IR 05000443/2023002: Difference between revisions
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If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: | If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: | ||
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Seabrook Station. | Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555- 0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Seabrook Station. | ||
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Seabrook Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding. | If you disagree with a cross -cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Seabrook Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding. | ||
Sincerely, | Sincerely, Matt R. Young, Chief Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety | ||
Matt R. Young, Chief Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000443 License No. NPF-86 | |||
Docket No. 05000443 License No. NPF-86 | |||
===Enclosure:=== | ===Enclosure:=== | ||
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==Inspection Report== | ==Inspection Report== | ||
Docket Number: 05000443 License Number: NPF-86 Report Number: 05000443/2023002 Enterprise Identifier: I-2023-002-0035 Licensee: NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC Facility: Seabrook Station Location: Seabrook, New Hampshire Inspection Dates: April 1, 2023 to June 30, 2023 Inspectors: T. Daun, Senior Resident Inspector C. Newport, Senior Resident Inspector S. Flanagan, Acting Resident Inspector P. Cataldo, Senior Reactor Inspector N. Eckhoff, Health Physicist Approved By: Matt R. Young, Chief Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Enclosure | Docket Number: 05000443 | ||
License Number: NPF-86 | |||
Report Number: 05000443/2023002 | |||
Enterprise Identifier: I-2023-002- 0035 | |||
Licensee: NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC | |||
Facility: Seabrook Station | |||
Location: Seabrook, New Hampshire | |||
Inspection Dates: April 1, 2023 to June 30, 2023 | |||
Inspectors: T. Daun, Senior Resident Inspector C. Newport, Senior Resident Inspector S. Flanagan, Acting Resident Inspector P. Cataldo, Senior Reactor Inspector N. Eckhoff, Health Physicist | |||
Approved By: Matt R. Young, Chief Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety | |||
Enclosure | |||
=SUMMARY= | =SUMMARY= | ||
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===List of Findings and Violations=== | ===List of Findings and Violations=== | ||
Failure to Establish Continuous Fire Watch on Fire Door Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.4] - 71111.05 Systems NCV 05000443/2023002-01 Teamwork Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Seabrook Station Facility Operating License Condition 2.F when the licensee failed to establish a continuous fire watch on fire door C107 which was open in the A essential switchgear room. | |||
Failure to Make Required 50.72(b)(3) Notifications Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV Not Applicable 71153 NCV 05000443/2023002-02 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv) with three examples when NextEra failed to make three required event notifications. | |||
Failure to Make Required 50.72(b)(3) Notifications Cornerstone | |||
===Additional Tracking Items=== | ===Additional Tracking Items=== | ||
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==INSPECTION SCOPES== | ==INSPECTION SCOPES== | ||
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards. | Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. | ||
Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards. | |||
==REACTOR SAFETY== | ==REACTOR SAFETY== | ||
==71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection== | ==71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection== | ||
===Seasonal Extreme Weather (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)=== | ===Seasonal Extreme Weather (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)=== | ||
: (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal high temperatures for the following system: service water and control building heating ventilation and air conditioning | : (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal high temperatures for the following system: service water and control building heating ventilation and air conditioning | ||
==71111.04 - Equipment Alignment== | ==71111.04 - Equipment Alignment== | ||
===Partial Walkdown (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)=== | ===Partial Walkdown (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)=== | ||
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains: | The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains: | ||
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==71111.05 - Fire Protection== | ==71111.05 - Fire Protection== | ||
===Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)=== | ===Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)=== | ||
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas: | The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas: | ||
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===Fire Brigade Drill Performance (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)=== | ===Fire Brigade Drill Performance (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)=== | ||
: (1) The inspectors evaluated the on-site fire brigade training and performance during | : (1) The inspectors evaluated the on-site fire brigade training and performance during an unannounced fire drill on May 19, 2023 | ||
==71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures== | ==71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures== | ||
===Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)=== | ===Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)=== | ||
: (1) The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the control | : (1) The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the control building cable spreading room on June 8, 2023 | ||
==71111.07A - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance== | ==71111.07A - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance== | ||
===Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)=== | ===Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)=== | ||
The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of: | The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of: | ||
: (1) 'B' primary component cooling water heat exchanger | : (1) 'B' primary component cooling water heat exchanger | ||
===71111.08P - In-service Inspection Activities (PWR) The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, risk significant piping system boundaries, and the containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing activities from April 10, 2023 through April 29, 2023. | ===71111.08P - In-service Inspection Activities (PWR) | ||
The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, risk significant piping system boundaries, and the containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing activities from April 10, 2023 through April 29, 2023. | |||
PWR In-service Inspection Activities - Nondestructive Examination (NDE) and Welding Activities (IP Section 03.01) === | PWR In-service Inspection Activities - Nondestructive Examination (NDE) and Welding Activities (IP Section 03.01)=== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.08|count=1}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.08|count=1}} | ||
(1) | |||
* Manual | * Manual ultronicisual e*inations fh -26'ontnmentiner during rrst t-240 azim(NDEtB1-I - - | ||
* Manual ultrasonic examination of 6-inch safety injection pipe-to-elbow welds S1-0251-07-02 and 03 (NDE Report SB1-UT-23-034 and 035) | * Manual ultrasonic examination of 6-inch safety injection pipe-to-elbow welds S1-0251- 07- 02 and 03 (NDE Report SB1-UT-23- 034 and 035) | ||
* Visual examination of pressurizer heater sleeves (NDE Report SB1-VT-23-043) | * Visual examination of pressurizer heater sleeves (NDE Report SB1-VT-23-043) | ||
* Visual examination of control rod drive mechanism canopy sleeve and clamp (NDE Report under WO 40807466-01) | * Visual examination of control rod drive mechanism canopy sleeve and clamp (NDE Report under WO 40807466- 01) | ||
* Class 1 welding activities and progressive liquid penetrant examinations associated with the steam generator bowl drain replacement under NRC-approved relief request 4RA-22-01 (ML23073A156) and engineering change EC297778 | * Class 1 welding activities and progressive liquid penetrant examinations associated with the steam generator bowl drain replacement under NRC-approved relief request 4RA-22- 01 (ML23073A156) and engineering change EC297778 | ||
* Magnetic particle examination of pressurizer skirt weld (NDE Report SB1-MT-23-002) | * Magnetic particle examination of pressurizer skirt weld (NDE Report SB1-MT-23- 002) | ||
* Liquid penetrant inspection following welding of Class 2 piping high point vent of 'A' charging pump (EC298147, and WO 40854907-01) | * Liquid penetrant inspection following welding of Class 2 piping high point vent of 'A' charging pump (EC298147, and WO 40854907- 01) | ||
* Verification of the performance of structural examinations of containment in accordance with IWE requirements, and associated with the 15-year 10 CFR 50 Appendix J, Type A Integrated Leak Rate Test (WO 40803307, EX1803.001 "Reactor Containment Integrated Leakage Rate Test - Type A," | * Verification of the performance of structural examinations of containment in accordance with IWE requirements, and associated with the 15-year 10 CFR 50 Appendix J, Type A Integrated Leak Rate Test (WO 40803307, EX1803.001 "Reactor Containment Integrated Leakage Rate Test - Type A," | ||
Revision 12) | Revision 12) | ||
PWR In-service Inspection Activities - Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample) | PWR In-service Inspection Activities - Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample) | ||
The inspectors verified that the licensee conducted the following reactor vessel upper head penetration inspections and addressed any identified defects appropriately: | The inspectors verified that the licensee conducted the following reactor vessel upper head penetration inspections and addressed any identified defects appropriately: | ||
: (1) Reactor pressure vessel head bare metal visual examination of penetrations 2, 3, 66, 76, 77, and 78 (NDE Report SB1-VT-23-055) | : (1) Reactor pressure vessel head bare metal visual examination of penetrations 2, 3, 66, 76, 77, and 78 (NDE Report SB1-VT-23-055) | ||
PWR In-service Inspection Activities - Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample) | PWR In-service Inspection Activities - Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample) | ||
The inspectors verified the licensee is managing the boric acid corrosion control program through a review of the following evaluations: | The inspectors verified the licensee is managing the boric acid corrosion control program through a review of the following evaluations: | ||
* | (1) | ||
* Bic acid iifi on 1- - -160AR 02405971) | |||
* Boric acid identified on 1-RH-V59 (AR 02453747) | * Boric acid identified on 1-RH-V59 (AR 02453747) | ||
* Boric acid identified downstream of 1-CS-V17 (AR 02449495) | * Boric acid identified downstream of 1-CS-V17 (AR 02449495) | ||
* Boric acid identified on flange of 1-RH-E-9B (AR 02453006) | * Boric acid identified on flange of 1-RH-E-9B (AR 02453006) | ||
* | * Bic acid iifi on swi -e - -VAR | ||
11Q - censperor Requalifi cirogram Licensed Oporfmance | |||
censrorerformancetctuallant/Mn ControomIPtion 03.01) | |||
(1 | (1 Sam | ||
( The ipectorserv and uaticensed or rformancettr rooming reactoolantystemtup,ctttup, apprcto criticity, and l physics ttiM 2023 | |||
censrorequificion Trng/E*inationsIPtion 03.0 (1 Sam | |||
( The ipectorserv and uaticensed or tronductn t antefenceimatJune 2023 | |||
==71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness== | ==71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness== | ||
===Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)=== | ===Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)=== | ||
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components remain capable of performing their intended function: | The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components remain capable of performing their intended function: | ||
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==71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control== | ==71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control== | ||
Risk Assessment and Management (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples) | |||
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed: | The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed: | ||
: (1) Elevated (shutdown) risk during reduced reactor coolant inventory on April 5, 2023 | : (1) Elevated (shutdown) risk during reduced reactor coolant inventory on April 5, 2023 | ||
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==71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments== | ==71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments== | ||
===Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)=== | ===Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)=== | ||
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments: | The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments: | ||
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==71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities== | ==71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities== | ||
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01)=== | |||
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) === | |||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 02458|count=1}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 02458|count=1}} | ||
: (1) The inspectors evaluated OR22 activities from April 1, 2023 through May 7, 2023 | : (1) The inspectors evaluated OR22 activities from April 1, 2023 through May 7, 2023 | ||
==71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk== | ==71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk== | ||
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality: | |||
===Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)=== | |||
=== | |||
: (1) 'A' centrifugal charging pump following rotating element replacement on April 16, 2023 | : (1) 'A' centrifugal charging pump following rotating element replacement on April 16, 2023 | ||
: (2) 'B' containment sump isolation valve encapsulation tank as left leak rate test following installation of manways following valve inspection on April 17, 2023 | : (2) 'B' containment sump isolation valve encapsulation tank as left leak rate test following installation of manways following valve inspection on April 17, 2023 | ||
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: (4) 'D' vital inverter after replacement on June 1, 2023 | : (4) 'D' vital inverter after replacement on June 1, 2023 | ||
: (5) 'B' emergency diesel generator after the planned maintenance window on June 9, 2023 | : (5) 'B' emergency diesel generator after the planned maintenance window on June 9, 2023 | ||
: (6) 'A' emergency diesel generator after the planned maintenance window on | : (6) 'A' emergency diesel generator after the planned maintenance window on June 26, 2023 | ||
=== | ===Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)=== | ||
: (1) 'A' auto safety injection, phase 'A' containment isolation, containment ventilation isolation and main steam isolation actuation surveillance test on April 3, 2023 | : (1) 'A' auto safety injection, phase 'A' containment isolation, containment ventilation isolation and main steam isolation actuation surveillance test on April 3, 2023 | ||
: (2) Reactor containment integrated leakage rate test on April 29, 2023 | : (2) Reactor containment integrated leakage rate test on April 29, 2023 | ||
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===Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)=== | ===Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)=== | ||
: (1) Local leak rate testing chemical and volume control normal letdown penetration X37A | : (1) Local leak rate testing chemical and volume control normal letdown penetration X37A on April 21, 2023 | ||
==71114.06 - Drill Evaluation== | ==71114.06 - Drill Evaluation== | ||
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample) | |||
: (1) The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine, full participation emergency planning drill on June 14, | |||
: (1) The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine, full participation emergency | |||
==RADIATION SAFETY== | ==RADIATION SAFETY== | ||
==71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls== | ==71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls== | ||
===Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)=== | ===Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)=== | ||
: (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identifies the magnitude and extent of radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and how the licensee assesses radiological hazards | : (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identifies the magnitude and extent of radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and how the licensee assesses radiological hazards | ||
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: (2) Observed surveys after valve removal in demineralizer alley | : (2) Observed surveys after valve removal in demineralizer alley | ||
: (3) Outage reactor vessel disassembly and reassembly as low as reasonably achievable plan - package number 23-01 | : (3) Outage reactor vessel disassembly and reassembly as low as reasonably achievable plan - package number 23-01 | ||
: (4) Outage reactor head peening as low as reasonably achievable plan - package number 23-02 High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (3 Samples) | : (4) Outage reactor head peening as low as reasonably achievable plan - package number 23-02 | ||
High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (3 Samples) | |||
The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following High Radiation Areas and Very High Radiation Areas: | The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following High Radiation Areas and Very High Radiation Areas: | ||
: (1) Locked high radiation areas in the primary auxiliary building | : (1) Locked high radiation areas in the primary auxiliary building | ||
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==71124.03 - In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation== | ==71124.03 - In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation== | ||
===Permanent Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)=== | ===Permanent Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)=== | ||
The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following permanently installed ventilation | The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following permanently installed ventilation systems: | ||
: (1) Primary auxiliary building cleanup filter PAH-F-16 | : (1) Primary auxiliary building cleanup filter PAH-F-16 | ||
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===Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for Emergency Use (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)=== | ===Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for Emergency Use (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)=== | ||
: (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees use and maintenance of self-contained | : (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees use and maintenance of self-contained breathing apparatuses | ||
==71124.04 - Occupational Dose Assessment== | ==71124.04 - Occupational Dose Assessment== | ||
===Source Term Characterization (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)=== | ===Source Term Characterization (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)=== | ||
: (1) The inspectors evaluated licensee performance as it pertains to radioactive source | : (1) The inspectors evaluated licensee performance as it pertains to radioactive source term characterization | ||
===External Dosimetry (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)=== | ===External Dosimetry (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)=== | ||
: (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee processes, stores, and uses external | : (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee processes, stores, and uses external dosimetry | ||
===Internal Dosimetry (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)=== | ===Internal Dosimetry (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)=== | ||
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==OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE== | ==OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE== | ||
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification | |||
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below: | |||
MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (IP Section 02.04)=== | |||
MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (IP Section 02.04) === | |||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71151|count=1}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71151|count=1}} | ||
: (1) For the period April 1, 2022 through March 31, 2023 | : (1) For the period April 1, 2022 through March 31, 2023 | ||
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: (1) For the period April 1, 2022 through March 31, 2023 | : (1) For the period April 1, 2022 through March 31, 2023 | ||
===71152S - Semi-Annual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semi- | ===71152S - Semi-Annual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semi-A nnual Trend Review (IP Section 03.02)=== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71152|count=1}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71152|count=1}} | ||
: (1) The inspectors reviewed the Seabrook corrective action program for trends that might be indicative of more significant safety issues | : (1) The inspectors reviewed the Seabrook corrective action program for trends that might be indicative of more significant safety issues | ||
===71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Reporting (IP Section 03.05) === | ===71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Reporting (IP Section 03.05)=== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71153|count=2}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71153|count=2}} | ||
: (1) Reportability follow up on actuation of the 'B' emergency diesel generator emergency power sequencer | : (1) Reportability follow up on actuation of the 'B' emergency diesel generator emergency power sequencer | ||
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==INSPECTION RESULTS== | ==INSPECTION RESULTS== | ||
Failure to Establish Continuous Fire Watch on Fire Door Cornerstone | Failure to Establish Continuous Fire Watch on Fire Door Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.4] - 71111.05 Systems NCV 05000443/2023002 - 01 Teamwork Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Seabrook Station Facility Operating License Condition 2.F when the licensee failed to establish a continuous fire watch on fire door C107 which was open in the A essential switchgear room. | ||
=====Description:===== | =====Description:===== | ||
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Corrective Actions: Corrective actions included entering the appropriate actions in the Technical Requirements Manual and implementing the required continuous fire watch until the degraded fire barrier had been restored. NextEra also wrote an AR for which directs an evaluation for the reason and to provide coaching to the work group. (AR2459087) | Corrective Actions: Corrective actions included entering the appropriate actions in the Technical Requirements Manual and implementing the required continuous fire watch until the degraded fire barrier had been restored. NextEra also wrote an AR for which directs an evaluation for the reason and to provide coaching to the work group. (AR2459087) | ||
Corrective Action References: 2459087 | Corrective Action References: 2459087 | ||
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(IMC0612 Appendix E example 2.d) | (IMC0612 Appendix E example 2.d) | ||
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix F, Fire Protection and Post - Fire Safe Shutdown SDP. The inspectors determined this issue to be of very low safety significance, Green, in Phase 1, Task 1.4.4.F, Fire Confinement, because the degraded fire barrier only adversely impacted one fire area and did not impact any other adjoining fire areas. | Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix F, Fire Protection and Post - Fire Safe Shutdown SDP. The inspectors determined this issue to be of very low safety significance, Green, in Phase 1, Task 1.4.4.F, Fire Confinement, because the degraded fire barrier only adversely impacted one fire area and did not impact any other adjoining fire areas. | ||
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=====Enforcement:===== | =====Enforcement:===== | ||
Violation: Seabrook Station, Unit 1 Facility Operating License Condition 2.F requires, in part, NextEra to implement and maintain effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, the Fire Protection Program Report, and the Fire Protection and Safe Shutdown Capability Report, as supplemented. Supplement 7 of the Safety Evaluation Report approved NextEra's request to establish fire protection program limiting conditions for operation and action statements that provide a level of protection equivalent to that provided by the fire protection sections of the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications. This commitment was incorporated into Section 9.5-1 of the Seabrook Updated Final Safety Analysis Report which states, in part, limiting conditions for operation, action statements, and surveillance requirements for the | Violation: Seabrook Station, Unit 1 Facility Operating License Condition 2.F requires, in part, NextEra to implement and maintain effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, the Fire Protection Program Report, and the Fire Protection and Safe Shutdown Capability Report, as supplemented. Supplement 7 of the Safety Evaluation Report approved NextEra's request to establish fire protection program limiting conditions for operation and action statements that provide a level of protection equivalent to that provided by the fire protection sections of the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications. This commitment was incorporated into Section 9.5-1 of the Seabrook Updated Final Safety Analysis Report which states, in part, limiting conditions for operation, action statements, and surveillance requirements for the f ire protection program are prescribed in the Seabrook Station Technical Requirements Manual. | ||
The Seabrook Station Technical Requirements Manual, Technical Requirement 11, Fire Rated Assemblies, establishes the limiting condition for operation, in part, to be all sealing devices in fire rated assemblies shall be functional while the equipment protected by the fire rated assemblies is required to be operable. The Technical Requirement 11 prescribes the actions for one or more fire rated sealing devices being nonfunctional as establishing a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected assembly within one hour or verify the functionality of fire detectors on at least one side of the nonfunctional assembly and establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Contrary to the above, on June 1, 2023, Seabrook did not establish required compensatory actions of Technical Requirement 11. | The Seabrook Station Technical Requirements Manual, Technical Requirement 11, Fire Rated Assemblies, establishes the limiting condition for operation, in part, to be all sealing devices in fire rated assemblies shall be functional while the equipment protected by the fire rated assemblies is required to be operable. The Technical Requirement 11 prescribes the actions for one or more fire rated sealing devices being nonfunctional as establishing a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected assembly within one hour or verify the functionality of fire detectors on at least one side of the nonfunctional assembly and establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Contrary to the above, on June 1, 2023, Seabrook did not establish required compensatory actions of Technical Requirement 11. | ||
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Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. | Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. | ||
Failure to Make Required 50.72(b)(3) Notifications Cornerstone | Failure to Make Required 50.72(b)(3) Notifications Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Not Severity Level IV Not 71153 Applicable NCV 05000443/2023002 - 02 Applicable Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non -cited violation of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv) with three examples when NextEra failed to make three required event notifications. | ||
Description : On April 12, 2023, while Seabrook Station was in Mode 6 at zero percent power, a valid actuation signal of the B emergency diesel generator emergency power sequencer occurred due to a loss of power to the B emergency Bus E6. The loss resulted from spurious operation of emergency power sequencer remote manual override relays that opened the unit auxiliary transformer feeder breaker to bus E6. Subsequently, the loss of power to bus E6 resulted in a valid actuation of an emergency power sequencer starting signal to the B emergency diesel generator. At the time of this event, the B emergency diesel generator was removed from service for scheduled maintenance and therefore, did not start. | |||
On April 12, 2023, while Seabrook Station was in Mode 6 at zero percent power, a valid actuation signal of the B emergency diesel generator emergency power sequencer occurred due to a loss of power to the B emergency Bus E6. The loss resulted from spurious operation of emergency power sequencer remote manual override relays that opened the unit auxiliary transformer feeder breaker to bus E6. Subsequently, the loss of power to bus E6 resulted in a valid actuation of an emergency power sequencer starting signal to the B emergency diesel generator. At the time of this event, the B emergency diesel generator was removed from service for scheduled maintenance and therefore, did not start. | |||
Within eight hours of the event occurring inspectors questioned the licensee on the reportability of the event but at the time the licensee determined the event was not reportable because the emergency diesel generator was tagged out-of-service. The inspectors reviewed NUREG-1022, Rev.3, Event Report Guidelines, and noted | Within eight hours of the event occurring inspectors questioned the licensee on the reportability of the event but at the time the licensee determined the event was not reportable because the emergency diesel generator was tagged out-of-service. The inspectors reviewed NUREG-1022, Rev.3, Event Report Guidelines, and noted S ection 3.2.6 example 3 states, The event is reportable because the actuation logic for the emergency diesel generator start was completed, even though the emergency diesel generator did not power the safety buses. | ||
On May 6, 2023, at 15:52 with Seabrook Station in Mode 3 at zero percent power, while performing digital rod position indication system surveillance testing, shutdown bank 'E' stopped withdrawing. In response, the reactor trip breakers were manually opened, initiating a valid actuation of the reactor protection system. Subsequently on May 6, at 22:53 while continuing to perform digital rod position indication system surveillance testing, shutdown bank 'C 'stopped inserting. Reactor trip breakers were manually opened, initiating a valid actuation of the reactor protection system. Initially the operators had determined these two reactor protection system actuations were not reportable. On May 11, 2023 the resident inspectors questioned why two events were not reported as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) "Eight Hour Reports", for the valid actuation of the reactor protection system. | On May 6, 2023, at 15:52 with Seabrook Station in Mode 3 at zero percent power, while performing digital rod position indication system surveillance testing, shutdown bank 'E' stopped withdrawing. In response, the reactor trip breakers were manually opened, initiating a valid actuation of the reactor protection system. Subsequently on May 6, at 22:53 while continuing to perform digital rod position indication system surveillance testing, shutdown bank 'C 'stopped inserting. Reactor trip breakers were manually opened, initiating a valid actuation of the reactor protection system. Initially the operators had determined these two reactor protection system actuations were not reportable. On May 11, 2023 the resident inspectors questioned why two events were not reported as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) "Eight Hour Reports", for the valid actuation of the reactor protection system. | ||
Corrective Actions: AR 02458443 was generated to perform common cause evaluation and make the missed reports as required by 10 CFR 50.72. NextEra reported the valid actuation of the 'B' emergency diesel generator emergency power sequencer and the two valid actuations of the | Corrective Actions: AR 02458443 was generated to perform common cause evaluation and make the missed reports as required by 10 CFR 50.72. NextEra reported the valid actuation of the 'B' emergency diesel generator emergency power sequencer and the two valid actuations of the r eactor program system as required by 50.72 (EN 56564 and EN 56565) on June 8, 2023. | ||
Corrective Action References: ARs 02458443, 02454289, 02456934, 02456952, 02459323, 02454246 | Corrective Action References: ARs 02458443, 02454289, 02456934, 02456952, 02459323, 02454246 | ||
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Violation: 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), "Eight Hour Reports," requires the licensee to notify the NRC for any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section, except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation. Contrary to the above, NextEra did not notify the NRC within eight hours of the occurrence of a condition at Seabrook Unit 1 as evidenced by the following examples: | Violation: 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), "Eight Hour Reports," requires the licensee to notify the NRC for any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section, except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation. Contrary to the above, NextEra did not notify the NRC within eight hours of the occurrence of a condition at Seabrook Unit 1 as evidenced by the following examples: | ||
: (1) On April 12, 2023 NextEra did not notify the NRC within eight hours of the occurrence of a condition at Seabrook Unit 1 that resulted in a valid actuation of the 'B' emergency diesel generator emergency power sequencer. | : (1) On April 12, 2023 NextEra did not notify the NRC within eight hours of the occurrence of a condition at Seabrook Unit 1 that resulted in a valid actuation of the 'B' emergency diesel generator emergency power sequencer. | ||
: (2) On May 6, 2023 at 15:52 NextEra did not notify the NRC within eight hours of the occurrence of a condition at Seabrook Unit 1 that resulted in a valid actuation of the | : (2) On May 6, 2023 at 15:52 NextEra did not notify the NRC within eight hours of the occurrence of a condition at Seabrook Unit 1 that resulted in a valid actuation of the r eactor program system. | ||
: (3) On May 6, 2023 at 22:53 NextEra did not notify the NRC within eight hours of the occurrence of a condition at Seabrook Unit 1 that resulted in a valid actuation of the reactor protection system. | : (3) On May 6, 2023 at 22:53 NextEra did not notify the NRC within eight hours of the occurrence of a condition at Seabrook Unit 1 that resulted in a valid actuation of the reactor protection system. | ||
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. | Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. | ||
Observation: Semi-Annual Trend Review | Observation: Semi-Annual Trend Review 71152S The inspectors evaluated a sample of issues and events that occurred over the first and second quarters of 2023. The evaluation did not reveal any new trends that could indicate a more significant safety issue. The inspectors determined that, in most cases, the issues were appropriately evaluated by NextEra for potential trends at a low threshold, and resolved within the scope of the corrective action program. | ||
==EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS== | ==EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS== | ||
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* On April 20, 2023, the inspectors presented the 71111.08P inspection results to Jeff Sobotka, Engineering Director, and other members of the licensee staff. | * On April 20, 2023, the inspectors presented the 71111.08P inspection results to Jeff Sobotka, Engineering Director, and other members of the licensee staff. | ||
* On May 25, 2023, the inspectors presented the 71124.03 and 71124.04 inspection results to Brian Booth, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. | * On May 25, 2023, the inspectors presented the 71124.03 and 71124.04 inspection results to Brian Booth, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. | ||
* On July 24, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated | * On July 24, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspectionresults to Brian Booth, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. | ||
=DOCUMENTS REVIEWED= | =DOCUMENTS REVIEWED= | ||
Inspection Type | Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or | ||
Procedure | Procedure Date | ||
71111.01 | 71111.01 Procedures OP-AA-102-1002 Seasonal Readiness Revision 40 | ||
Work Orders | Work Orders 40617315 | ||
40738017 | 40738017 | ||
4078192 | 4078192 | ||
| Line 364: | Line 386: | ||
40834945 | 40834945 | ||
40835181 | 40835181 | ||
71111.04 | 71111.04 Corrective Action 02196368 | ||
Documents | Documents | ||
Drawings | Drawings PID-1-RH-Residual Heat Removal System Overview Revision 003 | ||
B20660 | B20660 | ||
PID-1-SF-F20482 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean Up System Detail | PID-1-SF-F20482 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean Up System Detail Revision 11 | ||
Miscellaneous | Miscellaneous DBD-SF-01 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling, Purification, and Cleanup System Revision 3 | ||
Procedures | Procedures OS1000.04 Plant Cooldown From Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown Revision 72 | ||
OS1000.12 | OS1000.12 Operation with RCS at reduced Inventory Revision 19 | ||
OS1001.11 | OS1001.11 Reactor Coolant System Shutdown Level Instrumentation Revision 17 | ||
OS1001.12 | OS1001.12 Draining the Reactor Coolant System for Vessel Head Revision 23 | ||
Removal | Removal | ||
OS1013.04 | OS1013.04 Residual Heat Removal Train B Startup and Operation Revision 38 | ||
OS1016.05 | OS1016.05 Service Water Cooling Tower Operation Revision 40 | ||
OS1016.12 | OS1016.12 Contingency Cooling Tower Pump Restoration During Revision 2 | ||
Cooling Tower Maintenance | Cooling Tower Maintenance | ||
71111.05 | 71111.05 Corrective Action 02459087 | ||
Documents | Documents | ||
Resulting from | Resulting from | ||
Inspection | Inspection | ||
Procedures | Procedures FP 5.1 Fire Brigade Response Revision 07 | ||
FP-AA-104 | FP-AA-104 Fire Protection Program Revision 6 | ||
FP-AA-104-1003 | FP-AA-104-1003 Fire Response Revision 3 | ||
OS1200.00 | OS1200.00 Response to Fire or Fire Alarm Actuation Revision 28 | ||
OS1200.05 | OS1200.05 Response to EFW Pump House Fire Revision 00 | ||
Inspection Type | |||
Procedure | Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or | ||
71111.06 | Procedure Date | ||
71111.06 Corrective Action 00120752 | |||
Documents | Documents | ||
Drawings | Drawings 1-NHY-310431 Control Building, General Electrical Arrangement Revision 30 | ||
Procedures | Procedures MA5.7 Station Barriers, Penetration Seals, and Fire Wrap Revision 20 | ||
71111.07A | 71111.07A Corrective Action 02454023 | ||
Documents | Documents 02454415 | ||
2454487 | 2454487 | ||
Miscellaneous | Miscellaneous FPLE-213 Final Eddy Current Inspection Report For: PCCW E-17B 04/13/2023 | ||
Work Orders | Work Orders 40806953 | ||
40829216 | 40829216 | ||
71111.11Q Procedures | 71111.11Q Procedures OP-AA-100-1000 Conduct of Operations Revision 38 | ||
OP-AA-1000 | OP-AA-1000 Conduct of Infrequently Performed Tests or Evolutions Revision 19 | ||
OS1000.02 | OS1000.02 Plant Startup From Hot Standby To Minimum Load Revision 47 | ||
OS1000.07 | OS1000.07 Approach to Criticality Revision 16 | ||
RS1735 | RS1735 Reactivity Calculations Revision 10 | ||
RS1737 | RS1737 Post Refuel Low Power Physics Testing Revision 14 | ||
71111.12 | 71111.12 Corrective Action 02432518 | ||
Documents | Documents 02453360 | ||
2454004 | 2454004 | ||
2455093 | 2455093 | ||
| Line 413: | Line 436: | ||
2456467 | 2456467 | ||
2545140 | 2545140 | ||
Drawings | Drawings PID-1-CBA-Control Building Air Conditioning System Safety Related Revision 8 | ||
B20307 | B20307 Chilled Water System Train A | ||
Procedures | Procedures ER-AA100-2002 Maintenance Rule Program Administration Revision 13 | ||
Work Orders | Work Orders 40363937 | ||
40719515 | 40719515 | ||
40829214 | 40829214 | ||
| Line 422: | Line 445: | ||
40876632 | 40876632 | ||
237635 | 237635 | ||
71111.13 | 71111.13 Corrective Action 02453437 | ||
Inspection Type | |||
Procedure | Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or | ||
Documents | Procedure Date | ||
Documents 02453447 | |||
2453483 | 2453483 | ||
2453553 | 2453553 | ||
| Line 431: | Line 455: | ||
2453649 | 2453649 | ||
2453704 | 2453704 | ||
Procedures | Procedures OP-AA-102-1003 Guarded Equipment Revision 46 | ||
OS1016.11 | OS1016.11 Contingency Ocean Pump Restoration for SW Work Revision 12 | ||
Activities with Ocean Service Water Pumps Not in Service | Activities with Ocean Service Water Pumps Not in Service | ||
OS1056.03 | OS1056.03 Containment Penetrations Revision 16 | ||
OS1401.12 | OS1401.12 RCS Reduced Inventory Containment Integrity Verification Revision 5 | ||
WM-AA-203-1006 Critical Maintenance Management | WM-AA-203-1006 Critical Maintenance Management Revision 18 | ||
Work Orders | Work Orders 40844256 | ||
71111.15 | 71111.15 Corrective Action 02447144 | ||
Documents | Documents 02453822 | ||
2454246 | 2454246 | ||
2454289 | 2454289 | ||
| Line 453: | Line 477: | ||
Resulting from | Resulting from | ||
Inspection | Inspection | ||
Drawings | Drawings 1-NHY-310102, 4160V Bus 1-E6 RAT Inc Line Three Line Diagram Revision 7 | ||
Sh A72a | Sh A72a | ||
1-NHY-310102, | 1-NHY-310102, 4160V Bus 1-E6 RAT Inc Line Close Schematic Revision 14 | ||
Sh A72b | Sh A72b | ||
1-NHY-310102, | 1-NHY-310102, 4160V Bus 1-E6 RAT Inc Line Trip Schematic Revision 9 | ||
Inspection Type | |||
Procedure | Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or | ||
Procedure Date | |||
Sh A72c | Sh A72c | ||
1-NHY-310102, 4160V Bus 1-E6 P.T.S. Schematic Diagram | 1-NHY-310102, 4160V Bus 1-E6 P.T.S. Schematic Diagram Revision 10 | ||
Sh A73e | Sh A73e | ||
1-NHY-310102, 4160V Bus 1-E6 P.T.S. Auxiliary Contacts | 1-NHY-310102, 4160V Bus 1-E6 P.T.S. Auxiliary Contacts Revision 10 | ||
Sh A73f | Sh A73f | ||
1-NHY-310102, 4160V Bus 1-E6 PT'S. Schematic Diagram | 1-NHY-310102, 4160V Bus 1-E6 PT'S. Schematic Diagram Revision 7 | ||
Sh A73h | Sh A73h | ||
Work Orders | Work Orders 40803551 | ||
40803602 | 40803602 | ||
40882367 | 40882367 | ||
40883359 | 40883359 | ||
71111.18 | 71111.18 Drawings 9763-F-101402 Containment Concrete Mat Sections Revision 14 | ||
9763-F-101462 Containment Liner Bottom Plate | 9763-F-101462 Containment Liner Bottom Plate Revision 8 | ||
9763-F-805139 Containment Liner Floor Leak Chase Piping System Piping | 9763-F-805139 Containment Liner Floor Leak Chase Piping System Piping Revision 10 | ||
Arrangement | Arrangement | ||
FP01925-06 | FP01925-06 Seabrook Station Unit No. 1 Bottom Leak Chase - Erection Revision 0 | ||
Engineering | Engineering 298541 Design Change Package for Containment Boundary Change Revision 0 | ||
Changes | Changes to Include Embedded Liner Leak Chase System | ||
Miscellaneous | Miscellaneous 445860-SBSAG-Containment Shell Structure Axisymmetric Analysis Revision 0 | ||
7CS2-CALC | 7CS2-CALC | ||
9763.006-80-1 Containment Design Specification | 9763.006-80-1 Containment Design Specification Revision 8 | ||
CS-23-CALC | CS-23-CALC Containment Embedded Liner Leak Chase System Revision 0 | ||
Structural Evaluation | Structural Evaluation | ||
71111.20 | 71111.20 Corrective Action 02454401 | ||
Documents | Documents 02454409 | ||
Miscellaneous | Miscellaneous OR22 Outage Safety Review Supporting Documentation, | ||
Seabrook Nuclear Plant | Seabrook Nuclear Plant | ||
Procedures | Procedures ON1090.04 Containment Entry Revision 43 | ||
OS1000.03 | OS1000.03 Plant Shutdown From Minimum Load To Hot Standby Revision 40 | ||
OS1000.04 | OS1000.04 Plant Cooldown From Hot Standby To Cold Shutdown Revision 71 | ||
OS1000.06 | OS1000.06 Power Decrease Revision 30 | ||
OX1406.12 | OX1406.12 18 Month Containment And Containment Spray Revision 17 | ||
Recirculation Sump Surveillance | Recirculation Sump Surveillance | ||
Inspection Type | |||
Procedure | Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or | ||
SM 7.31 | Procedure Date | ||
71111.24 | SM 7.31 Shutdown Safety Review And Safety Assessment Revision 02 | ||
Documents | 71111.24 Corrective Action 02317995 | ||
Documents 02411459 | |||
2454285 | 2454285 | ||
2454455 | 2454455 | ||
| Line 515: | Line 541: | ||
2460704 | 2460704 | ||
2460764 | 2460764 | ||
Drawings | Drawings 1-NHY-300229 Installation of Electrical Raceway and Supports Revision 2 | ||
1-NHY-310108 Emergency Power Sequencer System Schematic Diagram | 1-NHY-310108 Emergency Power Sequencer System Schematic Diagram Revision 6 | ||
Procedures | Procedures ES1804.056 CBS-TK-101A and CBS-TK-101B Encapsulation Tank Revision 1 | ||
Leakage Rate Test | Leakage Rate Test | ||
EX1803.001 | EX1803.001 Reactor Containment Integrated Leakage Rate Test - Type Revision 12 | ||
A | A | ||
EX1803.003 | EX1803.003 Reactor Containment Type B and C Leakage Rate Tests Revision 19 | ||
LS0567 | LS0567 | ||
MS0539.28 | MS0539.28 A-EDG Coolant Recirculation, Draining and Refilling Revision 19 | ||
MS0539.54 | MS0539.54 B-EDG Coolant Recirculation, Draining and Refilling | ||
OX1426.03 | OX1426.03 Emergency Power Sequencer 18 month Operability Test Revision 11 | ||
OX1426.32 | OX1426.32 Diesel Generator 1B 36 Month Operability Surveillance Revision 29 | ||
OX1456.92 | OX1456.92 Centrifugal Charging Comprehensive Pump Test Revision 19 | ||
Inspection Type | |||
Procedure | Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or | ||
OX1456.92 | Procedure Date | ||
OX1456.93 | OX1456.92 Centrifugal Charging Comprehensive Pump Test Revision 19 | ||
OX1456.93 Train B SI, Phase A, CVI & MSI Actuation 18 Month Revision 27 | |||
Surveillance | Surveillance | ||
OX1456.96 | OX1456.96 Train A SI, Phase A, CVI & MSI Actuation 18 Month Revision 24 | ||
Surveillance | Surveillance | ||
Work Orders 40394846 | Work Orders 40394846 | ||
| Line 558: | Line 585: | ||
40877477 | 40877477 | ||
40879331 | 40879331 | ||
20 | 20 | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 14:25, 13 November 2024
| ML23220A209 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 08/08/2023 |
| From: | Matt Young NRC/RGN-I/DORS |
| To: | Coffey B Florida Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| IR 2023002 | |
| Download: ML23220A209 (1) | |
Text
August 8, 2023
SUBJECT:
SEABROOK STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000443/2023002
Dear Bob Coffey:
On June 30, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Seabrook Station. On July 24, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Brian Booth, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. One Severity Level IV violation without an associated finding is documented in this report. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555- 0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Seabrook Station.
If you disagree with a cross -cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Seabrook Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Matt R. Young, Chief Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety
Docket No. 05000443 License No. NPF-86
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number: 05000443
License Number: NPF-86
Report Number: 05000443/2023002
Enterprise Identifier: I-2023-002- 0035
Licensee: NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC
Facility: Seabrook Station
Location: Seabrook, New Hampshire
Inspection Dates: April 1, 2023 to June 30, 2023
Inspectors: T. Daun, Senior Resident Inspector C. Newport, Senior Resident Inspector S. Flanagan, Acting Resident Inspector P. Cataldo, Senior Reactor Inspector N. Eckhoff, Health Physicist
Approved By: Matt R. Young, Chief Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety
Enclosure
SUMMARY
The U.S. NRC continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Seabrook Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Establish Continuous Fire Watch on Fire Door Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.4] - 71111.05 Systems NCV 05000443/2023002-01 Teamwork Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Seabrook Station Facility Operating License Condition 2.F when the licensee failed to establish a continuous fire watch on fire door C107 which was open in the A essential switchgear room.
Failure to Make Required 50.72(b)(3) Notifications Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV Not Applicable 71153 NCV 05000443/2023002-02 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv) with three examples when NextEra failed to make three required event notifications.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Seabrook Station began the inspection period in refueling outage 22 (OR22) that commenced on March 31, 2023. On May 12, 2023, as the station was returning to 100 percent power, a heater drain pump failed requiring a rapid down power to 48 percent power for repairs. On May 14, 2023, the station returned to 100 percent power. Seabrook remained at or near 100 percent rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html.
Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal high temperatures for the following system: service water and control building heating ventilation and air conditioning
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Reactor water level instruments during decreased reactor pressure vessel water inventory for vessel disassembly on April 6, 2023
- (2) 'B' shutdown cooling system during decreased water inventory in reactor vessel on April 7, 2023
- (3) Spent fuel pool cooling system following core offload to spent fuel pool on April 10, 2023
- (4) 'A' cooling tower service water with 'B' cooling tower service water out-of-service for maintenance on April 11, 2023
- (5) 'B' residual heat removal system after aligning for emergency core cooling on May 5, 2023
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Containment building operating deck (C-F-3-Z) on April 13, 2023
- (2) Containment building middle level (C-F-2-Z) on April 21, 2023
- (3) Containment building lower level (C-F-1-Z) on April 27, 2023
- (4) 'A' switchgear room (CB-F-1A-A) on June 1, 2023
- (5) Primary auxiliary building ventilation rooms (PAB-F-3B-Z) on June 12, 2023
Fire Brigade Drill Performance (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the on-site fire brigade training and performance during an unannounced fire drill on May 19, 2023
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the control building cable spreading room on June 8, 2023
71111.07A - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance
Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:
- (1) 'B' primary component cooling water heat exchanger
===71111.08P - In-service Inspection Activities (PWR)
The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, risk significant piping system boundaries, and the containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing activities from April 10, 2023 through April 29, 2023.
PWR In-service Inspection Activities - Nondestructive Examination (NDE) and Welding Activities (IP Section 03.01)===
(1)
- Manual ultronicisual e*inations fh -26'ontnmentiner during rrst t-240 azim(NDEtB1-I - -
- Manual ultrasonic examination of 6-inch safety injection pipe-to-elbow welds S1-0251- 07- 02 and 03 (NDE Report SB1-UT-23- 034 and 035)
- Visual examination of control rod drive mechanism canopy sleeve and clamp (NDE Report under WO 40807466- 01)
- Class 1 welding activities and progressive liquid penetrant examinations associated with the steam generator bowl drain replacement under NRC-approved relief request 4RA-22- 01 (ML23073A156) and engineering change EC297778
- Liquid penetrant inspection following welding of Class 2 piping high point vent of 'A' charging pump (EC298147, and WO 40854907- 01)
- Verification of the performance of structural examinations of containment in accordance with IWE requirements, and associated with the 15-year 10 CFR 50 Appendix J, Type A Integrated Leak Rate Test (WO 40803307, EX1803.001 "Reactor Containment Integrated Leakage Rate Test - Type A,"
Revision 12)
PWR In-service Inspection Activities - Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors verified that the licensee conducted the following reactor vessel upper head penetration inspections and addressed any identified defects appropriately:
- (1) Reactor pressure vessel head bare metal visual examination of penetrations 2, 3, 66, 76, 77, and 78 (NDE Report SB1-VT-23-055)
PWR In-service Inspection Activities - Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors verified the licensee is managing the boric acid corrosion control program through a review of the following evaluations:
(1)
- Bic acid iifi on 1- - -160AR 02405971)
- Boric acid identified on 1-RH-V59 (AR 02453747)
- Boric acid identified downstream of 1-CS-V17 (AR 02449495)
- Boric acid identified on flange of 1-RH-E-9B (AR 02453006)
- Bic acid iifi on swi -e - -VAR
11Q - censperor Requalifi cirogram Licensed Oporfmance
censrorerformancetctuallant/Mn ControomIPtion 03.01)
(1 Sam
( The ipectorserv and uaticensed or rformancettr rooming reactoolantystemtup,ctttup, apprcto criticity, and l physics ttiM 2023
censrorequificion Trng/E*inationsIPtion 03.0 (1 Sam
( The ipectorserv and uaticensed or tronductn t antefenceimatJune 2023
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Control room building air system in accordance with the Maintenance Rule Program on June 8, 2023
Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following structures, systems, and components remains capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Quality control verifications are properly specified in accordance with the Quality Assurance Program and are implemented as specified during outage work activities
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Elevated (shutdown) risk during reduced reactor coolant inventory on April 5, 2023
- (2) Risk management actions required for containment closure in Mode 5 on April 6, 2023
- (3) Risk management actions associated with all ocean service water and one cooling tower service water out-of-service for maintenance on April 11, 2023
- (4) Elevated (yellow) risk during emergency diesel generator 'B' planned maintenance window the week of June 6, 2023
- (5) Elevated (yellow) risk during emergency diesel generator 'A' planned maintenance window the week of June 20, 2023
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) 'B' emergency bus failure and restoration (AR 02454289) on April 12, 2023
===02458425) on April 23, 2023
- (3) Emergency feedwater check valve cycling (AR 02458869*) on May 30, 2023
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01)===
- (1) The inspectors evaluated OR22 activities from April 1, 2023 through May 7, 2023
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
- (1) 'A' centrifugal charging pump following rotating element replacement on April 16, 2023
- (2) 'B' containment sump isolation valve encapsulation tank as left leak rate test following installation of manways following valve inspection on April 17, 2023
- (3) 'B' diesel generator sequencer power supply replacements on April 30, 2023
- (4) 'D' vital inverter after replacement on June 1, 2023
- (5) 'B' emergency diesel generator after the planned maintenance window on June 9, 2023
- (6) 'A' emergency diesel generator after the planned maintenance window on June 26, 2023
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
- (1) 'A' auto safety injection, phase 'A' containment isolation, containment ventilation isolation and main steam isolation actuation surveillance test on April 3, 2023
- (2) Reactor containment integrated leakage rate test on April 29, 2023
- (3) 'B' emergency diesel generator engineered safeguards test on May 2, 2023
In-service Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) 'B' centrifugal charging comprehensive pump test on April 7, 2023
Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Local leak rate testing chemical and volume control normal letdown penetration X37A on April 21, 2023
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine, full participation emergency planning drill on June 14,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identifies the magnitude and extent of radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and how the licensee assesses radiological hazards
Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee instructs workers on plant related radiological hazards and the radiation protection requirements intended to protect workers from those hazards
Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors observed/evaluated the following licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination and radioactive material:
- (1) Observed egress of personnel and material at the radiologically controlled area alternate access point, along with technician response to personal contamination alarms
- (2) Observed counting of survey material in a low background area to ensure accuracy of survey results
Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's control of radiological hazards for the following radiological work:
- (1) Observed surveying of work area after pipe cut during steam generator bowl work
- (2) Observed surveys after valve removal in demineralizer alley
- (3) Outage reactor vessel disassembly and reassembly as low as reasonably achievable plan - package number 23-01
- (4) Outage reactor head peening as low as reasonably achievable plan - package number 23-02
High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following High Radiation Areas and Very High Radiation Areas:
- (1) Locked high radiation areas in the primary auxiliary building
- (2) Locked high radiation area controls for under the reactor vessel head during reactor head peening
- (3) Observed a briefing for valve work performed in a locked high radiation area Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP Section 03.06) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance as it pertains to radiation protection requirements
71124.03 - In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation
Permanent Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following permanently installed ventilation systems:
- (1) Primary auxiliary building cleanup filter PAH-F-16
Temporary Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following temporary ventilation systems:
- (1) Temporary ventilation used in the waste storage building
Use of Respiratory Protection Devices (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees use of respiratory protection devices
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for Emergency Use (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees use and maintenance of self-contained breathing apparatuses
71124.04 - Occupational Dose Assessment
Source Term Characterization (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated licensee performance as it pertains to radioactive source term characterization
External Dosimetry (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee processes, stores, and uses external dosimetry
Internal Dosimetry (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following internal dose assessments:
- (1) Whole body counts related to AR 02455099
- (2) Reviewed calibration records of whole body count equipment
Special Dosimetric Situations (IP Section 03.04) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following special dosimetric situations:
- (1) Neutron dosimetry program
- (2) Declared pregnant worker program
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (IP Section 02.04)===
- (1) For the period April 1, 2022 through March 31, 2023
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) (1 Sample)
- (1) For the period April 1, 2022 through March 31, 2023
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (1 Sample)
- (1) For the period April 1, 2022 through March 31, 2023
71152S - Semi-Annual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semi-A nnual Trend Review (IP Section 03.02)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the Seabrook corrective action program for trends that might be indicative of more significant safety issues
71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Reporting (IP Section 03.05)
- (1) Reportability follow up on actuation of the 'B' emergency diesel generator emergency power sequencer
- (2) Reportability follow up on actuation of the reactor program system during digital rod position indication system surveillance testing
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Establish Continuous Fire Watch on Fire Door Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.4] - 71111.05 Systems NCV 05000443/2023002 - 01 Teamwork Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Seabrook Station Facility Operating License Condition 2.F when the licensee failed to establish a continuous fire watch on fire door C107 which was open in the A essential switchgear room.
Description:
On June 1, 2023, during a walkdown of the essential switchgear room NRC inspectors identified that fire door C107 was held open by extension cords pinched in the door. No fire watch was seen at the door or in either the essential switchgear room or the stairwell the door goes to. The inspectors immediately notified the control room. The control room confirmed a continuous fire watch should have been established by the work group and dispatched the fire brigade leader to investigate.
It was discovered that work was being performed in the stairwell that required power cords to be run from the essential switchgear room to the stair well for electrical power. The work group was briefed by the control room on the requirement to station a continuous fire watch while the door was open for the cords but when the work group left, they removed all the cords but missed one that was still in door. This was left unnoticed by the work group until the inspectors discovered it.
This fire door falls under the licensees Technical Requirements 11 for Fire Rated Assemblies which prescribes the actions for one or more fire rated sealing devices being nonfunctional as establishing a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected assembly within one hour or verify the functionality of fire detectors on at least one side of the nonfunctional assembly and establish an hourly fire watch patrol. The appropriate compensatory action for this degraded fire door was determined by the licensee to be a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected assembly.
Corrective Actions: Corrective actions included entering the appropriate actions in the Technical Requirements Manual and implementing the required continuous fire watch until the degraded fire barrier had been restored. NextEra also wrote an AR for which directs an evaluation for the reason and to provide coaching to the work group. (AR2459087)
Corrective Action References: 2459087
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that Seabrook's failure to establish appropriate compensatory measures for a degraded fire rated assembly as required by the Technical Requirements Manual was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within Seabrooks ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented. Specifically, a continuous fire watch was not established when fire door C107 was degraded.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the degraded condition identified with the open fire door would have adversely impacted the essential switchgear room's fire barrier functionality.
(IMC0612 Appendix E example 2.d)
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix F, Fire Protection and Post - Fire Safe Shutdown SDP. The inspectors determined this issue to be of very low safety significance, Green, in Phase 1, Task 1.4.4.F, Fire Confinement, because the degraded fire barrier only adversely impacted one fire area and did not impact any other adjoining fire areas.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.4 - Teamwork: Individuals and work groups communicate and coordinate their activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is maintained. Lack of communication or understanding between work personnel that ordered the continuous fire watch and the assigned personnel to the fire watch resulted in a misunderstanding of duties and responsibilities of the position.
Enforcement:
Violation: Seabrook Station, Unit 1 Facility Operating License Condition 2.F requires, in part, NextEra to implement and maintain effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, the Fire Protection Program Report, and the Fire Protection and Safe Shutdown Capability Report, as supplemented. Supplement 7 of the Safety Evaluation Report approved NextEra's request to establish fire protection program limiting conditions for operation and action statements that provide a level of protection equivalent to that provided by the fire protection sections of the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications. This commitment was incorporated into Section 9.5-1 of the Seabrook Updated Final Safety Analysis Report which states, in part, limiting conditions for operation, action statements, and surveillance requirements for the f ire protection program are prescribed in the Seabrook Station Technical Requirements Manual.
The Seabrook Station Technical Requirements Manual, Technical Requirement 11, Fire Rated Assemblies, establishes the limiting condition for operation, in part, to be all sealing devices in fire rated assemblies shall be functional while the equipment protected by the fire rated assemblies is required to be operable. The Technical Requirement 11 prescribes the actions for one or more fire rated sealing devices being nonfunctional as establishing a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected assembly within one hour or verify the functionality of fire detectors on at least one side of the nonfunctional assembly and establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Contrary to the above, on June 1, 2023, Seabrook did not establish required compensatory actions of Technical Requirement 11.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Make Required 50.72(b)(3) Notifications Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Not Severity Level IV Not 71153 Applicable NCV 05000443/2023002 - 02 Applicable Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non -cited violation of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv) with three examples when NextEra failed to make three required event notifications.
Description : On April 12, 2023, while Seabrook Station was in Mode 6 at zero percent power, a valid actuation signal of the B emergency diesel generator emergency power sequencer occurred due to a loss of power to the B emergency Bus E6. The loss resulted from spurious operation of emergency power sequencer remote manual override relays that opened the unit auxiliary transformer feeder breaker to bus E6. Subsequently, the loss of power to bus E6 resulted in a valid actuation of an emergency power sequencer starting signal to the B emergency diesel generator. At the time of this event, the B emergency diesel generator was removed from service for scheduled maintenance and therefore, did not start.
Within eight hours of the event occurring inspectors questioned the licensee on the reportability of the event but at the time the licensee determined the event was not reportable because the emergency diesel generator was tagged out-of-service. The inspectors reviewed NUREG-1022, Rev.3, Event Report Guidelines, and noted S ection 3.2.6 example 3 states, The event is reportable because the actuation logic for the emergency diesel generator start was completed, even though the emergency diesel generator did not power the safety buses.
On May 6, 2023, at 15:52 with Seabrook Station in Mode 3 at zero percent power, while performing digital rod position indication system surveillance testing, shutdown bank 'E' stopped withdrawing. In response, the reactor trip breakers were manually opened, initiating a valid actuation of the reactor protection system. Subsequently on May 6, at 22:53 while continuing to perform digital rod position indication system surveillance testing, shutdown bank 'C 'stopped inserting. Reactor trip breakers were manually opened, initiating a valid actuation of the reactor protection system. Initially the operators had determined these two reactor protection system actuations were not reportable. On May 11, 2023 the resident inspectors questioned why two events were not reported as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) "Eight Hour Reports", for the valid actuation of the reactor protection system.
Corrective Actions: AR 02458443 was generated to perform common cause evaluation and make the missed reports as required by 10 CFR 50.72. NextEra reported the valid actuation of the 'B' emergency diesel generator emergency power sequencer and the two valid actuations of the r eactor program system as required by 50.72 (EN 56564 and EN 56565) on June 8, 2023.
Corrective Action References: ARs 02458443, 02454289, 02456934, 02456952, 02459323, 02454246
Performance Assessment:
The inspectors determined this violation was associated with a minor performance deficiency. Failing to submit the event notifications as required by 10 CFR 50.72 within the required time was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within NextEras ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented. The inspectors reviewed the condition for Reactor Oversight Process significance and concluded there was no associated finding. Because this violation involves the traditional enforcement process and does not have an underlying technical violation that would be considered more than minor, a cross-cutting aspect is not assigned to this violation in accordance with IMC 0612.
Enforcement:
The ROPs significance determination process does not specifically consider the regulatory process impact in its assessment of licensee performance. Therefore, it is necessary to address this violation which impedes the NRCs ability to regulate using traditional enforcement to adequately deter non-compliance.
Severity: This violation was assessed using Section 2.2.4 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
Using the example listed in Section 6.9.d.9, A licensee fails to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.72, the issue was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation.
Violation: 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), "Eight Hour Reports," requires the licensee to notify the NRC for any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section, except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation. Contrary to the above, NextEra did not notify the NRC within eight hours of the occurrence of a condition at Seabrook Unit 1 as evidenced by the following examples:
- (1) On April 12, 2023 NextEra did not notify the NRC within eight hours of the occurrence of a condition at Seabrook Unit 1 that resulted in a valid actuation of the 'B' emergency diesel generator emergency power sequencer.
- (2) On May 6, 2023 at 15:52 NextEra did not notify the NRC within eight hours of the occurrence of a condition at Seabrook Unit 1 that resulted in a valid actuation of the r eactor program system.
- (3) On May 6, 2023 at 22:53 NextEra did not notify the NRC within eight hours of the occurrence of a condition at Seabrook Unit 1 that resulted in a valid actuation of the reactor protection system.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Observation: Semi-Annual Trend Review 71152S The inspectors evaluated a sample of issues and events that occurred over the first and second quarters of 2023. The evaluation did not reveal any new trends that could indicate a more significant safety issue. The inspectors determined that, in most cases, the issues were appropriately evaluated by NextEra for potential trends at a low threshold, and resolved within the scope of the corrective action program.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On April 14, 2023, the inspectors presented the 71124.01 inspection results to Brian Booth, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On April 20, 2023, the inspectors presented the 71111.08P inspection results to Jeff Sobotka, Engineering Director, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On May 25, 2023, the inspectors presented the 71124.03 and 71124.04 inspection results to Brian Booth, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On July 24, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspectionresults to Brian Booth, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
71111.01 Procedures OP-AA-102-1002 Seasonal Readiness Revision 40
Work Orders 40617315
40738017
4078192
40804835
40834945
40835181
71111.04 Corrective Action 02196368
Documents
Drawings PID-1-RH-Residual Heat Removal System Overview Revision 003
B20660
PID-1-SF-F20482 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean Up System Detail Revision 11
Miscellaneous DBD-SF-01 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling, Purification, and Cleanup System Revision 3
Procedures OS1000.04 Plant Cooldown From Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown Revision 72
OS1000.12 Operation with RCS at reduced Inventory Revision 19
OS1001.11 Reactor Coolant System Shutdown Level Instrumentation Revision 17
OS1001.12 Draining the Reactor Coolant System for Vessel Head Revision 23
Removal
OS1013.04 Residual Heat Removal Train B Startup and Operation Revision 38
OS1016.05 Service Water Cooling Tower Operation Revision 40
OS1016.12 Contingency Cooling Tower Pump Restoration During Revision 2
Cooling Tower Maintenance
71111.05 Corrective Action 02459087
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Procedures FP 5.1 Fire Brigade Response Revision 07
FP-AA-104 Fire Protection Program Revision 6
FP-AA-104-1003 Fire Response Revision 3
OS1200.00 Response to Fire or Fire Alarm Actuation Revision 28
OS1200.05 Response to EFW Pump House Fire Revision 00
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
71111.06 Corrective Action 00120752
Documents
Drawings 1-NHY-310431 Control Building, General Electrical Arrangement Revision 30
Procedures MA5.7 Station Barriers, Penetration Seals, and Fire Wrap Revision 20
71111.07A Corrective Action 02454023
Documents 02454415
2454487
Miscellaneous FPLE-213 Final Eddy Current Inspection Report For: PCCW E-17B 04/13/2023
Work Orders 40806953
40829216
71111.11Q Procedures OP-AA-100-1000 Conduct of Operations Revision 38
OP-AA-1000 Conduct of Infrequently Performed Tests or Evolutions Revision 19
OS1000.02 Plant Startup From Hot Standby To Minimum Load Revision 47
OS1000.07 Approach to Criticality Revision 16
RS1735 Reactivity Calculations Revision 10
RS1737 Post Refuel Low Power Physics Testing Revision 14
71111.12 Corrective Action 02432518
Documents 02453360
2454004
2455093
2455101
2456467
2545140
Drawings PID-1-CBA-Control Building Air Conditioning System Safety Related Revision 8
B20307 Chilled Water System Train A
Procedures ER-AA100-2002 Maintenance Rule Program Administration Revision 13
Work Orders 40363937
40719515
40829214
40876569
40876632
237635
71111.13 Corrective Action 02453437
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
Documents 02453447
2453483
2453553
2453595
2453649
2453704
Procedures OP-AA-102-1003 Guarded Equipment Revision 46
OS1016.11 Contingency Ocean Pump Restoration for SW Work Revision 12
Activities with Ocean Service Water Pumps Not in Service
OS1056.03 Containment Penetrations Revision 16
OS1401.12 RCS Reduced Inventory Containment Integrity Verification Revision 5
WM-AA-203-1006 Critical Maintenance Management Revision 18
Work Orders 40844256
71111.15 Corrective Action 02447144
Documents 02453822
2454246
2454289
2454290
2454753
2454778
2458425
2458457
2458527
2459800
Corrective Action 02458869
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Drawings 1-NHY-310102, 4160V Bus 1-E6 RAT Inc Line Three Line Diagram Revision 7
Sh A72a
1-NHY-310102, 4160V Bus 1-E6 RAT Inc Line Close Schematic Revision 14
Sh A72b
1-NHY-310102, 4160V Bus 1-E6 RAT Inc Line Trip Schematic Revision 9
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
Sh A72c
1-NHY-310102, 4160V Bus 1-E6 P.T.S. Schematic Diagram Revision 10
Sh A73e
1-NHY-310102, 4160V Bus 1-E6 P.T.S. Auxiliary Contacts Revision 10
Sh A73f
1-NHY-310102, 4160V Bus 1-E6 PT'S. Schematic Diagram Revision 7
Sh A73h
Work Orders 40803551
40803602
40882367
40883359
71111.18 Drawings 9763-F-101402 Containment Concrete Mat Sections Revision 14
9763-F-101462 Containment Liner Bottom Plate Revision 8
9763-F-805139 Containment Liner Floor Leak Chase Piping System Piping Revision 10
Arrangement
FP01925-06 Seabrook Station Unit No. 1 Bottom Leak Chase - Erection Revision 0
Engineering 298541 Design Change Package for Containment Boundary Change Revision 0
Changes to Include Embedded Liner Leak Chase System
Miscellaneous 445860-SBSAG-Containment Shell Structure Axisymmetric Analysis Revision 0
9763.006-80-1 Containment Design Specification Revision 8
CS-23-CALC Containment Embedded Liner Leak Chase System Revision 0
Structural Evaluation
71111.20 Corrective Action 02454401
Documents 02454409
Miscellaneous OR22 Outage Safety Review Supporting Documentation,
Seabrook Nuclear Plant
Procedures ON1090.04 Containment Entry Revision 43
OS1000.03 Plant Shutdown From Minimum Load To Hot Standby Revision 40
OS1000.04 Plant Cooldown From Hot Standby To Cold Shutdown Revision 71
OS1000.06 Power Decrease Revision 30
OX1406.12 18 Month Containment And Containment Spray Revision 17
Recirculation Sump Surveillance
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
SM 7.31 Shutdown Safety Review And Safety Assessment Revision 02
71111.24 Corrective Action 02317995
Documents 02411459
2454285
2454455
2454623
2454629
2454753
2455034
2456062
2456181
2456182
2459359
2459413
2459415
2459684
2459690
2460574
2460704
2460764
Drawings 1-NHY-300229 Installation of Electrical Raceway and Supports Revision 2
1-NHY-310108 Emergency Power Sequencer System Schematic Diagram Revision 6
Procedures ES1804.056 CBS-TK-101A and CBS-TK-101B Encapsulation Tank Revision 1
Leakage Rate Test
EX1803.001 Reactor Containment Integrated Leakage Rate Test - Type Revision 12
A
EX1803.003 Reactor Containment Type B and C Leakage Rate Tests Revision 19
LS0567
MS0539.28 A-EDG Coolant Recirculation, Draining and Refilling Revision 19
MS0539.54 B-EDG Coolant Recirculation, Draining and Refilling
OX1426.03 Emergency Power Sequencer 18 month Operability Test Revision 11
OX1426.32 Diesel Generator 1B 36 Month Operability Surveillance Revision 29
OX1456.92 Centrifugal Charging Comprehensive Pump Test Revision 19
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
OX1456.92 Centrifugal Charging Comprehensive Pump Test Revision 19
OX1456.93 Train B SI, Phase A, CVI & MSI Actuation 18 Month Revision 27
Surveillance
OX1456.96 Train A SI, Phase A, CVI & MSI Actuation 18 Month Revision 24
Surveillance
Work Orders 40394846
40427243
40605097
40728214
40782885
40803307
40803583
40806895
40806896
40807046
40807047
40807052
40807117
40807583
40811961
40825215
40844205
40844321
40844718
40845313
40854907
40877477
40879331
20