05000286/FIN-2011010-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Procedural Requirements of Engineering Change Process Not Implemented |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) because Entergy personnel did not adequately implement the procedural requirements of EN-DC- 115, Engineering Change Process, during the installation of a modification to the 33 instrument air desiccant dryer. Specifically, Entergy staff incorrectly replaced fuses in the motor controlcenter (MCC) which powers the dryer with smaller capacity fuses, rather than replacing existing control power fuses in the dryer control panel with fuses of increased capacity, as intended by the design change. As a result, the fuses in the MCC performed their intended function and burned out, deenergizing the dryer, and leading to excessive unavailability of the drYer and high humidity air in the instrument air header. Entergy staff entered this issue into their corrective action process as condition report (CR)-IP3-201103798. The inspectors determined the finding was more than minor because the finding was similar to the more than minor if' statement associated with example 5.b of Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612 Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues. Additionally, the finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (Le., core damage). Specifically, the unavailability of the 33 instrument air dryer caused moist air in the instrument air header which in turn led to high humidity and low pressure alarms on the 33 instrument air header. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined the finding was of very low safety significance because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of system safety function, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to external initiating events. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, associated with the Work Control attribute. Specifically, Entergy personnel did not adequately coordinate the planning and implementation of the engineering change process, which involved several site departments, and resulted in incorrectly installed fuses and multiple missed opportunities to both prevent and identify the error. |
| Site: | Indian Point  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000286/2011010 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | E Knutson J Ayala J Schoppy M Gray M Halter |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Indian Point - IR 05000286/2011010 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Indian Point) @ 2011Q3
Self-Identified List (Indian Point)
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