ML20199E130: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(StriderTol Bot insert)
 
(StriderTol Bot change)
 
Line 19: Line 19:
=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:.
{{#Wiki_filter:.
COMANCHE PEAK RESPONSE TEAM ACTION PLAN Item Number: V.c
COMANCHE PEAK RESPONSE TEAM ACTION PLAN Item Number: V.c Design Consideration for Piping Systems Between Seismic Category I and Non-Seismic Category I Buildings Revision No.
                    .'            Design Consideration for Piping Systems Between Seismic Category I and Non-Seismic Category I Buildings Revision No.                 0               1 Revised to Reflec';
0 1
[.            Description         Original Issue   NRC Consnents Prepared and Recommended by:     / ',' / q Review Team Leader 4 ihM                         M Date                   31 8(                       f(
[.
I
Revised to Reflec';
* Approved by:
Description Original Issue NRC Consnents Prepared and Recommended by:
Senior Review Team CMW. b                   _ A).     /
/ ',' / q Review Team Leader 4 ihM M
pace                 Nlr/tr           #
Date 31 8(
6l26ltf 8606230196 860609 PDR FOIA GARDE 86-36         PDR
f(
I Approved by:
Senior Review Team CMW. b
_ A).
/
pace Nlr/tr 6l26ltf 8606230196 860609 PDR FOIA GARDE 86-36 PDR


Revision:                                 1 Page                         1 of 6 ITEM NUMBER V.c Design Consideration for Piping Systems Between Seismic Category I ard Non-Seismic Category I Buildings
Revision:
1 Page 1 of 6 ITEM NUMBER V.c Design Consideration for Piping Systems Between Seismic Category I ard Non-Seismic Category I Buildings


==1.0 DESCRIPTION==
==1.0 DESCRIPTION==
OF ISSUE IDENTIFIED BY NRC l
OF ISSUE IDENTIFIED BY NRC l
In April, 1984 the Comanche Peak Special Review Team'(SRT). formed and coordinated between NRR. IE and Region II and IV, performed a limited revier of Comanche Peak. The TRT. in reviewing the SRT findings in the area of' piping design considerations ~. has                                                                                                                             i discovered that piping systems, such as Main Steam. Auxiliary Steaa                                                                                                                       !
In April, 1984 the Comanche Peak Special Review Team'(SRT). formed and coordinated between NRR. IE and Region II and IV, performed a limited revier of Comanche Peak. The TRT. in reviewing the SRT findings in the area of' piping design considerations ~. has i
and Feedvater, are routed from the Electrical Control Building (seismic category I) to the Turbine Building (non-seismic Category I) without any isolation. To be acceptable, each seismic Category
discovered that piping systems, such as Main Steam. Auxiliary Steaa and Feedvater, are routed from the Electrical Control Building (seismic category I) to the Turbine Building (non-seismic Category I) without any isolation. To be acceptable, each seismic Category
{                                                     I piping system should be isolated from any non-seismic Category I t
{
I piping system should be isolated from any non-seismic Category I t
piping system by separation, barrier or constraint.
piping system by separation, barrier or constraint.
If isolation is not feasible, then the effect on the seismic i
If isolation is not feasible, then the effect on the seismic Category I piping of the failure in the non-seismic Category I i
Category I piping of the failure in the non-seismic Category I piping must be considered (CPSES FSAR 3.7B.3-13.1).
piping must be considered (CPSES FSAR 3.7B.3-13.1).
For CPSES. FSAR Section 3.7B.2.8 establishes that the Turbine
For CPSES. FSAR Section 3.7B.2.8 establishes that the Turbine Building is a non-seismic Category I structure and failure is postulated during a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). The effect of Turbine Building failure on any non-isolated piping routed through i
  '                                                Building is a non-seismic Category I structure and failure is postulated during a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). The effect of i
the Turbine Building from any seismic Category I building must be considered.
Turbine Building failure on any non-isolated piping routed through the Turbine Building from any seismic Category I building must be considered.
In addition, for non-seismic Category I piping connected to seismic Category I piping, the dynamic effects of the non-seismic Category I piping must be considered in the seismic design of the seismic Category I piping and supports, unless TUEC can show that the i
In addition, for non-seismic Category I piping connected to seismic Category I piping, the dynamic effects of the non-seismic Category I piping must be considered in the seismic design of the seismic Category I piping and supports, unless TUEC can show that the i
I dynamic effects of the non-seismic Category I piping are isolated by anchors or restraints. The anchors or restraints used for isolation purposes must be designed to withstand the combined loading imposed by both the seismic Category I and non-seismic Category I piping.
dynamic effects of the non-seismic Category I piping are isolated I
by anchors or restraints. The anchors or restraints used for isolation purposes must be designed to withstand the combined loading imposed by both the seismic Category I and non-seismic Category I piping.
2.0 ACTION IDENTIFIED BY NRC Accordingly. TUEC shall provide analysis and documentation that the piping systems routed from seismic Category I to non-seismic Category I buildings meet the stated FSAR criteria.
2.0 ACTION IDENTIFIED BY NRC Accordingly. TUEC shall provide analysis and documentation that the piping systems routed from seismic Category I to non-seismic Category I buildings meet the stated FSAR criteria.
t i
t i
          ,- - - - - - - - , , - - - . - . - -            ,.n.----- - , - _ - - - - - . - - - - - - , - - - - - - - . . - , . - - - - - , - - - - - - - - - - ,              - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - . -          - - - .
,.n.-----


I Revision:-                   1 Page                   2 of 6 4
I Revision:-
1 Page 2 of 6 4
ITEM NUMBER V.c (Cont'd)
ITEM NUMBER V.c (Cont'd)


==3.0 BACKGROUND==
==3.0 BACKGROUND==
3.1 Information Supplementina NRC Description of Issue TUGC0 couaitted in the FSAR ti provide isolation between seismic Category I piping system and non-seismic piping systems by using anchors or seismic restraints. The methods used to implement the FSAR commitaant differ depending on such parameters as pipe size. location with respect to seismic buildings and location of isolation valves.
3.1 Information Supplementina NRC Description of Issue TUGC0 couaitted in the FSAR ti provide isolation between seismic Category I piping system and non-seismic piping systems by using anchors or seismic restraints. The methods used to implement the FSAR commitaant differ depending on such parameters as pipe size. location with respect to seismic buildings and location of isolation valves.
Some piping systems have active valves installed at or near the boundary between the seismic and non-seismic portions of the piping run. Furthermore, it is common practice to install an anchor or soment restraint directly to the Category I building structures or indirectly through intervening steel structures.
Some piping systems have active valves installed at or near the boundary between the seismic and non-seismic portions of the piping run.
Furthermore, it is common practice to install an anchor or soment restraint directly to the Category I building structures or indirectly through intervening steel structures.
Other piping systems are seismically isolated by using an anchor, acaent restraint, or a series of supports. The anchors and acaent restraints are designed for the combined load imposed by the piping on each side of the device. The seismically qualified portion has a calculated set of loads.
Other piping systems are seismically isolated by using an anchor, acaent restraint, or a series of supports. The anchors and acaent restraints are designed for the combined load imposed by the piping on each side of the device. The seismically qualified portion has a calculated set of loads.
The loads from the non-seismic piping are estimated, Where a series of supports is used to isolate the piping, two approaches were employed for determining the loads. First, for larger piping, the practice is generally to locate additional supports in the non-seismic portion of the system and extend the piping model to include that additional section of piping. The additional supports in the extented region (i.e. non-seismic portion) are designed to carry those loads.
The loads from the non-seismic piping are estimated, Where a series of supports is used to isolate the piping, two approaches were employed for determining the loads. First, for larger piping, the practice is generally to locate additional supports in the non-seismic portion of the system and extend the piping model to include that additional section of piping. The additional supports in the extented region (i.e. non-seismic portion) are designed to carry those loads.
Secondly, for small bore piping, loads are estimated based on a presumed span in the non-seismic piping which would establish a simply calculated fundamental frequency that maximizes the seismic response.
Secondly, for small bore piping, loads are estimated based on a presumed span in the non-seismic piping which would establish a simply calculated fundamental frequency that maximizes the seismic response.
In the specific situation, first identified by the TRT a portion of auxiliary steam system piping was routed from a seismic Category I building to a non-Category I building. The piping in question was all non-nuclear safety (NNS) piping (i.e. non-Category 1 piping); however, the piping was classified as high energy piping. The FSAR provides an optional criteria for evaluation of postulated pipe ruptures which can be applied to high energy NNS piping which is seismically analyzed. That option was selected for the noted portion of auxiliary steam piping resulting in a seismic analysis. As initially configured, the support system included an ar.chor to isolate the seismically analyzed portion                                                                   :
In the specific situation, first identified by the TRT a portion of auxiliary steam system piping was routed from a seismic Category I building to a non-Category I building. The piping in question was all non-nuclear safety (NNS) piping (i.e. non-Category 1 piping); however, the piping was classified as high energy piping. The FSAR provides an optional criteria for evaluation of postulated pipe ruptures which can be applied to high energy NNS piping which is seismically analyzed. That option was selected for the noted portion of auxiliary steam piping resulting in a seismic analysis. As initially configured, the support system included an ar.chor to isolate the seismically analyzed portion from the portion which extended into the non-Category I building. At a later date, the device was deleted to l
from the portion which extended into the non-Category I building. At a later date, the device was deleted to l
.-w--.,%---
                                            . - - - - , _ . , ,.,_,.m               -
___.,.e.-,
                                                                                              , - . , , .--,,----,---e--.--           . , - - - . - - - , - -
,.,_,.m
 
_..-%._,-,--._,,,,,,,w.,..-__--.e,,y-
Revision:                        1 Page                      3 of 6 ITEM NUMBER V.c (Cont'd)
.--,,----,---e--.--


==3.0 BACKGROUND==
Revision:
(Cont'd) alleviate thermal expansion stresses in a portion of the piping. The requirement to retain the seismic isolation was not clear, because none of the piping was Category I.
1 Page 3 of 6 ITEM NUMBER V.c (Cont'd) 3.0 BACKGROUND (Cont'd) alleviate thermal expansion stresses in a portion of the piping. The requirement to retain the seismic isolation was not clear, because none of the piping was Category I.
Although the specific issue raised by the TRT deals with Catego:y I' systems, based on the situation discussed above the scope of the issue is considered to include any piping system with a seismic analysis boundary. This includes a seismic class change from Category I to non-Category I, but also includes any system in which the seismic model is terminated within a piping run or branch.
Although the specific issue raised by the TRT deals with Catego:y I' systems, based on the situation discussed above the scope of the issue is considered to include any piping system with a seismic analysis boundary. This includes a seismic class change from Category I to non-Category I, but also includes any system in which the seismic model is terminated within a piping run or branch.
3.2 Preliminary Determination of Root Cause and Generic Implications The preliminary reviews conducted to date have not identified a root cause to this item. Because of the nature of this action plan, the Design ,d.squacy Program, and the Project Piping and Supports ProE m (see 4.1 below). root cause and l
3.2 Preliminary Determination of Root Cause and Generic Implications The preliminary reviews conducted to date have not identified a root cause to this item. Because of the nature of this action plan, the Design,d.squacy Program, and the Project Piping and Supports ProE m (see 4.1 below). root cause and f
f                        generic implications will cc : be identified as part of this action plan. Where appropriate, they will be addressed during implementation of the Design Adequacy Program.
generic implications will c : be identified as part of this c
4.0 CPRT ACTION PLAN 4.1   Scope and Methodology The Project Piping and Supports Program (PPSP) together with the Design Adequacy Program (DAP) includes provisions for significant piping re-analysis and associated support requalification.
l action plan. Where appropriate, they will be addressed during implementation of the Design Adequacy Program.
4.0 CPRT ACTION PLAN 4.1 Scope and Methodology The Project Piping and Supports Program (PPSP) together with the Design Adequacy Program (DAP) includes provisions for significant piping re-analysis and associated support requalification.
As such, it is prudent to address the major concerns of issue V.c within the PPSP and DAP. The scope of this action plan will therefore be limited to the following activities:
As such, it is prudent to address the major concerns of issue V.c within the PPSP and DAP. The scope of this action plan will therefore be limited to the following activities:
4.1.1   Idantification of all Unit 1, 2 and common, piping which has a seismic /non-seismic interface.
4.1.1 Idantification of all Unit 1, 2 and common, piping which has a seismic /non-seismic interface.
4.1.2 A review and discussion of the events related to and the reasons for the auxiliary steam pipe situation on which this issue is based.
4.1.2 A review and discussion of the events related to and the reasons for the auxiliary steam pipe situation on which this issue is based.
4.1.3   Recommendations to the PPSP and/or the DAP based on 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. Specifically, these will address any potential implications which should be considered during the PPSP and DAP implementation.
4.1.3 Recommendations to the PPSP and/or the DAP based on 4.1.1 and 4.1.2.
                                                                                                              - - - - - . . - - - -          - - - - _ - - - ~ -
Specifically, these will address any potential implications which should be considered during the PPSP and DAP implementation.
4 m
- - - - _ - - - ~ -


Revision:     1 Page'. 4 of 6 ITEN KUMBER V.c (Cont'd) 1 4.0 CPRT ACTION PLAN (Cont'd) 4.1.4 Preparation of Rosalte Report incorporating 4.1.1 and 4.1.3.
Revision:
1 Page'.
4 of 6 ITEN KUMBER V.c (Cont'd) 1 4.0 CPRT ACTION PLAN (Cont'd) 4.1.4 Preparation of Rosalte Report incorporating 4.1.1 and 4.1.3.
The work scope for item 4.1.1 is separated into two groups:
The work scope for item 4.1.1 is separated into two groups:
: a.            Safety related (i.e. ASME Class 1, 2 or 3) piping which is not high or moderate energy, and which was initially within the scope of the CPPE organization on site.
Safety related (i.e. ASME Class 1, 2 or 3) piping which a.
: b.           All other piping.
is not high or moderate energy, and which was initially within the scope of the CPPE organization on site.
                                        "his distinction is made because of the division of responsibility for qualifying the piping. Group (b) is
b.
:ypically large bore piping with some small bore (2" and under) piping which is high or moderate energy.               It is the piping initially within the Gibbs & Hill scope offsite. The number of piping runs in group (a) is very large, and the subset which includes seismic to non-seismic interface is also
All other piping.
:                                      substantial. Group (b) has approximately 300 piping runs per unit. Piping with seismic to non-seismic interfaces is a
"his distinction is made because of the division of responsibility for qualifying the piping. Group (b) is
}(/                                    small subset of the approximately 300 piping runs.
:ypically large bore piping with some small bore (2" and under) piping which is high or moderate energy.
It is the piping initially within the Gibbs & Hill scope offsite. The number of piping runs in group (a) is very large, and the subset which includes seismic to non-seismic interface is also substantial. Group (b) has approximately 300 piping runs per
}(/
Piping with seismic to non-seismic interfaces is a unit.
small subset of the approximately 300 piping runs.
Item 4.1.1 will include:
Item 4.1.1 will include:
Category I piping entering a non-Category I building Piping with a class change from Category I to non-Category I in the piping run 4                                          -
Category I piping entering a non-Category I building Piping with a class change from Category I to non-Category I in the piping run Piping runs with attached piping (i.e. small branch 4
Piping runs with attached piping (i.e. small branch runs) which have a class change NN3 piping runs which have a portion which is seismically analyzed to postulate breaks 4.2 Participants Roles and Responsibilities j
runs) which have a class change NN3 piping runs which have a portion which is seismically analyzed to postulate breaks 4.2 Participants Roles and Responsibilities The organizations and personnel that will participate in this j
The organizations and personnel that will participate in this effort are described below with their respective scopes of work.
effort are described below with their respective scopes of work.
I 4.2.1         Comanche Peak Project Engineering 4.2.1.1     Scope Identify seismic piping systems with non-seismic ir.terfaces for site scope.
I 4.2.1 Comanche Peak Project Engineering 4.2.1.1 Scope Identify seismic piping systems with non-seismic ir.terfaces for site scope.
        , , , . -    . c.                 . - ,      _ _ , ,        -
c.


Revision:     1 Page   5 of 6 ITEM NUMBER V.c (Cont'd) 4.0 CPRT ACTION PLAN (Cont'd)
Revision:
1 Page 5 of 6 ITEM NUMBER V.c (Cont'd) 4.0 CPRT ACTION PLAN (Cont'd)
Review and provide comumentary on auxiliary steam pipe situation.
Review and provide comumentary on auxiliary steam pipe situation.
Assist in preparation of Recults Report including reconstendations to,   ;
Assist in preparation of Recults Report including reconstendations to, the PPSP ar.d/or the DAP.
the PPSP ar.d/or the DAP.               l 4.2.1.2   Personnel Mr. C. Moehlman             Project Mechanical Engineer Mr. H. Harrison             Technical Services Supervisor 4.2.2 Gibbs & Hill, Inc., New York, New York 4.2.2.1   Scope Assist CPPE in identifying seismic piping systems with non-seismic interfaces (for specific scope of piping analysis problems).
l 4.2.1.2 Personnel Mr. C. Moehlman Project Mechanical Engineer Mr. H. Harrison Technical Services Supervisor 4.2.2 Gibbs & Hill, Inc., New York, New York 4.2.2.1 Scope Assist CPPE in identifying seismic piping systems with non-seismic interfaces (for specific scope of piping analysis problems).
Assist CPPE in review of auxiliary steam pipe situation.
Assist CPPE in review of auxiliary steam pipe situation.
i 4.2.2.2   Personnel Mr. H. Mentel               Applied Mechanics Supervisor 4.2.3 Third-Party Overview 4.2.3.1   Scope Evaluate commentary on auxiliary steam pipe situation.
4.2.2.2 Personnel i
Mr. H. Mentel Applied Mechanics Supervisor 4.2.3 Third-Party Overview 4.2.3.1 Scope Evaluate commentary on auxiliary steam pipe situation.
Prepare Results Report including recomunendations to the PPSP and/or the DAP.
Prepare Results Report including recomunendations to the PPSP and/or the DAP.
4.2.3.2   Personnel Mr. H. A. Levin             TERA CPR1/ Structural Review Tesa Leader m
4.2.3.2 Personnel Mr. H. A. Levin TERA CPR1/ Structural Review Tesa Leader m


Ravision:     1 Page   6 of 6 ITEN NUMBER V.c (Cont'd) 4.0 CPRT ACTION PLAN (Cont'd)
Ravision:
Dr. J. R. Honekamp TERA TRT Issues Manager Mr.' P. Streeter   TERA Senior Mechanical Engineer Dr.' C. Mortgat     TERA Senior' Structural Engineer 4.3 Personnel Qualification Requirements Participants in the implementation of this action plan meet the personnel qualification requirements of the Program Plan or the CPSES Quality Assurance Prograu as applicable.
1 Page 6 of 6 ITEN NUMBER V.c (Cont'd) 4.0 CPRT ACTION PLAN (Cont'd)
4.4 Standards / Acceptance Criteria                       .
Dr. J. R. Honekamp TERA TRT Issues Manager Mr.' P. Streeter TERA Senior Mechanical Engineer Dr.' C. Mortgat TERA Senior' Structural Engineer 4.3 Personnel Qualification Requirements Participants in the implementation of this action plan meet the personnel qualification requirements of the Program Plan or the CPSES Quality Assurance Prograu as applicable.
Compliance with FSAR Section 3.7B.3.13 will be assessed during PPSP and DAP implementation. Recommendations to the PPSP and/or the DAP associated with compliance will be identified as part of this action plan.
4.4 Standards / Acceptance Criteria Compliance with FSAR Section 3.7B.3.13 will be assessed during PPSP and DAP implementation.
5.0 SCHEDULE Identification of Piping Population:             Completed l
Recommendations to the PPSP and/or the DAP associated with compliance will be identified as part of this action plan.
Review of Auxiliary Steam Pipe Situation         06/28/85 Results Report:                                   07/08/85 1
5.0 SCHEDULE Identification of Piping Population:
Completed l
Review of Auxiliary Steam Pipe Situation 06/28/85 Results Report:
07/08/85 1
1
1


CPSES/FSAR The pertinent quality assurance requirements of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 are applied to all activities affecting the safety-related I
CPSES/FSAR The pertinent quality assurance requirements of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 are applied to all activities affecting the safety-related I functions of these structures, systems, and components as shown in Table 17A-1.
functions of these structures, systems, and components as shown in Table 17A-1.
3.2.l.1.1 Seismic Category I Structures 1.
3.2.l.1.1     Seismic Category I Structures
Containment Buildings including internal structures 2.
: 1. Containment Buildings including internal structures
Safeguards Buildings including diesel generator room and emergency switchgear room 3.
: 2. Safeguards Buildings including diesel generator room and emergency switchgear room
Auxiliary Building 4.
: 3.     Auxiliary Building
Electrical and Control Building 5.
: 4.     Electrical and Control Building
Fuel Building 6.
: 5. Fuel Building
Service Water Intake Structure 7.
: 6. Service Water Intake Structure
Safe Shutdown Impoundment Dam 8.
: 7. Safe Shutdown Impoundment Dam
;              8.
Refueling Water Storage Tanks and Associated Piping Tunnels 9.
Refueling Water Storage Tanks and Associated Piping Tunnels 9.
(    18              Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tanks and Associated Piping Tunnels
Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tanks and Associated Piping Tunnels
:              10. Condensate Storage Tanks and Associated Piping Tunnels
(
18 10.
Condensate Storage Tanks and Associated Piping Tunnels
(
(
3.2.1.1.2       Seismic Category I Mechanical Systems and Components 7
3.2.1.1.2 Seismic Category I Mechanical Systems and Components 7
All, or portions, of the following mechanical systems or components are seismic Category I as described in Appendix 17A and Table 17A-1:
All, or portions, of the following mechanical systems or components are seismic Category I as described in Appendix 17A and Table 17A-1:
l k
l k
A E NOMENT 18 APRIL 21, 1981                           3.2-2                               -
A E NOMENT 18 APRIL 21, 1981 3.2-2 3
3


(.          .
(.
CPSES/FSAR                                               ,
CPSES/FSAR i
i a
a
(.   )               17A SYSTEM NO.                                                   SYSTEM
(.
: 1.                       Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
)
:2.                         ChemicalandVolumeControlSystem(CVCS)                                                                                                 +
17A SYSTEM NO.
                    ~3.                         Boron Thennal. Regeneration Subsystem (BTRS)                                                                                         *
SYSTEM 1.
: 4.                       Safety Injection System (SIS)
Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
: 5.                       Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System
:2.
: 6.                       Baron Recycle System (BRS)
ChemicalandVolumeControlSystem(CVCS)
: 7.                       Containment Spray System (CSS) 7
+
('                 8.                       Containment Isolation System
~3.
                  '9.                         Combustible Gas Control System
Boron Thennal. Regeneration Subsystem (BTRS) 4.
: 10.                     Component Cooling Water System (CCWS)
Safety Injection System (SIS) 5.
: 11.                     Station Service Water System (SSWS)
Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System 6.
: 12.                     Main Steam, Reheat and Steam Dump System 4
Baron Recycle System (BRS) 7.
Containment Spray System (CSS) 7
('
8.
Containment Isolation System
'9.
Combustible Gas Control System 10.
Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) 11.
Station Service Water System (SSWS) 12.
Main Steam, Reheat and Steam Dump System 4
?
?
: 13.                     Auxiliary Feedwater System
13.
: 14.                     Steam Generator Feedwater System
Auxiliary Feedwater System 14.
: 15.                     Diesel Generator, Fuel 011, and Auxiliary Systems
Steam Generator Feedwater System 15.
: 16.                     Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System d
Diesel Generator, Fuel 011, and Auxiliary Systems 16.
: 3. 2 -3                                                                           JANUARY 31, 1980
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System d
_ . _ - - _ _ _ _ . . , , -- . ,- __._-___.-__--            . . _ _ _ _        , _ , , , , , , _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ . _ ,                  _m-
: 3. 2 -3 JANUARY 31, 1980
_m-


t .-   .
t.-
CPSES/FSAR
CPSES/FSAR
{17.
{17.
1.iquid Waste Processing System (LWPS)         *
1.iquid Waste Processing System (LWPS)
              "18.
"18.
Gaseous Waste Processing Syston (GWPS) 20.
Gaseous Waste Processing Syston (GWPS) 20.
Demineralized Water Makeup System
Demineralized Water Makeup System
              .'2,1. Vents and Drains System
.'2,1.
: 22.     Containment Ventilation Systems
Vents and Drains System 22.
* 23.
Containment Ventilation Systems 23.
Control Room Air-Conditioning System 24 Safeguards Building HVAC System 25.
Control Room Air-Conditioning System 24 Safeguards Building HVAC System 25.
Fuel Building Ventilation System 7       26.
Fuel Building Ventilation System 7
26.
Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System 27.
Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System 27.
Uncontrolled Access Area Ventilation System 28.
Uncontrolled Access Area Ventilation System 28.
Primary Plant Ventilation System
Primary Plant Ventilation System 29.
: 29.       Auxiliary Building HVAC System 30.
Auxiliary Building HVAC System 30.
Service Water Intake Structure Ventilation System
Service Water Intake Structure Ventilation System 31.
: 31.       Chilled Water Systems
Chilled Water Systems 32.
: 32.         Process Sampling System
Process Sampling System 33.
: 33.         Fuel Handling Equipment
Fuel Handling Equipment 34.
: 34.       Containment Equipment JANUARY 31, 1980                         3.2-4                   k
Containment Equipment JANUARY 31, 1980 3.2-4 k


i i
i i
CPSES/FSAR                           .
CPSES/FSAR
(-         35.
(-
* Miscellaneous Handling Equipment
35.
: 40.     Plant Gas System 7
Miscellaneous Handling Equipment 40.
: 42.       Tornado Venting Components
Plant Gas System 7
: 45. ' Potable and Sanitary Water System                                         12 9
42.
: 49.     Pipe Whip Restraints 3.2.1.1.3         Seismic Category I Electrical Systems and Components All, or portions, of the following electrical systems or components are seismic Category I as described in Appendix 17A and Table 17A-1:
Tornado Venting Components
: 45. ' Potable and Sanitary Water System 12 9
49.
Pipe Whip Restraints 3.2.1.1.3 Seismic Category I Electrical Systems and Components All, or portions, of the following electrical systems or components are seismic Category I as described in Appendix 17A and Table 17A-1:
17A SYSTEM NO.
17A SYSTEM NO.
SYSTEM
SYSTEM
(
(
37       Electrical Equipment
37 Electrical Equipment 38.
: 38.       Radiation Monitoring System
Radiation Monitoring System 41.
: 41.       Instrumentation and Control Equipment 3.2.1.1.4         Structures and Systems of Mixed Category None of the plant structures are classified as partially seismic Category I.       The boundaries of seismic Category I portions of systems are shown on the piping and instrumentation diagrams in appropriate sections of the FSAR.
Instrumentation and Control Equipment 3.2.1.1.4 Structures and Systems of Mixed Category None of the plant structures are classified as partially seismic Category I.
3.2.1.2         Seism,1c Category II 12 Those portions of systems or components whose continuec function is not required but whose failure could reduce the functioning of any seismic Category I system or component required to satisfy the requirements of
The boundaries of seismic Category I portions of systems are shown on the piping and instrumentation diagrams in appropriate sections of the FSAR.
(                                                 M%
3.2.1.2 Seism,1c Category II 12 Those portions of systems or components whose continuec function is not required but whose failure could reduce the functioning of any seismic Category I system or component required to satisfy the requirements of
 
(
    , e
M%
* 6 h      e e
* 6
ao       6o fdV f   5;rfe4W                                                                                 Yo                 _ _ _ _
, e h
ckye         TA~ , .
e e
71-         S~y hr               oms ~                                   5++/
ao 6o fdV f 5;rfe4W Yo ckye TA~,.
0"% N*y                                              9 i.T               lt$7                   /ish   w/ pi>Wr/O A C beh-                 meIAua r                                    - cPPe G.k Keller
71-S~y hr oms ~
                                                                                                            &Pr e               '
5++/
M 've / ben                                 w             -
9
o no (y ec c a f                     Ops
.T lt$7
                ~ ~ - ' ' ' ' *
/ish w/ pi>Wr/O A 0"% N*y i
                                          .=%.     . .-                              .,e=
C beh-meIAua
>***"*~~*=~~**-.mem.~..                       .n _.            . . . .    .      . . . _.__ ,                              _
- cPPe r
p--                                                     _ . _ _            _ . _ . . . . . _ _      . _ . _ .  . . . . . . _ _ _ _ .      .    .          _ ..}}
G.k Keller
&Pr e M 've
/ ben w o no (y ec c a f Ops
~ ~ - ' ' ' ' *
.=%.
.,e=
>***"*~~*=~~**-.mem.~..
.n p--
_. -. - -}}

Latest revision as of 08:02, 10 December 2024

Rev 1 to Comanche Peak Response Team Action Plan,Item V.C, Design Consideration for Piping Sys Between Seismic Category I & Non-Seismic Category I Bldg
ML20199E130
Person / Time
Site: Comanche Peak  Luminant icon.png
Issue date: 06/26/1985
From:
NRC - COMANCHE PEAK PROJECT (TECHNICAL REVIEW TEAM)
To:
Shared Package
ML20199D912 List: ... further results
References
FOIA-86-36 PROC-850626, NUDOCS 8606230196
Download: ML20199E130 (12)


Text

.

COMANCHE PEAK RESPONSE TEAM ACTION PLAN Item Number: V.c Design Consideration for Piping Systems Between Seismic Category I and Non-Seismic Category I Buildings Revision No.

0 1

[.

Revised to Reflec';

Description Original Issue NRC Consnents Prepared and Recommended by:

/ ',' / q Review Team Leader 4 ihM M

Date 31 8(

f(

I Approved by:

Senior Review Team CMW. b

_ A).

/

pace Nlr/tr 6l26ltf 8606230196 860609 PDR FOIA GARDE 86-36 PDR

Revision:

1 Page 1 of 6 ITEM NUMBER V.c Design Consideration for Piping Systems Between Seismic Category I ard Non-Seismic Category I Buildings

1.0 DESCRIPTION

OF ISSUE IDENTIFIED BY NRC l

In April, 1984 the Comanche Peak Special Review Team'(SRT). formed and coordinated between NRR. IE and Region II and IV, performed a limited revier of Comanche Peak. The TRT. in reviewing the SRT findings in the area of' piping design considerations ~. has i

discovered that piping systems, such as Main Steam. Auxiliary Steaa and Feedvater, are routed from the Electrical Control Building (seismic category I) to the Turbine Building (non-seismic Category I) without any isolation. To be acceptable, each seismic Category

{

I piping system should be isolated from any non-seismic Category I t

piping system by separation, barrier or constraint.

If isolation is not feasible, then the effect on the seismic Category I piping of the failure in the non-seismic Category I i

piping must be considered (CPSES FSAR 3.7B.3-13.1).

For CPSES. FSAR Section 3.7B.2.8 establishes that the Turbine Building is a non-seismic Category I structure and failure is postulated during a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). The effect of Turbine Building failure on any non-isolated piping routed through i

the Turbine Building from any seismic Category I building must be considered.

In addition, for non-seismic Category I piping connected to seismic Category I piping, the dynamic effects of the non-seismic Category I piping must be considered in the seismic design of the seismic Category I piping and supports, unless TUEC can show that the i

dynamic effects of the non-seismic Category I piping are isolated I

by anchors or restraints. The anchors or restraints used for isolation purposes must be designed to withstand the combined loading imposed by both the seismic Category I and non-seismic Category I piping.

2.0 ACTION IDENTIFIED BY NRC Accordingly. TUEC shall provide analysis and documentation that the piping systems routed from seismic Category I to non-seismic Category I buildings meet the stated FSAR criteria.

t i

,.n.-----

I Revision:-

1 Page 2 of 6 4

ITEM NUMBER V.c (Cont'd)

3.0 BACKGROUND

3.1 Information Supplementina NRC Description of Issue TUGC0 couaitted in the FSAR ti provide isolation between seismic Category I piping system and non-seismic piping systems by using anchors or seismic restraints. The methods used to implement the FSAR commitaant differ depending on such parameters as pipe size. location with respect to seismic buildings and location of isolation valves.

Some piping systems have active valves installed at or near the boundary between the seismic and non-seismic portions of the piping run.

Furthermore, it is common practice to install an anchor or soment restraint directly to the Category I building structures or indirectly through intervening steel structures.

Other piping systems are seismically isolated by using an anchor, acaent restraint, or a series of supports. The anchors and acaent restraints are designed for the combined load imposed by the piping on each side of the device. The seismically qualified portion has a calculated set of loads.

The loads from the non-seismic piping are estimated, Where a series of supports is used to isolate the piping, two approaches were employed for determining the loads. First, for larger piping, the practice is generally to locate additional supports in the non-seismic portion of the system and extend the piping model to include that additional section of piping. The additional supports in the extented region (i.e. non-seismic portion) are designed to carry those loads.

Secondly, for small bore piping, loads are estimated based on a presumed span in the non-seismic piping which would establish a simply calculated fundamental frequency that maximizes the seismic response.

In the specific situation, first identified by the TRT a portion of auxiliary steam system piping was routed from a seismic Category I building to a non-Category I building. The piping in question was all non-nuclear safety (NNS) piping (i.e. non-Category 1 piping); however, the piping was classified as high energy piping. The FSAR provides an optional criteria for evaluation of postulated pipe ruptures which can be applied to high energy NNS piping which is seismically analyzed. That option was selected for the noted portion of auxiliary steam piping resulting in a seismic analysis. As initially configured, the support system included an ar.chor to isolate the seismically analyzed portion from the portion which extended into the non-Category I building. At a later date, the device was deleted to l

.-w--.,%---

___.,.e.-,

,.,_,.m

_..-%._,-,--._,,,,,,,w.,..-__--.e,,y-

.--,,----,---e--.--

Revision:

1 Page 3 of 6 ITEM NUMBER V.c (Cont'd) 3.0 BACKGROUND (Cont'd) alleviate thermal expansion stresses in a portion of the piping. The requirement to retain the seismic isolation was not clear, because none of the piping was Category I.

Although the specific issue raised by the TRT deals with Catego:y I' systems, based on the situation discussed above the scope of the issue is considered to include any piping system with a seismic analysis boundary. This includes a seismic class change from Category I to non-Category I, but also includes any system in which the seismic model is terminated within a piping run or branch.

3.2 Preliminary Determination of Root Cause and Generic Implications The preliminary reviews conducted to date have not identified a root cause to this item. Because of the nature of this action plan, the Design,d.squacy Program, and the Project Piping and Supports ProE m (see 4.1 below). root cause and f

generic implications will c : be identified as part of this c

l action plan. Where appropriate, they will be addressed during implementation of the Design Adequacy Program.

4.0 CPRT ACTION PLAN 4.1 Scope and Methodology The Project Piping and Supports Program (PPSP) together with the Design Adequacy Program (DAP) includes provisions for significant piping re-analysis and associated support requalification.

As such, it is prudent to address the major concerns of issue V.c within the PPSP and DAP. The scope of this action plan will therefore be limited to the following activities:

4.1.1 Idantification of all Unit 1, 2 and common, piping which has a seismic /non-seismic interface.

4.1.2 A review and discussion of the events related to and the reasons for the auxiliary steam pipe situation on which this issue is based.

4.1.3 Recommendations to the PPSP and/or the DAP based on 4.1.1 and 4.1.2.

Specifically, these will address any potential implications which should be considered during the PPSP and DAP implementation.

4 m

- - - - _ - - - ~ -

Revision:

1 Page'.

4 of 6 ITEN KUMBER V.c (Cont'd) 1 4.0 CPRT ACTION PLAN (Cont'd) 4.1.4 Preparation of Rosalte Report incorporating 4.1.1 and 4.1.3.

The work scope for item 4.1.1 is separated into two groups:

Safety related (i.e. ASME Class 1, 2 or 3) piping which a.

is not high or moderate energy, and which was initially within the scope of the CPPE organization on site.

b.

All other piping.

"his distinction is made because of the division of responsibility for qualifying the piping. Group (b) is

ypically large bore piping with some small bore (2" and under) piping which is high or moderate energy.

It is the piping initially within the Gibbs & Hill scope offsite. The number of piping runs in group (a) is very large, and the subset which includes seismic to non-seismic interface is also substantial. Group (b) has approximately 300 piping runs per

}(/

Piping with seismic to non-seismic interfaces is a unit.

small subset of the approximately 300 piping runs.

Item 4.1.1 will include:

Category I piping entering a non-Category I building Piping with a class change from Category I to non-Category I in the piping run Piping runs with attached piping (i.e. small branch 4

runs) which have a class change NN3 piping runs which have a portion which is seismically analyzed to postulate breaks 4.2 Participants Roles and Responsibilities The organizations and personnel that will participate in this j

effort are described below with their respective scopes of work.

I 4.2.1 Comanche Peak Project Engineering 4.2.1.1 Scope Identify seismic piping systems with non-seismic ir.terfaces for site scope.

c.

Revision:

1 Page 5 of 6 ITEM NUMBER V.c (Cont'd) 4.0 CPRT ACTION PLAN (Cont'd)

Review and provide comumentary on auxiliary steam pipe situation.

Assist in preparation of Recults Report including reconstendations to, the PPSP ar.d/or the DAP.

l 4.2.1.2 Personnel Mr. C. Moehlman Project Mechanical Engineer Mr. H. Harrison Technical Services Supervisor 4.2.2 Gibbs & Hill, Inc., New York, New York 4.2.2.1 Scope Assist CPPE in identifying seismic piping systems with non-seismic interfaces (for specific scope of piping analysis problems).

Assist CPPE in review of auxiliary steam pipe situation.

4.2.2.2 Personnel i

Mr. H. Mentel Applied Mechanics Supervisor 4.2.3 Third-Party Overview 4.2.3.1 Scope Evaluate commentary on auxiliary steam pipe situation.

Prepare Results Report including recomunendations to the PPSP and/or the DAP.

4.2.3.2 Personnel Mr. H. A. Levin TERA CPR1/ Structural Review Tesa Leader m

Ravision:

1 Page 6 of 6 ITEN NUMBER V.c (Cont'd) 4.0 CPRT ACTION PLAN (Cont'd)

Dr. J. R. Honekamp TERA TRT Issues Manager Mr.' P. Streeter TERA Senior Mechanical Engineer Dr.' C. Mortgat TERA Senior' Structural Engineer 4.3 Personnel Qualification Requirements Participants in the implementation of this action plan meet the personnel qualification requirements of the Program Plan or the CPSES Quality Assurance Prograu as applicable.

4.4 Standards / Acceptance Criteria Compliance with FSAR Section 3.7B.3.13 will be assessed during PPSP and DAP implementation.

Recommendations to the PPSP and/or the DAP associated with compliance will be identified as part of this action plan.

5.0 SCHEDULE Identification of Piping Population:

Completed l

Review of Auxiliary Steam Pipe Situation 06/28/85 Results Report:

07/08/85 1

1

CPSES/FSAR The pertinent quality assurance requirements of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 are applied to all activities affecting the safety-related I functions of these structures, systems, and components as shown in Table 17A-1.

3.2.l.1.1 Seismic Category I Structures 1.

Containment Buildings including internal structures 2.

Safeguards Buildings including diesel generator room and emergency switchgear room 3.

Auxiliary Building 4.

Electrical and Control Building 5.

Fuel Building 6.

Service Water Intake Structure 7.

Safe Shutdown Impoundment Dam 8.

Refueling Water Storage Tanks and Associated Piping Tunnels 9.

Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tanks and Associated Piping Tunnels

(

18 10.

Condensate Storage Tanks and Associated Piping Tunnels

(

3.2.1.1.2 Seismic Category I Mechanical Systems and Components 7

All, or portions, of the following mechanical systems or components are seismic Category I as described in Appendix 17A and Table 17A-1:

l k

A E NOMENT 18 APRIL 21, 1981 3.2-2 3

(.

CPSES/FSAR i

a

(.

)

17A SYSTEM NO.

SYSTEM 1.

Reactor Coolant System (RCS)

2.

ChemicalandVolumeControlSystem(CVCS)

+

~3.

Boron Thennal. Regeneration Subsystem (BTRS) 4.

Safety Injection System (SIS) 5.

Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System 6.

Baron Recycle System (BRS) 7.

Containment Spray System (CSS) 7

('

8.

Containment Isolation System

'9.

Combustible Gas Control System 10.

Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) 11.

Station Service Water System (SSWS) 12.

Main Steam, Reheat and Steam Dump System 4

?

13.

Auxiliary Feedwater System 14.

Steam Generator Feedwater System 15.

Diesel Generator, Fuel 011, and Auxiliary Systems 16.

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System d

3. 2 -3 JANUARY 31, 1980

_m-

t.-

CPSES/FSAR

{17.

1.iquid Waste Processing System (LWPS)

"18.

Gaseous Waste Processing Syston (GWPS) 20.

Demineralized Water Makeup System

.'2,1.

Vents and Drains System 22.

Containment Ventilation Systems 23.

Control Room Air-Conditioning System 24 Safeguards Building HVAC System 25.

Fuel Building Ventilation System 7

26.

Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System 27.

Uncontrolled Access Area Ventilation System 28.

Primary Plant Ventilation System 29.

Auxiliary Building HVAC System 30.

Service Water Intake Structure Ventilation System 31.

Chilled Water Systems 32.

Process Sampling System 33.

Fuel Handling Equipment 34.

Containment Equipment JANUARY 31, 1980 3.2-4 k

i i

CPSES/FSAR

(-

35.

Miscellaneous Handling Equipment 40.

Plant Gas System 7

42.

Tornado Venting Components

45. ' Potable and Sanitary Water System 12 9

49.

Pipe Whip Restraints 3.2.1.1.3 Seismic Category I Electrical Systems and Components All, or portions, of the following electrical systems or components are seismic Category I as described in Appendix 17A and Table 17A-1:

17A SYSTEM NO.

SYSTEM

(

37 Electrical Equipment 38.

Radiation Monitoring System 41.

Instrumentation and Control Equipment 3.2.1.1.4 Structures and Systems of Mixed Category None of the plant structures are classified as partially seismic Category I.

The boundaries of seismic Category I portions of systems are shown on the piping and instrumentation diagrams in appropriate sections of the FSAR.

3.2.1.2 Seism,1c Category II 12 Those portions of systems or components whose continuec function is not required but whose failure could reduce the functioning of any seismic Category I system or component required to satisfy the requirements of

(

M%

  • 6

, e h

e e

ao 6o fdV f 5;rfe4W Yo ckye TA~,.

71-S~y hr oms ~

5++/

9

.T lt$7

/ish w/ pi>Wr/O A 0"% N*y i

C beh-meIAua

- cPPe r

G.k Keller

&Pr e M 've

/ ben w o no (y ec c a f Ops

~ ~ - ' ' ' ' *

.=%.

.,e=

>***"*~~*=~~**-.mem.~..

.n p--

_. -. - -