05000247/FIN-2011007-01
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Correctly lmplement an Approved Setpoint Change to Reactor Protection System lnstruments |
| Description | The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion lll, Design Control, in that Entergy did not ensure that design changes, including field changes, were subject to design control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design. Entergy implemented an instrument setpoint change, but delayed re-calibration of the in-field setpoint values and did not evaluate the adequacy of the in-field actual setpoints, which were later found outside the value required by the design basis. Specifically, Entergy revised surveillance procedures for the Unit 2 reactor protection system (RPS) over-power delta{emperature (OPdT) instrument to use a setpoint value specified in the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR). However, the procedures were not required to be performed until the next regularly scheduled surveillance period. Technical Specification 3.3.1 requires the allowable values to be set as specified by the COLR. Two of the four instrument channels had in-field values outside of the required allowable value. Entergy entered this issue into their corrective action program and performed an immediate operability evaluation and determined that the OPdT instrument was capable of performing its intended functions with the current in-field values. The team determined that the failure to ensure in-service instrument setpoint values satisfied design and licensing basis requirements was a performance deficiency. This issue was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (e.9., fuel cladding) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The team performed a Phase 1 Significance Determination Process screening, in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it affected only fuel barrier portion of the barrier integrity cornerstone. The team determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Practices because Entergy did not ensure adequate supervisory or management oversight of a design change. |
| Site: | Indian Point  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000247/2011007 Section 1R17 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.17 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Richmond F Arner D Orr J Brand E Burket L Doerflein M Orr |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
| ' | |
Finding - Indian Point - IR 05000247/2011007 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Indian Point) @ 2011Q4
Self-Identified List (Indian Point)
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||