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{{#Wiki_filter:r(RCForm366U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION(6-1998),LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/charactersforeachblock)APPROVEDBYOMBNo.3150-0(04EXPIRES06I30)2001ESTIIAATEDBVRDENPERRESPONSETOCOMPLYWITHT)eSMANDATORYBIFORMATIONCOUECTIONREOVESTI50.0HRS.REPORTEDlESSONSLEARNEDAREBICORPORATEDINTOTHEUCENSINGPROCESSANDFEDBACKTOINDVSTRY.FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDBIGBVRDENESTBIATETOTHEINFORMATIONANORECORDSMANAGEMENTBRANCH(T4F55).V.S.NVCLEARRECIAATORYCOMMISSION.WASIeNGTON.DC20555000).ANOTOTHEP~REDVCTIONPROJECT(5)50OIOI),OFFICEOFMANAGEMENTANDBVDGET,WASHINGTON,DC20505FACILITYNAME(1)CookNuclearPlantUnit1DOCKETNUMBER(2)05000-315PAGE(5)1of3TITLE(4)GeneralElectricHFARelaysInstalledinEmergencyDieselGeneratorsMayNotMeetSeismicQualificationEVENTDATE(5)LERNUMBER(6)REPORTDATE(7)OTHERFACILITIESINVOLVED(8)MONTH01DAYYEARYEAR0619991999SEQUENTIALNUMBER0010002101999REVISIONNUMBERMONTHDAYYEARFAILITYNAMCookUnit2AILINAMCKNUMBR05000-316NUMOPERATINGMODE(9)POWERLEVEL(10)NAME0050.73(a)(2)(i)50.73(a)(2)(II)50.73(a)(2)(ill)re)(11)20.2203(a)(2)(v)2p.2203(a)(3)(i)20.2203(a)(3)(ii)20.2201(b)20.2203(a)(1)20.2203(a)(2)(1)50.73(a)(2)(viii)50.73(a)(2)(x)73.71OTHER50.73(a)(2)(iv)20.2203(a)(4)20.2203(a)(2)(ii)50.73(a)(2)(v)50.73(a)(2)(vii)50.36(c)(1)50.36(c)(2)SpecifyYIAbslraclbe)orrornNRCFormSEBA20.2203(a)(2)(iii)2p.2203(a)(2)(iv)LICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER(12)TELEPHONENUMBER(IndudeAreaCods)THISREPORTISSUBMITTEDPURSUANTTOTHEREQUIREMENTSOF10CFR(I:(CheckoneormoMr.BrentD.Pogue,Licensing(616)465-5901x2604COMPLETEONELINEFOREACHCOMPONENTFAILUREDESCRIBEDINTHISREPORT(13)CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERREPORTABLETOEPIX,ACCAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERREPORTABLETOEPIXSUPPLEMENTALREPORTEXPECTED(14)XYES(IfYes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE)NOEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE15)MONTH'04DAY051999Abstract(Limitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximately15single-spacedtypewrittenlines)(16)OnJanuary11,1999,Units1and2EmergencyDieselGenerators(EDGs)weredeclaredinoperableat1828hoursandanENSnotificationwasmadeat2026hoursinaccordancewith10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i)and10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A).The.EDGsweredeclaredinoperableduetoaconcernidentifiedbyplantpersonnelthattheGeneralElectricHFAsafetyrelatedrelaysinstalledintheEDGcircuitsmaynotbeconfiguredinaccordancewithvendorrecommendedrequirementsforrelaycontactadjustmentandservicinginstructions,andtherefore,maynotmeetseismicqualificationrequirements.TherelayissuehadbeenidentifiedinaConditionReportonJanuary6,1999,howeverduetoprocessproblems,actionswerenotinitiatedtodeterminethesafetysignificanceoftheconditionuntilJanuary11,1999.AsbothunitsarecurrentlyinMode5,allsafeshutdowncircuitswerereviewedandoperabilitydeterminationsperformedforbothunits.ItwasdeterminedthatonlytheEDGswereaffectedinsuchawaythatspuriousoperationoftheHFArelayfromaseismiceventcouldpreventtheEDGsfromperformingtheirsafetyrelatedfunction.PreliminaryevaluationindicatesthatoperatingexperienceinformationprovidedtotheindustryregardingtheHFArelayswasincorrectlydispositionedin1985.Thisresultedinthefailuretoprovideinstructionsforconversionofcontactposition,adjustmentofthecontacts,andverificationofthecontactsonceconverted.Engineeringhasreviewedtheelementarydrawingsforthecontrolcircuitsofallsafeshutdownequipmentanddeterminedthat9relaysassociatedwiththeEDGshavecontactconfigurationsthatarenotoneoftheGEseismicallyqualifiedvariationsfortheHFArelay.Correctiveactionshavebeendevelopedandarecurrentlybeinginitiated.Therootcauseinvestigationofthisev'entis,ongoing,asistheevaluationofsafetysignificance.Supplementalinformationregardingadditionalcorrectiveactions,preventiveactions,andsafetysignificance,willbeprovidedinanupdatetothisLERbyApril5,1999.99022200i69902i0PDRADQCK050003i5SPDR NRCFORM366AU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION(6-1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONFACILITYNAME(1)CookNuclearPlantUnit1DOCKETNUMBER(2)05000-315YEAR1999LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIALNUMBER001REVISIONNUMBER00PAGE(3)2of3TEXT(Ilmorespaceisrequired,useedditionelcopiesofNRCForm(366A)(17)ConditionsPriortoEventUnit1wasinMode5,ColdShutdownUnit2wasinMode5,ColdShutdownDescritionofEventInlateDecember1998,engineeringpersonnelbeganareviewrelatedtoGeneralElectric(GE)HFArelaycontactconfiguration.whilereviewingadocumentationpackagerelatedtoaplantrestartissue.Asaresultofthereview,onJanuary6,1999,aconcernwasidentifiedthattheGEHFAsafetyrelatedrelaysinstalledinplantsystemcircuitsmaynotbeproperlyconfiguredinaccordancewithvendorinstructionsforrelaycontactadjustmentandservicinginstructions,andtherefore,maynotmeetseismicqualification.TheGEHFArelaysareprocuredwithallcontactsinthe"normallyopen"position,whichareconvertedto"normallyclosed"asrequiredbythecircuitinwhichtheyareinstalled.Whenconvertinga"normallyopen"contacttoa"normallyclosed"contact,pastandexistingplantpracticesdidnotverifythatallcriticalrelayadjustmentsarewithinthevendorspecifiedtolerances,norwerethealteredcontactarrangementsverifiedtobeoneoftheGEseismicallyapprovedconfigurations.Theseverificationsarenecessarytoensurethattheseismicqualificationhasbeenmaintained.AConditionReport(CR)waswrittendocumentingtheconcernwiththeHFArelaysandsubmittedtotheShiftTechnicalAdvisor(STA)onJanuary6,1999.Anoperabilitydeterminationcouldnotbemadeontheimpactofthisconditiononplantequipment,astherewasinsufficientinformationavailableonwhatcircuitswereaffected.Furtherinvestigationwasperformed,whichresultedintheidentificationthatHFArelayswereinstalledinvarioussafeshutdowncontrolcircuits,includingallfourEmergencyDieselGenerators(EDGs.Onceallsafeshutdowncircuitswerereviewedforbothunits,itwasdeterminedthatonlytheEDGswereaffectedinsuchawaythatspuriousoperationoftheHFArelaywouldpreventtheEDGsfromperformingtheirsafetyrelatedfunctioninMode5.TheEDGsweredeclaredinoperableat1828hoursonJanuary11,1999.CauseofEventPreliminaryevaluationindicatesthatoperatingexperienceinformationprovidedtotheindustryregardingtheHFArelayswasincorrectlydispositionedin1985.Thisresultedinthefailuretoprovideinstructionsforconversionofcontactposition,adjustmentofthecontacts,andverificationofthecontactsonceconverted.Additionally,engineeringhasreviewedtheelementarydrawingsforthecontrolcircuitsofallsafeshutdownequipmentanddeterminedthat9relaysassociatedwiththeEDGshavecontactconfigurationsthatarenotoneoftheGEseismicallyqualifiedvariationsfortheHFArelay.ProblemswiththetimelyprocessingofCRsandthecollectionofinformationneededtoperformoperabilitydeterminationsbecameapparentwhentheShiftSupervisordeclaredall4EDGsinoperableduetotheinabilitytodeterminewhateffecttheHFArelayconcernhadontheEDGs.TheconditionreportingprocesswasoverburdenedbylargenumbersofCRsgenerated,allofwhichrequiredreviewbytheSTA,whoisalsoexpectedtogeneratetheoperabilitydeterminationwhenrequired.ThisresultedinabacklogofbothunreviewedCRsandCRswaitingontheinformationnecessarytoperformtheoperabilitydeterminations.Therootcauseinvestigationforthiseventhasnotbeencompleted.SupplementalinformationregardingadditionalcorrectiveactionsandpreventiveactionswillbeprovidedinanupdatetothisLERbyApril5,1999.NRCFORM366A(6-1998)  
{{#Wiki_filter:r(RCForm366U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION (6-1998),LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/characters foreachblock)APPROVEDBYOMBNo.3150-0(04 EXPIRES06I30)2001 ESTIIAATED BVRDENPERRESPONSETOCOMPLYWITHT)eSMANDATORY BIFORMATION COUECTION REOVESTI50.0HRS.REPORTEDlESSONSLEARNEDAREBICORPORATED INTOTHEUCENSINGPROCESSANDFEDBACKTOINDVSTRY.
FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDBIG BVRDENESTBIATETOTHEINFORMATION ANORECORDSMANAGEMENT BRANCH(T4F55).V.S.NVCLEARRECIAATORY COMMISSION.
WASIeNGTON.
DC20555000).
ANOTOTHEP~REDVCTION PROJECT(5)50OIOI),
OFFICEOFMANAGEMENT ANDBVDGET,WASHINGTON, DC20505FACILITYNAME(1)CookNuclearPlantUnit1DOCKETNUMBER(2) 05000-315 PAGE(5)1of3TITLE(4)GeneralElectricHFARelaysInstalled inEmergency DieselGenerators MayNotMeetSeismicQualification EVENTDATE(5)LERNUMBER(6)REPORTDATE(7)OTHERFACILITIES INVOLVED(8)MONTH01DAYYEARYEAR0619991999SEQUENTIAL NUMBER0010002101999REVISIONNUMBERMONTHDAYYEARFAILITYNAMCookUnit2AILINAMCKNUMBR05000-316 NUMOPERATING MODE(9)POWERLEVEL(10)
NAME0050.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(II) 50.73(a)(2)(ill) re)(11)20.2203(a)(2)(v) 2p.2203(a)(3)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 20.2201(b)20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(2)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71OTHER50.73(a)(2)(iv) 20.2203(a)(4) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2)
SpecifyYIAbslraclbe)orrornNRCFormSEBA20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 2p.2203(a)(2)(iv)
LICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER(12)TELEPHONE NUMBER(IndudeAreaCods)THISREPORTISSUBMITTED PURSUANTTOTHEREQUIREMENTS OF10CFR(I:(CheckoneormoMr.BrentD.Pogue,Licensing (616)465-5901x2604COMPLETEONELINEFOREACHCOMPONENT FAILUREDESCRIBED INTHISREPORT(13)CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TOEPIX,ACCAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TOEPIXSUPPLEMENTAL REPORTEXPECTED(14)XYES(IfYes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE)NOEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE15)MONTH'04DAY051999Abstract(Limitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximately 15single-spaced typewritten lines)(16)OnJanuary11,1999,Units1and2Emergency DieselGenerators (EDGs)weredeclaredinoperable at1828hoursandanENSnotification wasmadeat2026hoursinaccordance with10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i) and10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A).
The.EDGsweredeclaredinoperable duetoaconcernidentified byplantpersonnel thattheGeneralElectricHFAsafetyrelatedrelaysinstalled intheEDGcircuitsmaynotbeconfigured inaccordance withvendorrecommended requirements forrelaycontactadjustment andservicing instructions, andtherefore, maynotmeetseismicqualification requirements.
Therelayissuehadbeenidentified inaCondition ReportonJanuary6,1999,howeverduetoprocessproblems, actionswerenotinitiated todetermine thesafetysignificance ofthecondition untilJanuary11,1999.Asbothunitsarecurrently inMode5,allsafeshutdowncircuitswerereviewedandoperability determinations performed forbothunits.Itwasdetermined thatonlytheEDGswereaffectedinsuchawaythatspuriousoperation oftheHFArelayfromaseismiceventcouldpreventtheEDGsfromperforming theirsafetyrelatedfunction.
Preliminary evaluation indicates thatoperating experience information providedtotheindustryregarding theHFArelayswasincorrectly dispositioned in1985.Thisresultedinthefailuretoprovideinstructions forconversion ofcontactposition, adjustment ofthecontacts, andverification ofthecontactsonceconverted.
Engineering hasreviewedtheelementary drawingsforthecontrolcircuitsofallsafeshutdownequipment anddetermined that9relaysassociated withtheEDGshavecontactconfigurations thatarenotoneoftheGEseismically qualified variations fortheHFArelay.Corrective actionshavebeendeveloped andarecurrently beinginitiated.
Therootcauseinvestigation ofthisev'entis,ongoing,asistheevaluation ofsafetysignificance.
Supplemental information regarding additional corrective actions,preventive actions,andsafetysignificance, willbeprovidedinanupdatetothisLERbyApril5,1999.99022200i6 9902i0PDRADQCK050003i5SPDR NRCFORM366AU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION (6-1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION FACILITYNAME(1)CookNuclearPlantUnit1DOCKETNUMBER(2) 05000-315 YEAR1999LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER001REVISIONNUMBER00PAGE(3)2of3TEXT(Ilmorespaceisrequired, useedditionel copiesofNRCForm(366A)(17)Conditions PriortoEventUnit1wasinMode5,ColdShutdownUnit2wasinMode5,ColdShutdownDescritionofEventInlateDecember1998,engineering personnel beganareviewrelatedtoGeneralElectric(GE)HFArelaycontactconfiguration.
whilereviewing adocumentation packagerelatedtoaplantrestartissue.Asaresultofthereview,onJanuary6,1999,aconcernwasidentified thattheGEHFAsafetyrelatedrelaysinstalled inplantsystemcircuitsmaynotbeproperlyconfigured inaccordance withvendorinstructions forrelaycontactadjustment andservicing instructions, andtherefore, maynotmeetseismicqualification.
TheGEHFArelaysareprocuredwithallcontactsinthe"normally open"position, whichareconverted to"normally closed"asrequiredbythecircuitinwhichtheyareinstalled.
Whenconverting a"normally open"contacttoa"normally closed"contact,pastandexistingplantpractices didnotverifythatallcriticalrelayadjustments arewithinthevendorspecified tolerances, norwerethealteredcontactarrangements verifiedtobeoneoftheGEseismically approvedconfigurations.
Theseverifications arenecessary toensurethattheseismicqualification hasbeenmaintained.
ACondition Report(CR)waswrittendocumenting theconcernwiththeHFArelaysandsubmitted totheShiftTechnical Advisor(STA)onJanuary6,1999.Anoperability determination couldnotbemadeontheimpactofthiscondition onplantequipment, astherewasinsufficient information available onwhatcircuitswereaffected.
Furtherinvestigation wasperformed, whichresultedintheidentification thatHFArelayswereinstalled invarioussafeshutdowncontrolcircuits, including allfourEmergency DieselGenerators (EDGs.Onceallsafeshutdowncircuitswerereviewedforbothunits,itwasdetermined thatonlytheEDGswereaffectedinsuchawaythatspuriousoperation oftheHFArelaywouldpreventtheEDGsfromperforming theirsafetyrelatedfunctioninMode5.TheEDGsweredeclaredinoperable at1828hoursonJanuary11,1999.CauseofEventPreliminary evaluation indicates thatoperating experience information providedtotheindustryregarding theHFArelayswasincorrectly dispositioned in1985.Thisresultedinthefailuretoprovideinstructions forconversion ofcontactposition, adjustment ofthecontacts, andverification ofthecontactsonceconverted.
Additionally, engineering hasreviewedtheelementary drawingsforthecontrolcircuitsofallsafeshutdownequipment anddetermined that9relaysassociated withtheEDGshavecontactconfigurations thatarenotoneoftheGEseismically qualified variations fortheHFArelay.Problemswiththetimelyprocessing ofCRsandthecollection ofinformation neededtoperformoperability determinations becameapparentwhentheShiftSupervisor declaredall4EDGsinoperable duetotheinability todetermine whateffecttheHFArelayconcernhadontheEDGs.Thecondition reporting processwasoverburdened bylargenumbersofCRsgenerated, allofwhichrequiredreviewbytheSTA,whoisalsoexpectedtogeneratetheoperability determination whenrequired.
Thisresultedinabacklogofbothunreviewed CRsandCRswaitingontheinformation necessary toperformtheoperability determinations.
Therootcauseinvestigation forthiseventhasnotbeencompleted.
Supplemental information regarding additional corrective actionsandpreventive actionswillbeprovidedinanupdatetothisLERbyApril5,1999.NRCFORM366A(6-1998)  


NRCFORM366AU.s.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION(6-1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONFACILITYNAME(1)CookNuclearPlantUnit1DOCKETNUMBER(2)05000-315YEAR1999LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIALNUMBER001REVISIONNUMBER00PAGE(3)3of3TEXT(ifmorespeceisrequired,useedditionelcopiesofNRCForm(366A)(17)AnalsisofEventThiseventwasreportedviatheENSonJanuary11,1999at2026hoursunder10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i),asaconditionwhichifhadbeenfoundwhiletheplantwasoperatingwouldhaveresultedintheplantbeingseriouslydegraded,andisalsobeingreportedunder10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A)tohavethepotentialtoalonepreventfulfillmentofthesafetyfunctionofsystemsthatareneededtomaintainthereactorinasafeshutdowncondition.ThisLERisbeingsubmittedinaccordancewith10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)and10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(A).TheGEHFArelaysareusedinnumeroussafeshutdownequipmentcontrolcircuits.ForallsafeshutdownequipmentrequiredinMode5thatutilizetheaffectedGEHFArelays,thecontrolcircuitshavebeenreviewedforimpactbasedontheidentifiedcondition.Asaresultofthisreview,onlytheEDGshavebeenidentifiedasbeingadverselyimpactedsuchthattheyhavebeendeclaredinoperable.Theimpactoftheserelaysinothersafeshutdownequipmentcontrolcircuitshasrevealedthattheequipment,incertaincases,isaffected,buttheeffectdoesnotjeopardizethesafetyfunctionoftheequipment.Additionalevaluationsarerequiredfortheeffectonequipmentinotherplantoperatingmodes.Thesafetysignificanceofthiseventisunderevaluation.FinaldeterminationregardingthesafetysignificanceandpastoperabilitywillbeprovidedinanupdatetothisLERbyApril5,1999.CorrectiveActionsAmulti-disciplineprojectteamwasformedtoaddresstheconditionoftheGEHFArelaysanddirectactivitiestorestoretheEDGstoanoperablecondition.AllsafeshutdownequipmentcontrolcircuitswerereviewedtodetermineinwhichcircuitstheHFArelaysareinstalled.Arelayinspectionprocedurewasdevelopedtoverify,andadjustasnecessary,thoseHFArelaysthatarenotwithinthevendorrecommendedspecifications.ThisprocedurealsoincorporatesvendorrecommendedguidanceforrelayadjustmentinanysubsequentmaintenanceactivitiesontheHFArelays.Uponcompletionoftherelayinspection,relaysthataredeterminedtobenon-compliantwillbeevaluatedforseismicperformance.NinerelaysassociatedwiththeEDGswerefoundinstalledinconfigurationsthatdonotmatchGEprocurementconfigurations,therefore,theseismicadequacyoftheseconfigurationsisconsideredtobeindeterminate.Theserelaysrequireadesignchangetorestoreeachoftherelaystotheirqualifiedcontactconfiguration.ThedesignchangewillbeimplementedpriortotheEDGsbeingdeclaredoperable.Apostmaintenancetestingprocedurehasbeendevelopedtotestandverifyoperabilityoftheserelays.Toaddresstheissueregardingthelackofatimelyresponsetodetermineoperability,asinglepoint,multi-disciplineteamtoreviewincomingconditionreportshasbeenimplemented.Theteam,whichincludesaSeniorReactorOperator,interfacesdirectlywiththeircounterpartswithintheirrespectiveorganizationstoincreaseconditionreportreviewefficiencyandimprovetimelyresponseuntilprogrammaticimprovementsareimplemented.Arevisiontotheoperabilitydeterminationprocedurehasbeenimplementedthatdirectstheengineeringorganizationtoperformoperabilitydeterminations,whenrequired,andprovidethemtotheOperationsShiftSupervisorforapproval.Therootcauseinvestigationforthiseventhasnotbeencompleted.Additionalcorrectiveactions,includingpreventiveactions,maybedevelopedbasedontheresultsoftherootcauseinvestigation.SupplementalinformationregardingadditionalcorrectiveactionsandpreventiveactionswillbeprovidedinanupdatetothisLERbyApril5,1999.PreviousSimilarEvents315/97-024-04NRCFORM366A(6-1998)}}
NRCFORM366AU.s.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION (6-1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION FACILITYNAME(1)CookNuclearPlantUnit1DOCKETNUMBER(2) 05000-315 YEAR1999LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER001REVISIONNUMBER00PAGE(3)3of3TEXT(ifmorespeceisrequired, useedditionel copiesofNRCForm(366A)(17)AnalsisofEventThiseventwasreportedviatheENSonJanuary11,1999at2026hoursunder10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i),
asacondition whichifhadbeenfoundwhiletheplantwasoperating wouldhaveresultedintheplantbeingseriously
: degraded, andisalsobeingreportedunder10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) tohavethepotential toalonepreventfulfillment ofthesafetyfunctionofsystemsthatareneededtomaintainthereactorinasafeshutdowncondition.
ThisLERisbeingsubmitted inaccordance with10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii) and10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(A).
TheGEHFArelaysareusedinnumeroussafeshutdownequipment controlcircuits.
Forallsafeshutdownequipment requiredinMode5thatutilizetheaffectedGEHFArelays,thecontrolcircuitshavebeenreviewedforimpactbasedontheidentified condition.
Asaresultofthisreview,onlytheEDGshavebeenidentified asbeingadversely impactedsuchthattheyhavebeendeclaredinoperable.
Theimpactoftheserelaysinothersafeshutdownequipment controlcircuitshasrevealedthattheequipment, incertaincases,isaffected, buttheeffectdoesnotjeopardize thesafetyfunctionoftheequipment.
Additional evaluations arerequiredfortheeffectonequipment inotherplantoperating modes.Thesafetysignificance ofthiseventisunderevaluation.
Finaldetermination regarding thesafetysignificance andpastoperability willbeprovidedinanupdatetothisLERbyApril5,1999.Corrective ActionsAmulti-discipline projectteamwasformedtoaddressthecondition oftheGEHFArelaysanddirectactivities torestoretheEDGstoanoperablecondition.
Allsafeshutdownequipment controlcircuitswerereviewedtodetermine inwhichcircuitstheHFArelaysareinstalled.
Arelayinspection procedure wasdeveloped toverify,andadjustasnecessary, thoseHFArelaysthatarenotwithinthevendorrecommended specifications.
Thisprocedure alsoincorporates vendorrecommended guidanceforrelayadjustment inanysubsequent maintenance activities ontheHFArelays.Uponcompletion oftherelayinspection, relaysthataredetermined tobenon-compliant willbeevaluated forseismicperformance.
Ninerelaysassociated withtheEDGswerefoundinstalled inconfigurations thatdonotmatchGEprocurement configurations, therefore, theseismicadequacyoftheseconfigurations isconsidered tobeindeterminate.
Theserelaysrequireadesignchangetorestoreeachoftherelaystotheirqualified contactconfiguration.
Thedesignchangewillbeimplemented priortotheEDGsbeingdeclaredoperable.
Apostmaintenance testingprocedure hasbeendeveloped totestandverifyoperability oftheserelays.Toaddresstheissueregarding thelackofatimelyresponsetodetermine operability, asinglepoint,multi-discipline teamtoreviewincomingcondition reportshasbeenimplemented.
Theteam,whichincludesaSeniorReactorOperator, interfaces directlywiththeircounterparts withintheirrespective organizations toincreasecondition reportreviewefficiency andimprovetimelyresponseuntilprogrammatic improvements areimplemented.
Arevisiontotheoperability determination procedure hasbeenimplemented thatdirectstheengineering organization toperformoperability determinations, whenrequired, andprovidethemtotheOperations ShiftSupervisor forapproval.
Therootcauseinvestigation forthiseventhasnotbeencompleted.
Additional corrective actions,including preventive actions,maybedeveloped basedontheresultsoftherootcauseinvestigation.
Supplemental information regarding additional corrective actionsandpreventive actionswillbeprovidedinanupdatetothisLERbyApril5,1999.PreviousSimilarEvents315/97-024-04 NRCFORM366A(6-1998)}}

Revision as of 07:06, 29 June 2018

LER 99-001-00:on 990106,noted That GE Hfa Relays Installed in EDGs May Not Meet Seismic Qualification.Caused by Operating Experience Info Incorrectly Dispositioned in 1985. Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990405
ML17335A514
Person / Time
Site: Cook American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 02/10/1999
From: POGUE B D
AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO., INC.
To:
Shared Package
ML17335A513 List:
References
LER-99-001, LER-99-1, NUDOCS 9902220016
Download: ML17335A514 (4)


Text

r(RCForm366U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION (6-1998),LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/characters foreachblock)APPROVEDBYOMBNo.3150-0(04 EXPIRES06I30)2001 ESTIIAATED BVRDENPERRESPONSETOCOMPLYWITHT)eSMANDATORY BIFORMATION COUECTION REOVESTI50.0HRS.REPORTEDlESSONSLEARNEDAREBICORPORATED INTOTHEUCENSINGPROCESSANDFEDBACKTOINDVSTRY.

FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDBIG BVRDENESTBIATETOTHEINFORMATION ANORECORDSMANAGEMENT BRANCH(T4F55).V.S.NVCLEARRECIAATORY COMMISSION.

WASIeNGTON.

DC20555000).

ANOTOTHEP~REDVCTION PROJECT(5)50OIOI),

OFFICEOFMANAGEMENT ANDBVDGET,WASHINGTON, DC20505FACILITYNAME(1)CookNuclearPlantUnit1DOCKETNUMBER(2) 05000-315 PAGE(5)1of3TITLE(4)GeneralElectricHFARelaysInstalled inEmergency DieselGenerators MayNotMeetSeismicQualification EVENTDATE(5)LERNUMBER(6)REPORTDATE(7)OTHERFACILITIES INVOLVED(8)MONTH01DAYYEARYEAR0619991999SEQUENTIAL NUMBER0010002101999REVISIONNUMBERMONTHDAYYEARFAILITYNAMCookUnit2AILINAMCKNUMBR05000-316 NUMOPERATING MODE(9)POWERLEVEL(10)

NAME0050.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(II) 50.73(a)(2)(ill) re)(11)20.2203(a)(2)(v) 2p.2203(a)(3)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 20.2201(b)20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(2)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71OTHER50.73(a)(2)(iv) 20.2203(a)(4) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2)

SpecifyYIAbslraclbe)orrornNRCFormSEBA20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 2p.2203(a)(2)(iv)

LICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER(12)TELEPHONE NUMBER(IndudeAreaCods)THISREPORTISSUBMITTED PURSUANTTOTHEREQUIREMENTS OF10CFR(I:(CheckoneormoMr.BrentD.Pogue,Licensing (616)465-5901x2604COMPLETEONELINEFOREACHCOMPONENT FAILUREDESCRIBED INTHISREPORT(13)CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TOEPIX,ACCAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TOEPIXSUPPLEMENTAL REPORTEXPECTED(14)XYES(IfYes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE)NOEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE15)MONTH'04DAY051999Abstract(Limitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximately 15single-spaced typewritten lines)(16)OnJanuary11,1999,Units1and2Emergency DieselGenerators (EDGs)weredeclaredinoperable at1828hoursandanENSnotification wasmadeat2026hoursinaccordance with10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i) and10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A).

The.EDGsweredeclaredinoperable duetoaconcernidentified byplantpersonnel thattheGeneralElectricHFAsafetyrelatedrelaysinstalled intheEDGcircuitsmaynotbeconfigured inaccordance withvendorrecommended requirements forrelaycontactadjustment andservicing instructions, andtherefore, maynotmeetseismicqualification requirements.

Therelayissuehadbeenidentified inaCondition ReportonJanuary6,1999,howeverduetoprocessproblems, actionswerenotinitiated todetermine thesafetysignificance ofthecondition untilJanuary11,1999.Asbothunitsarecurrently inMode5,allsafeshutdowncircuitswerereviewedandoperability determinations performed forbothunits.Itwasdetermined thatonlytheEDGswereaffectedinsuchawaythatspuriousoperation oftheHFArelayfromaseismiceventcouldpreventtheEDGsfromperforming theirsafetyrelatedfunction.

Preliminary evaluation indicates thatoperating experience information providedtotheindustryregarding theHFArelayswasincorrectly dispositioned in1985.Thisresultedinthefailuretoprovideinstructions forconversion ofcontactposition, adjustment ofthecontacts, andverification ofthecontactsonceconverted.

Engineering hasreviewedtheelementary drawingsforthecontrolcircuitsofallsafeshutdownequipment anddetermined that9relaysassociated withtheEDGshavecontactconfigurations thatarenotoneoftheGEseismically qualified variations fortheHFArelay.Corrective actionshavebeendeveloped andarecurrently beinginitiated.

Therootcauseinvestigation ofthisev'entis,ongoing,asistheevaluation ofsafetysignificance.

Supplemental information regarding additional corrective actions,preventive actions,andsafetysignificance, willbeprovidedinanupdatetothisLERbyApril5,1999.99022200i6 9902i0PDRADQCK050003i5SPDR NRCFORM366AU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION (6-1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION FACILITYNAME(1)CookNuclearPlantUnit1DOCKETNUMBER(2) 05000-315 YEAR1999LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER001REVISIONNUMBER00PAGE(3)2of3TEXT(Ilmorespaceisrequired, useedditionel copiesofNRCForm(366A)(17)Conditions PriortoEventUnit1wasinMode5,ColdShutdownUnit2wasinMode5,ColdShutdownDescritionofEventInlateDecember1998,engineering personnel beganareviewrelatedtoGeneralElectric(GE)HFArelaycontactconfiguration.

whilereviewing adocumentation packagerelatedtoaplantrestartissue.Asaresultofthereview,onJanuary6,1999,aconcernwasidentified thattheGEHFAsafetyrelatedrelaysinstalled inplantsystemcircuitsmaynotbeproperlyconfigured inaccordance withvendorinstructions forrelaycontactadjustment andservicing instructions, andtherefore, maynotmeetseismicqualification.

TheGEHFArelaysareprocuredwithallcontactsinthe"normally open"position, whichareconverted to"normally closed"asrequiredbythecircuitinwhichtheyareinstalled.

Whenconverting a"normally open"contacttoa"normally closed"contact,pastandexistingplantpractices didnotverifythatallcriticalrelayadjustments arewithinthevendorspecified tolerances, norwerethealteredcontactarrangements verifiedtobeoneoftheGEseismically approvedconfigurations.

Theseverifications arenecessary toensurethattheseismicqualification hasbeenmaintained.

ACondition Report(CR)waswrittendocumenting theconcernwiththeHFArelaysandsubmitted totheShiftTechnical Advisor(STA)onJanuary6,1999.Anoperability determination couldnotbemadeontheimpactofthiscondition onplantequipment, astherewasinsufficient information available onwhatcircuitswereaffected.

Furtherinvestigation wasperformed, whichresultedintheidentification thatHFArelayswereinstalled invarioussafeshutdowncontrolcircuits, including allfourEmergency DieselGenerators (EDGs.Onceallsafeshutdowncircuitswerereviewedforbothunits,itwasdetermined thatonlytheEDGswereaffectedinsuchawaythatspuriousoperation oftheHFArelaywouldpreventtheEDGsfromperforming theirsafetyrelatedfunctioninMode5.TheEDGsweredeclaredinoperable at1828hoursonJanuary11,1999.CauseofEventPreliminary evaluation indicates thatoperating experience information providedtotheindustryregarding theHFArelayswasincorrectly dispositioned in1985.Thisresultedinthefailuretoprovideinstructions forconversion ofcontactposition, adjustment ofthecontacts, andverification ofthecontactsonceconverted.

Additionally, engineering hasreviewedtheelementary drawingsforthecontrolcircuitsofallsafeshutdownequipment anddetermined that9relaysassociated withtheEDGshavecontactconfigurations thatarenotoneoftheGEseismically qualified variations fortheHFArelay.Problemswiththetimelyprocessing ofCRsandthecollection ofinformation neededtoperformoperability determinations becameapparentwhentheShiftSupervisor declaredall4EDGsinoperable duetotheinability todetermine whateffecttheHFArelayconcernhadontheEDGs.Thecondition reporting processwasoverburdened bylargenumbersofCRsgenerated, allofwhichrequiredreviewbytheSTA,whoisalsoexpectedtogeneratetheoperability determination whenrequired.

Thisresultedinabacklogofbothunreviewed CRsandCRswaitingontheinformation necessary toperformtheoperability determinations.

Therootcauseinvestigation forthiseventhasnotbeencompleted.

Supplemental information regarding additional corrective actionsandpreventive actionswillbeprovidedinanupdatetothisLERbyApril5,1999.NRCFORM366A(6-1998)

NRCFORM366AU.s.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION (6-1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION FACILITYNAME(1)CookNuclearPlantUnit1DOCKETNUMBER(2) 05000-315 YEAR1999LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER001REVISIONNUMBER00PAGE(3)3of3TEXT(ifmorespeceisrequired, useedditionel copiesofNRCForm(366A)(17)AnalsisofEventThiseventwasreportedviatheENSonJanuary11,1999at2026hoursunder10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i),

asacondition whichifhadbeenfoundwhiletheplantwasoperating wouldhaveresultedintheplantbeingseriously

degraded, andisalsobeingreportedunder10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) tohavethepotential toalonepreventfulfillment ofthesafetyfunctionofsystemsthatareneededtomaintainthereactorinasafeshutdowncondition.

ThisLERisbeingsubmitted inaccordance with10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii) and10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(A).

TheGEHFArelaysareusedinnumeroussafeshutdownequipment controlcircuits.

Forallsafeshutdownequipment requiredinMode5thatutilizetheaffectedGEHFArelays,thecontrolcircuitshavebeenreviewedforimpactbasedontheidentified condition.

Asaresultofthisreview,onlytheEDGshavebeenidentified asbeingadversely impactedsuchthattheyhavebeendeclaredinoperable.

Theimpactoftheserelaysinothersafeshutdownequipment controlcircuitshasrevealedthattheequipment, incertaincases,isaffected, buttheeffectdoesnotjeopardize thesafetyfunctionoftheequipment.

Additional evaluations arerequiredfortheeffectonequipment inotherplantoperating modes.Thesafetysignificance ofthiseventisunderevaluation.

Finaldetermination regarding thesafetysignificance andpastoperability willbeprovidedinanupdatetothisLERbyApril5,1999.Corrective ActionsAmulti-discipline projectteamwasformedtoaddressthecondition oftheGEHFArelaysanddirectactivities torestoretheEDGstoanoperablecondition.

Allsafeshutdownequipment controlcircuitswerereviewedtodetermine inwhichcircuitstheHFArelaysareinstalled.

Arelayinspection procedure wasdeveloped toverify,andadjustasnecessary, thoseHFArelaysthatarenotwithinthevendorrecommended specifications.

Thisprocedure alsoincorporates vendorrecommended guidanceforrelayadjustment inanysubsequent maintenance activities ontheHFArelays.Uponcompletion oftherelayinspection, relaysthataredetermined tobenon-compliant willbeevaluated forseismicperformance.

Ninerelaysassociated withtheEDGswerefoundinstalled inconfigurations thatdonotmatchGEprocurement configurations, therefore, theseismicadequacyoftheseconfigurations isconsidered tobeindeterminate.

Theserelaysrequireadesignchangetorestoreeachoftherelaystotheirqualified contactconfiguration.

Thedesignchangewillbeimplemented priortotheEDGsbeingdeclaredoperable.

Apostmaintenance testingprocedure hasbeendeveloped totestandverifyoperability oftheserelays.Toaddresstheissueregarding thelackofatimelyresponsetodetermine operability, asinglepoint,multi-discipline teamtoreviewincomingcondition reportshasbeenimplemented.

Theteam,whichincludesaSeniorReactorOperator, interfaces directlywiththeircounterparts withintheirrespective organizations toincreasecondition reportreviewefficiency andimprovetimelyresponseuntilprogrammatic improvements areimplemented.

Arevisiontotheoperability determination procedure hasbeenimplemented thatdirectstheengineering organization toperformoperability determinations, whenrequired, andprovidethemtotheOperations ShiftSupervisor forapproval.

Therootcauseinvestigation forthiseventhasnotbeencompleted.

Additional corrective actions,including preventive actions,maybedeveloped basedontheresultsoftherootcauseinvestigation.

Supplemental information regarding additional corrective actionsandpreventive actionswillbeprovidedinanupdatetothisLERbyApril5,1999.PreviousSimilarEvents315/97-024-04 NRCFORM366A(6-1998)