05000286/FIN-2011002-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Entergy Personnel Did Not Evaluate and Monitor a Thermal Barrier Boric Acid Leak |
| Description | The inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, lnstructions, Procedures, and Drawings, of very low safety significance (Green) because Entergy personnel did not adequately implement Boric Acid Control procedures. Specifically, Entergy personnel did not fully implement procedure EN-DC- 319, lnspection and Evaluation of Boric Acid Leaks and Engineering Report IP-RPT- 07-00093, Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program, and conduct boric acid evaluations or implement adequate monitoring actions for an identified leak from the lower thermal barrier flange joint (a bolted connection with a gasket) associated with the 32 RCP between 2005 and 2Q11. This issue was entered into the Entergy corrective action program as condition report (CR)-lP3-2011-01546. Corrective actions included performing the required evaluation in 2011 (3R16) and implementing leak monitoring actions for the next operating cycle. The inspectors determined the finding was more than minor because the finding is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as at power operations. Additionally, the inspectors determined that more than minor example 4.a of IMC 0612, Appendix E was similar because Entergy personnel had not performed engineering evaluations on this boric acid leak from 2005 - 2011. The inspectors completed Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1- Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings and screened the finding in accordance with Table 4a. The inspectors concluded that, assuming the worst case degradation of the leakage condition, this condition would not result in exceeding the Technical Specification (TS) limit for identified leakage and that the finding would not be likely to affect other mitigation systems which could result in a loss of safety function. Therefore, the inspectors determined this finding was of very low safety significance. The inspectors determined this finding had a cross-cutting in the area of Human Performance associated with the Work Practice attribute because Entergy personnel did not follow procedures as written. |
| Site: | Indian Point  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000286/2011002 Section 1R08 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2011 (2011Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.08 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Newport E Gray J Noggle M Gray M Halter P Cataldo T O'Hara |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
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Finding - Indian Point - IR 05000286/2011002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Indian Point) @ 2011Q1
Self-Identified List (Indian Point)
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