Information Notice 1990-69, Adequacy of Emergency and Essential Lighting: Difference between revisions

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| issue date = 10/31/1990
| issue date = 10/31/1990
| title = Adequacy of Emergency and Essential Lighting
| title = Adequacy of Emergency and Essential Lighting
| author name = Rossi C E
| author name = Rossi C
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
Line 14: Line 14:
| page count = 10
| page count = 10
}}
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES


COMMISSION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION===
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 October 31, 1990 NRC INFORMATION


NOTICE NO. 90-69: ADEQUACY OF EMERGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 October 31, 1990
 
  NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 90-69:   ADEQUACY OF EMERGENCY AND ESSENTIAL LIGHTING
AND ESSENTIAL
 
LIGHTING


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
:
:
All holders of operating
  All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
 
licenses or construction


permits for nuclear power reactors.
reactors.


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
: This information
:
  This information notice is intended to alert addressees to a possible problem


notice is intended to alert addressees
concerning the adequacy of emergency and essential lighting at commercial power


to a possible problem concerning
reactor facilities. It is expected that recipients will review the information


the adequacy of emergency
for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to


and essential
avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information


lighting at commercial
notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or


power reactor facilities.
written response is required.                               i


It is expected that recipients
==Description of Circumstances==
:
  On March 3, 1989, Unit 3 at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station experi- enced a reactor/turbine trip, main steam isolation, containment isolation, and


will review the information
safety injection as a result of a grid-induced load rejection event. This


for applicability
event included three significant system failures: (1) half of the steam bypass


to their facilities
control system malfunctioned; (2) the atmospheric dump valves (ADYs) failed to


and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
operate from the control room and the remote shutdown panel; and (3) the


However, suggestions
emergency lighting in the main steam support structure (MSSS) failed, hampering


contained
the operators in their attempt to cope with the ADY failures. Being unable to


in this information
maintain pressure control on the secondary side by operating the ADVs from the


notice do not constitute
control room or the remote shutdown panel, plant personnel attempted to establish


NRC requirements;
local (manual) control of the ADYs in the MSSS. When operators first entered
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.


i Description
the MSSS, they found no direct lighting. Normal lighting was lost due to the


of Circumstances:
loss of power to the non-Class 1E electrical busses in the plant. The emergency
On March 3, 1989, Unit 3 at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating


Station experi-enced a reactor/turbine
lighting was not properly positioned in the north MSSS room (containing the


trip, main steam isolation, containment
ADVs for the No. 1 steam generator) to provide adequate lighting for the


isolation, and safety injection
operators to perform their required activities and was not functioning at all


as a result of a grid-induced
in the south MSSS room (containing ADVs for the No. 2 steam generator).


load rejection
Because of a burned-out light bulb, plant personnel could not restore essential


event. This event included three significant
lighting (from Class 1E power sources) in the south MSSS room.


system failures:
"C-
(1) half of the steam bypass control system malfunctioned;
( 01200543
(2) the atmospheric


dump valves (ADYs) failed to operate from the control room and the remote shutdown panel; and (3) the emergency
IN 90-69 October 31, 1990 During the NRC inspection (50-530/89-13) conducted by an augmented inspection


lighting in the main steam support structure (MSSS) failed, hampering the operators
team (AIT) sent to examine the event at Palo Verde, the staff found deficien- cies in the licensee's maintenance and testing of emergency and essential


in their attempt to cope with the ADY failures.
lighting. The team discovered that plant personnel had waived the quarterly


Being unable to maintain pressure control on the secondary
preventive maintenance (PM) tasks on the MSSS emergency and essential lights


side by operating
for five consecutive quarters. By grouping the lights in the MSSS with the


the ADVs from the control room or the remote shutdown panel, plant personnel
lights in the containment building, which were inaccessible during power


attempted
operations, the PM tasks were waived for the MSSS lights during each of these


to establish local (manual) control of the ADYs in the MSSS. When operators
periods along with the containment lights. NRC inspections further revealed


first entered the MSSS, they found no direct lighting.
that the licensee, prior to the performance of the 8-hour lighting unit dis- charge test, performed preventive maintenance (i.e., battery replacement, addition of electrolyte, cleaning of battery terminals, and battery charging)
on the lighting unit battery. This preventive maintenance practice resulted


Normal lighting was lost due to the loss of power to the non-Class
in not verifying the performance of the 8-hour emergency lighting units in the


1E electrical
Was found" condition. The inspections also revealed that the licensee had


busses in the plant. The emergency lighting was not properly positioned
failed to implement the relevant portions of its quality assurance program for


in the north MSSS room (containing
emergency lighting. Because of these failures, the emergency lighting was not


the ADVs for the No. 1 steam generator)
properly tested, and deficiencies were not properly corrected.
to provide adequate lighting for the operators


to perform their required activities
After the event, plant personnel reconstructed the design bases of the


and was not functioning
lighting system and conducted walkdown inspections of the emergency and essen- tial lighting in the plant. In some instances, the licensee found the lighting


at all in the south MSSS room (containing
to be inadequate to perform the required tasks because the original design did


ADVs for the No. 2 steam generator).
not require emergency lights or because the emergency lights provided inade- quate illumination. In addition, the licensee identified many areas that


Because of a burned-out
required the installation of or modification to lighting to meet the licensee's


light bulb, plant personnel
design bases and the requirements in 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R.


could not restore essential lighting (from Class 1E power sources) in the south MSSS room."C-( 01200543 IN 90-69 October 31, 1990 During the NRC inspection
Background:
At Palo Verde, the essential lighting system is an integral part of the normal


(50-530/89-13)
lighting system that provides illumination if the normal lighting system fails.
conducted


by an augmented
The essential lighting system is rated non-Class lE but is powered from


inspection
Class lE sources. The system provides lighting in the control room, in the


team (AIT) sent to examine the event at Palo Verde, the staff found deficien-cies in the licensee's
shutdown panel area, in the main walkways and stairs, in the Class lE switchgear


maintenance
rooms, in areas having Class lE equipment, and in areas used for the safe


and testing of emergency
shutdown of the reactor. Upon loss of the normal lighting system, the essential


and essential lighting.
lighting system provides adequate illumination for the safe shutdown of the


The team discovered
reactor. The system receives power from two redundant and independent Class 1E


that plant personnel
ac busses. Each redundant Class 1E ac bus supplies power to 50 percent of the


had waived the quarterly preventive
essential lighting in the vital areas. The diesel generators provide backup


maintenance (PM) tasks on the MSSS emergency
power.


and essential
IN 90-69 October 31, 1990 The emergency lighting system receives dc power from two redundant Class lE


lights for five consecutive
batteries through inverters and provides illumination for the control room, the auxiliary electrical equipment rooms, the stairways, and the points leading


quarters.
to plant exits. The system is normally deenergized and is automatically


By grouping the lights in the MSSS with the lights in the containment
energized upon loss of ac power to the normal system. The emergency lighting


building, which were inaccessible
system is also composed of 8-hour and li-hour (individually battery-powered)
emergency lighting units. The 8-hour emergency lighting units are designed to


during power operations, the PM tasks were waived for the MSSS lights during each of these periods along with the containment
meet the technical requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.J which


lights. NRC inspections
requires that emergency lighting units with at least an 8-hour battery power


further revealed that the licensee, prior to the performance
supply be provided in all areas needed for operation of safe shutdown equipment


of the 8-hour lighting unit dis-charge test, performed
and in access and egress routes thereto. The li-hour emergency lighting units


preventive
are installed to meet the requirements of the Life Safety Code. These lighting


maintenance (i.e., battery replacement, addition of electrolyte, cleaning of battery terminals, and battery charging)on the lighting unit battery. This preventive
units are generally installed in plant locations to accommodate the safe


maintenance
evacuation of personnel in the event of a fire in such areas.


practice resulted in not verifying
Discussion:
During the Palo Verde event, the inadequate lighting conditions significantly


the performance
complicated the licensee's efforts to cope with the initial failure of the


of the 8-hour emergency
ADVs, which delayed the commencement of the controlled removal of decay heat as


lighting units in the Was found" condition.
called for by the emergency operating procedures.


The inspections
It is important to note that adequate PM and routine testing programs for


also revealed that the licensee had failed to implement
essential and emergency lighting systems are helpful in ensuring adequate


the relevant portions of its quality assurance
illumination for the operation of safe shutdown equipment. Emergency lighting


program for emergency
is a key fire protection feature associated with supporting post-fire safe


lighting.
shutdown operations. The exercise of good engineering design practices that


Because of these failures, the emergency
conform to industry standards ensures the ability of the lighting system to


lighting was not properly tested, and deficiencies
provide adequate station lighting in all vital areas during all types of


were not properly corrected.
accident or transient conditions. The implementation of an effective PM and


After the event, plant personnel
testing program which demonstrates lighting system operability is important.


reconstructed
Emergency lighting PM programs recommended by manufacturers generally include


the design bases of the lighting system and conducted
routine monitoring of the battery condition for each lighting unit, periodic


walkdown inspections
load testing to verify that the lighting unit and its associated charger are


of the emergency
functioning properly, and a periodic "as found" 8-hour lighting unit discharge


and essen-tial lighting in the plant. In some instances, the licensee found the lighting to be inadequate
test. In addition, the Palo Verde event identified that the inadvertent


to perform the required tasks because the original design did not require emergency
repositioning of the emergency lighting fixtures can cause inadequate illumina- tion and that routine verification of emergency lighting fixture orientation


lights or because the emergency
can ensure that emergency lighting is effective.


lights provided inade-quate illumination.
IN 90-69 October 31, 1990 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If


In addition, the licensee identified
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one


many areas that required the installation
of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.


of or modification
Charles E. Rossi,'rectoor


to lighting to meet the licensee's
Division of Operational Events Assessment


design bases and the requirements
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
in 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R.Background:
At Palo Verde, the essential
 
lighting system is an integral part of the normal lighting system that provides illumination
 
if the normal lighting system fails.The essential
 
lighting system is rated non-Class
 
lE but is powered from Class lE sources. The system provides lighting in the control room, in the shutdown panel area, in the main walkways and stairs, in the Class lE switchgear
 
rooms, in areas having Class lE equipment, and in areas used for the safe shutdown of the reactor. Upon loss of the normal lighting system, the essential lighting system provides adequate illumination
 
for the safe shutdown of the reactor. The system receives power from two redundant
 
and independent
 
Class 1E ac busses. Each redundant


Class 1E ac bus supplies power to 50 percent of the essential
Technical Contacts:  N. K. Trehan, NRR


lighting in the vital areas. The diesel generators
(301) 492-0777 S. R. Peterson, NRR


provide backup power.
(301) 492-3062 Attachment:  List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


IN 90-69 October 31, 1990 The emergency
Attachment 1 IN 90-69 October 31, 1990 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED


lighting system receives dc power from two redundant
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES


Class lE batteries
Information                                    Date of


through inverters
Notice No.              Subject              Issuance    Issued to


and provides illumination
90-68          Stress Corrosion Cracking      10/30/90    All holders of OLs


for the control room, the auxiliary
of Reactor Coolant Pump Bolts                or CPs for pres- surized water


electrical
reactors (PWRs).


equipment
90-67          Potential Security Equipment    10/29/90    All holders of OLs


rooms, the stairways, and the points leading to plant exits. The system is normally deenergized
Weaknesses                                  or CPs for


and is automatically
nuclear power


energized
reactors and


upon loss of ac power to the normal system. The emergency
Category I fuel


lighting system is also composed of 8-hour and li-hour (individually
facilities.


battery-powered)
90-66          Incomplete Draining and        10/25/90    All holders of OLs
emergency


lighting units. The 8-hour emergency
Drying of Shipping Casks                    for nuclear


lighting units are designed to meet the technical
power reactors


requirements
and all registered


of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.J which requires that emergency
users of NRC


lighting units with at least an 8-hour battery power supply be provided in all areas needed for operation
approved waste


of safe shutdown equipment and in access and egress routes thereto. The li-hour emergency
shipping packages.


lighting units are installed
88-63,        High Radiation Hazards          10/5/90      All holders of OLs


to meet the requirements
Supp. 1        From Irradiated Incore                      or CPs for nuclear


of the Life Safety Code. These lighting units are generally
Detectors and Cables                        power reactors.


installed
90-65          Recent Orifice Plate            10/5/90      All holders of OLs


in plant locations
Problems                                    or CPs for nuclear


to accommodate
power reactors.


the safe evacuation
90-64          Potential for Common-Mode      10/4/90      All holders of OLs


of personnel
Failure Of High Pressure                    or CPs for pres- Safety Injection Pumps or                    surized-water


in the event of a fire in such areas.Discussion:
Release of Reactor Coolant                  reactors.
During the Palo Verde event, the inadequate


lighting conditions
Outside Containment During


significantly
A Loss-Of-Coolant Accident


complicated
90-63          Management Attention to the    10/3/90      All fuel cycle


the licensee's
Establishment and Main-                      licensees possess- tenance of A Nuclear                        ing more than


efforts to cope with the initial failure of the ADVs, which delayed the commencement
Criticality Safety Program                  critical mass


of the controlled
quantities of


removal of decay heat as called for by the emergency
special nuclear


operating
material.


procedures.
OL = Operating License


It is important
CP = Construction Permit


to note that adequate PM and routine testing programs for essential
IN 90-69 October 31, 1990 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If


and emergency
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one


lighting systems are helpful in ensuring adequate illumination
of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.


for the operation
Charles E. Rossi, Director


of safe shutdown equipment.
Division of Operational Events Assessment


Emergency
lighting is a key fire protection
feature associated
with supporting
post-fire
safe shutdown operations.
The exercise of good engineering
design practices
that conform to industry standards
ensures the ability of the lighting system to provide adequate station lighting in all vital areas during all types of accident or transient
conditions.
The implementation
of an effective
PM and testing program which demonstrates
lighting system operability
is important.
Emergency
lighting PM programs recommended
by manufacturers
generally
include routine monitoring
of the battery condition
for each lighting unit, periodic load testing to verify that the lighting unit and its associated
charger are functioning
properly, and a periodic "as found" 8-hour lighting unit discharge test. In addition, the Palo Verde event identified
that the inadvertent
repositioning
of the emergency
lighting fixtures can cause inadequate
illumina-tion and that routine verification
of emergency
lighting fixture orientation
can ensure that emergency
lighting is effective.
IN 90-69 October 31, 1990 This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
contacts listed below or the appropriate
NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi,'rectoor
Division of Operational
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Technical
Technical Contacts:   N. K. Trehan, NRR
 
Contacts:  
N. K. Trehan, NRR (301) 492-0777 S. R. Peterson, NRR (301) 492-3062 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices
 
Attachment
 
1 IN 90-69 October 31, 1990 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
 
NOTICES Information
 
Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 90-68 90-67 90-66 Stress Corrosion
 
Cracking of Reactor Coolant Pump Bolts Potential
 
===Security Equipment Weaknesses===
Incomplete
 
Draining and Drying of Shipping Casks High Radiation
 
Hazards From Irradiated
 
Incore Detectors
 
and Cables Recent Orifice Plate Problems Potential
 
for Common-Mode
 
Failure Of High Pressure Safety Injection
 
Pumps or Release of Reactor Coolant Outside Containment
 
During A Loss-Of-Coolant
 
Accident Management
 
Attention
 
to the Establishment


and Main-tenance of A Nuclear Criticality
(301) 492-0777 S. R. Peterson, NRR


Safety Program 10/30/90 10/29/90 10/25/90 10/5/90 10/5/90 10/4/90 10/3/90 88-63, Supp. 1 90-65 90-64 90-63 All holders of OLs or CPs for pres-surized water reactors (PWRs).All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors and Category I fuel facilities.
(301) 492-3062 Attachment:  List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


All holders of OLs for nuclear power reactors and all registered
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES


users of NRC approved waste shipping packages.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for pres-surized-water
C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR RPB:ADM        AD/AD45        D/PD5          PD5:DRSP:NRR


reactors.All fuel cycle licensees
*CHBerlinger      *TechEd        *BABoger      *JEDyer        *SRPeterson


possess-ing more than critical mass quantities
10/18/90        10/18/90      10/09/90      10/09/90      09/24/90
  OGCB:DOEA:NRR    SELB:DST:NRR C/SELB:DST:NRR C/SPLB:DST:NRR D/DST: NRR


of special nuclear material.OL = Operating
*PCWen            *NKTrehan      *FRosa        *CMcCracken    *AThadani


License CP = Construction
09/24/90        09/24/90      09/25/90      10/03/90      10/03/90
  DOCUMENT NAME:  IN 90-69


Permit
IN 90-XX


IN 90-69 October 31, 1990 This information
October xx, 1990 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If


notice requires no specific action or written response.
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one


If you have any questions
of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.


about the information
Charles E. Rossi, Director


in this notice, please contact one of the technical
Division of Operational Events Assessment


contacts listed below or the appropriate
NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Technical
Technical Contacts:     N. K. Trehan, NRR
 
Contacts: N. K. Trehan, NRR (301) 492-0777 S. R. Peterson, NRR (301) 492-3062 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
 
C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
 
*CHBerlinger
 
10/18/90 RPB:ADM*TechEd 10/18/90 AD/AD45*BABoger 10/09/90 D/PD5 PD5:DRSP:NRR
 
*JEDyer *SRPeterson


10/09/90 09/24/90 OGCB:DOEA:NRR
(301) 492-0777 S. R. Peterson, NRR


*PCWen 09/24/90 SELB:DST:NRR
(301) 492-3062 Attachment:   List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


*NKTrehan 09/24/90 C/SELB:DST:NRR
Document Name:     INADQUATE LIGHTING


*FRosa 09/25/90 C/SPLB:DST:NRR
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
 
*CMcCracken
 
10/03/90 D/DST: NRR*AThadani 10/03/90 DOCUMENT NAME: IN 90-69 IN 90-XX October xx, 1990 This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
 
contacts listed below or the appropriate
 
NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
 
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical
 
Contacts: N. K. Trehan, NRR (301) 492-0777 S. R. Peterson, NRR (301) 492-3062 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices Document Name: INADQUATE
 
LIGHTING*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES


D/DOEA:NRR
D/DOEA:NRR


CERossitt col/o9 J I RPB:AD A D/A5A 9"e CHB e TEd j h ABoger EDyer 10/10/990
CERossitt
O M l 91O/q /9,*OGC :DOEA:F R *SELB:DST:NRR
 
*C/SELB:DST:yRg
 
/SPLB:DST:NRR
 
PCWen NKTrehan FRosa ( IWCMcCracken
 
09/24/90 09/24/90 09/25/90 ' 1 og /90*PD5:DRSP:NRR
 
SRPeterson
 
09/24/90 /t10(s
 
IN 90-XX September
 
xx, 1990 Discussion:
During the Palo Verde event, the inadequate
 
lighting conditions
 
significantly
 
complicated
 
the licensee's
 
efforts to cope with the initial ADVs failure.However, the plant personnel
 
were eventually
 
able to open two ADVs and, thereby, commence a controlled
 
removal of decay heat as called for by the emergency


operating
col/o9J        I  RPB:AD      A D/A5A 9 "e                    *PD5:DRSP:NRR


procedures.
CHB      e        TEd    h j ABoger              EDyer        SRPeterson


Other plants may also have inadequate
10/10/990                l O 91O/q


PM programs for the emergency
M                    /9,      09/24/90  /
*OGC :DOEA:FR    *SELB:DST:NRR *C/SELB:DST:yRg /SPLB:DST:NRR


and the essential
PCWen              NKTrehan      FRosa      ( IWCMcCracken      t10(s


lighting systems and may provide inadequate
09/24/90          09/24/90      09/25/90 '      1og /90


illumination
IN 90-XX


for the operation
September xx, 1990 Discussion:
During the Palo Verde event, the inadequate lighting conditions significantly


of safe shutdown equipment.
complicated the licensee's efforts to cope with the initial ADVs failure.


This event also points out that the inadvertent
However, the plant personnel were eventually able to open two ADVs and, thereby, commence a controlled removal of decay heat as called for by the


repositioning
emergency operating procedures.


of emergency
Other plants may also have inadequate PM programs for the emergency and the


lighting units can cause inadequate
essential lighting systems and may provide inadequate illumination for the


illumination.
operation of safe shutdown equipment. This event also points out that the


By verifying
inadvertent repositioning of emergency lighting units can cause inadequate


the orientation
illumination. By verifying the orientation of these units, the licensees can


of these units, the licensees
ensure that the lights are positioned properly.


can ensure that the lights are positioned
Emergency lighting is a key fire protection feature for the operation of the


properly.Emergency
safe shutdown equipment. Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 requires 8-hour


lighting is a key fire protection
emergency lighting units in areas used for the operation of safe shutdown


feature for the operation
equipment and in access and egress routes thereto. The staff relies on the


of the safe shutdown equipment.
exercise of good engineering design practice and design criteria that conform


Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 requires 8-hour emergency
to industry standards to ensure the ability of the lighting system to provide


lighting units in areas used for the operation
adequate station lighting in all vital areas during all types of accident or


of safe shutdown equipment
transient conditions and in the access routes to and from these areas.


and in access and egress routes thereto. The staff relies on the exercise of good engineering
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If


design practice and design criteria that conform to industry standards
you have any questions about the information inthis notice, please contact one


to ensure the ability of the lighting system to provide adequate station lighting in all vital areas during all types of accident or transient
of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.


conditions
Charles E. Rossi, Director


and in the access routes to and from these areas.This information
Division of Operational Events Assessment


notice requires you have any questions
about the of the technical
contacts listed no specific action or written response.
If information
in this notice, please contact one below or the appropriate
NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Technical
Technical Contacts:   N. K. Trehan, NRR
 
Contacts: N. K.(301)Trehan, NRR 492-0777 S. R. Peterson, NRR (301) 492-3062 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices Document Name: INADQUATE


LIGHTING D/DOEA:NRR
(301) 492-0777 S. R. Peterson, NRR


CERossi 09/ /90 OGCB:DOEA:NRR
(301) 492-3062 Attachment:   List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


PCWen Fcv'09/a4/9 O C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
Document Name:   INADQUATE LIGHTING


CHBerlinger
D/DOEA:NRR      C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR RPB:ADM        AD/AD45        D/PD5 CERossi        CHBerlinger     TechEd          BABoger        JEDyer


09/ /90 SELB:DST:NRR
09/ /90         09/ /90        09/ /90        09/ /9OqJ2s    09/ /90
OGCB:DOEA:NRR  SELB:DST:NRR    C/SELB :   IRR D/DST:NRRrt t'  PD5:DRSP:NRR


NKTrehanJLS
PCWen Fcv'      NKTrehanJLS     FRo            AThadani        SRPeterso e


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Document Name: INADQUATE
Document Name:


LIGHTING Requestor's
===INADQUATE LIGHTING===
Requestor's ID:
WERTMAN


ID: WERTMAN Author's Name: peter wen Document Comments: S34 information
Author's Name:
peter wen


notice}}
Document Comments:
S34 information notice}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 04:03, 24 November 2019

Adequacy of Emergency and Essential Lighting
ML031130214
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 10/31/1990
From: Rossi C
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-90-069, NUDOCS 9010250054
Download: ML031130214 (10)
v • d • e


UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 October 31, 1990

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 90-69: ADEQUACY OF EMERGENCY AND ESSENTIAL LIGHTING

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

This information notice is intended to alert addressees to a possible problem

concerning the adequacy of emergency and essential lighting at commercial power

reactor facilities. It is expected that recipients will review the information

for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to

avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information

notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or

written response is required. i

Description of Circumstances

On March 3, 1989, Unit 3 at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station experi- enced a reactor/turbine trip, main steam isolation, containment isolation, and

safety injection as a result of a grid-induced load rejection event. This

event included three significant system failures: (1) half of the steam bypass

control system malfunctioned; (2) the atmospheric dump valves (ADYs) failed to

operate from the control room and the remote shutdown panel; and (3) the

emergency lighting in the main steam support structure (MSSS) failed, hampering

the operators in their attempt to cope with the ADY failures. Being unable to

maintain pressure control on the secondary side by operating the ADVs from the

control room or the remote shutdown panel, plant personnel attempted to establish

local (manual) control of the ADYs in the MSSS. When operators first entered

the MSSS, they found no direct lighting. Normal lighting was lost due to the

loss of power to the non-Class 1E electrical busses in the plant. The emergency

lighting was not properly positioned in the north MSSS room (containing the

ADVs for the No. 1 steam generator) to provide adequate lighting for the

operators to perform their required activities and was not functioning at all

in the south MSSS room (containing ADVs for the No. 2 steam generator).

Because of a burned-out light bulb, plant personnel could not restore essential

lighting (from Class 1E power sources) in the south MSSS room.

"C-

( 01200543

IN 90-69 October 31, 1990 During the NRC inspection (50-530/89-13) conducted by an augmented inspection

team (AIT) sent to examine the event at Palo Verde, the staff found deficien- cies in the licensee's maintenance and testing of emergency and essential

lighting. The team discovered that plant personnel had waived the quarterly

preventive maintenance (PM) tasks on the MSSS emergency and essential lights

for five consecutive quarters. By grouping the lights in the MSSS with the

lights in the containment building, which were inaccessible during power

operations, the PM tasks were waived for the MSSS lights during each of these

periods along with the containment lights. NRC inspections further revealed

that the licensee, prior to the performance of the 8-hour lighting unit dis- charge test, performed preventive maintenance (i.e., battery replacement, addition of electrolyte, cleaning of battery terminals, and battery charging)

on the lighting unit battery. This preventive maintenance practice resulted

in not verifying the performance of the 8-hour emergency lighting units in the

Was found" condition. The inspections also revealed that the licensee had

failed to implement the relevant portions of its quality assurance program for

emergency lighting. Because of these failures, the emergency lighting was not

properly tested, and deficiencies were not properly corrected.

After the event, plant personnel reconstructed the design bases of the

lighting system and conducted walkdown inspections of the emergency and essen- tial lighting in the plant. In some instances, the licensee found the lighting

to be inadequate to perform the required tasks because the original design did

not require emergency lights or because the emergency lights provided inade- quate illumination. In addition, the licensee identified many areas that

required the installation of or modification to lighting to meet the licensee's

design bases and the requirements in 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R.

Background:

At Palo Verde, the essential lighting system is an integral part of the normal

lighting system that provides illumination if the normal lighting system fails.

The essential lighting system is rated non-Class lE but is powered from

Class lE sources. The system provides lighting in the control room, in the

shutdown panel area, in the main walkways and stairs, in the Class lE switchgear

rooms, in areas having Class lE equipment, and in areas used for the safe

shutdown of the reactor. Upon loss of the normal lighting system, the essential

lighting system provides adequate illumination for the safe shutdown of the

reactor. The system receives power from two redundant and independent Class 1E

ac busses. Each redundant Class 1E ac bus supplies power to 50 percent of the

essential lighting in the vital areas. The diesel generators provide backup

power.

IN 90-69 October 31, 1990 The emergency lighting system receives dc power from two redundant Class lE

batteries through inverters and provides illumination for the control room, the auxiliary electrical equipment rooms, the stairways, and the points leading

to plant exits. The system is normally deenergized and is automatically

energized upon loss of ac power to the normal system. The emergency lighting

system is also composed of 8-hour and li-hour (individually battery-powered)

emergency lighting units. The 8-hour emergency lighting units are designed to

meet the technical requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.J which

requires that emergency lighting units with at least an 8-hour battery power

supply be provided in all areas needed for operation of safe shutdown equipment

and in access and egress routes thereto. The li-hour emergency lighting units

are installed to meet the requirements of the Life Safety Code. These lighting

units are generally installed in plant locations to accommodate the safe

evacuation of personnel in the event of a fire in such areas.

Discussion:

During the Palo Verde event, the inadequate lighting conditions significantly

complicated the licensee's efforts to cope with the initial failure of the

ADVs, which delayed the commencement of the controlled removal of decay heat as

called for by the emergency operating procedures.

It is important to note that adequate PM and routine testing programs for

essential and emergency lighting systems are helpful in ensuring adequate

illumination for the operation of safe shutdown equipment. Emergency lighting

is a key fire protection feature associated with supporting post-fire safe

shutdown operations. The exercise of good engineering design practices that

conform to industry standards ensures the ability of the lighting system to

provide adequate station lighting in all vital areas during all types of

accident or transient conditions. The implementation of an effective PM and

testing program which demonstrates lighting system operability is important.

Emergency lighting PM programs recommended by manufacturers generally include

routine monitoring of the battery condition for each lighting unit, periodic

load testing to verify that the lighting unit and its associated charger are

functioning properly, and a periodic "as found" 8-hour lighting unit discharge

test. In addition, the Palo Verde event identified that the inadvertent

repositioning of the emergency lighting fixtures can cause inadequate illumina- tion and that routine verification of emergency lighting fixture orientation

can ensure that emergency lighting is effective.

IN 90-69 October 31, 1990 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one

of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.

Charles E. Rossi,'rectoor

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: N. K. Trehan, NRR

(301) 492-0777 S. R. Peterson, NRR

(301) 492-3062 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Attachment 1 IN 90-69 October 31, 1990 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

90-68 Stress Corrosion Cracking 10/30/90 All holders of OLs

of Reactor Coolant Pump Bolts or CPs for pres- surized water

reactors (PWRs).

90-67 Potential Security Equipment 10/29/90 All holders of OLs

Weaknesses or CPs for

nuclear power

reactors and

Category I fuel

facilities.

90-66 Incomplete Draining and 10/25/90 All holders of OLs

Drying of Shipping Casks for nuclear

power reactors

and all registered

users of NRC

approved waste

shipping packages.

88-63, High Radiation Hazards 10/5/90 All holders of OLs

Supp. 1 From Irradiated Incore or CPs for nuclear

Detectors and Cables power reactors.

90-65 Recent Orifice Plate 10/5/90 All holders of OLs

Problems or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

90-64 Potential for Common-Mode 10/4/90 All holders of OLs

Failure Of High Pressure or CPs for pres- Safety Injection Pumps or surized-water

Release of Reactor Coolant reactors.

Outside Containment During

A Loss-Of-Coolant Accident

90-63 Management Attention to the 10/3/90 All fuel cycle

Establishment and Main- licensees possess- tenance of A Nuclear ing more than

Criticality Safety Program critical mass

quantities of

special nuclear

material.

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

IN 90-69 October 31, 1990 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one

of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: N. K. Trehan, NRR

(301) 492-0777 S. R. Peterson, NRR

(301) 492-3062 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR RPB:ADM AD/AD45 D/PD5 PD5:DRSP:NRR

  • CHBerlinger *TechEd *BABoger *JEDyer *SRPeterson

10/18/90 10/18/90 10/09/90 10/09/90 09/24/90

OGCB:DOEA:NRR SELB:DST:NRR C/SELB:DST:NRR C/SPLB:DST:NRR D/DST: NRR

  • PCWen *NKTrehan *FRosa *CMcCracken *AThadani

09/24/90 09/24/90 09/25/90 10/03/90 10/03/90

DOCUMENT NAME: IN 90-69

IN 90-XX

October xx, 1990 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one

of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: N. K. Trehan, NRR

(301) 492-0777 S. R. Peterson, NRR

(301) 492-3062 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Document Name: INADQUATE LIGHTING

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

D/DOEA:NRR

CERossitt

col/o9J I RPB:AD A D/A5A 9 "e *PD5:DRSP:NRR

CHB e TEd h j ABoger EDyer SRPeterson

10/10/990 l O 91O/q

M /9, 09/24/90 /

  • OGC :DOEA:FR *SELB:DST:NRR *C/SELB:DST:yRg /SPLB:DST:NRR

PCWen NKTrehan FRosa ( IWCMcCracken t10(s

09/24/90 09/24/90 09/25/90 ' 1og /90

IN 90-XX

September xx, 1990 Discussion:

During the Palo Verde event, the inadequate lighting conditions significantly

complicated the licensee's efforts to cope with the initial ADVs failure.

However, the plant personnel were eventually able to open two ADVs and, thereby, commence a controlled removal of decay heat as called for by the

emergency operating procedures.

Other plants may also have inadequate PM programs for the emergency and the

essential lighting systems and may provide inadequate illumination for the

operation of safe shutdown equipment. This event also points out that the

inadvertent repositioning of emergency lighting units can cause inadequate

illumination. By verifying the orientation of these units, the licensees can

ensure that the lights are positioned properly.

Emergency lighting is a key fire protection feature for the operation of the

safe shutdown equipment. Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 requires 8-hour

emergency lighting units in areas used for the operation of safe shutdown

equipment and in access and egress routes thereto. The staff relies on the

exercise of good engineering design practice and design criteria that conform

to industry standards to ensure the ability of the lighting system to provide

adequate station lighting in all vital areas during all types of accident or

transient conditions and in the access routes to and from these areas.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information inthis notice, please contact one

of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: N. K. Trehan, NRR

(301) 492-0777 S. R. Peterson, NRR

(301) 492-3062 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Document Name: INADQUATE LIGHTING

D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR RPB:ADM AD/AD45 D/PD5 CERossi CHBerlinger TechEd BABoger JEDyer

09/ /90 09/ /90 09/ /90 09/ /9OqJ2s 09/ /90

OGCB:DOEA:NRR SELB:DST:NRR C/SELB : IRR D/DST:NRRrt t' PD5:DRSP:NRR

PCWen Fcv' NKTrehanJLS FRo AThadani SRPeterso e

09/ A/90 094S9 09/ /90 o9,o/90

09/a4/ 9O

C/S P s13 sT :PJR

Ce

EmcctfcKW

Document Name:

INADQUATE LIGHTING

Requestor's ID:

WERTMAN

Author's Name:

peter wen

Document Comments:

S34 information notice


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