Information Notice 1998-07, Offsite Power Reliability Challenges from Industry Deregulation: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:X 71 C sa'UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
{{#Wiki_filter:X 71 C sa'
                                            UNITED STATES


COMMISSION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION===
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 February 27, 1998 NRC INFORMATION


NOTICE 98-07: OFFSITE POWER RELIABILITY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 February 27, 1998 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 98-07: OFFSITE POWER RELIABILITY CHALLENGES FROM


CHALLENGES
INDUSTRY DEREGULATION
 
===FROM INDUSTRY DEREGULATION===


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
All holders of operating
All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors except those who have ceased
 
licenses for nuclear power reactors except those who have ceased operations
 
and have certified
 
that fuel has been permanently


removed from the vessel.
operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the vessel.


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alert
 
Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
 
notice to alert addressees
 
to a potential
 
concern relating to electric power industry deregulation
 
that could adversely
 
affect the reliability
 
of offsite power sources, i.e., power from the transmission
 
system grid to nuclear power plants. It is expected that recipients
 
will review the information
 
for applicability
 
to their facilities
 
and consider actions, as appropriate.
 
===However, suggestions===
contained
 
in this information
 
notice are not NRC requirements;
therefore, no specific action or written response to this notice is required.Description
 
of Circumstances
 
On July 11, 1989, safety systems at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station experienced
 
a sustained degraded voltage condition
 
and as a result the safety buses were automatically
 
transferred
 
from the offsite power system to onsite standby diesel generators.
 
The degraded condition
 
was caused by a turbine trip and deficiencies
 
in the offsite power system's transmission
 
network equipment.
 
The transfer of power supplies was initiated
 
by operation
 
of degraded voltage protective
 
relays, as designed.
 
Non-safety
 
system loads remained operable while being powered for approximately
 
1 hour from the degraded offsite power source. (LER 50-395/89-012)
On November 5, 1991, the licensee for Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 reported that, had its 500kV auto-transformer
 
been lost during summer peak conditions, the 161kV system might not have been able to maintain adequate voltages to support the operation
 
of the safety system loads of both units. (LER 50-313/91-010)
On April 15, 1992, Northeast
 
Nuclear Energy Company reported that under certain operating conditions
 
of the transmission
 
network (i.e., during heavy load conditions), a failure of transmission
 
system equipment
 
may cause a trip of all three Millstone
 
units and a loss of offsite power to the station. This operating
 
condition
 
was precipitated
 
by the economic displacement
 
of oil-fired
 
generating
 
units by non-utility
 
generators
 
and by the addition of other generating
 
capacity (Seabrook
 
and Hydro-Quebec)
to the transmission
 
network. (LER 50-245/92-020)
?PD 1re-F Normf, 1g-0o7 80a.2 7 q ~ r 1l~lill~lill~lill~lililuill1!\i
 
IN -07 February 27, 1998 On April 14, 1993, Wisconsin
 
Public Service Corporation
 
reported that under certain transmission
 
line contingencies, a potential
 
existed for the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant grid to become unstable and cause all offsite power sources into the plant to trip. (Ref: LER 50-305/93-010)
On December 30, 1993, Northeast
 
Nuclear Energy Company reported that under certain operating
 
conditions
 
of the transmission
 
network (i.e., Millstone
 
Units 2 and 3 off line), the transmission
 
network may not have sufficient
 
capacity to permit the continued
 
operation
 
of safety system loads from offsite sources following
 
a trip of Millstone
 
Unit 1. (LER 50-245/94-001)
On August 8, 1995, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) reported that under certain operating
 
conditions (i.e., a high system load with a specific 230kV transmission
 
line out of service), the transmission
 
network may not have sufficient
 
capacity to permit the continued operation
 
of the safety system loads from offsite sources following
 
a trip of one of the two Diablo Canyon units. (Ref: LER 50-275/95-007)
On August 10, 1996, a transmission
 
line sagged into a tree in Oregon creating a ground fault that progressed
 
into a major fault on the western Interconnection.
 
The subsequent
 
transient
 
resulted in the tripping of both Diablo Canyon, Units 1 and 2 (LER 50-275/96-012)
and Palo Verde, Units 1 and 3 (LER 50-528/004).
 
During the summer of 1997, concerns were expressed
 
about the impact of electric peak conditions
 
on the offsite power sources for nuclear power plants located in the Midwest and New England. In addition, the licensee for Clinton nuclear station sought an exemption
 
from offsite power regulatory
 
requirements
 
because of its analysis that offsite power would become inadequate
 
under certain summer peak conditions
 
following
 
the loss of the nuclear unit.Recent NRC inspection
 
findings and Licensee Event Reports have indicated
 
instances
 
when grid stability
 
analyses had not been updated by the licensees
 
to reflect changes in the grid power system. Office for Analysis and Evaluation
 
of Operational
 
Data study C97-01, "Grid Performance
 
Factors" dated March 20, 1997, identified
 
a Oneed to monitor grid conditions
 
on a regular basis." Discussion
 
In 1988, NRC issued the station blackout (SBO) rule. The requirements
 
of 10 CFR 50.63, "Loss of All Alternating
 
Current Power," specify that each light-water-cooled
 
nuclear power plant be able to withstand
 
and recover from an SBO (i.e., a loss of offsite and onsite emergency
 
ac power sources) for a specified
 
period. The NRC review of licensees'
analyses to assess the vulnerability
 
of offsite power and the time required for recovery indicated
 
that for most nuclear power plant sites the grid was stable and reliable.Historically, grid control is decentralized
 
and each utility or a small group of utilities
 
forms a control area containing
 
customers
 
for which it Is jurisdictionally


responsible.
addressees to a potential concern relating to electric power industry deregulation that could


The control areas form reliability
adversely affect the reliability of offsite power sources, i.e., power from the transmission system


councils that establish
grid to nuclear power plants. It is expected that recipients will review the information for


operating
applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate. However, suggestions


standards
contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or


by consensus.
written response to this notice is required.


These agreements, in turn, became the factors that determine
==Description of Circumstances==
On July 11, 1989, safety systems at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station experienced a sustained


the reliability
degraded voltage condition and as a result the safety buses were automatically transferred from


of the grid and the bases for the availability
the offsite power system to onsite standby diesel generators. The degraded condition was


of the offsite power system. Although the grid operating
caused by a turbine trip and deficiencies in the offsite power system's transmission network


standards
equipment. The transfer of power supplies was initiated by operation of degraded voltage


that evolved in the past provided reasonable
protective relays, as designed. Non-safety system loads remained operable while being powered


grid reliability, events like those discussed
for approximately 1 hour from the degraded offsite power source. (LER 50-395/89-012)
On November 5, 1991, the licensee for Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 reported that, had


herein reveal vulnerabilities
its 500kV auto-transformer been lost during summer peak conditions, the 161kV system might


of the electrical
not have been able to maintain adequate voltages to support the operation of the safety system


grid either through actual challenges
loads of both units. (LER 50-313/91-010)
On April 15, 1992, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company reported that under certain operating


or through licensee's
conditions of the transmission network (i.e., during heavy load conditions), a failure of


analyses to assess the adequacy of the offsite power system.
transmission system equipment may cause a trip of all three Millstone units and a loss of offsite


INS '7 Feb,--dry
power to the station. This operating condition was precipitated by the economic displacement


27, 1998 The present grid management
of oil-fired generating units by non-utility generators and by the addition of other generating


may be dismantled
capacity (Seabrook and Hydro-Quebec) to the transmission network. (LER 50-245/92-020)
                  ?PD 1re-F Normf, 1g-0o7 80a.2 7 q~ r                                      1l~lill~lill~lill~lililuill1!\i


or restructured
IN -07 February 27, 1998 On April 14, 1993, Wisconsin Public Service Corporation reported that under certain transmission


by two factors that are emerging:
line contingencies, a potential existed for the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant grid to become
non-utility


generation
unstable and cause all offsite power sources into the plant to trip. (Ref: LER 50-305/93-010)
On December 30, 1993, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company reported that under certain


and deregulation.
operating conditions of the transmission network (i.e., Millstone Units 2 and 3 off line), the


It Is anticipated
transmission network may not have sufficient capacity to permit the continued operation of safety


that in the future, power suppliers, whether utilities
system loads from offsite sources following a trip of Millstone Unit 1. (LER 50-245/94-001)
On August 8, 1995, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) reported that under certain


or independent
operating conditions (i.e., a high system load with a specific 230kV transmission line out of


power producers, will actively compete for sales to customers
service), the transmission network may not have sufficient capacity to permit the continued


who may be located anywhere on the power grid. This option creates multiple combinations
operation of the safety system loads from offsite sources following a trip of one of the two Diablo


of generating
Canyon units. (Ref: LER 50-275/95-007)
On August 10, 1996, a transmission line sagged into a tree in Oregon creating a ground fault that


units going on and off the grid based on economic and performance
progressed into a major fault on the western Interconnection. The subsequent transient resulted


related consequences.
in the tripping of both Diablo Canyon, Units 1 and 2 (LER 50-275/96-012) and Palo Verde, Units 1 and 3 (LER 50-528/004).


Regional grid control could be the responsibility
During the summer of 1997, concerns were expressed about the impact of electric peak


of centralized
conditions on the offsite power sources for nuclear power plants located in the Midwest and


independent
New England. In addition, the licensee for Clinton nuclear station sought an exemption from


system operators (ISOs). The responsibilities
offsite power regulatory requirements because of its analysis that offsite power would become


and authority
inadequate under certain summer peak conditions following the loss of the nuclear unit.


of an ISO are yet to be defined, but It is expected that the ISO, or a similar entity, will be charged with maintaining
Recent NRC inspection findings and Licensee Event Reports have indicated instances when grid


grid reliability
stability analyses had not been updated by the licensees to reflect changes in the grid power


to facilitate
system. Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data study C97-01, "Grid Performance


the marketing
Factors" dated March 20, 1997, identified a Oneed to monitor grid conditions on a regular basis."
Discussion


of power. It is uncertain
In 1988, NRC issued the station blackout (SBO) rule. The requirements of 10 CFR 50.63, "Loss


how the historic mechanisms
of All Alternating Current Power," specify that each light-water-cooled nuclear power plant be


for reliable operation
able to withstand and recover from an SBO (i.e., a loss of offsite and onsite emergency ac power


will change under the new grid operational
sources) for a specified period. The NRC review of licensees' analyses to assess the


structure.
vulnerability of offsite power and the time required for recovery indicated that for most nuclear


The Department
power plant sites the grid was stable and reliable.


of Energy has sponsored
Historically, grid control is decentralized and each utility or a small group of utilities forms a


a Task Force on Electric System Reliability
control area containing customers for which it Is jurisdictionally responsible. The control areas


to examine the implications
form reliability councils that establish operating standards by consensus. These agreements, in


of industry deregulation
turn, became the factors that determine the reliability of the grid and the bases for the availability


on the Nation's electric power supply.The capacity and capability
of the offsite power system. Although the grid operating standards that evolved in the past


of the offsite power system for each nuclear power plant could be significantly
provided reasonable grid reliability, events like those discussed herein reveal vulnerabilities of


influenced
the electrical grid either through actual challenges or through licensee's analyses to assess the


by the decisions
adequacy of the offsite power system.


emerging from these forthcoming
INS '7 Feb,--dry 27, 1998 The present grid management may be dismantled or restructured by two factors that are


changes. Since the capability
emerging: non-utility generation and deregulation. It Is anticipated that in the future, power


of the offsite power cannot be tested except when challenged
suppliers, whether utilities or independent power producers, will actively compete for sales to


in an actual event, the design bases of the offsite power can only be assured through an enveloping
customers who may be located anywhere on the power grid. This option creates multiple


analysis that accounts for the full spectrum of grid loading and transient
combinations of generating units going on and off the grid based on economic and performance


conditions
related consequences. Regional grid control could be the responsibility of centralized


that support the operability
independent system operators (ISOs). The responsibilities and authority of an ISO are yet to be


of safety systems. The NRC Standard Review Plan Section 8.2 provides current guidance for assessing
defined, but It is expected that the ISO, or a similar entity, will be charged with maintaining grid


the adequacy of the offsite power system. It addresses
reliability to facilitate the marketing of power. It is uncertain how the historic mechanisms for


grid analyses that demonstrate
reliable operation will change under the new grid operational structure. The Department of


acceptable
Energy has sponsored a Task Force on Electric System Reliability to examine the implications of


voltage and frequency
industry deregulation on the Nation's electric power supply.


when subjected
The capacity and capability of the offsite power system for each nuclear power plant could be


to scenarios
significantly influenced by the decisions emerging from these forthcoming changes. Since the


involving
capability of the offsite power cannot be tested except when challenged in an actual event, the


loss of nuclear unit generation, loss of the largest other unit, or loss of the most critical transmission
design bases of the offsite power can only be assured through an enveloping analysis that


line.Although the above events discussed
accounts for the full spectrum of grid loading and transient conditions that support the operability


may not demonstrate
of safety systems. The NRC Standard Review Plan Section 8.2 provides current guidance for


present generic weaknesses
assessing the adequacy of the offsite power system. It addresses grid analyses that


in licensees'
demonstrate acceptable voltage and frequency when subjected to scenarios involving loss of
processes, it is vital that licensees


continue to ensure that the design bases with respect to the reliability
nuclear unit generation, loss of the largest other unit, or loss of the most critical transmission line.


and stability
Although the above events discussed may not demonstrate present generic weaknesses in


of the offsite power sources do not degrade during the life of the nuclear facility.
licensees' processes, it is vital that licensees continue to ensure that the design bases with


The capacity and capability
respect to the reliability and stability of the offsite power sources do not degrade during the life of


of the offsite power system for nuclear power plants are important
the nuclear facility. The capacity and capability of the offsite power system for nuclear power


elements to be factored into the management
plants are important elements to be factored into the management of the changes resulting from


of the changes resulting
industry deregulation.


from industry deregulation.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions


This information
about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed below or


notice requires no specific action or written response.
the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.


If you have any questions about the information
orig /s/'d by


in this notice, please contact one of the technical
Jack W. Roe, Acting Director


contacts listed below or the appropriate
Division of Reactor Program Management


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.orig /s/'d by Jack W. Roe, Acting Director Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Technical Contacts: Ronaldo V. Jenkins, NRR                      Thomas Koshy, NRR
Technical


Contacts:
301415-2985                         301415-1 176 E-Mail: rvj2nrc.gov                  E-Mail: txk@nrc.gov
Ronaldo V. Jenkins, NRR Thomas Koshy, NRR 301415-2985  
301415-1 176 E-Mail: rvj2nrc.gov


E-Mail: txk@nrc.gov
A-1T              E~A  FiL              ;1 JAckETF


A-1T E~A FiL ;1 JAckETF Attachment:  
Attachment: Ust of recently issued Information Notices
Ust of recently issued Information


Notices OGC Concurrence (R. K Hoefling)  
OGC Concurrence (R. K Hoefling) 214198, PGEB Id 2/17198 (T. Essig),
214198, PGEB Id 2/17198 (T. Essig), AEOD Idc 2/12/98 (E.Rossi)  
  AEOD   Idc 2/12/98 (E.Rossi) & Tech Editor 1/27/98 DOCUMENT NAME: S:%DRPM SEC\98-07.IN - SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
& Tech Editor 1/27/98 DOCUMENT NAME: S:%DRPM SEC\98-07.IN


-SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
To receive a copy of Nhis document, Indicate Inthe box C=Copy wlo attachmentlenclosure E=Copy with attachmenUendosure N =No copy l


To receive a copy of Nhis document, Indicate In the box C=Copy wlo attachmentlenclosure
OFFICE          PECB I            EELB      I      IEELB I            PECB              PECB          LI    DRPM A


E=Copy with attachmenUendosure
NAME           TKoshy*           RJenkins*           JCalvo*           RDennig*         SRichards*           JRoe*
 
  DATE             2/2/98         j 2/2/98           j 2/2/98           2/10/98             2/11/98           2/17/98 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
N = No copy l OFFICE PECB I EELB I IEELB I PECB L PECB I DRPM A NAME TKoshy* RJenkins*  
JCalvo* RDennig* SRichards*  
JRoe*DATE 2/2/98 j 2/2/98 j 2/2/98 2/10/98 2/11/98 2/17/98 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY


Attachment
Attachment


IN 98-07 February 27, 1998 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
IN 98-07 February 27, 1998 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
 
NOTICES Information
 
Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 98-06 Unauthorized
 
Use of Ucense to 2/19198 All NRC licensees
 
authorized
 
to Obtain Radioactive
 
Materials, And Its Implications
 
Under The Expanded Title 18 of the U.S. Code Environmental
 
===Qualification===
Deficiency
 
for Cables and Containment
 
Penetration
 
Pigtails possess licensed material 97-45, Supp. 1 2/17/98 All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors except those licensees who have permanently
 
ceased operations
 
and have certified
 
that the fuel has been permanently
 
removed from the reactor vessel 98-05 98-04 98-03 98-02 98-01 97-91 97-90 Criminal History Record Information
 
1997 Enforcement
 
Sanctions
 
for deliberate
 
Violations
 
of NRC Employee Protection
 
requirements
 
Inadequate
 
Verification
 
of Overcurrent
 
Trip Setpoints
 
in Metal-Clad, Low-Voltage
 
Circuit Breakers Nuclear Power Plant Cold Weather Problems and Protective
 
Measures Thefts of Portable Gauges Recent Failures of Control Cables Used on Amersham Model 660 Posilock Radiography
 
===Systems Use of Nonconservative===
Acceptance
 
Criteria in Safety-Related
 
Pump Surveillance
 
Tests 2111/98 2/9/98 1/21/98 1/21/98 1/15/98 12/31/97 12/30/97 All holders of operating licenses for power reactors All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 
Commission
 
licensees All holders of operating
 
licenses for nuclear power reactors All holders of operating
 
licenses for nuclear power reactors All portable gauge licensees All industrial
 
radiography
 
licensees All holders of OLs for nuclear power reactors except those who have ceased operations
 
and have certified
 
that fuel has been permanently
 
removed from the vessel OL = Operating
 
License CP = Construction
 
Permit
 
IN9' Y , Feb~Uyxx, 1998 The present grid management
 
may be dismantled
 
or restructured
 
by two factors that are emerging:
non-utility
 
generation
 
and deregulation.
 
It Is anticipated
 
that in the future, power suppliers, whether utilities
 
or independent
 
power producers, will actively compete for sales to customers
 
who may be located anywhere on the power grid. This option creates multiple combinations
 
of generating
 
units going on and off the grid based on economic and performance
 
related consequences.
 
Regional grid control could be the responsibility
 
of centralized
 
independent
 
system operators (ISOs). The responsibilities
 
and authority
 
of an ISO are yet to be defined, but it Is expected that the ISO, or a similar entity, will be charged with maintaining
 
grid reliability
 
to facilitate
 
the marketing
 
of power. It is uncertain
 
how the historic mechanisms
 
for reliable operation
 
will change under the new grid operational
 
structure.
 
The Department
 
of Energy has sponsored
 
a Task Force on Electric System Reliability
 
to examine the implications


of industry deregulation
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES


on the Nation's electric power supply.The capacity and capability
Information                                          Date of


of the offsite power system for each nuclear power plant could be significantly
Notice No.            Subject                        Issuance  Issued to


influenced
98-06            Unauthorized Use of Ucense to      2/19198    All NRC licensees authorized to


by the decisions
Obtain Radioactive Materials,                    possess licensed material


emerging from these forthcoming
And Its Implications Under The


changes. Since the capability
Expanded Title 18 of the


of the offsite power cannot be tested except when challenged
U.S. Code


in an actual event, the design bases of the offsite power can only be assured through an enveloping
97-45, Supp. 1  Environmental Qualification        2/17/98    All holders of operating


analysis that accounts for the full spectrum of grid loading and transient
Deficiency for Cables and                     licenses for nuclear power


conditions
Containment Penetration                        reactors except those licensees


that support the operability
Pigtails                                      who have permanently ceased


of safety systems. The NRC Standard Review Plan Section 8.2 provides current guidance for assessing
operations and have certified that


the adequacy of the offsite power system. It addresses
the fuel has been permanently


grid analyses that demonstrate
removed from the reactor vessel


acceptable
98-05            Criminal History Record            2111/98    All holders of operating


voltage and frequency
Information                                    licenses for power reactors


when subjected
98-04            1997 Enforcement Sanctions for    2/9/98    All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory


to scenarios
deliberate Violations of NRC                  Commission licensees


Involving
Employee Protection requirements


loss of nuclear unit generation, loss of the largest other unit, or loss of the most critical transmission
98-03            Inadequate Verification of         1/21/98  All holders of operating licenses


line.Although the above events discussed
Overcurrent Trip Setpoints in                  for nuclear power reactors


may not demonstrate
Metal-Clad, Low-Voltage


present generic weaknesses
Circuit Breakers


in licensees'
98-02            Nuclear Power Plant Cold            1/21/98  All holders of operating licenses
processes, it is vital that licensees


continue to ensure that the design bases with respect to the reliability
Weather Problems and                          for nuclear power reactors


and stability
Protective Measures


of the offsite power sources do not degrade during the life of the nuclear facility.
98-01            Thefts of Portable Gauges            1/15/98  All portable gauge licensees


The capacity and capability
97-91            Recent Failures of Control          12/31/97  All industrial radiography


of the offsite power system for nuclear power plants are important
Cables Used on Amersham                        licensees


elements to be factored into the management
Model 660 Posilock Radiography


of the changes resulting
Systems


from industry deregulation.
97-90            Use of Nonconservative              12/30/97  All holders of OLs for nuclear


This information
Acceptance Criteria in                        power reactors except those


notice requires no specific action or written response.
Safety-Related Pump                            who have ceased operations


If you have any questions about the information
Surveillance Tests                            and have certified that fuel has


in this notice, please contact one of the technical
been permanently removed from


contacts listed below or the appropriate
the vessel


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Jack W. Roe, Acting Director Division of Reactor Program Management
OL = Operating License


===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
CP = Construction Permit
Technical


Contacts:
IN9' Y
Ronaldo V. Jenkins, NRR Thomas Koshy, NRR 301-415-2985
301-415-1176 E-Mail: rvjenrc.gov


E-Mail: txk@nrc.gov
,                                          Feb~Uyxx, 1998 The present grid management may be dismantled or restructured by two factors that are


Attachment:  
emerging: non-utility generation and deregulation. It Is anticipated that in the future, power
List of recently issued Information


Notices OGC Concurrence (R. K Hoefling)
suppliers, whether utilities or independent power producers, will actively compete for sales to
2/4198 DOCUMENT NAME: G:ITXK\GRIDIN2.1WPD


-'SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
customers who may be located anywhere on the power grid. This option creates multiple


To receive a copy of this document indicate In the box C=Copy wlo aftachmentlenclosure
combinations of generating units going on and off the grid based on economic and performance


E d: .ATo osure N = No copy[OFFICE lPECB lI EELB 1 _ EELB l PECB lI PECB I DRPM NAME TKoshy* RJenkins*
related consequences. Regional grid control could be the responsibility of centralized
JCalvo* RDennig* lSRichards'Jle


l DATE j 2/2/98 [2/2/98 2/2/98 j 2/10/98 l- ;1 /98 1/ 1/98_J___A_ 18- .8--OFFICIAL RECORD COPY t CM I Tre
independent system operators (ISOs). The responsibilities and authority of an ISO are yet to be


ING' x Febkty xx, 1998 The present grid management
defined, but it Is expected that the ISO, or a similar entity, will be charged with maintaining grid


may be dismantled
reliability to facilitate the marketing of power. It is uncertain how the historic mechanisms for


or restructured
reliable operation will change under the new grid operational structure. The Department of


by two factors that are emerging:
Energy has sponsored a Task Force on Electric System Reliability to examine the implications of
non-utility


generation
industry deregulation on the Nation's electric power supply.


and deregulation.
The capacity and capability of the offsite power system for each nuclear power plant could be


It is anticipated
significantly influenced by the decisions emerging from these forthcoming changes. Since the


that in the future, power suppliers, whether utilities
capability of the offsite power cannot be tested except when challenged in an actual event, the


or Independent
design bases of the offsite power can only be assured through an enveloping analysis that


power producers, will a6tively compete for sales to customers
accounts for the full spectrum of grid loading and transient conditions that support the operability


who may be located anywhere on the power grid. This option creates multiple combinations
of safety systems. The NRC Standard Review Plan Section 8.2 provides current guidance for


of generating
assessing the adequacy of the offsite power system. It addresses grid analyses that


units going on and off the grid based on economic and performance
demonstrate acceptable voltage and frequency when subjected to scenarios Involving loss of


related consequences.
nuclear unit generation, loss of the largest other unit, or loss of the most critical transmission line.


Regional grid control could be the responsibility
Although the above events discussed may not demonstrate present generic weaknesses in


of centralized
licensees' processes, it is vital that licensees continue to ensure that the design bases with


independent
respect to the reliability and stability of the offsite power sources do not degrade during the life of


system operators (ISOs). The responsibilities
the nuclear facility. The capacity and capability of the offsite power system for nuclear power


and authority
plants are important elements to be factored into the management of the changes resulting from


of an ISO are yet to be defined, but it is expected that the ISO, or a similar entity, will be charged with maintaining
industry deregulation.


grid reliability
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions


to facilitate
about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed below or


the marketing
the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.


of power. It is uncertain
Jack W. Roe, Acting Director


how the historic mechanisms
Division of Reactor Program Management


for reliable operation
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


will change under the new grid operational
Technical Contacts: Ronaldo V. Jenkins, NRR                    Thomas Koshy, NRR


structure.
301-415-2985                        301-415-1176 E-Mail: rvjenrc.gov                  E-Mail: txk@nrc.gov


The Department
Attachment: List of recently issued Information Notices


of Energy has sponsored
OGC Concurrence (R. K Hoefling) 2/4198 DOCUMENT NAME: G:ITXK\GRIDIN2.1WPD - 'SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE


a Task Force on Electric System Reliability
To receive a copy of this document indicate Inthe box C=Copy wlo aftachmentlenclosure E    d:        .ATo  osure N = No copy


to examine the implications
[OFFICE        lPECB          lI  EELB        1 _ EELB        l      PECB      lI      PECB          I  DRPM


of industry deregulation
NAME            TKoshy*        RJenkins*          JCalvo*          RDennig*      lSRichards'Jle


on the Nation's electric power supply.The capacity and capability
l DATE          j  2/2/98
                      _J___A_
                                  [2/2/98            .


of the offsite power system for each nuclear power plant could be significantly
2/2/98          j 2/10/98        l-;1      /98
                                                                                                  18-
                                                                                                                  1/98
                                                                                                                    1/ 8--
                                                        OFFICIAL RECORD COPY t                CM            I


influenced
Tre


by the decisions
ING' x


emerging from these forthcoming
Febkty xx, 1998 The present grid management may be dismantled or restructured by two factors that are


changes. Since the capability
emerging: non-utility generation and deregulation. It is anticipated that in the future, power


of the offsite power cannot be tested except when challenged
suppliers, whether utilities or Independent power producers, will a6tively compete for sales to


in an actual event, the design bases of the offsite power can only be assured through an enveloping
customers who may be located anywhere on the power grid. This option creates multiple


analysis that accounts for the full spectrum of grid loading and transient
combinations of generating units going on and off the grid based on economic and performance


conditions
related consequences. Regional grid control could be the responsibility of centralized


that support the operability
independent system operators (ISOs). The responsibilities and authority of an ISO are yet to be


of safety systems. The NRC Standard Review Plan Section 8.2 provides current guidance for assessing
defined, but it is expected that the ISO, or a similar entity, will be charged with maintaining grid


the adequacy of the offsite power system. It addresses
reliability to facilitate the marketing of power. It is uncertain how the historic mechanisms for


grid analyses that demonstrate
reliable operation will change under the new grid operational structure. The Department of


acceptable
Energy has sponsored a Task Force on Electric System Reliability to examine the implications of


voltage and frequency
industry deregulation on the Nation's electric power supply.


when subjected
The capacity and capability of the offsite power system for each nuclear power plant could be


to scenarios
significantly influenced by the decisions emerging from these forthcoming changes. Since the


involving
capability of the offsite power cannot be tested except when challenged in an actual event, the


loss of nuclear unit generation, loss of the largest other unit, or loss of the most critical transmission
design bases of the offsite power can only be assured through an enveloping analysis that


line.Although the above events discussed
accounts for the full spectrum of grid loading and transient conditions that support the operability


may not demonstrate
of safety systems. The NRC Standard Review Plan Section 8.2 provides current guidance for


present generic weakness in licensees'
assessing the adequacy of the offsite power system. It addresses grid analyses that
process, it is vital that licensees


continue to ensure that the design bases with respect to the reliability
demonstrate acceptable voltage and frequency when subjected to scenarios involving loss of


and stability
nuclear unit generation, loss of the largest other unit, or loss of the most critical transmission line.


of the offsite power sources do not degrade during the life of the nuclear facility.
Although the above events discussed may not demonstrate present generic weakness in


The capacity and capability
licensees' process, it is vital that licensees continue to ensure that the design bases with respect


of the offsite power system for nuclear power plants are important
to the reliability and stability of the offsite power sources do not degrade during the life of the


elements to be factored into the management
nuclear facility. The capacity and capability of the offsite power system for nuclear power plants


of the changes resulting
are important elements to be factored into the management of the changes resulting from


from industry deregulation.
industry deregulation.


This information
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions


notice requires no specific action or written response.
about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed below or


If you have any questions about the information
the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.


in this notice, please contact one of the technical
Jack W. Roe, Acting Director


contacts listed below or the appropriate
Division of Reactor Program Management


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Jack W. Roe, Acting Director Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Technical Contacts: Ronaldo V. Jenkins, NRR                    Thomas Koshy, NRR
Technical


Contacts:
301-415-2985                       301-415-1176 E-Mail: rvjenrc.gov                E-Mail: txk@nrc.gov
Ronaldo V. Jenkins, NRR Thomas Koshy, NRR 301-415-2985  
301-415-1176 E-Mail: rvjenrc.gov


E-Mail: txk@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of recently issued Information Notices


Attachment:  
OGC Concurrence (R. K Hoefling) 2/4/98 DOCUMENT NAME: G:ITXK\GRIDIN2.1WPD - SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
List of recently issued Information


Notices OGC Concurrence (R. K Hoefling)
To receive a copy of this document, idicate hithe box C=Copy wlo attachmentlenclosure E=Copy with attachmentlenclosure N = No copy
2/4/98 DOCUMENT NAME: G:ITXK\GRIDIN2.1WPD


-SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
lOFFICE          PECB      I      EELB          _L EELB        I -                       PECB                l- DRPM_
  NAME            TKoshyl          RJenkins*        JCalvo*              gnig ~        SRichards                JRoe


To receive a copy of this document, idicate hi the box C=Copy wlo attachmentlenclosure
l DATE          I  /==            2/2/9f          12/219°B9%
                                                            i          ,I                l            I          / I9t


E=Copy with attachmentlenclosure
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY


N = No copylOFFICE PECB I EELB _L EELB I -PECB l- DRPM_NAME TKoshyl RJenkins*
IN "x
JCalvo* g ~ nig SRichards


JRoel DATE I /== 2/2/9f 1 2/219 i ,I °B9% l I / I9t OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
February xx, 1998 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any


IN "x February xx, 1998 This information
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed


notice requires no specific action or written response.
below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.


If you have any questions
Jack W. Roe, Acting Director


about the information
Division of Reactor Program Management


in this notice, please contact one of the technical
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


contacts listed below or the appropriate
Technical Contacts: Ronaldo V. Jenkins, NRR


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Jack W. Roe, Acting Director Division of Reactor Program Management
301-415-2985 E-Mail: rvjenrc.gov


===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Thomas Koshy, NRR
Technical


Contacts: Ronaldo V. Jenkins, NRR 301-415-2985 E-Mail: rvjenrc.gov
301-415-1176 E-Mail: txkenrc.gov


Thomas Koshy, NRR 301-415-1176 E-Mail: txkenrc.gov
Attachment: List of recently issued Information Notices


Attachment:  
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\TXKAGRIDIN2.1WPD
List of recently issued Information


Notices DOCUMENT NAME: G:\TXKAGRIDIN2.1WPD
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box C=Copy wlo atachment/enclosure E=Copy with attachment/enclosure N = No copy


To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box C=Copy wlo atachment/enclosure
OFFICE      l PECB          lEELB                  EELB      El I PECB          I PECB            l    lDRPMl


E=Copy with attachment/enclosure
NAME                  s        RJenkins            JCalvo  /1      RDennig          SRichards            JRoe


N = No copy OFFICE l PECB lEELB EELB I El PECB I PECB l lDRPMl NAME s RJenkins JCalvo /1 RDennig SRichards
l DATE        121249          I L,-,9l              212/t9        I /           ,      II,9          ,      /    W


JRoel DATE 121249 I L,-,9l 212/t9 I / , I I,9 , / W OFFICIAL RECORD COPY}}
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 04:43, 24 November 2019

Offsite Power Reliability Challenges from Industry Deregulation
ML031050278
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 02/27/1998
From: Roe J
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-98-007, NUDOCS 9802240067
Download: ML031050278 (7)
v • d • e


X 71 C sa'

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 February 27, 1998 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 98-07: OFFSITE POWER RELIABILITY CHALLENGES FROM

INDUSTRY DEREGULATION

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors except those who have ceased

operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the vessel.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alert

addressees to a potential concern relating to electric power industry deregulation that could

adversely affect the reliability of offsite power sources, i.e., power from the transmission system

grid to nuclear power plants. It is expected that recipients will review the information for

applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate. However, suggestions

contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or

written response to this notice is required.

Description of Circumstances

On July 11, 1989, safety systems at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station experienced a sustained

degraded voltage condition and as a result the safety buses were automatically transferred from

the offsite power system to onsite standby diesel generators. The degraded condition was

caused by a turbine trip and deficiencies in the offsite power system's transmission network

equipment. The transfer of power supplies was initiated by operation of degraded voltage

protective relays, as designed. Non-safety system loads remained operable while being powered

for approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> from the degraded offsite power source. (LER 50-395/89-012)

On November 5, 1991, the licensee for Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 reported that, had

its 500kV auto-transformer been lost during summer peak conditions, the 161kV system might

not have been able to maintain adequate voltages to support the operation of the safety system

loads of both units. (LER 50-313/91-010)

On April 15, 1992, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company reported that under certain operating

conditions of the transmission network (i.e., during heavy load conditions), a failure of

transmission system equipment may cause a trip of all three Millstone units and a loss of offsite

power to the station. This operating condition was precipitated by the economic displacement

of oil-fired generating units by non-utility generators and by the addition of other generating

capacity (Seabrook and Hydro-Quebec) to the transmission network. (LER 50-245/92-020)

?PD 1re-F Normf, 1g-0o7 80a.2 7 q~ r 1l~lill~lill~lill~lililuill1!\i

IN -07 February 27, 1998 On April 14, 1993, Wisconsin Public Service Corporation reported that under certain transmission

line contingencies, a potential existed for the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant grid to become

unstable and cause all offsite power sources into the plant to trip. (Ref: LER 50-305/93-010)

On December 30, 1993, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company reported that under certain

operating conditions of the transmission network (i.e., Millstone Units 2 and 3 off line), the

transmission network may not have sufficient capacity to permit the continued operation of safety

system loads from offsite sources following a trip of Millstone Unit 1. (LER 50-245/94-001)

On August 8, 1995, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) reported that under certain

operating conditions (i.e., a high system load with a specific 230kV transmission line out of

service), the transmission network may not have sufficient capacity to permit the continued

operation of the safety system loads from offsite sources following a trip of one of the two Diablo

Canyon units. (Ref: LER 50-275/95-007)

On August 10, 1996, a transmission line sagged into a tree in Oregon creating a ground fault that

progressed into a major fault on the western Interconnection. The subsequent transient resulted

in the tripping of both Diablo Canyon, Units 1 and 2 (LER 50-275/96-012) and Palo Verde, Units 1 and 3 (LER 50-528/004).

During the summer of 1997, concerns were expressed about the impact of electric peak

conditions on the offsite power sources for nuclear power plants located in the Midwest and

New England. In addition, the licensee for Clinton nuclear station sought an exemption from

offsite power regulatory requirements because of its analysis that offsite power would become

inadequate under certain summer peak conditions following the loss of the nuclear unit.

Recent NRC inspection findings and Licensee Event Reports have indicated instances when grid

stability analyses had not been updated by the licensees to reflect changes in the grid power

system. Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data study C97-01, "Grid Performance

Factors" dated March 20, 1997, identified a Oneed to monitor grid conditions on a regular basis."

Discussion

In 1988, NRC issued the station blackout (SBO) rule. The requirements of 10 CFR 50.63, "Loss

of All Alternating Current Power," specify that each light-water-cooled nuclear power plant be

able to withstand and recover from an SBO (i.e., a loss of offsite and onsite emergency ac power

sources) for a specified period. The NRC review of licensees' analyses to assess the

vulnerability of offsite power and the time required for recovery indicated that for most nuclear

power plant sites the grid was stable and reliable.

Historically, grid control is decentralized and each utility or a small group of utilities forms a

control area containing customers for which it Is jurisdictionally responsible. The control areas

form reliability councils that establish operating standards by consensus. These agreements, in

turn, became the factors that determine the reliability of the grid and the bases for the availability

of the offsite power system. Although the grid operating standards that evolved in the past

provided reasonable grid reliability, events like those discussed herein reveal vulnerabilities of

the electrical grid either through actual challenges or through licensee's analyses to assess the

adequacy of the offsite power system.

INS '7 Feb,--dry 27, 1998 The present grid management may be dismantled or restructured by two factors that are

emerging: non-utility generation and deregulation. It Is anticipated that in the future, power

suppliers, whether utilities or independent power producers, will actively compete for sales to

customers who may be located anywhere on the power grid. This option creates multiple

combinations of generating units going on and off the grid based on economic and performance

related consequences. Regional grid control could be the responsibility of centralized

independent system operators (ISOs). The responsibilities and authority of an ISO are yet to be

defined, but It is expected that the ISO, or a similar entity, will be charged with maintaining grid

reliability to facilitate the marketing of power. It is uncertain how the historic mechanisms for

reliable operation will change under the new grid operational structure. The Department of

Energy has sponsored a Task Force on Electric System Reliability to examine the implications of

industry deregulation on the Nation's electric power supply.

The capacity and capability of the offsite power system for each nuclear power plant could be

significantly influenced by the decisions emerging from these forthcoming changes. Since the

capability of the offsite power cannot be tested except when challenged in an actual event, the

design bases of the offsite power can only be assured through an enveloping analysis that

accounts for the full spectrum of grid loading and transient conditions that support the operability

of safety systems. The NRC Standard Review Plan Section 8.2 provides current guidance for

assessing the adequacy of the offsite power system. It addresses grid analyses that

demonstrate acceptable voltage and frequency when subjected to scenarios involving loss of

nuclear unit generation, loss of the largest other unit, or loss of the most critical transmission line.

Although the above events discussed may not demonstrate present generic weaknesses in

licensees' processes, it is vital that licensees continue to ensure that the design bases with

respect to the reliability and stability of the offsite power sources do not degrade during the life of

the nuclear facility. The capacity and capability of the offsite power system for nuclear power

plants are important elements to be factored into the management of the changes resulting from

industry deregulation.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions

about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed below or

the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

orig /s/'d by

Jack W. Roe, Acting Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Ronaldo V. Jenkins, NRR Thomas Koshy, NRR

301415-2985 301415-1 176 E-Mail: rvj2nrc.gov E-Mail: txk@nrc.gov

A-1T E~A FiL ;1 JAckETF

Attachment: Ust of recently issued Information Notices

OGC Concurrence (R. K Hoefling) 214198, PGEB Id 2/17198 (T. Essig),

AEOD Idc 2/12/98 (E.Rossi) & Tech Editor 1/27/98 DOCUMENT NAME: S:%DRPM SEC\98-07.IN - SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

To receive a copy of Nhis document, Indicate Inthe box C=Copy wlo attachmentlenclosure E=Copy with attachmenUendosure N =No copy l

OFFICE PECB I EELB I IEELB I PECB PECB LI DRPM A

NAME TKoshy* RJenkins* JCalvo* RDennig* SRichards* JRoe*

DATE 2/2/98 j 2/2/98 j 2/2/98 2/10/98 2/11/98 2/17/98 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

Attachment

IN 98-07 February 27, 1998 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

98-06 Unauthorized Use of Ucense to 2/19198 All NRC licensees authorized to

Obtain Radioactive Materials, possess licensed material

And Its Implications Under The

Expanded Title 18 of the

U.S. Code

97-45, Supp. 1 Environmental Qualification 2/17/98 All holders of operating

Deficiency for Cables and licenses for nuclear power

Containment Penetration reactors except those licensees

Pigtails who have permanently ceased

operations and have certified that

the fuel has been permanently

removed from the reactor vessel

98-05 Criminal History Record 2111/98 All holders of operating

Information licenses for power reactors

98-04 1997 Enforcement Sanctions for 2/9/98 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

deliberate Violations of NRC Commission licensees

Employee Protection requirements

98-03 Inadequate Verification of 1/21/98 All holders of operating licenses

Overcurrent Trip Setpoints in for nuclear power reactors

Metal-Clad, Low-Voltage

Circuit Breakers

98-02 Nuclear Power Plant Cold 1/21/98 All holders of operating licenses

Weather Problems and for nuclear power reactors

Protective Measures

98-01 Thefts of Portable Gauges 1/15/98 All portable gauge licensees

97-91 Recent Failures of Control 12/31/97 All industrial radiography

Cables Used on Amersham licensees

Model 660 Posilock Radiography

Systems

97-90 Use of Nonconservative 12/30/97 All holders of OLs for nuclear

Acceptance Criteria in power reactors except those

Safety-Related Pump who have ceased operations

Surveillance Tests and have certified that fuel has

been permanently removed from

the vessel

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

IN9' Y

, Feb~Uyxx, 1998 The present grid management may be dismantled or restructured by two factors that are

emerging: non-utility generation and deregulation. It Is anticipated that in the future, power

suppliers, whether utilities or independent power producers, will actively compete for sales to

customers who may be located anywhere on the power grid. This option creates multiple

combinations of generating units going on and off the grid based on economic and performance

related consequences. Regional grid control could be the responsibility of centralized

independent system operators (ISOs). The responsibilities and authority of an ISO are yet to be

defined, but it Is expected that the ISO, or a similar entity, will be charged with maintaining grid

reliability to facilitate the marketing of power. It is uncertain how the historic mechanisms for

reliable operation will change under the new grid operational structure. The Department of

Energy has sponsored a Task Force on Electric System Reliability to examine the implications of

industry deregulation on the Nation's electric power supply.

The capacity and capability of the offsite power system for each nuclear power plant could be

significantly influenced by the decisions emerging from these forthcoming changes. Since the

capability of the offsite power cannot be tested except when challenged in an actual event, the

design bases of the offsite power can only be assured through an enveloping analysis that

accounts for the full spectrum of grid loading and transient conditions that support the operability

of safety systems. The NRC Standard Review Plan Section 8.2 provides current guidance for

assessing the adequacy of the offsite power system. It addresses grid analyses that

demonstrate acceptable voltage and frequency when subjected to scenarios Involving loss of

nuclear unit generation, loss of the largest other unit, or loss of the most critical transmission line.

Although the above events discussed may not demonstrate present generic weaknesses in

licensees' processes, it is vital that licensees continue to ensure that the design bases with

respect to the reliability and stability of the offsite power sources do not degrade during the life of

the nuclear facility. The capacity and capability of the offsite power system for nuclear power

plants are important elements to be factored into the management of the changes resulting from

industry deregulation.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions

about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed below or

the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Jack W. Roe, Acting Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Ronaldo V. Jenkins, NRR Thomas Koshy, NRR

301-415-2985 301-415-1176 E-Mail: rvjenrc.gov E-Mail: txk@nrc.gov

Attachment: List of recently issued Information Notices

OGC Concurrence (R. K Hoefling) 2/4198 DOCUMENT NAME: G:ITXK\GRIDIN2.1WPD - 'SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

To receive a copy of this document indicate Inthe box C=Copy wlo aftachmentlenclosure E d: .ATo osure N = No copy

[OFFICE lPECB lI EELB 1 _ EELB l PECB lI PECB I DRPM

NAME TKoshy* RJenkins* JCalvo* RDennig* lSRichards'Jle

l DATE j 2/2/98

_J___A_

[2/2/98 .

2/2/98 j 2/10/98 l-;1 /98

18-

1/98

1/ 8--

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY t CM I

Tre

ING' x

Febkty xx, 1998 The present grid management may be dismantled or restructured by two factors that are

emerging: non-utility generation and deregulation. It is anticipated that in the future, power

suppliers, whether utilities or Independent power producers, will a6tively compete for sales to

customers who may be located anywhere on the power grid. This option creates multiple

combinations of generating units going on and off the grid based on economic and performance

related consequences. Regional grid control could be the responsibility of centralized

independent system operators (ISOs). The responsibilities and authority of an ISO are yet to be

defined, but it is expected that the ISO, or a similar entity, will be charged with maintaining grid

reliability to facilitate the marketing of power. It is uncertain how the historic mechanisms for

reliable operation will change under the new grid operational structure. The Department of

Energy has sponsored a Task Force on Electric System Reliability to examine the implications of

industry deregulation on the Nation's electric power supply.

The capacity and capability of the offsite power system for each nuclear power plant could be

significantly influenced by the decisions emerging from these forthcoming changes. Since the

capability of the offsite power cannot be tested except when challenged in an actual event, the

design bases of the offsite power can only be assured through an enveloping analysis that

accounts for the full spectrum of grid loading and transient conditions that support the operability

of safety systems. The NRC Standard Review Plan Section 8.2 provides current guidance for

assessing the adequacy of the offsite power system. It addresses grid analyses that

demonstrate acceptable voltage and frequency when subjected to scenarios involving loss of

nuclear unit generation, loss of the largest other unit, or loss of the most critical transmission line.

Although the above events discussed may not demonstrate present generic weakness in

licensees' process, it is vital that licensees continue to ensure that the design bases with respect

to the reliability and stability of the offsite power sources do not degrade during the life of the

nuclear facility. The capacity and capability of the offsite power system for nuclear power plants

are important elements to be factored into the management of the changes resulting from

industry deregulation.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions

about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed below or

the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Jack W. Roe, Acting Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Ronaldo V. Jenkins, NRR Thomas Koshy, NRR

301-415-2985 301-415-1176 E-Mail: rvjenrc.gov E-Mail: txk@nrc.gov

Attachment: List of recently issued Information Notices

OGC Concurrence (R. K Hoefling) 2/4/98 DOCUMENT NAME: G:ITXK\GRIDIN2.1WPD - SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

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lOFFICE PECB I EELB _L EELB I - PECB l- DRPM_

NAME TKoshyl RJenkins* JCalvo* gnig ~ SRichards JRoe

l DATE I /== 2/2/9f 12/219°B9%

i ,I l I / I9t

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IN "x

February xx, 1998 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed

below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Jack W. Roe, Acting Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Ronaldo V. Jenkins, NRR

301-415-2985 E-Mail: rvjenrc.gov

Thomas Koshy, NRR

301-415-1176 E-Mail: txkenrc.gov

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DOCUMENT NAME: G:\TXKAGRIDIN2.1WPD

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OFFICE l PECB lEELB EELB El I PECB I PECB l lDRPMl

NAME s RJenkins JCalvo /1 RDennig SRichards JRoe

l DATE 121249 I L,-,9l 212/t9 I / , II,9 , / W

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY


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