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: c. Determine if there are enough different outlines 10 test the projected number and mix of applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated on subsequent days. | : c. Determine if there are enough different outlines 10 test the projected number and mix of applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated on subsequent days. | ||
: a. Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA and IPE insights) are covered in the appropriate exam sections. l'?JJ Ai,. ,, l ~ | : a. Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA and IPE insights) are covered in the appropriate exam sections. l'?JJ Ai,. ,, l ~ | ||
G E b. Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41/43 and 55.45 sampling is appropriate. 141! ~ ' I v N | G E b. Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41/43 and 55.45 sampling is appropriate. 141! ~ ' I v N | ||
E | E | ||
Line 71: | Line 70: | ||
-120 2. NRC examiners and facility contact assigned (C.1.d; C.2.e) /<>I t.'I...} N ~ | -120 2. NRC examiners and facility contact assigned (C.1.d; C.2.e) /<>I t.'I...} N ~ | ||
-120 3. Facility contact briefed on security and other requirements (C.2.c).; /Dt./,~ J, | -120 3. Facility contact briefed on security and other requirements (C.2.c).; /Dt./,~ J, | ||
-120 4. Corporate notification letter sent (C.2.d) n- \z-1+ ~ | -120 4. Corporate notification letter sent (C.2.d) n- \z-1+ ~ | ||
[-90] [5. Reference material due (C.1.e; C.3.c; Attachment 3)] 1"LI o i. If1t Jr | [-90] [5. Reference material due (C.1.e; C.3.c; Attachment 3)] 1"LI o i. If1t Jr | ||
Line 81: | Line 79: | ||
-14 10. Final license applications due and Form ES-201-4 prepared (C.1.1; C.2.i; ES-202) 1--lf,--lS- | -14 10. Final license applications due and Form ES-201-4 prepared (C.1.1; C.2.i; ES-202) 1--lf,--lS- | ||
-14 11. Examination approved by NRC supervisor for facility licensee review (C.2.h; C.3.f) | -14 11. Examination approved by NRC supervisor for facility licensee review (C.2.h; C.3.f) | ||
-A-lA - | -A-lA - | ||
-14 12. Examinations reviewed with facility licensee (C.1.j; C.2.f and h; C.3.g) ~/~ | -14 12. Examinations reviewed with facility licensee (C.1.j; C.2.f and h; C.3.g) ~/~ | ||
Line 138: | Line 135: | ||
: a. Author Michael Buckner I ~~ei~ Date | : a. Author Michael Buckner I ~~ei~ Date | ||
: b. Facility Reviewer(*) Joseph Welch I )q~ ~"t' | : b. Facility Reviewer(*) Joseph Welch I )q~ ~"t' | ||
;;_ :s- | ;;_ :s- | ||
: c. NRC Chief Examiner(#) S~UNO C-Pc'BA' lr:::.H Fl T7.a ?-!~A* ( ,.,/;;;//f/"-;,;, | : c. NRC Chief Examiner(#) S~UNO C-Pc'BA' lr:::.H Fl T7.a ?-!~A* ( ,.,/;;;//f/"-;,;, | ||
: d. NRC Supervisor E\.a.-e.n \.. C"'i:1.tthlf'l.~ / > \../ ,).~~ ~ | : d. NRC Supervisor E\.a.-e.n \.. C"'i:1.tthlf'l.~ / > \../ ,).~~ ~ | ||
\.) ~ | \.) ~ | ||
Note: # Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column "c"; chief examiner concurrence required. | Note: # Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column "c"; chief examiner concurrence required. | ||
* Not applicable for NRG-prepared examination outlines | * Not applicable for NRG-prepared examination outlines | ||
Line 155: | Line 150: | ||
T T c. Assess whether the outline over-emphasizes any systems, evolutions, or generic topics. Ml })- ~ | T T c. Assess whether the outline over-emphasizes any systems, evolutions, or generic topics. Ml })- ~ | ||
E N d. Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected KIA statements are appropriate. ~ 5r | E N d. Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected KIA statements are appropriate. ~ 5r | ||
~ | ~ | ||
: 2. a. Using Form ES-301-5, verify that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number s | : 2. a. Using Form ES-301-5, verify that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number s | ||
Line 171: | Line 165: | ||
' 'v µ/A | ' 'v µ/A | ||
: 4. a. Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA and IPE insights) are covered in the appropriate exam sections. /kt J fJ1< | : 4. a. Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA and IPE insights) are covered in the appropriate exam sections. /kt J fJ1< | ||
G E b. Assess whether the | G E b. Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41 /43 and 55.45 sampling is appropriate. ~ J) ~ | ||
N E | N E | ||
C. Ensure that KIA importance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5. ~ fr 1h<. | C. Ensure that KIA importance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5. ~ fr 1h<. | ||
Line 232: | Line 226: | ||
f 5>c.-t..~tfe I'4. (\. [{____ | f 5>c.-t..~tfe I'4. (\. [{____ | ||
R S, (to | R S, (to | ||
. _ 11Jt.o/141 r | . _ 11Jt.o/141 r | ||
I== | I== | ||
Line 252: | Line 245: | ||
1~ iw1LL~~~ j)Kt;"~r-13 ..trfAn#ek.<-y | 1~ iw1LL~~~ j)Kt;"~r-13 ..trfAn#ek.<-y | ||
-'ai: ?'. . .t?YC:- J. -=-i~i~~ | -'ai: ?'. . .t?YC:- J. -=-i~i~~ | ||
=-j~*~~-~========-=-~= ~~~~~~--p~~ -""=--~ ~b~Utt:..t'a....I~=- _Jiz~ | =-j~*~~-~========-=-~= ~~~~~~--p~~ -""=--~ ~b~Utt:..t'a....I~=- _Jiz~ | ||
-s a 14:5&~/d Qx~!iR ==_d..:S:.8.1<!2_0_ _ __ | -s a 14:5&~/d Qx~!iR ==_d..:S:.8.1<!2_0_ _ __ | ||
Line 531: | Line 523: | ||
!/ | !/ | ||
: 3. Each event description consists of | : 3. Each event description consists of | ||
* the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event | * the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event | ||
~4fl ~ | ~4fl ~ | ||
* the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew the expected operator actions (by shift position) | * the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew the expected operator actions (by shift position) | ||
* the event termination point (if applicable) | * the event termination point (if applicable) | ||
Line 544: | Line 534: | ||
~ | ~ | ||
41) | 41) | ||
~ | ~ | ||
IN(_ | IN(_ | ||
~ | ~ | ||
: 6. Sequencing and timing of events is reasonable, and allows the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives. ~ 1IJ<.. | : 6. Sequencing and timing of events is reasonable, and allows the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives. ~ 1IJ<.. | ||
Line 636: | Line 624: | ||
ES-401, REV 9 T1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401 *2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IA K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: | ES-401, REV 9 T1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401 *2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IA K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: | ||
RO SRO 008AG2.2.37 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident/ 3 3.6 4.6 D D D D 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment 009EA 1.14 Small Break LOCA I 3 3.4 3.4 D DOD Secondary pressure control | RO SRO 008AG2.2.37 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident/ 3 3.6 4.6 D D D D 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment 009EA 1.14 Small Break LOCA I 3 3.4 3.4 D DOD Secondary pressure control 011 EK3.15 Large Break LOCA / 3 4.3 4.4 DD~ DD DD D Criteria for shifting to recirculation mode 022AA2.04 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 2.9 3.a oo or.J~ oo How long PZR level can be maintained within limits 025AG2.1.28 Loss of RHR System / 4 4.1 4.1 DOD 0 D~ Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls. | ||
011 EK3.15 Large Break LOCA / 3 4.3 4.4 DD~ DD DD D Criteria for shifting to recirculation mode | |||
022AA2.04 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 2.9 3.a oo or.J~ oo How long PZR level can be maintained within limits | |||
025AG2.1.28 Loss of RHR System / 4 4.1 4.1 DOD 0 D~ Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls. | |||
- - -------- ---~---------*-*--- | - - -------- ---~---------*-*--- | ||
027AK2.03 Pressurizer Pressure Control System 2.6 2.8 O ~ O O O O O O O O O Controllers and positioners Malfunction I 3 029EK2.06 ATWS / 1 2.9 3.1 DODD Breakers, relays, and disconnects. | 027AK2.03 Pressurizer Pressure Control System 2.6 2.8 O ~ O O O O O O O O O Controllers and positioners Malfunction I 3 029EK2.06 ATWS / 1 2.9 3.1 DODD Breakers, relays, and disconnects. | ||
038EK1 .02 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture/ 3 3.2 3.5 ~ O O O O O [] O Leak rate vs. pressure | 038EK1 .02 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture/ 3 3.2 3.5 ~ O O O O O [] O Leak rate vs. pressure 054AA 1.03 Loss of Main Feedwater I 4 3.5 3.7 D DD D ~ D AFW auxiliaries, including oil cooling water supply 055EA 1.02 Station Blackout/ 6 4.3 4.4 Manual ED/G start 056AA2.60 Loss of Off-site Power I 6 2.7 2.9 open Page 1of2 04/09/2014 10:08 AM | ||
054AA 1.03 Loss of Main Feedwater I 4 3.5 3.7 D DD D ~ D AFW auxiliaries, including oil cooling water supply 055EA 1.02 Station Blackout/ 6 4.3 4.4 Manual ED/G start 056AA2.60 Loss of Off-site Power I 6 2.7 2.9 open Page 1of2 04/09/2014 10:08 AM | |||
ES-401, REV 9 T1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: | ES-401, REV 9 T1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: | ||
Line 656: | Line 636: | ||
GefRl:IOflORIS aREI eefl!Fels. ~ ~ 1'J..'J.. i"Vt. ~ | GefRl:IOflORIS aREI eefl!Fels. ~ ~ 1'J..'J.. i"Vt. ~ | ||
077AK3.01 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid 3.9 4.2 0 0 0----- Reactor and Turbinetrtpcriteria"-~. | 077AK3.01 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid 3.9 4.2 0 0 0----- Reactor and Turbinetrtpcriteria"-~. | ||
Disturbances I 6 | Disturbances I 6 WE04EK1 .3 LOCA Outside Containment I 3 3.5 3.9 ~ 0000[][]0 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (LOCA Outside Containment). | ||
WE04EK1 .3 LOCA Outside Containment I 3 3.5 3.9 ~ 0000[][]0 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (LOCA Outside Containment). | |||
WE05EK3.4 Inadequate Heat Transfer - Loss of 3.1 3.9 O ~ 0 0 [] [] RO or SRO function within the control room team as Secondary Heat Sink I 4 appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated. | WE05EK3.4 Inadequate Heat Transfer - Loss of 3.1 3.9 O ~ 0 0 [] [] RO or SRO function within the control room team as Secondary Heat Sink I 4 appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated. | ||
WE11 EK2.2 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc. I 4 3.9 4.3 ~ D 0 0 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility. | WE11 EK2.2 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc. I 4 3.9 4.3 ~ D 0 0 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility. | ||
------**-------- - - - - - ----------------- * - - - - - - ---*-*- "'*'-***--*----m*--.--~------ | ------**-------- - - - - - ----------------- * - - - - - - ---*-*- "'*'-***--*----m*--.--~------ | ||
Line 669: | Line 645: | ||
ES-401, REV 9 T1G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IA K1 K2 K3 K4 KS K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: | ES-401, REV 9 T1G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IA K1 K2 K3 K4 KS K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: | ||
RO SRO 001AA2.03 Continuous Rod Withdrawal I 1 4.s 4.8 DDDDDD ~ DDD Proper actions to be taken if automatic safety functions have not taken place | RO SRO 001AA2.03 Continuous Rod Withdrawal I 1 4.s 4.8 DDDDDD ~ DDD Proper actions to be taken if automatic safety functions have not taken place 028AK3.03 Pressurizer Level Malfunction I 2 3.s 4.1 DD~ D DODOO False indication of PZR level when PORV or spray valve is open and RCS saturated 051AA1.04 Loss of Condenser Vacuum 4 2.5 2.5 D n Rod position 060AA1.01 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel. I 9 2.8 3 OOO OO ~ OOOn Area radiation monitors 068AK2.01 Control Room Evac. I 8 3.9 4 D~DDDD Auxiliary shutdown panel layout 076AG2.1.32 High Reactor Coolant Activity I 9 3.8 4.0 DDDDOOOO to explain and apply all system limits and precautions. | ||
028AK3.03 Pressurizer Level Malfunction I 2 3.s 4.1 DD~ D DODOO False indication of PZR level when PORV or spray valve is open and RCS saturated 051AA1.04 Loss of Condenser Vacuum 4 2.5 2.5 D n Rod position | |||
060AA1.01 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel. I 9 2.8 3 OOO OO ~ OOOn Area radiation monitors 068AK2.01 Control Room Evac. I 8 3.9 4 D~DDDD Auxiliary shutdown panel layout | |||
076AG2.1.32 High Reactor Coolant Activity I 9 3.8 4.0 DDDDOOOO to explain and apply all system limits and precautions. | |||
------------*--*--***--****-*----****-****--***-*---*-*--*~- | ------------*--*--***--****-*----****-****--***-*---*-*--*~- | ||
WE08EK1 .2 RCS Overcooling - PTS I 4 3.4 4.o ~ D DOD DD Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Natural Circulation Operations). | WE08EK1 .2 RCS Overcooling - PTS I 4 3.4 4.o ~ D DOD DD Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Natural Circulation Operations). | ||
WE10EA2.2 Natural Circ. With Seam Void/ 4 3.4 3.9 n DD DD Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments. | WE10EA2.2 Natural Circ. With Seam Void/ 4 3.4 3.9 n DD DD Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments. | ||
WE1~ Containment Flooding I 5 ~D ~DD D | WE1~ Containment Flooding I 5 ~D ~DD D | ||
~1<"3.\ ;v1 ~-9 Page 1of1 04/09/2014 10:08 AM | ~1<"3.\ ;v1 ~-9 Page 1of1 04/09/2014 10:08 AM | ||
Line 687: | Line 655: | ||
---¥.~-~3 .*---*-* ---*-***. _. .,. | ---¥.~-~3 .*---*-* ---*-***. _. .,. | ||
RO | RO | ||
: 3. \ ~s SRO | |||
: 3. \ ~s | |||
SRO | |||
~ | ~ | ||
_.!3- D D D D VI D D D D D D | _.!3- D D D D VI D D D D D D | ||
Line 698: | Line 663: | ||
\ 0"1l:'ll> | \ 0"1l:'ll> | ||
* 004G2.4~1--- ChemiCal and Volume Control --42-:U--[j D D D D D D D D D [i'J Knowledgb of annunciatorsaiarms~-fildicationsor-response procedures 004~ Chemical and Volume ~ D [i'J D D D D D D D BWS'ftank-fteatei:s-1/..Z .o"; ~.-; 3.S- ~~ p~ | * 004G2.4~1--- ChemiCal and Volume Control --42-:U--[j D D D D D D D D D [i'J Knowledgb of annunciatorsaiarms~-fildicationsor-response procedures 004~ Chemical and Volume ~ D [i'J D D D D D D D BWS'ftank-fteatei:s-1/..Z .o"; ~.-; 3.S- ~~ p~ | ||
005K4.03 Residual Heat Removal 2.9 3.2 D D D ri'J D ODD AHR heat exchanger bypass flow control | 005K4.03 Residual Heat Removal 2.9 3.2 D D D ri'J D ODD AHR heat exchanger bypass flow control 006K2.01 Emergency Core Cooling 3.6 3.9 r-1 ri'J D D D D D D D D D ECCS pumps 007~ Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 9.1 9.4 DD D DJiftTo Mo | ||
006K2.01 Emergency Core Cooling 3.6 3.9 r-1 ri'J D D D D D D D D D ECCS pumps | |||
007~ Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 9.1 9.4 DD D DJiftTo Mo | |||
./ | ./ | ||
D Method et fermiR~ a stea111 bobble In the l'!f!I | D Method et fermiR~ a stea111 bobble In the l'!f!I | ||
* A3.o l 2.? 2.9 AArtA\ h ~ ~ b~ {) f~. | * A3.o l 2.? 2.9 AArtA\ h ~ ~ b~ {) f~. | ||
008A1.01 Component Cooling Water 2.8 2.9 n D -**---*-- | 008A1.01 Component Cooling Water 2.8 2.9 n D -**---*-- | ||
D D D [i'J n n n 11 | D D D [i'J n n n 11 | ||
-*------*---*~*-*------------- | -*------*---*~*-*------------- | ||
ccw flow rate | ccw flow rate 010K4.01 Pressurizer Pressure Control 2.1 2.9 D 0 D [] n Spray valve warm-up 012K3.01 Reactor Protection 3.9 4.o D fi'l D D D D CADS 013K1.06 Engineered Safety Features Actuation 4.2 4.4 ~] D D D D D D r-1 Eccs 013K2.01 Engineered Safety Features Actuation 3.6 3.8 [i'J D ESFAS/safeguards equipment control Page 1of3 04/09/2014 10:08 AM | ||
010K4.01 Pressurizer Pressure Control 2.1 2.9 D 0 D [] n Spray valve warm-up | |||
012K3.01 Reactor Protection 3.9 4.o D fi'l D D D D CADS | |||
013K1.06 Engineered Safety Features Actuation 4.2 4.4 ~] D D D D D D r-1 Eccs | |||
013K2.01 Engineered Safety Features Actuation 3.6 3.8 [i'J D ESFAS/safeguards equipment control Page 1of3 04/09/2014 10:08 AM | |||
ES-401, REV 9 T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: | ES-401, REV 9 T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: | ||
RO SRO 022A2.03 Containment Cooling 2.6 3.o DDDDDDD ~ DD Fan motor thermal overload/high-speed operation 022K3.02 Containment Cooling 3.0 3.3 DD Containment instrumentation readings | RO SRO 022A2.03 Containment Cooling 2.6 3.o DDDDDDD ~ DD Fan motor thermal overload/high-speed operation 022K3.02 Containment Cooling 3.0 3.3 DD Containment instrumentation readings | ||
*--~- -------- -*--*-****----*---- --*---------------*--*-*----.----------* | *--~- -------- -*--*-****----*---- --*---------------*--*-*----.----------* | ||
025K6.01 Ice Condenser 3.4 3.6 OOOOO ~ OOOOO Upper and lower doors of the ice condenser 026A4.05 Containment Spray 3.5 3.5 DDDDDDD D~ Containment spray reset switches | 025K6.01 Ice Condenser 3.4 3.6 OOOOO ~ OOOOO Upper and lower doors of the ice condenser 026A4.05 Containment Spray 3.5 3.5 DDDDDDD D~ Containment spray reset switches 039A3.02 Main and Reheat Steam 3.1 3.5 [J D D D D DD~DD Isolation of the MASS 059A1.07 Main Feedwater 2.5 2.6 n DDD DD ~ DDD D Feed Pump speed, including normal control speed for ICS | ||
039A3.02 Main and Reheat Steam 3.1 3.5 [J D D D D DD~DD Isolation of the MASS | |||
059A1.07 Main Feedwater 2.5 2.6 n DDD DD ~ DDD D Feed Pump speed, including normal control speed for ICS | |||
~.7 a.e- DD~ | ~.7 a.e- DD~ | ||
o D D D [f[fiJ--0-----;-;::;;;;:::- ~~~ Ab P.s 059~ Main Feedwater . ****-1*1-* sl aeei"eAt iAs!rl:lmeRlatieR-:- | o D D D [f[fiJ--0-----;-;::;;;;:::- ~~~ Ab P.s 059~ Main Feedwater . ****-1*1-* sl aeei"eAt iAs!rl:lmeRlatieR-:- | ||
c;\'2.4. ll 4-.o 4.2 | c;\'2.4. ll 4-.o 4.2 061~ Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater ~DODD | ||
061~ Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater ~DODD | |||
._~ | ._~ | ||
D DeGay l:leat 681:1rG8S QRQ | D DeGay l:leat 681:1rG8S QRQ | ||
* 1'5. 0) 2.6 2.7 n1. ' DD ~ *--T:T_o__ ~ '----L-~r~~*'ii l\.e4cfl...sl.1 | * 1'5. 0) 2.6 2.7 n1. ' DD ~ *--T:T_o__ ~ '----L-~r~~*'ii l\.e4cfl...sl.1 | ||
'"""' *-* ..'-""."" '" "' o ""' .' i<eS | '"""' *-* ..'-""."" '" "' o ""' .' i<eS 061K6.02 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater D 11 Pumps *-- _ | ||
* 062G2.2.39 Electrical Distribution 3.9 4.5 O - 0 DDODD ~ Knowledge of less than one hour technical specification action statements for systems. | |||
061K6.02 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater D 11 Pumps *-- _ | |||
062G2.2.39 Electrical Distribution 3.9 4.5 O - 0 DDODD ~ Knowledge of less than one hour technical specification action statements for systems. | |||
063K1.03 DC Electrical Distribution n Battery charger and battery Page 2 of 3 04/09/2014 10:08 AM | 063K1.03 DC Electrical Distribution n Battery charger and battery Page 2 of 3 04/09/2014 10:08 AM | ||
ES-401, REV 9 T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401*2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IA K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: | ES-401, REV 9 T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401*2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IA K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: | ||
RO SRO 064K1.02 Emergency Diesel Generator 3.1 3.6 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 D/G cooling water system | RO SRO 064K1.02 Emergency Diesel Generator 3.1 3.6 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 D/G cooling water system 073K3.01 Process Radiation Monitoring 3.6 4.2 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 DO 0 Radioactive effluent releases 076A3.02 Service Water 3.7 3.7 ODO ODO~ 0 Emergency heat loads 076K4.03 Service Water 2.9 3.4 0 0 ~ 0 0 DODO Automatic opening features associated with SWS isolation valves to CCW heat exchanges 078A4.01 Instrument Air 3.1 3.1 0 ~o Pressure gauges 103A2.04 Containment 3.5 3.6 0 0 0 OD~ DO Containment evacuation (including recognition of the alarm) | ||
073K3.01 Process Radiation Monitoring 3.6 4.2 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 DO 0 Radioactive effluent releases 076A3.02 Service Water 3.7 3.7 ODO ODO~ 0 Emergency heat loads 076K4.03 Service Water 2.9 3.4 0 0 ~ 0 0 DODO Automatic opening features associated with SWS isolation valves to CCW heat exchanges 078A4.01 Instrument Air 3.1 3.1 0 ~o Pressure gauges 103A2.04 Containment 3.5 3.6 0 0 0 OD~ DO Containment evacuation (including recognition of the alarm) | |||
Page 3 of 3 04/09/2014 10:08 AM | Page 3 of 3 04/09/2014 10:08 AM | ||
ES-401, REV 9 T2G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: | ES-401, REV 9 T2G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: | ||
RO SRO 001K2.01 Control Rod Drive 3.5 3.6 D ~ D D D D D D D D D One-line diagram of power supply to MIG sets. | RO SRO 001K2.01 Control Rod Drive 3.5 3.6 D ~ D D D D D D D D D One-line diagram of power supply to MIG sets. | ||
015G2.2.40 Nuclear Instrumentation 3.4 4.1 D [J DOD DD~ Ability to apply technical specifications for a system. | 015G2.2.40 Nuclear Instrumentation 3.4 4.1 D [J DOD DD~ Ability to apply technical specifications for a system. | ||
016A3.01 Non-nuclear Instrumentation 2.0 2.0 D D DD~DD Automatic selection of NNIS inputs to control systems 028A2.02 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge 3.5 3.9 DD DD DD~DDD LOCA condition and related concern over hydrogen Control | 016A3.01 Non-nuclear Instrumentation 2.0 2.0 D D DD~DD Automatic selection of NNIS inputs to control systems 028A2.02 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge 3.5 3.9 DD DD DD~DDD LOCA condition and related concern over hydrogen Control | ||
Line 759: | Line 698: | ||
~~ | ~~ | ||
Fuel Handling Equipment | Fuel Handling Equipment | ||
\'-4.oZ. Z.'5" 3,3 041K3.02 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control 3.8 3.9 D D ~ DDDDDD RCS 071A1.06 Waste Gas Disposal 2.5 2.8 D D D D [1 ~ DOD Ventilation system | \'-4.oZ. Z.'5" 3,3 041K3.02 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control 3.8 3.9 D D ~ DDDDDD RCS 071A1.06 Waste Gas Disposal 2.5 2.8 D D D D [1 ~ DOD Ventilation system 072~ Area Radiation Monitoring = 1 1 tl1001y, ineluclil'I§ seuFGes, ty13es, u11its and | ||
072~ Area Radiation Monitoring = 1 1 tl1001y, ineluclil'I§ seuFGes, ty13es, u11its and | |||
~\.Ol | ~\.Ol | ||
~s~~~::rs~ | ~s~~~::rs~ | ||
075K4.01 Circulating Water 2.5 2.8 D ~ DODD Heat sink 086M.Qi. Fire Protection 8.2 3,a, HaleR system | 075K4.01 Circulating Water 2.5 2.8 D ~ DODD Heat sink 086M.Qi. Fire Protection 8.2 3,a, HaleR system | ||
* A4*o' 3.3 3.3 Flrc. vJ~ 'Po~ | * A4*o' 3.3 3.3 Flrc. vJ~ 'Po~ | ||
Line 774: | Line 710: | ||
-et1a11yes, etE:' \~ 'V ~ ab b(.s fa,~ | -et1a11yes, etE:' \~ 'V ~ ab b(.s fa,~ | ||
--*--**--*-***--------*---*-m---------------- .. | --*--**--*-***--------*---*-m---------------- .. | ||
G2.1.34 Conduct of operations 2.7 3.5 0 o~ Knowledge of primary and seconaary cnem1stry 11m1ts | G2.1.34 Conduct of operations 2.7 3.5 0 o~ Knowledge of primary and seconaary cnem1stry 11m1ts G2.1.5 Conduct operations 2.9 3.9 OO DO 0 OD~ Ability to locate and use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc. | ||
G2.2.13 Equipment Control 4.1 4.3 - - - - -- O O O O O ~ Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures. | G2.2.13 Equipment Control 4.1 4.3 - - - - -- O O O O O ~ Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures. | ||
G2.2.2 Equipment Control 4.6 4.1 ODO~ Ability to manipulate the console controls as required to operate the facility between shutdown and designated power levels. | G2.2.2 Equipment Control 4.6 4.1 ODO~ Ability to manipulate the console controls as required to operate the facility between shutdown and designated power levels. | ||
G2.2.41 Equipment 9ontrol 3.5 3.9 0 0 0 0 0 DO o~ Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings | G2.2.41 Equipment 9ontrol 3.5 3.9 0 0 0 0 0 DO o~ Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings G2.3.5 Radiation Control 2.9 2.9 0 ~ Ability to use radiation monitoring systems G2.3.7 Radiation Control 3.5 3.6 [] co OD~ Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal or abnormal conditions G2.4.39 Emergency Procedures/Plans 3.9 3.8 [J O c o~ Knowledge of the RO's responsibilities in emergency plan implementation. | ||
G2.3.5 Radiation Control 2.9 2.9 0 ~ Ability to use radiation monitoring systems | |||
G2.3.7 Radiation Control 3.5 3.6 [] co OD~ Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal or abnormal conditions | |||
G2.4.39 Emergency Procedures/Plans 3.9 3.8 [J O c o~ Knowledge of the RO's responsibilities in emergency plan implementation. | |||
G2.4.4 Emergency Procedures/Plans 4.5 4.7 O O O O O ~ Ability to recognize system operating parameters which are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures. | G2.4.4 Emergency Procedures/Plans 4.5 4.7 O O O O O ~ Ability to recognize system operating parameters which are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures. | ||
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Line 794: | Line 722: | ||
029EG2.2.38 ATWS / 1 3.6 4.5 D o O O L~--'0owledge of conditions and limitations in the facility ~~~ | 029EG2.2.38 ATWS / 1 3.6 4.5 D o O O L~--'0owledge of conditions and limitations in the facility ~~~ | ||
license. ~ | license. ~ | ||
040AG2.4.30 Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat 2.7 4.1 O DO ~ Knowledge of events related to system operations/status Transfer/ 4 that must be reported to internal orginizations or outside agencies. | 040AG2.4.30 Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat 2.7 4.1 O DO ~ Knowledge of events related to system operations/status Transfer/ 4 that must be reported to internal orginizations or outside agencies. | ||
057AA2.04 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus/ 6 3.7 4 0 DO ~DO ESF system panel alarm annunciators and channel status indicators | 057AA2.04 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus/ 6 3.7 4 0 DO ~DO ESF system panel alarm annunciators and channel status indicators 077AA2.01 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid 3.5 3.6 O O O O O O O ~* -O- O O Operating point on the generator capability curve Disturbances / 6 Page 1of1 04/09/2014 10:08 AM | ||
077AA2.01 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid 3.5 3.6 | |||
O O O O O O O ~* -O- O O Operating point on the generator capability curve Disturbances / 6 Page 1of1 04/09/2014 10:08 AM | |||
ES-401, REV 9 SRO T1G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: | ES-401, REV 9 SRO T1G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: | ||
Line 811: | Line 734: | ||
ES-401, REV 9 SRO T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: | ES-401, REV 9 SRO T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: | ||
RO SRO 012G2.4.49 Reactor Protection 4.s 4.4 D D D D D D D D D D ~ Ability to perform without reference to procedures those actions that require immediate operation of system components and controls. | RO SRO 012G2.4.49 Reactor Protection 4.s 4.4 D D D D D D D D D D ~ Ability to perform without reference to procedures those actions that require immediate operation of system components and controls. | ||
025A2.05 Ice Condenser 2.5 2.1 [J o Abnormal glycol expansion tank level | 025A2.05 Ice Condenser 2.5 2.1 [J o Abnormal glycol expansion tank level 039G2.4.50 Main and Reheat Steam 4.2 4.o [J ooo 0[]000~ | ||
039G2.4.50 Main and Reheat Steam 4.2 4.o [J ooo 0[]000~ | |||
Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual. | Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual. | ||
- - - ------- --------=- --------*-*---*-*-----** ********-**..----*-*-***-----*--- | - - - ------- --------=- --------*-*---*-*-----** ********-**..----*-*-***-----*--- | ||
Line 827: | Line 747: | ||
ES-401, REV 9 SRO T3 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IA K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: | ES-401, REV 9 SRO T3 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IA K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: | ||
RO SRO G2.1.35 Conduct of operations 2.2 3.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of the fuel handling responsibilities of SRO's G2.2.17 Equipment Control 2.6 3.8 0 ODO o~ Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during power operations. | RO SRO G2.1.35 Conduct of operations 2.2 3.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of the fuel handling responsibilities of SRO's G2.2.17 Equipment Control 2.6 3.8 0 ODO o~ Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during power operations. | ||
G2.2.21 Equipment Control 2.9 4.1 0 0~ Knowledge of pre- and post-maintenance operability requirements. | G2.2.21 Equipment Control 2.9 4.1 0 0~ Knowledge of pre- and post-maintenance operability requirements. | ||
G2.3.13 Radiation Control 3.4 3.8 0 [] 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties | G2.3.13 Radiation Control 3.4 3.8 0 [] 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties G2.3.6 Radiation Control 2.0 3.8 0 0000000~ Ability to aprove release permits G2.4.38 Emergency Procedures/Plans 2.4 4.4 O O ~ Ability to take actions called for in the facility emergency plan, including supporting or acting as emergency coordinator. | ||
G2.3.6 Radiation Control 2.0 3.8 0 0000000~ Ability to aprove release permits G2.4.38 Emergency Procedures/Plans 2.4 4.4 O O ~ Ability to take actions called for in the facility emergency plan, including supporting or acting as emergency coordinator. | |||
G2.4.5 Emergency Procedures/Plans 3.7 4.3 0 ~ Knowledge of the organization of the operating procedures network for normal, abnormal and emergency evolutions. | G2.4.5 Emergency Procedures/Plans 3.7 4.3 0 ~ Knowledge of the organization of the operating procedures network for normal, abnormal and emergency evolutions. | ||
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Line 1,093: | Line 1,010: | ||
~:;'w,~ FSAR information is SRO only information. If this being used because of lesson plan objectives, then bases information used for | ~:;'w,~ FSAR information is SRO only information. If this being used because of lesson plan objectives, then bases information used for | ||
"' / | "' / | ||
the SRO exam cannot have an RO objective tied to it. Need to discuss. | the SRO exam cannot have an RO objective tied to it. Need to discuss. | ||
026 A4.05 42 H 2 x B E Question meets the KIA. Choice C is not plausible. | 026 A4.05 42 H 2 x B E Question meets the KIA. Choice C is not plausible. | ||
Line 1,227: | Line 1,143: | ||
(F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues Focus T/F I I I I Cred. Partial Job-1 Minutia #/ | (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues Focus T/F I I I I Cred. Partial Job-1 Minutia #/ | ||
Dist. Link I | Dist. Link I | ||
Back-1 Q= SRO I B/M/N I U/E/S units ward KIA Only Explanation | Back-1 Q= SRO I B/M/N I U/E/S units ward KIA Only Explanation 001 AA2.02 82 I H I 2 I x I I I I I I I I I I X I B Question submitted for preliminary pre-submittal review. | ||
001 AA2.02 82 I H I 2 I x I I I I I I I I I I X I B Question submitted for preliminary pre-submittal review. | |||
Question not counted as Unsatisfactory for the overall review. | Question not counted as Unsatisfactory for the overall review. | ||
The question can be answered using RO knowledge alone of the rod control system, effects of boration and AOP entry conditions. | The question can be answered using RO knowledge alone of the rod control system, effects of boration and AOP entry conditions. | ||
Line 1,330: | Line 1,244: | ||
One or more distractors is (are) partially correct (e.g., ifthe applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stem) . | One or more distractors is (are) partially correct (e.g., ifthe applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stem) . | ||
4. | 4. | ||
Check the appropriate box if a job content error is identified: | Check the appropriate box if a job content error is identified: | ||
The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid KIA but, as written, is not operational in content) . | The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid KIA but, as written, is not operational in content) . | ||
The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory) . | The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory) . | ||
The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons) . | The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons) . |
Latest revision as of 12:02, 5 February 2020
ML15126A440 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Sequoyah |
Issue date: | 05/06/2015 |
From: | NRC/RGN-II |
To: | Tennessee Valley Authority |
References | |
Download: ML15126A440 (86) | |
Text
-wR1ff£N ExAfi1 MtJJPlG ES-201 Examination Outline Quality Checklist Form ES-201-2 Facility: S:f<!( VO YA H Date of Examination: /YJAKcH -;(015 Initials Item Task Description a b* c#
1.
w
- a. Verify that the ouUine(s) fit(s) the appropriate model, in accordance with ES-401. .111 Al/II ~
R b. Assess whether the outline was systematically and randomly prepared in accordance with T
I Section D.1 of ES-401 and whether all KIA categories are appropriately sampled. !fl'? % &!
T c. Assess whether the outline over-emphasizes any systems, evolutions, or generic topics. ;;'11 NJA. dV E
N d. Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected KIA statements are appropriate. ~ ~ ~v
- 2. a. Using Fonn ES-301-5, verify that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number s
I of nonnal evolutions. instrument and component failures. technical specifications.
and major transients. I M
u l
A T
- b. Assess whether there are enough scenario sets (and spares) to test the projected number and mix of applicants in accordance with the expected crew comPQSition and rotation schedule without compromising exam integrity, and ensure that each applicant can be tested using at least one new or significantly modified scenario, that no scenarios are duplicated from the applicants' audit test(s). and that scenarios will not be repeated on subsequent days.
\
I 0
R
- c. To the extent possible, assess whether the ouUine(s) confonn(s) with the qualitative \
and quantitative criteria specified on Fonn ES-301-4 and described in Appendix D. \ j 1I
- 3. a. Verify that the systems walk-through outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-2:
~
w (1) the outline(s) contain(s) the required number of control room and in-plant tasks distributed among the safety functions as specified on the form tV II T
I (2) task repetition from the last two NRC examinations is within the limits specified on the form (3) no tasks are duplicated from the applicants' audit test( s)
(4) the number of neN or modified tasks meets or exceeds the minimums specified on the fonn (5) the number of alternate path. low-power, emergency, and RCA tasks meet the criteria on thefonn.
' \
- b. Verify that the administrative outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-1:
(1) the tasks are distributed among the topics as specified on the form (2) at least one task is new or significantly modified (3) no more than one task is repeated from the last two NRC llcensing examinations I
4.
- c. Determine if there are enough different outlines 10 test the projected number and mix of applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated on subsequent days.
- a. Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA and IPE insights) are covered in the appropriate exam sections. l'?JJ Ai,. ,, l ~
G E b. Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41/43 and 55.45 sampling is appropriate. 141! ~ ' I v N
E
- c. Ensure that KIA iml'>ortance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5. 411 10 4 I "
R A
- d. Check for duplication and overlap among exam sections. Ill/A ~ ~ N&1 l e. Check the entire exam fur balance of coverage. 111 "2 ~ /1 ~
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b.
Author Facility Reviewer (*) 1\1/A I ~ ///...ac. u
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- c. NRC Chief Examiner(#)' Dt11.V\ tP ( Vl.c. co~ I I fJ~#V 7.::J. 1 ">~ -!:,-
- d. NRC Supervisor k~'I. <i.~.rtl. ln,i'hr:lt 7 r~~- ......__,,... -- ' $ ':f
.)
I Note: # Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column *c*; chief examiner concurrence required.
- Not applicable for NRC-prepared examination outlines
sr§020r9-sup J-final-fonus-rns doc Form ES-201-1 Facility: "?EQVlOYA H Dt a e ofE xamina . f ion:Of':3/2-3/n/1 Wr: 3/1t/a~
Developed by: Written - Facility ~NRG D II Operating - Facility li2(NRG D Target Chief Date* Task Description (Reference) Examiner's Initials
-180 1. Examination administration date confirmed (C.1.a; C.2.a and b) 10/z.'>-/ 1'1 Jy
-120 2. NRC examiners and facility contact assigned (C.1.d; C.2.e) /<>I t.'I...} N ~
-120 3. Facility contact briefed on security and other requirements (C.2.c).; /Dt./,~ J,
-120 4. Corporate notification letter sent (C.2.d) n- \z-1+ ~
[-90] [5. Reference material due (C.1.e; C.3.c; Attachment 3)] 1"LI o i. If1t Jr
{-75} 6. Integrated examination outline(s) due, including Forms ES-201-2, ES-201-3, ES-301-1, ES-301-2, ES-301-5, ES-D-1's, ES-401-1/2, ES-401-3, and ES-401-4, as applicable (C.1.e and f; C.3.d) \2-17-l4 w-
{-70} {7. Examination outline(s) reviewed by NRC and feedback provided to facility licensee (C.2.h; C.3.e)}
it
{-45} 8. Proposed examinations (including written, walk-through JPMs, and scenarios, as applicable), supporting documentation (including Forms ES-301-3, ES-301-4, ES-301-5, ES-301-6, and ES-401-6, and any Form JI-ES-201-3 updates), and reference materials due (C.1.e, f, g and h; C.3.d) 1-lb-\S"°"
-30 9. Preliminary license applications (NRC Form 398's) due (C.1.1; C.2.g; ES-202) -i.-Z.-\ s- j),-
-14 10. Final license applications due and Form ES-201-4 prepared (C.1.1; C.2.i; ES-202) 1--lf,--lS-
-14 11. Examination approved by NRC supervisor for facility licensee review (C.2.h; C.3.f)
-A-lA -
-14 12. Examinations reviewed with facility licensee (C.1.j; C.2.f and h; C.3.g) ~/~
f
-7 13. Written examinations and operating tests approved by NRC supervisor (C.2.i; C.3.h) WIZ.ITTE.-1-t '. ~-13-t'° QfGfl.lti1Nt;.: 1.*Z1-1S: ~
-7 14. Final applications reviewed; 1 or 2 (if >10) applications audited to confirm
~
qualifications I eligibility; and examination approval and waiver letters sent (C.2.i; Attachment 5; ES-202, C.2.e; ES-204)
-7 15. Proctoring/written exam administration guidelines reviewed with facility licensee (C.3.k) "3-\(,-L~ 1J1i.__
-7 16. Approved scenarios, job performance measures, and questions distributed to NRC examiners (C.3.i) 3--z-1S- -1'J'K_
- Target dates are generally based on facility-prepared examinations and are keyed to the examination date identified in the corporate notification letter. They are for planning purposes and may be adjusted on a case-by-case basis in coordination with the facility licensee.
[Applies only] {Does not apply} to examinations prepared by the NRC.
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ES-201 Examination Outline Quality Checklist Form ES-201-2 Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Station 1 & 2 Date of Examination: 03/02/2015 Initials Item Task Description a b* c#
1.
w
- a. Verify that the outline(s) fit(s) the appropriate model, in accordance with ES-401. /1114' iJ1~ ;J/A R Assess whether the outline was systematically and randomly prepared in accordance with I
b.
Section D.1 of ES-401 and whether all KIA categories are appropriately sampled. /Jk tJiA tJ/A T
T c. Assess whether the outline over-emphasizes any systems, evolutions, or generic topics. ;1/lt Nlh N/A E
N d. Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected KIA statements are appropriate. 1lll-Y r'1/~
~
- 2. a. Using Form ES-301-5, verify that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number s
of normal evolutions, instrument and component failures, technical specifications, and major transients.
i ~ti ~ 1IJl I
M b. Assess whether there are enough scenario sets (and spares) to test the projected number u and mix of applicants in accordance with the expected crew composition and rotation schedult:
L without compromising exam integrity, and ensure that each applicant can be tested using at least one new or significantly modified scenario, that no scenarios are duplicated
~ {;~ ~
A T from the applicants' audit test(s), and that scenarios will not be repeated on subsequent days.
0 R
C. To the extent possible, assess whether the outline(s) conform(s) with the qualitative and quantitative criteria specified on Form ES-301-4 and described in Appendix D. l~ B ;ex.
- 3. a. Verify that the systems walk-through outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-2:
(1) the outline(s) contain(s) the required number of control room and in-plant tasks w distributed among the safety functions as specified on the form T
I (2) task repetition from the last two NRC examinations is within the limits specified on the form (3) no tasks are duplicated from the applicants' audit test(s)
(4) the number of new or modified tasks meets or exceeds the minimums specified on the form l~ ~ ftllt_
(5) the number of alternate path, low-power, emergency, and RCA tasks meet the criteria on the form.
- b. Verify that the administrative outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-1:
(1) the tasks are distributed among the topics as specified on the form (2) at least one task is new or significantly modified
/
l,j i.£ ~ '!Ji<_
(3) no more than one task is repeated from the last two NRC licensing examinations
- c. Determine if there are enough different outlines to test the projected number and mix of applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated on subsequent days. t *iiY ~ ~
- 4. a. Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA and IPE insights) are covered in the appropriate exam sections.
t- ~ ~ ?Im_
G E b. Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41/43 and 55.45 sampling is appropriate. l~l/($ q '$f(
N
- c. Ensure that KIA importance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5. ~~ (v ~
E R d. Check for duplication and overlap among exam sections. ;Jufj i "/bf._
A L e. Check the entire exam for balance of coverage. '1~ 'Q' -$l
~
L ti?(_
~
- a. Author Michael Buckner I ~~ei~ Date
- b. Facility Reviewer(*) Joseph Welch I )q~ ~"t'
- _
- s-
- c. NRC Chief Examiner(#) S~UNO C-Pc'BA' lr:::.H Fl T7.a ?-!~A* ( ,.,/;;;//f/"-;,;,
- d. NRC Supervisor E\.a.-e.n \.. C"'i:1.tthlf'l.~ / > \../ ,).~~ ~
\.) ~
Note: # Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column "c"; chief examiner concurrence required.
- Not applicable for NRG-prepared examination outlines
ES-201 Examination Outline Quality Checklist Form ES-201-2 Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Station 1 & 2 Date of Examination: 03/02~}.015 Of>i.A-TIN"
"=!>llB'. ~*~ wr:i:rrs.tJ Initials Item Task Description a b* c#
- 1. a. Verify that the outline(s) fit(s) the appropriate model, in accordance with ES-401. /.~ ~ $<.
w L/
~ ~ ~
R b. Assess whether the outline was systematically and randomly prepared in accordance with I Section D.1 of ES-401 and whether all KIA categories are appropriately sampled.
T T c. Assess whether the outline over-emphasizes any systems, evolutions, or generic topics. Ml })- ~
E N d. Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected KIA statements are appropriate. ~ 5r
~
- 2. a. Using Form ES-301-5, verify that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number s
of normal evolutions, instrument and component failures, technical specifications, and major transients.
tJ/A ti{A ~~
I M b. Assess whether there are enough scenario sets (and spares) to test the projected number u and mix of applicants in accordance with the expected crew composition and rotation schedule L without compromising exam integrity, and ensure that each applicant can be tested using A at least one new or significantly modified scenario, that no scenarios are duplicated T from the applicants' audit test(s), and that scenarios will not be repeated on subsequent days.
0 C. To the extent possible, assess whether the outline(s) conform(s) with the qualitative R
and quantitative criteria specified on Form ES-301-4 and described in Appendix D.
- 3. a. Verify that the systems walk-through outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-2:
(1) the outline(s) contain(s) the required. number of control room and in-plant tasks w distributed among the safety functions as specified on the form I (2) task repetition from the last two NRC examinations is within the limits specified on the form T (3) no tasks are duplicated from the applicants' audit test(s)
(4) the number of new or modified tasks meets or exceeds the minimums specified on the form (5) the number of alternate path, low-power, emergency, and RCA tasks meet the criteria on the form.
- b. Verify that the administrative outline meets the criteria sp~cified on Form ES-301-1:
(1) the tasks are distributed among the topics as specified on the form (2) at least one task is new or significantly modified (3) no more than one task is repeated from the last two NRC licensing examinations '/
- c. Determine if there are enough different outlines to test the projected number and mix of applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated on subsequent days.
' 'v µ/A
- 4. a. Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA and IPE insights) are covered in the appropriate exam sections. /kt J fJ1<
G E b. Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41 /43 and 55.45 sampling is appropriate. ~ J) ~
N E
C. Ensure that KIA importance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5. ~ fr 1h<.
R A
- d. Check for duplication and overlap among exam sections. *~ 0 -flH.
L e. Check the entire exam for balance of coverage. '~ (} 'BU_
- a. Author Michael Buckner I t1Jl~J7'~~ ;f,~,r
- b. Facility Reviewer(*) Joseoh Welch I ):/[ ~ ...... A A ~I ').l1s
- c. NRC Chief Examiner (#) S/2.UMO r.Ni3JW ,<....;::. i>n I "7~,A I ,:.fk.!JU~1! 3-/3-/S-
- d. NRC Supervisor tu th:rJL t-x-\A i-'hrr ~ If J~\
J . ..__
AA-1.C'i."" Ac
- '-1 0fr1l1s-Note: # Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column "c"; chief examiner concurrence required.
- Not applicable for NRC-prepared examination outlines
p~ I u¥ ___) \
ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3
- 1. Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 03/02/2015 as of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensee's procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.
- 2. Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of 03/02/2015 . From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
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ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3
- 1. Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 03/02/2015 as of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensee's procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.
- 2. Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of 03/02/2015 . From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
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Poer 3 5 ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3
- 1. Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of as of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensee's procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.
- 2. Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of . From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
PRINTED NAME JOB TITLE I RESPONSIBILITY
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Triolo, Owen B From: Link, William D Sent: Friday, March 20, 2015 10:51 AM To: Triolo, Owen B
Subject:
RE: SQN Exam Security Agreement Yes.
To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of 3/2/2015. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC Much Respect.
David Link Ul WBN Outage Specialist From: Triolo, Owen B Sent: Friday, March 20, 2015 10:48 AM To: Link, William D
Subject:
SQN Exam Security Agreement Please acknowledge the following yes or no.
To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of 3/2/2015. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
1
Triolo, Owen B From: Dahlman, Christopher Richard Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2015 9:41 AM To: Triolo, Owen B
Subject:
Re: SQN Exam Security Agreement Yes Sent from my iPhone On Mar 19, 2015, at 9:22 AM, Triolo, Owen B <obtriolo@tva.gov> wrote:
Please acknowledge the following yes or no.
To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of 3/2/2015. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
1
Triolo, Owen B From: Wylie, Sean Patrick Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2015 9:40 AM To: Triolo, Owen B
Subject:
RE: SQN Exam Security Agreement Yes From: Triolo, Owen B Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2015 9:02 AM To: Wylie, Sean Patrick
Subject:
SQN Exam Security Agreement Please acknowledge the following yes or no.
To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of 3/2/2015. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
1
Triolo, Owen B From: Kecy, James Douglas Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2015 9:37 AM To: Triolo, Owen B
Subject:
RE: SQN Exam Security Agreement Yes.
Jim kecy From: Triolo, Owen B Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2015 9:05 AM To: Kecy, James Douglas
Subject:
SQN Exam Security Agreement Please acknowledge the following yes or no.
To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of 3/2/2015. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
1
Triolo, Owen B From: Joplin, Russell Wayne Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2015 9:03 AM To: Triolo, Owen B
Subject:
RE: Russell on Vacation!!
I did NOT divulge any information about the 1503 exam.
Thank you, Russell 423.401.8758 (Cell) 423.751.6247 (Office)
NOTlCE: This electronic message transmission contains information which may be TVA SENSITIVE. TVA RESTRICTED or TVA CONFIDENTIAL. Any misuse or unauthorized disclosure can result in both civil and criminal penalties. If you are not the intended recipient. be aware that any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the content of this inf01mation is prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify me immediately by email and delete the original message.
From: Triolo, Owen B Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2015 9:02 AM To: Joplin, Russell Wayne
Subject:
RE: Russell on Vacation!!
Before you go ....................... .
Please acknowledge the following yes or no.
To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of 3/2/2015. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
From: Joplin, Russell Wayne Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2015 8:48 AM To: Barton, Michael Alan; Buckner, Michael Allen; Hill, Dale E; Hime, Max Eugene Jr; Hoffman, Dale Allen; Skubisz, Keith Robert; Triolo, Owen B; Wylie, Sean Patrick; Kecy, James Douglas; Albright, Thomas S Cc: Smith, Steven Vaughn; Smith, Walter Franklin Jr; McMullin, Matthew C; Vaughn, Christopher L
Subject:
Russell on Vacation!!
- Gents, I will be leaving today for a leisurely vacation with my lovely wife in (mostly) sunny Florida. I won't be checking email or answering my cell phone. If you need me, toss a bottle in the ocean and I'll call you as soon as it reaches my beach.
Seriously, if you need me, call my cell and leave a voice mail. Otherwise, I'll be back 3/30.
Respectfully, 1
Triolo, Owen B From: Edwards, Johnnie R Jr Sent: Friday, March 20, 2015 11:53 AM To: Triolo, Owen B
Subject:
Re: SQN Exam Security Agreement Yes, I did NOT give away any information on exam "Triolo, Owen B" <obtriolo@tva.gov> wrote:
Please acknowledge the following yes or no.
To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of 3/2/2015. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
1
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Seguoyah Nuclear Station 1 & 2 Date of Examination: 3/2/2015 Exam Level: RO 0 sRoD Operating Test No: 2015-301 Administrative Topic (see Type Describe activity to be performed Note) Code*
Perform 1-Pl-OPS-000-020.1 OPERATOR AT THE CONTROLS DUTY STATION CHECKLISTS MODES 1-4 to assess grid status and take required actions.
Conduct of Operations R,N 2.1. 7 (4.4/4. 7) Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.
Determine system lineup from a clearance restoration.
Conduct of Operations R,N 2.1.29 (4.1/4.1) Knowledge of how to conduct system lineups, such as valves, breakers, switches, etc.
Determine QPTR Equipment Control R,N 2.2.12 (3.0) Knowledge of surveillance procedures.
Change the Waste Disposal System Tanks Radiation Control S,N radiation monitor setpoint prior to release.
2.3.11 (3.8) Ability to control radiation releases.
Emergency Procedures/Plan Not examined NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.
- Type Codes & Criteria:(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (:5 3 for ROs; :s 4 for SROs & RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (~ 1)
(P)revious 2 exams (:s 1; randomly selected)
A.1.a While performing 1-Pl-OPS-000-020.1 OPERATOR AT THE CONTROLS DUTY STATION CHECKLISTS MODES 1-4 and given data that includes a high Switchyard voltage with the Main Generator low, the examinee will refer to Appendix E Guidance for Voltage Schedules and determine that further Main Generator voltage adjustments cannot be made to reduce Switchyard voltage. The examinee will determine the following:
- The unit is within all achievable voltage and reactive power limits.
- Notify Transmission Operator within 30 min.
- Log entry will be made to satisfy NERC requirements.
This JPM is based on Sequoyah plant operating experience.
A.1.b The examinee will determine the restoration of 1B Charging Pump and by using 1-S0-62-1 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM.
This JPM is based on Sequoyah plant operating experience.
A.2 The examinee will perform Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio with the plant computer INOPERABLE using O-Sl-NUC-000-133.0. The examinee will gather data, calculate, interpret and determine the acceptance is not met.
A.3 The examinee will change the setpoint for the Waste Disposal System Tanks radiation monitor to 5.31 E+03 in preparation for a liquid release.
A.4 Not examined.
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Station 1 & 2 Date of Examination: 3/2/2015 Exam Level: RO D SRO 0 Operating Test No: 2015-301 Administrative Topic (see Type Describe activity to be performed Note) Code*
Perform 1-Pl-OPS-000-020.1 OPERATOR AT THE CONTROLS DUTY STATION CHECKLISTS MODES 1-4 to assess grid status and take required actions.
Conduct of Operations R,N 2.1. 7 (4.4/4. 7) Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.
Review System Lineup From a Clearance Restoration.
Conduct of Operations R,N 2.1.29 (4.1 /4.1) Knowledge of how to conduct system lineups, such as valves, breakers, switches, etc.
SRO Determine Mode Change Requirements with INOP equipment Equipment Control R,N 2.2.35 (4.5) Ability to determine Technical Specification Mode of Operation.
Select and provide approval for workers to exceed their Administrative Dose Limit in order to make an emergent entry into the RCA.
2.3.13 (3.8) Knowledge of radiological safety Radiation Control R,M procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.
Classify the event and determine Protective Action Recommendations.
Emergency Procedures/Plan R,M 2.4.41 (4.6) Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications.
NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.
- Type Codes & Criteria:(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (::; 3 for ROs; ::; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (~ 1)
(P)revious 2 exams(::; 1; randomly selected)
A.1.a While performing 1-Pl-OPS-000-020.1 OPERATOR AT THE CONTROLS DUTY STATION CHECKLISTS MODES 1-4 and given data that includes a high Switchyard voltage with the Main Generator low, the examinee will refer to Appendix E Guidance for Voltage Schedules and determine that further Main Generator voltage adjustments cannot be made to reduce Switchyard voltage. The examinee will determine the following:
- The unit is within all achievable voltage and reactive power limits.
- Notify Transmission Operator within 30 min.
- Log entry will be made to satisfy NERC requirements.
This JPM is based on Sequoyah plant operating experience.
A.1.b The examinee will determine the restoration of 1B Charging Pump and by using 1-S0-62-1 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM.
This JPM is based on Sequoyah plant operating experience.
A.2 Given Unit 1 is in Mode 4 with the following equipment INOPERABLE:
- SG 1 SGBD Sample Isolation Valve (1-FSV-43-55) due to failed stroke time.
- RCS PZR Level Instrument Loop (1-L-68-320) for emergent repair.
- Power Range NI Channel I (N-41) removed from service for maintenance.
and preparations are being made to perform a change to MODE 3, the examinee Unit 1 Technical Specifications and assess given the rules of usage that the mode change to MODE 3 can proceed.
A.3 Given seven different workers during a life saving emergency, the Examinee will choose two (Varner and Bowman) of the seven for the authorization to exceed the TVA Administrative Dose Levels, determines authorization from the Site Emergency Director is required.
A.4 While acting as the Site Emergency Director and given data for a plant emergency, the examinee will use EPIP-1 EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX to interpret the data within 15 minutes and determine the correct Emergency Classification of General Emergency.
The examinee will then use EPIP-5 GENERAL EMERGENCY to determine Protective Action Recommendation (Recommendation 2).
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Station 1 & 2 Date of Examination: 3/2/2015 Exam Level: RO -'1 SRO-I D SRO-U D Operating Test No: 2015-301 Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)
System I JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function
- a. Continuous Rod Withdrawal While Withdrawing Shutdown Bank N,A,S 1 Rods During a Startup. APE 001 AA 1.05 (4.3/4.2)
- b. Depressurize the RCS to Enable Safety Injection Pump Flow N, EN, L, S 2 During a Loss of Charging. APE 022AA1.03 (3.2/3.2)
- c. Isolate the Ruptured Steam Generator with MSIV Failure to D,A, L,S 3 Close. EPE 038 EA1.32 (4.6/4.7)
- d. Start a Reactor Coolant Pump APE 015/017 AA2.09 (3.4/3.5) D, A, L, S 4P
- e. Initiate AFW Flow to Steam Generators While in ECA-2.1. EPE N,S 4S E12 EA 2.2 (3.4/3.9)
- f. Respond to High Containment Pressure, Place RHR Spray in D, A, EN, L, 5
Service. EPE E14 EA 1.1 (3.7/3.7) s
- g. Respond to a Loss of 1B Shutdown Board. 062 A2.04 (3.1/3.4) N,S 6
In-Plant Systems (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)
- i. Close MSIV's Locally. APE 040 AA1.04 (4.3/4.3) N, E,L 4S
- j. Take Local Control of the Turbine Driven AFW Level Control N,R,E,L 8 valve LCV-3-175. APE 068 AA1.03 (4.1/4.3)
- k. Perform Radiation Monitor O-RE-90-122 Flushing. 068 A4.04 D,R 9 (3.8/3.7)
@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO I SRO-I I SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 I 4-6 I 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank ::;;9/::;;8/::;;4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant ;:::11;:::11;:::1 (EN)gineered safety feature - I - I ;:::1 (control room system)
(L)ow-Power I Shutdown ;:::11;:::11;:::1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) ;:::21;:::21;:::1 (P)revious 2 exams ::;; 3 I ::;; 3 I ::;; 2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA ;:::11;:::1/;:::1 (S)imulator
- a. Shutdown Bank Withdrawal with Continuous Rod Motion The examinee will assume the shift in MODE 3 with prerequisites complete to withdraw Shutdown Bank "A" using O-S0-85-1 CONTROL ROD DRIVE SYSTEM to initialize the Rod Control Startup Step Counter Reset, close the Reactor Trip breakers and momentarily withdraw Shutdown Bank A.
When Shutdown Bank "A" is withdrawn a continuous rod motion condition occurs. The examinee will trip the Reactor using the Immediate Operator Actions of AOP-C.01, ROD CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS.
- b. Depressurize the RCS to Enable Safety Injection Pump Flow During a Loss of Charging The examinee will assume the shift with the Reactor tripped and ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response complete following a loss of all Charging pumps. The examinee will use AOP-M.09, LOSS OF CHARGING starting at step 27 to block Safety Injection and commence RCS Pressure reduction using a PORV to enable Safety Injection flow as demonstrated by Pressurizer level increasing.
- c. Isolate the Steam Generator Tube Rupture (With MSIV Failure to Close)
The examinee will assume the shift with the Reactor tripped following a Steam Generator Tube Rupture. The examinee will use E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE to attempt to isolate a ruptured steam generator using the ruptured steam generator MSIV. The ruptured steam generator MSIV will fail to close requiring the examinee will to isolate the steam paths of the ruptured Steam Generator by closing all intact Steam Generator MSIV's and the alternate flowpath isolation valves.
- d. Start a Reactor Coolant Pump The examinee will assume the shift in MODE 3 with prerequisites complete to start a Reactor Coolant pump. The examinee will use 1-S0-68-2 REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS to start the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP). Shortly after starting the pump, a high motor winding condition develops. The examinee will use Alarm Response 1-AR-M5-B and will transition to AOP-R.04 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP MALFUNCTIONS to manually trip the RCP.
- e. Initiate AFW Flow to Steam Generators While in ECA-2.1 The examinee will assume the shift during a common fault that results in all Steam Generators depressurizing. The examinee will use ECA-2.1, UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS to close the TD AFW pump steam supply valve and to reduce AFW flow to each Steam generator to 50 .:!:. 10gpm.
- f. Respond To High Containment Pressure Condition By Placing RHR Spray In Service.
The examinee will assume the shift during a LOCA and a High Containment Pressure condition. The examinee will use FR-Z.1, High Containment Pressure, starting at step 13 to establish RHR Spray flow to reduce Containment pressure. During the alignment, the B Train RHR Spray flow isolation valve FCV-72-41 fails to operate. The examinee uses the alternate path to re-establish B Train RHR to the injection mode and establishes A Train RHR to the Containment Spray mode.
- g. Respond to a Loss of Shutdown Board The examinee will assume the shift in MODE 1 when a loss of power to the 1B 6.9kV Shutdown Board occurs. The examinee will use AOP-P.05 LOSS OF UNIT 1 SHUTDOWN BOARDS to evaluate RCP seal cooling and start 1A Charging pump. The examinee will evaluate the 1B Diesel generator and determine the Diesel requires an EMERGENCY STOP due to a failure of the cooling water valves to open.
- h. Respond to ERCW Pump Trip and Isolate the ERCW Leak The examinee will assume the shift in MODE 1 when a trip of the Q-A Pump occurs, the examinee will manually start the J-A ERCW pump using AOP-M.01, LOSS OF ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER. After the pump is started, the examinee will evaluate ERCW flow and determine a rupture has occurred in "A" Train ERCW. The examinee will subsequently manually place all "A" Train ERCW pumps in PTL and open all alternate ERCW supply to DG valves.
- i. Close MSIV's Locally The examinee will assume the shift with the Reactor tripped following a fault on the Unit 1 #1 Steam Generator with a failure of the MSIV's to close. The examinee will use EA-1-1, CLOSING MS IVs LOCALLY to simulate placing the Auxiliary Control Room transfer switches to AUX and subsequently simulate removing the control power fuses from 125V Vital Battery Boards I and II for the failed open MSIV.
- j. Take Local Control of the Turbine Driven AFW Level Control valve LCV-3-175 The examinee will assume the shift following a Control Room evacuation with the Control Room staff unable to control Auxiliary Feed to the Unit 2 #4 Steam Generator. The examinee will use AOP-C.04 SHUTDOWN FROM AUXILIARY CONTROL ROOM, APPENDIX W.2 CONTROL OF UNIT 2 TURBINE DRIVEN AFW FLOW FROM OUTSIDE MCR to simulate aligning the Station Blackout air bottles to the failed open LCV-3-175, Unit 2 #4 Steam Generator level control valve and control Auxiliary Feed flow to the Unit 2 #4 Steam Generator. This JPM reflects a new plant modification.
- k. Radiation Monitor O-RE-90-122 Flushing After Hi Radiation Signal Isolation.
The examinee will assume the shift following a high radiation isolation during Cask Decon Collector Tank release. The examinee will use O-S0-77-1 WASTE DISPOSAL SYSTEM (LIQUID), section 8.2 Radiation Monitor O-RE-90-122 Flushing After Hi Radiation Signal Isolation of Release to simulate flushing the Liquid Effluent Radiation Monitor in an attempt to clear the high radiation signal. The examinee will then simulate isolating the Cask Decon Collector Tank and flushing the Cask Decon Collector Tank discharge to the Floor Drain Collector tank. The examinee will then simulate re-aligning the Cask Decon Collector Tank for liquid release.
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Station 1 & 2 Date of Examination: 3/2/2015 Exam Level: RO D SRO-I -'1 SRO-U D Operating Test No: 2015-301 Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)
System I JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function
- a. Continuous Rod Withdrawal While Withdrawing Shutdown Bank N,A,S 1 Rods During a Startup. APE 001 AA 1.05 (4.3/4.2)
- b. Depressurize the RCS to Enable Safety Injection Pump Flow N, EN, L, S 2 During a Loss of Charging. APE 022AA1.03 (3.2/3.2)
- c. Isolate the Ruptured Steam Generator with MSIV Failure to D, A, L, S 3 Close. EPE 038 EA1.32 (4.6/4.7)
- d. Start a Reactor Coolant Pump APE 015/017 AA2.09 (3.4/3.5) D,A, L,S 4P
- e. Not examined N/A N/A
- f. Respond to High Containment Pressure, Place RHR Spray in D, A, EN, L, 5
Service. EPE E14 EA1.1 (3.7/3.7) s
- g. Respond to a Loss of 1B Shutdown Board. 062 A2.04 (3.1/3.4) N,S 6
M,A,S 8 AA 1.3 (3.3/3.5)
In-Plant Systems (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)
- i. Close MSIV's Locally. APE 040AA1.04 (4.3/4.3) N, E,L 4S
- j. Take Local Control of the Turbine Driven AFW Level Control N,R,E, L 8 valve LCV-3-175. APE 068 AA1.03 (4.1/4.3)
- k. Perform Radiation Monitor O-RE-90-122 Flushing. 068 A4.04 D,R 9 (3.8/3.7)
@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO I SRO-I I SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 I 4-6 I 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank :::;9/:::;8/:::;4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant ;?:1/;?:1/;?:1 (EN)gineered safety feature - I - I ;?:1 (control room system)
(L)ow-Power I Shutdown ;?:1/;?:1/;?:1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) ;?:2/;?:2/;?:1 (P)revious 2 exams :::; 3 I :::; 3 I :::; 2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA ;?:1/;?:1/;?:1 (S)imulator
- a. Shutdown Bank Withdrawal with Continuous Rod Motion The examinee will assume the shift in MODE 3 with prerequisites complete to withdraw Shutdown Bank "A" using O-S0-85-1 CONTROL ROD DRIVE SYSTEM to initialize the Rod Control Startup Step Counter Reset, close the Reactor Trip breakers and momentarily withdraw Shutdown Bank A.
When Shutdown Bank "A" is withdrawn a continuous rod motion condition occurs. The examinee will trip the Reactor using the Immediate Operator Actions of AOP-C.01, ROD CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS.
- b. Depressurize the RCS to Enable Safety Injection Pump Flow During a Loss of Charging The examinee will assume the shift with the Reactor tripped and ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response complete following a loss of all Charging pumps. The examinee will use AOP-M.09, LOSS OF CHARGING starting at step 27 to block Safety Injection and commence RCS Pressure reduction using a PORV to enable Safety Injection flow as demonstrated by Pressurizer level increasing.
- c. Not examined
- d. Start a Reactor Coolant Pump The examinee will assume the shift in MODE 3 with prerequisites complete to start a Reactor Coolant pump. The examinee will use 1-S0-68-2 REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS to start the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP). Shortly after starting the pump, a high motor winding condition develops. The examinee will use Alarm Response 1-AR-M5-B and will transition to AOP-R.04 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP MALFUNCTIONS to manually trip the RCP.
- e. Initiate AFW Flow to Steam Generators While in ECA-2.1 The examinee will assume the shift during a common fault that results in all Steam Generators depressurizing. The examinee will use ECA-2.1, UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS to close the TD AFW pump steam supply valve and to reduce AFW flow to each Steam generator to 50 .:!::. 1Ogpm.
- f. Respond To High Containment Pressure Condition By Placing RHR Spray In Service.
The examinee will assume the shift during a LOCA and a High Containment Pressure condition. The examinee will use FR-Z.1, High Containment Pressure, starting at step 13 to establish RHR Spray flow to reduce Containment pressure. During the alignment, the B Train RHR Spray flow isolation valve FCV-72-41 fails to operate. The examinee uses the alternate path to re-establish B Train RHR to the injection mode and establishes A Train RHR to the Containment Spray mode.
- g. Respond to a Loss of Shutdown Board The examinee will assume the shift in MODE 1 when a loss of power to the 1B 6.9kV Shutdown Board occurs. The examinee will use AOP-P.05 LOSS OF UNIT 1 SHUTDOWN BOARDS to evaluate RCP seal cooling and start 1A Charging pump. The examinee will evaluate the 1B Diesel generator and determine the Diesel requires an EMERGENCY STOP due to a failure of the cooling water valves to open.
- h. Respond to ERCW Pump Trip and Isolate the ERCW Leak The examinee will assume the shift in MODE 1 when a trip of the Q-A Pump occurs, the examinee will manually start the J-A ERCW pump using AOP-M.01, LOSS OF ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER. After the pump is started, the examinee will evaluate ERCW flow and determine a rupture has occurred in "A" Train ERCW. The examinee will subsequently manually place all "A" Train ERCW pumps in PTL and open all alternate ERCW supply to DG valves.
- i. Close MSIV's Locally The examinee will assume the shift with the Reactor tripped following a fault on the Unit 1 #1 Steam Generator with a failure of the MSIV's to close. The examinee will use EA-1-1, CLOSING MSIVs LOCALLY to simulate placing the Auxiliary Control Room transfer switches to AUX and subsequently simulate removing the control power fuses from 125V Vital Battery Boards I and II for the failed open MSIV.
- j. Take Local Control of the Turbine Driven AFW Level Control valve LCV-3-175 The examinee will assume the shift following a Control Room evacuation with the Control Room staff unable to control Auxiliary Feed to the Unit 2 #4 Steam Generator. The examinee will use AOP-C.04 SHUTDOWN FROM AUXILIARY CONTROL ROOM, APPENDIX W.2 CONTROL OF UNIT 2 TURBINE DRIVEN AFW FLOW FROM OUTSIDE MGR to simulate aligning the Station Blackout air bottles to the failed open LCV-3-175, Unit 2 #4 Steam Generator level control valve and control Auxiliary Feed flow to the Unit 2 #4 Steam Generator. This JPM reflects a new plant modification.
- k. Radiation Monitor O-RE-90-122 Flushing After Hi Radiation Signal Isolation.
The examinee will assume the shift following a high radiation isolation during Cask Decon Collector Tank release. The examinee will use O-S0-77-1 WASTE DISPOSAL SYSTEM (LIQUID), section 8.2 Radiation Monitor O-RE-90-122 Flushing After Hi Radiation Signal Isolation of Release to simulate flushing the Liquid Effluent Radiation Monitor in an attempt to clear the high radiation signal. The examinee will then simulate isolating the Cask Decon Collector Tank and flushing the Cask Decon Collector Tank discharge to the Floor Drain Collector tank. The examinee will then simulate re-aligning the Cask Decon Collector Tank for liquid release.
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Station 1 & 2 Date of Examination: 3/2/2015 Exam Level: RO D SRO-I D SRO-U "" Operating Test No: 2015-301 Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)
System I JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function
- a. Continuous Rod Withdrawal While Withdrawing Shutdown Bank N,A,S 1 Rods During a Startup. APE 001 AA 1.05 (4.3/4.2)
- b. Not Examined N/A N/A
- c. Isolate the Ruptured Steam Generator with MSIV Failure to D,A, L,S 3 Close. EPE 038 EA1.32 (4.6/4.7)
- d. Not Examined N/A N/A
- e. Not Examined N/A N/A
- f. Respond to High Containment Pressure, Place RHR Spray in D, A, EN, L, 5
Service. EPE E14EA1.1 (3.7/3.7) s
- g. Not Examined N/A N/A
- h. Not Examined N/A N/A In-Plant Systems (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)
- i. Close MSIV's Locally. APE 040AA1.04 (4.3/4.3) N,E, L 4S
- j. Take Local Control of the Turbine Driven AFW Level Control N, R,E,L 8 valve LCV-3-175. APE 068 AA1.03 (4.1/4.3)
- k. Not Examined N/A N/A
@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO I SRO-I I SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 I 4-6 I 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank :::;9/:::;8/:::;4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant :2:1/:2:1/:2:1 (EN)gineered safety feature - I - I :2:1 (control room system)
(L)ow.:.Power I Shutdown :2:1/:2:1/:2:1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) :2:2/:2:2/:2:1 (P)revious 2 exams :::; 3 I :::; 3 I :::; 2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA :2:1/:2:1/:2:1 (S)imulator
- a. Shutdown Bank Withdrawal with Continuous Rod Motion The examinee will assume the shift in MODE 3 with prerequisites complete to withdraw Shutdown Bank "A" using O-S0-85-1 CONTROL ROD DRIVE SYSTEM to initialize the Rod Control Startup Step Counter Reset, close the Reactor Trip breakers and momentarily withdraw Shutdown Bank A.
When Shutdown Bank "A" is withdrawn a continuous rod motion condition occurs. The examinee will trip the Reactor using the Immediate Operator Actions of AOP-C.01, ROD CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS.
- b. Not Examined
- c. Isolate the Steam Generator Tube Rupture (With MSIV Failure to Close)
The examinee will assume the shift with the Reactor tripped following a Steam Generator Tube Rupture. The examinee will use E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE to attempt to isolate a ruptured steam generator using the ruptured steam generator MSIV. The ruptured steam generator MSIV will fail to close requiring the examinee will to isolate the steam paths of the ruptured Steam Generator by closing all intact Steam Generator MSIV's and the alternate flowpath isolation valves.
- d. Not Examined
- e. Not Examined
- f. Respond To High Containment Pressure Condition By Placing RHR Spray In Service.
The examinee will assume the shift during a LOCA and a High Containment Pressure condition. The examinee will use FR-Z.1, High Containment Pressure, starting at step 13 to establish RHR Spray flow to reduce Containment pressure. During the alignment, the B Train RHR Spray flow isolation valve FCV-72-41 fails to operate. The examinee uses the alternate path to re-establish B Train RHR to the injection mode and establishes A Train RHR to the Containment Spray mode.
- g. Not Examined
- h. Not Examined
- i. Close MSIV's Locally The examinee will assume the shift with the Reactor tripped following a fault on the Unit 1 #1 Steam Generator with a failure of the MSIV's to close. The examinee will use EA-1-1, CLOSING MSIVs LOCALLY to simulate placing the Auxiliary Control Room transfer switches to AUX and subsequently simulate removing the control power fuses from 125V Vital Battery Boards I and II for the failed open MSIV.
- j. Take Local Control of the Turbine Driven AFW Level Control valve LCV-3-175 The examinee will assume the shift following a Control Room evacuation with the Control Room staff unable to control Auxiliary Feed to the Unit 2 #4 Steam Generator. The examinee will use AOP-C.04 SHUTDOWN FROM AUXILIARY CONTROL ROOM, APPENDIX W.2 CONTROL OF UNIT 2 TURBINE DRIVEN AFW FLOW FROM OUTSIDE MGR to simulate aligning the Station Blackout air bottles to the failed open LCV-3-175, Unit 2 #4 Steam Generator level control valve and control Auxiliary Feed flow to the Unit 2 #4 Steam Generator. This JPM reflects a new plant modification.
- k. Not Examined
ES-301 Operating Test Quality Checklist Form ES-301-3 Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Station 1 & 2 Date of Examination: 03/02/2015 Operating Test Number: 2015-301 Initials
- 1. General Criteria a b* c#
- a. The operating test conforms with the previously approved outline; changes are consistent with sampling requirements (e.g., 10 CFR 55.45, operational importance, safety function distribution).
- b. There is no day-to-day repetition between this and other operating tests to be administered during this examination.
- c. The operatin test shall not duplicate items from the applicants' audit test(s). (see Section D.1.a.)
- d. Overlap with the written examination and between different parts of the operating test is within acceptable limits.
- e. It appears that the operating test will differentiate between competent and less-than-competent applicants at the desi nated license level.
- 2. Walk-Through Criteria
- a. Each JPM includes the following, as applicable:
initial conditions initiating cues references and tools, including associated procedures reasonable and validated time limits (average time allowed for completion) and specific designation if deemed to be time-critical by the facility licensee operationally important specific performance criteria that include:
detailed expected actions with exact criteria and nomenclature system response and other examiner cues statements describing important observations to be made by the applicant criteria for successful completion of the task identification of critical steps and their associated performance standards restrictions on these uence of steps, if applicable
- b. Ensure that any changes from the previously approved systems and administrative walk-through outlines (Forms ES-301-1 and 2) have not caused the test to deviate from any of the acceptance criteria (e.g., item distribution, bank use, repetition from the last 2 NRC examinations) specified on those forms and Form ES-201-2.
- 3. Simulator Criteria The associated simulator operating tests (scenario sets) have been reviewed in accordance with Form ES-301-4 and a copy is attached.
Date
- a. Author Michael Buckner 02/:i.o/ rS-
- b. Facility Reviewer(*) 7-/-~ /1~
c.
- d. NRC Supervisor NOTE:
- The facility signature is not applicable for NRG-developed tests.
- Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column "c"; chief examiner concurrence re uired.
ES-301 Simulator Scenario Quality Checklist Form ES-301-4 Facility: Sequoyah Station 1 & 2 Date of Exam: 03/02/2015 Scenario Numbers: 1/2/3/4/5 Operating Test No.: 2015-301 QUALITATIVE ATTRIBUTES Initials a b* c#
- 1. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the operators into expected events. i~ /) ilfl<.
- 2. The scenarios consist mostly of related events. qv15 ]- 18x
!/
- 3. Each event description consists of
- the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event
~4fl ~
- the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew the expected operator actions (by shift position)
- the event termination point (if applicable)
~
4.
5.
No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event.
The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.
~
41)
~
IN(_
~
- 6. Sequencing and timing of events is reasonable, and allows the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives. ~ 1IJ<..
v 8J.5 m<..
- 7. If time compression techniques are used, the scenario summary clearly so indicates.
Operators have sufficient time to carry out expected activities without undue time constraints.
Cues are given.
- ~ 'Ht{
- 8. The simulator modeling is not altered. 1.?.JI§ I~
- 9. The scenarios have been validated. Pursuant to 10 CFR 55.46(d), any open simulator performance deficiencies or deviations from the referenced plant have been evaluated to ensure that (
functional fidelity is maintained while running the planned scenarios. PfJJ 'l1fU-
- 10. Every operator will be evaluated using at least one new or significantly modified scenario.
other scenarios have been altered in accordance with Section D.5 of ES-301.
All
-~ ){ $1.
- 11. All individual operator competencies can be evaluated, as verified using Form ES-301-6 (submit the ..
form along with the simulator scenarios). ~ ~)1 WI-
- ~~ ~r
- 12. Each applicant will be significantly involved in the minimum number of transients and events specified on Form ES-301-5 (submit the form with the simulator scenarios).
1fJl,l
- 13. The level of difficulty is appropriate to support licensing decisions for each crew position. .. 74 x 1!J;(_
Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes -- -- --
- 1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 717161617 )~ \:r 1!JX.
- 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2/2/1 /1 /2 ,t;bM ~y ~
- 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 4/2/3/4/3 (~ yr Jb<_
- 4. Major transients (1-2) 1/1/1/1/1 ~ )" 1JJ(
- 5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1/3/1/1/1
- ~ 'X" ~
- 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 1/1/0/0/1 ,f145 ~i*
/I~
- 7. Critical tasks (2-3) 2/2/3/2/2 ~ \r IJile
()
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 "ty: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 1 & 2 Date of Exam: 3/2/2015 Operating Test No.: 2015-301 A E Scenarios p v 1 2 T M p E 0 I L N CREW CREW CREW CREW N I T T POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION I c A M
A T s A B s A B L u y R T 0 R T 0 N M(*)
T p 0 c p 0 c p R I u E
RO RX 3 1 1 1 0 x NOR 1a 1 1 1 1 SRO-I D l/C 4,5 2,3 4 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 8 6 2 2 2 1 D TS 0 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 1 1 0 x NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SRO-I D l/C 2,6 4,5 4 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 8 6 2 2 2 1 D TS 0 0 2 2 RO RX 0 1 1 0 D
SRO-I NOR 1a 1 1 1 1 D
SRO-U l/C 2,4,5 6
2,3,4 5
8 4 4 2 x MAJ 8 6 2 2 2 1 TS 5,7 3,5 4 0 2 2 RO RX D
SRO-I NOR D
SRO-U l/C MAJ D TS Instructions:
- 1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the "at-the-controls (ATC)"
and "balance-of-plant (BOP)" positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (l/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one l/C malfunction can be credited toward the two l/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
- 2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.
- 3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicant's competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicant's license level in the right-hand columns.
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 1 & 2 Date of Exam: 3/2/2015 Operating Test No.: 2015-301 A E Scenarios p v 3 4 5 T M p E 0 I L N CREW CREW CREW CREW T N I T POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION A I
M c s A B s A B s A B s A B L u A T R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 M(*)
N y 0 c p 0 c p 0 c p 0 c p p R I u T
E RO RX 4 1 1 1 0 D
SRO-I NOR 3 1 2 1 1 1 x l/C 1,2,4 5,6 2,5 8 4 4 2 SRO-U 5 D MAJ 6 7 7 3 2 2 1 TS 1,5 2 0 2 2 RO RX 3 1 1 1 0 D
SRO-I NOR 1 4 2 1 1 1, x l/C 1,5 3,4,5 1,6 8 4 4 2 SRO-U 6 D MAJ 6 7 7 3 2 2 1 TS 2,4 2 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 1 1 0 D
SRO-I NOR 3 4 2 1 1 1 x l/C 2,4 3,4 1,2, 8 4 4 2 SRO-U 5,6 D MAJ 6 7 7 3 2 2 1 TS 2,3 2 0 2 2 RO RX D
SRO-I NOR D
SRO-U l/C MAJ D TS Instructions:
- 1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the "at-the-controls (ATC)"
and "balance-of-plant (BOP)" positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (l/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one l/C malfunction can be credited toward the two l/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
- 2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.
- 3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicant's competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicant's license level in the right-hand columns.
ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 1 & 2 Date of Examination: 03/02/2015 Operatinq Test No.: 2015-301 APPLICANTS RO x RO D RO D RO D SRO-I D SRO-I x SRO-I D SRO-I D SRO-U D SRO-U D SRO-U x SRO-U D Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 5 2 3 4 3 4 5 Interpret/Diagnose 2,3, 2,3, 1,2, 1,2, 2,3, 1,2, 2,3, 1,2, 2,3, 1,2, Events and Conditions 5,6, 4,5, 3,4 3,4, 4,5, 3,4 5,6, 3,4 5,6, 3,4, 8,9, 6,7, 5,6, 5,6, 6,7, 5,6, 7,8 5,6, 7,8 5,6, 10 8 7 7,8, 8 7 7 7,8, 9 9 Comply With and 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, Use Procedures (1) 3,4, 3,4, 3,4 3,4, 3,4, 3,4 3,4, 3,4 3,4, 3,4, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 8,9 7,8 7 7,8, 7,8 7 7,8 7 7,8 7,8, 10 9 9 Operate Control 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,3, N/A N/A N/A Boards (2) 3,4, 3,4, 3,4 4,5, 3,4, 3,4 4,5, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 6,7, 5,6, 5,6, 6,7, 8,9 7,8 7 8,9 7,8 7 8 10 Communicate 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, and Interact 3,4, 3,4, 3,4 3,4, 3,4, 3,4 3,4, 3,4 3,4, 3,4, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 7,8, 7,8 7 7,8, 7,8 7 7,8 7 7,8 7,8, 9 9 9 10 Demonstrate N/A N/A N/A N/A 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, Supervisory Ability (3) 3,4, 3,4 3,4, 3,4 3,4, 3,4, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 7,8 7 7,8 7 7,8 7,8, 9
Comply With and N/A N/A N/A N/A 3,5 1,5 2,4 1,5 2,4 2,3 Use Tech. Specs. (3)
Notes:
( 1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.
(2) Optional for an SRO-U.
(3) Only applicable to SROs.
ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2
- .. SEQUOYAH Date of Exam: MARCH 2015 RO KIA Cateaorv Points SRO-Onlv Points Tier Group K K K K K K A A A A G A2 G* Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4
- Total
- 1. 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 18 3 3 6 Emergency&
Abnormal 2 I I 2 NIA 2 2 NIA I 9 2 2 4 Plant Evolutions Tier Totals 4 4 5 5 5 4 27 5 5 10 1 3 3 3 '~ ;, } 2 2 ~ 2 3 28 3 2 5 2.
Plant 2 ~ I 1 ~ ~ jr I I 1 I 1 10 0 2 1 3 Systems Tier Totals 1- 4 4 ~ ~ 1 3 3 jf 3 4 38 5 3 8
- 3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1 2 3 4 10 1 2 3 4 7 Categories 3 3 2 2 I 2 2 2 Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable KIA category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the "Tier Totals" in each KIA category shall not be less than two).
- 2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table.
The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions.
The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.
- 3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate KIA statements.
- 4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
- 5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those KIAs having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected.
Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
- 6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and KIA categories.
7.* The generic (G) KIAs in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the KIA Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable KIAs.
- 8. On the following pages, enter the KIA numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance ratings (I Rs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals(#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
- 9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the KIA catalog, and enter the KIA numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals(#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to KIAs that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.
ES-401, REV 9 T1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401 *2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IA K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:
RO SRO 008AG2.2.37 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident/ 3 3.6 4.6 D D D D 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment 009EA 1.14 Small Break LOCA I 3 3.4 3.4 D DOD Secondary pressure control 011 EK3.15 Large Break LOCA / 3 4.3 4.4 DD~ DD DD D Criteria for shifting to recirculation mode 022AA2.04 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 2.9 3.a oo or.J~ oo How long PZR level can be maintained within limits 025AG2.1.28 Loss of RHR System / 4 4.1 4.1 DOD 0 D~ Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls.
- - -------- ---~---------*-*---
027AK2.03 Pressurizer Pressure Control System 2.6 2.8 O ~ O O O O O O O O O Controllers and positioners Malfunction I 3 029EK2.06 ATWS / 1 2.9 3.1 DODD Breakers, relays, and disconnects.
038EK1 .02 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture/ 3 3.2 3.5 ~ O O O O O [] O Leak rate vs. pressure 054AA 1.03 Loss of Main Feedwater I 4 3.5 3.7 D DD D ~ D AFW auxiliaries, including oil cooling water supply 055EA 1.02 Station Blackout/ 6 4.3 4.4 Manual ED/G start 056AA2.60 Loss of Off-site Power I 6 2.7 2.9 open Page 1of2 04/09/2014 10:08 AM
ES-401, REV 9 T1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:
RO SRO 05~ Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus I 6 ~ 0 CJOOOO~[JOO Gere flooEI taRk pi:ess1m1 aREl-loorel-iRElieaters-AA Z. t,S' 3.l 3.1 ~c:..b'l,, "~ IP~_, (jr ~ p-o:S~
--~~=~ o~ (IY\. '-~ 41__ p~.
058~ Loss of DC Power I 6 '4.6 1.4 [] ~ Abi.lity to,peFfeFm. wi~baut u:terei:ice to prGGOEIHFee tf:tose \)~£<~
A~'2.4-.S'Z> 4.2 +.o aet1eRs tflat reeiu1F0-1mmeE11ate e13eFatien of s~stem ~ i'f..d:i ,*
GefRl:IOflORIS aREI eefl!Fels. ~ ~ 1'J..'J.. i"Vt. ~
077AK3.01 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid 3.9 4.2 0 0 0----- Reactor and Turbinetrtpcriteria"-~.
Disturbances I 6 WE04EK1 .3 LOCA Outside Containment I 3 3.5 3.9 ~ 0000[][]0 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (LOCA Outside Containment).
WE05EK3.4 Inadequate Heat Transfer - Loss of 3.1 3.9 O ~ 0 0 [] [] RO or SRO function within the control room team as Secondary Heat Sink I 4 appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.
WE11 EK2.2 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc. I 4 3.9 4.3 ~ D 0 0 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.
**-------- - - - - - ----------------- * - - - - - - ---*-*- "'*'-***--*----m*--.--~------
WE12EK1.3 Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat 3.4 3.7 ~
Transfer I 4 0 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators).
Page 2 of 2 04/09/2014 10:08 AM
ES-401, REV 9 T1G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IA K1 K2 K3 K4 KS K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:
RO SRO 001AA2.03 Continuous Rod Withdrawal I 1 4.s 4.8 DDDDDD ~ DDD Proper actions to be taken if automatic safety functions have not taken place 028AK3.03 Pressurizer Level Malfunction I 2 3.s 4.1 DD~ D DODOO False indication of PZR level when PORV or spray valve is open and RCS saturated 051AA1.04 Loss of Condenser Vacuum 4 2.5 2.5 D n Rod position 060AA1.01 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel. I 9 2.8 3 OOO OO ~ OOOn Area radiation monitors 068AK2.01 Control Room Evac. I 8 3.9 4 D~DDDD Auxiliary shutdown panel layout 076AG2.1.32 High Reactor Coolant Activity I 9 3.8 4.0 DDDDOOOO to explain and apply all system limits and precautions.
*--*--***--****-*----****-****--***-*---*-*--*~-
WE08EK1 .2 RCS Overcooling - PTS I 4 3.4 4.o ~ D DOD DD Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Natural Circulation Operations).
WE10EA2.2 Natural Circ. With Seam Void/ 4 3.4 3.9 n DD DD Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.
WE1~ Containment Flooding I 5 ~D ~DD D
~1<"3.\ ;v1 ~-9 Page 1of1 04/09/2014 10:08 AM
ES-401, REV 9 T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IA K1 K2 K3 K4 KS K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:
---¥.~-~3 .*---*-* ---*-***. _. .,.
- 3. \ ~s SRO
~
_.!3- D D D D VI D D D D D D
~
Effects of RCP shutdown on.seeeAaary par.ameteFS, r~te~e=r.:t'~t~ ~T-~~ s~
s1:10~ \ ~-~~
\ 0"1l:'ll>
- 004G2.4~1--- ChemiCal and Volume Control --42-:U--[j D D D D D D D D D [i'J Knowledgb of annunciatorsaiarms~-fildicationsor-response procedures 004~ Chemical and Volume ~ D [i'J D D D D D D D BWS'ftank-fteatei:s-1/..Z .o"; ~.-; 3.S- ~~ p~
005K4.03 Residual Heat Removal 2.9 3.2 D D D ri'J D ODD AHR heat exchanger bypass flow control 006K2.01 Emergency Core Cooling 3.6 3.9 r-1 ri'J D D D D D D D D D ECCS pumps 007~ Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 9.1 9.4 DD D DJiftTo Mo
./
D Method et fermiR~ a stea111 bobble In the l'!f!I
- A3.o l 2.? 2.9 AArtA\ h ~ ~ b~ {) f~.
008A1.01 Component Cooling Water 2.8 2.9 n D -**---*--
D D D [i'J n n n 11
-*------*---*~*-*-------------
ccw flow rate 010K4.01 Pressurizer Pressure Control 2.1 2.9 D 0 D [] n Spray valve warm-up 012K3.01 Reactor Protection 3.9 4.o D fi'l D D D D CADS 013K1.06 Engineered Safety Features Actuation 4.2 4.4 ~] D D D D D D r-1 Eccs 013K2.01 Engineered Safety Features Actuation 3.6 3.8 [i'J D ESFAS/safeguards equipment control Page 1of3 04/09/2014 10:08 AM
ES-401, REV 9 T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:
RO SRO 022A2.03 Containment Cooling 2.6 3.o DDDDDDD ~ DD Fan motor thermal overload/high-speed operation 022K3.02 Containment Cooling 3.0 3.3 DD Containment instrumentation readings
- --~- -------- -*--*-****----*---- --*---------------*--*-*----.----------*
025K6.01 Ice Condenser 3.4 3.6 OOOOO ~ OOOOO Upper and lower doors of the ice condenser 026A4.05 Containment Spray 3.5 3.5 DDDDDDD D~ Containment spray reset switches 039A3.02 Main and Reheat Steam 3.1 3.5 [J D D D D DD~DD Isolation of the MASS 059A1.07 Main Feedwater 2.5 2.6 n DDD DD ~ DDD D Feed Pump speed, including normal control speed for ICS
~.7 a.e- DD~
o D D D [f[fiJ--0-----;-;::;;;;:::- ~~~ Ab P.s 059~ Main Feedwater . ****-1*1-* sl aeei"eAt iAs!rl:lmeRlatieR-:-
c;\'2.4. ll 4-.o 4.2 061~ Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater ~DODD
._~
D DeGay l:leat 681:1rG8S QRQ
- 1'5. 0) 2.6 2.7 n1. ' DD ~ *--T:T_o__ ~ '----L-~r~~*'ii l\.e4cfl...sl.1
'"""' *-* ..'-""."" '" "' o ""' .' i<eS 061K6.02 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater D 11 Pumps *-- _
- 062G2.2.39 Electrical Distribution 3.9 4.5 O - 0 DDODD ~ Knowledge of less than one hour technical specification action statements for systems.
063K1.03 DC Electrical Distribution n Battery charger and battery Page 2 of 3 04/09/2014 10:08 AM
ES-401, REV 9 T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401*2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IA K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:
RO SRO 064K1.02 Emergency Diesel Generator 3.1 3.6 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 D/G cooling water system 073K3.01 Process Radiation Monitoring 3.6 4.2 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 DO 0 Radioactive effluent releases 076A3.02 Service Water 3.7 3.7 ODO ODO~ 0 Emergency heat loads 076K4.03 Service Water 2.9 3.4 0 0 ~ 0 0 DODO Automatic opening features associated with SWS isolation valves to CCW heat exchanges 078A4.01 Instrument Air 3.1 3.1 0 ~o Pressure gauges 103A2.04 Containment 3.5 3.6 0 0 0 OD~ DO Containment evacuation (including recognition of the alarm)
Page 3 of 3 04/09/2014 10:08 AM
ES-401, REV 9 T2G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:
RO SRO 001K2.01 Control Rod Drive 3.5 3.6 D ~ D D D D D D D D D One-line diagram of power supply to MIG sets.
015G2.2.40 Nuclear Instrumentation 3.4 4.1 D [J DOD DD~ Ability to apply technical specifications for a system.
016A3.01 Non-nuclear Instrumentation 2.0 2.0 D D DD~DD Automatic selection of NNIS inputs to control systems 028A2.02 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge 3.5 3.9 DD DD DD~DDD LOCA condition and related concern over hydrogen Control
. -- *-------- /
03~ 2:6-cl:s- DD D 00~ DD DOD Raeiatio1o *i .
~~
Fuel Handling Equipment
\'-4.oZ. Z.'5" 3,3 041K3.02 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control 3.8 3.9 D D ~ DDDDDD RCS 071A1.06 Waste Gas Disposal 2.5 2.8 D D D D [1 ~ DOD Ventilation system 072~ Area Radiation Monitoring = 1 1 tl1001y, ineluclil'I§ seuFGes, ty13es, u11its and
~\.Ol
~s~~~::rs~
075K4.01 Circulating Water 2.5 2.8 D ~ DODD Heat sink 086M.Qi. Fire Protection 8.2 3,a, HaleR system
- A4*o' 3.3 3.3 Flrc. vJ~ 'Po~
Page 1of1 04/09/2014 10:08 AM
ES-401, REV 9 T3 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:
RO SRO Conduct of operations ..3.1 a,+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ ~11owledge of criteria 01 eo11ditio11s lliat 1eqohe plant wiEle
<ii z. \. \ '"!>,SJ 4.2 anuou11ce111ems, socli as ~1 reaeter trip, ~de * .i _
-et1a11yes, etE:' \~ 'V ~ ab b(.s fa,~
--*--**--*-***--------*---*-m---------------- ..
G2.1.34 Conduct of operations 2.7 3.5 0 o~ Knowledge of primary and seconaary cnem1stry 11m1ts G2.1.5 Conduct operations 2.9 3.9 OO DO 0 OD~ Ability to locate and use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc.
G2.2.13 Equipment Control 4.1 4.3 - - - - -- O O O O O ~ Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures.
G2.2.2 Equipment Control 4.6 4.1 ODO~ Ability to manipulate the console controls as required to operate the facility between shutdown and designated power levels.
G2.2.41 Equipment 9ontrol 3.5 3.9 0 0 0 0 0 DO o~ Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings G2.3.5 Radiation Control 2.9 2.9 0 ~ Ability to use radiation monitoring systems G2.3.7 Radiation Control 3.5 3.6 [] co OD~ Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal or abnormal conditions G2.4.39 Emergency Procedures/Plans 3.9 3.8 [J O c o~ Knowledge of the RO's responsibilities in emergency plan implementation.
G2.4.4 Emergency Procedures/Plans 4.5 4.7 O O O O O ~ Ability to recognize system operating parameters which are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures.
Page 1of1 04/09/2014 10:08 AM
ES-401, REV 9 SRO T1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IA K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:
RO SRO 015AA2.02 RCP Malfunctions/ 4 2.8 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 Abnormalities in RCP air vent flow paths and/or oil cooling system 022A02.2.4 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup I 2 8.6 S.6 0 0 0 ODDO~ (fl'lu1u 011it} >.t:iilitYlo-&xlilaiA.tllevaiitltihs-ihcori"lrOi--0,~1~6 -\-c e-~ Ptt AG~.\ "'7 4 .4 4.'7 boam laym,its, syst~ms instn '.":'eRtatieA aAel J3Feeeoor?I pt!rf~~ *~
..aetio11s betwee11 rnnts at a fae1hly! ~ ~J~e..~
029EG2.2.38 ATWS / 1 3.6 4.5 D o O O L~--'0owledge of conditions and limitations in the facility ~~~
license. ~
040AG2.4.30 Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat 2.7 4.1 O DO ~ Knowledge of events related to system operations/status Transfer/ 4 that must be reported to internal orginizations or outside agencies.
057AA2.04 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus/ 6 3.7 4 0 DO ~DO ESF system panel alarm annunciators and channel status indicators 077AA2.01 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid 3.5 3.6 O O O O O O O ~* -O- O O Operating point on the generator capability curve Disturbances / 6 Page 1of1 04/09/2014 10:08 AM
ES-401, REV 9 SRO T1G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:
RO SRO 001AA2.02 Continuous Rod Withdrawal/ 1 4.2 4.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 Position of emergency boration valve 033AG2.1.20 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 4.6 4.6 0 DODO O[J ~ Ability to execute procedure steps.
**-*--*----- ------ *--**-***-** *******-********- --**-*--*-****-**---**-*-*m-*--.,'""""
061AA2.06 ARM System Alarms/ 7 3.2 4.1 0 0 DO [] ~ Required actions if alarm channel is out of service
*--- *-***-****-**----rn-**--**-----*-----
we14EG2.2.44 Loss of CTMT Integrity/ 5 4.2 4.4 DO ODO ~ Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions Page 1of1 04/09/2014 10:08 AM
ES-401, REV 9 SRO T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:
RO SRO 012G2.4.49 Reactor Protection 4.s 4.4 D D D D D D D D D D ~ Ability to perform without reference to procedures those actions that require immediate operation of system components and controls.
025A2.05 Ice Condenser 2.5 2.1 [J o Abnormal glycol expansion tank level 039G2.4.50 Main and Reheat Steam 4.2 4.o [J ooo 0[]000~
Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual.
- - - ------- --------=- --------*-*---*-*-----** ********-**..----*-*-***-----*---
063A2.01 DC Electrical Distribution 2.5 3.2 D D D D D D D ~ D D Grounds 103A2 03 Containment 3.5 3.8 ~ODD Phase A and B isolation Page 1of1 04/09/2014 10:08 AM
ES-401, REV 9 SRO T2G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IA K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:
RO SRO 028G2.1.25 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge 3.9 4.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Ability to interpret reference materials such as graphs, Control monographs and tables which contain performance data.
071A2.02 Waste Gas Disposal 3.3 3.6 0 [J ~ 0 Use of waste gas release monitors, radiation, gas flow rate and totalizer
- ~**--**-w-***'"'""'"'"'"'".'"'"'"-"
079A2.01 Station Air 2.9 3.2 DODO ~ [l 0 0 Cross-connection with IAS Page 1of1 04/09/2014 10:08 AM
ES-401, REV 9 SRO T3 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IA K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:
RO SRO G2.1.35 Conduct of operations 2.2 3.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of the fuel handling responsibilities of SRO's G2.2.17 Equipment Control 2.6 3.8 0 ODO o~ Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during power operations.
G2.2.21 Equipment Control 2.9 4.1 0 0~ Knowledge of pre- and post-maintenance operability requirements.
G2.3.13 Radiation Control 3.4 3.8 0 [] 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties G2.3.6 Radiation Control 2.0 3.8 0 0000000~ Ability to aprove release permits G2.4.38 Emergency Procedures/Plans 2.4 4.4 O O ~ Ability to take actions called for in the facility emergency plan, including supporting or acting as emergency coordinator.
G2.4.5 Emergency Procedures/Plans 3.7 4.3 0 ~ Knowledge of the organization of the operating procedures network for normal, abnormal and emergency evolutions.
Page 1of1 04/09/2014 10:08 AM
ES-401 Record of Rejected KlAs Form ES-401-4 Tier I Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected KlA RO TlGI 057 AA2.02 At SQN there are two (2) different level and pressure instruments associated with each of the Cold leg accumulators and they each have different power supplies, thus the loss or malfunction of one instrument does not cause any operational limitations. This is considered operational minutia.
Rejected and randomly re-selected:
057 AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus:
(CFR: 43.5 I 45.13)
AA2. l 8 The indicator, valve, breaker, or damper position which will occur on a loss of power .................... 3.1 3.1 TIGl 058 AG2.4.49 Unable to write an operationally valid, discriminatory question at the RO level for this Kl A Rejected and randomly re-selected:
058 AG2.4.50. Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual.
(CFR: 41.10 I 43.5 I 45.13)
Importance 4.2 I 4.0
TlG2 WEIS EK3.4 This is very similar to Tl G 1 WEOS EK3 .4.
Knowledge of RO and SRO functions within the control room team are the same for Loss of Secondary Heat Sink and Containment Flooding.
Over sampling of same Kl A for different events (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink and Containment Flooding).
Rejected and randomly re-selected :
WE15 EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Containment Flooding)
(CFR: 41.S I 41.l 0, 4S.6, 4S. l 3)
EK3 .1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.
IMPORTANCE RO 2.7 SRO 2.9 T2Gl 003 KS.04 Unable to write an operationally valid, discriminatory question at the RO level.
Rejected and randomly re-selected:
003 KS Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the RCPS:
(CFR: 41.S I 4S.7)
KS.03 Effects of RCP shutdown on T-ave., including the reason for the unreliability ofT-ave. in the shutdown loop ............ 3.1 3.S T2Gl 004 K2.04 At SQN the Boric Acid Tanks do have a minimum temperature (63°F) and do have heaters installed, however the heaters are redundant and the normal room temperature is high enough that the minimum temperature for the tank is rarely challenged. If a heater does malfunction or lose power the operators have a significant amount of time to recognize and research the problem, thus the knowledge of the power supply for the tank heaters is not required of the operators.
Rejected and randomly re-selected:
004 K2 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:
(CFR: 41.7)
K2.03 Charging pumps .......................... 3.3 3.S
T2Gl 007 K5.02 At SQN the PRT is not connected to the PZR during conditions when a PZR bubble is being drawn, thus there are no operational implications associated with the PRT during this evolution.
Rejected and randomly re-selected:
007 A3.0l Ability to monitor automatic operation of PRTS, including:
(CFR: 41.7)
Components which discharge to the PRT ............. .2.7*/2.9 T2Gl 059 G2.4.3 Main Feed Water (MFW) is not a system that is accounted for to mitigate major accidents at SQN, thus there are no post-accident monitors associated with MFW.
Rejected and randomly re-selected:
059 G2.4.11 Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.
(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)
IMPORTANCE RO 4.0 SRO 4.2 T2G2 034 K6.02 Could not write an RO level question without overlapping question
- 63 (T2/G2 072 Area Rad Monitor, Kl .03, Fuel Building Isolation)
Rejected and randomly re-selected:
034 K4 Knowledge of design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:
(CFR: 41.7)
K4.02 Fuel Movement RO 2.5 SRO 3 .3 T2.m~I 061 K5.02 Unable to write an operationally valid, discriminatory question at the RO level.
Rejected and randomly re-selected:
061K5 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the AFW:
(CFR: 41.5 I 45.7)
K5.0l Relationship between AFW flow and RCS heattransfer IMPORTANCE RO 3.6 SRO 3.9
T2G2 072 K5.0l Unable to write a discriminating question at the RO level due to being GET level knowledge.
Rejected and randomly re-selected:
072 Kl Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the ARM system and the following systems:
(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 I 45.7 to 45.8)
Kl.03 Fuel Building Isolation .................... 3.6* 3.7*
T2G2 086 A4.06 The fire protection system at SQN does not use Halon system.
Rejected and randomly re-selected:
086 A4 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:(CFR: 41.7 I 45.5 to 45.8)
A4.0l Fire water pumps ............................. 3.3 3.3 T3 G 2.1.14 Unable to write an operationally valid, discriminatory question at the RO level Rejected and randomly re-selected:
G 2.1. l Knowledge of conduct of operations requirements ... 3 .8 4.2 (CFR: 41.10 I 45.13)
SRO TlGl 022 AG2.2.4 There are no unit differences at SQN associated with Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup.
Rejected and randomly re-selected :
022 G2. l. 7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.
(CFR: 41.5 I 43.5 I 45.12 I 45.13)
ES-401 Written Examination Quality Checklist Form ES-401-6 1rv: ::sea1uovah Nuclear Plant 1 & 2 Date of Exam: Exam Level: RO X SRO X Initial Item Description c#
- 1. Questions and answers are technically accurate and applicable to the facility. ~
- 2. a. NRC K/As are referenced for all questions. 11'(_
- b. Facility learning objectives are referenced as available.
- 4. The sampling process was random and systematic (If more than 4 RO or 2 SRO questions were repeated from the last 2 NRC licensing exams, consult the NRR OL program office). 11K
- 5. Question duplication from the license screening/audit exam was controlled as indicated below (check the item that applies) and appears appropriate:
LS. the audit exam was systematically and randomly developed; or
_the audit exam was completed before the license exam was started; or
_ the examinations were developed independently; or
~~ ~ ~
_the licensee certifies that there is no duplication; or
_other (explain)
- 6. Bank use meets limits (no more than 75 percent Bank Modified New from the bank, at least 1O percent new, and the rest new or modified); enter the actual RO I SRO-only question distribution(s) at ri ht.
- 7. Between 50 and 60 percent of the questions on the RO exam are written at the comprehension/ analysis level; the SRO exam may exceed 60 percent if the randomly 34 / 8 selected K/As support the higher cognitive levels; enter the actual RO I SRO question distribution(s) at right.
- 8. References/handouts provided do not give away answers or aid in the elimination of distractors.
- 9. Question content conforms with specific K/A statements in the previously approved examination outline and is appropriate for the tier to which they are assigned; deviations are justified.
- 10. Question psychometric qualit and format meet the guidelines in ES Appendix B.
- 11. The exam contains the required number of one-point, multiple choice items; the total is correct and a rees with the value on the cover sheet.
Printed Name I Signature Date
- a. Author :r/1z/1 t-
- b. Facility Reviewer(*) 1/11. 1hS
- c. NRC Chief Examiner (#) 3-13-IS"
- d. NRC Regional Supervisor 3ft3.f 1 S' Note:
- The facility reviewer's initials/signature are not applicable for NRG-developed examinations.
- Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column "c"; chief examiner concurrence re uired.
ES-401 Sequoyah 2015-301 Pre-Submittal Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #I Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 008 AG2.2.37 1 H 2 B Question meets the KIA. Question is Satisfactory.
009 EA1.14 2 H 3 x ? N E Question meets the KIA. Need to ask what the operators are required to use, vice what they will use. Need to state "In accordance with ES-1.2" or "Per ES-1.2" or something similar in the question statement.
Step 12 of ES-1.2 is to maintain shutdown margin adequate and is before step 14 which is to initiate the cooldown. With no indication of initial SOM and no real indication given that SI is injecting given in the stem conditions, is choice D potentially the correct answer?
Core exits are 550 F (no trend) and SG pressures 1000 psig and stable. Does answering the procedure portion of this question require more than the required level of RO knowledge? Need to discuss.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB 011 EK3.15 3 F 2 x ? N E Question meets the KIA. Need to state "In accordance with ES-1.3" or "Per ES-1.3" or something similar in the question statement.
FSAR bases knowledge is SRO knowiedge. There are many setpoints associated with the swapover procedures that could be used for distractors (27, 22, 18, 11, 8) and used for a two part question.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB 022 AA2.04 4 H 2 x B E Question meets the KIA. Need to a "closest to" or "nearest to" to the question statement.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/1508
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only
~~c 025 AG2.1.28 F 3 x B E Question meets the KIA. Choice A needs the word "in" added after resulting. The caution statement in AOP-M.02 does not discuss the valve restraints. Is it expected that an RO would know about these being installed in an Appendix to a GO procedure?
027 AK2.03 6 H 2 B Question meets the KIA. Question is Satisfactory.
029 EK2.06 7 H 2 x B E Question meets the KIA. The second part of question about the Reactor Trip Breakers is too vague. FR-S.1 requires the Reactor Trip Breakers to be opened.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB
Q#
1.
LOK I LOO
- 2. I 3. Psychometric Flaws I I I I I 4. Job Content Flaws I I I I 5. Other I I
- 6. 7. 8.
(F/H) (1-5) I Stem Cues Focus I T/F ICr_ed.
Dist.
IPartial IJ?b-1 Link Minutia I #( IBack-units ward I
Q= SRO I B/M/N I U/E/S KIA Only Explanation 038 EK1.02 8 H 2 x x N Question submitted for preliminary pre-submittal review.
Question not counted as Unsatisfactory for the overall review.
Question doesn't meet the KIA; it's based on a tube leak vs. a tube rupture (AOP vs. EOP). Leak rate vs (RCS?) pressure drop. Also has 2 identical answers C and D (typo?).
Question is Unsatisfactory due to not meeting the KIA.
Stating that Letdown has NOT been isolated in the initial conditions could be a cue. It would be better to list a parameter.
The stem question should state IAW or per (whatever procedure),
the NEXT action ...
Need to be careful that you do not get into SRO level procedure knowledge. When asking the next step, is it major mitigation strategy or detailed knowledge of the procedure?
Corrections submitted 12/19/2014 There appears to be no indication of pressurizer level trend, which is required to use the table in step 31 of E-3. Discussed with licensee and they stated that applicants can use the differences between ruptured SIG pressure and RCS pressure to determine the steam generator level trend.
The question description states that no references would be provided.
Would be a better question if two times were given that showed the pressurizer level trend (vice pressure differential), use a pressurizer level between 20% and 30% with an evaluation for ADV setpoints, and use the associated four blocks for answer choices. Question now meets the KIA. Question is no longer Unsatisfactory, but still needs enhancement.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 054 AA1.03 9 F 2 x N E Question meets the KIA. Need to state that it is the S/G Level Lo-Lo setpoint for the distractors.
The only reference that I could find concerning the source of the oil cooling water supply was a North Anna event report in the lesson plan. Need to provide proof that this is the correct answer.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15DB 055 EA1.02 10 F 2 x B E Question meets the KIA. The second part answer choices are subsets of each other. Recommend asking if the AUO is or is not required to press the Trip to Local Pushbutton prior to pressing the Auto Start Pushbutton. Pushbutton is capitalized on one set of answer choices and lower case on the other set.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB 056 AA2.60 11 F 3 x N E Question submitted for preliminary pre-submittal review.
Could the MSIVs remaining open for 10 minutes be challenged by an applicant based on control air accumulator as well as the MSIV air reservoirs? Any engineering, FSAR doc? 20 min? What is your basis for the time given?
Also, since all four answer choices have "Local" included, it would be cleaner to just ask if indication is or is not available at 2-XX 6L.
Corrections submitted 12/19/2014 Question meets the KIA.
Need to look at the actual label for the 2-XX-55-6L lights. Specifying that they are PAM lights may be a cue for the second part question.
Could consider using a picture.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB
- 1. I LOO 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws I 5. Other I 6. I 7. I 8.
Q# I LOK (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues Focus T/F I I I Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back-1 Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Dist. Link units ward KIA Only I I Explanation 1057 AA2.18 (Replaced KIA 057 AA2.02)
F I 2 I I I I x I I I I I I I I N I E Question meets the KIA.
Distractor A.(2) is not plausible (manually closing the spray valve at 100% power. Designing a spray valve to fail open is also questionable regarding plausibility. Recommend picking another valve for a distractor if possible.
I058 AG2.4.49 H
I 3 I x I I I I I I I I I I I N I E Question meets the KIA. Choice B is also correct given the way the question is worded.
Replacement KIA provided.
058 G2.4.50 14 I F I 2 I I I I x I I I I I I I I B -077AK3.01 Question meets the KIA. Choice A is not plausible. There is no DIG running and no TS actions that require a trip for frequency. Choice D is not plausible. For choice Care you talking about the RCP UF relays? Question is Unsatisfactory due to two or more non-plausible distractors.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB I x IW/E04 EK1 .3 15 F I 2 I I I I I I I I I I I I N I E Question meets the KIA. RVLIS level would be a more credible distractor given that this is an ECA procedure following a LOCA.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15DB
-W/E05 EK3.4 16 I H I 2 I x I I I x I I I I I I I I B Question meets the KIA. Need to state that feed and bleed is in progress vice had been initiated. Need to state that AFW is available. Choices A, C and Dare not plausible. MSIV closure is not a concern for these plant conditions. There are no steps in the procedure that feed all steam generators at the maximum rate.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB
Q# I 1.
LOK I LOO 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws I 4. Job Content Flaws I 5. Other I 6. I 7. 8.
(F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues Focus T/F I I Cred. Partial Job-1 Minutia #/
Dist. Link I
units ward KIA Only I
Back-1 Q= SRO I B/M/N I U/E/S Explanation 17 I H I 3 I x I I I x I I X I I I I I I B W/E11 EK2.2 Question meets the KIA. Do not believe that it is operationally valid to ask the difference between 325 gpm and 400 gpm when the only methods to do this is by starting or stopping pumps or establishing CCPIT flow. The pumps that are currently operating are approximately 550-650 gpm each. This may also be closer to detailed knowledge of the procedure required for an SRO, since you are asking details in a RNO step deep in the procedure. The only reference that is being given is the table. Question is Unsatisfactory to more than one non-plausible distractor.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB W/E12 EK1.3 18 H 3 x x x B Question meets the KIA. Need to state what procedure the crew is in. Choice B is not plausible. Choice D is not plausible with no information given about a problem with MDAFW pumps and stating that flow has been reduced to 50 gpm. There would be no reason to initiate TDAFW pump flow given the choice to increase MDAFW pump flow. Question is Unsatisfactory due to more than one non-plausible distractor.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB 001 AA2.03 19 F 2 B Question meets the KIA. Choice B is not plausible. When is it ever allowed to just verify that RPS or another interlock protects the reactor? Choice C is not plausible given that the stem question states "First", there is no indication given of current Tave or rod position, and the ARP allows you to adjust rod position as necessary to maintain temperature. Question is Unsatisfactory due to two non-plausible distractors.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB
- 1. I 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws I 4. Job Content Flaws I 5. Other I 6. I 7. 8.
Q# I LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues Focus T/F I I I I Cred. Partial Job-1 Minutia #/
Dist. Link units ward KIA Only I
Back-1 Q= SRO I B/M/N I U/E/S Explanation 028 AK3.03 20 I H I 3 I x I I I I I I I I I x I I N Question submitted for preliminary pre-submittal review.
Question not counted as Unsatisfactory for the overall review.
Missing the "reason" portion of the KIA. Can fix by changing the second part of the question to ask why the pressurizer level is rising (SI actuated or bubble formation in reactor vessel head). Modify the stem to conclude steps in ES-0.2 have been completed to the point where SI is blocked without actually stating. (Maybe pressure has been stabilized between 1870 to 1920 psig and ALL steps have been completed to continue RCS depressurization .... ).
Question is Unsatisfactory due to not meeting the KIA.
Also enhance stem? Does a Loss of Offsite Power at SQN result in or require a trip? If not, enhance to state "complications from a Loss of Offsite Power resulted in a Unit 2 trip" The stem question should state IAW or per (whatever procedure),
the crew will be required to ....
Corrections submitted 12/19/2014 The KIA specifies false indications of pressurizer level while the PORV is open. The question is not set up in this manner. Need to specify plant temperature again in the current conditions.
The question submitted for the 45-day submittal has 900 psig and 520 F listed as the current temperature and pressure. Based on the steam tables, this makes the RCS sub-cooled and the selected answer (choice D) incorrect.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 051 AA1.04 21 H 3 x N E Question submitted for preliminary pre-submittal review.
Multiple correct answers. AOP-S.06 allows auto or manual rod control to reduce Tave and power until less than 20%. Could match Tave to a calculated no-load Tref. Consider testing something about C-5?
Enhancement. The wording "Main Turbine will be" implies/cues manual. Reword to a neutral choice.
Corrections submitted 12/19/2014 Need to specify condenser pressure instead of condenser vacuum.
Condenser pressure is the terminology used in all of the procedures.
With the pressure in the initial conditions being stable, the wording of the stem question could be a cue due to stating the Main Turbine will automatically trip for the second part question (if it was above the setpoint it would have already tripped). Need to identify the specific AOP for each part of the question. Could just ask how the rods would be controlled below 20% power.
The stem question statement "as condenser pressure rises to >1. 72 psia" could potentially lead to two correct answers. Could ask if a turbine trip is or is not required based on the given conditions or use a maximum value. Need to add "if a turbine trip occurs" to the second part question.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB 060 AA1.01 22 H 1 x N Question meets the K/A. Choices B and Dare not plausible. LOO =
- 1. Question is Unsatisfactory due to more than one non-plausible distractor and LOO = 1.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB
Q# I 1.
LOK I LOD 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws I 4. Job Content Flaws I 5. Other I 6. I 7. I 8.
(F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F ILink C~ed. Partial J?b-1 Minutia Iunits
- ! IBack-1 Q= ISRO IB/M/N IU/E/S I Explanation Focus Dist. ward KIA Only 23 I F I 1 I I I I x I I I I I I I ~ Question meets the KIA. Do not believe that RCS subcooling and lncore T/Cs are plausible for the ACR. Are there any digital meters or computer screens in the ACR? This makes the question not discriminating at all. Question is Unsatisfactory due to more than one non-plausible distractor and LOD = 1.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB I I076 AG2.1.32 24 F I 3 I I I I I I I ?
I I I I I B I E Question meets the KIA. Need to remove the "no" immediately prior to "Given." Is it expected for the RO applicants to know the method for throttling Cation bed flow? Is that frequently done? Possibly minutia? Need to discuss.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15DB
-W/EOB EK1 .2 H
I 3 I I I I I Ix I I I I I I B Question meets the KIA. Procedure bases are typically SRO only material. This appears to be more than major mitigation strategy.
Need to discuss. Question is Unsatisfactory due to not being an RO question.
-W/E10 EA2.2 25 I H I 2 I I I I I I I I I I I I B Question meets the KIA. Normally procedure selection is SRO material. However, this question tests a note in the procedure as well as entry conditions. Question is Satisfactory.
- W/E15 EK3.1 27 I F I 2 I x I I I x I I I I I I I I B Question meets the KIA. There is really not a correct answer to this question. FR-Z.2 does not direct determining the quality of the source of excess water in any step. Step two does determine containment sump activity level, but that is not the quality of the source of water. Choices A( 1) and D( 1) are not plausible. Question is Unsatisfactory due to no correct answer and more than one non-plausible distractor.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 28 i:i:.,i, H 2 x B E 003 KS.04
,,. *** Question meets the KIA. Choice D is not plausible 004 G2.4.31 29 H 3 x B E Question meets the KIA. Choice B is not plausible.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB 004 K2.04 30 H 2 x N E Question meets the KIA. Need to ask if the pump will automatically start when power is restored. Do you need to state in the initial conditions that the pump(s) were in service?
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB 005 K4.03 31 H 2 x B E Question meets the KIA. The picture could be misleading. The output meter needle shows fully closed. The current setting is either less than zero or more than 100.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB 006 K2.01 32 H 2 N Question meets the KIA. Question is Satisfactory.
- 4. Job Content Flaws I 5. Other I 6. I 7. I 8.
Q# I 1.
LOK I LOO 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws I (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F ILink C~ed. Partial J?b-1 Minutia #( IBack-1 Q= ISRO IB/M/N IU/E/S I Iunits Explanation Focus Dist. ward KIA Only 33 I F I 2 I I I I x I I I I I I I I B I 007 KS.02 Question submitted for preliminary pre-submittal review.
With Pressurizer isolated to draw a bubble A(2) and C(2) are not credible distractors.
C(1) and 0(1) are not credible distractors.
Question is Unsatisfactory due to more than one non-credible distractor.
This KIA should be rejected and a new KIA should be selected.
Licensee requested new KIA on 12/19/2014.
Randomly selected KIA 007 A3.01 and provided to the licensee.
007 A3.01 New question meets the KIA. New Question is Satisfactory.
008 A1.01 34 I F I 2 I x I I I I I I I I I I I B I E 1
Question meets the KIA. Need to provide an initial SFP temperature towards the upper end of the normal band.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/1508
-010K4.01 35 I F I 2 I x I I I I I I I I Ix I I M Question does not meet the KIA. Question is Unsatisfactory due to not meeting the KIA. Also, nothing in the given conditions would support placing Auxiliary Spray in service.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB 012 K3.01 36 I H I 3 I I I I I I I I I I I I N Question meets the KIA. Question is Satisfactory.
013 K1.06 37 I H I 3 I I I I I I I I I I I I IVI Question meets the KIA. Question is Satisfactory.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 013 K2.01 38 H 2 M Question meets the KIA. Question is Satisfactory.
022 A2.03 39 H 2 x x B E Question meets the KIA. The second part of choice C is not plausible. See P&L K of O-S0-30-5.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB 022 K3.02 40 F 2 x B E Question meets the KIA. Question: Is this correct for the sealed reference leg system?
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/1508
"~:~:
022 K6.01 F 2 x N E Question meets the KIA. The second part of the question may be SRO only material. Normally TS bases, procedure bases, and
~:;'w,~ FSAR information is SRO only information. If this being used because of lesson plan objectives, then bases information used for
"' /
the SRO exam cannot have an RO objective tied to it. Need to discuss.
026 A4.05 42 H 2 x B E Question meets the KIA. Choice C is not plausible.
039 A3.02 43 H 2 B Question meets the KIA. Question is Satisfactory.
'.;~:~:,;;
059 K4.05 H 2 x B E Question meets the KIA. First part of the question is a direct cue to
~Fi the second part answer.
059 G2.4.11 45 F 2 x N E Question meets the KIA. Choices 8(2) and 0(2) are not plausible because power is always reduced below 60% for a MFW pump trip IAW AOP-S.01.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 061 KS.02 lt)~r; H 2 ? N E
. Second part of question meets the KIA. First part of question is pretty much a different topic. Could potentially give an initial flowrate
! < and ask the required action and reason listed in the notes above 1<~;~ table.
061 K6.02 47 H 2 B Question meets the KIA. Question is Satisfactory.
062 G2.2.39 48 H 3 x N E Question meets the KIA. Choice A is not plausible. Is there any time when an LCO requirement is met, but you are required to perform a TS surveillance within one hour?
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB 063 K1.03 49 H 3 x B E Question meets the KIA. Choice A is not plausible.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB 064 K1.02 50 F 2 x N E Question meets the KIA. Choices C(1) and D(1) are not plausible.
There is also some natural circulation flow caused by the immersion heaters. Consider asking about the opening of the ERCW valve (40 rpm vs. 200 rpm) or which ERCW headers supply the heat exchanger (normal or backup).
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15DB
. 073 K3.01
}1' H 2 x B E
,* /, . Question meets the KIA. Choice D is not plausible.
076 A3.02 52 F 2 x N E Question meets the KIA. Choice D is not plausible.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15DB
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 076 K4.03 53 F 3 x B E Question meets the KIA. Need to be consistent between Hx and HXs in the stem question.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15DB 078 A4.01 54 H 2 N Question meets the KIA. Question is Satisfactory.
103 A2.04 55 H 2 x B E Question meets the KIA. Choice D is not plausible.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB 001 K2.01 56 H 2 B Question meets the KIA. Question is Satisfactory.
015 G2.2.40 57 H 2 x B E Question meets the KIA. Choice A is not plausible.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB 016 A3.01 58 H 3 B Question meets the KIA. Question is Satisfactory.
028 A2.02 59 F 2 B Question meets the KIA. Question is Satisfactory.
- 1. I 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws I 4. Job Content Flaws I 5. Other I 6. I 7. I 8.
Q# I LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues Focus T/F Dist.
I Link I I I units ward KIA Only I
cr.ed. Partial J?b-1 Minutia #( Back-1 Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/SI I Explanation
~6.02.
H I 1 I I I I I I I I I I I Question submitted for preliminary pre-submittal review.
Question not counted as Unsatisfactory for the overall review.
As written, LOO= 1.
Question is Unsatisfactory due to LOO = 1.
Possible fix to not have completed placing CREVs in recirc Mode and greater than - 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> has elapsed .. .fuel movement is/is not required to be shut down immediately. (correct evaluation of action
- a. only and not combine with b.)
Or you could test the< or= 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Tech Spec without a reference.
Corrections submitted 12/19/2014 Do not believe that both parts of choice "D" are plausible when added together.
2 I I I I x I I I I I I I I M lmml Choices A and B are not plausible for the modified question. With both monitors being failed and no actions taken, how can any LCO actions be met?
041 K3.02 61 I F I 2 I I I I x I I I I I I I I B I E 1
Question meets the KIA. Choices B and C not plausible due to impulse pressure failed high and choices indicate a load rejection.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB 071 A1.06 F
I 2 I I I I x I I I I I I I I B I E 1
Question meets the KIA. The first part of choices A and B are not plausible. Is there any flow path out the vent that could bypass the waste gas effluent monitor when releasing gas tanks?
072 K1.03 63 I F I 2 I I I I I I I I I I I I B Question meets the KIA. Question is Satisfactory.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 075 K4.01 64 F 2 x B E Question meets the KIA. Do not believe choice A is plausible. Also, believe choice D should be for 5 of 6 waterboxes. Need to discuss.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB 086 A4.01 65 H 2 x B E Question meets KIA. Need to be more specific on C(2) and D(2) distractors. Need to specify the high pressure shutdown information from the jockey pump.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB G2.1.14 l,~~:~t'."1; F 2 x B Question meets the KIA. Choices A and C are not plausible distractors. Applicants know that they never make an announcement 1;1;1~
directly after E-0 immediate actions. The entry conditions for ES-0.1 is SI not actuated and not required. Question is Unsatisfactory due
- 1. to more than one non-plausible distractor.
G2.1.34 67 F 2 x N E Question meets the KIA. Need a bar above the E for Gross Activity in order to have a fully correct answer and all plausible distractors.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB G2.1.5 68 F 2 x M E Question meets the KIA. Need to state that fuel handling is not in progress. What does the "or equivalent" mean for the incident commander? That could lead to two correct answers.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB G2.2.13 11'~9:/! F 2 x B E Question meets the KIA. Choice C is not plausible due to valve not I\/,; having handwheel.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only G2.2.2 70 H 2 x N E Question meets the KIA. Choice C is not plausible.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB G2.2.41 71 H 2 x ? N E Question meets the KIA. Fuse number in drawing doesn't appear to match the fuse number given in the stem. Is the print provided a hard copy or electronic version? Need more information to determine the plausibility of Maximo.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB G2.3.5 72 F 2 B Question meets the KIA. Question is Satisfactory.
G2.3.7 73 F 2 B Question meets the KIA. Question is Satisfactory.
G2.4.39
f~i;, F 2 x B +E Question meets the KIA. Choice D is not plausible. How could the hl'~> on-shift CRO not be required to go to the MCR? Is there a card
,:~~~\\'
reader in the OSC? If so, then per EPIP-8, there would be no correct answer.
G2.4.4 75 H 2 x x M E Question meets the KIA. Is Tavg monitored at 21 OF? Choice D is not plausible.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB
Q# I 1.
LOK I LOD
- 2. I 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other I 6. I 7. 8.
(F/H) (1-5) IStem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO I B/M/N I U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 76 I H I 2 I x I I I x I I I I I I Ix I N 015 AA2.02 Question does not meet the KIA at the SRO level. The first part of the question is RO knowledge because it is a major caution in FR-S.1. For a two part question on the SRO exam, a part that addresses the KIA needs to be SRO only.
There are two annunciators that alarmed. Need to update first 0800 bullet.
For the first part of the question, 0810 would be a more plausible distractor than 0805.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB
Q#
1.
I LOK I LOO 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws I 4. Job Content Flaws I 5. Other I 6. I 7. I 8.
(F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues Focus T/F ICr_ed.
Dist.
IPartial IJ?b-1 Link Minutia I #! IBack-1 Q= ISRO IB/M/N IU/E/S I units ward KIA Only Explanation x~2.1.7 77 I H I 2 I x I x I I I I I I I I I Question submitted for preliminary pre-submittal review.
Question not counted as Unsatisfactory for the overall review.
Fundamental knowledge of AOP entry condition not SRO knowledge. An applicant could pick the correct answer by only knowing the entry conditions (purpose) of AOP-R.03. Knowing the entry conditions (purpose) eliminates AOP-R.02 AOP-R.05. Based on the initial conditions AOP-R.03 would have to be a correct choice regardless of any other considerations.
Question is Unsatisfactory due to not being SRO only.
The initial conditions list an action that would be taken in AOP-R.03.
This is a cue.
Corrections submitted 12/19/2014 Need to specify "In accordance with OPDP-8" in the first part question stem. The question stem specifies an "Initial" Determination of Operability while OPDP-8 specifies an "Immediate" Determination of Operability. The word "must" in the first part question stem implies that the determination must be made by an on-shift SRO.
Question meets the KIA. The question as submitted for the 45 day submittal is Satisfactory.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB x M - 029 EG2.2.38 H
I 2 I x I I I I I I I I I I I Question does not meet the KIA. Simply writing that an ATWS occurs in the initial conditions does not make the question test knowledge required for the ATWS. You could remove the information in the stem about the ATWS and the question would be the same TS application question.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOO 1--~-,--~.--~-,--~~~-1-~~~----.~----.-~--t~----.-~~
(F/H) (1-5) Stem JCuesJ T/F Focus Dist.
I I Cred. Partial Job- I Minutia #/
Link I I Back-1 Q= SRO IB/M/N I U/E/S units ward KIA Only Explanation 040 AG2.4.30 79 H 2 x N E Question meets the KIA. Need to specify that Site Emergency Director judgment should not be used. The second part question should be rearranged to read better. Need to specify the first procedure transition in the first part question.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB 057 AA2.04 80 H 2 N Question meets the KIA. Question is Satisfactory.
077 AA2.01 81 H 2 x B Question meets the K/A. The given conditions need to be clarified.
Based on interpretation of the conditions given, it seems that the next required action is to trip the turbine at step 3.b of section 2.3.
Addressing SDBD voltage is in step 5. Question is Unsatisfactory due to no correct answer.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB
- 4. Job Content Flaws Q#
1.
I LOK I LOO 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws I I 5. Other I 6. I 7. 8.
(F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues Focus T/F I I I I Cred. Partial Job-1 Minutia #/
Dist. Link I
Back-1 Q= SRO I B/M/N I U/E/S units ward KIA Only Explanation 001 AA2.02 82 I H I 2 I x I I I I I I I I I I X I B Question submitted for preliminary pre-submittal review.
Question not counted as Unsatisfactory for the overall review.
The question can be answered using RO knowledge alone of the rod control system, effects of boration and AOP entry conditions.
Question is Unsatisfactory due to not being SRO only.
Choice D may very well be a correct answer also.
Remove "observed to be" from the initial conditions.
Correct distractors A (2) and C (2) ... AOP-C.01 maintains Tave within 1.5 F of Tref until repairs completed. Consider reversing order of maintain Tave within 3 F and closing FCV-62-138 to match AOP-C.02 step order.
Corrections submitted 12/19/2014 First part of the question meets the KIA at the SRO level based on s detailed knowledge of the procedure steps in AOP-C.02, however it is possible that it could be answered with RO systems knowledge.
Second part of the question is definitely SRO only.
Question is now Satisfactory.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB 033 AG2.1.20 83 H 2 x N The question does not meet the KIA at the SRO level. The first part of the question meets the KIA, but can be answered by RO knowledge of a major AOP-1.01 Caution statement.
Question is Unsatisfactory due to not meeting the KIA at the SRO Only level.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB
I I Q#
1.
I LOK I LOD 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws I 4. Job Content Flaws I 5. Other I 6. 7. 8.
(F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues Focus T/F ICr_ed.
Dist.
IPartial IJ?b-1 Link Minutia I #/ IBack-1 Q= ISRO IB/M/N IU/E/S I units ward KIA Only Explanation 84 I H I 3 I x I I I I I I I I I I I M I E 1061 AA2.06 Question meets the KIA. Need to state that area surveys are being performed as required.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15DB
-W/E14 EG2.2.44 85 I H I I I I I I I I I I I Ix I N Question submitted for preliminary pre-submittal review.
Question not counted as Unsatisfactory for the overall review.
The question does not meet the KIA for a loss of containment integrity. This Tier 1 Group 2 and should be related to Emergency/Abnormal Procedures. This is more of a Tier 2 question. Consider an FR-Z related question.
Question is Unsatisfactory due to not meeting the KIA.
Revise stem and/or answers {damper indications?) to match KIA
.... "interpret control room indications" Corrections submitted 12/19/2014 Do not believe this is SRO only as written. The reason for the procedure is stated in the purpose and appears to be more of a major mitigation strategy than knowledge of procedure bases. Also, there is a note prior to the first step in FR-Z.1 that states that it may be run in conjunction with ECA-1.1.
Question is Satisfactory as submitted with the 45-day submittal.
012 G2.4.49 86 I F I 2 I I I I I I I I I I I I M Question meets the KIA. Question is Satisfactory.
025 A2.05 87 I H I 2 I I I I I I I I I I I I M Question meets the KIA. Question is Satisfactory.
039 G2.4.50 88 I H I 2 I I I I I I I I I I I I N Question meets the KIA. Question is Satisfactory.
Q#
1.
I LOK I LOO 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws I 4. Job Content Flaws I 5. Other I 6. I 7. I 8.
(F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Icr.ed. IPartial IJ?b-1 Minutia I #( IBack-1 Q= ISRO IB/M/N IU/E/S I Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 89 I H I 2 I x I I I I I I I I I I x~ Question submitted for preliminary pre-submittal review.
Question not counted as Unsatisfactory for the overall review.
Annunciator response ... not SRO only.
There is potential for 2 correct answers (C, D) with a work order and/or to document, trend, etc. (also ARI discusses WO)
Question is Unsatisfactory due to not being SRO only.
Corrections submitted 12/19/2014 Need to discuss whether or not the second part of the question is operationally valid. We just need to ensure that the SRO would be expected to know this without a reference. I understand that it would be a direct lookup with the reference.
Question meets the KIA. Still need to discuss. With the reference, it seems that a choice between priority 1 and 2 would be more plausible. This is a "vital" component that has an alarm in the control room.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB 1103 A2.03 90 I H I 3 I x I I I I I I I I I I I N I E Question meets the KIA. No reference was provided. Do you expect the applicants to know all of the action statements in the table without a reference? Need to discuss.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB 028 G2.1.25 91 I H I 2 I I I I I I I I I I I I B Question meets the KIA. Question is Satisfactory.
071 A2.02 92 I F I 2 I I I I I I I I I I I I B Question meets the KIA. Question is Satisfactor *.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #I Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 079 A2.01 93 F 2 x B E Question meets the KIA. Need to state the procedure used for the first part question.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB G2.1.35 94 F 2 x x N E Question meets the KIA. Need to add "of the assumed 10%" to choices B(2) and D(2). Choices A(2) and C(2) are not plausible.
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB G2.2.17 95 F 2 B Question meets the KIA. Question is Satisfactory.
is~a,'~
G2.2.21 F 2 x B E Question meets the KIA. Choice D is not plausible.
G2.3.13 97 F 2 x B E Question meets the KIA. Need to fix formatting on choices A and B.
Is ALARA committee approval also required?
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB G2.3.6 98 H 2 x B Question meets the KIA. Question is Satisfactory.
G2.4.38 99 F 2 x B E Question meets the KIA. Need to work on enhancing the conditions listed in the stem. With a General Emergency being already declared, there is nothing to escalate to. With the TSC and CECC not being manned, who would you delegate to?
Necessary corrections completed. Question is now Satisfactory.
02/11/15 DB G2.4.5 100 H 3 B Question meets the KIA. Question is Satisfactory.
Instructions
[Refer to Section D of ES-401 and Appendix B for additional information regarding each of the following concepts.]
- 1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level.
- 2. Enter the level of difficulty (LOO) of each question using a 1 - 5 (easy- difficult) rating scale (questions in the 2 - 4 range are acceptable).
- 3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:
The stem lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information).
The stem or distractors contain cues (i.e., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc).
The answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements.
The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors should be repaired, more than one is unacceptable.
One or more distractors is (are) partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stem).
- 4. Check the appropriate box if a job content error is identified:
The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid KIA but, as written, is not operational in content).
The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory).
The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons).
The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements.
- 5. Check questions that are sampled for conformance with the approved KIA and those that are designated SRO-only (KIA and license level mismatches are unacceptable).
- 6. Enter question source: (B)ank, (M)odified, or (N)ew. Check that (M)odified questions meet criteria of ES-401 Section D.2.f.
- 7. Based on the reviewer's judgment, is the question as written (U)nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)ditorial enhancement, or (S)atisfactory?
- 8. At a minimum, explain any "U" ratings (e.g., how the Appendix B psychometric attributes are not being met).
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #I Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only Instructions
[Refer to Section D of ES-401 and Appendix B for additional information regarding each of the following concepts.]
- 1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level.
- 2. Enter the level of difficulty (LOD) of each question using a 1 - 5 (easy - difficult) rating scale (questions in the 2 - 4 range are acceptable).
- 3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:
.. The stem lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information) .
.. The stem or distractors contain cues (i.e., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc) .
The answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements .
. The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors should be repaired, more than one is unacceptable .
One or more distractors is (are) partially correct (e.g., ifthe applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stem) .
4.
Check the appropriate box if a job content error is identified:
The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid KIA but, as written, is not operational in content) .
The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory) .
The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons) .
The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements .
- 5. Check questions that are sampled for conformance with the approved KIA and those that are designated SRO-only (KIA and license level mismatches are unacceptable).
- 6. Enter question source: (B)ank, (M)odified, or (N)ew. Check that (M)odified questions meet criteria of ES-401 Section D.2.f.
- 7. Based on the reviewer's judgment, is the question as written (U)nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)ditorial enhancement, or (S)atisfactory?
- 8. At a minimum, explain any "U" ratings (e.g., how the Appendix B psychometric attributes are not being met).
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (FIH) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #I Back- Q= SRO BIMIN U/EIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 12 x x E T1G1 057 AA2.18
- 1. Cred Dist: The plausibility of 82 and D2 is border line because 480 V MOV indication (in the main control room) is usually derived from the 480 V breaker. Most of the time 120 VAC is used for control room indications for manually operated valves, not 480 V MOVs. See suggestion below.
- 2. Stem Focus: A1 and 81 should include the word "auto-open."
Suggest modifying the fill-in-the-blank statements as:
Based on the above conditions, 2-FCV-62-135, RWST TO CCP valve will _(1)_, and_(2)_.
A. auto-open; auto control of SG#2 atmospheric relief valve PICs has failed B. auto-open; charging flow controller 2-FCV-62-93 will not function in automatic C. remain closed; auto control of SG#2 atmospheric relief valve P/Cs has failed D. remain closed; charging flow controller 2-FCV-62-93 will not function in automatic
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 13 x x u T1G1 058 AG2.4.50
- 1. Q=KIA: The fill-in-the-blank statements test knowledge from AOP-P.02. The KIA requires testing the annunciator procedure.
- 2. Cred Dist: The wording of the second portion of the fill-in-the-blank statement ("if Unit 2 PZR level is greater than 30% .." and "be required to be placed in service") makes 82 and 02 not plausible. Instead, the second portion of the fill-in-the-blank statement should test whether or not normal letdown is or is not available (or whether excess letdown is or is not available).
Suggest the following:
WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with 2-M C, C-4, 125VDC VITAL BAT Ill DISCHARGE?
The Battery Board under voltage alarm set point is _(1 )_.
Downscale (zero or below) deflection of El-57-94, Vital Battery Bd Ill Amps, indicates current flow from the _(2)_.
A. 119 VDC; battery B. 105 VDC; charger C. 105 VDC; battery D. 119 VDC; charger
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #I Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 25 x x x E T1/G2 W/E08 EK1.2
- 1. Cred Dist: Choice A (raising AFW flow > 440 gpm) is not plausible because 1) the stem does not include any lowering SG levels and 2) a large cool down event is occurring in the stem.
- 2. Stem Focus: The stem does not specify where the Tcold value was obtained from. (is this the loop with the break?) The stem does not specify which SG has the steam break and which SGs are intact.
- 3. Cue: The last part of the stem question (" ... that will reduce the potential for damage to the reactor vessel." Is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
Suggest keeping everything in the stem, but add all four loop Tcold values such that one loop is to the left of Limit A and the other three values are to the right of Limit A. Provide Unit 1 Curve 1 PTS Limits as a reference to the applicants. Then test the applicants knowledge of FR-P.1 required actions (stop only one CCP) and their knowledge of FR-0 (whether a red or orange path exists). Here are the four answer choices:
A. Stop BOTH CCPs; ORANGE B. Only stop ONE CCP; ORANGE
- 1. The list of rejected KlAs needs to be updated with the basis for why this KIA was changed to 003 K5.03.
- 2. Partial: Choice A can also be construed as correct because the Tcold in the unaffected loops DOES lower, and this indirectly contributes to the REASON. Direct and indirect reasons are won in the post-exam appeal process.
Suggest revising the 2nd part of Choice "A" to another plausible reason. Alternatively, revise the 2nd portion of the question to test another parameter value response instead of the REASON.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 41 x E T2/G1 025 K6.01
- 1. Stem Focus: The stem question asks the applicant to identify a "condition"; however, none of the choices describes a condition.
The wording is confusing.
- 2. Stem Focus: To align with TS 3.6.5.3, the phase "frozen shut" should be changed to "physically restrained from opening."
- 3. Stem Focus: The Choices C & D refer to OUTLET Deck doors; are these same doors that Tech Spec refers to as Top Deck Doors? If so, then the wording should match Tech Specs.
Suggest the following WOOTF completes the statement below in accordance with Tech Spec LCO 3.6.5.3, Ice Condenser Doors?
With one or more ice condenser___ doors inoperable due to being physically restrained from opening, restore all _ _
doors to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
A. Intermediate deck B. Top deck
- c. Lower Inlet D. Access
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #I Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 44 x x T2G1 059 K4.05
- 1. Partial: The lesson plan and operating procedure only say that signal averaging is performed for the steam flow signal which is used to derive the set point. The lesson plan and operating procedure do NOT say that signal averaging is used for main 1
steam header pressure. The 1' portion of the fill-in-the-blank statement says that the main feed pump master speed controller uses - -
- 2. Stem Focus: The lead-in phrase on the fill-in-the-blank statement is not needed. Start the sentence with At 08:00.
- 3. Stem Focus: The 1 bullet in the stem and the 08:00 item should both be listed as initial conditions at 08:00.
Consider the following:
WOOTF completes the statement below?
Loss of will cause the MFP Master Controller to transfer from AUTO to MANUAL.
A. 213 Main Steam OR 213 Feed Water PRESSURE Channels B. 213 Feed Water Pressure Channels ONLY C. 213 Main Steam Pressure Channels ONLY D. the average steam FLOW signal 46 x T2G1 061 K5.02
- 1. The list of rejected KlAs needs to be updated with the basis for why this KIA was changed to 061 K5.01.
- 2. Stem Focus: The stem question should be re-worded to eliminate the words "should" and "first priority."
- 3. Stem Focus: The stem should indicate that the RCPs are running.
- 4. Stem Focus: Revise Choice "A" to say "Emergency Borate."
- 5. Stem Focus: Revise Choice "D" to say "Initiate Safety Injection."
Q#
1.
I LOK I 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. I 7. I 8.
(F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #I Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 51 I I I I I I I x I I I I I I I I E I T2G1 073 K3.01
- 1. Partial: The term "instrument malfunction" is subjective; therefore, the applicant could interpret this to mean that the instrument malfunctioned in such a way that its auto-isolation feature failed. Therefore, Choice "D" is also correct.
- 2. Partial: Is O-FCV-77-119 interlocked with the ABGTS breaker lo~ic or flow indication? There may be no correct answer to the 2" portion of the question.
Suggest testing some aspect(s) of the following:
Radiation Control Valve O-FCV-77-119 is interlocked with 1-FT-30-150 and 2-FT-30-165, and will terminate the release ifthe fan stops running. The radiation control valve O-FCV-77-119 will close on high radioactivity as indicated on O-RE-90-118. If the high radiation alarm is present, then appropriate actions must be taken to clear the high radiation condition. The control signal must be zeroed before the valve will reopen.
60 x E I T2G2 034 K6.02
- 1. Job-Link: The determination of whether or not fuel movement is or is not allowed is an SRO decision. The RO knowledge is what equipment is required to be operable during any mode of operation. This question is subject to post-exam appeals from RO applicants.
Suggest testing some aspect of when/how a Fuel Handling Area Isolation occurs in conjunction with the following annunciators:
O-XA<i5-12B{B3} O-XA-55-128 (B4J O*XA*55-12B{B6) 62 s IT2G2 071 A1.06
- 1. Stem Focus: The word "would" in the stem question should be replaced with "will." In the 2"d column of choices, the word "would" can be eliminated by placing an 's' on increase.
(increases).
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #I Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 66 x T3 G2.1.1
- 1. Please provide the reference that describes what the control room surveillance area is; what does CRO stand for at SQN?
- 2. Cred Dist: By process of elimination, an applicant can deduce that reactor controls is where the OATC (operator-at-the-controls) must remain; therefore, Choices C1 and 01 are borderline.
Alternative option could include:
WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with OPDP-1, Conduct of Operations, Section 3. 6, Reactivity Management?
Thermal power shall be closely monitored with the goal of maintaining the _(1)_ _ thermal power average slightly below the licensed thermal power limit.
If the core thermal power average for a one-hour period is found to exceed the licensed thermal power limit, prompt action shall be taken (typically no more than _(2)_ _ from point of discovery) to ensure that thermal power is less than the licensed thermal power limit.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #I Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 69 x T3 G2.2.13
- 1. Cred Dist: Choice "A" is not plausible because tagging the air supply valve in the open position still doesn't preclude a loss of air event from occurring.
Suggest the following:
WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with NPG-SPP-10.2, Clearance Procedure to Safely Control Energy, Appendix E, Special Requirements For Mechanical Clearances?
An air-operated valve that fails OPEN on a loss of air is not be considered closed for blocking purposes unless _(1 )_ _ .
An air-operated valve that fails CLOSED shall have its air supply
_ _ _ (2) _ _ isolated, depressurized and the valve visually checked-to-be-closed by local or remote indication.
A. an accumulator is connected and tagged; mechanically (ONLY)
- 8. an accumulator is connected and tagged; mechanically or electrically C. it is held closed by an installed jacking device; mechanically (ONLY)
D. it is held closed by an installed jacking device; mechanically or electrically 74 s T3 G2.4.39
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #I Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 78 x x T1 G1 029 G2.2.38
- 1. Cred Dist: Choices B2 and 02 are not plausible because AMSAC causes rods to insert, which, in essence, creates a cool down. Therefore, the FSAR bases for AMSAC cannot be to prevent an uncontrolled cool down.
- 2. Partial: The 1*1 part of the question is subjective because the word "direct" can be interpreted different ways; therefore, Choice A is also correct.
The KIA may be confusing to exam writers because of the Generic portion dealing with conditions and limits of the facility license. The facility license requires procedures. Therefore, anything related to EOPs dealing with ATWS hits the KIA SRO test items must hit one of the seven 55.43 topics; most often procedure selection is chosen.
A suggestion might include testing the SRO applicants' knowledge of FR-S.1. This could even include testing whether or not FR-S.1 provides guidance of when to enter the Severe Accident Control Room Guidelines.
96 s T3 G2.2.21
ES-403 Written Examination Grading Form ES-403-1 Quality Checklist
/
Facility: Date of Exam: .;/1e/1.5 Exam Level: RO CZf SRO D II Initials Item Description a b c
- 1. Clean answer sheets copied before qrading I~ Jt./ I IJ *11fJ,l
- 2. Answer key changes and question deletions justified and documented
- 3. Applicants' scores checked for addition errors (reviewers spot check> 25% of examinations)
- 4. Grading for all borderline cases (80 +/-2% overall and 70 or 80, as applicable, +/-4% on the SRO-only) reviewed in detail
- 5. All other failing examinations checked to ensure that grades are justified
- 6. Performance on missed questions checked for training deficiencies and wording problems; evaluate validity of questions missed by half or more of the applicants Printed Name/Signature Date
- a. Grader .J./Et<mtf/ 1.-?';J 4-:t~ ::?):ru/!s
- b. Facility Reviewer(*) Jf)/A- JV/A
- c. NRCChiefExaminer(*) Seu.NO~~)~~ 4-8-/S-
- d. NRC Supervisor (*) 6g"-"-'- [XL\,C/{i,\:J.i, ~ 7 lj\~3(ts
(*) The facility reviewer's signature is not applicable for examinations graded by the NRC; two independent NRC reviews are required.
ES-403 Written Examination Grading Form ES-403-1 Quality Checklist Date of Exam: 3 /, .JS Exam Level: RO Initials Item Descri tion a b c
- 1. Clean answer sheets co ied before 1JfU_
- 2. Answer key changes and question deletions justified and documented JV/A
- 3. Applicants' scores checked for addition errors reviewers s ot check > 25% of examinations 7lfX-
- 4. Grading for all borderline cases (80 +/-2% overall and 70 or 80, as a licable, +/-4% on the SRO-onl reviewed in detail w)t
- 5. All other failing examinations checked to ensure that grades are *ustified ~
- 6. Performance on missed questions checked for training deficiencies and wording problems; evaluate validity of questions missed b half or more of the applicants Printed Name/Signature Date
- a. Grader Sflt>U.5 7
- b. Facility Reviewer(*) ;
7
µ4
- c. NRG Chief Examiner(') 'B/2.W<lo ~~ 4-g-/S:-
- d. NRC Supervisor(*) b51lAA-\.. Gu~,,,/ 4{z3{fS-(*) The facility reviewer's signature is not applicable for examinations graded by the NRC; two independent NRC reviews are required.