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| issue date = 11/27/1991
| issue date = 11/27/1991
| title = Responds to 911029 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/91-33,50-260/91-33 & 50-296/91-33 & Enforcement Action 91-120.Corrective Actions:Credible Baseline Inventory of All SNM on Site Will Be Reported to NRC
| title = Responds to 911029 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/91-33,50-260/91-33 & 50-296/91-33 & Enforcement Action 91-120.Corrective Actions:Credible Baseline Inventory of All SNM on Site Will Be Reported to NRC
| author name = MEDFORD M O
| author name = Medford M
| author affiliation = TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
| author affiliation = TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
Line 14: Line 14:
| page count = 14
| page count = 14
}}
}}
See also: [[followed by::IR 05000259/1991033]]


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:ACCELERATED
{{#Wiki_filter:ACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DXSTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
DISTRIBUTION
CESSION NBR:9112020273                 DOC.DATE:   91/11/27     NOTARIZED: NO         DOCKET FACIL:50-259 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Tennessee                       05000259 50-260 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Tennessee                     05000260 50-296 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3, Tennessee                     05000296 AUTH. NAME             AUTHOR AFFILIATION MEDFORD,M.O.           Tennessee Valley Authority RECIP.NAME             RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
DEMONSTRATION
 
SYSTEM REGULATORY
==SUBJECT:==
INFORMATION
Responds       to 911029       ltr re violations noted in Insp Repts 50-259/91-33, 50-260/91-33 & 50-296/91-33 & Enforcement                                   D Action 91-120.Corrective actions:credible baseline inventory of all SNM on site will be reported to NRC.
DXSTRIBUTION
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IEOID COPIES RECEIVED:LTR TITLE: General     (50 Dkt)-Insp Rept/Notice of Vio 4 ation ENCL 3 SIZE:
SYSTEM (RIDS)CESSION NBR:9112020273
 
DOC.DATE: 91/11/27 NOTARIZED:
===Response===
NO DOCKET FACIL:50-259
A NOTES:
Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Tennessee 05000259 50-260 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Tennessee 05000260 50-296 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3, Tennessee 05000296 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
D RECIPIENT                 COPIES          'ECIPIENT                COPIES ID CODE/NAME                LTTR ENCL        ID CODE/NAME         LTTR ENCL HEBDON,F                       1      1    ROSS,T.                    1    1 WILLIAMS,J.                    1 t
MEDFORD,M.O.
1.
Tennessee Valley Authority RECIP.NAME
INTERNAL: ACRS                             2      2    AEOD                      1    1 AEOD/DEIIB                     1      1    AEOD/DS P/TPAB            1    1 DEDRO                           1      1    NRR HARBUCK,C.            1    1 NRR MORISSEAUiD                 1      1    NRR/DLPQ/LHFBPT            1    1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10                1      1    NRR/DOEA/OEAB              1    1 NRR/DREP/PEPB9H                 1      1    NRR/DST/DIR SE2            1    1 NRR/PMAS/ILRB12                 1      1    NUDOCS-ABSTRACT            1    1 05-D.-                         1      1    OGC/HDS3                  1    1 G~-                02         1      1    RGN2      FILE  01      1    1 EXTERNAL   EG&G/BRYCE 1 J ~           1     1     NRC PDR                    1 + 1 NSIC                            1     1 D
RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
                                                                                                    'S
Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)SUBJECT: Responds to 911029 ltr re violations
                                                                                                    .A D
noted in Insp Repts 50-259/91-33, 50-260/91-33
D NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
&50-296/91-33
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! COiVA ACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOii'I Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIIIINATEYOUR NAb, IE FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!
&Enforcement
TAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUXRED: LTTR                 25  ENCL       25
Action 91-120.Corrective
 
actions:credible
0 Tennessee Valley Authority, 1101 Market Street, Chattanooga. Tennessee 37402 Mark O. Medford Vice President, Nuclear Assurance, Licensing and Fuels November 27, 1991 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:        Document        Control Desk Mashington, D.C.                  20555 Gentlemen:
baseline inventory of all SNM on site will be reported to NRC.DISTRIBUTION
In the Hatter of                                                              Docket Nos. 50-259 Tennessee          Valley Authority                                                       50-260 50-296 BROGANS      FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)  NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-259, 260, 296/91-33          REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NOV) (ENFORCEMENT ACTION 91-120)
CODE: IEOID COPIES RECEIVED:LTR
This      letter provides              TVA's reply to S. D. Ebneter's letter to D. A, Nauman        dated October 29, 1991, which transmitted the subject NOV involving the inaccurate TVA special nuclear material (SNM) baseline inventory which was transmitted to NRC on April 17, 1991.
4 ENCL 3 SIZE: TITLE: General (50 Dkt)-Insp Rept/Notice
Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201 and as described in the enclosed "Reply to the Notice of Violation," TVA admits this violation. provides TVA's reply to the NOV. Enclosure 2 provides TVA commitments            to ensure an accurate and credible SNM inventory at BFN.
of Vio ation Response NOTES: D A RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME HEBDON,F WILLIAMS,J.
If you        have any questions regarding this response, please telephone
INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD/DEIIB
: 0. J. Zeringue at (205) 729-3675, or me at (615) 751-4776.
t DEDRO NRR MORISSEAUiD
Sincerely, Hark 0. Medford Enclosures cc: See page              2
NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10
 
NRR/DREP/PEPB9H
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission November 27, 1991 cc (Enclosures):
NRR/PMAS/ILRB12
NRC Resident Inspector
05-D.-G~-02 EXTERNAL EG&G/BRYCE
  ~
1 J~H NSIC COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1.2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1'ECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME ROSS,T.AEOD AEOD/DS P/TPAB NRR HARBUCK,C.
Browns  Ferry Nuclear Plant Route 12, Box 637 Athens, Alabama 35611 Mr. Thierry M. Ross, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One Mhite  Flint, North 11555  Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland  20852 Mr. B. A. Wilson, Project Chief U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323
NRR/DLPQ/LHFBPT
 
NRR/DOEA/OEAB
ENCLOSURE 1 Tennessee Valley Authority Browns.Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN)
NRR/DST/DIR
Reply to Notice of Violation     (NOV)
SE2 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT
(Enforcement Action 91-120)
OGC/HDS3 RGN2 FILE 01 NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1+1 D D'S NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:.A D D PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE!COiVA ACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOii'I Pl-37 (EXT.20079)TO ELIIIINATE
Inspection Report   Number 50-259, 260, 296/91-33 NRC STATEMENT OF   VIOLATION "During the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted on September 3 through 6, 1991, a violation of HRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for HRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1991), the violation is listed below:
YOUR NAb, IE FROM DISTRIBUTION
10 CFR   70.51(d) requires, in part, that each licensee who is authorized to possess at any one time and location special nuclear material (SNH) in a quantity totaling more than 350 grams of contained uranium-'235 shall conduct a physical inventory of all SNH in his possession under license at intervals not to exceed twelve months.
LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!TAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUXRED: LTTR 25 ENCL 25
Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to perform an adequate physical inventory in 1990. Specifically, the February and March 1990 physical inventory failed to include an item containing SNM, which was identified in the spent fuel pool on September 7, 1991."
0
This is   a Severity Level   III violation (Supplement III).
Tennessee Valley Authority, 1101 Market Street, Chattanooga.
TVA'S REPLY TVA admits that the results of     its physical inventory of SNM conducted in 1991 at BFN were   in error.
Tennessee 37402 Mark O.Medford Vice President, Nuclear Assurance, Licensing and Fuels November 27, 1991 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory
: 1. Reason   for the Violation As stated during the October 4, 1991 enforcement conference, the two inventory discrepancies which are the subject of this violation resulted from the use of engineering judgments during TVA's efforts to confirm the SNH baseline inventory at BFN.
Commission
 
ATTN: Document Control Desk Mashington, D.C.20555 Gentlemen:
0 BFN considers that the judgments utilized were reasonable.             However, in hindsight     certain   of these   judgments   proved faulty and =resulted in the misidentification of two non-fuel SNM items. Consequently, TVA inaccurately cataloged these items in its current inventory records.
In the Hatter of Tennessee Valley Authority Docket Nos.50-259 50-260 50-296 BROGANS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)-NRC INSPECTION
A discussion of the two events resulting in the inventory discrepancies is set forth below:
REPORT 50-259, 260, 296/91-33-REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NOV)(ENFORCEMENT
A. Event 1 On   August 21, 1991, a local-power range monitor (LPRM) without             a "hot end" (detector assemblies) was discovered. The LPRM was previously identified in the SNM baseline inventory as containing a "hot end."
ACTION 91-120)This letter provides TVA's reply to S.D.Ebneter's letter to D.A, Nauman dated October 29, 1991, which transmitted
Mhen   the SNM baseline inventory of the Unit 2 spent fuel storage pool (SFSP) was conducted, 18 full length LPRMs stored in the SFSP wore found severely entangled.           The engineer performing the inventory in the SFSP concluded         that these 18 LPRMs could not be individually separated       without   violating   the instructions provided in the     maintenance     request (MR) which was specifically initiated to perform       the inventory.
the subject NOV involving the inaccurate
These   instructions required the LPRMs to be maintained at least five feet under the surface of the SFSP at all times, to ensure prop'er shielding and for maintaining radiation exposures as low as reasonably   achievable (ALARA). Accordingly, a decision was made to rely     on a visual inspection of the LPRMs, obtaining the serial number   at the   cold end where practical. This was considered   a reasonable     approach under the circumstances.
TVA special nuclear material (SNM)baseline inventory which was transmitted
The LPRM discovered on August 21, 1991, without a           "hot end" was one of these 18 LPRMs from the Unit 2 SFSP.
to NRC on April 17, 1991.Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201 and as described in the enclosed"Reply to the Notice of Violation," TVA admits this violation.
B. 'Event 2 On September 7, 1991, while conducting a cleanup of the Unit 1 SFSP a LPRM "hot end" was discovered lying on the SFSP           floor.
Enclosure 1 provides TVA's reply to the NOV.Enclosure 2 provides TVA commitments
The LPRM "hot en'd" found during the pool cleanup was positioned under a length of Fuel Pool Cooling system piping in the pool and was partially obscured from view by this pipe. This area of the SFSP had been used to store other "cold end" pieces. During the SNM baseline inventory of the Unit 1 SFSP, a visual inspection was performed of the LPRMs stored in the Unit 1 SFSP. However, this LPRM "hot end" was not observed at this location in the   SFSP.
to ensure an accurate and credible SNM inventory at BFN.If you have any questions regarding this response, please telephone 0.J.Zeringue at (205)729-3675, or me at (615)751-4776.Sincerely, Hark 0.Medford Enclosures
 
cc: See page 2
0 TVA's analysis     of the two events     reflects that the inventory discrepancies can be directly         attributed   to the prior inventory problems which were     addressed     in a comprehensive   plan developed in 1990. (This perspective         is   especially   important   in view of the fact that   TVA has experienced     no   discrepancies   in its new   SNM tracking program   at BFN.)
U.S.Nuclear Regulatory
This comprehensive plan       was   instituted   as a result of the previous enforcement action (EA 89-239).           It was in Phase II of this plan that, the inventory discrepancies         were identiEied.
Commission
: 2. Corrective Actions Taken       and Planned As discussed in the enforcement conference of October 4, 1991, to address previous SHM inventory issues raised in EA 89-239, TVA developed a comprehensive three-phase plan in 1990 to complete non-fuel   SNM storage   activities.
November 27, 1991 cc (Enclosures):
Phase   I of the plan consisted oE performing extensive plant searches and detailed piece counts.           High level radwaste barrels and lead bricks were opened, and       searches   were made in the SFSPs.       The searches of the SFSPs       involved   the use oE robots and video equipment to provide a detailed piece count. In addition, TVA reinventoried previously packaged shipping liners and defined specific SHM storage areas within the SFSPs.
NRC Resident Inspector~Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Route 12, Box 637 Athens, Alabama 35611 Mr.Thierry M.Ross, Project Manager U.S.Nuclear Regulatory
Phases II and III consists oE a cleanup of the SFSPs and disposal of non-fuel SHM stored in the SFSPs. The cleanup efEorts provided TVA with a validation of the SFSP inventory and facilitated maintenance of the inventory. The ef Eor ts include processing approximately 300 non-SNM.items stored in tho SFSPs.             These items include: boxes, brushes,   cold   end material,     and miscellaneous   fuel assembly parts.
Commission
In the cover letter to the NOV the Staff requested that BFN "reconfirm" seven speciEic commitments (including schedule) that it states were made during the October 4, 1991 enforcement conference.
One Mhite Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 Mr.B.A.Wilson, Project Chief U.S.Nuclear Regulatory
TVA'ddresses below each         oE these matters.
Commission
        "The Plant Manager will be responsible Eor site             activities associated with the SFSPs."
Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323  
BFH has enhanced   management oversight by reiterating the Plant Manager's   responsibility for material stored in the SFSPs. This was communicated     to the Plant Operations Manager on November 1, 1991, and subsequently       included in Operations'ight orders.
ENCLOSURE 1 Tennessee Valley Authority Browns.Ferry
The applicable reEueling operations procedure will be revised to clarify the Plant Manager's responsibility for the SFSPs. This revision   will be   completed by December 23, 1991.
Nuclear Plant (BFN)Reply to Notice of Violation (NOV)(Enforcement
 
Action 91-120)Inspection
e "Mhen cleanup   is complete, the SFSPs will serve only as storage for spent LPRMs, and the LPRMs will be stored
Report Number 50-259, 260, 296/91-33 NRC STATEMENT OF VIOLATION"During the Nuclear Regulatory
                                                              'emporary in a   manner that assures proper identification and accountability."
Commission (NRC)inspection
The applicable refueling operations procedure will be revised to identify the   SFSPs as a temporary storage location for spent LPRMs and non-essential components.       This proceduxe will also be revised to provide for recommendations from Operations to the plant manager for disposal of unusable non-fuel SHM and non-essential components in the SFSPs. This xevision will be completed by Decembex 23, 1991. In addition, the applicable maintenance instruction is being revised to address proper storage of LPRMS which will assist in assuring proper identification and accountability. This revision will be completed by December 16, 1991.
conducted on September 3 through 6, 1991, a violation of HRC requirements
  "Cutting   and packaging operations of spent LPRMs for disposal will be   performed only at a time just prior to offsite shipment to an offsite burial facility."
was identified.
The applicable radwasto spent fuel pool clean-out procedure is being revised to direct the cutting and packaging requirements.
In accordance
Specifically, LPRMs will be stored in the SFSPs in a full-length condition until just prior to the time of shipment to an offsite disposal   facility.
with the"General Statement of Policy and Procedure for HRC Enforcement
  "All currently     known non-fuel SNM items and non-essential components   will be removed from all spent fuel pools, and [TVA]
Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1991), the violation is listed below: 10 CFR 70.51(d)requires, in part, that each licensee who is authorized
will refrain   from using the spent fuel pools to store these items during future operations."
to possess at any one time and location special nuclear material (SNH)in a quantity totaling more than 350 grams of contained uranium-'235
Known   non-fuel SNM items have been removed from the SFSPs and shipped offsite for disposal. Known non-essential components are being readied for disposal. As stated above, procedures will be revised to ensure that SFSPs are used only for temporary storage.
shall conduct a physical inventory of all SNH in his possession
Additionally,     some non-essential components (e.g., control rod blades, filters,'tellite rollers from the control xod blades, small items xetrieved duxing the vacuuming px'ocess, Unit 3 vibration strings) must remain in temporary storage until equipment is available to process these items. These items will be processed and shipped for disposal duxing Phase       III as required by our disposal action plan of 1990. However, the disposal of the stellite rollers is pending evaluation to
under license at intervals not to exceed twelve months.Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to perform an adequate physical inventory in 1990.Specifically, the February and March 1990 physical inventory failed to include an item containing
 
SNM, which was identified
determine   if the activity oE the rollers is low enough to allow disposal at an offsite burial facility. If the activity is not low enough, the rollers will have to remain in the SFSPs until such time as the activity has decreased sufficently to allow shipment. TVA expects the non-essential components, excluding the stellite rollers, to be removed from the SFSPs by June 1, 1992.
in the spent fuel pool on September 7, 1991." This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement
"[TVA] will vacuum clean sludges and other debris Erom all spent fuel pools and video-tape all items remaining in the pools after clean up is complete."
III).TVA'S REPLY TVA admits that the results of its physical inventory of SNM conducted in 1991 at BFN were in error.1.Reason for the Violation As stated during the October 4, 1991 enforcement
Accessible floor areas of the SFSPs are being vacuumed, and accessible floor areas and fuel storage areas are being videotaped to ensure thoroughness of the searches in the SFSPs for non-Euel SNM. If previously unaccounted for non-fuel SNM items are identified, they will be promptly included on BFH's inventory List and prepared for disposal in accordance with Phase   III of BFN'omprehensive plans. Those discrepancie will be reported to NRC, as appropriate. Vacuuming will be completed by January 9, 1992. Final videotaping will be performed after the non-essential components, discussed above, are removed from the SFSPs. TVA expects the final videotaping to be completed by   July 1, 1992.
conference, the two inventory discrepancies
"[TVA] will establish and report to     HRC, an accurate and credible baseline inventory of all SNM on     site ([TVA] indicated that this item would be completed by October 26, 1991)."
which are the subject of this violation resulted from the use of engineering
TVA   believes it will have a credible vacuuming and videotaping of the baseline  SNM inventory are completed.
judgments during TVA's efforts to confirm the SNH baseline inventory at BFN.  
when the                                      SFSPs Vacuuming difEiculties (e.g., vacuum cleaner breakdowns, and vacuuming under 40 feet of water) have extended the October 26, 1991 completion date that was previously scheduled in the
0  
.plan-of-the-day report provided during the enforcement conference. It should be noted that the fuel racks were not disassembled or   moved due to the difficulty of moving the spent fuel stored in   the SFSP.
BFN considers that the judgments utilized were reasonable.
"[TVA] will have an independent organization from outside the Tenne soe Valley Authority evaluate the entire SNM control and accounting program at the Browns Ferry Plant."
However, in hindsight certain of these judgments proved faulty and=resulted in the misidentification
As a continuing corrective action and to provide further assurance of our programmatic control of SHM, TVA will provide for an independent evaluation oE SHM control and accounting by an outside organization. TVA expects thi evaluation to be completed by July 1, 1992. If a change occurs to this schedule, TVA will notify the StaEE.
of two non-fuel SNM items.Consequently, TVA inaccurately
: 3. Date When Full Co lienee will be Achieved TVA considers that full compliance will be achieved when procedure revisions are complete, SFSPs are vacuumed and videotaped, and the independent evaluation is .completed. TVA expects these actions to be completed by July 1, 1992. Should TVA discover any discrepancies as a result of the independent evaluation, TVA will report such discrepancies as appropriate.
cataloged these items in its current inventory records.A discussion
PLLIC207/42
of the two events resulting in the inventory discrepancies
 
is set forth below: A.Event 1 On August 21, 1991, a local-power
~ ~ ~ ~
range monitor (LPRM)without a"hot end" (detector assemblies)
ENCLOSURE 2 Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Commitments from Enclosure 1
was discovered.
: 1. Revise refueling operations procedure to address plant manager' responsibility for the spent fuel storage pools (SFSPs). This revision will be completed by December 23, 1991.
The LPRM was previously
: 2. Revise refueling operations procedure to provide for recommendations from operations to the plant manager for the disposal of unusable non-fuel special nuclear material (SNM)/non-essential components in SFSP and a step which states the SFSP is only a temporary storage area for non-fuel SNM/non-essential components. This revision will be completed by December 23, 1991.
identified
: 3. Complete vacuuming of SFSPs. Vacuuming will be completed by January 9, 1992.
in the SNM baseline inventory as containing
: 4. Videotape SFSPs to ensure no non-fuel SNM is stored in SFSP.
a"hot end." Mhen the SNM baseline inventory of the Unit 2 spent fuel storage pool (SFSP)was conducted, 18 full length LPRMs stored in the SFSP wore found severely entangled.
Videotaping will be completed by July 1, 1992.
The engineer performing
: 5. TVA will provide for an independent   evaluation of SNM control and accounting by an outside organization. TVA expects this evaluation to be completed by July 1, 1992.
the inventory in the SFSP concluded that these 18 LPRMs could not be individually
: 6. Maintenance Instruction   i   being revised to address proper torage of LPRM which will assure proper identification and accountability.
separated without violating the instructions
This revision will be completed by December 16, 1991.
provided in the maintenance
: 7. Radwaste procedure   is being revised to address cutting and packaging requirements for LPRM storage. This revision will be completed by December 16, 1991.
request (MR)which was specifically
: 8. Dispose of non-essential components    in SFSP. Disposal of non-essential components, excluding    stellite rollers, will be completed by June 1, 1992.
initiated to perform the inventory.
 
These instructions
0}}
required the LPRMs to be maintained
at least five feet under the surface of the SFSP at all times, to ensure prop'er shielding and for maintaining
radiation exposures as low as reasonably
achievable (ALARA).Accordingly, a decision was made to rely on a visual inspection
of the LPRMs, obtaining the serial number at the cold end where practical.
This was considered
a reasonable
approach under the circumstances.
The LPRM discovered
on August 21, 1991, without a"hot end" was one of these 18 LPRMs from the Unit 2 SFSP.B.'Event 2 On September 7, 1991, while conducting
a cleanup of the Unit 1 SFSP a LPRM"hot end" was discovered
lying on the SFSP floor.The LPRM"hot en'd" found during the pool cleanup was positioned
under a length of Fuel Pool Cooling system piping in the pool and was partially obscured from view by this pipe.This area of the SFSP had been used to store other"cold end" pieces.During the SNM baseline inventory of the Unit 1 SFSP, a visual inspection
was performed of the LPRMs stored in the Unit 1 SFSP.However, this LPRM"hot end" was not observed at this location in the SFSP.  
0  
TVA's analysis of the two events reflects that the inventory discrepancies
can be directly attributed
to the prior inventory problems which were addressed in a comprehensive
plan developed in 1990.(This perspective
is especially
important in view of the fact that TVA has experienced
no discrepancies
in its new SNM tracking program at BFN.)This comprehensive
plan was instituted
as a result of the previous enforcement
action (EA 89-239).It was in Phase II of this plan that, the inventory discrepancies
were identiEied.
2.Corrective
Actions Taken and Planned As discussed in the enforcement
conference
of October 4, 1991, to address previous SHM inventory issues raised in EA 89-239, TVA developed a comprehensive
three-phase
plan in 1990 to complete non-fuel SNM storage activities.
Phase I of the plan consisted oE performing
extensive plant searches and detailed piece counts.High level radwaste barrels and lead bricks were opened, and searches were made in the SFSPs.The searches of the SFSPs involved the use oE robots and video equipment to provide a detailed piece count.In addition, TVA reinventoried
previously
packaged shipping liners and defined specific SHM storage areas within the SFSPs.Phases II and III consists oE a cleanup of the SFSPs and disposal of non-fuel SHM stored in the SFSPs.The cleanup efEorts provided TVA with a validation
of the SFSP inventory and facilitated
maintenance
of the inventory.
The ef Eor ts include processing
approximately
300 non-SNM.items
stored in tho SFSPs.These items include: boxes, brushes, cold end material, and miscellaneous
fuel assembly parts.In the cover letter to the NOV the Staff requested that BFN"reconfirm" seven speciEic commitments (including
schedule)that it states were made during the October 4, 1991 enforcement
conference.
TVA'ddresses
below each oE these matters."The Plant Manager will be responsible
Eor site activities
associated
with the SFSPs." BFH has enhanced management
oversight by reiterating
the Plant Manager's responsibility
for material stored in the SFSPs.This was communicated
to the Plant Operations
Manager on November 1, 1991, and subsequently
included in Operations'ight
orders.The applicable
reEueling operations
procedure will be revised to clarify the Plant Manager's responsibility
for the SFSPs.This revision will be completed by December 23, 1991.  
e"Mhen cleanup is complete, the SFSPs will serve only as'emporary storage for spent LPRMs, and the LPRMs will be stored in a manner that assures proper identification
and accountability." The applicable
refueling operations
procedure will be revised to identify the SFSPs as a temporary storage location for spent LPRMs and non-essential
components.
This proceduxe will also be revised to provide for recommendations
from Operations
to the plant manager for disposal of unusable non-fuel SHM and non-essential
components
in the SFSPs.This xevision will be completed by Decembex 23, 1991.In addition, the applicable
maintenance
instruction
is being revised to address proper storage of LPRMS which will assist in assuring proper identification
and accountability.
This revision will be completed by December 16, 1991."Cutting and packaging operations
of spent LPRMs for disposal will be performed only at a time just prior to offsite shipment to an offsite burial facility." The applicable
radwasto spent fuel pool clean-out procedure is being revised to direct the cutting and packaging requirements.
Specifically, LPRMs will be stored in the SFSPs in a full-length
condition until just prior to the time of shipment to an offsite disposal facility."All currently known non-fuel SNM items and non-essential
components
will be removed from all spent fuel pools, and[TVA]will refrain from using the spent fuel pools to store these items during future operations." Known non-fuel SNM items have been removed from the SFSPs and shipped offsite for disposal.Known non-essential
components
are being readied for disposal.As stated above, procedures
will be revised to ensure that SFSPs are used only for temporary storage.Additionally, some non-essential
components (e.g., control rod blades, filters,'tellite
rollers from the control xod blades, small items xetrieved duxing the vacuuming px'ocess, Unit 3 vibration strings)must remain in temporary storage until equipment is available to process these items.These items will be processed and shipped for disposal duxing Phase III as required by our disposal action plan of 1990.However, the disposal of the stellite rollers is pending evaluation
to
determine if the activity oE the rollers is low enough to allow disposal at an offsite burial facility.If the activity is not low enough, the rollers will have to remain in the SFSPs until such time as the activity has decreased sufficently
to allow shipment.TVA expects the non-essential
components, excluding the stellite rollers, to be removed from the SFSPs by June 1, 1992."[TVA]will vacuum clean sludges and other debris Erom all spent fuel pools and video-tape
all items remaining in the pools after clean up is complete." Accessible
floor areas of the SFSPs are being vacuumed, and accessible
floor areas and fuel storage areas are being videotaped
to ensure thoroughness
of the searches in the SFSPs for non-Euel SNM.If previously
unaccounted
for non-fuel SNM items are identified, they will be promptly included on BFH's inventory List and prepared for disposal in accordance
with Phase III of BFN'omprehensive
plans.Those discrepancie
will be reported to NRC, as appropriate.
Vacuuming will be completed by January 9, 1992.Final videotaping
will be performed after the non-essential
components, discussed above, are removed from the SFSPs.TVA expects the final videotaping
to be completed by July 1, 1992."[TVA]will establish and report to HRC, an accurate and credible baseline inventory of all SNM on site ([TVA]indicated that this item would be completed by October 26, 1991)." TVA believes it will have a credible baseline SNM inventory when the vacuuming and videotaping
of the SFSPs are completed.
Vacuuming dif Eiculties (e.g., vacuum cleaner breakdowns, and vacuuming under 40 feet of water)have extended the October 26, 1991 completion
date that was previously
scheduled in the.plan-of-the-day
report provided during the enforcement
conference.
It should be noted that the fuel racks were not disassembled
or moved due to the difficulty
of moving the spent fuel stored in the SFSP."[TVA]will have an independent
organization
from outside the Tenne soe Valley Authority evaluate the entire SNM control and accounting
program at the Browns Ferry Plant." As a continuing
corrective
action and to provide further assurance of our programmatic
control of SHM, TVA will provide for an independent
evaluation
oE SHM control and accounting
by an outside organization.
TVA expects thi evaluation
to be completed by July 1, 1992.If a change occurs to this schedule, TVA will notify the StaEE.  
3.Date When Full Co lienee will be Achieved TVA considers that full compliance
will be achieved when procedure revisions are complete, SFSPs are vacuumed and videotaped, and the independent
evaluation
is.completed.
TVA expects these actions to be completed by July 1, 1992.Should TVA discover any discrepancies
as a result of the independent
evaluation, TVA will report such discrepancies
as appropriate.
PLLIC207/42  
~~~~ENCLOSURE 2 Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Commitments
from Enclosure 1 1.Revise refueling operations
procedure to address plant manager'responsibility
for the spent fuel storage pools (SFSPs).This revision will be completed by December 23, 1991.2.Revise refueling operations
procedure to provide for recommendations
from operations
to the plant manager for the disposal of unusable non-fuel special nuclear material (SNM)/non-essential
components
in SFSP and a step which states the SFSP is only a temporary storage area for non-fuel SNM/non-essential
components.
This revision will be completed by December 23, 1991.3.Complete vacuuming of SFSPs.Vacuuming will be completed by January 9, 1992.4.Videotape SFSPs to ensure no non-fuel SNM is stored in SFSP.Videotaping
will be completed by July 1, 1992.5.TVA will provide for an independent
evaluation
of SNM control and accounting
by an outside organization.
TVA expects this evaluation
to be completed by July 1, 1992.6.Maintenance
Instruction
i being revised to address proper torage of LPRM which will assure proper identification
and accountability.
This revision will be completed by December 16, 1991.7.Radwaste procedure is being revised to address cutting and packaging requirements
for LPRM storage.This revision will be completed by December 16, 1991.8.Dispose of non-essential
components
in SFSP.Disposal of non-essential
components, excluding stellite rollers, will be completed by June 1, 1992.
0
}}

Latest revision as of 00:04, 16 November 2019

Responds to 911029 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/91-33,50-260/91-33 & 50-296/91-33 & Enforcement Action 91-120.Corrective Actions:Credible Baseline Inventory of All SNM on Site Will Be Reported to NRC
ML18036A453
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 11/27/1991
From: Medford M
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
EA-91-120, NUDOCS 9112020273
Download: ML18036A453 (14)


Text

ACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DXSTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

CESSION NBR:9112020273 DOC.DATE: 91/11/27 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-259 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Tennessee 05000259 50-260 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Tennessee 05000260 50-296 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3, Tennessee 05000296 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MEDFORD,M.O. Tennessee Valley Authority RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)

SUBJECT:

Responds to 911029 ltr re violations noted in Insp Repts 50-259/91-33, 50-260/91-33 & 50-296/91-33 & Enforcement D Action 91-120.Corrective actions:credible baseline inventory of all SNM on site will be reported to NRC.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IEOID COPIES RECEIVED:LTR TITLE: General (50 Dkt)-Insp Rept/Notice of Vio 4 ation ENCL 3 SIZE:

Response

A NOTES:

D RECIPIENT COPIES 'ECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL HEBDON,F 1 1 ROSS,T. 1 1 WILLIAMS,J. 1 t

1.

INTERNAL: ACRS 2 2 AEOD 1 1 AEOD/DEIIB 1 1 AEOD/DS P/TPAB 1 1 DEDRO 1 1 NRR HARBUCK,C. 1 1 NRR MORISSEAUiD 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFBPT 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/PEPB9H 1 1 NRR/DST/DIR SE2 1 1 NRR/PMAS/ILRB12 1 1 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT 1 1 05-D.- 1 1 OGC/HDS3 1 1 G~- 02 1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL EG&G/BRYCE 1 J H ~ 1 1 NRC PDR 1 + 1 NSIC 1 1 D

'S

.A D

D NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! COiVA ACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOii'I Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIIIINATEYOUR NAb, IE FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

TAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUXRED: LTTR 25 ENCL 25

0 Tennessee Valley Authority, 1101 Market Street, Chattanooga. Tennessee 37402 Mark O. Medford Vice President, Nuclear Assurance, Licensing and Fuels November 27, 1991 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Mashington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

In the Hatter of Docket Nos. 50-259 Tennessee Valley Authority 50-260 50-296 BROGANS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-259, 260, 296/91-33 REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NOV) (ENFORCEMENT ACTION 91-120)

This letter provides TVA's reply to S. D. Ebneter's letter to D. A, Nauman dated October 29, 1991, which transmitted the subject NOV involving the inaccurate TVA special nuclear material (SNM) baseline inventory which was transmitted to NRC on April 17, 1991.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201 and as described in the enclosed "Reply to the Notice of Violation," TVA admits this violation. provides TVA's reply to the NOV. Enclosure 2 provides TVA commitments to ensure an accurate and credible SNM inventory at BFN.

If you have any questions regarding this response, please telephone

0. J. Zeringue at (205) 729-3675, or me at (615) 751-4776.

Sincerely, Hark 0. Medford Enclosures cc: See page 2

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission November 27, 1991 cc (Enclosures):

NRC Resident Inspector

~

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Route 12, Box 637 Athens, Alabama 35611 Mr. Thierry M. Ross, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One Mhite Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 Mr. B. A. Wilson, Project Chief U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323

ENCLOSURE 1 Tennessee Valley Authority Browns.Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN)

Reply to Notice of Violation (NOV)

(Enforcement Action 91-120)

Inspection Report Number 50-259, 260, 296/91-33 NRC STATEMENT OF VIOLATION "During the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted on September 3 through 6, 1991, a violation of HRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for HRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1991), the violation is listed below:

10 CFR 70.51(d) requires, in part, that each licensee who is authorized to possess at any one time and location special nuclear material (SNH) in a quantity totaling more than 350 grams of contained uranium-'235 shall conduct a physical inventory of all SNH in his possession under license at intervals not to exceed twelve months.

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to perform an adequate physical inventory in 1990. Specifically, the February and March 1990 physical inventory failed to include an item containing SNM, which was identified in the spent fuel pool on September 7, 1991."

This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement III).

TVA'S REPLY TVA admits that the results of its physical inventory of SNM conducted in 1991 at BFN were in error.

1. Reason for the Violation As stated during the October 4, 1991 enforcement conference, the two inventory discrepancies which are the subject of this violation resulted from the use of engineering judgments during TVA's efforts to confirm the SNH baseline inventory at BFN.

0 BFN considers that the judgments utilized were reasonable. However, in hindsight certain of these judgments proved faulty and =resulted in the misidentification of two non-fuel SNM items. Consequently, TVA inaccurately cataloged these items in its current inventory records.

A discussion of the two events resulting in the inventory discrepancies is set forth below:

A. Event 1 On August 21, 1991, a local-power range monitor (LPRM) without a "hot end" (detector assemblies) was discovered. The LPRM was previously identified in the SNM baseline inventory as containing a "hot end."

Mhen the SNM baseline inventory of the Unit 2 spent fuel storage pool (SFSP) was conducted, 18 full length LPRMs stored in the SFSP wore found severely entangled. The engineer performing the inventory in the SFSP concluded that these 18 LPRMs could not be individually separated without violating the instructions provided in the maintenance request (MR) which was specifically initiated to perform the inventory.

These instructions required the LPRMs to be maintained at least five feet under the surface of the SFSP at all times, to ensure prop'er shielding and for maintaining radiation exposures as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). Accordingly, a decision was made to rely on a visual inspection of the LPRMs, obtaining the serial number at the cold end where practical. This was considered a reasonable approach under the circumstances.

The LPRM discovered on August 21, 1991, without a "hot end" was one of these 18 LPRMs from the Unit 2 SFSP.

B. 'Event 2 On September 7, 1991, while conducting a cleanup of the Unit 1 SFSP a LPRM "hot end" was discovered lying on the SFSP floor.

The LPRM "hot en'd" found during the pool cleanup was positioned under a length of Fuel Pool Cooling system piping in the pool and was partially obscured from view by this pipe. This area of the SFSP had been used to store other "cold end" pieces. During the SNM baseline inventory of the Unit 1 SFSP, a visual inspection was performed of the LPRMs stored in the Unit 1 SFSP. However, this LPRM "hot end" was not observed at this location in the SFSP.

0 TVA's analysis of the two events reflects that the inventory discrepancies can be directly attributed to the prior inventory problems which were addressed in a comprehensive plan developed in 1990. (This perspective is especially important in view of the fact that TVA has experienced no discrepancies in its new SNM tracking program at BFN.)

This comprehensive plan was instituted as a result of the previous enforcement action (EA 89-239). It was in Phase II of this plan that, the inventory discrepancies were identiEied.

2. Corrective Actions Taken and Planned As discussed in the enforcement conference of October 4, 1991, to address previous SHM inventory issues raised in EA 89-239, TVA developed a comprehensive three-phase plan in 1990 to complete non-fuel SNM storage activities.

Phase I of the plan consisted oE performing extensive plant searches and detailed piece counts. High level radwaste barrels and lead bricks were opened, and searches were made in the SFSPs. The searches of the SFSPs involved the use oE robots and video equipment to provide a detailed piece count. In addition, TVA reinventoried previously packaged shipping liners and defined specific SHM storage areas within the SFSPs.

Phases II and III consists oE a cleanup of the SFSPs and disposal of non-fuel SHM stored in the SFSPs. The cleanup efEorts provided TVA with a validation of the SFSP inventory and facilitated maintenance of the inventory. The ef Eor ts include processing approximately 300 non-SNM.items stored in tho SFSPs. These items include: boxes, brushes, cold end material, and miscellaneous fuel assembly parts.

In the cover letter to the NOV the Staff requested that BFN "reconfirm" seven speciEic commitments (including schedule) that it states were made during the October 4, 1991 enforcement conference.

TVA'ddresses below each oE these matters.

"The Plant Manager will be responsible Eor site activities associated with the SFSPs."

BFH has enhanced management oversight by reiterating the Plant Manager's responsibility for material stored in the SFSPs. This was communicated to the Plant Operations Manager on November 1, 1991, and subsequently included in Operations'ight orders.

The applicable reEueling operations procedure will be revised to clarify the Plant Manager's responsibility for the SFSPs. This revision will be completed by December 23, 1991.

e "Mhen cleanup is complete, the SFSPs will serve only as storage for spent LPRMs, and the LPRMs will be stored

'emporary in a manner that assures proper identification and accountability."

The applicable refueling operations procedure will be revised to identify the SFSPs as a temporary storage location for spent LPRMs and non-essential components. This proceduxe will also be revised to provide for recommendations from Operations to the plant manager for disposal of unusable non-fuel SHM and non-essential components in the SFSPs. This xevision will be completed by Decembex 23, 1991. In addition, the applicable maintenance instruction is being revised to address proper storage of LPRMS which will assist in assuring proper identification and accountability. This revision will be completed by December 16, 1991.

"Cutting and packaging operations of spent LPRMs for disposal will be performed only at a time just prior to offsite shipment to an offsite burial facility."

The applicable radwasto spent fuel pool clean-out procedure is being revised to direct the cutting and packaging requirements.

Specifically, LPRMs will be stored in the SFSPs in a full-length condition until just prior to the time of shipment to an offsite disposal facility.

"All currently known non-fuel SNM items and non-essential components will be removed from all spent fuel pools, and [TVA]

will refrain from using the spent fuel pools to store these items during future operations."

Known non-fuel SNM items have been removed from the SFSPs and shipped offsite for disposal. Known non-essential components are being readied for disposal. As stated above, procedures will be revised to ensure that SFSPs are used only for temporary storage.

Additionally, some non-essential components (e.g., control rod blades, filters,'tellite rollers from the control xod blades, small items xetrieved duxing the vacuuming px'ocess, Unit 3 vibration strings) must remain in temporary storage until equipment is available to process these items. These items will be processed and shipped for disposal duxing Phase III as required by our disposal action plan of 1990. However, the disposal of the stellite rollers is pending evaluation to

determine if the activity oE the rollers is low enough to allow disposal at an offsite burial facility. If the activity is not low enough, the rollers will have to remain in the SFSPs until such time as the activity has decreased sufficently to allow shipment. TVA expects the non-essential components, excluding the stellite rollers, to be removed from the SFSPs by June 1, 1992.

"[TVA] will vacuum clean sludges and other debris Erom all spent fuel pools and video-tape all items remaining in the pools after clean up is complete."

Accessible floor areas of the SFSPs are being vacuumed, and accessible floor areas and fuel storage areas are being videotaped to ensure thoroughness of the searches in the SFSPs for non-Euel SNM. If previously unaccounted for non-fuel SNM items are identified, they will be promptly included on BFH's inventory List and prepared for disposal in accordance with Phase III of BFN'omprehensive plans. Those discrepancie will be reported to NRC, as appropriate. Vacuuming will be completed by January 9, 1992. Final videotaping will be performed after the non-essential components, discussed above, are removed from the SFSPs. TVA expects the final videotaping to be completed by July 1, 1992.

"[TVA] will establish and report to HRC, an accurate and credible baseline inventory of all SNM on site ([TVA] indicated that this item would be completed by October 26, 1991)."

TVA believes it will have a credible vacuuming and videotaping of the baseline SNM inventory are completed.

when the SFSPs Vacuuming difEiculties (e.g., vacuum cleaner breakdowns, and vacuuming under 40 feet of water) have extended the October 26, 1991 completion date that was previously scheduled in the

.plan-of-the-day report provided during the enforcement conference. It should be noted that the fuel racks were not disassembled or moved due to the difficulty of moving the spent fuel stored in the SFSP.

"[TVA] will have an independent organization from outside the Tenne soe Valley Authority evaluate the entire SNM control and accounting program at the Browns Ferry Plant."

As a continuing corrective action and to provide further assurance of our programmatic control of SHM, TVA will provide for an independent evaluation oE SHM control and accounting by an outside organization. TVA expects thi evaluation to be completed by July 1, 1992. If a change occurs to this schedule, TVA will notify the StaEE.

3. Date When Full Co lienee will be Achieved TVA considers that full compliance will be achieved when procedure revisions are complete, SFSPs are vacuumed and videotaped, and the independent evaluation is .completed. TVA expects these actions to be completed by July 1, 1992. Should TVA discover any discrepancies as a result of the independent evaluation, TVA will report such discrepancies as appropriate.

PLLIC207/42

~ ~ ~ ~

ENCLOSURE 2 Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Commitments from Enclosure 1

1. Revise refueling operations procedure to address plant manager' responsibility for the spent fuel storage pools (SFSPs). This revision will be completed by December 23, 1991.
2. Revise refueling operations procedure to provide for recommendations from operations to the plant manager for the disposal of unusable non-fuel special nuclear material (SNM)/non-essential components in SFSP and a step which states the SFSP is only a temporary storage area for non-fuel SNM/non-essential components. This revision will be completed by December 23, 1991.
3. Complete vacuuming of SFSPs. Vacuuming will be completed by January 9, 1992.
4. Videotape SFSPs to ensure no non-fuel SNM is stored in SFSP.

Videotaping will be completed by July 1, 1992.

5. TVA will provide for an independent evaluation of SNM control and accounting by an outside organization. TVA expects this evaluation to be completed by July 1, 1992.
6. Maintenance Instruction i being revised to address proper torage of LPRM which will assure proper identification and accountability.

This revision will be completed by December 16, 1991.

7. Radwaste procedure is being revised to address cutting and packaging requirements for LPRM storage. This revision will be completed by December 16, 1991.
8. Dispose of non-essential components in SFSP. Disposal of non-essential components, excluding stellite rollers, will be completed by June 1, 1992.

0