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| {{#Wiki_filter:yPRIORITY1~(ACCELERATED RIDSPROCESSING) | | {{#Wiki_filter:yPRIORI TY 1~(ACCELERATED RIDS PROCESSING) |
| I.REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9507120033 DOC.DATE: | | I.REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9507120033 DOC.DATE: 95/07/07 NOTARIZED: |
| 95/07/07NOTARIZED: | | NO DOCKET g FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G 05000244 P AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION ST MARTIN,J.T. |
| NODOCKETgFACIL:50-244 RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,Rochester G05000244PAUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION STMARTIN,J.T.
| | Rochester Gas&Electric Corp.MECREDY,R.C. |
| Rochester Gas&ElectricCorp.MECREDY,R.C. | | Rochester Gas&Electric Corp.R RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION JOHNSON,A.R. |
| Rochester Gas&ElectricCorp.RRECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION JOHNSON,A.R. | | Project Directorate I-1 (PDl-1)(Post 941001) |
| ProjectDirectorate I-1(PDl-1)(Post941001)
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| ==SUBJECT:== | | ==SUBJECT:== |
| LER95-005-00:on 950607,FW isolation onhighSGleveloccurred.
| | LER 95-005-00:on 950607,FW isolation on high SG level occurred.Caused by decrease in instrument air pressure due to an air leak in containment.FW flow switched to manual control.W/950707 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED LTR ENCL SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72). |
| Causedbydecreaseininstrument airpressureduetoanairleakincontainment.FW flowswitchedtomanualcontrol.W/950707 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE:IE22TCOPIESRECEIVEDLTRENCLSIZE:TITLE:50.73/50.9 LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.NOTES:License Expdateinaccordance with10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).
| | I 0 05000244 T RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD1-1 PD INTERNAL: AEOD S B NRR/DE/EELB NRR/DISP/PIPB NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DSSA/SPS B/B RES/DS IR/EI B EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD NOAC MURPHY i G A NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME JOHNSON,A AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DOPS/OECB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DSSA/SPLB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN1 FILE 01 LI TCO BRYCE i J H NOAC POORE i W NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1'1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 N NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS: |
| I005000244TRECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD1-1PDINTERNAL:
| | PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE!CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN 5D8 (415-2083) |
| AEODSBNRR/DE/EELB NRR/DISP/PIPB NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DSSA/SPS B/BRES/DSIR/EIBEXTERNAL:
| | TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 26 ENCL 26 eGCHE51FR G~s~wo ElEcTec coepcw"crI~8w~Sr~vEriuE eGc~EsTFe. |
| LSTLOBBYWARDNOACMURPHYiGANRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL112211111111111111111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME JOHNSON,A AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DOPS/OECB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DSSA/SPLB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN1FILE01LITCOBRYCEiJHNOACPOOREiWNUDOCSFULLTXTCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111111'111111221111NNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:
| | MY~sd~a CATE July 7, 1995 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Attn: Allen R.Johnson PWR Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C.20555 |
| PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMOWFN5D8(415-2083)
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| TOELIMINATE YOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSFORDOCUMENTS YOUDON'TNEED!FULLTEXTCONVERSION REQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
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| LTTR26ENCL26 eGCHE51FR G~s~woElEcTeccoepcw"crI~8w~Sr~vEriuEeGc~EsTFe.
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| MY~sd~aCATEJuly7,1995U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission DocumentControlDeskAttn:AllenR.JohnsonPWRProjectDirectorate I-1Washington, D.C.20555 | |
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| ==Subject:== | | ==Subject:== |
| LER95-005,Instrument AirLeakinContainment CausesFeedwater Isolation R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244Inaccordance with10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,item(a)(2)(iv),whichrequiresareportof,"Anyeventorcondition thatresultedinamanualorautomatic actuation ofanyengineered safetyfeature(ESF),including thereactorprotection system(RPS)",theattachedLicenseeEventReportLER95-005isherebysubmitted.
| | LER 95-005, Instrument Air Leak in Containment Causes Feedwater Isolation R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No.50-244 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv), which requires a report of,"Any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS)", the attached Licensee Event Report LER 95-005 is hereby submitted. |
| Thiseventhasinnowayaffectedthepublic'shealthandsafety.Verytrulyyours,RobertC.Mecredyxc:U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Mr.AllenR.Johnson(MailStop14B2)PWRProjectDirectorate I-1Washington, D.C.20555U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission RegionI475Allendale RoadKingofPrussia,PA19406GinnaUSNRCSeniorResidentInspector
| | This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.Very truly yours, Robert C.Mecredy xc: U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr.Allen R.Johnson (Mail Stop 14B2)PWR Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C.20555 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Ginna USNRC Senior Resident Inspector'1 P r 9507l20033 950707 PDR ADOCK 05000244 S ma NRC FORM 366 (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OHB NO.3150-0'104 EXPIRES 5/3'I/95 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)(See reverse for required nunbcr of digits/characters for each block)ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY llITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORllARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE INFORHATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCHHISSION, MASNINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET NASHINGTON DC 20503.FAGILITY NAHE (1)R.E.G irma Nuclear Power P lant DOCKET NUHBER (2)05000244 PAGE (3)10F8 TITLE (4>Instrument Air Leak in Containment Causes Feedwater Isolation MONTH DAY 06 07 YEAR YEAR 95 95 EVENT DATE (5)LER NUMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER--005--REVISION NUMBER 00 HOHTN DAY YEAR 07 07 REPORT DATE (7)FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER FACILITY HAHE DOCKET NUMBER OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)OPERATING.MODE (9)P(NER LEVEL (10)N 097 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT 20.402(b)20.405(a)(1)(i)20.405(a)(1)(ii) 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 20.405(c>50.36(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50'3(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 50'3(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50'3(a)(2)(x) 73.71(b)73.71(c)OTHER (Spec'I fy In Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)TO THE REQUIREHENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or mor e)(11)LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)NAME John T.St.Hartin-Tcchnical Assistant TELEPHONE NUHBER (Include Area Code)(716)77'1-3641 COHPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IH THIS REPORT ('13)CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT HANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONEHI'ANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS B LD PSF 0000 N SUPPLEHENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).X HO EXPECTED SUSHI SS I ON DATE (15)MONTH DAY YEAR ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)(16)On June 7, 1995 at approximately 1905 approximately 97%steady state reactor power isolated to Containment due to an air leak, Steam Generator level occurred when levels level in the Steam Generators. |
| '1Pr9507l20033 950707PDRADOCK05000244Sma NRCFORM366(5-92)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEDBYOHBNO.3150-0'104 EXPIRES5/3'I/95LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednunbcrofdigits/characters foreachblock)ESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOMPLYllITHTHISINFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST:50.0HRS.FORllARDCOMMENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIHATETOTHEINFORHATION ANDRECORDSHANAGEHENT BRANCH(HNBB7714),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY CCHHISSION, MASNINGTON, DC20555-0001 ANDTOTHEPAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT(3150-0104), | | EDST, with the plant at and the Instrument Air system Feedwater Isolation on high went above 67%narrow range Immediate corrective action was to manually control feedwater flow until levels in the Steam Generators were restored to their normal operating band.The underlying cause of the inability to control Steam Generator levels was a decrease in Instrument Air pressure due to an Instrument Air leak in Containment, followed by restoration of air pressure with a demand signal to fully open main feedwater regulating valves.This event is NUREG-1022 Cause Code (B).Corrective action to preclude repetition is outlined in Section V.B.NRC FORM 366 (5-92> |
| OFFICEOFMANAGEMENT ANDBUDGETNASHINGTON DC20503.FAGILITYNAHE(1)R.E.GirmaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETNUHBER(2)05000244PAGE(3)10F8TITLE(4>Instrument AirLeakinContainment CausesFeedwater Isolation MONTHDAY0607YEARYEAR9595EVENTDATE(5)LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER--005--REVISIONNUMBER00HOHTNDAYYEAR0707REPORTDATE(7)FACILITYNAMEDOCKETNUMBERFACILITYHAHEDOCKETNUMBEROTHERFACILITIES INVOLVED(8)OPERATING
| | NRC FORH 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORHATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (MNBB 1714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3180-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET'WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUHBER (2)YEAR 05000244 95 LER NUMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUHBER--005--REVISION NUMBER 00 PAGE (3)2 OF 8 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS: |
| .MODE(9)P(NERLEVEL(10)N097THISREPORTISSUBMITTED PURSUANT20.402(b) 20.405(a)(1)(i)20.405(a)(1)(ii) 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 20.405(c> | | The plant was at approximately 97%steady state reactor power with no significant activities in progress.A soldered joint connection in the Instrument Air system in Containment failed, causing a decrease in Instrument Air pressure, and loss of control air to air-operated components, including the main feedwater regulating valves.II.DESCRIPTION OF EVENT: A.DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES OF MAJOR OCCURRENCES: |
| 50.36(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50'3(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 50'3(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50'3(a)(2)(x) 73.71(b)73.71(c)OTHER(Spec'IfyInAbstractbelowandinText,NRCForm366A)TOTHEREQUIREHENTS OF10CFR5:(Checkoneormore)(11)LICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER(12)NAMEJohnT.St.Hartin-Tcchnical Assistant TELEPHONE NUHBER(IncludeAreaCode)(716)77'1-3641 COHPLETEONELINEFOREACHCOMPONENT FAILUREDESCRIBED IHTHISREPORT('13)CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT HANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDSCAUSESYSTEMCOMPONEHI'ANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDSBLDPSF0000NSUPPLEHENTAL REPORTEXPECTED(14)YES(Ifyes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE).XHOEXPECTEDSUSHISSIONDATE(15)MONTHDAYYEARABSTRACT(Limitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximately 15single-spaced typewritten lines)(16)OnJune7,1995atapproximately 1905approximately 97%steadystatereactorpowerisolatedtoContainment duetoanairleak,SteamGenerator leveloccurredwhenlevelslevelintheSteamGenerators. | | o June 7, 1995, 1856 EDST: Instrument Air system leak occurs in Containment. |
| EDST,withtheplantatandtheInstrument AirsystemFeedwater Isolation onhighwentabove67%narrowrangeImmediate corrective actionwastomanuallycontrolfeedwater flowuntillevelsintheSteamGenerators wererestoredtotheirnormaloperating band.Theunderlying causeoftheinability tocontrolSteamGenerator levelswasadecreaseinInstrument AirpressureduetoanInstrument AirleakinContainment, followedbyrestoration ofairpressurewithademandsignaltofullyopenmainfeedwater regulating valves.ThiseventisNUREG-1022 CauseCode(B).Corrective actiontoprecluderepetition isoutlinedinSectionV.B.NRCFORM366(5-92> | | o June 7, 1995, 1902 EDST: Instrument Air to Containment is isolated, restoring normal air pressure to air-operated components outside Containment. |
| NRCFORH366A(5-92)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION APPROVEDBYOMBNO.3150-0104 EXPIRES5/31/95ESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOMPLYWITHTHISINFORHATION COLLECTION REQUEST:50.0HRS.FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIMATETOTHEINFORHATION ANDRECORDSHANAGEHENT BRANCH(MNBB1714),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COHHISSION, WASHINGTON, DC20555-0001 ANDTOTHEPAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT(3180-0104),
| | o June 7, 1995, 1905 EDST: Steam Generator (S/G)levels increase above 67%.Event date and time.o June 7, 1995, 1905 EDST: Discovery date and time.June 7, 1995, 1910 EDST: "A" and"B" S/G levels restored to pre-event normal operating band.B.EVENT: On June 7, 1995, at approximately 1856 EDST, with the plant at approximately 978 steady state reactor power, a soldered joint connection on a two inch Instrument Air (IA)line in Containment (CNMT)failed, resulting in leakage from the IA system and decrease in IA pressure.This decrease in IA pressure resulted in loss of control air to air-operated components, with valves beginning to travel to their respective"fail" positions. |
| OFFICEOFMANAGEMENT ANDBUDGET'WASHINGTON DC20503.FACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETNUHBER(2)YEAR0500024495LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIAL NUHBER--005--REVISIONNUMBER00PAGE(3)2OF8TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366A)(17)PRE-EVENT PLANTCONDITIONS:
| | Among these components were the two main feedwater regulating valves (MFRV)(fail closed)which drifted towards the closed position as IA pressure at the valve actuator decreased. |
| Theplantwasatapproximately 97%steadystatereactorpowerwithnosignificant activities inprogress.
| | NRC FORH 366A (5-92) |
| Asolderedjointconnection intheInstrument AirsysteminContainment failed,causingadecreaseinInstrument Airpressure, andlossofcontrolairtoair-operated components, including themainfeedwater regulating valves.II.DESCRIPTION OFEVENT:A.DATESANDAPPROXIMATE TIMESOFMAJOROCCURRENCES:
| | .NRC FORH 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHNISSIOH LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OHB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHATIOH COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COHHENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE INFORHATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHEHT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.HUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3180-0104), OFFICE OF HAHAGEHEHT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAHE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUHBER (2)YEAR 05000244 95 LER HWER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUHBER--005--REVI SION NUHBER 00 PAGE (3)3 OF 8 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A)(17)At approximately 1902 EDST, the Control Room operators had diagnosed the probable location of the IA leak, and closed the IA CNMT Isolation valve, AOV-5392.With the closure of AOV-5392, the leak was isolated, and normal IA pressure was restored to components outside CNMT.Due to the MFRVs drifting closed, feedwater (FW)flows and Steam Generator (S/G)levels decreased, resulting in an increasing"demand" signal to the MFRVs.Isolation of the IA leak resulted in restoration of IA pressure, and the MFRVs opened fully, responding to the increased demand signal.At the time the MFRVs went to the full open position, level was approximately 25%in the"A" S/G and 40%in the"B" S/G.The increase in FW flow resulted in increasing level in the"A" and"B" S/Gs.Within three minutes narrow range level in the"B" S/G had increased to cause FW Isolation on high level in the"B" S/G (S/G level>/=67 0 narrow range level).The"B" MFRV closed in response to this FW Isolation signal as designed, and reopened when level decreased below 67%.For the next ninety seconds, there were several occurrences of FW Isolation for the"B" S/G as level cycled around 67%.During this time narrow range level in the"A" S/G also increased to cause FW Isolation on high level in the"A" S/G.For approximately twenty seconds, there were occurrences of FW Isolation for the"A" S/G as level cycled around 67%.This short term S/G level transient continued until the Control Room operators took manual control to restore S/G levels.At approximately 1910 EDST, levels in the"A" and"B" S/Gs were restored to their normal operating band.C.INOPERABLE STRUCTURES i COMPONENTS OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT: The decrease in IA pressure resulted in loss of control air to air-operated components. |
| oJune7,1995,1856EDST:Instrument AirsystemleakoccursinContainment.
| | D.OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED: Due to the failed soldered joint connection in CNMT, and the subsequent isolation of IA to CNMT, air-operated components in CNMT failed to their respective"fail" positions. |
| oJune7,1995,1902EDST:Instrument AirtoContainment isisolated, restoring normalairpressuretoair-operated components outsideContainment.
| | These included several valves and ventilation dampers.In addition, the Reactor Compartment Cooling (RCC)fan motor tripped when the associated dampers failed closed.HRC FORH 366A (5-92) |
| oJune7,1995,1905EDST:SteamGenerator (S/G)levelsincreaseabove67%.Eventdateandtime.oJune7,1995,1905EDST:Discovery dateandtime.June7,1995,1910EDST:"A"and"B"S/Glevelsrestoredtopre-event normaloperating band.B.EVENT:OnJune7,1995,atapproximately 1856EDST,withtheplantatapproximately 978steadystatereactorpower,asolderedjointconnection onatwoinchInstrument Air(IA)lineinContainment (CNMT)failed,resulting inleakagefromtheIAsystemanddecreaseinIApressure.
| | JIRC FORM 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AHD RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AHD TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET'WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUMBER (2)05000244 YEAR 95 LER NUMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER--005--REVISION HUMBER 00 PAGE (3)4 OF 8 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)For air-operated components outside the CNMT, there was a decrease in IA pressure throughout the plant for six minutes, until IA to CNMT was isolated.During this time, numerous air-operated components outside CNMT started to travel to their respective"fail" positions. |
| ThisdecreaseinIApressureresultedinlossofcontrolairtoair-operated components, withvalvesbeginning totraveltotheirrespective "fail"positions.
| | With the exception of the MFRVs, this loss of control air did not adversely affect the ability of the Control Room operators to maintain plant conditions. |
| Amongthesecomponents werethetwomainfeedwater regulating valves(MFRV)(failclosed)whichdriftedtowardstheclosedpositionasIApressureatthevalveactuatordecreased.
| | E.METHOD OF DISCOVERY: |
| NRCFORH366A(5-92)
| | This event was immediately apparent due to alarms and indications in the Control Room.In particular, Main Control Board annunciators C-17 (CONTAINMENT VENT SYSTEM)and H-8 (INSTRUMENT AIR LO PRESS 100 PSI)alarmed, indicating a problem with IA in CNMT.OPERATOR ACTION: The Control Room operators responded to Main Control Board annunciators C-17, H-8 and H-16 (INSTRUMENT AIR COMP), and referred to Alarm Response Procedures C-17, H-8 and H-16.They entered Abnormal Operating Procedure AP-IA.l (LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR).The Control Room operators requested that the auxiliary operator start the standby diesel-driven air compressor. |
| .NRCFORH366A(5-92)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COHNISSIOH LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION APPROVEDBYOHBNO.3150-0104 EXPIRES5/31/95ESTIHATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOHPLYWITHTHISINFORHATIOH COLLECTION REQUEST:50.0HRS.FORWARDCOHHENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIHATETOTHEINFORHATION ANDRECORDSHANAGEHEHT BRANCH(HNBB7714),U.S.HUCLEARREGULATORY COHHISSION, WASHINGTON, DC20555-0001 ANDTOTHEPAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT(3180-0104), | | Following the steps of AP-IA.1 and with the knowledge that abnormal alarms were received on CNMT systems prior to those on secondary systems, the Control Room operators isolated IA to CNMT by closing the IA CNMT Isolation valve (AOV-5392). |
| OFFICEOFHAHAGEHEHT ANDBUDGETWASHINGTON DC20503.FACILITYNAHE(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETNUHBER(2)YEAR0500024495LERHWER(6)SEQUENTIAL NUHBER--005--REVISIONNUHBER00PAGE(3)3OF8TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofHRCForm366A)(17)Atapproximately 1902EDST,theControlRoomoperators haddiagnosed theprobablelocationoftheIAleak,andclosedtheIACNMTIsolation valve,AOV-5392.
| | This action isolated the leak from the rest of the IA system, and IA pressure increased to normal pressure in the rest of the system.After the FW Isolation, the Control Room operators transferred control of the MFRVs to"manual" to restore S/G levels to their normal operating band.When S/G levels and FW flows were stabilized, they transferred control of the MFRVs back to"automatic". |
| WiththeclosureofAOV-5392, theleakwasisolated, andnormalIApressurewasrestoredtocomponents outsideCNMT.DuetotheMFRVsdriftingclosed,feedwater (FW)flowsandSteamGenerator (S/G)levelsdecreased, resulting inanincreasing "demand"signaltotheMFRVs.Isolation oftheIAleakresultedinrestoration ofIApressure, andtheMFRVsopenedfully,responding totheincreased demandsignal.AtthetimetheMFRVswenttothefullopenposition, levelwasapproximately 25%inthe"A"S/Gand40%inthe"B"S/G.TheincreaseinFWflowresultedinincreasing levelinthe"A"and"B"S/Gs.Withinthreeminutesnarrowrangelevelinthe"B"S/Ghadincreased tocauseFWIsolation onhighlevelinthe"B"S/G(S/Glevel>/=670narrowrangelevel).The"B"MFRVclosedinresponsetothisFWIsolation signalasdesigned, andreopenedwhenleveldecreased below67%.Forthenextninetyseconds,therewereseveraloccurrences ofFWIsolation forthe"B"S/Gaslevelcycledaround67%.Duringthistimenarrowrangelevelinthe"A"S/Galsoincreased tocauseFWIsolation onhighlevelinthe"A"S/G.Forapproximately twentyseconds,therewereoccurrences ofFWIsolation forthe"A"S/Gaslevelcycledaround67%.ThisshorttermS/Gleveltransient continued untiltheControlRoomoperators tookmanualcontroltorestoreS/Glevels.Atapproximately 1910EDST,levelsinthe"A"and"B"S/Gswererestoredtotheirnormaloperating band.C.INOPERABLE STRUCTURES iCOMPONENTS ORSYSTEMSTHATCONTRIBUTED TOTHEEVENT:ThedecreaseinIApressureresultedinlossofcontrolairtoair-operated components.
| | HRC FORM 366A (5-92) |
| D.OTHERSYSTEMSORSECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED: | | JIRC FORA 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150 0104 EXP I RES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTONt DC 20555 0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150.0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUMBER (2)05000244 YEAR 95 LER NUMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER--005--REVISION NUMBER 00 PAGE (3)5OF8 EXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)With loss of letdown flow, the operators manually decreased charging flow to minimum flow, and secured one charging pump.The Shift Supervisor made a decision to initiate a power reduction until the leak was located, isolated, and IA pressure returned to normal throughout the system.At approximately 1908 EDST, a power reduction was started at one percent per minute, per Normal Operating Procedure 0-5.1 (LOAD REDUCTIONS). |
| Duetothefailedsolderedjointconnection inCNMT,andthesubsequent isolation ofIAtoCNMT,air-operated components inCNMTfailedtotheirrespective "fail"positions.
| | Subsequently, the Control Room operators notified maintenance personnel and higher supervision. |
| Theseincludedseveralvalvesandventilation dampers.Inaddition, theReactorCompartment Cooling(RCC)fanmotortrippedwhentheassociated dampersfailedclosed.HRCFORH366A(5-92)
| | An auxiliary operator and Radiation Protection technician conducted a CNMT entry, at power in an attempt to identify and isolate the leak.The leak was located on the main two inch IA header in CNMT.A temporary repair was made to the failed joint connection. |
| JIRCFORM366A(5-92)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION APPROVEDBYOMBNO.3150-0104 EXPIRES5/31/95ESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOMPLYWITHTHISINFORMATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST:50.0HRS.FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIMATETOTHEINFORMATION AHDRECORDSMANAGEMENT BRANCH(MNBB7714),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC20555-0001 AHDTOTHEPAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT(3150-0104),
| | This repair enabled the Control Room operators to restore some pressure to the IA system in CNMT, sufficient to allow operation of selected valves and ventilation dampers.The NRC Operations Center was notified at approximately 2211 EDST, per 10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(ii), non-emergency four hour notification. |
| OFFICEOFMANAGEMENT ANDBUDGET'WASHINGTON DC20503.FACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETNUMBER(2)05000244YEAR95LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER--005--REVISIONHUMBER00PAGE(3)4OF8TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366A)(17)Forair-operated components outsidetheCNMT,therewasadecreaseinIApressurethroughout theplantforsixminutes,untilIAtoCNMTwasisolated.
| | G.SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES: |
| Duringthistime,numerousair-operatedcomponents outsideCNMTstartedtotraveltotheirrespective "fail"positions.
| | The MFRVs and MFRV bypass valves closed automatically as a result of the FW Isolation signals.Ventilation dampers for the Containment Recirculation Cooling fans and RCC fans failed to their respective safeguards positions. |
| Withtheexception oftheMFRVs,thislossofcontrolairdidnotadversely affecttheabilityoftheControlRoomoperators tomaintainplantconditions.
| | CNMT Isolation valves for charging and letdown also failed to their safeguards positions., III.CAUSE OF EVENT: A.IMMEDIATE CAUSE: The immediate cause of the FW Isolation was level in the S/Gs being)/=67%.The high level was caused by increased FW flows when the MFRVs went full open in response to the valve demand signal.This situation resulted in overfeeding the S/Gs.NRC FORM 366A (5.92) |
| E.METHODOFDISCOVERY: | | JIRC FORM 366A (5-92)U.S~NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY MITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORllARD COMHENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS HANAGEMEHT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, HASHINGTONt DC 20555 0001 AND TO THE PAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEHENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAHE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUMBER (2)05000244 YEAR LER NUHBER (6)SEQUENTIAL HUMBER--005--95 REVISION NUMBER 00 PAGE (3)GOF8 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)B.INTERMEDIATE CAUSE: The intermediate cause of the open valve demand signal for the MFRVs was decreased FW flows and S/G levels as the MFRVs drifted toward the closed position as IA pressure decreased. |
| Thiseventwasimmediately apparentduetoalarmsandindications intheControlRoom.Inparticular, MainControlBoardannunciators C-17(CONTAINMENT VENTSYSTEM)andH-8(INSTRUMENT AIRLOPRESS100PSI)alarmed,indicating aproblemwithIAinCNMT.OPERATORACTION:TheControlRoomoperators responded toMainControlBoardannunciators C-17,H-8andH-16(INSTRUMENT AIRCOMP),andreferredtoAlarmResponseProcedures C-17,H-8andH-16.TheyenteredAbnormalOperating Procedure AP-IA.l(LOSSOFINSTRUMENT AIR).TheControlRoomoperators requested thattheauxiliary operatorstartthestandbydiesel-driven aircompressor.
| | C.ROOT CAUSE: The underlying cause of the decrease in IA pressure was the failure of a soldered joint connection in a two inch IA line in CNMT.This was caused by insufficient insertion of the pipe into a fitting during original construction. |
| Following thestepsofAP-IA.1andwiththeknowledge thatabnormalalarmswerereceivedonCNMTsystemspriortothoseonsecondary systems,theControlRoomoperators isolatedIAtoCNMTbyclosingtheIACNMTIsolation valve(AOV-5392). | | This event is NUREG-1022 Cause Code (B),"Design, Manufacturing, Construction |
| ThisactionisolatedtheleakfromtherestoftheIAsystem,andIApressureincreased tonormalpressureintherestofthesystem.AftertheFWIsolation, theControlRoomoperators transferred controloftheMFRVsto"manual"torestoreS/Glevelstotheirnormaloperating band.WhenS/GlevelsandFWflowswerestabilized, theytransferred controloftheMFRVsbackto"automatic".
| |
| HRCFORM366A(5-92)
| |
| JIRCFORA366A(5-92)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION APPROVEDBYOMBNO.31500104EXPIRES5/31/95ESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOMPLYWITHTHISINFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST:50.0HRS.FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIMATETOTHEINFORMATION ANDRECORDSMANAGEMENT BRANCH(MNBB7714),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTONt DC205550001ANDTOTHEPAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT(3150.0104),
| |
| OFFICEOFMANAGEMENT ANDBUDGETWASHINGTON DC20503.FACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETNUMBER(2)05000244YEAR95LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER--005--REVISIONNUMBER00PAGE(3)5OF8EXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366A)(17)Withlossofletdownflow,theoperators manuallydecreased chargingflowtominimumflow,andsecuredonechargingpump.TheShiftSupervisor madeadecisiontoinitiateapowerreduction untiltheleakwaslocated,isolated, andIApressurereturnedtonormalthroughout thesystem.Atapproximately 1908EDST,apowerreduction wasstartedatonepercentperminute,perNormalOperating Procedure 0-5.1(LOADREDUCTIONS).
| |
| Subsequently, theControlRoomoperators notifiedmaintenance personnel andhighersupervision. | |
| Anauxiliary operatorandRadiation Protection technician conducted aCNMTentry,atpowerinanattempttoidentifyandisolatetheleak.TheleakwaslocatedonthemaintwoinchIAheaderinCNMT.Atemporary repairwasmadetothefailedjointconnection.
| |
| ThisrepairenabledtheControlRoomoperators torestoresomepressuretotheIAsysteminCNMT,sufficient toallowoperation ofselectedvalvesandventilation dampers.TheNRCOperations Centerwasnotifiedatapproximately 2211EDST,per10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(ii),non-emergency fourhournotification.
| |
| G.SAFETYSYSTEMRESPONSES: | |
| TheMFRVsandMFRVbypassvalvesclosedautomatically asaresultoftheFWIsolation signals.Ventilation dampersfortheContainment Recirculation CoolingfansandRCCfansfailedtotheirrespective safeguards positions.
| |
| CNMTIsolation valvesforchargingandletdownalsofailedtotheirsafeguards positions.,
| |
| III.CAUSEOFEVENT:A.IMMEDIATE CAUSE:Theimmediate causeoftheFWIsolation waslevelintheS/Gsbeing)/=67%.Thehighlevelwascausedbyincreased FWflowswhentheMFRVswentfullopeninresponsetothevalvedemandsignal.Thissituation resultedinoverfeeding theS/Gs.NRCFORM366A(5.92) | |
| JIRCFORM366A(5-92)U.S~NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION APPROVEDBYOMBNO.3150-0104 EXPIRES5/31/95ESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOMPLYMITHTHISINFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST:50.0HRS.FORllARDCOMHENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIMATETOTHEINFORMATION ANDRECORDSHANAGEMEHT BRANCH(HNBB7714),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION, HASHINGTONt DC205550001ANDTOTHEPAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECT(3150-0104),
| |
| OFFICEOFMANAGEHENT ANDBUDGETWASHINGTON DC20503.FACILITYNAHE(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETNUMBER(2)05000244YEARLERNUHBER(6)SEQUENTIAL HUMBER--005--95REVISIONNUMBER00PAGE(3)GOF8TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366A)(17)B.INTERMEDIATE CAUSE:Theintermediate causeoftheopenvalvedemandsignalfortheMFRVswasdecreased FWflowsandS/GlevelsastheMFRVsdriftedtowardtheclosedpositionasIApressuredecreased.
| |
| C.ROOTCAUSE:Theunderlying causeofthedecreaseinIApressurewasthefailureofasolderedjointconnection inatwoinchIAlineinCNMT.Thiswascausedbyinsufficient insertion ofthepipeintoafittingduringoriginalconstruction. | |
| ThiseventisNUREG-1022 CauseCode(B),"Design,Manufacturing, Construction
| |
| /Installation". | | /Installation". |
| ThiseventdoesnotmeettheNUMARC93-01,"Industry Guideline forMonitoring theEffectiveness ofMaintenance atNuclearPowerPlants",definition ofa"Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure".
| | This event does not meet the NUMARC 93-01,"Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants", definition of a"Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure".IV.ANALYSIS OF EVENT: This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv), which requires a report of,"Any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS)".The FW Isolation of the"A" and"B" S/Gs was an automatic actuation of an ESF system.An assessment was performed considering both the safety consequences and implications of this event with the following results and conclusions: |
| IV.ANALYSISOFEVENT:Thiseventisreportable inaccordance with10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,item(a)(2)(iv),whichrequiresareportof,"Anyeventorcondition thatresultedinamanualorautomatic actuation ofanyengineered safetyfeature(ESF),including thereactorprotection system(RPS)".TheFWIsolation ofthe"A"and"B"S/Gswasanautomatic actuation ofanESFsystem.Anassessment wasperformed considering boththesafetyconsequences andimplications ofthiseventwiththefollowing resultsandconclusions: | | There were no operational or safety consequences or implications attributed to the FW isolations because: The FW isolations occurred at the required S/G level.o S/G levels were quickly stabilized and manual control of MFRVs was accomplished to mitigate any consequences of the event.Based on the above, it can be concluded that the public's health and safety was assured at all times.NRC FORM 366A (5-92) |
| Therewerenooperational orsafetyconsequences orimplications attributed totheFWisolations because:TheFWisolations occurredattherequiredS/Glevel.oS/Glevelswerequicklystabilized andmanualcontrolofMFRVswasaccomplished tomitigateanyconsequences oftheevent.Basedontheabove,itcanbeconcluded thatthepublic'shealthandsafetywasassuredatalltimes.NRCFORM366A(5-92)
| | ARC FORM 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150-0104 EXP I RES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDIHG BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MHBB 7714), U.ST NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AHD TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3140 0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTOH DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUMBER (2)05000244 YEAR LER NUMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 95--005--REVISION NUMBER 00 PAGE (3)7 OF 8 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A)(17)V.CORRECTIVE ACTION: A.ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS: o MFRVs were returned to automatic after S/G levels were restored to their pre-event normal operating band.o A temporary repair was made to the failed joint connection in CNMT.This temporary repair enabled the Control Room operators to restore some pressure to the IA system in CNMT, sufficient to allow operation of selected valves and ventilation dampers.After letdown flow was restored and the Control Room operators could control primary system volume, the load reduction was stopped.Maintenance personnel installed a temporary modification designed by Engineering, which permitted isolation of the failed joint for permanent repair, while maintaining an air supply to the letdown valves.This allowed the operators to maintain letdown flow.o Maintenance personnel performed the permanent repair by replacing the failed joint connection and adjacent pipe sections, and removed the temporary modification. |
| ARCFORM366A(5-92)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION APPROVEDBYOMBNO.3150-0104 EXPIRES5/31/95ESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOMPLYWITHTHISINFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST:50.0HRS.FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDIHG BURDENESTIMATETOTHEINFORMATION ANDRECORDSMANAGEMENT BRANCH(MHBB7714),U.STNUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC20555-0001 AHDTOTHEPAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT(31400104),OFFICEOFMANAGEMENT ANDBUDGETWASHINGTOH DC20503.FACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETNUMBER(2)05000244YEARLERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER95--005--REVISIONNUMBER00PAGE(3)7OF8TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofHRCForm366A)(17)V.CORRECTIVE ACTION:A.ACTIONTAKENTORETURNAFFECTEDSYSTEMSTOPRE-EVENT NORMALSTATUS:oMFRVswerereturnedtoautomatic afterS/Glevelswererestoredtotheirpre-event normaloperating band.oAtemporary repairwasmadetothefailedjointconnection inCNMT.Thistemporary repairenabledtheControlRoomoperators torestoresomepressuretotheIAsysteminCNMT,sufficient toallowoperation ofselectedvalvesandventilation dampers.AfterletdownflowwasrestoredandtheControlRoomoperators couldcontrolprimarysystemvolume,theloadreduction wasstopped.Maintenance personnel installed atemporary modification designedbyEngineering, whichpermitted isolation ofthefailedjointforpermanent repair,whilemaintaining anairsupplytotheletdownvalves.Thisallowedtheoperators tomaintainletdownflow.oMaintenance personnel performed thepermanent repairbyreplacing thefailedjointconnection andadjacentpipesections, andremovedthetemporary modification.
| | At the completion of these activities, normal IA was restored to CNMT.B.ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: |
| Atthecompletion oftheseactivities, normalIAwasrestoredtoCNMT.B.ACTIONTAKENORPLANNEDTOPREVENTRECURRENCE:
| | A sample of joint connections in the IA system will be examined by non-destructive techniques to confirm adequate pipe insertion into fittings.o This event will be evaluated and compared against Plant Simulator response under controlled conditions. |
| Asampleofjointconnections intheIAsystemwillbeexaminedbynon-destructive techniques toconfirmadequatepipeinsertion intofittings.
| | Any lessons learned and enhancements to the control of primary system pressure will be identified, and procedures changed, as appropriate. |
| oThiseventwillbeevaluated andcomparedagainstPlantSimulator responseundercontrolled conditions.
| | NRC FORM 366A (5-92) |
| Anylessonslearnedandenhancements tothecontrolofprimarysystempressurewillbeidentified, andprocedures changed,asappropriate.
| | NRC FORM 366A (5-92)U.ST NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOH LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150-0104 EXP I RES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORUARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORHATION AHD RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, MASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET UASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAHE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUMBER (2)05000244 YEAR LER NUMBER (6)SEQUEHTIAL NUMBER 95--005--REVISION NUMBER 00 PAGE (3)8 OF 8 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)VI.ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: |
| NRCFORM366A(5-92)
| | A.FAILED COMPONENTS: |
| NRCFORM366A(5-92)U.STNUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSIOH LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION APPROVEDBYOMBNO.3150-0104 EXPIRES5/31/95ESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOMPLYWITHTHISINFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST:50.0HRS.FORUARDCOMMENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIMATETOTHEINFORHATION AHDRECORDSMANAGEMENT BRANCH(MNBB7714),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION, MASHINGTON, DC20555-0001 ANDTOTHEPAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECT(3150-0104),
| | There were no component failures, in that a soldered joint connection failed.This inch copper pipe to a two inch copper manufacturer of the pipe and fitting is manufacturer of the solder is unknown.the leak occurred when joint connected a two elbow fitting.The not relevant, and the B.PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS: A similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results: No documentation of similar LER events with the same root cause at Ginna Nuclear Power Plant could be iden-tified.C.SPECIAL COMMENTS: None NRC FORM 366A (5-92)}} |
| OFFICEOFMANAGEMENT ANDBUDGETUASHINGTON DC20503.FACILITYNAHE(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETNUMBER(2)05000244YEARLERNUMBER(6)SEQUEHTIAL NUMBER95--005--REVISIONNUMBER00PAGE(3)8OF8TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366A)(17)VI.ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
| |
| A.FAILEDCOMPONENTS: | |
| Therewerenocomponent
| |
| : failures, inthatasolderedjointconnection failed.Thisinchcopperpipetoatwoinchcoppermanufacturer ofthepipeandfittingismanufacturer ofthesolderisunknown.theleakoccurredwhenjointconnected atwoelbowfitting.Thenotrelevant, andtheB.PREVIOUSLERsONSIMILAREVENTS:AsimilarLEReventhistorical searchwasconducted withthefollowing results:Nodocumentation ofsimilarLEReventswiththesamerootcauseatGinnaNuclearPowerPlantcouldbeiden-tified.C.SPECIALCOMMENTS:
| |
| NoneNRCFORM366A(5-92)}}
| |
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Caused by Personnel Error.Blown Fuse Was Replaced & Offsite Power Was Restored to Safeguards Bus 17.With 990513 Ltr ML17265A6431999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Moisture Separator Vanes Were Incorrectly Installed,Per 10CFR21.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg. Subject Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A6141999-03-31031 March 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990301,two Main Steam non-return Check Valves Were Declared Inoperable Due to Exceedance of Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Changes in Methodology & Matls.Packing Gland Torque Will Be Adjusted.With 990331 Ltr ML17265A6131999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990227,discovered That Surveillance Had Not Been Performed at Frequency,Per Ts.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure O-6.13 Will Be Evaluated for Enhancement Documentation of Completion of ITS Srs.With 990329 Ltr ML17265A6061999-03-24024 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990222,plant Was Noted Outside Design Basis.Caused by Deficiencies in NSSS Vendor Slb Mass & Energy Release.Placed Temporary Administrative Restriction 40 Degrees F Max on Screenhouse Bay Temp ML17265A4951998-12-21021 December 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 981120,loss of 34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751,resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg.Caused by Faulted Cable Splice.Performed Appropriate Actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1.With 981221 Ltr ML17265A4931998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 971030,determined That Improperly Performed Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Procedure non-adherence.Appropriate Calibr Procedures Were Properly Performed with 24 H of Condition Discovery ML17265A4691998-11-25025 November 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Systems (Creats) Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored to CR ML17265A4271998-10-0505 October 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Air Samples Were Taken & Determined That Source of Radiation Was Naturally Occurring Radon.With 981005 Ltr ML17265A3671998-07-14014 July 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 971019,CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Actuating Function Was Not Operable.Caused by Mispositioned Switch.Revised Procedure CPI-MON-R37.W/980714 Ltr ML17265A1921998-03-11011 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980209,discovered That Boraflex Degradation in SPF Was Greater than Was Assumed.Caused by Dissolution of Boron on Boraflex Matrix,Per 10CFR50.21.Removed Spent Fuel Assemblies from Selected Degraded Storage Rack Cells ML17265A1641998-02-0606 February 1998 LER 97-007-01:on 971117,reactor Engineer Recognized That Neutron Flux Low Range Trip Circuitry for Channel Was Not in Tripped Condition as Required.Caused by Technical Inadequacies.Channel Defeat Will Be Identified ML17265A1601998-02-0606 February 1998 LER 97-006-01:on 971103,verification of B Concentration Was Not Performed Due to Misinterpretation of Event Sequence. Audible Count Rate Function Was Restored to Operable Status ML17264B1441997-12-17017 December 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 971117,NF Low Range Trip Circuitry for Channel N-44 Was Not Placed in Tripped Condition.Caused by Technical Inadequacies in Procedures.Implemented EWR 4862 to Resolve Design deficiency.W/971217 Ltr ML17264B1291997-12-0303 December 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 971103,NIS Audible Count Rate Function Was Inoperable.Caused by Misinterpretation of Event Sequence Due to Not Verifying Boron Concentration.B Verification Occurred Every 12 H Per ITS LCO Action 3.9.2.C.3.W/971203 Ltr ML17264B1271997-12-0101 December 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 971031,undetected Unblocking of SI Actuation Signal Occurred at Low Pressure Condition,Due to Faulty Bistable Which Resulted in Inadvertent SI Actuation Signal.Sias,Ci & CVI Signals Were Reset ML17264B1211997-11-24024 November 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 971024,radiation Monitor Alarm Were Noted Due to Higher than Normal Radioactive Gas Concentration Resulted in Cvi.New R-12 Alarm Setpoint Was Maintained for Duration of Refueling Outage ML17264B0461997-09-29029 September 1997 LER 97-003-01:on 970730,bistable Instrument Trip Setpoint Could Have Exceeded Allowable Value.Caused by Insufficient Existing Margin Between Trip Setpoint & Allowable Value. Held Switches in Tripped configuration.W/970929 Ltr ML17264B0111997-08-27027 August 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970730,high Steam Flow Bistable Instrument Setpoint Plus Instrument Uncertainty Could Exceed Allowable Value in ITS Was Identified.Caused by Entry Into ITS LCO 3.0.3.Switches Placed in Tripped configuration.W/970827 Ltr ML17264A9941997-08-19019 August 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970720,34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751 Was Lost.Caused by Automatic Actuation of B Emergency DG Due to Undervoltage on Safeguards Buses 16 & 17.Offsite Power Restored to Safeguards Buses 16 & 17.W/970819 Ltr ML17264A9911997-08-11011 August 1997 LER 96-009-02:on 960723,determined That Leak Rate Outside Containment Was Greater than Program Limit.Caused by Weld Defect.Isolated Leak & Cut Out & Replaced Leaking Pipe ML17264A8271997-03-0303 March 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970131,discovered Service Water Temp Was Less than Specified Value.Caused by non-representative Method of Monitoring.Increased Water Temp in Screenhouse Bay to Greater than 35 Degrees F.W/970303 Ltr ML17264A8071997-01-22022 January 1997 LER 96-015-00:on 961223,discovered Thermally Induced Overpressure Transient Could Occur.Caused by Thermal Expansion of Fluid During Design Basis Accident Condition. Installed Relief Valve on Affected line.W/970122 Ltr ML17264A7471996-11-27027 November 1996 LER 96-013-00:on 961029,circuit Breakers Closed While in Mode 3 & Resulted in Condition Prohibited by TS Due to Personnel Error.Circuit Breakers for MOV-878B & MOV-878D Were re-opened.W/961127 Ltr ML17264A6051996-09-19019 September 1996 LER 96-012-00:on 960820,feedwater Transient Occurred,Due to Closure of Feedwater Regulating Valve,Causing Lo Lo Steam Generator Level Reactor Trip.Sgs Were Restored & Missing Screw in 1/P-476 Was replaced.W/960919 Ltr ML17264A6061996-09-19019 September 1996 LER 96-009-01:on 960723,leakage Outside Containment Occurred,Due to Weld Defect,Resulting in Leak Rate Greater than Program Limits.Source of Leakage Isolated from RWST by Freeze Seal,Allowing Exit from ITS LCO 3.0.3.W/960919 Ltr ML17264A5911996-09-0505 September 1996 LER 96-011-00:on 960807,improper Configuration of Circuit Breaker Occurred,Due to Undetected Internal Interference, Resulting in Automatic Start of Both Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.Running AFW Pumps Were secured.W/960905 Ltr ML17264A5921996-09-0505 September 1996 LER 96-010-00:on 960806,latching of Main Turbine While in Mode 4 Occurred,Due to Defective Procedure,Resulting in Automatic Start of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.Caused by Defective Maint Procedure.Procedure revised.W/960905 Ltr ML17264A5891996-08-22022 August 1996 LER 96-009-00:on 960723,determined Leak on Piping Sys Outside Containment Greater than Program Limit.Caused by Weld Defect.Pipe & Socket Welds Were Cut Out & Replaced. W/960822 Ltr ML17264A5781996-08-0606 August 1996 LER 96-008-00:on 960707,main Feedwater Pump Breakers Opened. Caused by Change in Seal Water Differential Pressure Occurred During Sys Realignment.Afw Flow Controlled as Desired to Maintain S/G level.W/960806 Ltr ML17264A5561996-07-12012 July 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 960612,CR Operators Identified Control Rods Misaligned & Not Moving in Proper Sequence.Caused by Faulty Firing Circuit Card in Rod Control Sys.Faulty Firing Circuit Card in 1BD Power Cabinet replaced.W/960712 Ltr ML17264A5421996-06-20020 June 1996 LER 96-006-00:on 960521,discovered Containment Penetration Not in Required Status.Caused by Personnel Error.Installed Flange Inside Containment Penetration 2.W/960620 Ltr ML17264A5411996-06-17017 June 1996 LER 96-005-00:on 960516,PORC Determined Deficient Procedures Do Not Meet SRs for Testing safety-related Logic Circuits. Caused by Inadequancies in Individual Testing Procedures. Procedures Re Improved TSs revised.W/960617 Ltr ML17264A5051996-05-17017 May 1996 LER 96-003-01:on 960308,identified That Both Pressurizer PORVs Inoperable Concurrently Due to Disconnection of Flex Hose to Both PORV Actuators to Install air-sets for Benchset & Limit Switch Activities.Hpes Completed ML17264A4481996-04-0808 April 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960308,both Pressurizer Relief Valves Inoperable.Hpes Evaluation Is Being Conducted to Determined Cause of Event.C/As:Both PORVs restored.W/960408 Ltr ML17264A4471996-04-0808 April 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960307,secondary Transient Occurred.Caused by Loss of B Condenser Circulating Water Pump.C/As: Thermography performed.W/960408 Ltr ML17264A4101996-03-18018 March 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 950504,inservice Test Not Performed During Refueling Outage.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Surveillance Frequency.Valve Test Performed & Disassembled. W/960318 Ltr ML17264A2971995-12-14014 December 1995 LER 95-009-00:on 950817,surveillance Was Not Performed Due to Improper Application of TS Requirements Resulting in TS Violation.Testing of MOV-515 Was Performed on 951115.W/ 951214 Ltr ML17264A1711995-09-25025 September 1995 LER 95-008-00:on 950825,secondary Transient Occurred.Caused by Loss of B Condenser Circulating Water Pump That Resulted in Manual Rt.Returned S/G Levels to Normal Operating levels.W/950925 Ltr 1999-09-22
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17265A7541999-09-22022 September 1999 LER 99-011-00:on 990823,small Tears Were Discovered in Flexible Duct Work Connector at Inlet of CR HVAC Sys Return Air Fan (AKF08).Caused by in-leakage Greater than That Assumed.Implemented Temporary Mod 99-029.With 990922 Ltr ML17265A7431999-08-24024 August 1999 LER 99-004-01:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Chevron Separator Vanes Were Installed Backwards.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg.Moisture Separator Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A7181999-07-23023 July 1999 LER 99-007-01:on 990423,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Instrument & Control Technicians Inadvertently Pulling Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Channel.Setpoint Adjustments Were Completed by Different Crew of Technicians ML17265A7081999-07-22022 July 1999 LER 98-003-02:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Was Noted Due to Invalid Causes.Caused by Various Degraded Components in CR RM Sys.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored ML17265A7031999-07-19019 July 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990617,determined That Temporary Unescorted Access Had Been Granted to Contractor Employee.Caused by Incomplete Info Re Circumstances of Individual Military Separation.Individual Access Was Revoked.With 990719 Ltr ML17265A7021999-07-15015 July 1999 LER 99-010-00:on 990615,ventilation Isolation of Auxiliary Bldg Occurred When Auxiliary Bldg Gas Radiation Monitor R-14 Reached High Alarm Setpoint.Cr Operators Rest Auxiliary Bldg Ventilation Isolation Signal.With 990715 Ltr ML17265A6851999-06-21021 June 1999 LER 99-001-01:on 990222,deficiencies in NSSS Vendor steam- Line Brake Mass & Energy Release Analysis Results in Plant Being Outside Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Deficiencies in W.Temporary Administrative Replaced.With 990621 Ltr ML17265A6661999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-009-00:on 990503,instrumentation Declared Inoperable in Multiple Channels Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts. Caused by Unanticipated High Frequency AC Voltage Ripple. Entered TS LCO 3.0.3.With 990602 Ltr ML17309A6541999-05-27027 May 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990427,overtemperature Delta T Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Faulted Bistable During Calibr of Redundant Channel.Plant Was Stabilized in Mode 3 & Faulted Bistable Was Subsequently Replaced.With 990527 Ltr ML17265A6631999-05-24024 May 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990423,technicians Inadvertently Pulled Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Cahnnel,Causing Reactor Trip,Due to High Range Flux Trip.Caused by Personnel Error. Labeling Scheme Improved ML17265A6601999-05-21021 May 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990421,start of turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Was Noted.Caused by MOV Being Left in Open Position.Closed Manual Isolation Valve to Secure Steam to Pump.With 990521 Ltr ML17265A6441999-05-13013 May 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990413,undervoltage Signal of Safeguards Bus During Testing Resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg. Caused by Personnel Error.Blown Fuse Was Replaced & Offsite Power Was Restored to Safeguards Bus 17.With 990513 Ltr ML17265A6431999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Moisture Separator Vanes Were Incorrectly Installed,Per 10CFR21.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg. Subject Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A6141999-03-31031 March 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990301,two Main Steam non-return Check Valves Were Declared Inoperable Due to Exceedance of Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Changes in Methodology & Matls.Packing Gland Torque Will Be Adjusted.With 990331 Ltr ML17265A6131999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990227,discovered That Surveillance Had Not Been Performed at Frequency,Per Ts.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure O-6.13 Will Be Evaluated for Enhancement Documentation of Completion of ITS Srs.With 990329 Ltr ML17265A6061999-03-24024 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990222,plant Was Noted Outside Design Basis.Caused by Deficiencies in NSSS Vendor Slb Mass & Energy Release.Placed Temporary Administrative Restriction 40 Degrees F Max on Screenhouse Bay Temp ML17265A4951998-12-21021 December 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 981120,loss of 34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751,resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg.Caused by Faulted Cable Splice.Performed Appropriate Actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1.With 981221 Ltr ML17265A4931998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 971030,determined That Improperly Performed Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Procedure non-adherence.Appropriate Calibr Procedures Were Properly Performed with 24 H of Condition Discovery ML17265A4691998-11-25025 November 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Systems (Creats) Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored to CR ML17265A4271998-10-0505 October 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Air Samples Were Taken & Determined That Source of Radiation Was Naturally Occurring Radon.With 981005 Ltr ML17265A3671998-07-14014 July 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 971019,CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Actuating Function Was Not Operable.Caused by Mispositioned Switch.Revised Procedure CPI-MON-R37.W/980714 Ltr ML17265A1921998-03-11011 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980209,discovered That Boraflex Degradation in SPF Was Greater than Was Assumed.Caused by Dissolution of Boron on Boraflex Matrix,Per 10CFR50.21.Removed Spent Fuel Assemblies from Selected Degraded Storage Rack Cells ML17265A1641998-02-0606 February 1998 LER 97-007-01:on 971117,reactor Engineer Recognized That Neutron Flux Low Range Trip Circuitry for Channel Was Not in Tripped Condition as Required.Caused by Technical Inadequacies.Channel Defeat Will Be Identified ML17265A1601998-02-0606 February 1998 LER 97-006-01:on 971103,verification of B Concentration Was Not Performed Due to Misinterpretation of Event Sequence. Audible Count Rate Function Was Restored to Operable Status ML17264B1441997-12-17017 December 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 971117,NF Low Range Trip Circuitry for Channel N-44 Was Not Placed in Tripped Condition.Caused by Technical Inadequacies in Procedures.Implemented EWR 4862 to Resolve Design deficiency.W/971217 Ltr ML17264B1291997-12-0303 December 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 971103,NIS Audible Count Rate Function Was Inoperable.Caused by Misinterpretation of Event Sequence Due to Not Verifying Boron Concentration.B Verification Occurred Every 12 H Per ITS LCO Action 3.9.2.C.3.W/971203 Ltr ML17264B1271997-12-0101 December 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 971031,undetected Unblocking of SI Actuation Signal Occurred at Low Pressure Condition,Due to Faulty Bistable Which Resulted in Inadvertent SI Actuation Signal.Sias,Ci & CVI Signals Were Reset ML17264B1211997-11-24024 November 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 971024,radiation Monitor Alarm Were Noted Due to Higher than Normal Radioactive Gas Concentration Resulted in Cvi.New R-12 Alarm Setpoint Was Maintained for Duration of Refueling Outage ML17264B0461997-09-29029 September 1997 LER 97-003-01:on 970730,bistable Instrument Trip Setpoint Could Have Exceeded Allowable Value.Caused by Insufficient Existing Margin Between Trip Setpoint & Allowable Value. Held Switches in Tripped configuration.W/970929 Ltr ML17264B0111997-08-27027 August 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970730,high Steam Flow Bistable Instrument Setpoint Plus Instrument Uncertainty Could Exceed Allowable Value in ITS Was Identified.Caused by Entry Into ITS LCO 3.0.3.Switches Placed in Tripped configuration.W/970827 Ltr ML17264A9941997-08-19019 August 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970720,34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751 Was Lost.Caused by Automatic Actuation of B Emergency DG Due to Undervoltage on Safeguards Buses 16 & 17.Offsite Power Restored to Safeguards Buses 16 & 17.W/970819 Ltr ML17264A9911997-08-11011 August 1997 LER 96-009-02:on 960723,determined That Leak Rate Outside Containment Was Greater than Program Limit.Caused by Weld Defect.Isolated Leak & Cut Out & Replaced Leaking Pipe ML17264A8271997-03-0303 March 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970131,discovered Service Water Temp Was Less than Specified Value.Caused by non-representative Method of Monitoring.Increased Water Temp in Screenhouse Bay to Greater than 35 Degrees F.W/970303 Ltr ML17264A8071997-01-22022 January 1997 LER 96-015-00:on 961223,discovered Thermally Induced Overpressure Transient Could Occur.Caused by Thermal Expansion of Fluid During Design Basis Accident Condition. Installed Relief Valve on Affected line.W/970122 Ltr ML17264A7471996-11-27027 November 1996 LER 96-013-00:on 961029,circuit Breakers Closed While in Mode 3 & Resulted in Condition Prohibited by TS Due to Personnel Error.Circuit Breakers for MOV-878B & MOV-878D Were re-opened.W/961127 Ltr ML17264A6051996-09-19019 September 1996 LER 96-012-00:on 960820,feedwater Transient Occurred,Due to Closure of Feedwater Regulating Valve,Causing Lo Lo Steam Generator Level Reactor Trip.Sgs Were Restored & Missing Screw in 1/P-476 Was replaced.W/960919 Ltr ML17264A6061996-09-19019 September 1996 LER 96-009-01:on 960723,leakage Outside Containment Occurred,Due to Weld Defect,Resulting in Leak Rate Greater than Program Limits.Source of Leakage Isolated from RWST by Freeze Seal,Allowing Exit from ITS LCO 3.0.3.W/960919 Ltr ML17264A5911996-09-0505 September 1996 LER 96-011-00:on 960807,improper Configuration of Circuit Breaker Occurred,Due to Undetected Internal Interference, Resulting in Automatic Start of Both Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.Running AFW Pumps Were secured.W/960905 Ltr ML17264A5921996-09-0505 September 1996 LER 96-010-00:on 960806,latching of Main Turbine While in Mode 4 Occurred,Due to Defective Procedure,Resulting in Automatic Start of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.Caused by Defective Maint Procedure.Procedure revised.W/960905 Ltr ML17264A5891996-08-22022 August 1996 LER 96-009-00:on 960723,determined Leak on Piping Sys Outside Containment Greater than Program Limit.Caused by Weld Defect.Pipe & Socket Welds Were Cut Out & Replaced. W/960822 Ltr ML17264A5781996-08-0606 August 1996 LER 96-008-00:on 960707,main Feedwater Pump Breakers Opened. Caused by Change in Seal Water Differential Pressure Occurred During Sys Realignment.Afw Flow Controlled as Desired to Maintain S/G level.W/960806 Ltr ML17264A5561996-07-12012 July 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 960612,CR Operators Identified Control Rods Misaligned & Not Moving in Proper Sequence.Caused by Faulty Firing Circuit Card in Rod Control Sys.Faulty Firing Circuit Card in 1BD Power Cabinet replaced.W/960712 Ltr ML17264A5421996-06-20020 June 1996 LER 96-006-00:on 960521,discovered Containment Penetration Not in Required Status.Caused by Personnel Error.Installed Flange Inside Containment Penetration 2.W/960620 Ltr ML17264A5411996-06-17017 June 1996 LER 96-005-00:on 960516,PORC Determined Deficient Procedures Do Not Meet SRs for Testing safety-related Logic Circuits. Caused by Inadequancies in Individual Testing Procedures. Procedures Re Improved TSs revised.W/960617 Ltr ML17264A5051996-05-17017 May 1996 LER 96-003-01:on 960308,identified That Both Pressurizer PORVs Inoperable Concurrently Due to Disconnection of Flex Hose to Both PORV Actuators to Install air-sets for Benchset & Limit Switch Activities.Hpes Completed ML17264A4481996-04-0808 April 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960308,both Pressurizer Relief Valves Inoperable.Hpes Evaluation Is Being Conducted to Determined Cause of Event.C/As:Both PORVs restored.W/960408 Ltr ML17264A4471996-04-0808 April 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960307,secondary Transient Occurred.Caused by Loss of B Condenser Circulating Water Pump.C/As: Thermography performed.W/960408 Ltr ML17264A4101996-03-18018 March 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 950504,inservice Test Not Performed During Refueling Outage.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Surveillance Frequency.Valve Test Performed & Disassembled. W/960318 Ltr ML17264A2971995-12-14014 December 1995 LER 95-009-00:on 950817,surveillance Was Not Performed Due to Improper Application of TS Requirements Resulting in TS Violation.Testing of MOV-515 Was Performed on 951115.W/ 951214 Ltr ML17264A1711995-09-25025 September 1995 LER 95-008-00:on 950825,secondary Transient Occurred.Caused by Loss of B Condenser Circulating Water Pump That Resulted in Manual Rt.Returned S/G Levels to Normal Operating levels.W/950925 Ltr 1999-09-22
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17265A7601999-10-0505 October 1999 Part 21 Rept Re W2 Switch Supplied by W Drawn from Stock, Did Not Operate Properly After Being Installed on 990409. Switch Returned to W on 990514 for Evaluation & Root Cause Analysis ML17265A7621999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 991008 Ltr ML17265A7531999-09-23023 September 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Corrective Action & Closeout of 10CFR21 Rept of Noncompliance Re Unacceptable Part for 30-4 Connector. Unacceptable Parts Removed from Stock & Scrapped ML17265A7541999-09-22022 September 1999 LER 99-011-00:on 990823,small Tears Were Discovered in Flexible Duct Work Connector at Inlet of CR HVAC Sys Return Air Fan (AKF08).Caused by in-leakage Greater than That Assumed.Implemented Temporary Mod 99-029.With 990922 Ltr ML17265A7471999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 990909 Ltr ML17265A7431999-08-24024 August 1999 LER 99-004-01:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Chevron Separator Vanes Were Installed Backwards.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg.Moisture Separator Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A7341999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 990806 Ltr ML17265A7291999-07-29029 July 1999 Interim Part 21 Rept Re safety-related DB-25 Breaker Mechanism Procured from W Did Not Pas Degradatin Checks When Drawn from Stock to Be Installed Into BUS15/03A.Holes Did Not line-up & Tripper Pan Bent ML17265A7181999-07-23023 July 1999 LER 99-007-01:on 990423,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Instrument & Control Technicians Inadvertently Pulling Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Channel.Setpoint Adjustments Were Completed by Different Crew of Technicians ML17265A7081999-07-22022 July 1999 LER 98-003-02:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Was Noted Due to Invalid Causes.Caused by Various Degraded Components in CR RM Sys.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored ML17265A7131999-07-22022 July 1999 Special Rept:On 990407,radiation Monitor RM-14A Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Failed Communication Link from TSC to Plant Process Computer Sys.Communication Link Was re-established & RM-14A Was Declaed Operable on 990521 ML17265A7031999-07-19019 July 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990617,determined That Temporary Unescorted Access Had Been Granted to Contractor Employee.Caused by Incomplete Info Re Circumstances of Individual Military Separation.Individual Access Was Revoked.With 990719 Ltr ML17265A7211999-07-19019 July 1999 ISI Rept for Third Interval (1990-1999) Third Period, Second Outage (1999) at Re Ginna Npp. ML17265A7021999-07-15015 July 1999 LER 99-010-00:on 990615,ventilation Isolation of Auxiliary Bldg Occurred When Auxiliary Bldg Gas Radiation Monitor R-14 Reached High Alarm Setpoint.Cr Operators Rest Auxiliary Bldg Ventilation Isolation Signal.With 990715 Ltr ML17265A7661999-06-30030 June 1999 1999 Rept of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments Conducted Without Prior NRC Approval for Jan 1998 Through June 1999, Per 10CFR50.59.With 991020 Ltr ML17265A7011999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 990712 Ltr ML17265A6851999-06-21021 June 1999 LER 99-001-01:on 990222,deficiencies in NSSS Vendor steam- Line Brake Mass & Energy Release Analysis Results in Plant Being Outside Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Deficiencies in W.Temporary Administrative Replaced.With 990621 Ltr ML17265A6761999-06-16016 June 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Defects & noncompliances,10CFR21(d)(3)(ii), Which Requires Written Notification to NRC on Identification of Defect or Failure to Comply. Relays Were Returned to Eaton for Evaluation & Root Cause Analysis ML17265A6661999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-009-00:on 990503,instrumentation Declared Inoperable in Multiple Channels Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts. Caused by Unanticipated High Frequency AC Voltage Ripple. Entered TS LCO 3.0.3.With 990602 Ltr ML17265A6681999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990608 Ltr ML17265A6651999-05-27027 May 1999 Interim Rept Re W2 Control Switch,Procured from W,Did Not Operate Satisfactorily When Drawn from Stock to Be Installed in Main Control Board for 1C2 Safety Injection Pump. Estimated That Evaluation Will Be Completed by 991001 ML17309A6541999-05-27027 May 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990427,overtemperature Delta T Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Faulted Bistable During Calibr of Redundant Channel.Plant Was Stabilized in Mode 3 & Faulted Bistable Was Subsequently Replaced.With 990527 Ltr ML17265A6631999-05-24024 May 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990423,technicians Inadvertently Pulled Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Cahnnel,Causing Reactor Trip,Due to High Range Flux Trip.Caused by Personnel Error. Labeling Scheme Improved ML17265A6601999-05-21021 May 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990421,start of turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Was Noted.Caused by MOV Being Left in Open Position.Closed Manual Isolation Valve to Secure Steam to Pump.With 990521 Ltr ML17265A6591999-05-17017 May 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Relay Deficiency Detected During pre-installation Testing.Caused by Incorrectly Wired Relay Coil.Relays Were Returned to Eaton Corp for Investigation. Relays Were Repaired & Retested ML17265A6441999-05-13013 May 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990413,undervoltage Signal of Safeguards Bus During Testing Resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg. Caused by Personnel Error.Blown Fuse Was Replaced & Offsite Power Was Restored to Safeguards Bus 17.With 990513 Ltr ML17265A6431999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Moisture Separator Vanes Were Incorrectly Installed,Per 10CFR21.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg. Subject Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A6381999-05-0707 May 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Replacement Turbocharger Exhaust Turbine Side Drain Port Not Functioning as Design Intended.Caused by Manufacturing Deficiency.Turbocharger Was Reaasembled & Reinstalled on B EDG ML17265A6391999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990510 Ltr ML17265A6361999-04-23023 April 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Power Supply That Did Not Work Properly When Drawn from Stock & Installed in -25 Vdc Slot.Power Supply Will Be Sent to Vendor to Perform Failure Mode Assessment.Evaluation Will Be Completed by 991001 ML17265A6301999-04-18018 April 1999 Rev 1 to Cycle 28 COLR for Re Ginna Npp. ML17265A6251999-04-15015 April 1999 Special Rept:On 990309,halon Systems Were Removed from Svc & Fire Door F502 Was Blocked Open.Caused by Mods Being Made to CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys.Continuous Fire Watch Was Established with Backup Fire Suppression Equipment ML17265A6551999-04-0909 April 1999 Initial Part 21 Rept Re Mfg Deficiency in Replacement Turbocharger for B EDG Supplied by Coltec Industries. Deficiency Consisted of Missing Drain Port in Intermediate Casing.Required Oil Drain Port Machined Open ML17265A6291999-03-31031 March 1999 Rev 0 to Cycle 28 COLR for Re Ginna Npp. ML17265A6241999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Ginna Station.With 990409 Ltr ML17265A6141999-03-31031 March 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990301,two Main Steam non-return Check Valves Were Declared Inoperable Due to Exceedance of Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Changes in Methodology & Matls.Packing Gland Torque Will Be Adjusted.With 990331 Ltr ML17265A6131999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990227,discovered That Surveillance Had Not Been Performed at Frequency,Per Ts.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure O-6.13 Will Be Evaluated for Enhancement Documentation of Completion of ITS Srs.With 990329 Ltr ML17265A6061999-03-24024 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990222,plant Was Noted Outside Design Basis.Caused by Deficiencies in NSSS Vendor Slb Mass & Energy Release.Placed Temporary Administrative Restriction 40 Degrees F Max on Screenhouse Bay Temp ML17265A5661999-03-0101 March 1999 Rev 26 to QA Program for Station Operation. ML17265A5961999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990310 Ltr ML17265A5371999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990205 Ltr ML17265A5951998-12-31031 December 1998 Rg&E 1998 Annual Rept. ML17265A5001998-12-21021 December 1998 Rev 26 to QA Program for Station Operation. ML17265A4951998-12-21021 December 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 981120,loss of 34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751,resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg.Caused by Faulted Cable Splice.Performed Appropriate Actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1.With 981221 Ltr ML17265A4931998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 971030,determined That Improperly Performed Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Procedure non-adherence.Appropriate Calibr Procedures Were Properly Performed with 24 H of Condition Discovery ML17265A4761998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 981210 Ltr ML17265A4691998-11-25025 November 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Systems (Creats) Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored to CR ML17265A4531998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 981110 Ltr ML17265A4271998-10-0505 October 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Air Samples Were Taken & Determined That Source of Radiation Was Naturally Occurring Radon.With 981005 Ltr ML17265A4291998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 981009 Ltr 1999-09-30
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yPRIORI TY 1~(ACCELERATED RIDS PROCESSING)
I.REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9507120033 DOC.DATE: 95/07/07 NOTARIZED:
NO DOCKET g FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G 05000244 P AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION ST MARTIN,J.T.
Rochester Gas&Electric Corp.MECREDY,R.C.
Rochester Gas&Electric Corp.R RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION JOHNSON,A.R.
Project Directorate I-1 (PDl-1)(Post 941001)
SUBJECT:
LER 95-005-00:on 950607,FW isolation on high SG level occurred.Caused by decrease in instrument air pressure due to an air leak in containment.FW flow switched to manual control.W/950707 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED LTR ENCL SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).
I 0 05000244 T RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD1-1 PD INTERNAL: AEOD S B NRR/DE/EELB NRR/DISP/PIPB NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DSSA/SPS B/B RES/DS IR/EI B EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD NOAC MURPHY i G A NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME JOHNSON,A AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DOPS/OECB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DSSA/SPLB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN1 FILE 01 LI TCO BRYCE i J H NOAC POORE i W NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1'1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 N NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE!CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN 5D8 (415-2083)
TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 26 ENCL 26 eGCHE51FR G~s~wo ElEcTec coepcw"crI~8w~Sr~vEriuE eGc~EsTFe.
MY~sd~a CATE July 7, 1995 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Attn: Allen R.Johnson PWR Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C.20555
Subject:
LER 95-005, Instrument Air Leak in Containment Causes Feedwater Isolation R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No.50-244 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv), which requires a report of,"Any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS)", the attached Licensee Event Report LER 95-005 is hereby submitted.
This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.Very truly yours, Robert C.Mecredy xc: U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr.Allen R.Johnson (Mail Stop 14B2)PWR Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C.20555 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Ginna USNRC Senior Resident Inspector'1 P r 9507l20033 950707 PDR ADOCK 05000244 S ma NRC FORM 366 (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OHB NO.3150-0'104 EXPIRES 5/3'I/95 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)(See reverse for required nunbcr of digits/characters for each block)ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY llITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORllARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE INFORHATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCHHISSION, MASNINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET NASHINGTON DC 20503.FAGILITY NAHE (1)R.E.G irma Nuclear Power P lant DOCKET NUHBER (2)05000244 PAGE (3)10F8 TITLE (4>Instrument Air Leak in Containment Causes Feedwater Isolation MONTH DAY 06 07 YEAR YEAR 95 95 EVENT DATE (5)LER NUMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER--005--REVISION NUMBER 00 HOHTN DAY YEAR 07 07 REPORT DATE (7)FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER FACILITY HAHE DOCKET NUMBER OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)OPERATING.MODE (9)P(NER LEVEL (10)N 097 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT 20.402(b)20.405(a)(1)(i)20.405(a)(1)(ii) 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 20.405(c>50.36(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50'3(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 50'3(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50'3(a)(2)(x) 73.71(b)73.71(c)OTHER (Spec'I fy In Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)TO THE REQUIREHENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or mor e)(11)LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)NAME John T.St.Hartin-Tcchnical Assistant TELEPHONE NUHBER (Include Area Code)(716)77'1-3641 COHPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IH THIS REPORT ('13)CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT HANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONEHI'ANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS B LD PSF 0000 N SUPPLEHENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).X HO EXPECTED SUSHI SS I ON DATE (15)MONTH DAY YEAR ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)(16)On June 7, 1995 at approximately 1905 approximately 97%steady state reactor power isolated to Containment due to an air leak, Steam Generator level occurred when levels level in the Steam Generators.
EDST, with the plant at and the Instrument Air system Feedwater Isolation on high went above 67%narrow range Immediate corrective action was to manually control feedwater flow until levels in the Steam Generators were restored to their normal operating band.The underlying cause of the inability to control Steam Generator levels was a decrease in Instrument Air pressure due to an Instrument Air leak in Containment, followed by restoration of air pressure with a demand signal to fully open main feedwater regulating valves.This event is NUREG-1022 Cause Code (B).Corrective action to preclude repetition is outlined in Section V.B.NRC FORM 366 (5-92>
NRC FORH 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORHATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (MNBB 1714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3180-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET'WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUHBER (2)YEAR 05000244 95 LER NUMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUHBER--005--REVISION NUMBER 00 PAGE (3)2 OF 8 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS:
The plant was at approximately 97%steady state reactor power with no significant activities in progress.A soldered joint connection in the Instrument Air system in Containment failed, causing a decrease in Instrument Air pressure, and loss of control air to air-operated components, including the main feedwater regulating valves.II.DESCRIPTION OF EVENT: A.DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES OF MAJOR OCCURRENCES:
o June 7, 1995, 1856 EDST: Instrument Air system leak occurs in Containment.
o June 7, 1995, 1902 EDST: Instrument Air to Containment is isolated, restoring normal air pressure to air-operated components outside Containment.
o June 7, 1995, 1905 EDST: Steam Generator (S/G)levels increase above 67%.Event date and time.o June 7, 1995, 1905 EDST: Discovery date and time.June 7, 1995, 1910 EDST: "A" and"B" S/G levels restored to pre-event normal operating band.B.EVENT: On June 7, 1995, at approximately 1856 EDST, with the plant at approximately 978 steady state reactor power, a soldered joint connection on a two inch Instrument Air (IA)line in Containment (CNMT)failed, resulting in leakage from the IA system and decrease in IA pressure.This decrease in IA pressure resulted in loss of control air to air-operated components, with valves beginning to travel to their respective"fail" positions.
Among these components were the two main feedwater regulating valves (MFRV)(fail closed)which drifted towards the closed position as IA pressure at the valve actuator decreased.
NRC FORH 366A (5-92)
.NRC FORH 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHNISSIOH LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OHB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHATIOH COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COHHENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE INFORHATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHEHT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.HUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3180-0104), OFFICE OF HAHAGEHEHT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAHE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUHBER (2)YEAR 05000244 95 LER HWER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUHBER--005--REVI SION NUHBER 00 PAGE (3)3 OF 8 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A)(17)At approximately 1902 EDST, the Control Room operators had diagnosed the probable location of the IA leak, and closed the IA CNMT Isolation valve, AOV-5392.With the closure of AOV-5392, the leak was isolated, and normal IA pressure was restored to components outside CNMT.Due to the MFRVs drifting closed, feedwater (FW)flows and Steam Generator (S/G)levels decreased, resulting in an increasing"demand" signal to the MFRVs.Isolation of the IA leak resulted in restoration of IA pressure, and the MFRVs opened fully, responding to the increased demand signal.At the time the MFRVs went to the full open position, level was approximately 25%in the"A" S/G and 40%in the"B" S/G.The increase in FW flow resulted in increasing level in the"A" and"B" S/Gs.Within three minutes narrow range level in the"B" S/G had increased to cause FW Isolation on high level in the"B" S/G (S/G level>/=67 0 narrow range level).The"B" MFRV closed in response to this FW Isolation signal as designed, and reopened when level decreased below 67%.For the next ninety seconds, there were several occurrences of FW Isolation for the"B" S/G as level cycled around 67%.During this time narrow range level in the"A" S/G also increased to cause FW Isolation on high level in the"A" S/G.For approximately twenty seconds, there were occurrences of FW Isolation for the"A" S/G as level cycled around 67%.This short term S/G level transient continued until the Control Room operators took manual control to restore S/G levels.At approximately 1910 EDST, levels in the"A" and"B" S/Gs were restored to their normal operating band.C.INOPERABLE STRUCTURES i COMPONENTS OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT: The decrease in IA pressure resulted in loss of control air to air-operated components.
D.OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED: Due to the failed soldered joint connection in CNMT, and the subsequent isolation of IA to CNMT, air-operated components in CNMT failed to their respective"fail" positions.
These included several valves and ventilation dampers.In addition, the Reactor Compartment Cooling (RCC)fan motor tripped when the associated dampers failed closed.HRC FORH 366A (5-92)
JIRC FORM 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AHD RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AHD TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET'WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUMBER (2)05000244 YEAR 95 LER NUMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER--005--REVISION HUMBER 00 PAGE (3)4 OF 8 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)For air-operated components outside the CNMT, there was a decrease in IA pressure throughout the plant for six minutes, until IA to CNMT was isolated.During this time, numerous air-operated components outside CNMT started to travel to their respective"fail" positions.
With the exception of the MFRVs, this loss of control air did not adversely affect the ability of the Control Room operators to maintain plant conditions.
E.METHOD OF DISCOVERY:
This event was immediately apparent due to alarms and indications in the Control Room.In particular, Main Control Board annunciators C-17 (CONTAINMENT VENT SYSTEM)and H-8 (INSTRUMENT AIR LO PRESS 100 PSI)alarmed, indicating a problem with IA in CNMT.OPERATOR ACTION: The Control Room operators responded to Main Control Board annunciators C-17, H-8 and H-16 (INSTRUMENT AIR COMP), and referred to Alarm Response Procedures C-17, H-8 and H-16.They entered Abnormal Operating Procedure AP-IA.l (LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR).The Control Room operators requested that the auxiliary operator start the standby diesel-driven air compressor.
Following the steps of AP-IA.1 and with the knowledge that abnormal alarms were received on CNMT systems prior to those on secondary systems, the Control Room operators isolated IA to CNMT by closing the IA CNMT Isolation valve (AOV-5392).
This action isolated the leak from the rest of the IA system, and IA pressure increased to normal pressure in the rest of the system.After the FW Isolation, the Control Room operators transferred control of the MFRVs to"manual" to restore S/G levels to their normal operating band.When S/G levels and FW flows were stabilized, they transferred control of the MFRVs back to"automatic".
HRC FORM 366A (5-92)
JIRC FORA 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150 0104 EXP I RES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTONt DC 20555 0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150.0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUMBER (2)05000244 YEAR 95 LER NUMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER--005--REVISION NUMBER 00 PAGE (3)5OF8 EXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)With loss of letdown flow, the operators manually decreased charging flow to minimum flow, and secured one charging pump.The Shift Supervisor made a decision to initiate a power reduction until the leak was located, isolated, and IA pressure returned to normal throughout the system.At approximately 1908 EDST, a power reduction was started at one percent per minute, per Normal Operating Procedure 0-5.1 (LOAD REDUCTIONS).
Subsequently, the Control Room operators notified maintenance personnel and higher supervision.
An auxiliary operator and Radiation Protection technician conducted a CNMT entry, at power in an attempt to identify and isolate the leak.The leak was located on the main two inch IA header in CNMT.A temporary repair was made to the failed joint connection.
This repair enabled the Control Room operators to restore some pressure to the IA system in CNMT, sufficient to allow operation of selected valves and ventilation dampers.The NRC Operations Center was notified at approximately 2211 EDST, per 10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(ii), non-emergency four hour notification.
G.SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES:
The MFRVs and MFRV bypass valves closed automatically as a result of the FW Isolation signals.Ventilation dampers for the Containment Recirculation Cooling fans and RCC fans failed to their respective safeguards positions.
CNMT Isolation valves for charging and letdown also failed to their safeguards positions., III.CAUSE OF EVENT: A.IMMEDIATE CAUSE: The immediate cause of the FW Isolation was level in the S/Gs being)/=67%.The high level was caused by increased FW flows when the MFRVs went full open in response to the valve demand signal.This situation resulted in overfeeding the S/Gs.NRC FORM 366A (5.92)
JIRC FORM 366A (5-92)U.S~NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY MITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORllARD COMHENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS HANAGEMEHT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, HASHINGTONt DC 20555 0001 AND TO THE PAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEHENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAHE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUMBER (2)05000244 YEAR LER NUHBER (6)SEQUENTIAL HUMBER--005--95 REVISION NUMBER 00 PAGE (3)GOF8 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)B.INTERMEDIATE CAUSE: The intermediate cause of the open valve demand signal for the MFRVs was decreased FW flows and S/G levels as the MFRVs drifted toward the closed position as IA pressure decreased.
C.ROOT CAUSE: The underlying cause of the decrease in IA pressure was the failure of a soldered joint connection in a two inch IA line in CNMT.This was caused by insufficient insertion of the pipe into a fitting during original construction.
This event is NUREG-1022 Cause Code (B),"Design, Manufacturing, Construction
/Installation".
This event does not meet the NUMARC 93-01,"Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants", definition of a"Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure".IV.ANALYSIS OF EVENT: This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv), which requires a report of,"Any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS)".The FW Isolation of the"A" and"B" S/Gs was an automatic actuation of an ESF system.An assessment was performed considering both the safety consequences and implications of this event with the following results and conclusions:
There were no operational or safety consequences or implications attributed to the FW isolations because: The FW isolations occurred at the required S/G level.o S/G levels were quickly stabilized and manual control of MFRVs was accomplished to mitigate any consequences of the event.Based on the above, it can be concluded that the public's health and safety was assured at all times.NRC FORM 366A (5-92)
ARC FORM 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150-0104 EXP I RES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDIHG BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MHBB 7714), U.ST NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AHD TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3140 0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTOH DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUMBER (2)05000244 YEAR LER NUMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 95--005--REVISION NUMBER 00 PAGE (3)7 OF 8 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A)(17)V.CORRECTIVE ACTION: A.ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS: o MFRVs were returned to automatic after S/G levels were restored to their pre-event normal operating band.o A temporary repair was made to the failed joint connection in CNMT.This temporary repair enabled the Control Room operators to restore some pressure to the IA system in CNMT, sufficient to allow operation of selected valves and ventilation dampers.After letdown flow was restored and the Control Room operators could control primary system volume, the load reduction was stopped.Maintenance personnel installed a temporary modification designed by Engineering, which permitted isolation of the failed joint for permanent repair, while maintaining an air supply to the letdown valves.This allowed the operators to maintain letdown flow.o Maintenance personnel performed the permanent repair by replacing the failed joint connection and adjacent pipe sections, and removed the temporary modification.
At the completion of these activities, normal IA was restored to CNMT.B.ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:
A sample of joint connections in the IA system will be examined by non-destructive techniques to confirm adequate pipe insertion into fittings.o This event will be evaluated and compared against Plant Simulator response under controlled conditions.
Any lessons learned and enhancements to the control of primary system pressure will be identified, and procedures changed, as appropriate.
NRC FORM 366A (5-92)
NRC FORM 366A (5-92)U.ST NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOH LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150-0104 EXP I RES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORUARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORHATION AHD RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, MASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET UASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAHE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUMBER (2)05000244 YEAR LER NUMBER (6)SEQUEHTIAL NUMBER 95--005--REVISION NUMBER 00 PAGE (3)8 OF 8 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)VI.ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
A.FAILED COMPONENTS:
There were no component failures, in that a soldered joint connection failed.This inch copper pipe to a two inch copper manufacturer of the pipe and fitting is manufacturer of the solder is unknown.the leak occurred when joint connected a two elbow fitting.The not relevant, and the B.PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS: A similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results: No documentation of similar LER events with the same root cause at Ginna Nuclear Power Plant could be iden-tified.C.SPECIAL COMMENTS: None NRC FORM 366A (5-92)