05000247/FIN-2011002-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Main Steam System Configuration Control Procedure Not Adequate to Ensure Closure of MS-55D |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, because Entergy procedure 2-COL-18.1, Main Steam and Reheat System, was not adequate to ensure closure of main steam isolation valve (MSIV) bypass stop valve MS-55D. Specifically, between April 10, 2010 and September 12, 2010, procedure 2-COL-18.1 did not provide adequate instructions to operators to ensure MS-55D was closed, which resulted in MS-55D being left partially open, and unable to isolate the 24 steam generator (SG) during accident conditions. Entergy personnel took immediate corrective actions to close MS-55D. This issue was entered into Entergys CAP as condition reports (CRs) IP2-2010-05694 and IP2-2010-06745. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability and reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). Specifically, the inadequate procedure resulted in the manual 3-inch MSIV bypass stop valve MS-55D for the 24 SG being left partially open for approximately five months. Based on NRC senior reactor analyst review, it was determined that operators could have isolated the other three SGs with their MSIVs and steamed them to remove decay heat and depressurize the plant using their atmospheric dump valves, while isolating the 24 SG further down the main steam system at the turbine bypass and stop valves. Therefore, using IMC 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the inspectors determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not result in a loss of the safety function given the operators ability to isolate the other SGs and the 24 SG with the turbine bypass and stop valves. Additionally, the finding was not potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined there was no cross-cutting issue associated with the finding because the performance deficiency did not reflect Entergy\'s current performance. Specifically, the procedure change occurred more than three years ago and was outside the current assessment period. |
| Site: | Indian Point  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000247/2011002 Section 1R04 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2011 (2011Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.04 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Rao J Noggle J Richmond M Catts M Gray O Ayegbusi |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Indian Point - IR 05000247/2011002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Indian Point) @ 2011Q1
Self-Identified List (Indian Point)
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