrupture.Therefore, itisconcluded thattheprobability ofoccurrence ofatankrupturewouldnotbesignificantly increased byaninterruption orlossofA.C.power.Thegreatlyreducedfissionproductactivities atthecurrenttimeprovidesassurance thattheconsequences ofthiseventareboundedbythecurrentanalysisandwould,therefore, notbesignificantly increased. | |||
Uncontrolled rodclustercontrolassembl(RCCA)withdrawal fromasubcritical condition Thiseventcanonlyoccur,withthereactortripbreakersclosedandthecontrolroddrivemechanisms (CRDMs)energized. | |||
Withtheexception oftestingorspecialma'ntenance, theroddrivemotorgenerator setremainstaggedoutuntilMode3andthisalonewouldprecluderodmovement. | |||
Iftheconditions forrodwithdrawal aremet,twooperablesourcerangeinstruments andtworeactortripchannelsandtripbreakersmustbeoperable. | |||
Aninterruption orlossofpowerwouldprecludeCRDMmovementandreleasethecontrolrods.Thesourcerangeinstruments wouldremainavailable. | |||
Therefore, itisconcluded thattheprobability ofoccurrence ofanuncontrolled RCCAwithdrawal wouldnotbesignificantly increased byaninterruption orlossofA.C.powerinModes5or6.Acceptable consequences forthiseventrelyonprecluding itsoccurrence. | |||
~Cfl Ci~IAttachment 4TOAEP:NRC:1322 Page3hUncontrolled boron.dilutionThiseventrequiresamalfunction oftheCVCS.TheCVCSisdesignedtolimit,evenundervariouspostulated failuremodes,thepotential rateofdilutiontoavaluewhichprovidestheoperatorsufficient timetocorrectthesituation inasafeandorderlymanner.Therateofadditionofunborated watermakeuptothereactorcoolantsystemislimitedbythecapacityoftheprimarywaterpumps.Themaximumadditionrateinthiscaseis225gpmwithbothprimarywaterpumpsrunning.Aninterruption orlossofA.C.powerwouldprecludepumpoperation andaccidental dilution. | |||
TheRWSTisnotacredibledilutionsourceasrecognized bya-footnotetoT/S3/4.8.1.2. | |||
Therefore, thepossibility ofanuncontrolled borondilutionisnotsignificantly increased. | |||
Acceptable consequences forthiseventrelyonprecluding itsoccurrence andbydetection withthesourcerangenuclearinstrumentation requiredbytheT/SinModes5and,6.Theproposedrevisioninvolvesdeferralofcertainsurveillance requirements whenshutdownbutdoesnotreducetherequiredoperablepowersourcesoftheLimitingCondition forOperation (LCO),doesnotincreasetheallowedoutagetimeofanyrequiredoperablepowersuppliesanddoesnotreducetherequirement toknowthatthedeferredSRscouldbemetatalltimes.Deferralofthetestingdoesnotbyitselfincreasethepotential thatthetestingwouldnotbemetandthepreviously evaluated accidents described abovedonotrelyonautomatic startingorloadingofthesingleoperableEDGpermitted inModes5and6.ThemonthlyEDGstarts,fuellevelchecks,andfueltransferpumpcheckswillcontinuetobeperformed toprovideadequateconfidence thattherequiredEDGwillbeavailable ifneeded.Therefore, itisconcluded thattherequiredA.C.sourceswillremainavailable andthepreviously evaluated consequences willnotbeincreased. | |||
Theproposedadministrative changeforunit2deletesareference toT/S4.0.8thatisnolongerapplicable and,thus,doesnotincreasetheprobability orconsequences ofanaccident. | |||
Theeditorial changetounit1correctsatypographical error.Thecorrection isnotintendedtochangethemeaning.Therefore, basedontheabovediscussion, itisconcluded thattheproposedamendment doesnotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated. | |||
/2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated? | |||
Theproposedchangesdonotinvolveoperation oftherequiredelectrical powersourcesinamannerorconfiguration different thanthosepreviously recognized orevaluated. | |||
Nonewfailuremechanisms oftheA.C.powersuppliesareintroduced byextension ofthesubjectsurveillance intervals. | |||
fi~,< | fi~,< | ||
Attachment 4TOAEP:NRC:1322 Page4Theproposedadministrative changeforunit2deletesareference toT/S4.0.8thatisnolongerapplicable and,thus,doesnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccident. | |||
Theeditorial changetounit1correctsatypographical error.Thecorrection isnotintendedtochangethemeaning.Therefore, itisconcluded thattheproposedchangesdonotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously evaluated. | |||
3.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety?Therequiredoperablepowersupplieshavenotbeenreduced.Deferralofthespecified SRsdoesnotbyitselfintroduce afailuremechanism, andpastperformance oftheSRshasdemonstrated reliability inpassingthedeferredsurveillances. | |||
Therefore, theavailability ofpowersuppliesassumedforaccidentmitigation isnotsignificantly reducedandpreviousmarginsofsafetyaremaintained. | |||
Theproposedadministrative changeforunit2deletesareference toT/S4.0.8thatisnolongerapplicable andthus,doesnotincreasetheprobability orconsequences ofanaccident. | |||
Theeditorial changetounit1correctsatypographical error.Thecorrection isnotintendedtochangethemeaning.Therefore, thesechangesdonotinvolveasignificant reduction inthemarginofsafety.Insummary,basedupontheaboveevaluation, I&Mhasconcluded thatthesechangesinvolvenosignificant hazardsconsideration. | |||
ATTACHMENT 5TOAEP:NRC:1322 ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT Attachment 5toAEP:NRC:1322 Page1Environmental Assessment I&Mhasevaluated thislicenseamendment requestagainstthecriteriaforidentification oflicensing andregulatory actionsrequiring environmental assessment inaccordance with10CFR51.21.?&Mhasdetermined thatthislicenseamendment requestmeetsthecriteriaforacategorical exclusion setforthin10CFR51.22(c)(9) | |||
.Thisdetermination isbasedonthefactthatthischangeisbeingproposedasanamendment toalicenseissuedpursuantto10CFR50thatchangesarequirement withrespecttoinstallation oruseofafacilitycomponent locatedwithintherestricted area,asdefinedin10CFR20,orthatchangesaninspection orasurveillance requirement, andtheamendment meetsthefollowing specificcriteria. | |||
(i)Theamendment involvesnosignificant hazardsconsideration. | |||
Asdemonstrated inattachment 4,thisproposedamendment doesnotinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration. | |||
(ii)Thereisnosignificant changeinthetypesorsignificant increaseintheamountsofanyeffluentthatmaybereleasedoffsite.Asdocumented inattachment 1,therewillbenosignificant changeinthetypesorsignificant increaseintheamountsofanyeffluents releasedoffsite.(iii)Thereisnosignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposure. | |||
Theproposedchangeswillnotresultinsignificant changesintheoperation orconfiguration ofthefacility. | |||
Therewillbenochangeinthelevelofcontrolsormethodology usedforprocessing ofradioactive effluents orhandlingofsolidradioactive waste,norwilltheproposalresultinanychangeinthenormalradiation levelswithintheplant.Therefore, therewillbenosignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposureresulting fromthischange. | |||
4.i"IPC',h}} | 4.i"IPC',h}} |
Revision as of 09:14, 29 June 2018
ML17325B555 | |
Person / Time | |
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Site: | Cook |
Issue date: | 04/19/1999 |
From: | INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. |
To: | |
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ML17325B553 | List: |
References | |
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Download: ML17325B555 (27) | |
Text
ATTACHMENT 2ATOAEP,:NRC:1322 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGESMARKEDTOSHOWPROPOSEDCHANGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT13/48-9B3/48-1990423012T 9904i9PDRADOCK05000815PPDR ELECTRIchL POVZRSYSTEMSLIMXTIHQCOHDXTIOH FOROPERATION aminimumthefollovingA.C.electrical poversourcesshallbeOPERABLZ; a.Onecircuitbetveentheoffsitetransmission netvorkaadtheonsiteClass1Edistribution system,andb.Onedieselgenerator vith:l.Adayfueltankcontaiaiag aminimumof70gallonsoffuel,2.Afuelstoragesystemcontaining aminimumindicated volumeof46,000gallonsoffuel,aad3.Afueltransferpump.hPPLIChBILXTT:
MODES5aad6.hCTZON:WithlessthantheaboveminimumrequiredA.C.electrical rsourcesOPERhBLE, suspendalloperations involving COREhLTERATXOHS positivereactivity changes+uatiltheminimumrequiredA.C.electrical poversourcesarerestoredtoOPERhBLEstatus.SURVEILLhHCE REUIR1DKHTS 4.8.1.2TheaboverequiredA.C.electrical poversourcesshallbedemonstrated OPERhBLEbytheperfozmaace ofeachoftheSurveillance Requirements of4.8.1.1.1 aad4.$.1.1.2exceptforrequirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.5.'Por purposesofthisspecification, additionofvaterfromtheNSTdoesnotconstitute apositivereactivity additionprovidedtheboronconcentration intheRUSTisgreaterthantheminimumrequiredbySpecification 3.1.2.7.b.2.
Commencing in1999duringtheextendedshutdowninitiated in1997,the18-monthsurveillance requirements 4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a) andb);4.8.1.1.2.e.6.a),
b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.8; 4.8.1.1.2.e.9.a),
b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.
10.a)andb);and4.8.1.1.2.e.11, maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theshutdown.
COOKNUCLEhRPLhNT-UHIT13/48-9hM1BRMENT NO.$25,445 3/4BASES3/4.8ELECTRICAL POWERSYSTEMS\TheOPERABILITY oftheA.C.andD.Cpowersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringoperation ensuresthatsufficient powerwillbeavailable tosupplythesafetyrelatedequipment requiredfor1)thesafeshutdownofthefacilityand2)themitigation andcontrolofaccidentconditions withinthefacility.
Theminimumspecified independent andredundant A.C.andD.C.powersourcesanddistribution systemssatisfytherequirements ofGeneralDesignCriteria17ofAppendixA"to10CFR50.TheACTIONrequirements specified forthelevelsofdegradation ofthepowersourcesproviderestriction uponcontinued facilityoperation commensurate withthelevelofdegradation.
TheOPERABILITY ofthepowersourcesareconsistent withtheinitialcondition assumptions oftheaccidentanalysesandarebaseduponmaintaining atleastoneofeachoftheonsiteA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsOPERABLEduringaccidentconditions coincident withanassumedlossofoffsitepowerandsinglefailureoftheotheronsiteA.C.sollrce.TheOPERABILITY oftheminimumspecified A.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringshutdownandrefueling ensuresthat1)thefacilitycanbemaintained intheshutdownorrefueling condition forextendedtimeperiodsand2)sufficient instrumentation andcontrolcapability isavailable formonitoring andmaintaining thefacilitystatus.rTheABandCDstationbatterysystemsprovideareliablesourceofcontinuous powerforsupplyandcontrolofplantloadssuch'asswitchgear andannunciator controlcircuits, staticinverters, valvecontrolcenters,emergency lightingandmotorcontrolcenters.Thedesigndutycyclesofthesebatteries arecomposite loadprofilesresulting fromthecombination ofthethreehourLossOfCoolantAccident/Loss OfOffsitePowerbatteryloadprofilesandthefourhourStationBlackoutbatteryloadprofiles.
ThetrainNstationbatterysystemprovidesanindependent 250voltDCpowersupplyforpowerandcontroloftheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrain.Thelimitingconditions ofoperation forthetrainNbatteryareconsistent withtherequirements oftheauxiliaiy feedwater system.Thesurveillance requirements forthetrainNbatterysystemareconsistent withtherequirements oftheABandCDstationbatteries.
ThetrainNbatteryloadsarederivedfmmequipment intheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrainandbatterysizingisconsistent withthefunctional requirements ofthesecomponents.
Simulated loadsforbatterytestsareloadsequivalent tomeasuredactualloads.Specificsurveillance requirements (SRs)ofSR4.8.1.2maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theextendedoutagethatcommenced in1997.Thedelayispermitted torecognize thesignificant ongoingmaintenance tosafetysystemsandcomponents thatwouldberequiredtobeOPERABLEsolelytosupportthereferenced surveillances.
Thedelayrecognizes thereduceddecayheatloadandfissionproductactivities resulting fromtheextendedshutdownandconsequently thesmallbenefitfromperforming thesurveillances priortothenextentryintoMODE4.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet,butactualperformance isnotrequireduntiltherequiredsafetysystemsarereadytosupportentryintoMODE4.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1PageB3/48-1 sh ATTACHHENT 2BTOAEP:NRC:1322 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGESMARKEDTOSHOWPROPOSEDCHANGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT23/48-9B3/48"1 E1~
'EY~CTRICALPOtrEltSYST.SSHUTDOwNLI'MITING CONDTIONFOR0ERATION3.8.1.2Asaminimum,thefollowing A.C.electrical powersourcessnailoeOPERABL:-:
Onecircuitbetweentheoffsitetransmission networkandtheonsiteClasslEdistribution system,andb.Onedieselgenerator with:1.Adayfueltankcontaining aminimumof70gallonsoffuel,2.Afuelstoragesystemcontainistg aminimumindicated volumeof46,000gallonsoffuel,and3.Afueltransferpump.'ODES5'and6;ACTION:WithlessthantheaboveminimumrequiredA.C.electrical power"sources
- OPERABLE, suspendalloperations involving COREALTERATIONS orpositivereactivity changes*untiltheminimumrequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesarerestoredtoOP~LEstatus.SURVEILr<8ICEREUIBAHTS4.8.1.2TheaboverequiredA.C.electrical po~ersourcesshallbedemonstrated OPERABLEbytheperformance ofeachoftheSurveillance Requiretaencn of4.8.1.1.1 and4.8.1.1.2 exceptforrequirexenu 4.8.1.1.2.e.g~
- Forpurposesofthisspecification, additionofwaterfromtheRWSTdoesnotconstitute apositivereactivity additionprovidedtheboronconcentration intheRWSTisgreaterthantheminimumrequiredbySpecification 3.1.2.7.b
.2.P"Commencing ini999duringtheextendedshutdowninitiated in1997,thelg-monthsurveillance requirements 4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a) andb);4.8.1.1.2.e.6.a),
b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.8;
~"4.8.1.1.2.e.9.a),
b)andc);4.8.1.l.2.e.10.a) andb);and4.8.1.1.2.e.11, maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theshutdown.
COOKNUCLMPLANT-UNIT23/48-9AMENDKEZZ NO.
3/4BASES3/4.8ELECTRICAL POWZRYSTEMSTheOPERABILITY oftheA.C.andD.Cpowersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringoperation ensuresthatsufficient powerwillbeavailable tosupplythesafetyrelatedequipment requiredfor1)thesafeshutdownofthefacilityand2)themitigation andcontrolofaccidentconditions withinthefacility.
Theminimumspecified independent andredundant A.C.andD.C.powersourcesanddistribution systemssatisfytherequirements ofGeneralDesignCriteria17ofAppendix"A"to10CFR50.TheACTIONrequirements specified forthelevelsofdegradation ofthepowersourcesproviderestriction uponcontinued facilityoperation commensurate withthelevelofdegradation.
TheOPERABILITY ofthepowersourcesareconsistent withtheinitialcondition assumptions oftheaccidentanalysesandarebaseduponmaintaining atleastoneofeachoftheonsiteA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsOPERABLEduringaccidentconditions coincident withanassumedlossofoffsitepowerandsinglefailureoftheotheronsiteA.C.source.TheOPERABILITY oftheminimumspecified A.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringshutdownandrefueling ensuresthat1)thefacilitycanbemaintained intheshutdownorrefueling condition forextendedtimeperiodsand2)sufficient instrumentation andcontrolcapability isavailable formonitoring andmaintaining thefacilitystatus.TheABandCDstationbatterysystemsprovideareliablesourceofcontinuous powerforsupplyandcontrolofplantloadssuchasswitchgear andannunciator controlcircuits, staticinverters, valvecontrolcenters,emergency lightingandmotorcontrolcenters.Thedesigndutycyclesofthesebatteries arecomposite loadprofilesresulting fromthecombination ofthethreehourLossOfCoolantAccident/Loss OfOffsitePowerbatteryloadprofilesandthefourhourStationBlackoutbatteryloadprofiles.
ThetrainNstationbatterysystemprovidesanindependent 250voltDCpowersupplyforpowerandcontroloftheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrain.Thelimitingconditions ofoperation forthetrainNbatteryareconsistent withtherequirements oftheauxiliary feedwater system.Thesurveillance requirements forthetrainNbatterysystemareconsistent withtherequirements oftheABandCDstationbatteries.
ThetrainNbatteryloadsarederivedfromequipment intheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrainandbatterysizingisconsistent withthefunctional requirements ofthesecomponents.
Simulated loadsforbatterytestsareloadsequivalent tomeasuredactualloads.Specificsurveillance requirements (SRs)ofSR4.8.1.2maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theextendedoutagethatcommenced in1997.Thedelayispermitted torecognize thesignificant ongoingmaintenance tosafetysystemsandcomponents thatwouldberequiredtobeOPERABLEsolelytosupportthereferenced surveillances.
Thedelayrecognizes thereduceddecayheatloadandreducedfissionproductactivities resulting fromtheextendedshutdownandconsequently thesmallbenefitfromperforming thesurveillances priortothenextentryintoMODE4.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet,butactualperformance isnotrequireduntiltherequiredsafetysystemsarereadytosupportentryintoMODE4.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2PageB3/48-1 ATTACHMENT 3ATOAEP:NRC:1322 PROPOSEDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT13/48-9B3/48-1 C
3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONS I<OROPERATION ANDSURVEILLANCE REQUIIK<MENTS 3/4.8ELE<CTRICAL POWERSYSTEMSSHUTDOWNLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION 3.8.1.2Asaminimum,thefollowing A.C.electrical powersourcesshallbeOPERABLE:
Onecircuitbetweentheoffsitetransmission networkandtheonsiteClass1Edistribution system,andOnedieselgenerator with:Adayfueltankcontaining aminimumof70gallonsoffuel,Afuelstoragesystemcontaining aminimumindicated volumeof46,000gallonsoffuel,andAPPLICABILITY:
3.Afueltransferpump.MODES5and6.ACTION:WithlessthantheaboveminimumrequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesOPERABLE, suspendalloperations involving COREALTERATIONS orpositivereactivity changes'ntil theminimumrequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesarerestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.SURVEILLANCE REUIREMENTS 4.8.1.2TheaboverequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesshallbedemonstrated OPERABLEbytheperformance ofeachoftheSurveillance Requirements of4.8.1.1.1 and4.8.1.1.2 exceptforrequirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.5.
Commencing in1999duringtheextendedshutdowninitiated in1997,the18-monthsurveillance requirements 4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a) andb);4.8.1.1.2.e.6.a),
b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.8; 4.8.1.1.2.e.9.a),
b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.10.a) andb);and4.8.1.1.2.e.
11,maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theshutdown.
'Forpurposesofthisspecification, additionofwaterfromtheRWSTdoesnotconstitute apositivereactivity additionprovidedtheboronconcentration intheRWSTisgreaterthantheminimum,requiredbySpecification 3.1.2.7.b.2.
COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1Page3/48-9AMENDMENT 425,445" r)4~~'/4BASES3/4.8ELE<CTRICAL POWI<.RSYSTE<MSTheOPERABILITY oftheA.C.andD.Cpowersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringoperation ensuresthatsufficient powerwillbeavailable tosupplythesafetyrelatedequipment requiredfor1)thesafeshutdownofthefacilityand2)themitigation andcontrolofaccidentconditions withinthefacility.
Theminimumspecified independent andredundant A.C.andD.C.powersourcesanddistribution systemssatisfytherequirements ofGeneralDesignCriteria17ofAppendix"A"to10CFR50.TheACTIONrequirements specified forthelevelsofdegradation ofthepowersourc'esproviderestriction uponcontinued facilityoperation commensurate withthelevelofdegradation.
TheOPERABILITY ofthepowersourcesareconsistent withtheinitialcondition assumptions oftheaccidentanalysesandarebaseduponmaintaining atleastoneofeachoftheonsiteA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsOPERABLEduringaccidentconditions coincident withanassumedlossofoffsitepowerandsinglefailureoftheotheronsiteA.C.source.TheOPERABILITY oftheminimumspecified A.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringshutdownandrefueling ensuresthatI)thefacilitycanbemaintained intheshutdownorrefueling condition forextendedtimeperiodsand2)sufficient instrumentation andcontrolcapability isavailable formonitoring andmaintaining thefacilitystatus.Specificsurveillance requirements (SRs)ofSR4.8.1.2maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theextendedoutagethatcommenced in1997.Thedelayispermitted torecognize thesignificant ongoingmaintenance tosafetysystemsandcomponents thatwouldberequiredtobeOPERABLEsolelytosupportthereferenced surveillances.
Thedelayrecognizes thereduceddecayheatloadandfissionproductactivities resulting fromtheextendedshutdownandconsequently thesmallbenefitfromperforming thesurveillances priortothenextentryintoMODE4.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet,butactualperformance isnotrequireduntiltherequiredsafetysystemsarereadyto'support entryintoMODE4.TheABandCDstationbatterysystemsprovideareliablesourceofcontinuous powerforsupplyandcontrolofplantloadssuchasswitchgear andannunciator controlcircuits, staticinverters, valvecontrolcenters,emergency lightingandmotorcontrolcenters.Thedesigndutycyclesofthesebatteries arecomposite load'profiles resulting fromthecombination ofthethreehourLossOfCoolantAccident/Loss OfOffsitePowerbattery'oad profilesandthefourhourStationBlackoutbatteryloadprofiles.
ThetrainNstationbatterysystemprovidesanindependent 250voltDCpowersupplyforpowerandcontroloftheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrain.Thelimitingconditions ofoperation forthetrainNbatteryareconsistent withtherequirements oftheauxiliary fecdwater system.Thesurveillance requirements forthetrainNbatterysystemareconsistent withtherequirements oftheABandCDstationbatteries.
ThetrainNbatteryloadsarederivedfromequipment in'theturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrainandbatterysizingisconsistent withthefunctional requirements ofthesecomponents.
Simulated loadsforbatterytestsareloadsequivalent tomeasuredactualloads.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1PageB3/48-1AMENDMENT 86,498 ATTACHMENT 3BTOAEP:NRC:1322 PROPOSEDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT23/48-9B3/48-1 ff~0l 3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOROPERATION ANDSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3'/4.8ELECTRICAL POWERSYSTEMSSHUTDOWNLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION 3.8.1.2Asaminimum,thefollowing A.C.electrical powersourcesshallbeOPERABLE:
a.Onecircuitbetweentheoffsitetransmission networkandtheonsiteClass1Edistribution system,andb.Onedieselgenerator with:1.Adayfueltankcontaining aminimumof70gallonsoffuel,Afuelstoragesystemcontaining aminimumindicated volumeof46,000gallonsoffuel,andAPPLICABILITY:
3.Afueltransferpump.MODES5and6.ACTION:WithlessthantheaboveminimumrequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesOPERABLE, suspendalloperations involving COREALTERATIONS orpositivereactivity changes'ntil theminimumrequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesarerestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.SURVEILLANCE REUIREMENTS 4.8.1.2TheaboverequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesshallbedemonstrated OPERABLEbytheperformance ofeachoftheSurveillance Requirements of4.8.1.1.1'nd 4.8.1.1.2 exceptforrequirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.5.
Commencing in1999duringtheextendedshutdowninitiated in1997,'the 18-monthsurveillance requirements 4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a) andb);4.8.1.1.2.e.6.a),
b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.8; 4.8.1.1.2.e.9.a),
b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.10.a) andb);and4.8.1.1.2.e.
II,maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theshutdown.
'Forpurposesofthisspecification, additionofwaterfromtheRWSTdoesnotconstitute apositivereactivity additionprovidedtheboronconcentration intheRWSTisgreaterthantheminimumrequiredbySpecification 3.1.2.7.b.2.
COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2Page3/48-9AMENDMENT 448,483,459 3/4BASES314.8ELECTRICAL POWERSYSTEMSTheOPERABILITY oftheA.C.andD.Cpowersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringoperation ensuresthatsufficient powerwillbeavailable tosupplythesafetyrelatedequipment requiredforI)thesafeshutdownofthefacilityand2)themitigation andcontrolofaccidentconditions withinthefacility.
Theminimumspecified independent andredundant A.C.andD.C.powersourcesanddistribution systemssatisfytherequirements ofGeneralDesignCriteria17ofAppendix"A"to10CFR50.TheACTIONrequirements specified forthelevelsofdegradation ofthepowersourcesproviderestriction uponcontinued facilityoperation commensurate withthelevelofdegradation.
TheOPERABILITY ofthepowersourcesareconsistent withtheinitialcondition assumptions oftheaccidentanalysesandarebaseduponmaintaining atleastoneofeachoftheonsiteA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsOPERABLEduringaccidentconditions coincident withanassumedlossofoffsitepowerandsinglefailureoftheotheronsiteA.C.source.TheOPERABILITY oftheminimumspecified A.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringshutdownandrefueling ensuresthat1)thefacilitycanbemaintained intheshutdownorrefueling condition forextendedtimeperiodsand2)sufficient instrumentation andcontrolcapability isavailable formonitoring andmaintaining thefacilitystatus.Specificsurveillance requirements (SRs)ofSR4.8.1.2maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theextendedoutagethatcommenced in1997.Thedelayispermitted torecognize thesignificant ongoingmaintenance tosafetysystemsandcomponents thatwouldberequiredtobeOPERABLEsolelytosupportthereferenced surveillances.
Thedelayrecognizes thereduceddecayheatloadandreducedfissionproductactivities resulting fromtheextendedshutdownandconsequently thesmallbenefitfromperforming thesurveillances priortothenextentryintoMODE4.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet.butactualperformance isnotrequireduntiltherequiredsafetysystemsarcreadytosupportentryintoMODE4.TheABandCDstationbatterysystemsprovideareliablesourceofcontinuous powerforsupplyandcontrolofplantloadssuchasswitchgear andannunciator controlcircuits, staticinverters, valvecontrolcenters,emergency lightingandmotorcontrolcenters.Thedesigndutycyclesofthesebatteries arecomposite load,"profiles resulting fromthecombination ofthethreehourLossOfCoolantAccident/Loss OfOffsitePowerbatteryloadprofilesandthefourhourStationBlackoutbatteryloadprofiles.
ThetrainNstationbatterysystemprovidesanindependent 250voltDCpowersupplyforpowerandcontroloftheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrain.Thelimitingconditions ofoperation forthetrainNbatteryareconsistent withtherequirements oftheauxiliary feedwater system.Thesurveillance requirements forthetrainNbatterysystemareconsistent withtherequirements oftheABandCDstationbattcrics.
ThetrainNbatteryloadsarederivedfromequipment intheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrainandbatterysizingisconsistent withthefunctional requirements ofthesecomponents.
Simulated loadsforbatterytestsareloadsequivalent tomeasuredactualloads.lCOOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2Page83/48-1AMENDMENT VB,483 ATTACHMENT 4TOAEP:NRC:1322 NOSIGNIFICANT HAZARDSCONSIDERATION EVALUATION 1AI'I4.
Attachment 4TOAEP:NRC:1322 Page1NoSinificantHazardsConsideration Evaluation I&Mhasevaluated thisproposedamendment anddetermined thatitinvolvesnosignificant hazardsconsideration.
According to10CFR50.92(c),
aproposedamendment toanoperating licenseinvolvesnosignificant hazardsconsideration ifoperation ofthefacilityinaccordance withtheproposedamendment wouldnot:1.involveasignificant increaseintheprobability ofoccurrence orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated; 2.createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously analyzed; or3.involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.I&MproposestoreviseT/S3/4.8.1.2, "Electrical PowerSystems,Shutdown,"
anditsassociated basestoprovideaone-timeextension ofthe18-monthsurveillance intervalforspecificsurveillance requirements (SRs).Inaddition, forunit2only,aminoradministrative changeisincludedtodeleteareference toT/S4.0.8thatisnolongerapplicable.
Forunit1only,aneditorial correction ismade.Thedetermination thatthecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92aremetforthisamendment requestisindicated below.1.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability ofoccurrence orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated?
Adiscussion ofeachoftheapplicable accidents follows.FuelhandlinaccidentTheonlytimeafuelhandlingaccidentcouldoccurisduringthehandlingofafuelassembly.
Thedesignoffuelhandlingequipment issuchthataninterruption ofA.C.powerwouldnotcauseafuelelementtobeinadvertently dropped.Therefore, aninterruption orlossofA.C.powerdoesnotsignificantly increasetheprobability ofafuelhandlingaccident.
Atpresent,fissionproductactivities inthefuelassemblypellet-to-cladding gapsaregreatlyreduced.Thefuelhandlingaccidentanalysisconsiders thethyroiddoseatthesiteboundaryandinthelowpopulation zone.Thisdoseisdominated bytheisotopeiodine131,whichalsodecaysmoreslowlythantheotheriodinecontributors tothedose.Theactivityofiodine131decreases byone-halfevery8.05days.Thecurrentshutdownperiodofapproximately 18monthsrepresents over70half-lives.
Activityofaradioactive materialisgenerally considered tobenegligible after7half-lives (areduction inactivityof1/128).Bycontrast, theaccidentanalysisassumesaniodinereduction oflessthan1/10(fromactivated charcoalfiltration) inthefuelhandlingbuilding, andnoreduction inthecontainment, priortorelease.Therefore, theconsequences ofafuelhandling Attachment 4TOAEP:NRC:1322 Page2accidentareclearlyboundedbytheexistingsafetyanalysiswithouttakingcreditforanyiodineremovalbycharcoalfiltration.
Thegreatlyreducedfissionproductactivityatthecurrenttimeprovidesassurance thattheconsequences ofthiseventareboundedbytheexistinganalysis.
Therefore, theconsequences arenotsignificantly increased.
Accidental releaseofradioactive liuidsTheinadvertent releaseofradioactive liquidwastestotheenvironment wasevaluated forthewasteevaporator condensate andmonitortanks,condensate storagetank,primarywaterstoragetank,refueling waterstoragetank(RWST),theauxiliary buildingstoragetanksandthechemicalandvolumecontrolsystem(CVCS)holduptanks.Itwasconcluded, intheUFSARChapter14evaluation, thatlossofliquidfromthesetankstotheenvironment isnotacredibleaccident.
Thisconclusion doesnotdependonoperating mode,hence,furtherevaluation ofthiseventisnotrequired.
WasteasreleaseRadioactive gasesareintroduced intothereactorcoolantbytheescapeoffissionproductsifdefectsexistinthefuelcladding.
Theprocessing ofthereactorcoolantbyauxiliary systemsresultsintheaccumulation ofradioactive gasesinvarioustanks.Thetwomainsourcesofanysignificant gaseousradioactivity thatcouldoccurwouldbethevolumecontroltank(VCT)andthegasdecaytanks.Itisassumedthat'atankrupturesbyanunspecified mechanism afterthereactorhasbeenoperating foronecorecyclewith1%defectsinthefuelcladding.
Thereisnoidentified mechanism bywhichaninterruption orlossofpowercouldresultinatankrupture.Therefore, itisconcluded thattheprobability ofoccurrence ofatankrupturewouldnotbesignificantly increased byaninterruption orlossofA.C.power.Thegreatlyreducedfissionproductactivities atthecurrenttimeprovidesassurance thattheconsequences ofthiseventareboundedbythecurrentanalysisandwould,therefore, notbesignificantly increased.
Uncontrolled rodclustercontrolassembl(RCCA)withdrawal fromasubcritical condition Thiseventcanonlyoccur,withthereactortripbreakersclosedandthecontrolroddrivemechanisms (CRDMs)energized.
Withtheexception oftestingorspecialma'ntenance, theroddrivemotorgenerator setremainstaggedoutuntilMode3andthisalonewouldprecluderodmovement.
Iftheconditions forrodwithdrawal aremet,twooperablesourcerangeinstruments andtworeactortripchannelsandtripbreakersmustbeoperable.
Aninterruption orlossofpowerwouldprecludeCRDMmovementandreleasethecontrolrods.Thesourcerangeinstruments wouldremainavailable.
Therefore, itisconcluded thattheprobability ofoccurrence ofanuncontrolled RCCAwithdrawal wouldnotbesignificantly increased byaninterruption orlossofA.C.powerinModes5or6.Acceptable consequences forthiseventrelyonprecluding itsoccurrence.
~Cfl Ci~IAttachment 4TOAEP:NRC:1322 Page3hUncontrolled boron.dilutionThiseventrequiresamalfunction oftheCVCS.TheCVCSisdesignedtolimit,evenundervariouspostulated failuremodes,thepotential rateofdilutiontoavaluewhichprovidestheoperatorsufficient timetocorrectthesituation inasafeandorderlymanner.Therateofadditionofunborated watermakeuptothereactorcoolantsystemislimitedbythecapacityoftheprimarywaterpumps.Themaximumadditionrateinthiscaseis225gpmwithbothprimarywaterpumpsrunning.Aninterruption orlossofA.C.powerwouldprecludepumpoperation andaccidental dilution.
TheRWSTisnotacredibledilutionsourceasrecognized bya-footnotetoT/S3/4.8.1.2.
Therefore, thepossibility ofanuncontrolled borondilutionisnotsignificantly increased.
Acceptable consequences forthiseventrelyonprecluding itsoccurrence andbydetection withthesourcerangenuclearinstrumentation requiredbytheT/SinModes5and,6.Theproposedrevisioninvolvesdeferralofcertainsurveillance requirements whenshutdownbutdoesnotreducetherequiredoperablepowersourcesoftheLimitingCondition forOperation (LCO),doesnotincreasetheallowedoutagetimeofanyrequiredoperablepowersuppliesanddoesnotreducetherequirement toknowthatthedeferredSRscouldbemetatalltimes.Deferralofthetestingdoesnotbyitselfincreasethepotential thatthetestingwouldnotbemetandthepreviously evaluated accidents described abovedonotrelyonautomatic startingorloadingofthesingleoperableEDGpermitted inModes5and6.ThemonthlyEDGstarts,fuellevelchecks,andfueltransferpumpcheckswillcontinuetobeperformed toprovideadequateconfidence thattherequiredEDGwillbeavailable ifneeded.Therefore, itisconcluded thattherequiredA.C.sourceswillremainavailable andthepreviously evaluated consequences willnotbeincreased.
Theproposedadministrative changeforunit2deletesareference toT/S4.0.8thatisnolongerapplicable and,thus,doesnotincreasetheprobability orconsequences ofanaccident.
Theeditorial changetounit1correctsatypographical error.Thecorrection isnotintendedtochangethemeaning.Therefore, basedontheabovediscussion, itisconcluded thattheproposedamendment doesnotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.
/2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated?
Theproposedchangesdonotinvolveoperation oftherequiredelectrical powersourcesinamannerorconfiguration different thanthosepreviously recognized orevaluated.
Nonewfailuremechanisms oftheA.C.powersuppliesareintroduced byextension ofthesubjectsurveillance intervals.
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Attachment 4TOAEP:NRC:1322 Page4Theproposedadministrative changeforunit2deletesareference toT/S4.0.8thatisnolongerapplicable and,thus,doesnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccident.
Theeditorial changetounit1correctsatypographical error.Thecorrection isnotintendedtochangethemeaning.Therefore, itisconcluded thattheproposedchangesdonotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously evaluated.
3.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety?Therequiredoperablepowersupplieshavenotbeenreduced.Deferralofthespecified SRsdoesnotbyitselfintroduce afailuremechanism, andpastperformance oftheSRshasdemonstrated reliability inpassingthedeferredsurveillances.
Therefore, theavailability ofpowersuppliesassumedforaccidentmitigation isnotsignificantly reducedandpreviousmarginsofsafetyaremaintained.
Theproposedadministrative changeforunit2deletesareference toT/S4.0.8thatisnolongerapplicable andthus,doesnotincreasetheprobability orconsequences ofanaccident.
Theeditorial changetounit1correctsatypographical error.Thecorrection isnotintendedtochangethemeaning.Therefore, thesechangesdonotinvolveasignificant reduction inthemarginofsafety.Insummary,basedupontheaboveevaluation, I&Mhasconcluded thatthesechangesinvolvenosignificant hazardsconsideration.
ATTACHMENT 5TOAEP:NRC:1322 ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT Attachment 5toAEP:NRC:1322 Page1Environmental Assessment I&Mhasevaluated thislicenseamendment requestagainstthecriteriaforidentification oflicensing andregulatory actionsrequiring environmental assessment inaccordance with10CFR51.21.?&Mhasdetermined thatthislicenseamendment requestmeetsthecriteriaforacategorical exclusion setforthin10CFR51.22(c)(9)
.Thisdetermination isbasedonthefactthatthischangeisbeingproposedasanamendment toalicenseissuedpursuantto10CFR50thatchangesarequirement withrespecttoinstallation oruseofafacilitycomponent locatedwithintherestricted area,asdefinedin10CFR20,orthatchangesaninspection orasurveillance requirement, andtheamendment meetsthefollowing specificcriteria.
(i)Theamendment involvesnosignificant hazardsconsideration.
Asdemonstrated inattachment 4,thisproposedamendment doesnotinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.
(ii)Thereisnosignificant changeinthetypesorsignificant increaseintheamountsofanyeffluentthatmaybereleasedoffsite.Asdocumented inattachment 1,therewillbenosignificant changeinthetypesorsignificant increaseintheamountsofanyeffluents releasedoffsite.(iii)Thereisnosignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposure.
Theproposedchangeswillnotresultinsignificant changesintheoperation orconfiguration ofthefacility.
Therewillbenochangeinthelevelofcontrolsormethodology usedforprocessing ofradioactive effluents orhandlingofsolidradioactive waste,norwilltheproposalresultinanychangeinthenormalradiation levelswithintheplant.Therefore, therewillbenosignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposureresulting fromthischange.
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