05000247/FIN-2011005-02: Difference between revisions
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| CCA = H.7 | | CCA = H.7 | ||
| INPO aspect = WP.3 | | INPO aspect = WP.3 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a finding because Entergy procedure ENN-DC-150, Condition Monitoring of Maintenance Rule Structures, did not have appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. Specifically, since September 6, 2007, Entergy personnel did not have an adequate procedure with acceptance criteria to determine if wall penetrations were properly sealed, which resulted in water intrusion into the 480 volt room during Hurricane lrene due to degradation of two service water (SW) pipe penetrations. Entergy personnel immediately directed water to a floor drain, placed sandbags around the 480 volt switchgear, and initiated actions to develop a permanent repair to the penetration seals. Entergy personnel entered this issue into the CAP as CR-\P2-2011-4324. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability and reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Also, in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (lMC) 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix E, Minor Examples, this finding is similar to examples 3.i and 3.j. Specifically, water intrusion in the 480 volt room could impact all four trains of 480 volt switchgear. Using IMC 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the inspectors determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not result in an actual loss of safety function, was not a loss of barrier function, and was not potentially risk significant for external events. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the resources attribute because Entergy personnel did not have complete, accurate and up-to-date procedures and work packages, to ensure adequate inspection of flood penetration seals. | | description = The inspectors identified a finding because Entergy procedure ENN-DC-150, Condition Monitoring of Maintenance Rule Structures, did not have appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. Specifically, since September 6, 2007, Entergy personnel did not have an adequate procedure with acceptance criteria to determine if wall penetrations were properly sealed, which resulted in water intrusion into the 480 volt room during Hurricane lrene due to degradation of two service water (SW) pipe penetrations. Entergy personnel immediately directed water to a floor drain, placed sandbags around the 480 volt switchgear, and initiated actions to develop a permanent repair to the penetration seals. Entergy personnel entered this issue into the CAP as CR-\\P2-2011-4324. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability and reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Also, in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (lMC) 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix E, Minor Examples, this finding is similar to examples 3.i and 3.j. Specifically, water intrusion in the 480 volt room could impact all four trains of 480 volt switchgear. Using IMC 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the inspectors determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not result in an actual loss of safety function, was not a loss of barrier function, and was not potentially risk significant for external events. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the resources attribute because Entergy personnel did not have complete, accurate and up-to-date procedures and work packages, to ensure adequate inspection of flood penetration seals. | ||
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Latest revision as of 20:43, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Indian Point  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000247/2011005 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Bickett J Furia J Noggle M Catts M Gray O Ayegbiso S Mccarver T Fish |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
| ' | |