Previously Unidentified Release Path from Boiling Water Reactor Control Rod Hydraulic UnitsML031130145 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant ![Entergy icon.png](/w/images/7/79/Entergy_icon.png) |
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Issue date: |
12/18/1990 |
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From: |
Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
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To: |
|
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References |
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IN-90-078, NUDOCS 9012120148 |
Download: ML031130145 (11) |
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Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>. |
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 December 18, 1990 NRC INFORMATION
NOTICE NO. 90-78: PREVIOUSLY
UNIDENTIFIED
RELEASE PATH FROM BOILING WATER REACTOR CONTROL ROD HYDRAULIC UNITS
Addressees
All holders of operating
licenses or construction
permits for boiling water reactors (BWRs).
Purpose
- This information
notice is intended to alert addressees
to potential
problems pertaining
to a previously
unidentified
release path from the control rod drive hydraulic
systems in boiling water reactors that may lead to design basis accident radiation
doses significantly
exceeding
the values specified
in the Final Safety Analysis Report. It is expected that recipients
will review the information
for applicability
to their facilities
and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
However, suggestions
contained
in this information
notice do not constitute
NRC requirements;
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description
of Circumstances:
In June 1989, a design review for unmonitored
release paths at Washington
Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 resulted in the discovery
of a previously
unidenti-fied radiation
release path in the control rod drive hydraulic
system. This path is postulated
to result from the following
sequence of conditions.
The two control rod drive pumps are shut down following
a design basis accident.There is a break outside of the reactor building (secondary
containment)
in the non-seismically
qualified
piping or tankage to which the control rod hydraulic
system is connected (see Figure 1). Reactor coolant leaks past the double seals in any of the 185 control rod drives and the valves in their associated
hydraulic
control units. The leakage flows back through one or more of the four headers connecting
each of the 185 hydraulic
control units to the common control rod drive (CRD) pump header. The leakage then flows through the CRD pump header and the control rod drive pumps to the break or the conden-sate storage tank located outside of the reactor building.Much of the pathway to the condensate
storage tank lies outside of the reactor building and includes piping that is not seismically
qualified.
In addition, this piping passes close to the air intakes for the control room ventilation
system. Consequently, a failure of the supply piping for the drive pumps s3 -1D8W- /'C
IN 90-78 December 18, 1990 during an accident would not only greatly increase the potential
external release, but could increase the radiation
dose to the control room operators.
General Electric-Nuclear
Energy performed
calculations
for the newly postulated
release path for a design basis accident with concurrent
failure of the non-seismically
qualified
supply piping for the control rod drive system at Washington
Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2. The calculations
incorporated
the source terms specified
in Regulatory
Guide 1.3 and assumed that 10% of the iodine would escape as a gas from the liquid release. These calculations
produced a 30-day thyroid dose for control room operators
of 121 rem per gpm of leakage, a 30-day thyroid dose at the outer boundary of the low-population
zone of 86 rem per gpm of leakage, and a 2-hour thyroid dose at the exclusion
zone boundary of 36 rem per gpm of leakage. A generic communication
discussing
this concern was sent by General Electric-Nuclear
Energy to each BWR utility in July 1989.Discussion:
For the control rod hydraulic
systems at General Electric boiling water reac-tors, the inboard isolation
for the primary containment
is provided by the double seals in the control rod drives, and the outboard isolation
for the primary containment
is provided by valves within the hydraulic
control units.However, past leak tests of the rod drive seals that were performed
by General Electric produced a maximum of 5 gpm per drive. Leakage from the hydraulic control units can also be significant.
As shown in Figure 1, four paths lead from each of the 185 hydraulic
control units to the common CRD pump header. Three of these paths, the accumulator
charging header, the drive header and the cooling header include check valves to prevent the return of water from the hydraulic
units. In addition, water escaping through the accumulator
charging header must leak through the insert side scram valve, and water escaping through the drive header must leak through one of the directional
control valves. However, the check valve in the exhaust header is oriented so as to permit the flow of water back to the CRD pump header.The exhaust water then flows via the CRD pump header back to the reactor vessel (or, as at Washington
Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2, to the reactor water cleanup system) along with the excess pump flow. Therefore, only one normally closed valve prevents water that is leaking out of each of the 185 control rod drives from returning
through the associated
exhaust header to the CRD pump header.During startup testing at Limerick Unit 1, and at Susquehanna
Unit 1, the total leakage from all of the hydraulic
control units combined was measured at 5 gpm and 11 gpm, respectively.
Both of these reactors include additional
check valves at the discharge
of the control'rod
drive pump (area A in Figure 1). A partial audit by the NRC staff indicates
that many of the newer BWR plants have check valves installed
in the discharge
pipe of the control rod drive pumps. However, this audit also showed that other BWR plants, mostly the earlier ones, did not have such check valves. The control rod drive system for BWR/6 plants is de-signed with a testable check valve and a motor-operated
isolation
valve. There-fore, this pathway is applicable
to pre-BWR/6 plants only.
Ie IN 90-78 December 18, 1990 Combining
the General Electric dose calculations
for the postulated
path with the leak rates measured from the hydraulic
units at either Limerick or Susquehanna
produces dose rates significantly
in excess of the values in the Final Safety Analysis Report. Independent
calculations
by the NRC staff pro-duced offsite dose values that were comparable
to the General Electric results.Radiation
release by this path is not possible as long as the control rod drive pumps are kept running. However, continued
operation
of these pumps following an accident cannot be assured, particularly
if the non-seismically
qualified suction piping were to fail.This problem was resolved at Washington
Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 by the installation
of two check valves in series in the common discharge
pipe from the control rod drive pumps (at area A in Figure 1) to prevent backflow out of the reactor building (secondary
containment).
The Washington
Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 installation
includes provisions
for leak testing the valves and a leak rate criterion
of 0.01 gpm was established
for these valves.This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
contacts listed below or the appropriate
NRR project manager.Division of Operational
Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
Contacts:
Charles R. Nichols, NRR (301) 492-0854 Donald C. Kirkpatrick, NRR (301) 492-1849 Attachments:
1. Figure 1. BWR Control Rod Drive System 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices
Note: At Washington
Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, the control rod drive return water Is piped to the reactor w water cleanup system SvITE..t.
.... \SECONDONDARY
OAin4Z( EXHAUST CWHIOL VALV(S CONTAINMENT
~I ~>*PCV "(E S CU OUTSIDE OF DRV BUILDINGA-H
AREA A SCIM VALVIE 6TaLQUT1 COTROL4MmuMRG
RMOO140MIX
ROD To OTHE CONTARNEN
R-OD I.-AJ___ -. CrI DRIVEPUMPSM
~j 0 c Figure 1. BWR CONTROL ROD DRIVE SYSTEM
Attachment
2 IN 90-78 December 18, 1990 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
NOTICES Information
Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 90-77 88-23, Supp. 3 90-76 90-75 90-74 90-73 90-72 90-71 90-70 90-38, Supp. 1 Inadvertent
Removal of Fuel Assemblies
from the Reactor Core Potential
for Gas Binding of High-Pressure
Safety Injection Pumps During A Loss-Of-Coolant
Accident Failure Of Turbine Overspeed Trip Mechanism
Because Of Inadequate
Spring Tension Denial Of Access To Current Low-Level
Radioactive
Waste Disposal Facilities
Information
on Precursors
To Severe Accidents Corrosion
Of Valve-To-Torque Tube Keys In Spray Pond Cross Connect Valves Testing of Parallel Disc Gate Valves In Europe Effective
Use of Radi-ation Safety Committees
to Exercise Control Over Medical Use Programs Pump Explosions
Involving Ammonium Nitrate License and Fee Require-ments for Processing
Fin-ancial Assurance
Submittals
for Decommissioning
12/12/90 12/10/90 12/7/90 12/5/90 12/4/90 11/29/90 11/28/90 11/6/90 11/6/90 11/6/90 All holders of OLs or CPs for pressurized- water reactors (PWRS).All holders of OLs or CPs for pressurized- water reactors (PWRs).All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All Michigan holders of NRC licenses.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All NRC licensees authorized
to use by-product material for medical purposes.All uranium fuel fabrication
and conversion
facilities.
All fuel facility and materials
licensees.
OL = Operating
License CP = Construction
Permit
IN 90-78 December 18, 1990 Combining
the General Electric dose calculations
for the postulated
path with the leak rates measured from the hydraulic
units at either Limerick or Susquehanna
produces dose rates significantly
in excess of the values in the Final Safety Analysis Report. Independent
calculations
by the NRC staff pro-duced offsite dose values that were comparable
to the General Electric results.Radiation
release by this path is not possible as long as the control rod drive pumps are kept running. However, continued
operation
of these pumps following an accident cannot be assured, particularly
if the non-seismically
qualified suction piping were to fail.This problem was resolved at Washington
Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 by the installation
of two check valves in series in the common discharge
pipe from the control rod drive pumps (at area A in Figure 1) to prevent backflow out of the reactor building (secondary
containment).
The Washington
Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 installation
includes provisions
for leak testing the valves and a leak rate criterion
of 0.01 gpm was established
for these valves.This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
contacts listed below or the appropriate
NRR project manager.Origina Signkd IN Charles E Rossi Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
Contacts:
Charles R. Nichols, NRR (301) 492-0854 Donald C. Kirkpatrick, NRR (301) 492-1849 Attachments:
1. Figure 1. BWR Control Rod Drive System 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices*12/11/90 NJDi *C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
CHBerlinger
12/L~/jW 111/09/90*OGCB:DOEA:NRR
- D/U ST:NRR *RPB:ADM DCKirkpatrick
CRNichols
CMcCracken
AThadani TechEd 08/17/90 08/20/90 09/24/90 10/30/90 08/06/90 DOCUMENT NAME: IN 90-78 IN 90-XX August xx, 1990 for these and other plants produced offsite dose values that were comparable
to the General Electric results and that could also significantly
exceed the values specified
in the Final Safety Analysis Report. Radiation
release by this path is not possible as long as the control rod drive pumps are kept running. However, continued
operation
of these pumps following
an accident cannot be ensured, particularly
if the non-seismically
qualified
suction piping were to fall.This problem was resolved at Washington
Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 by the installation
of two check valves in series in the common discharge
pipe from the control rod drive pumps to prevent back flow out of the secondary
contain-ment. The Washington
Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 installation
includes provisions
for leak testing the valves. Washington
Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 planned to establish
a leak rate criterion
for these valves of 0.01 gpm.The control rod drive system for BWR/6 plants is designed with a testable check valve and a motor-operated
isolation
valve, therefore
this pathway is applicable
to only pre-BWR/6 plants.This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
Contacts:
Charles R. Nichols, NRR (301) 492-0856 Donald C. Kirkpatrick, NRR (301) 492-1849 Attachments:
1. Figure of Control Rod Hydraulic
System 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices Document Name: UNIDENTIFIED
RELEASE PATH IN*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
D/DOEA:NRR
C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
CERossi CHBerlinger
10/ /90 10/ /90 OGCB:DOEA:NRR
SPLB:DST:NRR
C/SPLB:DST:NRR
D/DST:NRRK4 RPB:ADM DCKirkpatrick*
CRNichols*
CMcCracken*
AThadani TechEd*08/17/90 08/20/90 09/24/90 10M /90 08/06/90
1990 Page 3 f 3 Combining
the General Electric dose calculations
for the postulated
path with the leak rates measured from the hydraulic
units at either Limerick or Susquehanna
produces dose rates significantly
in excess of the values specified in the Final Safety Analysis Report. Independent
calculations
by the NRC staff produced offsite dose values that were comparable
to the General Electric results and that could also significantly
exceed the values specified
in the Final Safety Analysis Report. Radiation
release by this path is not possible as long as the control rod drive pumps are kept running. However, continued operation
of these pumps following
an accident cannot be assured, particularly
if the non-seismically
qualified
suction piping were to fail.This problem was resolved at Washington
Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 by the installation
of two check valves in series in the common discharge
pipe from the control rod drive pumps (at area A) to prevent backflow out of the reactor building secondary
containment.
The Washington
Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 installation
includes provisions
for leak testing the valves and a leak rate criterion
of 0.01 gpm was established
for these valves.This information
notice requires you have any questions
about the of the technical
contacts listed no specific action or written response.
If information
in this notice, please contact one below or the appropriate
NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
Contacts: Charles R. Nichols, NRR (301) 492-0854 Donald C. Kirkpatrick, NRR (301) 492-1849 Attachments:
1. Figure 1. BWR Control Rod Drive System 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices Document Name: RELEASE PATH NOTICE D/DOEA:NRR
CERossi 11/ /90*D/DST:NRR
AThadani 10/30/90 ok 1vko .*C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
CHBerlinger
11/09/90*RPB:ADM TechEd 08/06/90*OGCB:DOEA:NRR
DCKirkpatrick
08/17/90*SPLB:DST:NRR
CRNichols 08/20/90*C/SPLB:DST:NRR
CMcCracken
09/24/90
IN 90-XX August xx, 1990 this path is not possible as long as the control rod drive pumps are kept running. However, continued
operation
of these pumps following
an accident cannot be ensured, particularly
if the non-seismically
qualified
suction piping were to fail.This problem was resolved at Washington
Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 by the installation
of two check valves in series in the common discharge
pipe from the control rod drive pumps to prevent back flow out of the secondary
contain-ment. The Washington
Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 installation
includes provisions
for leak testing the valves. Washington
Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 planned to establish
a leak rate criterion
for these valves of 0.01 gpm.This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
Contacts: Charles R. Nichols, NRR (301) 492-0856 Donald C. Kirkpatrick, NRR (301) 492-1849 Attachments:
1. Figure of Control Rod Hydraulic
System 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices Document Name: UNIDENTIFIED
RELEASE PATH IN*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
OGCB:W EA:NRR DOrirkpathick
08/e 9/90 VC<SPLB:DST:NRR
CRNichols 08AV2/9M;*^
CISPLB:DST:NRR
CMcCracken
OF/p/90 D/DOEA:NRR
CERossi 08/ /90 D/DST:NRR AThadani 408/ /90 V1 C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
CHBerlinger
08/ /90*RPB:ADM TechEd 08/06/90
IN 90-XX August xx, 1990 The Washington
Nuclear power installation
includes provisions
for leak testing the valves. Washington
Nuclear Power has established
a very low leak rate criterion
for these valves (.01 gpm was indicated).
A partial check by the NRC staff indicates
that many of the newer BWR plants already have check valves installed
in the control rod drive pump discharge
pipe. However, this check also showed that other BWR plants, mainly the earlier ones, did not have such check valves.This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
Contact: Charles R. Nichols, NRR (301) 492-0854 Attachments:
1. Figure of Control Rod Hydraulic
System 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices Document Name: UNIDENTIFIED
RELEASE PATH IN D/DOEA:NRR
CERossi 08/ /90 D/DST:NRR AThadani 08/ /90 C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
CHBerlinger
08/ /90 RPB:ADM TechEd J ai P 08/C /90 OGCB:DOEA:NRR
SPLB:DST:NRR
DCKirkpatyi
.- CRNichols 08/' /9 xF 08/ /go C/SPLB:DST:NRR
CMcCracken
08/ /90
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list | - Information Notice 1990-01, Importance of Proper Response to Self-Identified Violations by Licensees (12 January 1990, Topic: Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1990-02, Potential Degradation of Secondary Containment (22 January 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-03, Malfunction of Borg-Warner Bolted Bonnet Check Valves Caused by Failure of the Swing Arm (23 January 1990, Topic: Liquid penetrant)
- Information Notice 1990-04, Cracking of the Upper Shell-to-Transition Cone Girth Welds in Steam Generators, (26 January 1990, Topic: Nondestructive Examination)
- Information Notice 1990-05, Inter-System Discharge of Reactor Coolant (29 January 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-06, Potential for Loss of Shutdown Cooling While at Low Reactor Coolant Levels (29 January 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-07, New Information Regarding Insulation Material Performance and Debris Blockage of PWR Containment Sumps (30 January 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-08, KR-85 Hazards from Decayed Fuel (1 February 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-08, KR-85 Hazards From Decayed Fuel (1 February 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-09, Extended Interim Storage of Low-Level Radioactive Waste by Fuel Cycle and Materials Licensees (5 February 1990, Topic: Decommissioning Funding Plan)
- Information Notice 1990-10, Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) of Inconel 600 (23 February 1990, Topic: Boric Acid, Hydrostatic, Liquid penetrant)
- Information Notice 1990-10, Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking of Inconel 600 (23 February 1990, Topic: Boric Acid, Hydrostatic, Nondestructive Examination, Liquid penetrant)
- Information Notice 1990-11, Maintenance Deficiency Associated with Solenoid-Operated Valves (28 February 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-12, Monitoring or Interruption of Plant Communications (28 February 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-13, Importance of Review and Analysis of Safeguards Event Logs (5 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-14, Accidental Disposal of Radioactive Materials (6 March 1990, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1990-15, Reciprocity Notification of Agreement State Radiation Control Directors Before Beginning Work in Agreement States (17 March 1990, Topic: Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1990-16, Compliance with New Decommissioning Rule (7 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-17, Weight and Center of Gravity Discrepancies for Copes-Vulcan Valves (8 March 1990, Topic: Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1990-18, Potential Problems with Crosby Safety Relief Valves Used on Diesel Generator Air Start Receiver Tanks (9 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-18, Potential Problems With Crosby Safety Relief Valves Used on Diesel Generator Air Start Receiver Tanks (9 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-19, Potential Loss of Effective Volume for Containment Recirculation Spray at PWR Facilities (14 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-20, Personnel Injuries Resulting from Improper Operation of Radwaste Incinerators (22 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-21, Potential Failure of Motor-Operated Butterfly Valves to Operate Because Valve Seat Friction was Underestimated (22 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-21, Potential Failure of Motor-Operated Butterfly Valves to Operate Because Valve Seat Friction Was Underestimated (22 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-22, Unanticipated Equipment Actuations Following Restoration of Power to Rosemount Transmitter Trip Units (23 March 1990, Topic: Reactor Vessel Water Level)
- Information Notice 1990-23, Improper Installation of Patel Conduit Seals (4 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-24, Transportation of Model Spec 2-T Radiographic Exposure Device (10 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-24, Transportation of Model SPEC 2-T Radiographic Exposure Device (10 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-25, Loss of Vital AC Power With Subsequent Reactor Coolant System Heat-Up (16 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-25, Loss of Vital AC Power with Subsequent Reactor Coolant System Heat-Up (16 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-26, Inadequate Flow of Essential Service Water to Room Coolers and Heat Exchangers for Engineered Safety-Feature Systems (24 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-27, Clarification of the Recent Revisions to the Regulatory Requirements for Packaging of Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6) for Transportation (30 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-28, Potential Error In High Steamline Flow Setpoint (30 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-28, Potential Error in High Steamline Flow Setpoint (30 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-29, Cracking of Cladding and Its Heat-Affected Zone in the Base Metal of a Reactor Vessel Head (30 April 1990, Topic: Nondestructive Examination, Liquid penetrant)
- Information Notice 1990-30, Ultrasonic Inspection Techniques for Dissimilar Metal Welds (1 May 1999, Topic: Dissimilar Metal Weld)
- Information Notice 1990-31, Update on Waste Form and High Integrity Container Topical Report Review Status, Identification of Problems with Cement Solidification, and Reporting of Waste Mishaps (4 May 1990, Topic: Process Control Program)
- Information Notice 1990-31, Update on Waste form and High Integrity Container Topical Report Review Status, Identification of Problems with Cement Solidification, and Reporting of Waste Mishaps (4 May 1990, Topic: Process Control Program)
- Information Notice 1990-32, Surface Crack and Subsurface Indications in the Weld of a Reactor Vessel Head (3 May 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-33, Sources of Unexpected Occupational Radiation Exposures at Spent Fuel Storage Pools (9 May 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-34, Response to False Siren Activations (10 May 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-35, Transportation of Type a Quantities of Non-Fissile Radioactive Materials (24 May 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-37, Sheared Pinion Gear-To-Shaft Keys in Limitorque Motor Actuators (24 May 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-38, License and Fee Requirements for Processing Financial Assurance Submittals for Decommissioning (6 November 1990, Topic: Authorized possession limits)
- Information Notice 1990-39, Recent Problems with Service Water Systems (1 June 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-40, Results of NRC-Sponsored Testing of Motor-Operated Valves (5 June 1990, Topic: Weak link)
- Information Notice 1990-41, Potential Failure of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers and Ak Circuit Breakers (12 June 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-42, Failure of Electrical Power Equipment Due to Solar Magnetic Disturbances (19 June 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-43, Mechanical Interference with Thermal Trip Function in GE Molded-Case Circuit Breakers (29 June 1990)
... further results |
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