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| issue date = 07/12/2010
| issue date = 07/12/2010
| title = Errata for Fort Calhoun Station NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000285-09-004 and 072000054/09-001
| title = Errata for Fort Calhoun Station NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000285-09-004 and 072000054/09-001
| author name = Clark J A
| author name = Clark J
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-IV/DRP
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-IV/DRP
| addressee name = Bannister D J
| addressee name = Bannister D
| addressee affiliation = Omaha Public Power District
| addressee affiliation = Omaha Public Power District
| docket = 05000285
| docket = 05000285
Line 18: Line 18:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NU C LE AR RE G ULATO RY C O M M I S S I O N R E GI ON I V 612 EAST LAMAR BLVD , SU ITE 400 AR LIN GTON , TEXAS 76011-4125 July 12, 2010 David J. Bannister, Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 P. O. Box 550 Fort Calhoun, NE 68023-0550 Subject: ERRATA FOR FORT CALHOUN STATION NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000285/2009004 and 072000054/2009001
[[Issue date::July 12, 2010]]


David J. Bannister, Vice President
==Dear Mr. Bannister:==
It was identified that an inconsistency exists in REPORT 05000285/2009004 and 072000054/2009001, dated November 13, 2009, between the description of the crosscutting aspect of the first GREEN finding under the Barrier Integrity cornerstone located in the Summary of Findings, and the description of the finding in Section 1R15, Operability Evaluations. Specifically, the correct crosscutting aspect for the described finding was in problem identification and resolution because of the failure to take appropriate corrective actions to address safety issues [P.1 (d)]. This is consistent with the information that was provided during the exit meeting held on October 7, 2009. As a result of this correction, please replace page 3 of the report with the enclosed page 3 (Summary of Findings).


and Chief Nuclear Officer Omaha Public Power District
In addition, it was also found that an inspection activity was inadvertently omitted from the same NRC Inspection Report 05000285/200904 and 072000054/2009001, dated November 13, 2009.


Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 P. O. Box 550 Fort Calhoun, NE 68023-0550
The inspection activity in question was the in-office review of Revision 14 to the Fort Calhoun Station Radiological Emergency response Plan Section L, Medical and Public Health Support, and Section F, Emergency Communications. Please add page 34 to NRC Inspection Report 05000285/200904 and 072000054/2009001.


Subject: ERRATA FOR FORT CALHOUN STATION NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000285/2009004 and 072000054/2009001
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, and its enclosure, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRCs document system (ADAMS).


==Dear Mr. Bannister:==
ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
It was identified that an inconsistency exists in REPORT 05000285/2009004 and 072000054/2009001, dated November 13, 2009, between the description of the crosscutting aspect of the first GREEN finding under the "Barrier Integrity" cornerstone located in the "Summary of Findings," and the description of the finding in Section 1R15, "Operability Evaluations." Specifically, the correct crosscutting aspect for the described finding was in problem identification and resolution because of the failure to take appropriate corrective actions to address safety issues [P.1 (d)]. This is consistent with the information that was provided during the exit meeting held on October 7, 2009. As a result of this correction, please replace page 3 of the report with the enclosed page 3 (Summary of Findings).
 
In addition, it was also found that an inspection activity was inadvertently omitted from the same
 
NRC Inspection Report 05000285/200904 and 072000054/2009001, dated November 13, 2009. The inspection activity in question was the in-office review of Revision 14 to the Fort Calhoun Station Radiological Emergency response Plan Section L, "Medical and Public Health Support,"
and Section F, "Emergency Communications." Please add page 34 to NRC Inspection Report 05000285/200904 and 072000054/2009001.
 
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, and its enclosure, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).


.
.
Omaha Public Power District - 2 - Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.


Sincerely,/RA/ Jeffrey A. Clark, P.E.
Omaha Public Power District -2-Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.


Chief, Project Branch E Division of Reactor Projects
Sincerely,
/RA/
Jeffrey A. Clark, P.E.


Docket: 50-285 License: DPR-40  
Chief, Project Branch E Division of Reactor Projects Docket: 50-285 License: DPR-40 Enclosure:
Errata Pages 3 and 34 for NRC Inspection Report 05000285/200904 and 072000054/2009001 cc w/Enclosure:
Jeffrey A. Reinhart Site Vice President Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Adm P.O. Box 550 Fort Calhoun, NE 68023-0550 Mr. Thomas C. Matthews Manager - Nuclear Licensing Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Adm.


===Enclosure:===
P.O. Box 550 Fort Calhoun, NE 68023-0550 Winston & Strawn Attn: David A. Repke, Esq.
Errata Pages 3 and 34 for NRC Inspection Report 05000285/200904 and 072000054/2009001


cc w/
1700 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20006-3817 Chairman Washington County Board of Supervisors P.O. Box 466 Blair, NE 68008


===Enclosure:===
Omaha Public Power District -3-Ms. Julia Schmitt, Manager Radiation Control Program Nebraska Health & Human Services R & L Public Health Assurance 301 Centennial Mall, South P.O. Box 95007 Lincoln, NE 68509-5026 Ms. Melanie Rasmussen Radiation Control Program Officer Bureau of Radiological Health Iowa Department of Public Health Lucas State Office Building, 5th Floor 321 East 12th Street Des Moines, IA 50319 Chief, Technological Hazards Branch FEMA, Region VII 9221 Ward Parkway Suite 300 Kansas City, MO 64114-3372
Jeffrey A. Reinhart Site Vice President Omaha Public Power District  


Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Adm P.O. Box 550
Omaha Public Power District -4-Electronic distribution by RIV:
 
Regional Administrator (Elmo.Collins@nrc.gov)
Fort Calhoun, NE 68023-0550 Mr. Thomas C. Matthews Manager - Nuclear Licensing Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Adm. P.O. Box 550 Fort Calhoun, NE 68023-0550 Winston & Strawn Attn: David A. Repke, Esq.
Deputy Regional Administrator (Chuck.Casto@nrc.gov)
 
DRP Director (Dwight.Chamberlain@nrc.gov)
1700 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20006-3817
 
Chairman Washington County Board of Supervisors P.O. Box 466 Blair, NE 68008 Omaha Public Power District - 3 - Ms. Julia Schmitt, Manager Radiation Control Program
 
Nebraska Health & Human Services R & L Public Health Assurance 301 Centennial Mall, South P.O. Box 95007 Lincoln, NE 68509-5026
 
Ms. Melanie Rasmussen Radiation Control Program Officer Bureau of Radiological Health Iowa Department of Public Health Lucas State Office Building, 5th Floor 321 East 12th Street Des Moines, IA 50319
 
Chief, Technological Hazards Branch FEMA, Region VII
 
9221 Ward Parkway Suite 300 Kansas City, MO 64114-3372 Omaha Public Power District - 4 - Electronic distribution by RIV:  
 
Regional Administrator (Elmo.Collins@nrc.gov) Deputy Regional Administrator (Chuck.Casto@nrc.gov) DRP Director (Dwight.Chamberlain@nrc.gov)
DRP Deputy Director (Anton.Vegel@nrc.gov)
DRP Deputy Director (Anton.Vegel@nrc.gov)
DRS Director (Roy.Caniano@nrc.gov)
DRS Director (Roy.Caniano@nrc.gov)
DRS Deputy Director (Troy.Pruett@nrc.gov)
DRS Deputy Director (Troy.Pruett@nrc.gov)
Senior Resident Inspector (John.Kirkland@nrc.gov) Resident Inspector (Jacob.Wingebach@nrc.gov) Branch Chief, DRP/E (Jeff.Clark@nrc.gov) Senior Project Engineer, DRP/E (Ray.Azua@nrc.gov)
Senior Resident Inspector (John.Kirkland@nrc.gov)
Resident Inspector (Jacob.Wingebach@nrc.gov)
Branch Chief, DRP/E (Jeff.Clark@nrc.gov)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/E (Ray.Azua@nrc.gov)
FCS Site Secretary (Berni.Madison@nrc.gov)
FCS Site Secretary (Berni.Madison@nrc.gov)
Public Affairs Officer (Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov) Public Affairs Officer (Lara.Uselding@nrc.gov)
Public Affairs Officer (Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov)
Branch Chief, DRS/TSB (Michael.Hay@nrc.gov)  
Public Affairs Officer (Lara.Uselding@nrc.gov)
 
Branch Chief, DRS/TSB (Michael.Hay@nrc.gov)
Team Leader, TSB (Chuck.Paulk@nrc.gov) Project Manager (Lynnea. Wilkins@nrc.gov)
Team Leader, TSB (Chuck.Paulk@nrc.gov)
RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov) Regional Counsel (Karla.Fuller@nrc.gov) Congressional Affairs Officer (Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov)
Project Manager (Lynnea. Wilkins@nrc.gov)
Regional State Liason Officer (Bill.Maier@nrc.gov)  
RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov)
 
Regional Counsel (Karla.Fuller@nrc.gov)
Nuclear Security & Incident Response (Robert.Kahler@nrc.gov)  
Congressional Affairs Officer (Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov)
 
Regional State Liason Officer (Bill.Maier@nrc.gov)
Nuclear Security & Incident Response (Robert.Kahler@nrc.gov)
DRS/TSB STA (Dale.Powers@nrc.gov)
DRS/TSB STA (Dale.Powers@nrc.gov)
OEDO RIV Coordinator (Leigh.Trocine@nrc.gov) ROPreports (ROPreorts.Resource@nrc.gov)
OEDO RIV Coordinator (Leigh.Trocine@nrc.gov)
OEMail Resource (OEMAIL.Resource@nrc.gov)  
ROPreports (ROPreorts.Resource@nrc.gov)
OEMail Resource (OEMAIL.Resource@nrc.gov)
File located: R:\_REACTORS\_FCS\2010\FC 2009-04 ERRATA RP-RVA.doc SUNSI Rev Compl. : Yes No ADAMS  : Yes No Reviewer Initials JAC Publicly Avail : Yes No Sensitive Yes : No Sens. Type Initials JAC SRI:DRP/E SPE:DRP/E C:DRS/PSB1 C:DRP/E JKirkland RAzua MPShannon JAClark
/RA/  /RA/ /RA/ /RA/
07/08/10  07/08/10 0709/10 07/12/10 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY  T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax


File located: R:\_REACTORS\_FCS\2010\FC 2009-04 ERRATA RP-RVA.doc SUNSI Rev Compl. Yes No ADAMS Yes No Reviewer Initials JAC Publicly Avail Yes No Sensitive Yes No Sens. Type Initials JAC SRI:DRP/E SPE:DRP/E C:DRS/PSB1 C:DRP/E JKirkland RAzua MPShannon JAClark /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ 07/08/10 07/08/10 0709/10 07/12/10 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax ERRATA either installed in the plant or stored in the warehouse. Additionally, the procedure failed to adequately evaluate defects in components, which have never been installed or used in the nuclear plant.
ERRATA either installed in the plant or stored in the warehouse. Additionally, the procedure failed to adequately evaluate defects in components, which have never been installed or used in the nuclear plant.


The inspectors determined that the failure to adopt appropriate procedures to evaluate deviations and failures to comply associated with substantial safety hazards was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because if the procedure were left uncorrected it could become a more serious safety concern. Specifically, failure to notify the vendor upon discovery of a deviation does not allow for adequate evaluation of other components that could be subject to the deviation. Additionally, components with deviations could be located in the licensee's warehouse and subsequently installed in the plant without the licensee's knowledge, potentially creating a substantial safety hazard.
The inspectors determined that the failure to adopt appropriate procedures to evaluate deviations and failures to comply associated with substantial safety hazards was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because if the procedure were left uncorrected it could become a more serious safety concern. Specifically, failure to notify the vendor upon discovery of a deviation does not allow for adequate evaluation of other components that could be subject to the deviation. Additionally, components with deviations could be located in the licensees warehouse and subsequently installed in the plant without the licensees knowledge, potentially creating a substantial safety hazard.


Because this issue affected a potential reporting requirement and NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function, it was evaluated with the traditional enforcement process. Consistent with the guidance in Section IV.A.3 and Supplement VII paragraph D.4 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, this violation was categorized at Severity Level IV noncited violation. There is no crosscutting aspect associated with this finding because it is not indicative of current performance in that the procedure is many years old. (Section 4OA3)
Because this issue affected a potential reporting requirement and NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function, it was evaluated with the traditional enforcement process. Consistent with the guidance in Section IV.A.3 and Supplement VII paragraph D.4 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, this violation was categorized at Severity Level IV noncited violation. There is no crosscutting aspect associated with this finding because it is not indicative of current performance in that the procedure is many years old. (Section 4OA3)
Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity  
Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity
* Green. The inspectors identified a finding of having very low safety significance (Green) for failure to perform checks at the beginning of each shift on the main hoist limit switches of the refueling area crane (HE - 2) in the spent fuel pool area as specified in ANSI B30.2 - 1976, Overhead and Gantry Cranes, Section 2-2.1.2 Frequent Inspections a.2, prior to using the crane to perform dry fuel storage activities on June 29, 2009.


Green. The inspectors identified a finding of having very low safety significance (Green) for failure to perform checks at the beginning of each shift on the main hoist limit switches of the refueling area crane (HE - 2) in the spent fuel pool area as specified in ANSI B30.2 - 1976, "Overhead and Gantry Cranes", Section 2-2.1.2 Frequent Inspections a.2, prior to using the crane to perform dry fuel storage activities on June 29, 2009.
The failure to perform checks on the main hoist limit switches at the beginning of each work shift is a performance deficiency because the dry cask personnel used the crane to perform dry cask storage operations to lift items over the spent fuel pool without performing the required checks per shift change. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, minor question 2 because if left uncorrected the performance deficiency could lead to a more significant safety issue. Specifically, the main hoist limit switches are installed to limit the main hoist travel and to prevent a two blocking event. Preventing two blocking events ensures safe load handling of heavy loads over the spent fuel pool. Using the NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Phase 1 screening worksheet under the Barrier Cornerstone for spent fuel pool issues, the finding screened as having very low safety significance because it did not result in loss of cooling to the spent fuel pool, did not cause damage to the fuel cladding or result in dropped fuel assembly or result in a loss of spent fuel pool volume of greater than 10 percent. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in problem identification and resolution because the licensee failed to take appropriate corrective actions to address safety issues [P.1 (d)]. (Section 1R15)
  -3-  Enclosure


The failure to perform checks on the main hoist limit switches at the beginning of each work shift is a performance deficiency because the dry cask personnel used the crane to perform dry cask storage operations to lift items over the spent fuel pool without performing the required checks per shift change. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix B, "Issue Screening", minor question 2 because if left uncorrected the performance deficiency could lead to a more significant safety issue. Specifically, the main hoist limit switches are installed to limit the main hoist travel and to prevent a two blocking event. Preventing two blocking events ensures safe load handling of heavy loads over the spent fuel pool. Using the NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Phase 1 screening worksheet under the Barrier Cornerstone for spent fuel pool issues, the finding screened as having very low safety significance because it did not result in loss of cooling to the spent fuel pool, did not cause damage to the fuel cladding or result in dropped fuel assembly or result in a loss of spent fuel pool volume of greater than 10 percent. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in problem identification and resolution because the licensee failed to take appropriate corrective actions to address safety issues [P.1 (d)]. (Section 1R15) Enclosure ERRATA 1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04)
ERRATA 1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04)
a. Inspection Scope The inspector performed an in-office review of Revision 14 to Fort Calhoun Station Radiological Emergency Response Plan Section L, "Medical and Public Health Support,"
a. Inspection Scope The inspector performed an in-office review of Revision 14 to Fort Calhoun Station Radiological Emergency Response Plan Section L, Medical and Public Health Support, submitted August 5, 2009, and Section F, Emergency Communications, submitted September 24, 2009. These revisions designated the Operations Support Center as having responsibility for medical response while the facility is activated, relocated the First Aid Room from the Technical Support Center to the Maintenance Building, expanded the number of stations on the Conference Operations Network hotline, and added additional communications capability at the Scenario Development Room.
submitted August 5, 2009, and Section F, "Emergency Communications," submitted September 24, 2009. These revisions designated the Operations Support Center as having responsibility for medical response while the facility is activated, relocated the First Aid Room from the Technical Support Center to the Maintenance Building, expanded the number of stations on the Conference Operations Network hotline, and added additional communications capability at the Scenario Development Room.


These revisions were compared to their previous revisions, to the criteria of NUREG-0654, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, and to the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) to determine if the revisions adequately implemented the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q). These reviews were not documented in safety evaluation reports and did not constitute approval of licensee-generated changes; therefore, these revisions are subject to future inspection.
These revisions were compared to their previous revisions, to the criteria of NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1, and to the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) to determine if the revisions adequately implemented the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q). These reviews were not documented in safety evaluation reports and did not constitute approval of licensee-generated changes; therefore, these revisions are subject to future inspection.


These activities constitute completion of two samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.04-05. Note that combined with the results documented on page 18 of this report for Section 1EP4 these activities constitute a total completion of six samples in this report as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.04-05.
These activities constitute completion of two samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.04-05. Note that combined with the results documented on page 18 of this report for Section 1EP4 these activities constitute a total completion of six samples in this report as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.04-05.
Line 110: Line 99:
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.


4. OTHER ACTIVITIES  
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA6 Meetings Exit Meeting Summary On September 29, 2009, the inspector conducted a telephonic exit meeting with Mr. S. Gebers, Manager, Emergency Preparedness and Health Physics, to present the results of the in-office inspection of licensee changes to their emergency plan. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
 
4OA6 Meetings Exit Meeting Summary


On September 29, 2009, the inspector conducted a telephonic exit meeting with Mr. S. Gebers, Manager, Emergency Preparedness and Health Physics, to present the results of the in-office inspection of licensee changes to their emergency plan. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified. Enclosure
- 34 -  Enclosure
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 17:18, 13 November 2019

Errata for Fort Calhoun Station NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000285-09-004 and 072000054/09-001
ML101930141
Person / Time
Site: Fort Calhoun Omaha Public Power District icon.png
Issue date: 07/12/2010
From: Clark J
NRC/RGN-IV/DRP
To: Bannister D
Omaha Public Power District
References
IR-09-004
Download: ML101930141 (6)


Text

UNITED STATES NU C LE AR RE G ULATO RY C O M M I S S I O N R E GI ON I V 612 EAST LAMAR BLVD , SU ITE 400 AR LIN GTON , TEXAS 76011-4125 July 12, 2010 David J. Bannister, Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 P. O. Box 550 Fort Calhoun, NE 68023-0550 Subject: ERRATA FOR FORT CALHOUN STATION NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000285/2009004 and 072000054/2009001

Dear Mr. Bannister:

It was identified that an inconsistency exists in REPORT 05000285/2009004 and 072000054/2009001, dated November 13, 2009, between the description of the crosscutting aspect of the first GREEN finding under the Barrier Integrity cornerstone located in the Summary of Findings, and the description of the finding in Section 1R15, Operability Evaluations. Specifically, the correct crosscutting aspect for the described finding was in problem identification and resolution because of the failure to take appropriate corrective actions to address safety issues [P.1 (d)]. This is consistent with the information that was provided during the exit meeting held on October 7, 2009. As a result of this correction, please replace page 3 of the report with the enclosed page 3 (Summary of Findings).

In addition, it was also found that an inspection activity was inadvertently omitted from the same NRC Inspection Report 05000285/200904 and 072000054/2009001, dated November 13, 2009.

The inspection activity in question was the in-office review of Revision 14 to the Fort Calhoun Station Radiological Emergency response Plan Section L, Medical and Public Health Support, and Section F, Emergency Communications. Please add page 34 to NRC Inspection Report 05000285/200904 and 072000054/2009001.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, and its enclosure, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRCs document system (ADAMS).

ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

.

Omaha Public Power District -2-Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Jeffrey A. Clark, P.E.

Chief, Project Branch E Division of Reactor Projects Docket: 50-285 License: DPR-40 Enclosure:

Errata Pages 3 and 34 for NRC Inspection Report 05000285/200904 and 072000054/2009001 cc w/Enclosure:

Jeffrey A. Reinhart Site Vice President Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Adm P.O. Box 550 Fort Calhoun, NE 68023-0550 Mr. Thomas C. Matthews Manager - Nuclear Licensing Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Adm.

P.O. Box 550 Fort Calhoun, NE 68023-0550 Winston & Strawn Attn: David A. Repke, Esq.

1700 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20006-3817 Chairman Washington County Board of Supervisors P.O. Box 466 Blair, NE 68008

Omaha Public Power District -3-Ms. Julia Schmitt, Manager Radiation Control Program Nebraska Health & Human Services R & L Public Health Assurance 301 Centennial Mall, South P.O. Box 95007 Lincoln, NE 68509-5026 Ms. Melanie Rasmussen Radiation Control Program Officer Bureau of Radiological Health Iowa Department of Public Health Lucas State Office Building, 5th Floor 321 East 12th Street Des Moines, IA 50319 Chief, Technological Hazards Branch FEMA, Region VII 9221 Ward Parkway Suite 300 Kansas City, MO 64114-3372

Omaha Public Power District -4-Electronic distribution by RIV:

Regional Administrator (Elmo.Collins@nrc.gov)

Deputy Regional Administrator (Chuck.Casto@nrc.gov)

DRP Director (Dwight.Chamberlain@nrc.gov)

DRP Deputy Director (Anton.Vegel@nrc.gov)

DRS Director (Roy.Caniano@nrc.gov)

DRS Deputy Director (Troy.Pruett@nrc.gov)

Senior Resident Inspector (John.Kirkland@nrc.gov)

Resident Inspector (Jacob.Wingebach@nrc.gov)

Branch Chief, DRP/E (Jeff.Clark@nrc.gov)

Senior Project Engineer, DRP/E (Ray.Azua@nrc.gov)

FCS Site Secretary (Berni.Madison@nrc.gov)

Public Affairs Officer (Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov)

Public Affairs Officer (Lara.Uselding@nrc.gov)

Branch Chief, DRS/TSB (Michael.Hay@nrc.gov)

Team Leader, TSB (Chuck.Paulk@nrc.gov)

Project Manager (Lynnea. Wilkins@nrc.gov)

RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov)

Regional Counsel (Karla.Fuller@nrc.gov)

Congressional Affairs Officer (Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov)

Regional State Liason Officer (Bill.Maier@nrc.gov)

Nuclear Security & Incident Response (Robert.Kahler@nrc.gov)

DRS/TSB STA (Dale.Powers@nrc.gov)

OEDO RIV Coordinator (Leigh.Trocine@nrc.gov)

ROPreports (ROPreorts.Resource@nrc.gov)

OEMail Resource (OEMAIL.Resource@nrc.gov)

File located: R:\_REACTORS\_FCS\2010\FC 2009-04 ERRATA RP-RVA.doc SUNSI Rev Compl. : Yes No ADAMS  : Yes No Reviewer Initials JAC Publicly Avail : Yes No Sensitive Yes : No Sens. Type Initials JAC SRI:DRP/E SPE:DRP/E C:DRS/PSB1 C:DRP/E JKirkland RAzua MPShannon JAClark

/RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/

07/08/10 07/08/10 0709/10 07/12/10 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax

ERRATA either installed in the plant or stored in the warehouse. Additionally, the procedure failed to adequately evaluate defects in components, which have never been installed or used in the nuclear plant.

The inspectors determined that the failure to adopt appropriate procedures to evaluate deviations and failures to comply associated with substantial safety hazards was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because if the procedure were left uncorrected it could become a more serious safety concern. Specifically, failure to notify the vendor upon discovery of a deviation does not allow for adequate evaluation of other components that could be subject to the deviation. Additionally, components with deviations could be located in the licensees warehouse and subsequently installed in the plant without the licensees knowledge, potentially creating a substantial safety hazard.

Because this issue affected a potential reporting requirement and NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function, it was evaluated with the traditional enforcement process. Consistent with the guidance in Section IV.A.3 and Supplement VII paragraph D.4 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, this violation was categorized at Severity Level IV noncited violation. There is no crosscutting aspect associated with this finding because it is not indicative of current performance in that the procedure is many years old. (Section 4OA3)

Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity

  • Green. The inspectors identified a finding of having very low safety significance (Green) for failure to perform checks at the beginning of each shift on the main hoist limit switches of the refueling area crane (HE - 2) in the spent fuel pool area as specified in ANSI B30.2 - 1976, Overhead and Gantry Cranes, Section 2-2.1.2 Frequent Inspections a.2, prior to using the crane to perform dry fuel storage activities on June 29, 2009.

The failure to perform checks on the main hoist limit switches at the beginning of each work shift is a performance deficiency because the dry cask personnel used the crane to perform dry cask storage operations to lift items over the spent fuel pool without performing the required checks per shift change. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, minor question 2 because if left uncorrected the performance deficiency could lead to a more significant safety issue. Specifically, the main hoist limit switches are installed to limit the main hoist travel and to prevent a two blocking event. Preventing two blocking events ensures safe load handling of heavy loads over the spent fuel pool. Using the NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Phase 1 screening worksheet under the Barrier Cornerstone for spent fuel pool issues, the finding screened as having very low safety significance because it did not result in loss of cooling to the spent fuel pool, did not cause damage to the fuel cladding or result in dropped fuel assembly or result in a loss of spent fuel pool volume of greater than 10 percent. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in problem identification and resolution because the licensee failed to take appropriate corrective actions to address safety issues [P.1 (d)]. (Section 1R15)

-3- Enclosure

ERRATA 1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04)

a. Inspection Scope The inspector performed an in-office review of Revision 14 to Fort Calhoun Station Radiological Emergency Response Plan Section L, Medical and Public Health Support, submitted August 5, 2009, and Section F, Emergency Communications, submitted September 24, 2009. These revisions designated the Operations Support Center as having responsibility for medical response while the facility is activated, relocated the First Aid Room from the Technical Support Center to the Maintenance Building, expanded the number of stations on the Conference Operations Network hotline, and added additional communications capability at the Scenario Development Room.

These revisions were compared to their previous revisions, to the criteria of NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1, and to the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) to determine if the revisions adequately implemented the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q). These reviews were not documented in safety evaluation reports and did not constitute approval of licensee-generated changes; therefore, these revisions are subject to future inspection.

These activities constitute completion of two samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.04-05. Note that combined with the results documented on page 18 of this report for Section 1EP4 these activities constitute a total completion of six samples in this report as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.04-05.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA6 Meetings Exit Meeting Summary On September 29, 2009, the inspector conducted a telephonic exit meeting with Mr. S. Gebers, Manager, Emergency Preparedness and Health Physics, to present the results of the in-office inspection of licensee changes to their emergency plan. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

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