ML21200A241

Amended - Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4 - NRC Integrated Inspection Reports 05200025/2020003 and 05200026/2020003

ML21200A241
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	07/13/2021
From:	Nicole Coovert NRC/RGN-II
To:	Yox M Southern Nuclear Operating Co
Nicole Coovert
References
IR 2020003
Download: ML21200A241 (96)

Text

JuO\ , 2021 Mr. Michael Yox Regulatory Affairs Director Southern Nuclear Operating Company 7825 River Road, BlN 63031 Waynesboro, GA 30830

SUBJECT:

AMENDED - VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 3 AND 4 -

NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORTS 05200025/2020003, 05200026/2020003

Dear Mr. Yox:

On, November 10, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued the subject report, Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession Number ML20315A455. In reviewing this report, the NRC found that a correction was required for the cross-cutting aspect associated with the Green non-cited violation (NCV)5200025/2020003-01. Accordingly, we are providing an amended version of the report. The changes include, a revision to the Summary of Findings on page 8, and to Section 1A07, on page 20 of the report.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public inspections, exemptions, requests for withholding, of the NRC's "Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs ADAMS. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). To the extent

M. Yox 2 possible, your response should not include any personal privacy or proprietary information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction.

Sincerely, Digitally signed by Nicole C. Nicole C. Coovert Date: 2021.07.13 Coovert 08:45:12 -04'00' Nicole C. Coovert, Chief Construction Inspection Branch 1 Division of Construction Oversight Docket Nos.: 5200025, 5200026 License Nos.: NPF-91, NPF-92

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report (IR) 05200025/2020003, 05200026/2020003 w/attachment: Supplemental Information

M. Yox 3 cc w/ encls:

Resident Manager Resident Inspector Oglethorpe Power Corporation Vogtle Plant Units 3 & 4 Alvin W. Vogtle Nuclear Plant 8805 River Road 7821 River Road Waynesboro, GA 30830 Waynesboro, GA 30830 Mr. Barty Simonton Office of the Attorney General Team Leader 40 Capitol Square, SW Environmental Radiation Program Atlanta, GA 30334 Air Protection Branch Environmental Protection Division Southern Nuclear Operating Company 4244 International Parkway, Suite 120 Document Control Coordinator Atlanta, GA 30354-3906 3535 Colonnade Parkway Birmingham, AL 35243 Brian H. Whitley Regulatory Affairs Director Anne F. Appleby Southern Nuclear Operating Company Olgethorpe Power Corporation 3535 Colonnade Parkway, BIN N-226-EC 2100 East Exchange Place Birmingham, AL 35243 Tucker, GA 30084 Mr. Michael Yox County Commissioner Regulatory Affairs Director Office of the County Commissioner Southern Nuclear Operating Company Burke County Commission 7825 River Road, BIN 63031 Waynesboro, GA 30830 Waynesboro, GA 30830 Mr. Wayne Guilfoyle Commissioner District 8 Augusta-Richmond County Commission 4940 Windsor Spring Rd Hephzibah, GA 30815 Gwendolyn Jackson Burke County Library 130 Highway 24 South Waynesboro, GA 30830 Mr. Reece McAlister Executive Secretary Georgia Public Service Commission Atlanta, GA 30334

M. Yox 4 Email aagibson@southernco.com (Amanda Gibson) acchambe@southernco.com (Amy Chamberlian) bhwhitley@southernco.com (Brian Whitley)

Bill.Jacobs@gdsassociates.com (Bill Jacobs) corletmm@westinghouse.com (Michael M. Corletti) crpierce@southernco.com (C.R. Pierce) dahjones@southernco.com (David Jones) david.hinds@ge.com (David Hinds) david.lewis@pillsburylaw.com (David Lewis) dlfulton@southernco.com (Dale Fulton) ed.burns@earthlink.net (Ed Burns) edavis@pegasusgroup.us (Ed David)

G2NDRMDC@southernco.com (SNC Document Control)

George.Taylor@opc.com (George Taylor) harperzs@westinghouse.com (Zachary S. Harper) james1.beard@ge.com (James Beard)

JHaswell@southernco.com (Jeremiah Haswell) jim@ncwarn.org (Jim Warren)

John.Bozga@nrc.gov (John Bozga)

Joseph_Hegner@dom.com (Joseph Hegner) karlg@att.net (Karl Gross) kmstacy@southernco.com (Kara Stacy) kroberts@southernco.com (Kelli Roberts)

KSutton@morganlewis.com (Kathryn M. Sutton) kwaugh@impact-net.org (Kenneth O. Waugh) markus.popa@hq.doe.gov (Markus Popa) mdmeier@southernco.com (Mike Meier) media@nei.org (Scott Peterson)

Melissa.Smith@Hq.Doe.Gov (Melissa Smith) mike.price@opc.com (M.W. Price)

MKWASHIN@southernco.com (MKWashington) mphumphr@southernco.com (Mark Humphrey)

MSF@nei.org (Marvin Fertel) nirsnet@nirs.org (Michael Mariotte)

Nuclaw@mindspring.com (Robert Temple)

Paul@beyondnuclear.org (Paul Gunter) pbessette@morganlewis.com (Paul Bessette) ppsena@southernco.com (Peter Sena,III) r.joshi15@comcast.net (Ravi Joshi) rwink@ameren.com (Roger Wink) sabinski@suddenlink.net (Steve A. Bennett) sjackson@meagpower.org (Steven Jackson) sjones@psc.state.ga.us (Shemetha Jones) skauffman@mpr.com (Storm Kauffman) slieghty@southernco.com (Steve Leighty) sroetger@psc.state.ga.us (Steve Roetger) syagee@southernco.com (Stephanie Agee)

TomClements329@cs.com (Tom Clements)

Vanessa.quinn@dhs.gov (Vanessa Quinn) wayne.marquino@gmail.com (Wayne Marquino)

William.Birge@hq.doe.gov (William Birge)

M. Yox 5 X2edgran@southernco.com (Eddie R. Grant) x2gabeck@southernco.com (Gary Becker)

X2hagge@southern.com (Neil Haggerty)

X2wwill@southernco.com (Daniel Williamson)

7 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Inspection Report Docket Numbers: 5200025 5200026 License Numbers: NPF-91 NPF-92 Report Numbers: 05200025/2020003 05200026/2020003 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc Facility: Vogtle Unit 3 Combined License Vogtle Unit 4 Combined License Location: Waynesboro, GA Inspection Dates: July 1, 2020 through September 30, 2020 Inspectors: A. Artayet, Senior Construction Inspector, DCO K. Carrington, Resident Inspector, DCO G. Crespo, Senior Construction Inspector, DCO J. Eargle, Senior Resident Inspector - Testing, DCO B. Griman, Resident Inspector Development Program, DRP P. Heher, Resident Inspector, DCO N. Karlovich, Resident Inspector, DCO B. Kemker, Senior Resident Inspector, DCO G. Khouri, Senior Construction Inspector, DCO J. Lizardi-Barreto, Construction Inspector, DCO R. Patel, Resident Inspector (Acting), DCO A. Ponko, Senior Construction Inspector, DCO S. Smith, Senior Construction Inspector, DCO S. Temple, Resident Inspector, DCO J. Vasquez, Construction Inspector, DCO Approved by: Nicole Coovert, Branch Chief Construction Inspection Branch 1

8

SUMMARY

OF FINDINGS Inspection Report (IR) 05200025/2020003, 05200026/2020003; 07/01/2020 through 09/30/2020; Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Units 3 and 4, Integrated Inspection Report.

This report covers a three-month period of inspection by regional and resident inspectors.

One construction finding of very low safety significance (Green) with an associated non-cited violation (NCV) in the Inspection/Testing Cornerstone was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) which is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2519, Construction Significance Determination Process. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0613, Appendix F, Construction Cross-Cutting Areas and Aspects. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe construction of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in IMC 2506, Construction Reactor Oversight Process General Guidance and Basis Document.

A. NRC-Identified and Self Revealed Findings (Green) The inspectors identified a construction finding of very low safety significance (Green) with an associated NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50), Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for the licensee's failure to perform leakage examinations of two American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Class 2, pressure-retaining, weld joints for containment penetrations P27 and P28 to satisfy the requirements of ASME Section III.

The performance deficiency was of more than minor safety significance, and thus a finding, because it represented an adverse condition that rendered the quality of a structure unacceptable or indeterminate, and required substantive corrective action. The inspectors determined this finding was not associated with an ITAAC; it was not associated with a security program; it was not associated with an IMC 2504 operational/construction program; and it was not associated with a repetitive, NRC-identified omission of a program critical attribute. The inspectors determined this finding was of very low safety significance because the licensee was able to demonstrate the design function of the applicable structure (containment vessel) would not be impaired by successfully reperforming a pneumatic test of the affected welds. The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program as condition report (CR) 50056351. The inspectors determined the finding was indicative of present licensee performance and was associated with the cross-cutting aspect Resources, in the area of Human Performance. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources were available and adequate to support nuclear safety The licensee did not ensure the contractor understood the location of the welds or had updated procedures and drawings to satisfactorily perform targeted ASME Section III weld examinations during the pneumatic test. [H.1] (Section 1A07)

B. Licensee-Identified Violations None

9 REPORT DETAILS Summary of Plant Construction Status Unit 3: The licensee completed concrete placement over the shield building conical roof and was completing the shield building construction. In the containment building, the licensee completed installation of reactor coolant system (RCS) and passive core cooling system (PXS) piping and instrumentation, electrical conduits and cables (safety and non-safety related), necessary to support the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) required hydrostatic testing on the reactor and reactor coolant systems. The licensee completed the containment vessel ASME required pneumatic pressure test and integrated leak rate test. The licensee completed the construction of the auxiliary building structure.

Unit 4: The licensee continued with shield building construction. In the containment building, the licensee completed installation of RCS and PXS large bore piping and was in the process of routing raceways, cables, and terminations. The licensee continued construction of the auxiliary building structure from elevation 117- 6 to 160 and routing of electrical raceways.

1. CONSTRUCTION REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Design/Engineering, Procurement/Fabrication, Construction/Installation, Inspection/Testing IMC 2503, Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) - Related Work Inspections 1A01 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.1.02.02a (13) / Family 06F (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.1.02.02a (13) / Family 06F

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.1.02.02a (13). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

x 65001.06-02.03 - Post Installation Activities The inspectors reviewed surveillance records for selected safety related components to determine if adequate preventative maintenance was being established and performed in accordance with the vendor technical manual and licensee procedures.

Specifically, the inspectors reviewed Equipment Preservation Check Records (EPCR) to determine if the recommended maintenance activities specified in the technical manual were being established in accordance with the licensee procedure for the following components:

Motor operated valves (MOVs):

x Automatic depressurization system (ADS) stage 4 isolation: RCS-PLV-0014A/B/C/D x ADS stages 1, 2, & 3: RCS-PLV-001A/B, 2A/B, 3A/B

10 Squib valves:

x ADS stage 4: RCS-PLV-004A/B/C/D Also, the inspectors reviewed these records to verify if the maintenance activities were being performed at their prescribed frequencies specified by the technical manual. The inspectors reviewed the licensee procedure to determine if provisions were made to establish requirements for establishing periodic maintenance. The inspectors also conducted a walkdown of the accessible components to verify cleanliness, environmental controls, coverings, and preservatives were being maintained per site procedures.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A02 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.1.02.02a (13) / Family 06F

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.1.02.02a (13). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

x 65001.03-02.07 - Review of Records x 65001.04-02.04 - Documentation Packages x 65001.B-02.06 - Records The inspectors reviewed a selection of PCI Energy Services (PCI) quality assurance data packages (QADPs) containing lifetime records pertinent to field installation of Class 1 components, piping, and supports for the RCS in accordance with the requirements of the 1998 Edition including 2000 Addenda of the ASME Code Section III, Division 1, to verify compliance of entries in the following RCS ASME N-5 data reports for the following pressure boundary segments:

x reactor coolant loop (RCL) piping with twelve field welds joining two hot legs and four cold legs to the inlet and outlet nozzles of the reactor vessel, steam generators, and four reactor coolant pumps for the A and B sides of the RCS described in data packages SV3-RCS-MJR-001 and SV3-RCS-MJR-002, respectively; x pressurizer surge line with five pipe spools consisting of six welds and assembly of four pipe supports with end points from the hot leg nozzle to the pressurizer bottom inlet nozzle described in data package SV3-RCS-MJR-005; and x passive residual heat removal (PRHR) return line with five pipe spool pieces and assembly of three pipe supports from steam generator-1 (SG-A) back to the CA05 structural module wall penetration inside the pressurizer and steam generator compartments described in data package SV3-RCS-MJR-009.

11 The inspectors also reviewed a selection of QADPs that contain lifetime records pertinent to welding, machining, and final nondestructive examination (NDE) activities completed during field installation of supports for the reactor vessel, steam generators, and pressurizer in accordance with the 1998 Edition including 2000 Addenda of the ASME Code Section III, Subsection NF, to verify compliance for completion of the RCS ASME N-5 data reports for the following:

x reactor vessel with four supports joined to the CA04 structural module embedment plates and reactor vessel (RV) support thermal and bottom wear plates with limited tack welding of shims to bumpers described in data package SV3-RCS-MJR-MV01; x steam generator-1 and -2 (SG-A and -B) that included vertical column support assemblies, lower-intermediate-upper lateral supports with prior completion of NF-4441 inlay and overlay weldments to the CA01 structural module wall, and assembly of the upper lateral supports that was performed by others described in data packages SV3-RCS-MJR-MB01A and SV3-RCS-MJR-MB01B; and x pressurizer with four support columns connected to the adjoining building structure with anchor bolts, eight lower rigid sway struts with weld-on-brackets to the CA01 structural module wall, and eight upper rigid sway struts connected with lugs to the CA01 wall boxes described in data package SV3-RCS-MJR-MV2.

The installation N-5 data reports were also reviewed to verify they were completed and certified with signatures by the NA certificate holder representative and authorized nuclear inspector in accordance with the general requirements of the ASME Code Section III, Subsection NCA, with physical stamping of the ASME code symbol on "NA Class 1" nameplates.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A03 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.1.02.05a.i (19) / Family 14A

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.1.02.05a.i (19). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

x 65001.09-02.02 - Attributes of Electrical Cable installation x 65001.09-02.03 - Documentation x 65001.A- As-Built Attributes for SSCs associated with ITAAC x 65001.A.02.02 - Installation Records Review x 65001.A.02.03 - Independent Assessment/Measurement Inspection The inspectors performed an independent as-built inspection for raceway (i.e. cable trays and conduits) and supports associated with ITAAC 2.1.02.05a.i to determine whether the as-built critical attributes conformed to the final design and met the ITAAC-related requirements. This ITAAC is associated with the RCS and specifies that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 can withstand seismic

12 design basis loads without loss of safety function. This inspection focused on the independent observation and measurement of several raceways and supports that route safety-related cables used for supporting the safety function of the equipment concerned by this ITAAC. The following raceway supports along with their associated raceway sections were walked down by the inspectors:

x SV3-1231-SH-E1620

x SV3-1231-SH-E1627

x SV3-1231-SH-E1857

x SV3-1231-SH-E1931

x SV3-1231-SH-E1967

x SV3-1231-SH-E1968

x SV3-1231-SH-E1039

x SV3-1231-SH-E1042

x SV3-1231-SH-E1062

x SV3-1231-SH-E1065

The inspectors conducted walk-downs of the raceway sections and supports to verify if the as-built characteristics were as specified on the design documents and work procedures for these raceway sections and supports. These characteristics included raceway and supports identification labels, location, dimensions, size, material, and raceway and support type. During the walkdowns, the inspectors also verified if any damage had occurred prior to its installation and if the as-built condition conforms to their associated construction records, including work packages and drawings.

The inspectors reviewed the following information to determine if the as-built configuration was in accordance with the final design and that any differences between the as-built and as-designed condition were reconciled in accordance with approved modification or change processes:

x work packages, applicable specifications, drawings, and approved procedures to determine if the licensee verified installed raceway and supports met applicable codes, standards, regulations, and quality requirements;

x quality control (QC) inspection reports were reviewed and discussed to verify that acceptance of several raceway sections and supports was in accordance with required installation attributes and that QC inspection was accurate and complete;

x construction documents to verify torque wrenches used were qualified in accordance with quality procedures; and

x the latest approved-for-construction drawings, manufacturers instructions, and procedures to determine these were used and maintained for the installation of these raceway and supports.

The inspectors also interviewed personnel and reviewed a sample of design procedures and documents to verify if the licensee established an effective method for tracking, evaluating and dispositioning changes or modifications for anchors and interfacial connections (i.e. bolting and raceway clamps) for raceways and supports.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

13 1A04 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.1.02.05a.i (19) / Family 14A (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.1.02.05a.i (19) / Family 14A

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.1.02.05a.i (19). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

x 65001.09-02.02 - Attributes of Electrical Cable installation x 65001.09-02.03 - Documentation x 65001.F-02.02-Fabrication Records Review The inspectors performed an inspection associated with fabrication activities and materials for raceway (i.e. cable trays and conduits) and supports associated with ITAAC 2.1.02.05a.i. This ITAAC is associated with the RCS and specifies that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. This inspection focused on construction and procurement records produced during the fabrication of several raceways and supports that route safety-related cables used for supporting the safety function of the equipment concerned by this ITAAC.

The inspectors reviewed the following information to verify if the fabrication activities were conducted in accordance with ITAAC-related attributes and regulatory commitments:

x a sample of purchase orders to verify that they specify quality, technical, and 10 CFR Part 21 and Part 50.55(e) requirements; x procurement records produced for conduits, cable tray, steel sections and hardware to verify compliance with technical requirements and to determine if materials and components were manufactured by vendors on the approved vendors list (ASL);

x work packages, applicable specifications, drawings, and approved procedures to verify that fabrication activities were completed in compliance with applicable codes, standards, regulations, and quality requirements; x work packages and quality control inspection reports to verify that acceptance of several conduit and cable tray supports was in accordance with required fabrication attributes, and dimensions and tolerances from design drawings and specifications; x material requisition reports for several items, including Unistrut, bolting, and steel sections, to verify material technical requirements and traceability were in accordance with quality and mechanical testing requirements; and x a sample of welding procedure specifications and welder qualifications to verify if welding activities were performed by qualified individuals and approved procedures per the sites quality program requirements.

The inspectors also interviewed personnel and reviewed a sample of audit reports and surveillances to verify that audits documented the placement or retention of the contractor on the ASL, were done by qualified auditors, and audit findings were properly documented and dispositioned.

b. Findings

14 No findings were identified.

1A05 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.1.03.06.i (75) / Family 05A (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.1.03.06.i (75) / Family 05A

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.1.03.06.i (75). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

x 65001.09-02.02 - Attributes of Electrical Cable installation x 65001.09-02.03 - Documentation x 65001.F-02.02-Fabrication Records Review The inspectors performed an inspection associated with fabrication activities and materials for raceway (i.e. cable trays and conduits) and supports associated with ITAAC 2.1.03.06.i. This ITAAC is associated with the reactor system (RXS) and specifies that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. This inspection focused on construction and procurement records produced during the fabrication of several raceways and supports that route safety-related cables used for supporting the safety function of the equipment concerned by this ITAAC.

The inspectors reviewed the following information to verify that fabrication activities were conducted in accordance with ITAAC-related attributes and regulatory commitments:

x a sample of purchase orders to verify that they specify quality, technical, and 10 CFR Part 21 and Part 50.55(e) requirements; x procurement records produced for conduits, cable tray, steel sections and hardware to verify compliance with technical requirements and to determine if materials and components were manufactured by vendors on the ASL; x work packages, applicable specifications, drawings, and approved procedures to verify that fabrication activities were completed in compliance with applicable codes, standards, regulations, and quality requirements; x work packages and quality control inspection reports to verify that acceptance of several conduit and cable tray supports was in accordance with required fabrication attributes, and dimensions and tolerances from design drawings and specifications; x material requisition reports for several items, including Unistrut, bolting, and steel sections, to verify material technical requirements and traceability were in accordance with quality and mechanical testing requirements; and x a sample of welding procedure specifications and welder qualifications to verify if welding activities were performed by qualified individuals and approved procedures per the sites quality program requirements.

The inspectors also interviewed personnel and reviewed a sample of audit reports and surveillances to verify that audits documented the placement or retention of the contractor on the ASL, were done by qualified auditors, and audit findings were properly documented and dispositioned.

b. Findings

15 No findings were identified.

1A06 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.1.03.06.i (75) / Family 05A

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.1.03.06.i (75). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

x 65001.09-02.03 - Documentation x 65001.A- As-Built Attributes for SSCs associated with ITAAC x 65001.A.02.02 - Installation Records Review x 65001.A.02.03 - Independent Assessment/Measurement Inspection The inspectors performed an independent as-built inspection for raceway (i.e. cable trays and conduits) and supports associated with ITAAC 2.1.03.06.i to determine whether the as-built critical attributes conformed to the final design and met the ITAAC-related requirements. This ITAAC is associated with the RXS and specifies that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. This inspection focused on the independent observation and measurement of several raceways and supports that route safety-related cables used for supporting the safety function of the equipment concerned by this ITAAC. The following raceway supports along with their associated raceway sections were walked down by the inspectors:

x SV3-1231-SH-E1620 x SV3-1231-SH-E1627 x SV3-1231-SH-E1857 x SV3-1231-SH-E1931 x SV3-1231-SH-E1967 x SV3-1231-SH-E1968 The inspectors conducted walk-downs of the raceway sections and supports to verify if the as-built characteristics were as specified on the design documents and work procedures for these raceway sections and supports. These characteristics included raceway and supports identification labels, location, dimensions, size, material, and raceway and support type. During the walkdowns, the inspectors also verified if any damage had occurred prior to its installation and if the as-built condition conforms to their associated construction records, including work packages and drawings.

The inspectors reviewed the following information to determine if the as-built configuration was in accordance with the final design and that any differences between the as-built and as-designed condition were reconciled in accordance with approved modification or change processes:

x work packages, applicable specifications, drawings, and approved procedures to determine if the licensee verified installed raceway and supports met applicable codes, standards, regulations, and quality requirements;

16 x QC inspection reports were reviewed and discussed to verify that acceptance of several raceway sections and supports was in accordance with required installation attributes and that QC inspection was accurate and complete; x construction documents to verify torque wrenches used were qualified in accordance with quality procedures; and x the latest approved-for-construction drawings, manufacturers instructions, and procedures to determine these were used and maintained for the installation of these raceway and supports.

The inspectors also interviewed personnel and reviewed a sample of design procedures and documents to verify if the licensee established an effective method for tracking, evaluating and dispositioning changes or modifications for anchors and interfacial connections (i.e. bolting and raceway clamps) for raceways and supports.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A07 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.2.01.02a (91) / Family 06F

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.01.02a (91). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

x 65001.11 - Construction Inspection Program Inspection of ITAAC-Related Containment Integrity and Containment Penetrations x 65001.11-02.11 - Problem Identification and Resolution x 65001.C-02.01 - Program and Procedure Reviews x 65001.C-02.02 - Construction Test Observation x 65001.C-02.03 - Construction Test Record Review x 65001.C-02.04 - General Quality Assurance Review From July 5 to July 7, 2020, a pneumatic structural integrity test (SIT) of the Vogtle Unit 3 containment vessel (CV) was performed to demonstrate the ability of the containment to withstand specified internal pressure loads and act as a leak-tight barrier during a design basis accident. The SIT was conducted by Chicago Bridge and Iron Services (CBIS) in the accompaniment of Westinghouse, ILRT Inc., and SNC. The inspectors reviewed procedures and records, conducted walkdowns, performed test observations, and interviewed personnel to assess performance and compliance with rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and ASME code standards.

The inspectors performed a pre-test walkdown and general inspection of accessible portions of the containment interior and exterior surfaces; attended pre-job, safety, and infrequent test evolution briefings; observed test equipment setup and performance; and interviewed test personnel regarding procedural limitations, examination techniques, and ASME requirements. The inspectors reviewed pneumatic test procedure and related drawings, SIT chart recorder data, calibration records and test prerequisites, and personnel qualifications and certifications.

17 The inspectors reviewed the following information to determine if the inspection attributes were met:

x procedures and work instructions were approved by authorized personnel; x current procedure revision was available and in use at the test location by test personnel; x records existed for those welds/joints that were vacuum box tested prior to the SIT due to being inaccessible; x following test completion, the test data were evaluated by the licensee and its contractors (ILRT Inc.);

x test data was accurate and precisely recorded; x deficiencies and test interruptions or continuations were handled in accordance with approved procedures and documented in the test narrative log; x preliminary test results, records, data, and analyses were as expected and any discrepancies were logged; x test anomalies, problems, interruptions, and/or deficiencies recorded in the logs were documented and evaluated in accordance with procedures; and x the disposition of any deviations and corrective measures, if any, were documented and evaluated, and required retests or leakage examinations were performed, as necessary.

The inspectors verified through observation the following activities to determine if the inspection attributes were met:

x administrative test controls were properly followed; x a qualified (licensed) nuclear inspector was present during the SIT and at the time of the leakage examinations; x containment was pressurized to 1.1 times its design pressure and the maximum permissible test pressure was not exceeded; x test pressure was retained for a minimum of 10 minutes then reduced to a specified fraction of the pressure for leakage examinations of joints, penetrations, connections, and high stress regions; x after achieving 50% of the final test pressure, the rate of containment pressurization was increased in increments of approximately 1/10 of the test pressure up to 1.10 times the design pressure; x maximum rate of containment pressurization and depressurization were specified by procedure and adhered to throughout the SIT; x verified hold times for pressure stabilization and depressurization were specified and adhered to during the test; x depressurization rate of the containment and unloading increments paralleled the loading cycle; x maximum permissible test pressure was maintained for a minimum of 10 minutes then reduced to the greater of either the design pressure or the specified fraction of the test pressure for the leakage examinations; x adverse weather or environmental conditions which could impact test results were appropriately monitored and taken into consideration during the test; x logging of test parameters, leakage rates, observations was performed at a pre-determined periodicity; and x observed leakage examinations (solution/bubble film test technique) of various welds, reviewed sketches, and verified examinations of applicable joints, penetrations, and connections and regions of high stress (such as

18 seam welds, welds in the shell and dome, nozzle welds, welds of penetration sleeves) were performed in accordance with ASME Subsection NE.

The inspectors also performed the following activities to determine if the inspection attributes were met:

x verified by observation, interviews, and walkdowns that the containment structure was pressurized using a medium that was reasonably clear, dry, nonflammable, and free of contaminants; x verified by observation and data review that containment displacement was appropriately monitored during the test and did not exceed design parameters; x verified through interviews that testing was adequately coordinated, including appropriate abort criteria established; and x verified through interview and preliminary data review that no structural damage resulted from the test.

Last, the inspectors verified through walkdowns, interviews, and observation that the type, sensor location, range, accuracy, and calibration of instrumentation met requirements and standards, were specified, and indicating as expected.

Specifically, the inspectors verified if:

x displacement instrumentation used to measure overall deformation and deflection of the CV were installed at several points and elevations on the vessel; x humidity and temperature sensors were located at several locations and elevations throughout the containment and trending as expected; and x pressure gauges, recorders, displays, and other required test equipment were within the range and accuracy specified, calibrations were current, and instruments were in service prior to test.

b. Findings Introduction A construction finding of very low safety significance (Green) with an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was identified by the inspectors on July 17, 2020, for the licensee's failure to perform leakage examinations of two ASME Class 2, pressure-retaining, mechanical weld joints for containment penetrations P27 and P28. During the pneumatic SIT of the Unit 3 containment vessel, leakage examinations of welds SV3-SGS-PY-C03A-3 and SV3-SGS-PY-C03B-3 were not performed, as required by procedure 165766-830-05-PR-000010, "Pneumatic Testing of Unit 3 Containment Vessel to satisfy the requirements of ASME Section III.

Description Between July 5 and 7, 2020, the licensee performed a SIT of the Vogtle Unit 3 CV to satisfy the requirements of ASME Section III, Article NE-6000, Testing. Article NE-6000 required the vessel be pressurized to 1.1 times its design pressure for a minimum of 10 minutes prior to being depressurized to a lower value to allow for leakage examination of joints/welds, connections, and regions of high stress in accordance with paragraph NE- 6324. The scope of welds/joints required to be

19 examined were specified in procedure 165766-830-05-PR-000010, and included inspections of the Class 2, pressure-retaining, flued head to guard pipe welds for containment penetrations P27 and P28 or welds SV3-SGS-PY-C03A-3 and SV3-SGS-PY-C03B-3. Specifically, step 5.5.2 of the procedure required, in part, CBIS solution film test (leakage examination) the exterior pressure boundary welds as required and as specified by drawings 165766-830-05-SK-46101 through 165766-830-05-SK-46103 (Accessible Welds). Additionally, these welds were a part of the mechanical penetrations required to be inspected under paragraph NE-6712 of ASME Section III.

Prior to a July 17, 2020 NRC interview with the licensees weld examiners, it was discovered that mechanical weld joints SV3-SGS-PY-C03A-3 and SV3-SGS-PY-C03B-3 were not inspected as required by procedure 165766-830-05-PR-000010 and as specified in drawing 165766-830-05-SK-46102. The licensee captured this issue in the corrective action program as Condition Report (CR) 50056351. A preliminary investigation into the cause identified the examiners field of view was obstructed by scaffolding in place at the time of the pneumatic test and the obstruction prevented the examiners from seeing and locating the missed welds.

Analysis The inspectors determined that the failure to perform ASME Section III examinations in accordance with SIT Procedure 165766-830-05-PR-000010, as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, was a performance deficiency.

Per the guidance in IMC 0613, Power Reactor Construction Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated November 4, 2020, the inspectors determined traditional enforcement or enforcement discretion would not apply to this performance deficiency. Per the guidance in IMC 0613, Power Reactor Construction Inspection Reports, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Construction Issues, the inspectors determined the performance deficiency was of more than minor significance because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Construction Reactor Safety - Inspection/ Testing Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure programs and processes are adequately developed and implemented to inspect and test structures, systems, and components. The inspectors also reviewed the appendix E examples of minor issues and found one similar example of a not minor if performance deficiency. Example 22 was similar, in that the procedural step was required by Appendix B Criterion V as well as the ASME Code.

The inspectors determined this finding was not associated with an ITAAC; it was not associated with a security program; it was not associated with an IMC 2504 operational/construction program; and it was not associated with a repetitive, NRC-identified omission of a program critical attribute. In accordance with IMC 2519, Construction Significance Determination Process, appendix A, AP 1000 Construction Significance Determination Process, dated October 26, 2020, the inspectors determined the finding was associated with, the containment, a structure assigned to the intermediate risk column of the AP1000 Construction Significance Determination Matrix, and reasonable assurance could not be provided that the finding would not impair a portion of the containment design function (row 2 of the matrix). Specifically, because the licensee failed to perform examinations of SV3-SGS-PY-C03A-3 and SV3-SGS-PY-C03B-3, reasonable assurance could not be provided that the respective containment penetrations (P27 and P28) could support

20 the design function of CNS as a leak-tight barrier. The inspectors determined this finding was a performance deficiency of very low safety significance (Green) based on its placement in intermediate risk column and row 2 of the matrix.

The licensee subsequently performed a leakage examination using the vacuum box test method for these two welds and verified there was zero leakage in accordance with ASME Section III requirements.

In accordance with IMC 0613, Appendix F, Construction Cross-Cutting Areas and Aspects, the finding was determined to be indicative of present licensee performance and was associated with the cross-cutting aspect Resources, in the area of Human Performance, because the licensee failed to ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources were available and adequate to support nuclear safety. The licensee did not ensure the contractor understood the location of the welds or had updated procedures and drawings to satisfactorily perform targeted ASME Section III weld examinations during the pneumatic test [H.1].

Enforcement 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,"

requires, in part, that activities affecting quality be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.

Contrary to the above, on July 7, 2020, the licensee failed to accomplished activities affecting quality in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.

Specifically, step 5.5.2 of procedure 165766-830-05-PR-000010, "Pneumatic Testing of Unit 3 Containment Vessel," required in part that CBIS solution film test (leakage examination) the exterior pressure boundary welds as required and as specified by drawings 165766-830-05-SK-46101 through 165766-830-05-SK-46103 (Accessible Welds). Welds SV3-SGS-PY-C03A-3 and SV3-SGS-PY-C03B-3 were identified on CBIS drawing 165766-830-05-SK-46102, Revision 2, as welds requiring solution film testing (leakage examination), however the licensee failed to perform leakage examinations of welds SV3-SGS-PY-C03A-3 and SV3-SGS-PY-C03B-3 for penetrations P27 and P28 in accordance with Step 5.5.2 of CBIS procedure 165766-830-05-PR-000010 to meet ASME Code Section III.

The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program as CR-50056351 and has performed successful pneumatic tests on the welds in question as corrective actions. Because this violation was not repetitive or willful, was of very low safety significance (Green), and was entered into the licensees corrective action program, it is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 05200025/2020003-01, Failure to Perform ASME Section III Leakage Examinations in Accordance with Procedure).

1A08 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.2.01.02a (91) / Family 06F

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.01.02a (91). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

21 x 65001.F- Inspection of the ITAAC-Related Design and Fabrication Requirements x 65001.F-02.01-Design Document Review x 65001.F-02.04-General QA Review For the CV, the inspectors reviewed design documents, implementing procedures and interface policies that govern the design control program associated with the design of the CV, to verify compliance with the regulatory requirements of Criterion III, Design Control, of Appendix B, to 10 CFR Part 50, with the Vogtle 3&4 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), and with the applicable requirements of Division 1, Subsection NC, Class 2 Components, and Subsection NE, Class MC Component, of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code,Section III, Rules of Construction of Nuclear Facility Components.

The inspectors reviewed the CV design specification and the design report to verify the results, for the various load combination, including seismic, were within the allowable limits of ASME Section III to verify if the CV would meet its design safety function as described in the UFSAR. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed:

x the functional requirements as defined by the Westinghouse Electric Company (WEC) design specification (i. e., component classification, design requirements, environmental conditions and transients, loading and seismic requirements, load combinations, permissible stresses) were consistent with the UFSAR; x CBIS design calculations to determine if the requirements of the design specifications were appropriately translated into the calculations, including seismic loads, and any issues were appropriately resolved; x design calculations, including material properties, conformed to the requirements of ASME Section III, Division 1, Subsections NC and NE; x drawings and dimensions used in design calculation to verify that as-built configuration was reflected in the analysis; x design attributes associated with component classification and ASME service level were in accordance with applicable requirements of ASME B&PV Code, ASME Section III Division 1 - Subsection NC, 1998 Edition with 2000 Addenda, and ASME B&PV Code Section III, Division 1 - Subsection NE, 2001 Edition including 2002 Addenda; and x selected deviations and nonconformance were dispositioned and reconciled to maintain compliance with the Code.

The inspectors reviewed software and personnel qualifications for ASME related design work for the following:

x ANSYS Version 19.2, to perform finite element analysis to perform stress analysis and fatigue evaluation of CV components per ASME B&PV Code,Section III; x ANSYS Version 11.0, used by Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries Corporation (IHI) to perform finite element modelling of CV Personnel Airlock; and x verification of implementation of UFSAR Section 3.9.1.2, Computer Programs Used in Analysis.

22 The inspectors also verified that: (1) quality standards were specified and included in design documents; (2) independent verifications and checks were integrated into the process and were being performed; (3) design interface between client and contractor were documented; and (3) design changes were being effectively controlled and approved by original design organization. The inspectors also discussed the Design Control program with CBIS and Westinghouse management and technical staff.

The inspectors reviewed a sample of personnel qualification records for engineers who performed design activities, specifically for design calculations for CV and its components. This review was to verify that the design documents were created and verified by qualified engineers, and that personnel involved in the development of design documents met CBIS, WEC and their contractors procedure requirements for approvers, reviewers, and verifiers and also met the independent verification requirements of ASME B&PV Code,Section III and ASME NQA-1-1994 Edition, Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications. The NRC inspection team reviewed sample qualification records of registered professional engineering personnel from CBIS, WEC and IHI that were involved in certifying CV design documents and conformed that the qualification records were current and met the requirements of ASME B&PV Code,Section III, Mandatory Appendix XXIII, Qualifications and Duties of Certifying Engineers Performing Certification Activities.

For software control, the inspectors reviewed CBISs software validation and verification process for the ANSYS Finite Analysis software used for design analysis and calculations of CV and its components and confirmed that the software was commercially procured, verified and validated prior to its use and installation. The NRC inspection team verified that each new version of the ANSYS, including latest version 19.2, was subject to verification through regression testing to previous software versions known to be acceptable, and that the calculations supported the conclusions. The NRC inspection team also confirmed that CBIS had evaluated all incoming ANSYS software error reports for their impact on previous design analysis and calculations. Further, the NRC inspection team reviewed CBIS audit of IHI software quality assurance program and confirmed that CBIS have verified IHIs verification and validation of ANSYS software program for use in CV airlock design analysis.

For procurement document control, the inspectors reviewed purchase order issued by the licensee and WEC to CBIS to verify that the requirements identified in the procedures were imposed in the applicable purchasing documents. The inspectors verified that the licensee and WEC purchase orders (POs) defined contract deliverables, instructions for the disposition of nonconformances, access rights, and provisions for the extension of contractual requirements to CBIS. Further, the NRC inspection team verified if the safety-related POs reviewed included clauses invoking the provisions of 10 CFR Part 21, Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance, and requiring CBIS to conduct safety-related work under its approved quality assurance (QA) program. In addition, the NRC inspection team reviewed CBIS PO to IHI for procurement of CV personnel airlock design and verified if CBIS had invoked all applicable technical, quality and regulatory requirement for procurement of safety-related SSCs.

The inspectors reviewed issues entered by the licensee, CBIS and WEC corrective action program (CAP) to assess issues that might warrant additional follow-up inspection, to assess repetitive or long-term issues, to assess adverse performance

23 trends, and to verify if the CAP appropriately included regulatory required non-safety related SSCs. The NRC inspection team reviewed conditions entered the CBIS and WEC CAP to determine whether the issues were appropriately classified in accordance with the licensee, CBIS quality assurance program and CAP implementing procedures. The NRC inspection team reviewed corrective actions associated with conditions entered into the CAP to determine whether appropriate actions to correct the issues were identified and implemented effectively, including immediate or short-term corrective actions, in accordance with the applicable quality assurance program requirements and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action. Additionally, the NRC inspection team reviewed the corrective actions taken to determine whether they were commensurate with the significance of the associated conditions in accordance with the licensee's CAP implementing procedures. The NRC inspection team completed reviews of CAP to verify issues from all aspects of the project, including equipment, human performance, and program issues, were being identified by the licensee and its contractors at an appropriate threshold and entered into the CAP as required by the licensee and its contractors CAP implementing procedures.

The inspectors reviewed a sample of audits to verify implementation of the licensee, CBIS and WEC audit programs. The NRC inspection team verified that CBIS prepared and approved plans that identify the audit scope, focus, and applicable checklist criteria before the initiation of the audit activity. The inspectors determined if the audit reports contained a review of the relevant QA criteria VII, Control of Purchased Material, Equipment and Services, of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 for the activities that individual contractor performed, as well as documentation of pertinent contractor guidance associated with each criterion. For audits that resulted in findings, the inspectors verified that the contractor had established a plan for corrective action and that WEC and CBIS had reviewed and approved the corrective action and verified its satisfactory completion and proper documentation in a timely manner.

The inspectors also verified if CBIS performed external audits commensurate with the required frequencies specified in the CBIS quality assurance manual (QAM),

associated procedures, and the applicable section(s) of the ASME B&PV Code, and that audit results were adequately reviewed by responsible management.

In the case of third-party audits, the NRC inspection team verified that CBIS reviewed and accepted the supplied third-party audit documentation before taking credit for the audit results.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A09 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.2.01.02a (91) / Family 06F

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.01.02a (91). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

x 65001.11-02.03 - Installation and Welding

24 The inspectors reviewed a PCI Energy Services QADP, SV3-CNS-MJR-002, for the containment system (CNS) that contained lifetime records pertinent to welding, final NDE, and vacuum box testing activities for ten welds during field installation of the fuel transfer tube assembly that included the transfer tube, annular ring, spent fuel pool (SFP) flange, vessel bellows plate ring, SFP shim plate, vessel side bellows, and SFP side bellows. The inspectors verified if these activities were performed in accordance with the requirements of the 2001 Edition including 2002 Addenda of the ASME Code Section III, Division 1, Subsection NE, Class MC for metal containment components. The installation N-5 data report was also reviewed to verify it was completed and certified with signatures by the NA certificate holder representative and authorized nuclear inspector in accordance with the general requirements of the ASME Code Section III, Subsection NCA, with physical stamping of the ASME code symbol on a "NA Class MC" nameplate.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A10 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.2.01.02a (91) / Family 06F

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.01.02a (91). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

x 65001.11 - Construction Inspection Program Inspection of ITAAC-Related Containment Integrity and Containment Penetrations The inspectors reviewed Stone and Webster (S&W) and CBIS records associated with welding two 18-inch diameter carbon steel guard pipes to the CV external side penetration sleeves for field welds C05A-2 (penetration P44) and C05B-2 (penetration P45) to verify welding, radiography, and solution film vacuum box testing of the welds (guard pipes open-ended to atmosphere) were performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III, Subsection NE.

The inspectors reviewed weld data sheets (WDSs) SV3-SGS-PY-C05A-2 and SV3-SGS-PY-C05B-2 to verify QC and applicable Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI) inspection hold points were signed-off and dated for acceptance of internal cleanliness, fit-up with alignment tack welds, and final visual examination in accordance with NCA-4134.10 and NE-4230. The inspectors also reviewed the entries on the WDSs to determine whether the traceability of four different weld filler metals and eight welders were maintained in accordance with NE-4122 and NE-4300.

The inspectors reviewed welding procedure specification (WPS) 1-1.1GT(M)SM-NE-2 to verify the latest revision changes were performed within the limits of essential variables for the previously reviewed supporting procedure qualification records PQ607A and PQ607B in accordance with ASME Code Section IX, Article II.

The inspectors reviewed performance qualification records for eight welders to verify these welders were tested and certified in accordance with the requirements of the

25 ASME Code Section IX, Article III for butt welds C05A-2 and C05B-2 located in annulus between the CV and shield building.

The inspectors reviewed certified material test reports (CMTRs) for both guard pipes and 3/32-inch diameter E7018 electrodes to verify they were compatible and met the requirements for chemical analysis and mechanical properties in accordance with the applicable ASME Code Section II, Parts A and C, for carbon steel material specifications. The inspectors also reviewed the hydrostatic test report of the guard pipes to verify pressure testing was performed in accordance with ASME Code Section III, Subsection NE.

The inspectors reviewed MISTRAS computed radiography examination reports V RT-301-0540 (C05A-2) and V-18-RT-301-0488 (C05B-2) to determine whether acceptance by SNT-TC-1A Level II and III examiners were performed with no rejectable indications using the proper type of source, image quality indicator (IQI) size, exposure time, and geometric unsharpness in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III (Article NB-5000) and Section V (Article 2).

The inspectors also reviewed CBIS Traveler U3-CNS welds-NI-SFT-2 to verify acceptance of solution film vacuum box testing of the guard pipe to penetration sleeve butt welds, witnessed by the ANI and CBIS QC inspector NDE Level II, were performed in accordance with previously reviewed CBIS procedure CMS-830-15-PR-45164, Solution Film Testing Vacuum Box Technique ASME Section III, Division 1, Subsection NE."

b. Findings Introduction The inspectors identified an unresolved item (URI) associated with the licensees structural model analysis of containment penetrations 44 and 45 (P44/P45).

Specifically, UFSAR Section 3.6.2.1.1.4, High Energy Piping in Containment Penetration Areas, states, in part, that breaks are not postulated in the portions of ASME Code,Section III, Class 2 or Class 3 piping, provided subject piping meets the following provisions: Level C service limits of the ASME Code,Section III, Paragraph NE-3221 are not exceeded by the loadings associated with containment design pressure and temperature in combinations with a safe shutdown earthquake. The licensees postulation was based on ASME Code Section III, Level C Service limits not being exceeded. At the time of the inspection, the licensee identified it had not performed structural model calculations for P44/P45 to verify they were meeting their current license bases (CLB). The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program as CR 50063621 and WEC CAP IR 2020-10571.

Description The inspectors determined a performance deficiency existed associated with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to have design control measures for verifying or checking the adequacy of the design of containment penetrations 44 and 45. Specifically, the licensee failed to perform a structural model calculation for P44 and P45 to verify the adequacy of the penetrations design in accordance with its CLB.

26 Per IMC 0613, Power Reactor Construction Inspection Reports, this issue will remain unresolved pending further analysis by SNC and Westinghouse, which will be used by the inspectors to determine if the performance deficiency is material to the acceptance criteria of an ITAAC (URI 05200025/2020003-02, ASME Section III Level C Service Limits May Not Be Met for Containment Penetrations 44 and 45).

1A11 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.2.01.05.i (98) / Family 11A (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.2.01.05.i (98) / Family 11A

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.01.05.i (98). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

x 65001.09-02.02 - Attributes of Electrical Cable installation x 65001.09-02.03 - Documentation x 65001.F-02.02-Fabrication Records Review The inspectors performed an inspection associated with fabrication activities and materials for raceway (i.e. cable trays and conduits) and supports associated with ITAAC 2.2.01.05.i. This ITAAC is associated with the CNS and specifies that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. This inspection focused on construction and procurement records produced during the fabrication of several raceways and supports that route safety-related cables used for supporting the safety function of the equipment concerned by this ITAAC.

Specifically, the inspectors performed the following to verify that fabrication activities were conducted in accordance with ITAAC-related attributes and regulatory commitments:

x a sample of purchase orders to verify that they specify quality, technical, and 10 CFR Part 21 and Part 50.55(e) requirements; x procurement records produced for conduits, cable tray, steel sections and hardware to verify compliance with technical requirements and to determine if materials and components were manufactured by vendors on the ASL; x work packages, applicable specifications, drawings, and approved procedures to verify that fabrication activities were completed in compliance with applicable codes, standards, regulations, and quality requirements; x work packages and quality control inspection reports to verify that acceptance of several conduit and cable tray supports was in accordance with required fabrication attributes, and dimensions and tolerances from design drawings and specifications; x material requisition reports for several items, including Unistrut, bolting, and steel sections, to verify material technical requirements and traceability were in accordance with quality and mechanical testing requirements; and x a sample of welding procedure specifications and welder qualifications to verify if welding activities were performed by qualified individuals and approved procedures per the sites quality program requirements.

The inspectors also interviewed personnel and reviewed a sample of audit reports and surveillances to verify that audits documented the placement or retention of the

27 contractor on the ASL, were done by qualified auditors, and audit findings were properly documented and dispositioned.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A12 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.2.01.05.i (98) / Family 11A

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.01.05.i (98). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

x 65001.09-02.02 - Attributes of Electrical Cable installation x 65001.09-02.03 - Documentation x 65001.A- As-Built Attributes for SSCs associated with ITAAC x 65001.A.02.02 - Installation Records Review x 65001.A.02.03 - Independent Assessment/Measurement Inspection The inspectors performed an independent as-built inspection for raceway (i.e. cable trays and conduits) and supports associated with ITAAC 2.2.01.05.i to determine whether the as-built critical attributes conformed to the final design and met the ITAAC-related requirements. This ITAAC is associated with the CNS and specifies that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. This inspection focused on the independent observation and measurement of several raceways and supports that route safety-related cables used for supporting the safety function of the equipment concerned by this ITAAC. The following raceway supports along with their associated raceway sections were walked down by the inspectors:

x SV3-1222-SH-E736 x SV3-1222-SH-E738 x SV3-1222-SH-E873 The inspectors conducted walk-downs of the raceway sections and supports to verify if the as-built characteristics were as specified on the design documents and work procedures for these raceway sections and supports. These characteristics included raceway and supports identification labels, location, dimensions, size, material, and raceway and support type. During the walkdowns, the inspectors also verified if any damage had occurred prior to its installation and if the as-built condition conforms to their associated construction records, including work packages and drawings.

The inspectors reviewed the following information to determine if the as-built configuration was in accordance with the final design and that any differences between the as-built and as-designed condition were reconciled in accordance with approved modification or change processes:

x work packages, applicable specifications, drawings, and approved procedures to determine if the licensee verified installed raceway and supports met applicable codes, standards, regulations, and quality requirements;

28 x QC inspection reports were reviewed and discussed to verify that acceptance of several raceway sections and supports was in accordance with required installation attributes and that QC inspection was accurate and complete; x construction documents to verify torque wrenches used were qualified in accordance with quality procedures; and x the latest approved-for-construction drawings, manufacturers instructions, and procedures to determine these were used and maintained for the installation of these raceway and supports.

The inspectors also interviewed personnel and reviewed a sample of design procedures and documents to verify if the licensee established an effective method for tracking, evaluating and dispositioning changes or modifications for anchors and interfacial connections (i.e. bolting and raceway clamps) for raceways and supports.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A13 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.2.03.02a (159) / Family 06F (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.2.03.02a (159) / Family 06F

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.03.02a (159). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

x 65001.06-02.03 - Post Installation Activities The inspectors reviewed surveillance records for selected safety related components to determine if adequate preventative maintenance was being established and performed in accordance with the vendor technical manual and licensee procedures.

Specifically, the inspectors reviewed EPCRs to determine if the recommended maintenance activities specified in the technical manual were being established in accordance with the licensee procedure for the following components:

Air Operated Valves (AOVs):

x Accumulator discharge valves: PXS-PLV-14A/B, 15A/B x Passive residual heat removal heat exchanger (PRHR HX) outlet: PXS-PLV-108A/B Squib valves:

x In containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST): PXS-PLV-123A/B, 125A/B x Containment recirculation: PXS-PLV-118A/B, 120A/B Also, the inspectors reviewed these records to verify if the maintenance activities were being performed at their prescribed frequencies specified by the technical manual. The inspectors reviewed the licensee procedure to determine if provisions were made to establish requirements for establishing periodic maintenance. The inspectors conducted a walkdown of the accessible components to verify cleanliness, environmental controls, coverings, and preservatives were being maintained per site procedures.

29

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A14 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.2.03.02a (159) / Family 06F

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.03.02a (159). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

x 65001.03-02.07 - Review of Records The inspectors reviewed a selection of S&W ASME N-5 data reports pertinent to field installation of Class 1, 2, and 3 components, piping, valves, and supports for the PXS in accordance with the requirements of the 1998 Edition including 2000 Addenda of the ASME Code Section III, Division 1, to verify compliance of entries in the following PXS ASME N-5 data reports of pressure boundary segments:

x core makeup tank alpha (CMT-A) and its supports including six thermowells SV3-JE-TW015A through -TW020A shown in N-5 serial-no. SV3-PXS-MJR-MT01A for Class 1; x 8-inch diameter line L007A at top of CMT-A with cold leg inlet isolation motor operated valve V002A and 1-inch diameter branch lines L068A and L069A to flanges of limit switches LS031 and LS033, respectively, ending at the flatolet on top of the pipe cap shown in N-5 serial-no. SV3-PXS-MJR-001 for Class 1; x eight 1-inch diameter lines each with connections to the shell of CMT-B, bellows globe valves, and low level pressure transmitters shown in N-5 serial-no. SV3-PXS-MJR-004 for Class 2; x 1-inch diameter line L042 of outside containment nitrogen (N2) supply with isolation globe valve V042 (includes seal welds of containment penetration P18) to check valve V043 inside containment with 1-inch branch pipe for containment penetration test globe valve V052 shown in N-5 serial-no. SV3-PXS-MJR-015 for Class 2; x PRHR HX and supports located inside the IRWST shown in N-5 serial-no.

SV3-PXS-MJR-ME02 for Class 1; x PRHR HX 14-inch diameter outlet line L103 with branch lines L104A and B for control discharge globe valves V108A and B into common line L105 with manual gate valve V109 shown in N-5 serial-no. SV3-PXS-MJR-019 for Class 1; x 1-inch, 4-inch, and 6-inch diameter vertical and sloped lines interconnected from eight containment recirculating downspout screens 1A-D and 2A-D to the IRWST gutter and PXS collection boxes A & B (eventually routing to IRWST drain lines and containment sumps - not bound by data report) shown in N-5 serial-no. SV3-PXS-MJR-025 for Class 3; x 8-inch diameter line L015A (with 1-inch drain line for globe valve V012A) from the bottom outlet of CMT-A to branch lines L016A and L017A for discharge isolation globe valves V014A and V015A into common line L020A (with 1-inch drain line for globe valve V252A) for check valves V016A and V017A (each with 1-inch vent lines for globe valves V250A and V251A) shown in N-5 serial-no. SV3-PXS-MJR-026 for Class 1;

30 x 1-inch diameter accumulator leak test globe valve V202A of branch line L057A into 8-inch diameter line L027A from accumulator discharge isolation gate valve V027A and flow limiting orifice R02A shown in N-5 serial-no. SV3-PXS-MJR-027 for Class 3; and x 8-inch diameter IRWST screen B gravity injection check valves V122B and V124B (each with 2-inch branch lines L122B and L126B for check test globe valves V128B and V129B) to isolation gate valves V123B and V125B, respectively, (eventually routing to RCS DVI-B line - not bound by data report) shown in N-5 serial-no. SV3-PXS-MJR-031 for Class 1.

The installation N-5 data reports were also reviewed to verify they were completed and certified with signatures by the NA certificate holder representative and authorized nuclear inspector in accordance with the general requirements of the ASME Code Section III, Subsection NCA.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A15 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.2.03.05a.i (165) / Family 14A (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.2.03.05a.i (165) / Family 14A

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.03.05a.i (165). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

x 65001.09-02.02 - Attributes of Electrical Cable installation x 65001.09-02.03 - Documentation x 65001.F-02.02-Fabrication Records Review The inspectors performed an inspection associated with fabrication activities and materials for raceway (i.e. cable trays and conduits) and supports associated with ITAAC 2.2.03.05a.i. This ITAAC is associated with the PXS and specifies that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. This inspection focused on construction and procurement records produced during the fabrication of several raceways and supports that route safety-related cables used for supporting the safety function of the equipment concerned by this ITAAC.

The inspectors reviewed the following information to verify if the fabrication activities were conducted in accordance with ITAAC-related attributes and regulatory commitments:

x a sample of purchase orders to verify that they specify quality, technical, and 10 CFR Part 21 and Part 50.55(e) requirements; x procurement records produced for conduits, cable tray, steel sections and hardware to verify compliance with technical requirements and to determine if materials and components were manufactured by vendors on the ASL; x work packages, applicable specifications, drawings, and approved procedures to verify that fabrication activities were completed in compliance with applicable codes, standards, regulations, and quality requirements;

31 x work packages and quality control inspection reports to verify that acceptance of several conduit and cable tray supports was in accordance with required fabrication attributes, and dimensions and tolerances from design drawings and specifications; x material requisition reports for several items, including Unistrut, bolting, and steel sections, to verify material technical requirements and traceability were in accordance with quality and mechanical testing requirements; and x a sample of welding procedure specifications and welder qualifications to verify if welding activities were performed by qualified individuals and approved procedures per the sites quality program requirements.

The inspectors also interviewed personnel and reviewed a sample of audit reports and surveillances to verify that audits documented the placement or retention of the contractor on the ASL, were done by qualified auditors, and audit findings were properly documented and dispositioned.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A16 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.2.03.05a.i (165) / Family 14A

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.03.05a.i (165). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

x 65001.09-02.02 - Attributes of Electrical Cable installation x 65001.09-02.03 - Documentation x 65001.A- As-Built Attributes for SSCs associated with ITAAC x 65001.A.02.02 - Installation Records Review x 65001.A.02.03 - Independent Assessment/Measurement Inspection The inspectors performed an independent as-built inspection for raceway (i.e. cable trays and conduits) and supports associated with ITAAC 2.2.03.05a.i to determine whether the as-built critical attributes conformed to the final design and met the ITAAC-related requirements. This ITAAC is associated with the PXS and specifies that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. This inspection focused on the independent observation and measurement of several raceways and supports that route safety-related cables used for supporting the safety function of the equipment concerned by this ITAAC. The following raceway supports along with their associated raceway sections were walked down by the inspectors:

x SV3-1231-SH-E1039 x SV3-1231-SH-E1042 x SV3-1231-SH-E1062 x SV3-1231-SH-E1065 x SV3-1132-SH-E117 x SV3-1132-SH-E211 x SV3-1132-SH-E276

32 The inspectors conducted walk-downs of the raceway sections and supports to verify if the as-built characteristics were as specified on the design documents and work procedures for these raceway sections and supports. These characteristics included raceway and supports identification labels, location, dimensions, size, material, and raceway and support type. During the walkdowns, the inspectors also verified if any damage had occurred prior to its installation and if the as-built condition conforms to their associated construction records, including work packages and drawings.

The inspectors reviewed the following information to determine if the as-built configuration was in accordance with the final design and that any differences between the as-built and as-designed condition were reconciled in accordance with approved modification or change processes:

x work packages, applicable specifications, drawings, and approved procedures to determine if the licensee verified installed raceway and supports met applicable codes, standards, regulations, and quality requirements; x QC inspection reports were reviewed and discussed to verify that acceptance of several raceway sections and supports was in accordance with required installation attributes and that QC inspection was accurate and complete; x construction documents to verify torque wrenches used were qualified in accordance with quality procedures; and x the latest approved-for-construction drawings, manufacturers instructions, and procedures to determine these were used and maintained for the installation of these raceway and supports.

The inspectors also interviewed personnel and reviewed a sample of design procedures and documents to verify if the licensee established an effective method for tracking, evaluating and dispositioning changes or modifications for anchors and interfacial connections (i.e. bolting and raceway clamps) for raceways and supports.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A17 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.5.02.02.i (522) / Family 10A

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.5.02.02.i (522). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

x 65001.09-02.02 - Attributes of Electrical Cable installation x 65001.09-02.03 - Documentation x 65001.A- As-Built Attributes for SSCs associated with ITAAC x 65001.A.02.02 - Installation Records Review x 65001.A.02.03 - Independent Assessment/Measurement Inspection The inspectors performed an independent as-built inspection for raceway (i.e. cable trays and conduits) and supports associated with ITAAC 2.5.02.02i to determine whether the as-built critical attributes conformed to the final design and met the ITAAC-related requirements. This ITAAC is associated with the Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) and specifies that the seismic Category I equipment

33 identified in Table 2.5.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. This inspection focused on the independent observation and measurement of several raceways and supports that route safety-related cables used for supporting the safety function of the equipment concerned by this ITAAC. The following raceway supports along with their associated raceway sections were walked down by the inspectors:

x SV3-1231-SH-E1709 x SV3-1231-SH-E1710 x SV3-1231-SH-E1738 x SV3-1231-SH-E1747 The inspectors conducted walk-downs of the raceway sections and supports to verify if the as-built characteristics were as specified on the design documents and work procedures for these raceway sections and supports. These characteristics included raceway and supports identification labels, location, dimensions, size, material, and raceway and support type. During the walkdowns, the inspectors also verified if any damage had occurred prior to its installation and if the as-built condition conforms to their associated construction records, including work packages and drawings.

The inspectors reviewed the following information to determine if the as-built configuration was in accordance with the final design and that any differences between the as-built and as-designed condition were reconciled in accordance with approved modification or change processes:

x work packages, applicable specifications, drawings, and approved procedures to determine if the licensee verified installed raceway and supports met applicable codes, standards, regulations, and quality requirements; x QC inspection reports were reviewed and discussed to verify that acceptance of several raceway sections and supports was in accordance with required installation attributes and that QC inspection was accurate and complete; x construction documents to verify torque wrenches used were qualified in accordance with quality procedures; and x the latest approved-for-construction drawings, manufacturers instructions, and procedures to determine these were used and maintained for the installation of these raceway and supports.

The inspectors also interviewed personnel and reviewed a sample of design procedures and documents to verify if the licensee established an effective method for tracking, evaluating and dispositioning changes or modifications for anchors and interfacial connections (i.e. bolting and raceway clamps) for raceways and supports.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A18 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.5.02.02.i (522) / Family 10A (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.5.02.02.i (522) / Family 10A

a. Inspection Scope

34 The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.5.02.02.i (522). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

x 65001.09-02.02 - Attributes of Electrical Cable installation x 65001.09-02.03 - Documentation x 65001.F-02.02-Fabrication Records Review The inspectors performed an inspection associated with fabrication activities and materials for raceway (i.e. cable trays and conduits) and supports associated with ITAAC 2.5.02.02i. This ITAAC is associated with the PMS and specifies that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. This inspection focused on construction and procurement records produced during the fabrication of several raceways and supports that route safety-related cables used for supporting the safety function of the equipment concerned by this ITAAC.

The inspectors reviewed the following information to verify if the fabrication activities were conducted in accordance with ITAAC-related attributes and regulatory commitments:

x a sample of purchase orders to verify that they specify quality, technical, and 10 CFR Part 21 and Part 50.55(e) requirements; x procurement records produced for conduits, cable tray, steel sections and hardware to verify compliance with technical requirements and to determine if materials and components were manufactured by vendors on the ASL; x work packages, applicable specifications, drawings, and approved procedures to verify that fabrication activities were completed in compliance with applicable codes, standards, regulations, and quality requirements; x work packages and quality control inspection reports to verify that acceptance of several conduit and cable tray supports was in accordance with required fabrication attributes, and dimensions and tolerances from design drawings and specifications; x material requisition reports for several items, including Unistrut, bolting, and steel sections, to verify material technical requirements and traceability were in accordance with quality and mechanical testing requirements; and x a sample of welding procedure specifications and welder qualifications to verify if welding activities were performed by qualified individuals and approved procedures per the sites quality program requirements.

The inspectors also interviewed personnel and reviewed a sample of audit reports and surveillances to verify that audits documented the placement or retention of the contractor on the ASL, were done by qualified auditors, and audit findings were properly documented and dispositioned.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A19 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.6.03.02.i (597) / Family 08A (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.6.03.02.i (597) / Family 08A

a. Inspection Scope

35 The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.6.03.02.i (597). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

x 65001.09-02.02 - Attributes of Electrical Cable installation x 65001.09-02.03 - Documentation x 65001.F-02.02-Fabrication Records Review The inspectors performed an inspection associated with fabrication activities and materials for raceway (i.e. cable trays and conduits) and supports associated with ITAAC 2.6.03.02.i. This ITAAC is associated with the class 1E DC and uninterruptible power supply system (IDS) and specifies that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. This inspection focused on construction and procurement records produced during the fabrication of several raceways and supports that route safety-related cables used for supporting the safety function of the equipment concerned by this ITAAC.

The inspectors reviewed the following information to verify if the fabrication activities were conducted in accordance with ITAAC-related attributes and regulatory commitments:

x a sample of purchase orders to verify that they specify quality, technical, and 10 CFR Part 21 and Part 50.55(e) requirements; x procurement records produced for conduits, cable tray, steel sections and hardware to verify compliance with technical requirements and to determine if materials and components were manufactured by vendors on the ASL; x work packages, applicable specifications, drawings, and approved procedures to verify that fabrication activities were completed in compliance with applicable codes, standards, regulations, and quality requirements; x work packages and quality control inspection reports to verify that acceptance of several conduit and cable tray supports was in accordance with required fabrication attributes, and dimensions and tolerances from design drawings and specifications; x material requisition reports for several items, including Unistrut, bolting, and steel sections, to verify material technical requirements and traceability were in accordance with quality and mechanical testing requirements; and x a sample of welding procedure specifications and welder qualifications to verify if welding activities were performed by qualified individuals and approved procedures per the sites quality program requirements.

The inspectors also interviewed personnel and reviewed a sample of audit reports and surveillances to verify that audits documented the placement or retention of the contractor on the ASL, were done by qualified auditors, and audit findings were properly documented and dispositioned.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A20 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.6.03.02.i (597) / Family 08A

36

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.6.03.02.i (597). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

x 65001.09-02.02 - Attributes of Electrical Cable installation x 65001.09-02.03 - Documentation x 65001.A- As-Built Attributes for SSCs associated with ITAAC x 65001.A.02.02 - Installation Records Review x 65001.A.02.03 - Independent Assessment/Measurement Inspection The inspectors performed an independent as-built inspection for raceway (i.e. cable trays and conduits) and supports associated with ITAAC 2.6.03.02.i to determine whether the as-built critical attributes conformed to the final design and met the ITAAC-related requirements. This ITAAC is associated with the IDS and specifies that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. This inspection focused on the independent observation and measurement of several raceways and supports that route safety-related cables used for supporting the safety function of the equipment concerned by this ITAAC. The following raceway supports along with their associated raceway sections were walked down by the inspectors:

x SV3-1231-SH-E1731 x SV3-1231-SH-E1830 x SV3-1231-SH-E1794 (IDS)

The inspectors conducted walk-downs of the raceway sections and supports to verify if the as-built characteristics were as specified on the design documents and work procedures for these raceway sections and supports. These characteristics included raceway and supports identification labels, location, dimensions, size, material, and raceway and support type. During the walkdowns, the inspectors also verified if any damage had occurred prior to its installation and if the as-built condition conforms to their associated construction records, including work packages and drawings.

The inspectors reviewed the following information to determine if the as-built configuration was in accordance with the final design and that any differences between the as-built and as-designed condition were reconciled in accordance with approved modification or change processes:

x work packages, applicable specifications, drawings, and approved procedures to determine if the licensee verified installed raceway and supports met applicable codes, standards, regulations, and quality requirements; x QC inspection reports were reviewed and discussed to verify that acceptance of several raceway sections and supports was in accordance with required installation attributes and that QC inspection was accurate and complete; x construction documents to verify torque wrenches used were qualified in accordance with quality procedures; and x the latest approved-for-construction drawings, manufacturers instructions, and procedures to determine these were used and maintained for the installation of these raceway and supports.

37 The inspectors also interviewed personnel and reviewed a sample of design procedures and documents to verify if the licensee established an effective method for tracking, evaluating and dispositioning changes or modifications for anchors and interfacial connections (i.e. bolting and raceway clamps) for raceways and supports.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A21 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.6.03.07 (616) / Family 08F

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.6.03.07 (616). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

x 65001.08-02.03 - Completed Work x 65001.F-02.01-Design Document Review The inspectors performed an inspection of Unit 3 Class 1E dc and UPS System (IDS) equipment that had been replaced after being wetted by water that migrated inside the Unit 3 electrical cabinets SV3-IDSC-DC-1 and -DT-1 (24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Battery Charger and Voltage Regulating Transformer). As a result of this event, a condition report was generated to document the need to transfer components from Unit 4 (SV4-IDSC-DC-1 and -DT-1) to Unit 3.

The inspectors reviewed non-conformance and disposition report (N&D) SV3-IDSC-GNR-000011, Revision 0, "Unit 3 IDSC Cabinets Damaged by Water (ESR 50036899)." This N&D described the condition that caused the water intrusion and the decision to replace SV3-IDSC-DC-1 and SV3-IDSC-DT-1 cabinets. The inspectors reviewed the work package to remove these Unit 3 cabinets and their replacement with Unit 4 cabinets SV4-IDSC-DC-1 and SV4-IDSC-DT-1. The inspectors reviewed the work package to verify:

x reassembly of the equipment cabinets at shipping splits; x reconnecting, torquing, and insulation of bus bars; x other miscellaneous internal connections as specified in the vendor manual; x vendor manual for any shipping split connections including control and power wiring were completed as required; x instructions to perform cable testing and terminations x the nameplate information to verify if this was a like for like replacement of IDS cabinets; and x all equipment, conduits, and cables were installed in accordance with design drawings and specifications.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A22 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 3.3.00.02a.i.b (761) / Family 01F

38

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 3.3.00.02a.i.b (761). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

x 65001.01-02.07 - Identification and Resolution of Problem x 65001.02-02.01 - Inspection of Concrete Placement x 65001.02-02.07 - Problem Identification and Resolution x 65001.A.02.04 - Review As-built Deviations/Nonconformance x 65001.F- Inspection of the ITAAC-Related Design and Fabrication Requirements x 65001.F-02.01-Design Document Review The inspectors observed the vertical, horizontal, and transverse reinforcing bars installed in the lower 10-0 section of the outer passive containment cooling system (PCS) tank wall approximately between azimuths 0 and 90 degrees to verify if the sizes, spacing, material designation, grade, lap splices, and layout of the bars were consistent with the applicable design drawings, engineering & design coordination report (E&DCRs), construction specification SV3-CC01-Z0-31, and American Concrete Institute (ACI) 349-01.

The inspectors also observed installation of the bottom radial and circumferential reinforcing in the PCS tank roof slab. Specifically, the inspectors verified if the sizes, spacing, material designation, lap splices, and layout of the bars were consistent with the applicable design drawings, E&DCRs, construction specification SV3-CC01-Z0-31, and ACI 349-01.

The inspectors reviewed four E&DCRs to verify that design changes made to the PCS tank wall and roof reinforcing steel were performed in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. Specifically, the inspectors verified if the design changes were subject to control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design and were approved by the organization that performed the original design or the designated responsible organization. The inspectors also reviewed the E&DCRs to verify if the revisions to the PCS tank outer wall reinforcing steel were consistent with those approved in LAR 16-031R.

The inspectors reviewed a sample of CRs associated with the steel reinforcement and concrete of the shield building to verify the evaluations and corrective actions were conducted in accordance with the licensee's CAP; the issues were accurately identified and documented in a timely manner; and the issues were classified and resolved commensurate with their safety significance.

The inspectors reviewed the trending codes applied to each CR to verify they were correctly identified, tracked, and trended in accordance with ND-AD-002-025, "Issue Identification, Screening, and Dispatching." The inspectors reviewed a sample of nonconformances associated with the steel reinforcement and concrete to verify the nonconformances had adequate technical evaluations and were dispositioned in accordance with APP-GW-GAP-428, "Nonconformance and Disposition Report."

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A23 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 3.3.00.02a.i.c (762) / Family 01F

39

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 3.3.00.02a.i.c (762). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

x 65001.01-02.07 - Identification and Resolution of Problem x 65001.02-02.07 - Problem Identification and Resolution x 65001.F-02.04-General QA Review The inspectors reviewed a sample of CRs associated with the structural steel and embedments for the non-radiologically controlled portion of the auxiliary building to verify the evaluations and corrective actions were conducted in accordance with the licensee's CAP; the issues were accurately identified and documented in a timely manner; and the issues were classified and resolved commensurate with their safety significance. The inspectors reviewed the trending codes applied to each CR to verify they were correctly identified, tracked, and trended in accordance with ND-AD-002-025, "Issue Identification, Screening, and Dispatching." The inspectors reviewed a sample of nonconformances associated with the structural steel and embedments to verify the nonconformances had adequate technical evaluations and were dispositioned in accordance with APP-GW-GAP-428, "Nonconformance and Disposition Report."

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A24 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.2.03.02a (159) / Family 06F

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.03.02a (159). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

x 65001.03-02.03 - Installation and Welding x 65001.03-02.06 - Nondestructive Examination (NDE) x 65001.03-02.07 - Review of Records x 65001.06-02.01 - General Installation x 65001.B-02.03-Welder Qualification x 65001.B-02.04-Production Controls x 65001.B-02.05-Inspection The inspectors reviewed welding and NDE records associated with field welds (FW) 34 and 35 located on the inlet and outlet sides, respectively, of gate valve PXS-PL-V101 with connecting line RCS-PL-L134 for the RCS and PXS-PL-L102 for the PXS supply, respectively, to the PRHR HX to determine if the 14-inch diameter stainless steel motor operated valve was installed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III, Subsection NB, for Class 1 components.

The inspectors reviewed WDSs SV4-RCS-PLW-034-1 and SV4-PXS-PLW-035-1 for work packages P0W-800072 and P0W-1013959, respectively, to verify QC inspection

40 hold points were signed-off and dated for acceptance of internal cleanliness, fit-up with alignment tack welds, and final visual examination in accordance with NCA-4134.10 and NB-4230. The inspectors also reviewed the entries on the WDSs to determine whether the traceability of previously reviewed stainless steel weld filler metals and welders were maintained in accordance with NB-4122 and NB-4300. In addition, the inspectors reviewed performance qualification records of welders for FW 35 to verify if these welders were tested and certified for welding on the PXS side of valve V101 in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Code Section IX, Article III.

The inspectors reviewed MISTRAS computed radiography examination report V RT-302-0797 for FW 34 on the RCS inlet side and V-20-RT-302-0796 for FW 35 on the PXS outlet side of valve V101 to determine whether acceptance by a SNT-TC-1A Level III examiner was performed with no rejectable indications using the proper type of source, IQI size, exposure time, and geometric unsharpness in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III (Article NB-5000) and Section V (Article 2).

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A25 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 3.3.00.02a.i.b (761) / Family 01F

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 3.3.00.02a.i.b (761). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

x 65001.01-02.07 - Identification and Resolution of Problem x 65001.02-02.01 - Inspection of Concrete Placement x 65001.02-02.04 - Expansion Anchor Installation x 65001.02-02.07 - Problem Identification and Resolution x 65001.F- Inspection of the ITAAC-Related Design and Fabrication Requirements x 65001.F-02.01-Design Document Review The inspectors observed concrete placement in the air inlet structure of the shield building cylindrical wall. The inspectors reviewed the placement plan to verify if preplacement planning had been completed to assure quality construction and contingency plans had been made to address unexpected events.

The inspectors reviewed two concrete batch plant delivery tickets to verify if the batched mixes conformed to the placement plan and were discharged in accordance with the construction specification. Additionally, the inspectors observed in-process record testing to verify if concrete temperature, flow, air content, and unit weight conformed to requirements and in-process testing was completed at the proper location and frequency as required by the construction specification.

The inspectors also reviewed placement activities to verify that drop distances did not exceed specification requirements; placement rates were consistent with the placement plan; and appropriate attention was given to areas of obstruction within the modules to minimize the potential for voids or honeycombing.

41 The inspectors reviewed a sample of CRs associated with the steel panels and concrete to verify the evaluations and corrective actions were conducted in accordance with the licensee's CAP; the issues were accurately identified and documented in a timely manner; and the issues were classified and resolved commensurate with their safety significance. The inspectors reviewed the trending codes applied to each CR to verify they were correctly identified, tracked, and trended in accordance with ND-AD-002-025, "Issue Identification, Screening, and Dispatching." The inspectors reviewed a sample of nonconformances associated with the steel panels and concrete to verify the nonconformances had adequate technical evaluations and were dispositioned in accordance with APP-GW-GAP-428, "Nonconformance and Disposition Report."

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A26 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 3.3.00.02a.i.c (762) / Family 01F

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 3.3.00.02a.i.c (762). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

x 65001.02-02.01 - Inspection of Concrete Placement x 65001.F- Inspection of the ITAAC-Related Design and Fabrication Requirements x 65001.F-02.01-Design Document Review The inspectors observed the reinforcing steel within room 12505, the upper nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system (VBS) B&D equipment room, at elevation 135-3. This room is located between walls M and P and the shield building cylindrical wall and wall 11. Specifically, the inspectors verified if the material designation, grade, sizes, spacing, lap splices, and general layout of the top and bottom reinforcing bars within the concrete slab on metal deck were consistent with the applicable design drawings, E&DCRs, construction specification SV4-CC01-Z0-31, and ACI 349-01.

The inspectors reviewed two E&DCRs to verify if design changes made to the slab reinforcement were performed in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. Specifically, the inspectors verified if the design changes were subject to control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design and were approved by the organization that performed the original design or the designated responsible organization. The inspectors also reviewed the E&DCR to verify if an adequate technical justification was provided for the design change; deviations from applicable quality standards such as ACI 349-01 were controlled; and the revised design was correctly translated into the updated design output documents.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

42 1A27 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 3.3.00.02a.i.c (762) / Family 01F

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 3.3.00.02a.i.c (762). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

x 65001.01-02.07 - Identification and Resolution of Problem x 65001.02-02.01 - Inspection of Concrete Placement x 65001.02-02.07 - Problem Identification and Resolution x 65001.F- Inspection of the ITAAC-Related Design and Fabrication Requirements x 65001.F-02.01-Design Document Review x 65001.F-02.04-General QA Review The inspectors observed the reinforcing steel in wall P between elevations 135-3 and approximately 146-10. This wall forms the west wall of the upper VBS B&D Equipment Room (Room 12505). Specifically, the inspectors verified if the material designation, grade, sizes, spacing, lap splices, and general layout of the vertical, horizontal, and transverse reinforcing bars within the wall were consistent with the applicable design drawings, E&DCRs, construction specification SV4-CC01-Z0-31, and ACI 349-01.

The inspectors reviewed four E&DCRs to verify if design changes impacting the construction of wall P were performed in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. Specifically, the inspectors verified if the design changes were subject to control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design and were approved by the organization that performed the original design or the designated responsible organization. The inspectors also reviewed the E&DCR to verify if an adequate technical justification was provided for the design change, deviations from applicable quality standards such as ACI 349-01 were controlled, and the revised design was correctly translated into the updated design output documents.

The inspectors reviewed a sample of CRs associated with the steel reinforcement and embedments to verify the evaluations and corrective actions were conducted in accordance with the licensee's CAP; the issues were accurately identified and documented in a timely manner; and the issues were classified and resolved commensurate with their safety significance. The inspectors reviewed the trending codes applied to each CR to verify they were correctly identified, tracked, and trended in accordance with ND-AD-002-025, "Issue Identification, Screening, and Dispatching." The inspectors reviewed a sample of nonconformances associated with the steel reinforcement and embedments to verify the nonconformances had adequate technical evaluations and were dispositioned in accordance with APP-GW-GAP-428, "Nonconformance and Disposition Report." Additionally, the inspectors observed repairs and rework resulting from the nonconformances to verify if they were conducted in accordance with the dispositions.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

43 IMC 2504, Construction Inspection Program - Inspection of Construction and Operational Programs 1P01 Construction QA Criterion 16 x 35007-A16.04 - Inspection Requirements and Guidance - 0 samples x 35007-A16.04.01 - Inspection of QA Implementing Documents - 0 samples x 35007-A16.04.02 - Inspection of QA Program Implementation - 0 samples

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed issues entered into the licensee's CAP daily to assess issues that might warrant additional follow-up inspection, to assess repetitive or long term issues, to assess adverse performance trends, and to verify if the CAP appropriately included regulatory required non-safety related SSCs. The inspectors periodically attended the licensee's CAP review meetings, held discussions with licensee and contractor personnel, and performed reviews of CAP activities during the conduct of other baseline inspection procedures. The inspectors reviewed conditions entered into the licensee's CAP to determine whether the issues were classified in accordance with the licensee's quality assurance program and CAP implementing procedures. The inspectors reviewed corrective actions associated with conditions entered into the CAP to determine whether appropriate actions to correct the issues were identified and implemented effectively, including immediate or short-term corrective actions, in accordance with the applicable quality assurance program requirements and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the corrective actions taken to determine whether they were commensurate with the significance of the associated conditions in accordance with the licensee's CAP implementing procedures. The inspectors completed reviews of CAP entry logs to verify issues from all aspects of the project, including equipment, human performance, and program issues, were being identified by the licensee and its contractors at an appropriate threshold and entered into the CAP as required by licensee's CAP implementing procedures.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

4. OTHER INSPECTION RESULTS 4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

.1 Exit Meeting.

On October 23, 2020, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. M. Yox, Vogtle 3&4 Director of Regulatory Affairs, and other licensee and contractor staff members. Proprietary information was reviewed during the inspection period but was not included in the inspection report.

44 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensees and Contractor Personnel R. Beilke, ITAAC Project Manager C. Castell, SNC Licensing Engineer N. Kellenberger, SNC Licensing Supervisor S. Leighty, SNC Licensing Supervisor T. Petrak, SNC ITAAC Manager L. Pritchett, SNC Licensing Engineer K. Roberts, SNC, Licensing Manager G. Scott, SNC Licensing Engineer M. Yox, SNC Regulatory Affairs Director LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Item Number Type Status Description 05200025/2020003-01 NCV Open/Closed Failure to Perform ASME Section III Leakage Examinations (Section 1A07)05200025/2020003-02 URI Open ASME Section III Level C Service Limits May Not Be Met for Containment Penetrations 44 and 45 (Section 1A10)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

[2503 Documents]

Section 1A01 Unit 3 & 4 EPCRs for the following valves through 7/30/2020 RCS-PLV-001 A/B RCS-PLV-002 A/B RCS-PLV-003 A/B RCS-PLV-0014 A/B/C/D RCS-PLV-0004 A/B/C/D Condition Reports CR 50057519, "NRC Criterion XIII inspection observation", dated 7/29/2020 CR 50057525, "NRC Criterion XIII inspection observation", dated 7/29/2020 CR 50057585, "Work orders cancelled without proper justification", dated 7/30/2020 Procedures 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N6201, "Field Material Storage Control", Revision 9 B-GEN-MNT-002, "Work Process And Requirements For Plant Equipment Preservation And Preventive Maintenance", Version 2.0 APP-PV14-VMM-001, "Instruction, Operation and Maintenance Manual for PV14 Air Operated Globe Valves, ASME Section III, Class 1, 2 & 3", Revision 3 APP-PV20-VMM-001, "Installation, Operation & Maintenance Manual for AP1000 PV20 Piston Operated Rotary Ball Valves", Revision 2.0 SV0-PV01-VMM-001, "MAINTENANCE MANUAL for AP1000 PV01 Size 3 or Larger Motor Operated Gate Valves,Section III, Class 1, 2 & 3", Revision 0

45 SV0-PV01-VMM-002, "Instruction Manual for AP1000 PV01 Size 3 and Larger Motor Operated Globe Valves,Section III, Class 1, 2 & 3", Revision 1 APP-PV70-VMM-001, "PV70 Squib (Pyrotechnic Actuated) Valves Maintenance Manual",

Revision 2 APP-PV98-VMM-001, "PV98 Pyrotechnic Actuator Instruction Manual (for PV70 Squib Valves)", Revision 1 Section 1A02 N-3173, PCI Energy Services, "ASME NA Certificate of Authorization (Corporate),

Construction of Class 1, 2, 3, CS & MC field Installation at various locations certified by ASME," Expires September 2, 2020 N-3173-3, PCI Energy Services, "ASME NA Certificate of Authorization, Class 1, 2, 3, CS &

MC field installation at the Vogtle NPS, Units 3 and 4, 7824 River Road, Waynesboro, Georgia 30830," Expires August 19, 2019 S&W 132175-2554-055-088-00007, SV0-RCS-VQQ-800006, "PCI 910962-001, Quality Assurance Data Package for Vogtle Unit 3 AP1000 RCS Reactor Coolant Loop (Alpha) Piping Field Installation," Document No. SV3-RCS-MJR-001, includes "Section 7.0: PCI Quality Assurance Travelers with Field Change Requests and Weld Map" and "Section 8.0: PCI Final Nondestructive Examination Reports, with Mistras Radiography Reader Sheets with CR Film Document Locator Numbers and TEAM UT Reports," (866 pages), 12/19/2019 PCI "Form N-5 Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, As Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1," for RCS Reactor Coolant Loop Piping (Alpha) for Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV3-RCS-MJR-001 installed for Stone & Webster, Inc., (4 pages), 04/03/2019 PCI Checklist-001, "Final Documentation Checklist - Vogtle Unit 3 AP1000 Reactor Coolant Loop (RCL) Piping (ALPHA) Field Installation," (8 pages), Revision 1 PCI 910962-FR-001, "PCI Final Report - Vogtle Unit 3 AP1000 RCS Reactor Coolant Loop (RCL) Piping (Alpha) Field Installation," Revision 0 PCI Photo of ASME Code Symbol Stamping on "NA Class 1" Nameplate by PCI Energy Services for Serial Number SV3-RCS-MJR-001, page 498 S&W 132175-2554-055-088-00006, SV0-RCS-VQQ-800005, "PCI 910962-002, Quality Assurance Data Package for Vogtle Unit 3 AP1000 RCS Reactor Coolant Loop (Bravo) Piping Field Installation," Document No. SV3-RCS-MJR-002, includes "Section 7.0: PCI Quality Assurance Travelers with Field Change Requests and Weld Map" and "Section 8.0: PCI Final Nondestructive Examination Reports, with Mistras Radiography Reader Sheets with CR Film Document Locator Numbers and TEAM UT Reports," (829 pages), 02/04/2020 PCI "Form N-5 Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, As Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1," for RCS Reactor Coolant Loop Piping (Bravo) Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV3-RCS-MJR-002 installed for Stone & Webster, Inc., (4 pages),

03/21/2019

46 PCI Checklist-002, "Final Documentation Checklist - Vogtle Unit 3 AP1000 Reactor Coolant Loop (RCL) Piping (Bravo) Field Installation," (8 pages), Revision 1 PCI 910962-FR-002, "PCI Final Report - Vogtle Unit 3 AP1000 RCS Reactor Coolant Loop (RCL) Piping (Bravo) Field Installation," Revision 0 PCI Photo of ASME Code Symbol Stamping on "NA Class 1" Nameplate by PCI Energy Services for Serial Number SV3-RCS-MJR-002, page 496 S&W 132175-2554-055-088-00003, SV0-RCS-VQQ-800002, "PCI 912941-001, Quality Assurance Data Package for Vogtle Unit 3 AP1000 RCS Surge Line Pipe and Pipe Supports Field Installation," Document No. SV3-RCS-MJR-005, includes "Section 7.0: PCI Quality Assurance Travelers with Field Change Requests and Weld Map (Pipe and Pipe Supports)"

and "Section 8.0: PCI Final Nondestructive Examination Reports, with Mistras Radiography Reader Sheets and TEAM UT Reports," (653 pages), 08/02/2019 PCI "Form N-5 Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, As Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1," for RCS Surge Line Pipe and Pipe Supports for Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV3-RCS-MJR-005 installed for Stone & Webster, Inc., (4 pages), 06/10/2019 PCI Checklist-002, "Final Documentation Checklist - Vogtle Unit 3 AP1000 RCS Surge Line Pipe and Surge Line Pipe Supports Field Installation," (8 pages), Revision 1 PCI 912941-FR-001, "PCI Final Report - Vogtle Unit 3 AP1000 RCS Surge Line Pipe and Pipe Supports Field Installation," Revision 0 PCI Photo of ASME Code Symbol Stamping on "NA Class 1" Nameplate by PCI Energy Services for Serial Number SV3-RCS-MJR-005, page 479 S&W 1321752004-2554, "PCI 912941-002, Quality Assurance Data Package for Vogtle Unit 3 AP1000 PRHR Return Pipe and Pipe Supports Field Installation," Document No. SV3-RCS-MJR-009, includes "Section 7.0: PCI Quality Assurance Travelers with Field Change Requests and Weld Map (Pipe and Pipe Supports)" and "Section 8.0: PCI Final Nondestructive Examination Reports, with Mistras Radiography Reader Sheets and TEAM UT Reports," (868 pages), 03/21/2019 PCI "Form N-5 (Partial) Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, As Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1," for PRHR Return Pipe and Pipe Supports for Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV3-RCS-MJR-009 installed for Stone & Webster, Inc., (4 pages),

08/19/2019 PCI Checklist-002, "Final Documentation Checklist - Vogtle Unit 3 AP1000 PRHR Return Line Pipe and PRHR Return Line Pipe Supports Field Installation," (7 pages), Revision 0 PCI 912941-FR-002, "PCI Final Report - Vogtle Unit 3 AP1000 RCS PRHR Return Pipe and Pipe Supports Field Installation," Revision 0 PCI Photo of ASME Code Symbol Stamping on "NA Class 1" Nameplate by PCI Energy Services for Serial Number SV3-RCS-MJR-009, page 467

47 S&W 132175-2376-055-088-0001, SV0-RCS-VQQ-800017, "PCI Final Quality Assurance Data Package for Vogtle Unit 3 AP1000 Reactor Vessel and RV Support Field Installation,"

Document No. SV3-RCS-MJR-MV01, includes "Section 9.0: PCI Quality Assurance Travelers (Corporate and Site) with Field Change Requests" and "Section 10.0: PCI Final Nondestructive Examination Reports," (337 pages), 08/09/2019 PCI "Form N-5 Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, As Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1," for Reactor Vessel and RV Support for Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV3-RCS-MJR-MV01 installed for Stone & Webster, Inc., (3 pages),

07/06/2018 PCI Checklist-002, "Final Documentation Checklist - Vogtle Unit 3 AP1000 Reactor Vessel and RV Support Field Installation," (4 pages), Revision 1 PCI 909964/909965-FR-001, "PCI Final Report - Vogtle Unit 3 AP1000 Reactor Vessel and RV Support Field Installation," Revision 1 PCI Photo of ASME Code Symbol Stamping on "NA Class 1" Nameplate by PCI Energy Services for Serial Number SV3-RCS-MJR-MV01, page 24 S&W 132175-2554-055-088-0017, SV0-RCS-VQQ-800016, "PCI Quality Assurance Data Package for Vogtle Unit 3 AP1000 RCS Steam Generator 1 (Alpha) and Primary Equipment Supports Field Installation," Document No. SV3-RCS-MJR-MB01A, includes "Section 7.0: PCI Quality Assurance Travelers (Corporate and Site) with Field Change Requests, and Weld Maps (Overlays/Inlays, Brackets, and Supports" and "Section 8.0: PCI Final Nondestructive Examination Reports, with TEAM UT Reports," (1367 pages), 10/11/2019 PCI "Form N-5 Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, As Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1," for Steam Generator 1 (Alpha) with Supplemental Sheets for Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV3-RCS-MJR-MB01A installed for Stone & Webster, Inc.,

(3 pages), 11/15/2019 PCI Checklist-002, "Final Documentation Checklist - Vogtle Unit 3 AP1000 Steam Generator 1 (Alpha), Wall Brackets and Supports Installation," (14 pages), Revision 0 PCI 911082/912881-FR-001, "PCI Final Report - Vogtle Unit 3 AP1000 RCS Steam Generator 1-Alpha (SV3-RCS-MB01), Wall Brackets and Supports Installation," Revision 0 PCI Photo of ASME Code Symbol Stamping on "NA Class 1" Nameplate by PCI Energy Services for Serial Number SV3-RCS-MJR-MB01A, page 988 S&W 911082/912881, "PCI Quality Assurance Data Package for Vogtle Unit 3 AP1000 RCS Steam Generator 2 (Bravo) (SV3-RCS-MB02), Wall Brackets and Supports Installation,"

Document No. SV3-RCS-MJR-MB01B, includes "Section 7.0: PCI Quality Assurance Travelers (Corporate and Site) with Field Change Requests, and Weld Maps (Overlays/Inlays, Brackets, and Supports" and "Section 8.0: PCI Final Nondestructive Examination Reports, with TEAM UT Reports," (1669 pages), 08/28/2019

48 PCI "Form N-5 Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, As Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1," for Steam Generator 2 (Bravo) with Supplemental Sheets for Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV3-RCS-MJR-MB01B installed for Stone &

Webster, Inc., (4 pages), 11/15/2019 PCI Checklist-002, "Final Documentation Checklist - Vogtle Unit 3 AP1000 Steam Generator 2 (Bravo), Wall Brackets and Supports Installation," (16 pages), Revision 1 PCI 911082/912881-FR-001, "PCI Final Report - Vogtle Unit 3 AP1000 RCS Steam Generator 2-Bravo (SV3-RCS-MB02), Wall Brackets and Supports Installation," Revision 0 PCI Photo of ASME Code Symbol Stamping on "NA Class 1" Nameplate by PCI Energy Services for Serial Number SV3-RCS-MJR-MB01B, page 1121 S&W 132175-2554-055-088-0010, SV0-RCS-VQQ-800009, "PCI Quality Assurance Data Package for Vogtle Unit 3 AP1000 Pressurizer, Vertical Columns, and Upper and Lower Rigid Supports Field Installation," Document No. SV3-RCS-MJR-MV20, includes "Section 7.0:

PCI Quality Assurance Travelers with Field Change Requests, and Weld Maps (Upper/Lower Weld-on Brackets/Lugs" and "Section 8.0: PCI Final Nondestructive Examination Reports, with TEAM UT Reports," (777 pages), 08/29/2019 PCI "Form N-5 Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, As Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1," for Pressurizer with Supplemental Sheets for Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV3-RCS-MJR-MV20 installed for Stone & Webster, Inc., (5 pages),

08/19/2019 PCI Checklist-002, "Final Documentation Checklist - Vogtle Unit 3 AP1000 Pressurizer Install," (8 pages), Revision 0 PCI 910962-FR-003, "PCI Final Report - Vogtle Unit 3 AP1000 RCS Pressurizer, Vertical Columns, and Upper/Lower Struts Field Installation," Revision 0 PCI Photo of ASME Code Symbol Stamping on "NA Class 1" Nameplate by PCI Energy Services for Serial Number SV3-RCS-MJR-MV20, page 627 Section 1A03 Work Packages:

SV3-1231-SHW-800033 SV3-1231-SHW-800050 Procedures:

APP-GW-GAP-420, Engineering and Design Coordination Report, Rev. 20 APP-GW-GAP-428, Nonconformance and Disposition Report (N&D), Rev. 18 ND-AD-002-027, Nonconforming Items, Rev. 7 26139-000-G27-GZC-00001, Advanced Authorization Process Requirements During the Construction and Testing Phases at Vogtle Units 3 & 4 Southern Nuclear Corp., Rev. 0 Engineering Change Documents:

SV3-1231-GEF-000010, Field routed conduit use engineered supports (ESR50045032), Rev.

0

49 SV3-12304-GEF-000002, Changeover to flex / Abandon support (ESR50031692), Rev. 0 Drawings:

APP-1231-ER-621, Auxiliary Building Area 1 El. 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 11),

Rev. 3 APP-1231-ER-634, Auxiliary Building Area 1 El. 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 24),

Rev. 1 APP-ECS-E9-030, Conduits Notes and Details, Rev. 16 APP-ECS-E9-062, Cable Tray Notes and Details Sheet 1, Rev. 2 APP-ECS-E9-100, Conduits Notes and Support Details General Notes, Rev. 3 APP-ECS-E9-101, Conduits Notes and Support Details Conduit Cables, Rev. 1 APP-SH25-VF-016, Fabrication Requirements Tray Supports Seismic Cat 1 Trapeze Vertical Riser Up to 2.5gh & 2.5gv (1 Cable Tray) - No Brace, Rev. 3 SV3-1130-ER-909, Conduit Support Fabrication Drawing, Rev. 0 SV3-CA02-S5-02001, Containment Building Area 2 Module CA02 - Submodule CA02_02 Isometric Views, Rev. 2 SV3-CA02-S5B-02001, Containment Building Area 2 Module CA02 - Submodule CA02_02 Bill of Materials, Rev. 3 SV3-1231-ER-605, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 5), Rev. 3 SV3-1231-ER-615, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 5),

Rev. 3 SV3-1231-ER-625, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 15),

Rev. 2 SV3-1231-SH-224, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Raceway Supports Details (Sheet 15),

Rev. 3 SV3-1231-CEX-993, Auxiliary Building Area 1 Small Walls Embedments Index EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 1), Rev. 5 SV3-1231-ER-640, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 15),

Rev. 2 SV3-CE01-CE-001, Standard Embedment Plates Headed Anchor (HA) Type (Sheet 1), Rev. 8 SV3-1231-ER-607, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 7), Rev. 3 SV3-1231-ER-645, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 35),

Rev. 0 SV3-1231-ER-624, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 14),

Rev. 4 SV3-1231-SH-221, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Raceway Supports Details (Sheet 12),

Rev. 3 Condition Reports (CRs):

CR 50063697 CR 50048617 Specifications:

APP-G1-V8-001, AP1000 Electrical Installation Specification, Rev. 7 Miscellaneous:

PLV002ABXD[PT] Rev: 3 Quality Control Inspection Reports:

26139-SV4-IR-ER-00081, Raceway and Accessories Inspection Record, dated 3-5-2019 SV3-1231-1002631, Raceway and Accessories Inspection Record, dated 6/20/2020

50 SV3-1231-ERW-1006383, Raceway and Accessories Inspection Record, dated 7-11-2020 Section 1A04 Specification APP-G1-V8-001, AP1000 Electrical Installation Specification, Revision 7 Work Packages SV3-1231-SHW-800050, U3, Install Conduit Supports, Aux, Elevation 100-0, Area 1, Room 12305 Drawings APP-ECS-E9-012, Cable Tray notes and Details Sheet 3, Revision 12 APP-ECS-E9-013, Cable Tray Notes and Details Sheet 4, Revision 7 APP-ECS-E9-014, Cable Tray Notes and Details Sheet 5, Revision 5 APP-ECS-E9-030, Conduit Notes and Details, Revision 16 APP-ECS-E9-062, Cable Tray Notes and Details Sheet 1, Revision 2 APP-ECS-E9-063, Cable Tray Notes and Details Sheet 12, Revision 2 APP-1231-ER-604, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 4), Revision 4 APP-1231-ER-605, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 5), Revision 3 APP-1231-ER-606, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 6),

Revision 2 APP-1231-ER-607, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 7),

Revision 3 APP-1231-SH-224, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Raceway Supports Details Sheet (Sheet 5), Revision 3 APP-1231-ER-616, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 6), Revision 2 WM-E-3-12-318590, Weld Map for the Auxiliary Building Installation of Conduit Support SV3-1231-SH-E1620 APP-1231-ER-625, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 15),

Revision 2 WM-E-3-12-318592, Weld Map for the Auxiliary Building Installation of Conduit Support SV3-1231-SH-E1626 APP-1231-ER-618, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 8),

Revision 3 WM-E-3-12-318595, Weld Map for the Auxiliary Building Installation of Conduit Support SV3-1231-SH-E1801 APP-1231-ER-612, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 2),

Revision 4 WM-E-3-12-318600, Weld Map for the Auxiliary Building Installation of Conduit Support SV3-1231-SH-E1806 APP-1231-ER-630, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 20),

Revision 1 WM-E-3-12-318609, Weld Map for the Auxiliary Building Installation of Conduit Support SV3-1231-SH-E1931 APP-1231-ER-645, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 35),

Revision 0 WM-E-3-12-318611, Weld Map for the Auxiliary Building Installation of Conduit Support SV3-1231-SH-E1967 Purchase Orders

51 SNV1004125 SNV1000934 SNV1002720 Material Receiving Report J132175-MRR-18-02477 J132175-MRR-17-06035 J132176-MRR-15-01079 J132176-MRR-15-01446 26139-MRR-19-03080 Procedures 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N7101, Construction Quality Verification Program, Revision 3 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N6204, Field Material Control and Traceability, Revision 4 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N3701, Welding Program, Revision 0 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N6105, Material Withdrawal, Revision 8 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N3302, Raceways and Accessories, Revision 9 Supplier Audit/Survey CNOS-19-293, Dubose National Energy Services, Date 11-7-2019 CNOS-18-254, Nova Machine Products, Date 4-26-2018 CNOS-18-004, Dubose National Energy Services, Date 1-10-2011 Welding Procedure Specifications P1-A-Lh (Structural), For Vogtle only, Revision 0 WPS1-1.1C02, SMAW and FCAW Welding of P-No. 1 materials E7018 and E71T-12M filler, without PWHT, without impacts, Revision 2 Section 1A05 Specifications APP-G1-V8-001, AP1000 Electrical Installation Specification, Revision 7 Work Packages SV3-1231-SHW-800050, U3, Install Conduit Supports, Aux, Elevation 100-0, Area 1, Room 12305 Drawings APP-ECS-E9-012, Cable Tray notes and Details Sheet 3, Revision 12 APP-ECS-E9-013, Cable Tray Notes and Details Sheet 4, Revision 7 APP-ECS-E9-014, Cable Tray Notes and Details Sheet 5, Revision 5 APP-ECS-E9-030, Conduit Notes and Details, Revision 16 APP-ECS-E9-062, Cable Tray Notes and Details Sheet 1, Revision 2 APP-ECS-E9-063, Cable Tray Notes and Details Sheet 12, Revision 2 APP-1231-ER-604, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 4), Revision 4 APP-1231-ER-605, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 5), Revision 3 APP-1231-ER-606, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 6),

Revision 2 APP-1231-ER-607, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 7),

Revision 3

52 APP-1231-SH-224, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Raceway Supports Details Sheet (Sheet 5), Revision 3 APP-1231-ER-616, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 6), Revision 2 WM-E-3-12-318590, Weld Map for the Auxiliary Building Installation of Conduit Support SV3-1231-SH-E1620 APP-1231-ER-625, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 15),

Revision 2 WM-E-3-12-318592, Weld Map for the Auxiliary Building Installation of Conduit Support SV3-1231-SH-E1626 APP-1231-ER-618, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 8),

Revision 3 WM-E-3-12-318595, Weld Map for the Auxiliary Building Installation of Conduit Support SV3-1231-SH-E1801 APP-1231-ER-612, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 2),

Revision 4 WM-E-3-12-318600, Weld Map for the Auxiliary Building Installation of Conduit Support SV3-1231-SH-E1806 APP-1231-ER-630, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 20),

Revision 1 WM-E-3-12-318609, Weld Map for the Auxiliary Building Installation of Conduit Support SV3-1231-SH-E1931 APP-1231-ER-645, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 35),

Revision 0 WM-E-3-12-318611, Weld Map for the Auxiliary Building Installation of Conduit Support SV3-1231-SH-E1967 Purchase Orders SNV1004125 SNV1000934 SNV1002720 Material Receiving Report J132175-MRR-18-02477 J132175-MRR-17-06035 J132176-MRR-15-01079 J132176-MRR-15-01446 26139-MRR-19-03080 Procedures 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N7101, Construction Quality Verification Program, Revision 3 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N6204, Field Material Control and Traceability, Revision 4 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N3701, Welding Program, Revision 0 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N6105, Material Withdrawal, Revision 8 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N3302, Raceways and Accessories, Revision 9 Supplier Audit/Survey CNOS-19-293, Dubose National Energy Services, Date 11-7-2019 CNOS-18-254, Nova Machine Products, Date 4-26-2018 CNOS-18-004, Dubose National Energy Services, Date 1-10-2011 Welding Procedure Specifications P1-A-Lh (Structural), For Vogtle only, Revision 0

53 WPS1-1.1C02, SMAW and FCAW Welding of P-No. 1 materials E7018 and E71T-12M filler, without PWHT, without impacts, Revision 2 Section 1A06 Work Packages:

SV3-1231-SHW-800050 Procedures:

APP-GW-GAP-420, Engineering and Design Coordination Report, Rev. 20 APP-GW-GAP-428, Nonconformance and Disposition Report (N&D), Rev. 18 ND-AD-002-027, Nonconforming Items, Rev. 7 26139-000-G27-GZC-00001, Advanced Authorization Process Requirements During the Construction and Testing Phases at Vogtle Units 3 & 4 Southern Nuclear Corp., Rev. 0 Engineering Change Documents:

SV3-1231-GEF-000010, Field routed conduit use engineered supports (ESR50045032), Rev.

0 SV3-12304-GEF-000002, Changeover to flex / Abandon support (ESR50031692), Rev. 0 Drawings:

APP-1231-ER-621, Auxiliary Building Area 1 El. 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 11),

Rev. 3 APP-1231-ER-634, Auxiliary Building Area 1 El. 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 24),

Rev. 1 APP-ECS-E9-030, Conduits Notes and Details, Rev. 16 APP-ECS-E9-062, Cable Tray Notes and Details Sheet 1, Rev. 2 APP-ECS-E9-100, Conduits Notes and Support Details General Notes, Rev. 3 APP-ECS-E9-101, Conduits Notes and Support Details Conduit Cables, Rev. 1 APP-SH25-VF-016, Fabrication Requirements Tray Supports Seismic Cat 1 Trapeze Vertical Riser Up to 2.5gh & 2.5gv (1 Cable Tray) - No Brace, Rev. 3 SV3-1130-ER-909, Conduit Support Fabrication Drawing, Rev. 0 SV3-CA02-S5-02001, Containment Building Area 2 Module CA02 - Submodule CA02_02 Isometric Views, Rev. 2 SV3-CA02-S5B-02001, Containment Building Area 2 Module CA02 - Submodule CA02_02 Bill of Materials, Rev. 3 SV3-1231-ER-605, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 5), Rev. 3 SV3-1231-ER-615, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 5),

Rev. 3 SV3-1231-ER-625, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 15),

Rev. 2 SV3-1231-SH-224, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Raceway Supports Details (Sheet 15),

Rev. 3 SV3-1231-CEX-993, Auxiliary Building Area 1 Small Walls Embedments Index EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 1), Rev. 5 SV3-1231-ER-640, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 15),

Rev. 2 SV3-CE01-CE-001, Standard Embedment Plates Headed Anchor (HA) Type (Sheet 1), Rev. 8 SV3-1231-ER-607, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 7), Rev. 3 SV3-1231-ER-645, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 35),

Rev. 0

54 SV3-1231-ER-624, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 14),

Rev. 4 SV3-1231-SH-221, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Raceway Supports Details (Sheet 12),

Rev. 3 Condition Reports (CRs):

CR 50063697 CR 50048617 Specifications:

APP-G1-V8-001, AP1000 Electrical Installation Specification, Rev. 7 Miscellaneous:

PLV002ABXD[PT] Rev: 3 Quality Control Inspection Reports:

26139-SV4-IR-ER-00081, Raceway and Accessories Inspection Record, dated 3-5-2019 SV3-1231-1002631, Raceway and Accessories Inspection Record, dated 6/20/2020 SV3-1231-ERW-1006383, Raceway and Accessories Inspection Record, dated 7-11-2020 Section 1A07 Procedures 165766-830-05-PR-000010, Pneumatic Testing of Unit 3 Containment Vessel, Revision 3 3-CNS-ITPP-501, ILRT Containment System Leak Rate Test (Type A), Revision 6 3-CNS-ITPP-502, Containment Penetration Leak Rate (Type B) Preoperational Test, Revision 3

CMS-830-15-PR-45165, Leak Detection Final Testing, ASME Section III, Division 1-Subsection NE and NC, Revision 2 CBIS CMS-830-15-PR-45164, Solution Film Testing Vacuum Box Technique ASME Section III, Division 1, Subsection NE, Revision 1 Design Specifications SV3-CNS-Z0-001, AP100 Containment System Penetration Assemblies (CNS) Design Specification, Revision 1 SV3-EY01-Z0-001, Electrical Penetration Assemblies, Revision 9 SV3-MV50-Z0-001, AP1000 Containment Vessel Design Specification, Revision 15 Drawings 165766-000-SP-SK-46101, Accessible Welds, Revision 2 165766-000-SP-SK-46102, Accessible Welds, Revision 1, 2 165766-000-SP-SK-46103, Accessible Welds, Revision 2 165766-000-SP-SK-46201, Instrument Locations, Revision 2 Field Weld No. SV3-SGS-PY-C05A-2 (Penetration P44):

WEC Piping Isometric Drawing-No. SV3-SGS-PLW-115-R1, Steam Generator System Auxiliary Building Room 12406 Startup Feedwater A, Revision 1 WEC Piping Isometric Drawing-No. SV3-SGS-PLW-310-R4, Steam Generator System Containment Building Rooms 11400/11601 Startup Feedwater A, Revision 4 WEC SV3-SGS-MLK-882136, Weld Map for Penetration SV3-SGS-PY-C05A (P44), Revision 1

Field Weld No. SV3-SGS-PY-C05B-2 (Penetration P45):

WEC Piping Isometric Drawing-No. SV3-SGS-PLW-125-R1, Steam Generator System Auxiliary Building Room 12404 Startup Feedwater B, Revision 1

55 WEC Piping Isometric Drawing-No. SV3-SGS-PLW-320-R3, Steam Generator System Containment Building Rooms 11400/11602 Startup Feedwater B, Revision 3 165766-830-05-CK-46014, Pneumatic Test Instructions 165766-830-05-FM-046014, Vertical Vessel Pneumatic Test Layout, Revision 2 165766-830-05-FM-046015, Pressure Test Safety Distance Map, Revision 2 165766-830-05-FM-046016, Pressure Test Safety Distance Map, Revision 1 165766-830-05-FM-046017, Vertical Vessel Pneumatic Test Layout, Revision 1 AP1000 Containment Vessel Pneumatic Test Analysis APP-VUS-M6-001, Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Containment Leak Rate Test Systems, Revision 5CMS-720-03-FM-11003, Nonconformance Report- Nuclear, ILRT Inc. Pressurization System Sketch S01, Sheet 1, Revision 1 SFT-U3-MAP-01, SFT Map- Unit#3 Lower Ring Assembly, Revision 6 V0G3.20-L200625A, ILRT Inc. SIT Instrument List- Attachment 1, Revision 0 V0G3.20-L200625A, Calibration Certificates- Attachment 2, Revision 0 Engineering Changes E&DCR APP-0000-GEF-850031, CV Sleeve Extension Weld Repair Welding Code, Revision 0

E&DCR SV0-CNS-GEF-001, Modification to Containment Vessel Electrical Penetrations, Revision 0 Condition Reports CR 50056351, P27 and P28 Nozzle Weld Joints Identified as Not Surface Film Tested While Unit 3 Containment was Pressurized, 07/17/2020 Miscellaneous 1998 ASME BPVC, Division 1, Subsection NC- Class 2 Components, Rules for Construction of Nuclear Facility Components, 1998 Edition (2000 Addenda), July 1, 2000 1998 ASME BPVC, Division 1, Subsection NE- Class MC Components, Rules for Construction of Nuclear Power Plant Components, 1998 Edition (2000 Addenda), July 1, 2000 ANS N45.4-1972, Leakage Rate Testing of Containment Structures for Nuclear Reactors, March 16, 1972 ANS 56.8-1994, American National Standard for Containment System Leakage Testing Requirements, August 04, 1994 Graphical Data for Temperature Instruments ILRT Inc Pressurization Data 07/05 to 07/06/2020 M&TE Calibration Services Receipt Checklist- Equipment ID 34VP3203, dated 01/08/2020 Sensing Systems Corporation Pressurization Data for 07/05/2020 SIT & ILRT Construction Readiness Action Item List SIT-ILRT Test Profile Section 1A08 Procedures:

CBIS Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual Revision 25, dated January 13, 2020 CBIS document No. CMS-720-03-PR-01001, Review of Client/Owner Documents, Revision 10, dated September 6, 2018 CBIS document No. CMS-720-03-PR-02001, Design Change Control, Revision 6, dated May 28, 2015 CBIS Procedure CMS-720-03-PR-02051, Qualification of Certifying Engineers, Revision 5, dated January 2, 2019 CBIS Procedure CMS-720-03-PR-02151, Computer Programs for Nuclear Applications, Revision 6, dated September 26, 2017 CBIS Procedure CMS-720-03-PR-02351, Classification of Materials, Revision 9, dated September 9, 2016 CBIS Procedure CMS-720-03-PR-02451, Design Documents, Revision 9, dated March 27, 2020

56 CBIS Procedure CMS-720-03-PR-03001, Procurement Specifications, Revision 8, dated January 2, 2019 CBIS Procedure CMS-720-03-PR-03051, Control of Requisitions for Materials and Services, Revision 10, dated November 10, 2016 CBS Procedure CMS-830-00-PR-01060, Engineering Software Validation, Revision 5, dated October 5, 2017 CBS Nuclear Contract QA Handbook Index Contract No. 165766 (231121) Revision 182, dated September 9, 2020 CBIS document No. VPS-604-5-2,Vendor Procurement Specification for Fabricated Equipment Hatch, Revision 2, dated December 7, 2009 CBIS document No. VPS-604-5-3, Vendor Procurement Specification for Fabricated Personnel Airlock, Revision 3, dated May 10, 2010 CBIS document No. VPS-604-5, Project Specification for Fabricated Containment Vessel Parts, Revision 4, dated January 21, 2010 SNOC Procedure ND-QA-005, Quality Assurance Reviews, Version 21, dated June 25, 2020 WEC Document No. APP-GW-GAP-420, Engineering and Design Coordination Report, Revision 20 WEC Document No. APP-MV50-VP-01, Equipment Qualification Methodology and Documentation Requirements for AP1000 Containment Vessel Components, Revision 5, dated September 27, 2016 WEC Document No. APP-GW-GAP-341, AP1000 Plant Program Design Change Control, Revision 8 WEC document No.W2.9.4-102, Deviation Notices, Revision 2.1, dated September 18, 2018 Purchase Orders:

CBIS PO No. 490404 to IHI Corporation, Revision 008, dated September 22, 2015, for procurement of CV components SNOC Contract No. 56600, issued to CBIS dated March 5, 2018 SNOC Document No. ND-18-0404, Transmittal of Signed $0 Purchase Order for Containment Vessel Technical and Quality Requirements for Southern Nuclear Approval Prior to Issuance to CBI Services, dated March 21, 2018 WEC PO No. 4500739876, Safety-Related PO for the exchange of administration of the technical and quality requirements associated with remaining or future engineering activities and documentation deliverables for two AP1000 Containment Vessels for Vogtle Units 3 & 4, including previous approvals under Rejected PO 4500281180, issued to CBI Services Inc.

dated March 12, 2018 Design Documents:

CBIS 165766-000-05-CL-000002, Design of Containment Vessel for Internal and External Pressure, Rev.6 165766-000-05-CL-000022, Analysis of Polar Crane Girder, Rev.3 - Ongoing 165766-000-05-CL-000028, 3D Analysis of Large Penetrations, Small Penetrations, and CV Shell, Rev.1 CBIS document No. 165766-000-05-000003, Containment Vessel Pressure Capabilities, Revision 4, dated July 16, 2020 CBIS document No. 165766-000-05-CL-000012, Design of Containment Vessel Penetration Reinforcement, Revision 5, dated August 10, 2020 CBIS document No. 165766-000-05-000027, Eigenvalue Buckling Analysis for Containment Vessel, Revision 2, dated June 22, 2020 CBIS document No. 165766-000-05-CL-000029, Containment Vessel Design Summary, Revision 1, dated September 11, 2020 CBIS document No. 165766-000-05-CL-000029 - Appendix A, Containment Vessel Fatigue Evaluation Methodology, Revision 1, dated September 11, 2020

57 CBIS document No. 165766-000-05-CL-000030, Containment Vessel Fatigue Evaluation, Revision 1, dated September 4, 2020 CBIS document No.165766-000-05-CL-0000031, Additional Containment Vessel Design Calculations for As-Built Conditions, Revision 1, September 11, 2020 CBIS document No. 165766-000-SP-LS-0PC01, Vogtle CV Print Control Record, Revision 158, dated August 31, 2020 CBIS Issued-For-Construction drawing No. 165766-001-02, Top and Bottom Head Layout, Revision 2 CBIS Issued-For-Construction drawing No. 165766-032-01, Ext. Stiffness Field Assembly, Revision 13 CBIS Issued-For-Construction drawing No. 165766-033-01, Crane Girder Field Assembly, Revision 14 CBIS Issued-For-Construction drawing No. 165766-036-10, Field Installation CV Attachment Plates, Revision 5 CBIS Issued-For-Construction drawing No. 165766-041-02, Equipment Hatch Rails- CBI Supplied, Revision 1 CBIS document No. GS603-5-1, General Specification for Cylindrical Sheet Steel Plates with and without Nozzles, Revision 3, dated December 10, 2010 IHI document No. 022K310, Design Report of Upper and Lower Personnel Airlocks, Revision 4, dated May 14, 2013 IHI document No. 022K508, Eigenvalue Analysis of the Personnel Airlock Door Unit, Revision 2, dated September 30, 2011 IHI document No. 022K801, Electrical Penetration Assemblies Design Specification, Revision 5, dated July 26, 2013 IHI document No. 022K802, Electrical Penetration Design Report, Revision 2, dated March 11, 2016 WEC documents:

WEC document No. APP-MV50-Z0-001, AP1000 Containment Vessel Design Specification, Revision 13 WEC document No. APP-MV50-Z0-001, AP1000 Containment Vessel Design Specification, Revision 15 APP-MV50-S2C-036, AP1000 Containment Vessel Top Head Fracture Analysis due to PCS Flow Actuation, Rev.10030 WEC E&DCR No. APP-MV50-GEF-359, "Changes to APP-MV50-S2C-009, Revision 2, Revision 0 WEC E&DCR No. APP-MV50-GEF-394, CV Stiffener - Outside Containment Surface-between Penetrations P06 and P07, Revision 0 WEC E&DCR No: APP-MV50-GEF-417, Changes to Support Containment Vessel Cyclic Service Evaluation, Revision 0 WEC E&DCR No. APP-MV50-S2C-009, Time History Analysis of Containment Vessel and Polar Crane, Revision 2 WEC drawing APP-MV50-VI-100, AP1000 Containment Vessel Vertical External Stiffener, Revision 0 WEC document No. APP-MV50-GEC-001, AP1000 Containment System - Cyclic Service Evaluation for Containment Vessel, Revision 4, approved on March 16, 2020 WEC document No.165766-000-05-CL-000003, Containment Vessel Pressure Capabilities, Revision 4, dated July 16, 2020 WEC deviation notice (DN) No. SV4-M50-GNR-011, Deviation Notice for Containment Vessel Unit # 4 T-Series Attachment Plates, Revision 0, dated August 26, 2016 WEC DN No. SV3-MV50-GNR-055, Vogtle Unit 3 CV: Field Deviation report for MV50 Containment Vessel Shear Studs, dated July 2, 2015

58 WEC DN No. SV3-MV50-GNR-075, Deviation Notice for Unit 3 Upper Equipment Hatch Misalignment, Revision 0, dated July 23, 2020 Corrective Action Reports (CAR)

CBIS significant condition adverse to quality (SCAQ) file No. SV0-L00-11053-001, Stop Work Order for standing water on the CV bottom head plates, closed on September 4, 2020 CBIS SCAQ file No. SV0-L00-11053-002, Lower Shell Ring S-1 Vertical Weld Seams show signs of linear indications after Post Weld Heat Treating (PWHT) activities were completed, closed on September 4, 2020 CBIS CAR No. 2017-002, dated March 27, 2018 SNOC corrective action quality report (CAQR) 268404, Containment Vessel/Polar Crane Seismic Response, dated February 19, 2017 SNOC CAQR 271479, Realistic Input needed for CV Buckling Evaluation, dated March 4, 2019 SNOC CAQR 274242, APP-MV50-Z0C-004 Exceeding Allowable Load, dated March 22, 2019 WEC CAP IR-2017-688, SNC CR 10409867 Realistic Inputs Needed for Containment Vessel Buckling Evaluation, closed on November 5, 2018 WEC CAP IR 2018-10873, Several CV attachment plate footprint loads listed in APP-MV50-Z0-004 Rev. 1 exceeded the allowable loads listed in the CV design specification APP-MV50-Z0-001. The attachment plate footprints WEC CAP IR-2019-18497, SNC CR 50035124: NRC identified concern with content of Application Reports required by ASME QME-1-2007, closed on April 25, 2020 WEC CAP IR-2020-6906, APP-MV50-Z0-001 Table 2(g) mistake with conversion errors in SSE moment values, dated May 21, 2019.

WEC CAP IR-2020-1834, Missed Evaluations in the CV Cyclic Service Calculation, WEC CAP IR-2020-2480,Unqualified WEC Level III Inspection/Test personnel, closed on April 6, 2020 WEC CAP IR-2020-7379, Missed impact to piping and MV50 analyses, dated June 20, 2020 WEC Supplier Corrective Action Report No. 100449187, WES-2017-002, CBI Services, Corrective Action Program, dated April 25, 2017 Audit Reports:

CBIS audit report No. A-2014-05 of IHI Corporation, Nuclear Power Operations, dated July 27, 2014 CBIS audit report No. 2009-1, of IHI Corporation, Nuclear Power Operations, - Software Quality Assurance, dated August 28, 2009 SNOC audit report No. ND-20-0425, Nuclear Development Assurance audit report of Vogtle 3&4 WEC Quality Assurance and ASME programs, SN-ND-2020.01-WEC Site/Corp-QA/ASME, dated April 16, 2020 WEC audit report No. WES-2017-003, of CBIS HQ, Chicago, IL, dated March 17, 2017 Personnel Qualification Records:

CBIS form No. CMS-,720-03-FM-1606 Self-Training Acknowledgment Record-Nuclear, for design engineers, reviewer, verifier, Engineering manager CBIS Registered Professional Engineer (RPE) qualification records of two engineering personnel CBIS lead auditor qualification records IHI RPE qualification record for design engineer certifying CV personnel airlock design documents WEC RPE-10931-09-2019, Certified Qualification Record, of design engineer SNOC ND-QA-008-F02 -ND-QA, Lead Auditor Qualification Record, of two lead auditors

59 Miscellaneous American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code 2001 including the 2002 addenda,Section III "Nuclear Power Plant Components, Class MC Components, Division 1 Subsection NE and NCA American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code 1998 including the 2000 addenda,Section III "Nuclear Power Plant Components, Class 2 Components, Division 1 Subsection NC SNOC Document Change Request -2020-076, Implementation of AP1000 Electrical Penetration Retaining Ring for Vogtle Units 3 & 4, dated July 31, 2020 CBIS document No. 137200-830-SP-RP-00009, ANSYS Version 19.2 Verification and Validation, Revision 0, dated January 15, 2019, originator Stephen Hsu and checked by Randy Eberly CBIS form No. CBS-720-FM-03-FM-02151, ANSYS Class 3 Error Report, for Error Reports Nos. 2019-04, 05, WB2019-05, dated March 27, 2019 CBIS form No. CBS-720-FM-03-FM-02151, ANSYS Class 3 Error Report, for ANSYS Class 3 Error Report Nos. 2019-23, 05, WB2019-0512, 13 dated November 25, 2019 CBIS form No. CBS-720-FM-03-FM-02151, ANSYS Class 3 Error Report, for ANSYS Class 3 Error Report Nos. 2019-12, AIM02019-02, dated August 1, 2019 CBIS letter to WEC dated June 1, 2016, Justification for Containment Vessel Buckling Analysis PO 4500281180- Vogtle Units 3 & 4 CBIS Technical Document Review Transmittal (TDRT), approval of IHI document No.

026R156, Shop Trial Fitting Procedure of Elliptical Head, Revision 2, on April 8, 2010 CBIS TDRT approving IHI document No. 5901003-026R156, Shop Trial Fitting Procedure of Elliptical Head, Revision 2, on March 16, 2010 CBIS disposition of IHI Deviation Notice No. DN-003-126, Penetration Sleeve of Upper Personnel Airlock Unit 4, dated July 24, 2012 LDCR-2020-076, Implementation of AP1000 Electrical Penetration Retaining Ring for Vogtle 3 and, 4; Version 1.0 N&D SV3-MV50-GNR-005, Vogtle Unit 3 - Deviation Notice for Indications Found During Site Receiving Inspection on Plate for AP1000 Containment Vessel Bottom Head, Revision 0 N&D SV3-MV50-GNR-071, Deviation Notice for SV3 CV Ring#3, Penetration P12 Arc Strikes, Revision 0 NCR: U3-361 NCR U3-388 NCR U3-344 NCR-VOG-U3-017 NCR-VOG-U3-036 Section 1A09 N-3173, PCI Energy Services, "ASME NA Certificate of Authorization (Corporate),

Construction of Class 1, 2, 3, CS & MC field Installation at various locations certified by ASME," Expires September 2, 2020 N-3173-3, PCI Energy Services, "ASME NA Certificate of Authorization, Class 1, 2, 3, CS &

MC field installation at the Vogtle NPS, Units 3 and 4, 7824 River Road, Waynesboro, Georgia 30830," Expires August 19, 2019 S&W 132175-2554-055-088-00016, SV0-CNS-VQQ-800001, "PCI 914582, Quality Assurance Data Package for Vogtle Unit 3 AP1000 Fuel Transfer Tube Assembly Penetration P11 Installation," Document No. SV3-CNS-MJR-002, includes "Section 7.0: PCI Quality Assurance Travelers (Corp and Site) with Field Change Requests and Weld Map" and "Section 8.0: PCI Final Nondestructive Examination Reports with Mistras Vacuum Box Test Reports" with PCI FTT Drawing-No. SK-FTT Welds (page 24, revision B), (444 pages),

Revision 1

60 PCI "Form N-5 Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, As Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1," for Fuel Transfer Assembly for Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV3-CNS-MJR-002 installed for Stone & Webster, Inc., (3 pages), 08/15/2019 PCI Checklist-001, "Final Documentation Checklist - Vogtle Unit 3 AP1000 Fuel Transfer Tube Field Installation," (5 pages), Revision 1 PCI 914582-FR-001, "PCI Final Report - Vogtle Unit 3 AP1000 Fuel Transfer Tube Assembly (SV3-CNS-MJR-002) Installation," Revision 0 PCI Photo of ASME Code Symbol Stamping on "NA Class MC" Nameplate by PCI Energy Services for Serial Number SV3-CNS-MJR-002, page 182 Section 1A10 Field Weld No. SV3-SGS-PY-C05A-2 (Penetration P-44):

SEO KOATSU KOGYO Co. Ltd. CMTR G20818-041CM for SA-350 Gr. LF2 Class 1, P44 penetration sleeve, Test Mark AF479, Heat-No. JOL4527, Lot/Piece-No. AF47901, Revision 3, 10/18/2011 Atlas Industrial MFG, SV3-ML10-VQQ-004 (QADP 13429-1-QAR, pg. 322 of 616), P44 CMTRs 13429-1-P01-R1 (pages 435-462), SA-333 Gr. 6, Heat-No. 11321, S/N 12801, Revision 3 (52 pages)

Atlas Industrial MFG, SV3-ML10-VQQ-004 (pg. 326 of 616) WEC QR-14-2282 Rev. 2 , Line Item 8, Penetration Guard Pipe P44, Master Material No. 200004034, S/N 12801, Heat No. 11321 (pg. 2 of 2)

SV3-ML10-VQQ-004 (pg. 432 of 616) Tioga Pipe Supply Hydrostatic Test Report 704501, S/N 704501-1, Date of Test 2/15/13 (pg. 8 of 8)

S&W WPS1-1.1GT(M)SM-NE-2 "Welding Procedure Specification (WPS) ASME Section IX" with supporting procedure qualification records (PQRs) PQ607A (rev. 2) and PQ607B (rev.

3), Revision 10 S&W Weld Data Sheet SV3-SGS-PY-C05A-2, 06/26/2020 S&W Record of Welder Performance Qualification Test - ASME Section IX Groove Weld, Test-No. 1CS-03, Welder JMB, Test Date 04/05/2018 S&W Record of Welder Performance Qualification Test - ASME Section IX Groove Weld, Test-No. 1CS-03, Welder LAV, Test Date 03/01/2018 S&W Record of Welder Performance Qualification Test - ASME Section IX Groove Weld, Test-No. 1CS-03, Welder RGC, Test Date 06/21/2018 MISTRAS V-20-RT-301-0540, Computed Radiography Examination Report, Weld-No. SV3-SGS-PY-C05A-2, 06/24/2020 Field Weld No. SV3-SGS-PY-C05B-2 (Penetration P45):

SEO KOATSU KOGYO Co. Ltd. CMTR G20818-042CM for SA-350 Gr. LF2 Class 1, P45 penetration sleeve, Test Mark AF480, Heat-No. JOL4527, Lot/Piece-No. AF48001, Revision 3, 10/18/2011 Atlas Industrial MFG, SV3-ML10-VQQ-004 (QADP 13429-2-QAR, pg. 473 of 616), P45 CMTRs 13429-2-P01-R1 (pages 586-607), SA-333 Gr. 6, Heat-No. 11321, S/N 12802, Revision 3 (52 pages)

Atlas Industrial MFG, SV3-ML10-VQQ-004 (pg. 326 of 616) WEC QR-14-2282 Rev. 2 , Line Item 9, Penetration Guard Pipe P45, Master Material No. 200004035, S/N 12802, Heat No. 11321 (pg. 2 of 2)

SV3-ML10-VQQ-004 (pg. 432 of 616) Tioga Pipe Supply Hydrostatic Test Report 704501, S/N 704501-2, Date of Test 2/15/13 (pg. 8 of 8)

Weldstar Certificate of Compliance and Conformance, Item #19, 3/32 diameter electrodes, ESAB E7018 H4R, Atom Arc E7018SR, Heat # 80161C, Lot # 2A822E02, Control # PPP014, 7/26/2018

61 ESAB CMTR 2-59547-00-0-NUC, E7018 H4R, 3/32 X 14, Lot # 2A822E02, Heat # 80161C, Tradename Atom Arc E7018SR, Control # PPP014, 7/26/2018 S&W Weld Data Sheet SV3-SGS-PY-C05B-2, 06/18/2020 S&W Record of Welder Performance Qualification Test - ASME Section IX Groove Weld, Test-No. 1CS-03, Welder AJH, Test Date 06/21/2018 S&W Record of Welder Performance Qualification Test - ASME Section IX Groove Weld, Test-No. 1CS-03, Welder JRS, Test Date 02/08/2018 S&W Record of Welder Performance Qualification Test - ASME Section IX Groove Weld, Test-No. 1CS-03, Welder LVH, Test Date 03/01/2018 S&W Record of Welder Performance Qualification Test - ASME Section IX Groove Weld, Test-No. 1CS-03, Welder TLC, Test Date 06/21/2018 S&W Record of Welder Performance Qualification Test - ASME Section IX Groove Weld, Test-No. 1CS-03, Welder WLO, Test Date 06/21/2018 MISTRAS V-18-RT-301-0488, Computed Radiography Examination Report, Weld-No. SV3-SGS-PY-C05B-2, 09/09/2018 CBIS Traveler U3-CNSwelds-NI-SFT-2, Unit 3 CNS system, SFT Welds at Nuclear Island with Traveler Document Reference Summary Sheet, 3 pages, 7/22/2020 CBIS List of 33 Level I & II Personnel Qualified for SFT in accordance with CBIS NQAM CMS-720-03-PL-00010, and CBIS Level II NDE Certification of Qualification ASME Section III for Solution Film Testing (SFT) method for RB ID# 2878491, signed 7/19/2018, Effective Period 6/28/2018 to 6/2021 Section 1A11 Specifications APP-G1-V8-001, AP1000 Electrical Installation Specification, Revision 7 Work Order Packages SV3-1222-SHW-800039 SV3-1222-SHW-800040 SV3-1222-ERW-800012 Drawings APP-ECS-E9-012, Cable Tray notes and Details Sheet 3, Revision 12 APP-ECS-E9-013, Cable Tray Notes and Details Sheet 4, Revision 7 APP-ECS-E9-014, Cable Tray Notes and Details Sheet 5, Revision 5 APP-ECS-E9-030, Conduit Notes and Details, Revision 16 APP-ECS-E9-062, Cable Tray Notes and Details Sheet 1, Revision 2 APP-ECS-E9-063, Cable Tray Notes and Details Sheet 12, Revision 2 APP-1231-ER-604, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 4), Revision 4 APP-1231-ER-605, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 5), Revision 3 APP-1231-ER-606, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 6),

Revision 2 APP-1231-ER-607, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 7),

Revision 3 APP-1231-SH-224, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Raceway Supports Details Sheet (Sheet 5), Revision 3 APP-1231-ER-616, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 6), Revision 2 WM-E-3-12-318590, Weld Map for the Auxiliary Building Installation of Conduit Support SV3-1231-SH-E1620

62 APP-1231-ER-625, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 15),

Revision 2 WM-E-3-12-318592, Weld Map for the Auxiliary Building Installation of Conduit Support SV3-1231-SH-E1626 APP-1231-ER-618, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 8),

Revision 3 WM-E-3-12-318595, Weld Map for the Auxiliary Building Installation of Conduit Support SV3-1231-SH-E1801 APP-1231-ER-612, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 2),

Revision 4 WM-E-3-12-318600, Weld Map for the Auxiliary Building Installation of Conduit Support SV3-1231-SH-E1806 APP-1231-ER-630, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 20),

Revision 1 WM-E-3-12-318609, Weld Map for the Auxiliary Building Installation of Conduit Support SV3-1231-SH-E1931 APP-1231-ER-645, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 35),

Revision 0 WM-E-3-12-318611, Weld Map for the Auxiliary Building Installation of Conduit Support SV3-1231-SH-E1967 Purchase Orders SNV1004125 SNV1000934 SNV1002720 Material Receiving Report J132175-MRR-18-02477 J132175-MRR-17-06035 J132176-MRR-15-01079 J132176-MRR-15-01446 26139-MRR-19-03080 Procedures 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N7101, Construction Quality Verification Program, Revision 3 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N6204, Field Material Control and Traceability, Revision 4 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N3701, Welding Program, Revision 0 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N6105, Material Withdrawal, Revision 8 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N3302, Raceways and Accessories, Revision 9 Supplier Audit/Survey CNOS-19-293, Dubose National Energy Services, Date 11-7-2019 CNOS-18-254, Nova Machine Products, Date 4-26-2018 CNOS-18-004, Dubose National Energy Services, Date 1-10-2011 Welding Procedure Specifications P1-A-Lh (Structural), For Vogtle only, Revision 0 WPS1-1.1C02, SMAW and FCAW Welding of P-No. 1 materials E7018 and E71T-12M filler, without PWHT, without impacts, Revision 2 Section 1A12 Work Packages:

SV3-1222-SHW-800040

63 Procedures:

APP-GW-GAP-420, Engineering and Design Coordination Report, Rev. 20 APP-GW-GAP-428, Nonconformance and Disposition Report (N&D), Rev. 18 ND-AD-002-027, Nonconforming Items, Rev. 7 26139-000-G27-GZC-00001, Advanced Authorization Process Requirements During the Construction and Testing Phases at Vogtle Units 3 & 4 Southern Nuclear Corp., Rev. 0 Engineering Change Documents:

SV3-1231-GEF-000010, Field routed conduit use engineered supports (ESR50045032), Rev.

0 SV3-12304-GEF-000002, Changeover to flex / Abandon support (ESR50031692), Rev. 0 Drawings:

APP-1231-ER-621, Auxiliary Building Area 1 El. 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 11),

Rev. 3 APP-1231-ER-634, Auxiliary Building Area 1 El. 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 24),

Rev. 1 APP-ECS-E9-030, Conduits Notes and Details, Rev. 16 APP-ECS-E9-062, Cable Tray Notes and Details Sheet 1, Rev. 2 APP-ECS-E9-100, Conduits Notes and Support Details General Notes, Rev. 3 APP-ECS-E9-101, Conduits Notes and Support Details Conduit Cables, Rev. 1 APP-SH25-VF-016, Fabrication Requirements Tray Supports Seismic Cat 1 Trapeze Vertical Riser Up to 2.5gh & 2.5gv (1 Cable Tray) - No Brace, Rev. 3 SV3-1130-ER-909, Conduit Support Fabrication Drawing, Rev. 0 SV3-CA02-S5-02001, Containment Building Area 2 Module CA02 - Submodule CA02_02 Isometric Views, Rev. 2 SV3-CA02-S5B-02001, Containment Building Area 2 Module CA02 - Submodule CA02_02 Bill of Materials, Rev. 3 SV3-1231-ER-605, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 5), Rev. 3 SV3-1231-ER-615, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 5),

Rev. 3 SV3-1231-ER-625, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 15),

Rev. 2 SV3-1231-SH-224, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Raceway Supports Details (Sheet 15),

Rev. 3 SV3-1231-CEX-993, Auxiliary Building Area 1 Small Walls Embedments Index EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 1), Rev. 5 SV3-1231-ER-640, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 15),

Rev. 2 SV3-CE01-CE-001, Standard Embedment Plates Headed Anchor (HA) Type (Sheet 1), Rev. 8 SV3-1231-ER-607, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 7), Rev. 3 SV3-1231-ER-645, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 35),

Rev. 0 SV3-1231-ER-624, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 14),

Rev. 4 SV3-1231-SH-221, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Raceway Supports Details (Sheet 12),

Rev. 3 Condition Reports (CRs):

CR 50063697 CR 50048617

64 Specifications:

APP-G1-V8-001, AP1000 Electrical Installation Specification, Rev. 7 Miscellaneous:

PLV002ABXD[PT] Rev: 3 Quality Control Inspection Reports:

26139-SV4-IR-ER-00081, Raceway and Accessories Inspection Record, dated 3-5-2019 SV3-1231-1002631, Raceway and Accessories Inspection Record, dated 6/20/2020 SV3-1231-ERW-1006383, Raceway and Accessories Inspection Record, dated 7-11-2020 Section 1A13 Unit 3 & 4 EPCRs for the following valves through 7/30/2020 PXS-PLV-14 A/B PXS-PLV-15 A/B PXS-PLV-108 A/B PXS-PLV-123 A/B PXS-PLV-125 A/B PXS-PLV-118 A/B PXS-PLV-120 A/B Condition Reports CR 50057519, "NRC Criterion XIII inspection observation", dated 7/29/2020 CR 50057525, "NRC Criterion XIII inspection observation", dated 7/29/2020 CR 50057585, "Work orders cancelled without proper justification", dated 7/30/2020 Procedures 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N6201, "Field Material Storage Control", Revision 9 B-GEN-MNT-002, "Work Process And Requirements For Plant Equipment Preservation And Preventive Maintenance", Version 2.0 APP-PV14-VMM-001, "Instruction, Operation and Maintenance Manual for PV14 Air Operated Globe Valves, ASME Section III, Class 1, 2 & 3", Revision 3 APP-PV20-VMM-001, "Installation, Operation & Maintenance Manual for AP1000 PV20 Piston Operated Rotary Ball Valves", Revision 2.0 SV0-PV01-VMM-001, "MAINTENANCE MANUAL for AP1000 PV01 Size 3 or Larger Motor Operated Gate Valves,Section III, Class 1, 2 & 3", Revision 0 SV0-PV01-VMM-002, "Instruction Manual for AP1000 PV01 Size 3 and Larger Motor Operated Globe Valves,Section III, Class 1, 2 & 3", Revision 1 APP-PV70-VMM-001, "PV70 Squib (Pyrotechnic Actuated) Valves Maintenance Manual",

Revision 2 APP-PV98-VMM-001, "PV98 Pyrotechnic Actuator Instruction Manual (for PV70 Squib Valves)", Revision 1 Section 1A14 SV3-PXS-M6-001, WEC "Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Passive Core Cooling System,"

Revision 14.

SV3-PXS-M6-002, WEC "Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Passive Core Cooling System,"

Revision 18 SV3-PXS-M6-003, WEC "Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Passive Core Cooling System,"

Revision 13 SV3-PXS-M6-005, WEC "Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Passive Core Cooling System,"

Revision 1

65 S&W "Form N-5 Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, As Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1," for Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV3-PXS-MJR-MT01A installed for WEC, (11 pages), 06/04/2020 S&W "Form N-5 Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, As Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1," for Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV3-PXS-MJR-001 installed for WEC, (12 pages), 04/06/2020 S&W "Form N-5 Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, As Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1," for Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV3-PXS-MJR-004 installed for WEC, (13 pages), 06/10/2020 S&W "Form N-5 Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, As Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1," for Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV3-PXS-MJR-015 installed for WEC, (12 pages), 05/06/2020 S&W "Form N-5 Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, As Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1," for Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV3-PXS-MJR-ME02 installed for WEC, (8 pages), 04/19/2020 S&W "Form N-5 Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, As Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1," for Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV3-PXS-MJR-019 installed for WEC, (12 pages), 04/20/2020 S&W "Form N-5 Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, As Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1," for Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV3-PXS-MJR-025 installed for WEC, (18 pages), 06/04/2020 S&W "Form N-5 Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, As Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1," for Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV3-PXS-MJR-026 installed for WEC, (16 pages), 06/25/2020 S&W "Form N-5 Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, As Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1," for Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV3-PXS-MJR-027 installed for WEC, (14 pages), 02/26/2020 S&W "Form N-5 Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, As Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1," for Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV3-PXS-MJR-031 installed for WEC, (12 pages), 04/25/2020 Section 1A15 Specifications

66 APP-G1-V8-001, AP1000 Electrical Installation Specification, Revision 7 Work Packages SV3-1231-SHW-800021, U3, Install weld and Label Scheduled Conduit Supports, Containment, Elevation 107-2, Area 2-WP 1, Room 11300 Drawings APP-ECS-E9-012, Cable Tray notes and Details Sheet 3, Revision 12 APP-ECS-E9-013, Cable Tray Notes and Details Sheet 4, Revision 7 APP-ECS-E9-014, Cable Tray Notes and Details Sheet 5, Revision 5 APP-ECS-E9-030, Conduit Notes and Details, Revision 16 APP-ECS-E9-062, Cable Tray Notes and Details Sheet 1, Revision 2 APP-ECS-E9-063, Cable Tray Notes and Details Sheet 12, Revision 2 WM-E-3-11-307866, Conduit Support Installation Weld Map for Containment Area 2 Elevation 107'-2", Support E117, Revision 0 WM-E-3-11-307874, Conduit Support Installation Weld Map for Containment Area 2 Elevation 107'-2", Support E211, Revision 0 WM-E-3-11-307885, Conduit Support Installation Weld Map for Containment Area 2 Elevation 107'-2", Support E276, Revision 0 APP-1130-ER-504, Containment Building Area 2 and Area 3 EL 107'-2" Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 1), Revision 6 APP-1130-ER-505, Containment Building Area 2 and Area 3 EL 107'-2" Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 2), Revision 3 APP-1130-ER-509, Containment Building Area 2 and Area 3 EL 107'-2" Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 6), Revision 4 APP-1130-ER-444, Conduit Supports Fabrication Drawing, Revision 1 APP-1130-ER-555, Box Support Fabrication Drawing, Revision 0 APP-1130-ER-909, Conduit Support Fabrication Drawing, Revision 1 APP-CA20-S5-02001, Auxiliary Building Areas 5&6 Module CA20 Submodule CA20-02 Isometric Views, Revision 6 Purchase Orders SNV1004125 SNV1000934 SNV1002720 Material Receiving Report J132175-MRR-18-02477 J132175-MRR-17-06035 J132176-MRR-15-01079 J132176-MRR-15-01446 26139-MRR-19-03080 Procedures 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N7101, Construction Quality Verification Program, Revision 3 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N6204, Field Material Control and Traceability, Revision 4 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N3701, Welding Program, Revision 0 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N6105, Material Withdrawal, Revision 8 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N3302, Raceways and Accessories, Revision 9 Supplier Audit/Survey CNOS-19-293, Dubose National Energy Services, Date 11-7-2019 CNOS-18-254, Nova Machine Products, Date 4-26-2018

67 CNOS-18-004, Dubose National Energy Services, Date 1-10-2011 Welding Procedure Specifications P1-A-Lh (Structural), For Vogtle only, Revision 0 WPS1-1.1C02, SMAW and FCAW Welding of P-No. 1 materials E7018 and E71T-12M filler, without PWHT, without impacts, Revision 0 Section 1A16 Work Packages:

SV3-1231-SHW-800033 SV3-1132-SHW-800021 Procedures:

APP-GW-GAP-420, Engineering and Design Coordination Report, Rev. 20 APP-GW-GAP-428, Nonconformance and Disposition Report (N&D), Rev. 18 ND-AD-002-027, Nonconforming Items, Rev. 7 26139-000-G27-GZC-00001, Advanced Authorization Process Requirements During the Construction and Testing Phases at Vogtle Units 3 & 4 Southern Nuclear Corp., Rev. 0 Engineering Change Documents:

SV3-1231-GEF-000010, Field routed conduit use engineered supports (ESR50045032), Rev.

0 SV3-12304-GEF-000002, Changeover to flex / Abandon support (ESR50031692), Rev. 0 Drawings:

APP-1231-ER-621, Auxiliary Building Area 1 El. 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 11),

Rev. 3 APP-1231-ER-634, Auxiliary Building Area 1 El. 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 24),

Rev. 1 APP-ECS-E9-030, Conduits Notes and Details, Rev. 16 APP-ECS-E9-062, Cable Tray Notes and Details Sheet 1, Rev. 2 APP-ECS-E9-100, Conduits Notes and Support Details General Notes, Rev. 3 APP-ECS-E9-101, Conduits Notes and Support Details Conduit Cables, Rev. 1 APP-SH25-VF-016, Fabrication Requirements Tray Supports Seismic Cat 1 Trapeze Vertical Riser Up to 2.5gh & 2.5gv (1 Cable Tray) - No Brace, Rev. 3 SV3-1130-ER-909, Conduit Support Fabrication Drawing, Rev. 0 SV3-CA02-S5-02001, Containment Building Area 2 Module CA02 - Submodule CA02_02 Isometric Views, Rev. 2 SV3-CA02-S5B-02001, Containment Building Area 2 Module CA02 - Submodule CA02_02 Bill of Materials, Rev. 3 SV3-1231-ER-605, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 5), Rev. 3 SV3-1231-ER-615, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 5),

Rev. 3 SV3-1231-ER-625, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 15),

Rev. 2 SV3-1231-SH-224, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Raceway Supports Details (Sheet 15),

Rev. 3 SV3-1231-CEX-993, Auxiliary Building Area 1 Small Walls Embedments Index EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 1), Rev. 5 SV3-1231-ER-640, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 15),

Rev. 2 SV3-CE01-CE-001, Standard Embedment Plates Headed Anchor (HA) Type (Sheet 1), Rev. 8

68 SV3-1231-ER-607, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 7), Rev. 3 SV3-1231-ER-645, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 35),

Rev. 0 SV3-1231-ER-624, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 14),

Rev. 4 SV3-1231-SH-221, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Raceway Supports Details (Sheet 12),

Rev. 3 Condition Reports (CRs):

CR 50063697 CR 50048617 Specifications:

APP-G1-V8-001, AP1000 Electrical Installation Specification, Rev. 7 Miscellaneous:

PLV002ABXD[PT] Rev: 3 Quality Control Inspection Reports:

26139-SV4-IR-ER-00081, Raceway and Accessories Inspection Record, dated 3-5-2019 SV3-1231-1002631, Raceway and Accessories Inspection Record, dated 6/20/2020 SV3-1231-ERW-1006383, Raceway and Accessories Inspection Record, dated 7-11-2020 Section 1A17 Work Packages:

SV3-1231-SHW-800010 SV3-1231-SHW-800012 Procedures:

APP-GW-GAP-420, Engineering and Design Coordination Report, Rev. 20 APP-GW-GAP-428, Nonconformance and Disposition Report (N&D), Rev. 18 ND-AD-002-027, Nonconforming Items, Rev. 7 26139-000-G27-GZC-00001, Advanced Authorization Process Requirements During the Construction and Testing Phases at Vogtle Units 3 & 4 Southern Nuclear Corp., Rev. 0 Engineering Change Documents:

SV3-1231-GEF-000010, Field routed conduit use engineered supports (ESR50045032), Rev.

0 SV3-12304-GEF-000002, Changeover to flex / Abandon support (ESR50031692), Rev. 0 Drawings:

APP-1231-ER-621, Auxiliary Building Area 1 El. 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 11),

Rev. 3 APP-1231-ER-634, Auxiliary Building Area 1 El. 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 24),

Rev. 1 APP-ECS-E9-030, Conduits Notes and Details, Rev. 16 APP-ECS-E9-062, Cable Tray Notes and Details Sheet 1, Rev. 2 APP-ECS-E9-100, Conduits Notes and Support Details General Notes, Rev. 3 APP-ECS-E9-101, Conduits Notes and Support Details Conduit Cables, Rev. 1 APP-SH25-VF-016, Fabrication Requirements Tray Supports Seismic Cat 1 Trapeze Vertical Riser Up to 2.5gh & 2.5gv (1 Cable Tray) - No Brace, Rev. 3 SV3-1130-ER-909, Conduit Support Fabrication Drawing, Rev. 0

69 SV3-CA02-S5-02001, Containment Building Area 2 Module CA02 - Submodule CA02_02 Isometric Views, Rev. 2 SV3-CA02-S5B-02001, Containment Building Area 2 Module CA02 - Submodule CA02_02 Bill of Materials, Rev. 3 SV3-1231-ER-605, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 5), Rev. 3 SV3-1231-ER-615, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 5),

Rev. 3 SV3-1231-ER-625, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 15),

Rev. 2 SV3-1231-SH-224, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Raceway Supports Details (Sheet 15),

Rev. 3 SV3-1231-CEX-993, Auxiliary Building Area 1 Small Walls Embedments Index EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 1), Rev. 5 SV3-1231-ER-640, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 15),

Rev. 2 SV3-CE01-CE-001, Standard Embedment Plates Headed Anchor (HA) Type (Sheet 1), Rev. 8 SV3-1231-ER-607, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 7), Rev. 3 SV3-1231-ER-645, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 35),

Rev. 0 SV3-1231-ER-624, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 14),

Rev. 4 SV3-1231-SH-221, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Raceway Supports Details (Sheet 12),

Rev. 3 Condition Reports (CRs):

CR 50063697 CR 50048617 Specifications:

APP-G1-V8-001, AP1000 Electrical Installation Specification, Rev. 7 Miscellaneous:

PLV002ABXD[PT] Rev: 3 Quality Control Inspection Reports:

26139-SV4-IR-ER-00081, Raceway and Accessories Inspection Record, dated 3-5-2019 SV3-1231-1002631, Raceway and Accessories Inspection Record, dated 6/20/2020 SV3-1231-ERW-1006383, Raceway and Accessories Inspection Record, dated 7-11-2020 Section 1A18 Specifications APP-G1-V8-001, AP1000 Electrical Installation Specification, Revision 7 Work Order Packages SV3-1231-SHW-800012 SV3-1231-SHW-800010 Drawings APP-ECS-E9-012, Cable Tray notes and Details Sheet 3, Revision 12 APP-ECS-E9-013, Cable Tray Notes and Details Sheet 4, Revision 7 APP-ECS-E9-014, Cable Tray Notes and Details Sheet 5, Revision 5

70 APP-ECS-E9-030, Conduit Notes and Details, Revision 16 APP-ECS-E9-062, Cable Tray Notes and Details Sheet 1, Revision 2 APP-ECS-E9-063, Cable Tray Notes and Details Sheet 12, Revision 2 APP-1231-ER-604, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 4), Revision 4 APP-1231-ER-605, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 5), Revision 3 APP-1231-ER-606, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 6),

Revision 2 APP-1231-ER-607, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 7),

Revision 3 APP-1231-SH-224, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Raceway Supports Details Sheet (Sheet 5), Revision 3 APP-1231-ER-616, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 6), Revision 2 WM-E-3-12-318590, Weld Map for the Auxiliary Building Installation of Conduit Support SV3-1231-SH-E1620 APP-1231-ER-625, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 15),

Revision 2 WM-E-3-12-318592, Weld Map for the Auxiliary Building Installation of Conduit Support SV3-1231-SH-E1626 APP-1231-ER-618, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 8),

Revision 3 WM-E-3-12-318595, Weld Map for the Auxiliary Building Installation of Conduit Support SV3-1231-SH-E1801 APP-1231-ER-612, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 2),

Revision 4 WM-E-3-12-318600, Weld Map for the Auxiliary Building Installation of Conduit Support SV3-1231-SH-E1806 APP-1231-ER-630, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 20),

Revision 1 WM-E-3-12-318609, Weld Map for the Auxiliary Building Installation of Conduit Support SV3-1231-SH-E1931 APP-1231-ER-645, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 35),

Revision 0 WM-E-3-12-318611, Weld Map for the Auxiliary Building Installation of Conduit Support SV3-1231-SH-E1967 Purchase Orders SNV1004125 SNV1000934 SNV1002720 Material Receiving Report J132175-MRR-18-02477 J132175-MRR-17-06035 J132176-MRR-15-01079 J132176-MRR-15-01446 26139-MRR-19-03080 Procedures 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N7101, Construction Quality Verification Program, Revision 3 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N6204, Field Material Control and Traceability, Revision 4

71 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N3701, Welding Program, Revision 0 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N6105, Material Withdrawal, Revision 8 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N3302, Raceways and Accessories, Revision 9 Supplier Audit/Survey CNOS-19-293, Dubose National Energy Services, Date 11-7-2019 CNOS-18-254, Nova Machine Products, Date 4-26-2018 CNOS-18-004, Dubose National Energy Services, Date 1-10-2011 Welding Procedure Specifications P1-A-Lh (Structural), For Vogtle only, Revision 0 WPS1-1.1C02, SMAW and FCAW Welding of P-No. 1 materials E7018 and E71T-12M filler, without PWHT, without impacts, Revision 2 Section 1A19 Specifications APP-G1-V8-001, AP1000 Electrical Installation Specification, Revision 7 Work Packages SV3-1231-SHW-800012, Weld and Label Conduit Supports, Aux, Elevation 100-0, Area 1, Room 12304 Drawings APP-ECS-E9-012, Cable Tray notes and Details Sheet 3, Revision 12 APP-ECS-E9-013, Cable Tray Notes and Details Sheet 4, Revision 7 APP-ECS-E9-014, Cable Tray Notes and Details Sheet 5, Revision 5 APP-ECS-E9-030, Conduit Notes and Details, Revision 16 APP-ECS-E9-062, Cable Tray Notes and Details Sheet 1, Revision 2 APP-ECS-E9-063, Cable Tray Notes and Details Sheet 12, Revision 2 APP-1231-ER-603, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100'-0" Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 3), Revision 4 APP-1231-ER-605, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 5), Revision 3 APP-1231-SH-224, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Raceway Supports Details Sheet (Sheet 5), Revision 3 WM-E-3-12-318355, Conduit Support Installation Weld Map for Auxiliary Building Support E1830, Revision 0 WM-E-3-12-318348, Conduit Support Installation Weld Map for Auxiliary Building Support E1740, Revision 0 WM-E-3-12-318346, Conduit Support Installation Weld maps for Auxiliary Building Support E1794, Revision 0 APP-1240-SS-911, Auxiliary Building Area 1 Auxiliary Beams Plan EL 117'-6", Revision 1 APP-1240-SS-912, Auxiliary Building Area 1 Auxiliary Beams Connection Details EL. 117'-6",

Revision 2 APP-1231-ER-611, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 1),

Revision 3 APP-1231-ER-620, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 10),

Revision 2 APP-1231-ER-618, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 8),

Revision 3 APP-1231-ER-631, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 21),

Revision 1 WM-E-3-12-318368, Conduit Support Installation Weld Map for Auxiliary Building , Support E1731, Revision 0

72 APP-1231-ER-633, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 23),

Revision 1 APP-1231-ER-641, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL. 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 31),

Revision 0 Purchase Orders SNV1004125 SNV1000934 SNV1002720 Material Receiving Report J132175-MRR-18-02477 J132175-MRR-17-06035 J132176-MRR-15-01079 J132176-MRR-15-01446 26139-MRR-19-03080 Procedures 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N7101, Construction Quality Verification Program, Revision 3 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N6204, Field Material Control and Traceability, Revision 4 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N3701, Welding Program, Revision 0 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N6105, Material Withdrawal, Revision 8 26139-000-4MP-T81C-N3302, Raceways and Accessories, Revision 9 Supplier Audit/Survey CNOS-19-293, Dubose National Energy Services, Date 11-7-2019 CNOS-18-254, Nova Machine Products, Date 4-26-2018 CNOS-18-004, Dubose National Energy Services, Date 1-10-2011 Welding Procedure Specifications P1-A-Lh (Structural), For Vogtle only, Revision 0 WPS1-1.1C02, SMAW and FCAW Welding of P-No. 1 materials E7018 and E71T-12M filler, without PWHT, without impacts, Rev Section 1A20 Work Packages:

SV3-1231-SHW-800010 SV3-1231-SHW-800012 Procedures:

APP-GW-GAP-420, Engineering and Design Coordination Report, Rev. 20 APP-GW-GAP-428, Nonconformance and Disposition Report (N&D), Rev. 18 ND-AD-002-027, Nonconforming Items, Rev. 7 26139-000-G27-GZC-00001, Advanced Authorization Process Requirements During the Construction and Testing Phases at Vogtle Units 3 & 4 Southern Nuclear Corp., Rev. 0 Engineering Change Documents:

SV3-1231-GEF-000010, Field routed conduit use engineered supports (ESR50045032), Rev.

0 SV3-12304-GEF-000002, Changeover to flex / Abandon support (ESR50031692), Rev. 0 Drawings:

73 APP-1231-ER-621, Auxiliary Building Area 1 El. 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 11),

Rev. 3 APP-1231-ER-634, Auxiliary Building Area 1 El. 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 24),

Rev. 1 APP-ECS-E9-030, Conduits Notes and Details, Rev. 16 APP-ECS-E9-062, Cable Tray Notes and Details Sheet 1, Rev. 2 APP-ECS-E9-100, Conduits Notes and Support Details General Notes, Rev. 3 APP-ECS-E9-101, Conduits Notes and Support Details Conduit Cables, Rev. 1 APP-SH25-VF-016, Fabrication Requirements Tray Supports Seismic Cat 1 Trapeze Vertical Riser Up to 2.5gh & 2.5gv (1 Cable Tray) - No Brace, Rev. 3 SV3-1130-ER-909, Conduit Support Fabrication Drawing, Rev. 0 SV3-CA02-S5-02001, Containment Building Area 2 Module CA02 - Submodule CA02_02 Isometric Views, Rev. 2 SV3-CA02-S5B-02001, Containment Building Area 2 Module CA02 - Submodule CA02_02 Bill of Materials, Rev. 3 SV3-1231-ER-605, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 5), Rev. 3 SV3-1231-ER-615, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 5),

Rev. 3 SV3-1231-ER-625, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 15),

Rev. 2 SV3-1231-SH-224, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Raceway Supports Details (Sheet 15),

Rev. 3 SV3-1231-CEX-993, Auxiliary Building Area 1 Small Walls Embedments Index EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 1), Rev. 5 SV3-1231-ER-640, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 15),

Rev. 2 SV3-CE01-CE-001, Standard Embedment Plates Headed Anchor (HA) Type (Sheet 1), Rev. 8 SV3-1231-ER-607, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 7), Rev. 3 SV3-1231-ER-645, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 35),

Rev. 0 SV3-1231-ER-624, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 14),

Rev. 4 SV3-1231-SH-221, Auxiliary Building Area 1 EL 100'-0" Raceway Supports Details (Sheet 12),

Rev. 3 Condition Reports (CRs):

CR 50063697 CR 50048617 Specifications:

APP-G1-V8-001, AP1000 Electrical Installation Specification, Rev. 7 Miscellaneous:

PLV002ABXD[PT] Rev: 3 Quality Control Inspection Reports:

26139-SV4-IR-ER-00081, Raceway and Accessories Inspection Record, dated 3-5-2019 SV3-1231-1002631, Raceway and Accessories Inspection Record, dated 6/20/2020 SV3-1231-ERW-1006383, Raceway and Accessories Inspection Record, dated 7-11-2020 Section 1A21

74 Procedures:

N&D No: SV3-IDSC-GNR-000011 Rev. 0, Unit 3 IDSC Cabinets Damaged by Water (ESR 50036899)

Work Packages:

SV3-1222-DCW-1091262, Rev. 0 U3 AUX Install Electrical Equipment SV3-IDSCDC-1 & SV3-IDSC-DT-1, Connect Raceways, Install Cables, and Perform Final Testing and Terminations in Room 12203.

SV3-IDSC-DCW-1091194 - De-term cables, disconnect conduits, and remove electrical equipment.

SV3-1222-DCW-1091262 - Reinstalling conduit, cables, and new equipment.

Corrective Action Reports:

CAR 80002392 - Replace SV3-IDSC-DC-1 and DT-1 with SV4-IDSC-DC-1 and DT-1.

Condition Report:

CR 50046418 - Replace SV3-IDSC-DC-1 and -DT-1 with SV4-IDSC-DC-1 and DT-1.

Miscellaneous Documents:

SV4-DT01-VQQ-006, QR-20-219 Quality Release & Certificate of Conformance, Rev. 0 -

Class 1E Regulating Transformer.

SV4-DC01-VQQ-008, QR-20-220 Quality Release & Certificate of Conformance, Rev. 0 -

Class 1E Battery Charger.

Section 1A22 Procedures and Specifications APP-GW-GAP-428, "Nonconformance and Disposition Report." Revision 16 ND-AD-002-025, "Issue Identification, Screening, and Dispatching," Revision 2.0 SV3-CC01-Z0-031, Safety Related Placing Concrete and Reinforcing Steel, Westinghouse Seismic Category I, Safety Class C NUCLEAR SAFETY, Revision 8 Drawings SV3-0000-C9-001, AP1000 CONCRETE GENERAL NOTES, REV. 8 SV3-0000-C9-002, AP1000 CONCRETE GENERAL NOTES, REV. 8 SV3-1278-CR-024-R2, CONICAL ROOF CONCRETE REINFORCEMENT SECTION A-A -

RADIAL AND VERTICAL BARS ARRANGEMENT SV3-1278-CR-025-R1, CONICAL ROOF CONCRETE REINFORCEMENT SECTION B-B -

CIRCUMFERENTIAL BARS ARRANGEMENT SV3-1278-CR-027-R2, PCCS TANK OUTER WALL CONCRETE REINFORCEMENT (VERTICAL)

SV3-1278-CR-029-R1, PCCS TANK INNER WALL CONCRETE REINFORCEMENT GENERAL ARRANGEMENT SV3-1278-CR-030-R1, PCCS TANK INNER WALL CONCRETE REINFORCEMENT (VERTICAL)

SV3-1278-CR-031-R1, PCCS TANK INNER WALL CONCRETE REINFORCEMENT (HORIZONTAL)

SV3-1278-CR-032-R1, PCCS TANK ROOF CONCRETE REINFORCEMENT GENERAL ARRANGEMENT BOTTOM LEVEL SV3-1278-CR-033-R1, PCCS TANK ROOF CONCRETE REINFORCEMENT GENERAL ARRANGEMENT TOP LEVEL SV3-1278-CR-034-R1, PCCS TANK ROOF CONCRETE REINFORCEMENT BOTTOM LEVEL (CIRCUMFERENTIAL)

75 SV3-1278-CR-035-R1, PCCS TANK ROOF CONCRETE REINFORCEMENT TOP LEVEL (CIRCUMFERENTIAL)

SV3-1278-CR-036-R1, PCCS TANK OUTER WALL CONCRETE REINFORCEMENT SECTION F-F - RADIAL & CIRCUM. BARS ARRANGEMENT SV3-1208-CCK-001, "Shield Building Construction Joint Locations & Concrete Compressive Strengths Rollout View," Revision 3 Corrective Action Program Documents CR 70000547, U3 Conical Roof, 5/15/20 CR 70000336, Unit 3 Tension Ring Panels TR08 & TR09, 10/29/19 CR 70000455, TR10 & TR11 Design Concrete Compressive Strength, 2/4/20 CR 70000510, RC12 Repair, 3/31/20 E&DCRs APP-1278-GEF-850129, Shield Building Conical Roof Rebar Adjustments(I) -

ESR#50017956-, Revision 0 APP-1278-GEF-850133, Shield Building Conical Roof Rebar Adjustments (II) -

ESR#50017956-, Revision 0 APP-1278-GEF-850134, Shield Building Conical Roof Rebar Adjustments (III) -

ESR#50017956-, Revision 0 APP-FSAR-GEF-166, Shield Building Conical Roof. Compression Ring connection reinforcement. Revised design, Revision 0 Miscellaneous Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 3 and 4, Revision to License Amendment and Exemption Request: Shield Building Roof Changes (LAR 16-031R1), June 16, 2017 Southern Nuclear Operating Company, ND-17-1051, Enclosure 8, Revision to Protected Information for Request for License Amendment Regarding Shield Building Roof Changes, (Withheld Information), (LAR 16-031R1) 2020SCC1359, "Wood Self Consolidating Concrete Card," 4/20/20 2020SCC1369 "Wood Self Consolidating Concrete Card," 4/20/20 2020SCC1361, "Wood Self Consolidating Concrete Card," 4/20/20 2019SCC1323, "Wood Self Consolidating Concrete Card," 3/4/20 Nonconformance and Disposition Reports SV3-CC01-GNR-000599, "U3 RC12 Repair Low Concrete Strength (ESR 50046594),"

Revision 0 SV3-CC01-GNR-000574, "Unit 3 Tension Ring Panels TR08 & TR09 Voids (ESR 50033024),"

Revision 0 SV3-1278-GNR-000034, "U3 Shield Bldg Roof - Missing Shear Crossties (ESR #50050535),"

Revision 0 SV3-CC01-GNR-000594, "U3 RC12 Repair Low Concrete Strength (ESR 50046594),"

Revision 0 Section 1A23 CR 50059948, "Concrete Pour Advance Authorization," 8/20/20 SV3-SS01-GNR-000909, "Area 1 Roof Framing Steel Connection Issues (ESR 50051471),"

Revision 0 CR 50046494, "NI3 Aux. Bldg. Embed Plates in Wall Placement 153," 3/30/20 SV3-CE01-GNR-000408, "NI3_Aux. Bldg. Plate with Incorrect Safety Class/Seismic Category-Wall Placement 153 (ESR 50046507)," Revision 0 APP-GW-GAP-428, "Nonconformance and Disposition Report," Revision 16

76 ND-AD-002-025, "Issue Identification, Screening, and Dispatching," Revision 2.0 Section 1A24 FW-No. SV4-RCS-PLW-034-1:

WEC P&ID APP-RCS-M6-001, "Reactor Cooling System," Revision 17 WEC Piping Isometric Drawing-No. SV4-RCS-PLW-033-R3, "Reactor Coolant System Containment Building Rooms 11303 PRHR Supply Line," Revision 3 WEC Piping Isometric Drawing-No. SV4-RCS-PLW-034-R2, "Reactor Coolant System Containment Building Rooms 11303/11500 Supply Line," Revision 2 S&W Weld Data Sheet SV4-RCS-PLW-034-1, 10/09/2019 MISTRAS V-20-RT-302-0797, Computed Radiography Examination Report, Weld-No. SV4-RCS-PLW-034-1, 08/27/2020 FW-No. SV4-PXS-PLW-035-1:

WEC P&ID APP-PXS-M6-002, "Passive Core Cooling System," Revision 18 WEC Piping Isometric Drawing-No. SV4-PXS-PLW-035-R2, "Passive Core Cooling System Building Room 11500 PRHR Supply Line," Revision 2 S&W Weld Data Sheet SV4-PXS-PLW-035-1, 08/07/2019 S&W Record of Welder Performance Qualification Test - ASME Section IX, Test-No. 1CS-02 for welder CDA, 05/27/2020 S&W Record of Welder Performance Qualification Test - ASME Section IX, Test-No. 1CS-02 for welder EGF, 01/16/2019 MISTRAS V-20-RT-302-0796, Computed Radiography Examination Report, Weld-No. SV4-PXS-PLW-035-1, 08/27/2020 Section 1A25 Specifications SV4-CC01-Z0-031, Safety Related Placing Concrete and Reinforcing Steel, Rev.8 SV4-CC01-Z0-027, "Safety Related Concrete Testing Services, Westinghouse Seismic Category I, Safety Class C "NUCLEAR SAFETY"," Rev. 7 APP-GW-GAP-428, "Nonconformance and Disposition Report." Revision 16 ND-AD-002-025, "Issue Identification, Screening, and Dispatching," Revision 2.0 Miscellaneous Unit 4 Nuclear Island Shield Building Air Inlet Concrete Placement Elevation 247-6 to 264-4, Rev. 0 Concrete/Grout Delivery Ticket No. 58071, Pour #6165, Load #37, Date 00/01/2020 Concrete/Grout Delivery Ticket No. 83094, Pour #6165, Load #55, Date 09/01/2020 CR 50049720, RT Crane Operator Error, 5/7/20 CBIS Observation Report 231122-QA-RP-200027, 5/7/20 CBIS Nonconformance Report 231122-004-QA-NC-00081, "Unit 4 6 Panel Assembly 1314B,"

Revision 0 SV4-1208-GNR-000095, "Repair of Panel 014E after crane boom impact (ESR#50050078),"

Revision 0 CR 50050702, U4 Shield Course 9 & 10, 5/18/20 SV4-CY01-GNR-000005, "U4 Shield Course 9 & 10 - low grout breaks at 56 days (ESR 50051179)," Revision 0 Section 1A26 E&DCRs APP-1251-GEF-850012, Specific Detail Around Penetrations Required (ESR50019635),

Rev. 0 APP-1251-GEF-850013, Area 1 EL 135-3 Slab REIF Cleanup (ESR 50024100), Rev. 0

77 Specifications SV4-CC01-Z0-031, Safety Related Placing Concrete and Reinforcing Steel, Rev.8 Drawings SV4-0000-C9-001, AP1000 CONCRETE GENERAL NOTES, REV. 9 SV4-0000-C9-002, AP1000 CONCRETE GENERAL NOTES, REV. 9 SV4-0000-C9-002A, AP1000 CONCRETE GENERAL NOTES, REV. 2 SV4-1251-CC-105-R1, AUXILIARY BUILDING CONCRETE FLOOR EL. 1353 AREA 1 SV4-1250-CR-195-R3, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREAS 1 & 2 CONCRETE REINFORCEMENT FLOOR EL 135-3 SECTIONS SV4-1251-CR-105-R1, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 1 CONCRETE REINFORCEMENT FLOOR EL 135-3 PLAN SV4-1251-CR-115-R0, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 1 CONCRETE REINFORCEMENT FLOOR EL 135-3 DETAILS (SHEET 1)

SV4-1251-CR-125-R0, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 1 CONCRETE REINFORCEMENT FLOOR EL 135-3 DETAILS (SHEET 2)

Section 1A27 E&DCRs APP-1251-GEF-067, Auxiliary Building Area 1 Wall P EL 135-3 West View Permanent Formwork Plate Optimization (ESR 50014747), Rev. 0 APP-1261-GEF-008, Roof Area 1. Concrete Structure Drawings Revision, Revision 0 SV0-CC01-GEF-000469, Added Construction Joints in Walls M and P (ESR 50019536, Rev.

0 SV4-CR01-GEF-000458, Unit 4 AUX WP 148/149/150 Splice Location Tolerance for P/M/L (ESR 50043977), Rev. 0 Specifications SV4-CC01-Z0-031, Safety Related Placing Concrete and Reinforcing Steel, Rev.8 APP-GW-GAP-428, "Nonconformance and Disposition Report." Revision 16 ND-AD-002-025, "Issue Identification, Screening, and Dispatching," Revision 2.0 Drawings SV4-0000-C9-001, AP1000 CONCRETE GENERAL NOTES, REV. 9 SV4-0000-C9-002, AP1000 CONCRETE GENERAL NOTES, REV. 9 SV4-0000-C9-002A, AP1000 CONCRETE GENERAL NOTES, REV. 2 SV4-1250-CC-919-R1, AUXILIARY BUILDING CONCRETE OUTLINE AREA EL 135-3 SECTIONS I & J SV4-1200-CR-914, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 1 CONCRETE REINFORCEMENT WALLS P & Q ELEVATIONS, REV. 9 SV4-1250-CR-914, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 1 CONCRETE REINFORCEMENT WALLS P & Q SECTIONS & DETAILS EL. 135-3, REV. 4 Miscellaneous CR 50050640, Unit 4 AUX WP 161 Reinforcement Elevation 145'-9" & 146'-10", 5/18/20 SV4-CR01-GNR-000684, "U4 AUX WP 161 Wrong Size REINF Installed Between EL 145'-9" and 146'-10" (ESR 50050698)," Revision 0 CR 50045402, U4-Aux-Vertical plate for Beam seat (S20) in room 12421, 3/18/20

[2504 Documents]

Section 1P01

78 APP-GW-GAP-420, "Engineering and Design Coordination Reports," Revision 20 APP-GW-GAP-428, "Nonconformance and Disposition Report," Revision 17 ND-AD-002, "Nuclear Development Program Corrective Action Program," Revision 6.0 ND-AD-002-025, "Issue Identification, Screening, and Dispatching," Revision 3.0 ND-AD-002-026, "Corrective Action Program Processing," Revision 3.0 ND-AD-002-027, "Nonconforming Items," Revision 7.0 LIST OF ACRONYMS ACI American Concrete Institute ADS Automatic Depressurization System ANI Authorized Nuclear Inspector AOV Air Operated Valve ASL Approved Vendors List ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers CBIS Chicago Bridge and Iron Services CMT Core Makeup Tank CMTR Certified Material Test Report CNS containment system CR Condition Report CV Containment Vessel E&DCR Engineering & Design Coordination Report EPCR Equipment Preservation Check Records FW Field Weld IDS Class 1E DC and Uninterruptible Power Supply System IMC Inspection Manual Chapter IQI Image Quality Indicator IRWST In Containment Refueling Water Storage Tank ITAAC Inspections, Tests, Analysis, and Inspection Criteria MOV Motor Operated Valve N&D Nonconformance and Disposition Reports NCV Non-Cited Violation NDE Nondestructive Examination NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PCI PCI Energy Services PCS Passive Containment Cooling System PMS Protection and Safety Monitoring System PRHR HX Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger PT Liquid Penetrant Examination PXS Passive Core Cooling System QA Quality Assurance QC Quality Control RCS Reactor Coolant System RT Radiographic Examination RXS Reactor System SFP Spent Fuel Pool SIT Structural Integrity Test SSC Structures, Systems, and Components S&W Stone and Webster

79 UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report URI Unresolved Item VBS Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System VEGP Vogtle Electric Generating Plant WDS Weld Data Sheet WEC Westinghouse Electric Company WPS Welding Procedure Specification ITAAC INSPECTED 106

ITAAC INSPECTED No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Acceptance Criteria Analysis

13 2.1.02.02a 2.a) The components Inspection will be The ASME Code identified in Table conducted of the as- Section III design 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code built components and reports exist for the Section III are piping as as-built components designed and documented in the and piping identified in constructed in ASME design Tables 2.1.2-1 and accordance with reports. Inspection 2.1.2-2 as ASME ASME Code Section III of the as-built Code Section III. A requirements. 2.b) pressure boundary report exists and The piping identified in welds will be concludes that the Table 2.1.2-2 as performed in ASME Code Section ASME Code Section III accordance with the III requirements are is designed and ASME Code Section met for non-constructed in III. A hydrostatic destructive accordance with test will be performed examination of ASME Code Section III on the components pressure boundary requirements. 3.a) and piping required welds. A report Pressure boundary by the ASME Code exists and concludes welds in components Section III to be that the results of the identified in Table hydrostatically hydrostatic test of the 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code tested. Inspection components and Section III meet ASME will be performed for piping identified in Code Section III the existence of a Table 2.1.2-1 and requirements. 3.b) report verifying that Table 2.1.2-2 as Pressure boundary the as-built piping ASME Code Section welds in piping meets the III conform with the identified in Table requirements for requirements of the 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code functional capability. ASME Code Section Section III meet ASME Inspection will be III. A report exists Code Section III performed for the and concludes that requirements. 4.a) existence of an LBB each of the as-built The components evaluation report or lines identified in identified in Table an evaluation report Table 2.1.2-2 for 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code on the protection which functional Section III retain their from dynamic effects capability is required pressure boundary of a pipe break. meets the integrity at their design Section 3.3, Nuclear requirements for pressure. 4.b) The Island Buildings, functional capability.

piping identified in contains the design An LBB evaluation Table 2.1.2-2 as descriptions and report exists and ASME Code Section III inspections, tests, concludes that the retains its pressure analyses, and LBB acceptance boundary integrity at acceptance criteria criteria are met by the its design pressure. for protection from as-built RCS piping 5.b) Each of the lines the dynamic effects and piping materials, identified in Table of pipe rupture. or a pipe break 2.1.2-2 for which evaluation report functional capability is exists and concludes required is designed to that protection from withstand combined the dynamic effects of normal and seismic

No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Acceptance Criteria Analysis design basis loads a line break is without a loss of its provided.

functional capability.

6. Each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as designed for LBB meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.

19 2.1.02.05a.i 5.a) The seismic i) Inspection will be i) The seismic Category I equipment performed to verify Category I equipment identified in Table that the seismic identified in Table 2.1.2-1 can withstand Category I 2.1.2-1 is located on seismic design basis equipment and the Nuclear Island. ii) loads without loss of valves identified in A report exists and safety function. 7.a) Table 2.1.2-1 are concludes that the The Class 1E located on the seismic Category I equipment identified in Nuclear Island. ii) equipment can Table 2.1.2-1 as being Type tests, analyses, withstand seismic qualified for a harsh or a combination of design basis loads environment can type tests and without loss of safety withstand the analyses of seismic function. iii) A report environmental Category I exists and concludes conditions that would equipment will be that the as-built exist before, during, performed. iii) equipment including and following a design Inspection will be anchorage is basis accident without performed for the seismically bounded loss of safety function existence of a report by the tested or for the time required to verifying that the as- analyzed conditions.

perform the safety built equipment i) A report exists and function. including anchorage concludes that the is seismically Class 1E equipment bounded by the identified in Table tested or analyzed 2.1.2-1 as being conditions. i) Type qualified for a harsh tests, analyses, or a environment can combination of type withstand the tests and analyses environmental will be performed on conditions that would Class 1E equipment exist before, during, located in a harsh and following a design environment. ii) basis accident without Inspection will be loss of safety function performed of the as- for the time required built Class 1E to perform the safety equipment and the function. ii) A report associated wiring, exists and concludes cables, and that the as-built Class terminations located 1E equipment and the in a harsh associated wiring, environment. cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

75 2.1.03.06.i 6. The seismic i) Inspection will be i) The seismic Category I equipment performed to verify Category I equipment identified in Table that the seismic identified in Table 2.1.3-1 can withstand Category I 2.1.3-1 is located on seismic design basis equipment identified the Nuclear Island. ii) loads without loss of in Table 2.1.3-1 is A report exists and safety function. 9.a) located on the concludes that the The Class 1E Nuclear Island. ii) seismic Category I equipment identified in Type tests, analyses, equipment can Table 2.1.3-1 as being or a combination of withstand seismic qualified for a harsh type tests and design basis loads environment can analyses of seismic without loss of safety withstand the Category I function. iii) A report environmental equipment will be exists and concludes conditions that would performed. iii) that the as-built exist before, during, Inspection will be equipment including and following a design performed for the anchorage is basis accident without existence of a report seismically bounded loss of safety function verifying that the as- by the tested or for the time required to built equipment analyzed conditions.

perform the safety including anchorage i) A report exists and function. is seismically concludes that the bounded by the Class 1E equipment tested or analyzed identified in Table conditions. i) Type 2.1.3-1 as being tests, analysis, or a qualified for a harsh combination of type environment can tests and analysis withstand the will be performed on environmental Class 1E equipment conditions that would located in a harsh exist before, during, environment. ii) and following a design Inspection will be basis accident without performed of the as- loss of safety function built Class 1E for the time required equipment and the to perform the safety associated wiring, function. ii) A report cables, and exists and concludes terminations located that the as-built Class in a harsh 1E equipment and the environment. associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Acceptance Criteria Analysis 91 2.2.01.02a 2.a) The components Inspection will be The ASME Code identified in Table conducted of the as- Section III design 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code built components and reports exist for the Section III are piping as as-built components designed and documented in the and piping identified in constructed in ASME design Table 2.2.1-1 and accordance with reports. Inspection 2.2.1-2 as ASME ASME Code Section III of the as-built Code Section III. A requirements. 2.b) pressure boundary report exists and The piping identified in welds will be concludes that the Table 2.2.1-2 as performed in ASME Code Section ASME Code Section III accordance with the III requirements are is designed and ASME Code Section met for constructed in III. i) A hydrostatic non-destructive accordance with or pressure test will examination of ASME Code Section III be performed on the pressure boundary requirements. 3.a) components required welds. i) A report Pressure boundary by the ASME Code exists and concludes welds in components Section III to be that the results of the identified in Table tested. A hydrostatic pressure test of the 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code or pressure test will components identified Section III meet ASME be performed on the in Table 2.2.1-1 as Code Section III piping required by ASME Code Section requirements. 3.b) the ASME Code III conform with the Pressure boundary Section III to be requirements of the welds in piping pressure tested. ASME Code Section identified in Table III. A report exists and 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code concludes that the Section III meet ASME results of the pressure Code Section III test of the piping requirements. 4.a) identified in Table The components 2.2.1-2 as ASME identified in Table Code Section III 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code conform with the Section III retain their requirements of the pressure boundary ASME Code Section integrity at their design III.

pressure. 4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.

98 2.2.01.05.i 5. The seismic i) Inspection will be i) The seismic Category I equipment performed to verify Category I equipment identified in Table that the seismic identified in Table 2.2.1-1 can withstand Category I 2.2.1-1 is located on seismic design basis equipment and the Nuclear Island. ii) loads without loss of valves identified in A report exists and structural integrity and Table 2.2.1-1 are concludes that the safety function. 6.a) located on the seismic Category I The Class 1E Nuclear Island. ii) equipment can equipment identified in Type tests, analyses, withstand seismic Table 2.2.1-1 as being or a combination of design basis dynamic qualified for a harsh type tests and loads without loss of environment can analyses of seismic structural integrity and withstand the Category I safety function. iii) environmental equipment will be The as-built conditions that would performed. iii) equipment including exist before, during, Inspection will be anchorage is and following a design performed for the seismically bounded basis accident without existence of a report by the tested or loss of safety function verifying that the as- analyzed conditions.

for the time required to built equipment i) A report exists and perform the safety including anchorage concludes that the function. 6.d) The non- is seismically Class 1E equipment Class 1E electrical bounded by the identified in Table penetrations identified tested or analyzed 2.2.1-1 as being in Table 2.2.1-1 as conditions. i) Type qualified for a harsh being qualified for a tests, analyses, or a environment can harsh environment can combination of type withstand the withstand the tests and analyses environmental environmental will be performed on conditions that would conditions that would Class 1E equipment exist before, during, exist before, during, located in a harsh and following a design and following a design environment. ii) basis accident without basis accident without Inspection will be loss of safety function loss of containment performed of the as- for the time required pressure boundary built Class 1E to perform the safety integrity. equipment and the function. ii) A report associated wiring, exists and concludes cables, and that the as-built Class terminations located 1E equipment and the in a harsh associated wiring, environment. i) cables, and Type tests, analyses, terminations identified or a combination of in Table 2.2.1-1 as type tests and being qualified for a analyses will be harsh environment are performed on bounded by type non-Class 1E tests, analyses, or a electrical combination of type penetrations located tests and analyses. i) in a harsh A report exists and

No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Acceptance Criteria Analysis environment. ii) concludes that the Inspection will be non-Class 1E performed of the as- electrical penetrations built non-Class 1E identified in Table electrical 2.2.1-1 as being penetrations located qualified for a harsh in a harsh environment can environment. withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of containment pressure boundary integrity. ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built non-Class 1E electrical penetrations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

159 2.2.03.02a 2.a) The components Inspection will be The ASME Code identified in Table conducted of the as- Section III design 2.2.3-1 as ASME Code built components and reports exist for the Section III are piping as as-built components designed and documented in the and piping identified in constructed in ASME design Table 2.2.3-1 and accordance with reports. Inspection 2.2.3-2 as ASME ASME Code Section III of the as-built Code Section III. A requirements. 2.b) pressure boundary report exists and The piping identified in welds will be concludes that the Table 2.2.3-2 as performed in ASME Code Section ASME Code Section III accordance with the III requirements are is designed and ASME Code Section met for non-constructed in III. A hydrostatic destructive accordance with test will be performed examination of ASME Code Section III on the components pressure boundary requirements. 3.a) and piping required welds. A report Pressure boundary by the ASME Code exists and concludes welds in components Section III to be that the results of the identified in Table hydrostatically hydrostatic test of the 2.2.3-1 as ASME Code tested. Inspection components and Section III meet ASME will be performed for piping identified in Code Section III the existence of a Table 2.2.3-1 and requirements. 3.b) report verifying that 2.2.3-2 as ASME Pressure boundary the as-built piping Code Section III welds in piping meets the conform with the identified in Table requirements for requirements of the 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code functional capability. ASME Code Section Section III meet ASME Inspection will be III. A report exists Code Section III performed for the and concludes that requirements. 4.a) existence of an LBB each of the as-built The components evaluation report or lines identified in identified in Table an evaluation report Table 2.2.3-2 for 2.2.3-1 as ASME Code on the protection which functional Section III retain their from dynamic effects capability is required pressure boundary of a pipe break. meets the integrity at their design Section 3.3, Nuclear requirements for pressure. 4.b) The Island Buildings, functional capability.

piping identified in contains the design An LBB evaluation Table 2.2.3-2 as descriptions and report exists and ASME Code Section III inspections, tests, concludes that the retains its pressure analyses, and LBB acceptance boundary integrity at acceptance criteria criteria are met by the its design pressure. for protection from as-built RCS piping 5.b) Each of the lines the dynamic effects and piping materials, identified in Table of pipe rupture. or a pipe break 2.2.3-2 for which evaluation report functional capability is exists and concludes required is designed to that protection from withstand combined the dynamic effects of normal and seismic

No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Acceptance Criteria Analysis design basis loads a line break is without a loss of its provided.

functional capability.

6. Each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.2.3-2 as designed for LBB meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.

165 2.2.03.05a.i 5.a) The seismic i) Inspection will be i) The seismic Category I equipment performed to verify Category I equipment identified in Table that the seismic identified in Table 2.2.3-1 can withstand Category I 2.2.3-1 is located on seismic design basis equipment and the Nuclear Island. ii) loads without loss of valves identified in A report exists and safety function. 7.a) Table 2.2.3-1 are concludes that the The Class 1E located on the seismic Category I equipment identified in Nuclear Island. ii) equipment can Table 2.2.3-1 as being Type tests, analyses, withstand seismic qualified for a harsh or a combination of design basis dynamic environment can type tests and loads without loss of withstand the analyses of seismic safety function. For environmental Category I the PXS containment conditions that would equipment will be recirculation and exist before, during, performed. iii) IRWST screens, a and following a design Inspection will be report exists and basis accident without performed for the concludes that the loss of safety function existence of a report screens can withstand for the time required to verifying that the as- seismic dynamic loads perform the safety built equipment and also post-accident function. including anchorage operating loads, is seismically including head loss bounded by the and debris weights.

tested or analyzed iii) A report exists and conditions. i) Type concludes that the as-tests, analyses, or a built equipment combination of type including anchorage is tests and analyses seismically bounded will be performed on by the tested or Class 1E equipment analyzed conditions.

located in a harsh For the PXS environment. ii) containment Inspection will be recirculation and performed of the as- IRWST screens, a built Class 1E report exists and equipment and the concludes that the as-associated wiring, built screens including cables, and their anchorage are terminations located bounded by the in a harsh seismic loads and environment. also post-accident operating loads, including head loss and debris weights. i)

A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh

No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Acceptance Criteria Analysis environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function. ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

522 2.5.02.02.i 2. The seismic i) Inspection will be i) The seismic Category I equipment, performed to verify Category I equipment identified in Table that the seismic identified in Table 2.5.2-1, can withstand Category I 2.5.2-1 is located on seismic design basis equipment identified the Nuclear Island. ii) loads without loss of in Table 2.5.2-1 is A report exists and safety function. 3. located on the concludes that the The Class 1E Nuclear Island. ii) seismic Category I equipment, identified Type tests, analyses, equipment can in Table 2.5.2-1, has or a combination of withstand seismic electrical surge type tests and design basis loads withstand capability analyses of seismic without loss of safety (SWC), and can Category I function. iii) A report withstand the equipment will be exists and concludes electromagnetic performed. iii) that the as-built interference (EMI), Inspection will be equipment including radio frequency performed for the anchorage is interference (RFI), and existence of a report seismically bounded electrostatic discharge verifying that the as- by the tested or (ESD) conditions that built equipment analyzed conditions.

would exist before, including anchorage A report exists and during, and following a is seismically concludes that the design basis accident bounded by the Class 1E equipment without loss of safety tested or analyzed identified in Table function for the time conditions. Type 2.5.2-1 can withstand required to perform the tests, analyses, or a the SWC, EMI, RFI, safety function. 4. combination of type and ESD conditions The Class 1E tests and analyses that would exist equipment, identified will be performed on before, during, and in Table 2.5.2-1, can the equipment. Type following a design withstand the room tests, analyses, or a basis accident without ambient temperature, combination of type loss of safety function humidity, pressure, tests and analyses for the time required and mechanical will be performed on to perform the safety vibration conditions the Class 1E function. A report that would exist equipment identified exists and concludes before, during, and in Table 2.5.2-1. that the Class 1E following a design equipment identified in basis accident without Table 2.5.2-1 can loss of safety function withstand the room for the time required to ambient temperature, perform the safety humidity, pressure, function. and mechanical vibration conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required

No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Acceptance Criteria Analysis to perform the safety function.

597 2.6.03.02.i 2. The seismic i) Inspection will be i) The seismic Category I equipment performed to verify Category I equipment identified in Table that the seismic identified in Table 2.6.3-1 can withstand Category I 2.6.3-1 is located on seismic design basis equipment identified the Nuclear Island. ii) loads without loss of in Table 2.6.3-1 is A report exists and safety function. located on the concludes that the Nuclear Island. ii) seismic Category I Type tests, analyses, equipment can or a combination of withstand seismic type tests and design basis loads analyses of seismic without loss of safety Category I function. iii) A report equipment will be exists and concludes performed. iii) that the as-built Inspection will be equipment including performed for the anchorage is existence of a report seismically bounded verifying that the as- by the tested or built equipment analyzed conditions.

including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

616 2.6.03.07 7. The IDS dc battery Analyses for the as- Analyses for the as-fuses and battery built IDS dc electrical built IDS dc electrical charger circuit distribution system to distribution system breakers, and dc determine the exist and conclude distribution panels, capacities of the that the capacities of MCCs, and their circuit battery fuses and as-built IDS battery breakers and fuses, battery charger fuses and battery are sized to supply circuit breakers, and charger circuit their load dc distribution breakers, and dc requirements. 8. panels, MCCs, and distribution panels, Circuit breakers and their circuit breakers MCCs, and their fuses in IDS battery, and fuses, will be circuit breakers and battery charger, dc performed. Analyses fuses, as determined distribution panel, and for the as-built IDS by their nameplate MCC circuits are rated dc electrical ratings, exceed their to interrupt fault distribution system to analyzed load currents. 9. The IDS determine fault requirements.

batteries, battery currents will be Analyses for the as-chargers, dc performed. Analyses built IDS dc electrical distribution panels, for the as-built IDS distribution system and MCCs are rated to dc electrical exist and conclude withstand fault distribution system to that the analyzed fault currents for the time determine fault currents do not required to clear the currents will be exceed the interrupt fault from its power performed. Analyses capacity of circuit source. 10. The IDS for the as-built IDS breakers and fuses in electrical distribution dc electrical the battery, battery system cables are distribution system to charger, dc rated to withstand fault determine fault distribution panel, and currents for the time currents will be MCC circuits, as required to clear the performed. determined by their fault from its power nameplate ratings.

source. Analyses for the as-built IDS dc electrical distribution system exist and conclude that the IDS dc electrical distribution system cables will withstand the analyzed fault currents, as determined by manufacturers ratings, for the time required to clear the fault from its power source as determined by the circuit interrupting device coordination analyses.

No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Acceptance Criteria Analysis Analyses for the as-built IDS dc electrical distribution system exist and conclude that the IDS dc electrical distribution system cables will withstand the analyzed fault currents, as determined by manufacturers ratings, for the time required to clear the fault from its power source as determined by the circuit interrupting device coordination analyses.

761 3.3.00.02a.i.b 2.a) The nuclear island i) An inspection of i.b) A report exists structures, including the nuclear island which reconciles the critical sections structures will be deviations during listed in Table 3.3-7, performed. construction, including are seismic Category I Deviations from the Table 3.3-1 wall and and are designed and design due to as-built floor thicknesses, and constructed to conditions will be concludes that the as-withstand design basis analyzed for the built shield building loads as specified in design basis loads, structures, including the Design and for radiation the critical sections, Description, without shielding. conform to the loss of structural approved design and integrity and the will withstand the safety-related design basis loads functions. 3.) Walls specified in the and floors of the Design Description nuclear island without loss of structures as defined structural integrity or on Table 3.3-1 except the safety-related for designed openings functions, and without or penetrations, impacting compliance provide shielding with the radiation during normal protection licensing operations. basis.

No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Acceptance Criteria Analysis 762 3.3.00.02a.i.c 2.a) The nuclear island i) An inspection of i.c) A report exists structures, including the nuclear island which reconciles the critical sections structures will be deviations during listed in Table 3.3-7, performed. construction, including are seismic Category I Deviations from the Table 3.3-1 wall and and are designed and design due to as-built floor thicknesses, and constructed to conditions will be concludes that the as-withstand design basis analyzed for the built structures in the loads as specified in design basis loads, non-radiologically the Design and for radiation controlled area of the Description, without shielding. auxiliary building, loss of structural including the critical integrity and the sections, conform to safety-related the approved design functions. 3.) Walls and will withstand the and floors of the design basis loads nuclear island specified in the structures as defined Design Description on Table 3.3-1 except without loss of for designed openings structural integrity or or penetrations, the safety-related provide shielding functions, and without during normal impacting compliance operations. with the radiation protection licensing basis.