ML20198K619
| ML20198K619 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 05/28/1986 |
| From: | Forney W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198K608 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-455-86-10, GL-85-05, GL-85-06, GL-85-07, GL-85-13, GL-85-14, GL-85-22, GL-85-5, GL-85-6, GL-85-7, NUDOCS 8606040076 | |
| Download: ML20198K619 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000455/1986010
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-455/86010(DRP)
Docket No. 50-455
License No. CPPR-131
Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
Post Office Box 767
Chicago, IL 60690
Facility Name:
Byron Station, Unit 2
Inspection at: Byron Station, Byron, IL
Inspection Conducted: March 18 through May 15, 1986
Inspectors:
J. M. Hinds, Jr.
P. G. Brochman
R. M. Lerch
A. Dunlop
Approved By:
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Reactor Projects Section lA
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Inspection Summary
Inspection on March 18 through May 15, 1986 (Report No. 50-455/86010(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident
inspectors and two regional inspectors of licensee action on previous inspection
findings; 50.55(e) reports; generic letters; new fuel receipt; preoperational
testing; housekeeping; ooerational safety; non-routine events; generic concerns
from Braidwood; and other activities.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified nor were any items
identified which could affect the public health and safety.
C606040076 060528
ADOCK 05000455
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Commonwealth Edison Company
R. Querio, Station Manager
V. Schlosser, Project Manager
- G. Sorenson. Project Construction Manager
D. Tuetken, Startup Superintendent
R. Pleniewicz, Production Superintendent
R. Ward, Services Superintendent
L. Sues, Assistant Superintendent, Operating
T. Joyce, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Services
- R. Klinger, Project Quality Control Supervisor
- J. Woldridge. Quality Assurance Supervisor
- R. Moravec, Project Construction Mechanical Supervisor
W. Blythe, Operating Engineer, Unit 0
D. Brindle, Operating Engineer, Unit 2
E. Falb, Unit 2 Testing Supervisor
- E. Briette, Quality Assurance Engineer
- J. Yesinowski, Onsite Nuclear Safety Group Engineer
- D. Spitzer, Compliance Staff
The inspector also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor
personnel during the course of this inspection.
- Denotes those present during the exit interview on May 15, 1986.
2.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)
a.
(Closed) Violation (455/85045-04(DRP)):
Failure to specify
appropriate acceptance criteria in test SI 73.62.
The inspector
reviewed the licensee's response and verified that the minimum
acceptable performance curves for the 2A CV, 2B CV, 2A SI, 28 SI,
2A RH, and 28 RH pumps had been added to Appendix 0 of SI 73.62
by TCR No. 1.
The inspector verified that these curves were
referenced in the acceptance criteria, Sections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3
of SI 73.62.
Based on the corrective action taken by the licensee
to incorporate the appropriate pump performance curves in SI 73.62
the inspector has no further concerns regarding this matter and this
item is considered closed.
b.
(Closed) Violation (455/86004-01(DRP)):
Failure to follow cleanliness
standards required by ANSI N45.2.3.
Tba inspector reviewed the
licensee's response and verified that tue corrective actions had been
accomplished as stated.
The inspector subsequently observed indivi-
duals in Level II cleanliness zones and verified that they were wearing
the required protective clothing.
Based on the actions taken by the
licensee, the inspector has no further concerns regarding this matter
and this item is considered closed.
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c.
(Closed) Violation (455/86004-02(DRP)):
Failure to follow
administrative procedures when removing a Temporary Mechanical
Alteration. The inspector reviewed the licensee's response and
verified that the corrective actions had been accomplished to
complete the administrative requirements for removal of the temporary
mechanical alteration.
The inspector interviewed Unit 2 testing
personnel to verify their understanding of the requirements.
Based
on the actions taken by the licensee, the inspector has no further
concerns regarding this matter and this item is considered closed.
3.
Followup on 10 CFR 50.55(e) Reports (92700)
(Closed) Part 50.55(e) Report (455/83003-EE):
Reactor coolant pump, steam
generator, and pressurizer column and lateral supports not installed within
the tolerances specified in S&L design drawing S-1105.
The inspector
reviewed NCR F-912 and verified that corrective actions had been accom-
plished as stated.
Based on these actions, the inspector has no further
concerns regarding this matter and this item is considered closed.
4.
Generic Letter (GL) Followup (92703)
The inspector reviewed the Byron Station Program for the receipt, review
and corrective actions regarding GLs.
Copies of all GLs are sent to
licensee corporate offices and to the Byron Station.
The Nuclear Licensing
Administrator's (NLA) office in the corporate headquarters is responsible
for assigning responsibilities for GL review. The station handling of GLs
is fashioned af ter Byron Administrative Procedure (BAP) 1260-1. " Operating
Experience Feedback" and although not specifically listed in BAP 1260-1
with other NRC correspondence which includes bulletins, circulars and
information notices, the licensee has committed to including GLs in the
next revision of BAP 1260-1 and is tracking this commitment with Action
Item Request (AIR) No. 6-86-109. A review of the station file indicated
that the station copy was on file for GLs 85005; 85006; 85007; 85013;
85014; and 85022.
The routing pages indicated that the GLs were routed
through the Assistant Superintendent for review and distribution of the GLs.
Each GL file was reviewed by the inspector for assignment from NLA and site
response when appropriate.
The inspector concluded that the administration
of the Byron Station GL review program is being adequately implemented.
This completes the action required by the C. E. Norelius Memorandum of
February 28, 1986 " Handling of Generic Letters."
No violations or deviations were observed.
5.
Receipt of New Fuel (60501)
During the inspection period, the licensee received new fuel shipments
No. 3 through 14 during March 18 to May 1,1986, from Westinghouse Nuclear
Fuel Services in Columbia, South Carolina.
Upon arrival at the site, the
shipment was monitored for radiation and contamination, inspected for
damage and stored in the new fuel storage vault.
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Prior to and during the receipt and inspection of shipment No. 3 through 14,
the inspectors performed inspection tours of the fuel storage area and
adjacent fuel handling service areas to evaluate implementation of license
storage requirements, and integrity of security controls in effect
including:
tence or wall continuity, access controls, security force
awareness, security force procedure and security plan implementation,
provisions for environmental control including dust and debris control,
chloride contamination, and physical dcmage protection from construction
activities or weather conditions.
The inspectors reviewed the documentation and records for new fuel receipt
inspections for shipments No. 3 through 14. The review verified that
licensee's receiving inspection documentation included fuel manufacturer
shipping documents; documents required by NRC and 00T regulations and
vendor quality assurance documents transmitted to the licensee.
The inspectors reviewed the completed Fuel Handling Procedures / Checklists
for Fuel Receiving Record Container Reports, BFP FH-T, to verify that the
licensee visually inspected shipping containers for external damage,
security seal integrity, shock indicator integrity, and loose material or
parts for the containers in shipments No. 3 through 14. The inspectors
witnessed portions of the off-loading and stcrage operations of shipments
No. 3 through 14. The inspectors also witnessed the container opening,
radiological monitoring, up-ending, assembly removal, inspection process
and storage procedures for portions of these shipments.
No violations or deviaticns were identified.
6.
Preoperational Test Witnessing (61720, 70314, 70317)
The inspectors witnessed portions of the below listed preoperational test
procedures to verify that testing was conducted in acccrdance with approved
procedures; that all test equipment was properly installed; that test data
was collected and recorded properly; and that test deficiencies were
documented ar;d test changes were processed in an approved manner.
FW 2.34.67, "Feedwater Tempering Flow"
PC 2.58.60, "Containnent Local Leak Rate"
RC 2.63.60, " Integrated Hot Functional Testing Sequence"
RC 2.63.62, "RCS Instruments & Interlocks"
RC 2.63.67, "RCPs, Loop Stop Valves, & Relief Line Flow "
RP 2.68.60, " Reactor Protection"
RP 2.68.62, " Reactor Protection"
No violations or deviations were observed.
7.
Housekeeping / Care and Preservation of Safety-Related Components (71302)
The inspectors conducted plant tours of Unit 2 between March 18 and May 15,
1906. Areas of the Unit 2 plant observed during the tours included the
containment, fuel handling, and storage areas, auxiliary buildirg areas
including the Unit 2 portion of the control room, and the turbine building.
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Areas were inspected for work in progress, state of cleanliness, overall
housekeeping, state of fire protection equipment and n.ethods being employed,
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and the care and preservation of safety-related components and equipment.
The inspectors were accompanied by licensee personnel on portions of the
tours for the purpose of identifying areas where additional housekeeping
ef forts should be concentrated to improve the overall cleanlinen of
Unit 2.
Inspector concerns were related to the licensee.
Observations of work in progress included: witnessing of fitup tcd
soldering of an instrument air line outside the biological shielo; fitup
and welding of a pipe whip restraint on a safety injection pipe.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
In accordance with the guidance provided in Temporary Instruction
(TI) 2515/68 the resident inspectors received training on March 26 and 27,
1986 from a regional specialist on methods to increase the effectiveness
of the routine safeguard inspections conducted by the resident inspectors
under IE Inspection Program 71707. Based upon satisfactory completion of
this training, TI 2515/68 is considered closed.
9.
Review of Non-Routine Events (90712)
The inspector conducted an in-office review of a special report (letter
from R. E. Querio to James G. Keppler, dated March 11, 1986) detailing two
failures of the 2A Diesel Generator (DG). This report was submitted under
the requirements of Unit 1 Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.3.
On
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February 12 and February 17, 1986 the 2ADG failed under load. On the first
failure the DG tripped due to a connecting rod high temperature.
On the
second failure a crack was observed on a rocker arm cover, and the DG was
shut down normally.
In both cases, the DG failed due to broken valve
rocker arms.
Investigation of this problem by the licensee's maintenance
,
department, engineering staff, and a technical representative of the
manufacturer, Cooper-Bessemer, determined that the intermediate cause was
excessive friction between the crosshead member and its guide. When the
camshaft rotates, each cam drives a crosshead in and out of a crosshead
guide.
The crosshead member is connected to a rocker arm by means of a
pushrod. The rocker arm in turn opens and closes its associated intake
or exhaust valves.
The root cause of the failed rocker arms is cylinder liner misalignment
(cylinder liner to base), which in turn causes head misalignment, (cylinder
liner to head).
Sufficient head misalignment will cause abnormal side
loading and deformation of the cam follower bushing (crosshead guide).
When the bushings are subjected to these conditions, the running clearances
between the cam follower and the bushing are inadequate, and the cam
follower will stick. With the follower stuck in an intermediate position,
the cylinder's valve train is subjected to greater than normal loads due
to combustion pressures and impact loads from the cam.
Increased loads
on the valve train will ultimately lead to failure of the rocker arms.
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As corrective action the five left (5L) and ten right (10R) cylinder heads
were removed and the crosshead guides were honed to remove any score marks
caused by friction between the crosshead member and its guide, and the
seven lef t (7L) cylinder head was replaced.
Additionally, an alignment
tool for checking cylinder liner alignment was procured and will be used
in the 18 month teardown procedure to verify cylinder alignment. All
cylinders on the 2ADG were monitored while the DG was running under load
with an En-Spec 1000 engine analyzer and no other problems were identified.
On May 5, 1986 the 7L rocker arm broke while the DG was under load.
The
licensee's investigation determined that the cause of the broken rocker
arm was not the same. The licensee has repaired the DG and following
discussions with Region III has started performance of additional testing
of the 2ADG. The inspectors will review the failure of May 5, 1986 in a
subsequent inspection report after the special report is issued.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10. Generic Testing Concerns Identified at Ecaidwood Which ar
.plicable to
' Byron Unit 2
During a review of a diesel generator (DG) preoperational test at Braidwood
Station the inspector identified a concern relating to the testing of DG
air start system.
This concern was documented in Inspection Report
No. 456/86010(DRS). As the DG design at Braidwood is identical to those
installed at Byron this concern is also applicable to Byron Units 1 and 2.
The Byron /Braidwood SER, Section 9.5.6 sta+es that the DGs will be verified
to start four times from a single air receiver without being recharged
between starts.
The correct test method would be to have the initial
pressure in the air receiver at the lowest possible value for which a DG
would be declared operable. Braidwood has not defined this operability
limit.
The Braidwood test started with an initial pressure of 250 psig
which is the pressure point at which the air compressor secures and is the
highest pressure normally seen by the system.
Due to Braidwood's procedures being developed from Byron's, the inspector
has a concern that Byron performed its DG test in a similar manner.
This
is considered an unresolved item (455/86010-01(DRP)) pending the licensee
addressir.g the DG air start system operability limit and evaluation by
the inspector.
Additionally, during Integrated Hot Functional (IHF) testing at Braidwood
Unit 1, a computer software problem was identified during IT-10, "RTD
Cross Calibration".
Braidwood found this problem to be generic to Unit 2.
Braidwood obtained new sof tware from the vendor to correct its deficiency.
Because of this, the inspector has a concern that Byron may have the same
software problem. This is considered an open item (455/86010-02(DRP)
pending further evaluation by the inspector.
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11. Unresolved items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required
in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable itcms, violations,
or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is
discussed in Paragraph 10.
12. Open Items
Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which
will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some acticn
on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. An open item disclosed during
the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 10.
13.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 at
the conclusion of the inspection cn May 15,1986. The inspectors sumn.arized
the purpose and scope of the inspection end the findings. The inspectors
also discussed the likely informaticnal content of the inspection report
with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the
inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as
proprietary.
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