Information Notice 1998-07, Offsite Power Reliability Challenges from Industry Deregulation: Difference between revisions
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{{#Wiki_filter:X 71 C sa'UNITED STATES | {{#Wiki_filter:X 71 C sa' | ||
UNITED STATES | |||
COMMISSION | NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | ||
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION | |||
NOTICE 98-07: OFFSITE POWER RELIABILITY | WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 February 27, 1998 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 98-07: OFFSITE POWER RELIABILITY CHALLENGES FROM | ||
INDUSTRY DEREGULATION | |||
==Addressees== | ==Addressees== | ||
All holders of operating | All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors except those who have ceased | ||
licenses for nuclear power reactors except those who have ceased | |||
removed from the vessel. | operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the vessel. | ||
==Purpose== | ==Purpose== | ||
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory | The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alert | ||
Commission (NRC) is issuing this information | |||
notice to alert | |||
addressees to a potential concern relating to electric power industry deregulation that could | |||
adversely affect the reliability of offsite power sources, i.e., power from the transmission system | |||
grid to nuclear power plants. It is expected that recipients will review the information for | |||
applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate. However, suggestions | |||
contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or | |||
written response to this notice is required. | |||
==Description of Circumstances== | |||
On July 11, 1989, safety systems at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station experienced a sustained | |||
the | degraded voltage condition and as a result the safety buses were automatically transferred from | ||
the offsite power system to onsite standby diesel generators. The degraded condition was | |||
caused by a turbine trip and deficiencies in the offsite power system's transmission network | |||
equipment. The transfer of power supplies was initiated by operation of degraded voltage | |||
protective relays, as designed. Non-safety system loads remained operable while being powered | |||
for approximately 1 hour from the degraded offsite power source. (LER 50-395/89-012) | |||
On November 5, 1991, the licensee for Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 reported that, had | |||
its 500kV auto-transformer been lost during summer peak conditions, the 161kV system might | |||
of the | not have been able to maintain adequate voltages to support the operation of the safety system | ||
loads of both units. (LER 50-313/91-010) | |||
On April 15, 1992, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company reported that under certain operating | |||
conditions of the transmission network (i.e., during heavy load conditions), a failure of | |||
transmission system equipment may cause a trip of all three Millstone units and a loss of offsite | |||
power to the station. This operating condition was precipitated by the economic displacement | |||
of oil-fired generating units by non-utility generators and by the addition of other generating | |||
capacity (Seabrook and Hydro-Quebec) to the transmission network. (LER 50-245/92-020) | |||
?PD 1re-F Normf, 1g-0o7 80a.2 7 q~ r 1l~lill~lill~lill~lililuill1!\i | |||
IN -07 February 27, 1998 On April 14, 1993, Wisconsin Public Service Corporation reported that under certain transmission | |||
line contingencies, a potential existed for the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant grid to become | |||
unstable and cause all offsite power sources into the plant to trip. (Ref: LER 50-305/93-010) | |||
On December 30, 1993, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company reported that under certain | |||
and | operating conditions of the transmission network (i.e., Millstone Units 2 and 3 off line), the | ||
transmission network may not have sufficient capacity to permit the continued operation of safety | |||
system loads from offsite sources following a trip of Millstone Unit 1. (LER 50-245/94-001) | |||
On August 8, 1995, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) reported that under certain | |||
operating conditions (i.e., a high system load with a specific 230kV transmission line out of | |||
service), the transmission network may not have sufficient capacity to permit the continued | |||
operation of the safety system loads from offsite sources following a trip of one of the two Diablo | |||
Canyon units. (Ref: LER 50-275/95-007) | |||
On August 10, 1996, a transmission line sagged into a tree in Oregon creating a ground fault that | |||
progressed into a major fault on the western Interconnection. The subsequent transient resulted | |||
in the tripping of both Diablo Canyon, Units 1 and 2 (LER 50-275/96-012) and Palo Verde, Units 1 and 3 (LER 50-528/004). | |||
During the summer of 1997, concerns were expressed about the impact of electric peak | |||
conditions on the offsite power sources for nuclear power plants located in the Midwest and | |||
New England. In addition, the licensee for Clinton nuclear station sought an exemption from | |||
offsite power regulatory requirements because of its analysis that offsite power would become | |||
inadequate under certain summer peak conditions following the loss of the nuclear unit. | |||
Recent NRC inspection findings and Licensee Event Reports have indicated instances when grid | |||
grid | stability analyses had not been updated by the licensees to reflect changes in the grid power | ||
system. Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data study C97-01, "Grid Performance | |||
Factors" dated March 20, 1997, identified a Oneed to monitor grid conditions on a regular basis." | |||
Discussion | |||
of | In 1988, NRC issued the station blackout (SBO) rule. The requirements of 10 CFR 50.63, "Loss | ||
of All Alternating Current Power," specify that each light-water-cooled nuclear power plant be | |||
able to withstand and recover from an SBO (i.e., a loss of offsite and onsite emergency ac power | |||
sources) for a specified period. The NRC review of licensees' analyses to assess the | |||
vulnerability of offsite power and the time required for recovery indicated that for most nuclear | |||
power plant sites the grid was stable and reliable. | |||
of | Historically, grid control is decentralized and each utility or a small group of utilities forms a | ||
control area containing customers for which it Is jurisdictionally responsible. The control areas | |||
form reliability councils that establish operating standards by consensus. These agreements, in | |||
of | turn, became the factors that determine the reliability of the grid and the bases for the availability | ||
of the offsite power system. Although the grid operating standards that evolved in the past | |||
of | provided reasonable grid reliability, events like those discussed herein reveal vulnerabilities of | ||
the electrical grid either through actual challenges or through licensee's analyses to assess the | |||
adequacy of the offsite power system. | |||
INS '7 Feb,--dry 27, 1998 The present grid management may be dismantled or restructured by two factors that are | |||
emerging: non-utility generation and deregulation. It Is anticipated that in the future, power | |||
suppliers, whether utilities or independent power producers, will actively compete for sales to | |||
customers who may be located anywhere on the power grid. This option creates multiple | |||
combinations of generating units going on and off the grid based on economic and performance | |||
related consequences. Regional grid control could be the responsibility of centralized | |||
independent system operators (ISOs). The responsibilities and authority of an ISO are yet to be | |||
defined, but It is expected that the ISO, or a similar entity, will be charged with maintaining grid | |||
the | reliability to facilitate the marketing of power. It is uncertain how the historic mechanisms for | ||
grid | reliable operation will change under the new grid operational structure. The Department of | ||
Energy has sponsored a Task Force on Electric System Reliability to examine the implications of | |||
industry deregulation on the Nation's electric power supply. | |||
The capacity and capability of the offsite power system for each nuclear power plant could be | |||
significantly influenced by the decisions emerging from these forthcoming changes. Since the | |||
capability of the offsite power cannot be tested except when challenged in an actual event, the | |||
design bases of the offsite power can only be assured through an enveloping analysis that | |||
accounts for the full spectrum of grid loading and transient conditions that support the operability | |||
of safety systems. The NRC Standard Review Plan Section 8.2 provides current guidance for | |||
assessing the adequacy of the offsite power system. It addresses grid analyses that | |||
demonstrate acceptable voltage and frequency when subjected to scenarios involving loss of | |||
nuclear unit generation, loss of the largest other unit, or loss of the most critical transmission line. | |||
Although the above events discussed may not demonstrate present generic weaknesses in | |||
licensees' processes, it is vital that licensees continue to ensure that the design bases with | |||
respect to the reliability and stability of the offsite power sources do not degrade during the life of | |||
of the offsite power system for nuclear power | the nuclear facility. The capacity and capability of the offsite power system for nuclear power | ||
elements to be factored into the management | plants are important elements to be factored into the management of the changes resulting from | ||
industry deregulation. | |||
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions | |||
about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed below or | |||
the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager. | |||
orig /s/'d by | |||
Jack W. Roe, Acting Director | |||
Division of Reactor Program Management | |||
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | ||
Technical Contacts: Ronaldo V. Jenkins, NRR Thomas Koshy, NRR | |||
Technical | |||
301415-2985 301415-1 176 E-Mail: rvj2nrc.gov E-Mail: txk@nrc.gov | |||
301415-1 176 E-Mail: rvj2nrc.gov | |||
E | A-1T E~A FiL ;1 JAckETF | ||
Attachment: Ust of recently issued Information Notices | |||
Ust of recently issued Information | |||
OGC Concurrence (R. K Hoefling) 214198, PGEB Id 2/17198 (T. Essig), | |||
214198, PGEB Id 2/17198 (T. Essig), AEOD Idc 2/12/98 (E.Rossi) | AEOD Idc 2/12/98 (E.Rossi) & Tech Editor 1/27/98 DOCUMENT NAME: S:%DRPM SEC\98-07.IN - SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE | ||
& Tech Editor 1/27/98 DOCUMENT NAME: S:%DRPM SEC\98-07.IN | |||
To receive a copy of Nhis document, Indicate Inthe box C=Copy wlo attachmentlenclosure E=Copy with attachmenUendosure N =No copy l | |||
OFFICE PECB I EELB I IEELB I PECB PECB LI DRPM A | |||
NAME TKoshy* RJenkins* JCalvo* RDennig* SRichards* JRoe* | |||
DATE 2/2/98 j 2/2/98 j 2/2/98 2/10/98 2/11/98 2/17/98 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY | |||
JCalvo* RDennig* SRichards* | |||
JRoe*DATE 2/2/98 j 2/2/98 j 2/2/98 2/10/98 2/11/98 2/17/98 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY | |||
Attachment | Attachment | ||
IN 98-07 February 27, 1998 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED | IN 98-07 February 27, 1998 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED | ||
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES | |||
Information Date of | |||
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to | |||
98-06 Unauthorized Use of Ucense to 2/19198 All NRC licensees authorized to | |||
Obtain Radioactive Materials, possess licensed material | |||
And Its Implications Under The | |||
Expanded Title 18 of the | |||
U.S. Code | |||
97-45, Supp. 1 Environmental Qualification 2/17/98 All holders of operating | |||
Deficiency for Cables and licenses for nuclear power | |||
Containment Penetration reactors except those licensees | |||
Pigtails who have permanently ceased | |||
operations and have certified that | |||
the | the fuel has been permanently | ||
removed from the reactor vessel | |||
98-05 Criminal History Record 2111/98 All holders of operating | |||
Information licenses for power reactors | |||
98-04 1997 Enforcement Sanctions for 2/9/98 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory | |||
deliberate Violations of NRC Commission licensees | |||
Employee Protection requirements | |||
98-03 Inadequate Verification of 1/21/98 All holders of operating licenses | |||
Overcurrent Trip Setpoints in for nuclear power reactors | |||
Metal-Clad, Low-Voltage | |||
Circuit Breakers | |||
98-02 Nuclear Power Plant Cold 1/21/98 All holders of operating licenses | |||
Weather Problems and for nuclear power reactors | |||
Protective Measures | |||
of | 98-01 Thefts of Portable Gauges 1/15/98 All portable gauge licensees | ||
97-91 Recent Failures of Control 12/31/97 All industrial radiography | |||
Cables Used on Amersham licensees | |||
Model 660 Posilock Radiography | |||
Systems | |||
97-90 Use of Nonconservative 12/30/97 All holders of OLs for nuclear | |||
Acceptance Criteria in power reactors except those | |||
Safety-Related Pump who have ceased operations | |||
Surveillance Tests and have certified that fuel has | |||
been permanently removed from | |||
the vessel | |||
OL = Operating License | |||
= | CP = Construction Permit | ||
IN9' Y | |||
, Feb~Uyxx, 1998 The present grid management may be dismantled or restructured by two factors that are | |||
emerging: non-utility generation and deregulation. It Is anticipated that in the future, power | |||
suppliers, whether utilities or independent power producers, will actively compete for sales to | |||
customers who may be located anywhere on the power grid. This option creates multiple | |||
combinations of generating units going on and off the grid based on economic and performance | |||
related consequences. Regional grid control could be the responsibility of centralized | |||
independent system operators (ISOs). The responsibilities and authority of an ISO are yet to be | |||
defined, but it Is expected that the ISO, or a similar entity, will be charged with maintaining grid | |||
reliability to facilitate the marketing of power. It is uncertain how the historic mechanisms for | |||
reliable operation will change under the new grid operational structure. The Department of | |||
Energy has sponsored a Task Force on Electric System Reliability to examine the implications of | |||
industry deregulation on the Nation's electric power supply. | |||
and | The capacity and capability of the offsite power system for each nuclear power plant could be | ||
significantly influenced by the decisions emerging from these forthcoming changes. Since the | |||
capability of the offsite power cannot be tested except when challenged in an actual event, the | |||
design bases of the offsite power can only be assured through an enveloping analysis that | |||
accounts for the full spectrum of grid loading and transient conditions that support the operability | |||
of safety systems. The NRC Standard Review Plan Section 8.2 provides current guidance for | |||
of | assessing the adequacy of the offsite power system. It addresses grid analyses that | ||
demonstrate acceptable voltage and frequency when subjected to scenarios Involving loss of | |||
nuclear unit generation, loss of the largest other unit, or loss of the most critical transmission line. | |||
Although the above events discussed may not demonstrate present generic weaknesses in | |||
licensees' processes, it is vital that licensees continue to ensure that the design bases with | |||
respect to the reliability and stability of the offsite power sources do not degrade during the life of | |||
the nuclear facility. The capacity and capability of the offsite power system for nuclear power | |||
plants are important elements to be factored into the management of the changes resulting from | |||
industry deregulation. | |||
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions | |||
about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed below or | |||
the | the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager. | ||
Jack W. Roe, Acting Director | |||
Division of Reactor Program Management | |||
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | |||
Technical Contacts: Ronaldo V. Jenkins, NRR Thomas Koshy, NRR | |||
301-415-2985 301-415-1176 E-Mail: rvjenrc.gov E-Mail: txk@nrc.gov | |||
Attachment: List of recently issued Information Notices | |||
OGC Concurrence (R. K Hoefling) 2/4198 DOCUMENT NAME: G:ITXK\GRIDIN2.1WPD - 'SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE | |||
a | To receive a copy of this document indicate Inthe box C=Copy wlo aftachmentlenclosure E d: .ATo osure N = No copy | ||
[OFFICE lPECB lI EELB 1 _ EELB l PECB lI PECB I DRPM | |||
NAME TKoshy* RJenkins* JCalvo* RDennig* lSRichards'Jle | |||
l DATE j 2/2/98 | |||
_J___A_ | |||
[2/2/98 . | |||
2/2/98 j 2/10/98 l-;1 /98 | |||
18- | |||
1/98 | |||
1/ 8-- | |||
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY t CM I | |||
Tre | |||
ING' x | |||
Febkty xx, 1998 The present grid management may be dismantled or restructured by two factors that are | |||
emerging: non-utility generation and deregulation. It is anticipated that in the future, power | |||
suppliers, whether utilities or Independent power producers, will a6tively compete for sales to | |||
customers who may be located anywhere on the power grid. This option creates multiple | |||
combinations of generating units going on and off the grid based on economic and performance | |||
related consequences. Regional grid control could be the responsibility of centralized | |||
independent system operators (ISOs). The responsibilities and authority of an ISO are yet to be | |||
defined, but it is expected that the ISO, or a similar entity, will be charged with maintaining grid | |||
the | reliability to facilitate the marketing of power. It is uncertain how the historic mechanisms for | ||
grid | reliable operation will change under the new grid operational structure. The Department of | ||
Energy has sponsored a Task Force on Electric System Reliability to examine the implications of | |||
industry deregulation on the Nation's electric power supply. | |||
The capacity and capability of the offsite power system for each nuclear power plant could be | |||
significantly influenced by the decisions emerging from these forthcoming changes. Since the | |||
capability of the offsite power cannot be tested except when challenged in an actual event, the | |||
design bases of the offsite power can only be assured through an enveloping analysis that | |||
accounts for the full spectrum of grid loading and transient conditions that support the operability | |||
of safety systems. The NRC Standard Review Plan Section 8.2 provides current guidance for | |||
assessing the adequacy of the offsite power system. It addresses grid analyses that | |||
demonstrate acceptable voltage and frequency when subjected to scenarios involving loss of | |||
nuclear unit generation, loss of the largest other unit, or loss of the most critical transmission line. | |||
Although the above events discussed may not demonstrate present generic weakness in | |||
licensees' process, it is vital that licensees continue to ensure that the design bases with respect | |||
of the offsite power | to the reliability and stability of the offsite power sources do not degrade during the life of the | ||
nuclear facility. The capacity and capability of the offsite power system for nuclear power plants | |||
of the changes resulting | are important elements to be factored into the management of the changes resulting from | ||
industry deregulation. | |||
This information | This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions | ||
notice | about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed below or | ||
the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager. | |||
Jack W. Roe, Acting Director | |||
Division of Reactor Program Management | |||
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | ||
Technical Contacts: Ronaldo V. Jenkins, NRR Thomas Koshy, NRR | |||
Technical | |||
301-415-2985 301-415-1176 E-Mail: rvjenrc.gov E-Mail: txk@nrc.gov | |||
301-415-1176 E-Mail: rvjenrc.gov | |||
Attachment: List of recently issued Information Notices | |||
OGC Concurrence (R. K Hoefling) 2/4/98 DOCUMENT NAME: G:ITXK\GRIDIN2.1WPD - SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE | |||
To receive a copy of this document, idicate hithe box C=Copy wlo attachmentlenclosure E=Copy with attachmentlenclosure N = No copy | |||
- | lOFFICE PECB I EELB _L EELB I - PECB l- DRPM_ | ||
NAME TKoshyl RJenkins* JCalvo* gnig ~ SRichards JRoe | |||
l DATE I /== 2/2/9f 12/219°B9% | |||
i ,I l I / I9t | |||
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY | |||
IN "x | |||
February xx, 1998 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any | |||
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed | |||
below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager. | |||
Jack W. Roe, Acting Director | |||
Division of Reactor Program Management | |||
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | |||
Technical Contacts: Ronaldo V. Jenkins, NRR | |||
301-415-2985 E-Mail: rvjenrc.gov | |||
Thomas Koshy, NRR | |||
301-415-1176 E-Mail: txkenrc.gov | |||
Attachment: List of recently issued Information Notices | |||
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\TXKAGRIDIN2.1WPD | |||
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box C=Copy wlo atachment/enclosure E=Copy with attachment/enclosure N = No copy | |||
OFFICE l PECB lEELB EELB El I PECB I PECB l lDRPMl | |||
NAME s RJenkins JCalvo /1 RDennig SRichards JRoe | |||
l DATE 121249 I L,-,9l 212/t9 I / , II,9 , / W | |||
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY}} | |||
{{Information notice-Nav}} | {{Information notice-Nav}} |
Latest revision as of 04:43, 24 November 2019
X 71 C sa'
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 February 27, 1998 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 98-07: OFFSITE POWER RELIABILITY CHALLENGES FROM
INDUSTRY DEREGULATION
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors except those who have ceased
operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the vessel.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alert
addressees to a potential concern relating to electric power industry deregulation that could
adversely affect the reliability of offsite power sources, i.e., power from the transmission system
grid to nuclear power plants. It is expected that recipients will review the information for
applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate. However, suggestions
contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or
written response to this notice is required.
Description of Circumstances
On July 11, 1989, safety systems at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station experienced a sustained
degraded voltage condition and as a result the safety buses were automatically transferred from
the offsite power system to onsite standby diesel generators. The degraded condition was
caused by a turbine trip and deficiencies in the offsite power system's transmission network
equipment. The transfer of power supplies was initiated by operation of degraded voltage
protective relays, as designed. Non-safety system loads remained operable while being powered
for approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> from the degraded offsite power source. (LER 50-395/89-012)
On November 5, 1991, the licensee for Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 reported that, had
its 500kV auto-transformer been lost during summer peak conditions, the 161kV system might
not have been able to maintain adequate voltages to support the operation of the safety system
loads of both units. (LER 50-313/91-010)
On April 15, 1992, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company reported that under certain operating
conditions of the transmission network (i.e., during heavy load conditions), a failure of
transmission system equipment may cause a trip of all three Millstone units and a loss of offsite
power to the station. This operating condition was precipitated by the economic displacement
of oil-fired generating units by non-utility generators and by the addition of other generating
capacity (Seabrook and Hydro-Quebec) to the transmission network. (LER 50-245/92-020)
?PD 1re-F Normf, 1g-0o7 80a.2 7 q~ r 1l~lill~lill~lill~lililuill1!\i
IN -07 February 27, 1998 On April 14, 1993, Wisconsin Public Service Corporation reported that under certain transmission
line contingencies, a potential existed for the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant grid to become
unstable and cause all offsite power sources into the plant to trip. (Ref: LER 50-305/93-010)
On December 30, 1993, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company reported that under certain
operating conditions of the transmission network (i.e., Millstone Units 2 and 3 off line), the
transmission network may not have sufficient capacity to permit the continued operation of safety
system loads from offsite sources following a trip of Millstone Unit 1. (LER 50-245/94-001)
On August 8, 1995, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) reported that under certain
operating conditions (i.e., a high system load with a specific 230kV transmission line out of
service), the transmission network may not have sufficient capacity to permit the continued
operation of the safety system loads from offsite sources following a trip of one of the two Diablo
Canyon units. (Ref: LER 50-275/95-007)
On August 10, 1996, a transmission line sagged into a tree in Oregon creating a ground fault that
progressed into a major fault on the western Interconnection. The subsequent transient resulted
in the tripping of both Diablo Canyon, Units 1 and 2 (LER 50-275/96-012) and Palo Verde, Units 1 and 3 (LER 50-528/004).
During the summer of 1997, concerns were expressed about the impact of electric peak
conditions on the offsite power sources for nuclear power plants located in the Midwest and
New England. In addition, the licensee for Clinton nuclear station sought an exemption from
offsite power regulatory requirements because of its analysis that offsite power would become
inadequate under certain summer peak conditions following the loss of the nuclear unit.
Recent NRC inspection findings and Licensee Event Reports have indicated instances when grid
stability analyses had not been updated by the licensees to reflect changes in the grid power
system. Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data study C97-01, "Grid Performance
Factors" dated March 20, 1997, identified a Oneed to monitor grid conditions on a regular basis."
Discussion
In 1988, NRC issued the station blackout (SBO) rule. The requirements of 10 CFR 50.63, "Loss
of All Alternating Current Power," specify that each light-water-cooled nuclear power plant be
able to withstand and recover from an SBO (i.e., a loss of offsite and onsite emergency ac power
sources) for a specified period. The NRC review of licensees' analyses to assess the
vulnerability of offsite power and the time required for recovery indicated that for most nuclear
power plant sites the grid was stable and reliable.
Historically, grid control is decentralized and each utility or a small group of utilities forms a
control area containing customers for which it Is jurisdictionally responsible. The control areas
form reliability councils that establish operating standards by consensus. These agreements, in
turn, became the factors that determine the reliability of the grid and the bases for the availability
of the offsite power system. Although the grid operating standards that evolved in the past
provided reasonable grid reliability, events like those discussed herein reveal vulnerabilities of
the electrical grid either through actual challenges or through licensee's analyses to assess the
adequacy of the offsite power system.
INS '7 Feb,--dry 27, 1998 The present grid management may be dismantled or restructured by two factors that are
emerging: non-utility generation and deregulation. It Is anticipated that in the future, power
suppliers, whether utilities or independent power producers, will actively compete for sales to
customers who may be located anywhere on the power grid. This option creates multiple
combinations of generating units going on and off the grid based on economic and performance
related consequences. Regional grid control could be the responsibility of centralized
independent system operators (ISOs). The responsibilities and authority of an ISO are yet to be
defined, but It is expected that the ISO, or a similar entity, will be charged with maintaining grid
reliability to facilitate the marketing of power. It is uncertain how the historic mechanisms for
reliable operation will change under the new grid operational structure. The Department of
Energy has sponsored a Task Force on Electric System Reliability to examine the implications of
industry deregulation on the Nation's electric power supply.
The capacity and capability of the offsite power system for each nuclear power plant could be
significantly influenced by the decisions emerging from these forthcoming changes. Since the
capability of the offsite power cannot be tested except when challenged in an actual event, the
design bases of the offsite power can only be assured through an enveloping analysis that
accounts for the full spectrum of grid loading and transient conditions that support the operability
of safety systems. The NRC Standard Review Plan Section 8.2 provides current guidance for
assessing the adequacy of the offsite power system. It addresses grid analyses that
demonstrate acceptable voltage and frequency when subjected to scenarios involving loss of
nuclear unit generation, loss of the largest other unit, or loss of the most critical transmission line.
Although the above events discussed may not demonstrate present generic weaknesses in
licensees' processes, it is vital that licensees continue to ensure that the design bases with
respect to the reliability and stability of the offsite power sources do not degrade during the life of
the nuclear facility. The capacity and capability of the offsite power system for nuclear power
plants are important elements to be factored into the management of the changes resulting from
industry deregulation.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions
about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed below or
the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
orig /s/'d by
Jack W. Roe, Acting Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: Ronaldo V. Jenkins, NRR Thomas Koshy, NRR
301415-2985 301415-1 176 E-Mail: rvj2nrc.gov E-Mail: txk@nrc.gov
A-1T E~A FiL ;1 JAckETF
Attachment: Ust of recently issued Information Notices
OGC Concurrence (R. K Hoefling) 214198, PGEB Id 2/17198 (T. Essig),
AEOD Idc 2/12/98 (E.Rossi) & Tech Editor 1/27/98 DOCUMENT NAME: S:%DRPM SEC\98-07.IN - SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
To receive a copy of Nhis document, Indicate Inthe box C=Copy wlo attachmentlenclosure E=Copy with attachmenUendosure N =No copy l
OFFICE PECB I EELB I IEELB I PECB PECB LI DRPM A
NAME TKoshy* RJenkins* JCalvo* RDennig* SRichards* JRoe*
DATE 2/2/98 j 2/2/98 j 2/2/98 2/10/98 2/11/98 2/17/98 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Attachment
IN 98-07 February 27, 1998 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to
98-06 Unauthorized Use of Ucense to 2/19198 All NRC licensees authorized to
Obtain Radioactive Materials, possess licensed material
And Its Implications Under The
Expanded Title 18 of the
U.S. Code
97-45, Supp. 1 Environmental Qualification 2/17/98 All holders of operating
Deficiency for Cables and licenses for nuclear power
Containment Penetration reactors except those licensees
Pigtails who have permanently ceased
operations and have certified that
the fuel has been permanently
removed from the reactor vessel
98-05 Criminal History Record 2111/98 All holders of operating
Information licenses for power reactors
98-04 1997 Enforcement Sanctions for 2/9/98 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
deliberate Violations of NRC Commission licensees
Employee Protection requirements
98-03 Inadequate Verification of 1/21/98 All holders of operating licenses
Overcurrent Trip Setpoints in for nuclear power reactors
Metal-Clad, Low-Voltage
Circuit Breakers
98-02 Nuclear Power Plant Cold 1/21/98 All holders of operating licenses
Weather Problems and for nuclear power reactors
Protective Measures
98-01 Thefts of Portable Gauges 1/15/98 All portable gauge licensees
97-91 Recent Failures of Control 12/31/97 All industrial radiography
Cables Used on Amersham licensees
Model 660 Posilock Radiography
Systems
97-90 Use of Nonconservative 12/30/97 All holders of OLs for nuclear
Acceptance Criteria in power reactors except those
Safety-Related Pump who have ceased operations
Surveillance Tests and have certified that fuel has
been permanently removed from
the vessel
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
IN9' Y
, Feb~Uyxx, 1998 The present grid management may be dismantled or restructured by two factors that are
emerging: non-utility generation and deregulation. It Is anticipated that in the future, power
suppliers, whether utilities or independent power producers, will actively compete for sales to
customers who may be located anywhere on the power grid. This option creates multiple
combinations of generating units going on and off the grid based on economic and performance
related consequences. Regional grid control could be the responsibility of centralized
independent system operators (ISOs). The responsibilities and authority of an ISO are yet to be
defined, but it Is expected that the ISO, or a similar entity, will be charged with maintaining grid
reliability to facilitate the marketing of power. It is uncertain how the historic mechanisms for
reliable operation will change under the new grid operational structure. The Department of
Energy has sponsored a Task Force on Electric System Reliability to examine the implications of
industry deregulation on the Nation's electric power supply.
The capacity and capability of the offsite power system for each nuclear power plant could be
significantly influenced by the decisions emerging from these forthcoming changes. Since the
capability of the offsite power cannot be tested except when challenged in an actual event, the
design bases of the offsite power can only be assured through an enveloping analysis that
accounts for the full spectrum of grid loading and transient conditions that support the operability
of safety systems. The NRC Standard Review Plan Section 8.2 provides current guidance for
assessing the adequacy of the offsite power system. It addresses grid analyses that
demonstrate acceptable voltage and frequency when subjected to scenarios Involving loss of
nuclear unit generation, loss of the largest other unit, or loss of the most critical transmission line.
Although the above events discussed may not demonstrate present generic weaknesses in
licensees' processes, it is vital that licensees continue to ensure that the design bases with
respect to the reliability and stability of the offsite power sources do not degrade during the life of
the nuclear facility. The capacity and capability of the offsite power system for nuclear power
plants are important elements to be factored into the management of the changes resulting from
industry deregulation.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions
about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed below or
the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Jack W. Roe, Acting Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: Ronaldo V. Jenkins, NRR Thomas Koshy, NRR
301-415-2985 301-415-1176 E-Mail: rvjenrc.gov E-Mail: txk@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of recently issued Information Notices
OGC Concurrence (R. K Hoefling) 2/4198 DOCUMENT NAME: G:ITXK\GRIDIN2.1WPD - 'SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
To receive a copy of this document indicate Inthe box C=Copy wlo aftachmentlenclosure E d: .ATo osure N = No copy
[OFFICE lPECB lI EELB 1 _ EELB l PECB lI PECB I DRPM
NAME TKoshy* RJenkins* JCalvo* RDennig* lSRichards'Jle
l DATE j 2/2/98
_J___A_
[2/2/98 .
2/2/98 j 2/10/98 l-;1 /98
18-
1/98
1/ 8--
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY t CM I
Tre
ING' x
Febkty xx, 1998 The present grid management may be dismantled or restructured by two factors that are
emerging: non-utility generation and deregulation. It is anticipated that in the future, power
suppliers, whether utilities or Independent power producers, will a6tively compete for sales to
customers who may be located anywhere on the power grid. This option creates multiple
combinations of generating units going on and off the grid based on economic and performance
related consequences. Regional grid control could be the responsibility of centralized
independent system operators (ISOs). The responsibilities and authority of an ISO are yet to be
defined, but it is expected that the ISO, or a similar entity, will be charged with maintaining grid
reliability to facilitate the marketing of power. It is uncertain how the historic mechanisms for
reliable operation will change under the new grid operational structure. The Department of
Energy has sponsored a Task Force on Electric System Reliability to examine the implications of
industry deregulation on the Nation's electric power supply.
The capacity and capability of the offsite power system for each nuclear power plant could be
significantly influenced by the decisions emerging from these forthcoming changes. Since the
capability of the offsite power cannot be tested except when challenged in an actual event, the
design bases of the offsite power can only be assured through an enveloping analysis that
accounts for the full spectrum of grid loading and transient conditions that support the operability
of safety systems. The NRC Standard Review Plan Section 8.2 provides current guidance for
assessing the adequacy of the offsite power system. It addresses grid analyses that
demonstrate acceptable voltage and frequency when subjected to scenarios involving loss of
nuclear unit generation, loss of the largest other unit, or loss of the most critical transmission line.
Although the above events discussed may not demonstrate present generic weakness in
licensees' process, it is vital that licensees continue to ensure that the design bases with respect
to the reliability and stability of the offsite power sources do not degrade during the life of the
nuclear facility. The capacity and capability of the offsite power system for nuclear power plants
are important elements to be factored into the management of the changes resulting from
industry deregulation.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions
about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed below or
the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Jack W. Roe, Acting Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: Ronaldo V. Jenkins, NRR Thomas Koshy, NRR
301-415-2985 301-415-1176 E-Mail: rvjenrc.gov E-Mail: txk@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of recently issued Information Notices
OGC Concurrence (R. K Hoefling) 2/4/98 DOCUMENT NAME: G:ITXK\GRIDIN2.1WPD - SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
To receive a copy of this document, idicate hithe box C=Copy wlo attachmentlenclosure E=Copy with attachmentlenclosure N = No copy
lOFFICE PECB I EELB _L EELB I - PECB l- DRPM_
NAME TKoshyl RJenkins* JCalvo* gnig ~ SRichards JRoe
l DATE I /== 2/2/9f 12/219°B9%
i ,I l I / I9t
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
IN "x
February xx, 1998 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed
below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Jack W. Roe, Acting Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: Ronaldo V. Jenkins, NRR
301-415-2985 E-Mail: rvjenrc.gov
301-415-1176 E-Mail: txkenrc.gov
Attachment: List of recently issued Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\TXKAGRIDIN2.1WPD
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box C=Copy wlo atachment/enclosure E=Copy with attachment/enclosure N = No copy
OFFICE l PECB lEELB EELB El I PECB I PECB l lDRPMl
NAME s RJenkins JCalvo /1 RDennig SRichards JRoe
l DATE 121249 I L,-,9l 212/t9 I / , II,9 , / W
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY