ML20198K619

Insp Rept 50-455/86-10 on 860318-0515.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Insp findings,10CFR50.55(e) Repts,Generic Ltrs,New Fuel Receipt,Preoperational Testing & Housekeeping

ML20198K619
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	05/28/1986
From:	Forney W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198K608	List: ML20198K605 ML20198K619
References
50-455-86-10, GL-85-05, GL-85-06, GL-85-07, GL-85-13, GL-85-14, GL-85-22, GL-85-5, GL-85-6, GL-85-7, NUDOCS 8606040076
Download: ML20198K619 (7)

See also: IR 05000455/1986010

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-455/86010(DRP)

Docket No. 50-455 License No. CPPR-131

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company

Post Office Box 767

Chicago, IL 60690

Facility Name: Byron Station, Unit 2

Inspection at: Byron Station, Byron, IL

Inspection Conducted: March 18 through May 15, 1986

Inspectors: J. M. Hinds, Jr.

P. G. Brochman

R. M. Lerch

A. Dunlop

Approved By: orn f 4/2f/f/,

Reactor Projects Section lA Da t'e /

Inspection Summary

Inspection on March 18 through May 15, 1986 (Report No. 50-455/86010(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident

inspectors and two regional inspectors of licensee action on previous inspection

findings; 50.55(e) reports; generic letters; new fuel receipt; preoperational

testing; housekeeping; ooerational safety; non-routine events; generic concerns

from Braidwood; and other activities.

Results: No violations or deviations were identified nor were any items

identified which could affect the public health and safety.

C606040076

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Commonwealth Edison Company

R. Querio, Station Manager

V. Schlosser, Project Manager

• G. Sorenson. Project Construction Manager

D. Tuetken, Startup Superintendent

R. Pleniewicz, Production Superintendent

R. Ward, Services Superintendent

L. Sues, Assistant Superintendent, Operating

T. Joyce, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Services

• R. Klinger, Project Quality Control Supervisor

• J. Woldridge. Quality Assurance Supervisor

• R. Moravec, Project Construction Mechanical Supervisor

W. Blythe, Operating Engineer, Unit 0

D. Brindle, Operating Engineer, Unit 2

E. Falb, Unit 2 Testing Supervisor

• E. Briette, Quality Assurance Engineer

• J. Yesinowski, Onsite Nuclear Safety Group Engineer

• D. Spitzer, Compliance Staff

The inspector also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor

personnel during the course of this inspection.

• Denotes those present during the exit interview on May 15, 1986.

2. Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)

a. (Closed) Violation (455/85045-04(DRP)): Failure to specify

appropriate acceptance criteria in test SI 73.62. The inspector

reviewed the licensee's response and verified that the minimum

acceptable performance curves for the 2A CV, 2B CV, 2A SI, 28 SI,

2A RH, and 28 RH pumps had been added to Appendix 0 of SI 73.62

by TCR No. 1. The inspector verified that these curves were

referenced in the acceptance criteria, Sections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3

of SI 73.62. Based on the corrective action taken by the licensee

to incorporate the appropriate pump performance curves in SI 73.62

the inspector has no further concerns regarding this matter and this

item is considered closed.

b. (Closed) Violation (455/86004-01(DRP)): Failure to follow cleanliness

standards required by ANSI N45.2.3. Tba inspector reviewed the

licensee's response and verified that tue corrective actions had been

accomplished as stated. The inspector subsequently observed indivi-

duals in Level II cleanliness zones and verified that they were wearing

the required protective clothing. Based on the actions taken by the

licensee, the inspector has no further concerns regarding this matter

and this item is considered closed.

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c. (Closed) Violation (455/86004-02(DRP)): Failure to follow

administrative procedures when removing a Temporary Mechanical

Alteration. The inspector reviewed the licensee's response and

verified that the corrective actions had been accomplished to

complete the administrative requirements for removal of the temporary

mechanical alteration. The inspector interviewed Unit 2 testing

personnel to verify their understanding of the requirements. Based

on the actions taken by the licensee, the inspector has no further

concerns regarding this matter and this item is considered closed.

3. Followup on 10 CFR 50.55(e) Reports (92700)

(Closed) Part 50.55(e) Report (455/83003-EE): Reactor coolant pump, steam

generator, and pressurizer column and lateral supports not installed within

the tolerances specified in S&L design drawing S-1105. The inspector

reviewed NCR F-912 and verified that corrective actions had been accom-

plished as stated. Based on these actions, the inspector has no further

concerns regarding this matter and this item is considered closed.

4. Generic Letter (GL) Followup (92703)

The inspector reviewed the Byron Station Program for the receipt, review

and corrective actions regarding GLs. Copies of all GLs are sent to

licensee corporate offices and to the Byron Station. The Nuclear Licensing

Administrator's (NLA) office in the corporate headquarters is responsible

for assigning responsibilities for GL review. The station handling of GLs

is fashioned af ter Byron Administrative Procedure (BAP) 1260-1. " Operating

Experience Feedback" and although not specifically listed in BAP 1260-1

with other NRC correspondence which includes bulletins, circulars and

information notices, the licensee has committed to including GLs in the

next revision of BAP 1260-1 and is tracking this commitment with Action

Item Request (AIR) No. 6-86-109. A review of the station file indicated

that the station copy was on file for GLs 85005; 85006; 85007; 85013;

85014; and 85022. The routing pages indicated that the GLs were routed

through the Assistant Superintendent for review and distribution of the GLs.

Each GL file was reviewed by the inspector for assignment from NLA and site

response when appropriate. The inspector concluded that the administration

of the Byron Station GL review program is being adequately implemented.

This completes the action required by the C. E. Norelius Memorandum of

February 28, 1986 " Handling of Generic Letters."

No violations or deviations were observed.

5. Receipt of New Fuel (60501)

During the inspection period, the licensee received new fuel shipments

No. 3 through 14 during March 18 to May 1,1986, from Westinghouse Nuclear

Fuel Services in Columbia, South Carolina. Upon arrival at the site, the

shipment was monitored for radiation and contamination, inspected for

damage and stored in the new fuel storage vault.

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Prior to and during the receipt and inspection of shipment No. 3 through 14,

the inspectors performed inspection tours of the fuel storage area and

adjacent fuel handling service areas to evaluate implementation of license

storage requirements, and integrity of security controls in effect

including: tence or wall continuity, access controls, security force

awareness, security force procedure and security plan implementation,

provisions for environmental control including dust and debris control,

chloride contamination, and physical dcmage protection from construction

activities or weather conditions.

The inspectors reviewed the documentation and records for new fuel receipt

inspections for shipments No. 3 through 14. The review verified that

licensee's receiving inspection documentation included fuel manufacturer

shipping documents; documents required by NRC and 00T regulations and

vendor quality assurance documents transmitted to the licensee.

The inspectors reviewed the completed Fuel Handling Procedures / Checklists

for Fuel Receiving Record Container Reports, BFP FH-T, to verify that the

licensee visually inspected shipping containers for external damage,

security seal integrity, shock indicator integrity, and loose material or

parts for the containers in shipments No. 3 through 14. The inspectors

witnessed portions of the off-loading and stcrage operations of shipments

No. 3 through 14. The inspectors also witnessed the container opening,

radiological monitoring, up-ending, assembly removal, inspection process

and storage procedures for portions of these shipments.

No violations or deviaticns were identified.

6. Preoperational Test Witnessing (61720, 70314, 70317)

The inspectors witnessed portions of the below listed preoperational test

procedures to verify that testing was conducted in acccrdance with approved

procedures; that all test equipment was properly installed; that test data

was collected and recorded properly; and that test deficiencies were

documented ar;d test changes were processed in an approved manner.

FW 2.34.67, "Feedwater Tempering Flow"

PC 2.58.60, "Containnent Local Leak Rate"

RC 2.63.60, " Integrated Hot Functional Testing Sequence"

RC 2.63.62, "RCS Instruments & Interlocks"

RC 2.63.67, "RCPs, Loop Stop Valves, & Relief Line Flow "

RP 2.68.60, " Reactor Protection"

RP 2.68.62, " Reactor Protection"

No violations or deviations were observed.

7. Housekeeping / Care and Preservation of Safety-Related Components (71302)

The inspectors conducted plant tours of Unit 2 between March 18 and May 15,

1906. Areas of the Unit 2 plant observed during the tours included the

containment, fuel handling, and storage areas, auxiliary buildirg areas

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including the Unit 2 portion of the control room, and the turbine building.

Areas were inspected for work in progress, state of cleanliness, overall

housekeeping, state of fire protection equipment and n.ethods being employed,

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and the care and preservation of safety-related components and equipment.

The inspectors were accompanied by licensee personnel on portions of the

tours for the purpose of identifying areas where additional housekeeping

ef forts should be concentrated to improve the overall cleanlinen of

Unit 2. Inspector concerns were related to the licensee.

Observations of work in progress included: witnessing of fitup tcd

soldering of an instrument air line outside the biological shielo; fitup

and welding of a pipe whip restraint on a safety injection pipe.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

8. Operational Safety Verification (71707)

In accordance with the guidance provided in Temporary Instruction

(TI) 2515/68 the resident inspectors received training on March 26 and 27,

1986 from a regional specialist on methods to increase the effectiveness

of the routine safeguard inspections conducted by the resident inspectors

under IE Inspection Program 71707. Based upon satisfactory completion of

this training, TI 2515/68 is considered closed.

9. Review of Non-Routine Events (90712)

The inspector conducted an in-office review of a special report (letter

from R. E. Querio to James G. Keppler, dated March 11, 1986) detailing two

failures of the 2A Diesel Generator (DG). This report was submitted under

the requirements of Unit 1 Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.3. On

! February 12 and February 17, 1986 the 2ADG failed under load. On the first

failure the DG tripped due to a connecting rod high temperature. On the

second failure a crack was observed on a rocker arm cover, and the DG was

shut down normally. In both cases, the DG failed due to broken valve

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rocker arms. Investigation of this problem by the licensee's maintenance

department, engineering staff, and a technical representative of the

manufacturer, Cooper-Bessemer, determined that the intermediate cause was

excessive friction between the crosshead member and its guide. When the

camshaft rotates, each cam drives a crosshead in and out of a crosshead

guide. The crosshead member is connected to a rocker arm by means of a

pushrod. The rocker arm in turn opens and closes its associated intake

or exhaust valves.

The root cause of the failed rocker arms is cylinder liner misalignment

(cylinder liner to base), which in turn causes head misalignment, (cylinder

liner to head). Sufficient head misalignment will cause abnormal side

loading and deformation of the cam follower bushing (crosshead guide).

When the bushings are subjected to these conditions, the running clearances

between the cam follower and the bushing are inadequate, and the cam

follower will stick. With the follower stuck in an intermediate position,

the cylinder's valve train is subjected to greater than normal loads due

to combustion pressures and impact loads from the cam. Increased loads

on the valve train will ultimately lead to failure of the rocker arms.

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As corrective action the five left (5L) and ten right (10R) cylinder heads

were removed and the crosshead guides were honed to remove any score marks

caused by friction between the crosshead member and its guide, and the

seven lef t (7L) cylinder head was replaced. Additionally, an alignment

tool for checking cylinder liner alignment was procured and will be used

in the 18 month teardown procedure to verify cylinder alignment. All

cylinders on the 2ADG were monitored while the DG was running under load

with an En-Spec 1000 engine analyzer and no other problems were identified.

On May 5, 1986 the 7L rocker arm broke while the DG was under load. The

licensee's investigation determined that the cause of the broken rocker

arm was not the same. The licensee has repaired the DG and following

discussions with Region III has started performance of additional testing

of the 2ADG. The inspectors will review the failure of May 5, 1986 in a

subsequent inspection report after the special report is issued.

No violations or deviations were identified.

10. Generic Testing Concerns Identified at Ecaidwood Which ar .plicable to

' Byron Unit 2

During a review of a diesel generator (DG) preoperational test at Braidwood

Station the inspector identified a concern relating to the testing of DG

air start system. This concern was documented in Inspection Report

No. 456/86010(DRS). As the DG design at Braidwood is identical to those

installed at Byron this concern is also applicable to Byron Units 1 and 2.

The Byron /Braidwood SER, Section 9.5.6 sta+es that the DGs will be verified

to start four times from a single air receiver without being recharged

between starts. The correct test method would be to have the initial

pressure in the air receiver at the lowest possible value for which a DG

would be declared operable. Braidwood has not defined this operability

limit. The Braidwood test started with an initial pressure of 250 psig

which is the pressure point at which the air compressor secures and is the

highest pressure normally seen by the system.

Due to Braidwood's procedures being developed from Byron's, the inspector

has a concern that Byron performed its DG test in a similar manner. This

is considered an unresolved item (455/86010-01(DRP)) pending the licensee

addressir.g the DG air start system operability limit and evaluation by

the inspector.

Additionally, during Integrated Hot Functional (IHF) testing at Braidwood

Unit 1, a computer software problem was identified during IT-10, "RTD

Cross Calibration". Braidwood found this problem to be generic to Unit 2.

Braidwood obtained new sof tware from the vendor to correct its deficiency.

Because of this, the inspector has a concern that Byron may have the same

software problem. This is considered an open item (455/86010-02(DRP)

pending further evaluation by the inspector.

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11. Unresolved items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required

in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable itcms, violations,

or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is

discussed in Paragraph 10.

12. Open Items

Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which

will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some acticn

on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. An open item disclosed during

the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 10.

13. Exit Interview (30703)

The inspectors met with licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 at

the conclusion of the inspection cn May 15,1986. The inspectors sumn.arized

the purpose and scope of the inspection end the findings. The inspectors

also discussed the likely informaticnal content of the inspection report

with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the

inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as

proprietary.

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