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| {{#Wiki_filter:NRCFORM366!5-1999)U.UCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/characters foreachblock)APPROBYOMBNO.31RMRBC06/30/2001 Estimated burdenperresponsetocomplywiththismandatoInformation collection request:50hrs.Reportedlessonlearnedareincorporated intothelicensing processandfbacktoindustry. | | {{#Wiki_filter:NRC FORM 366!5-1999)U.UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)APPRO BY OMB NO.31RMRBC 06/30/2001 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandato Information collection request: 50 hrs.Reported lesson learned are incorporated into the licensing process and f back to industry.Forward comments regarding burde estimate to the Rocords Management Branch (T4)F33), US Nuclear Regulatory Commlsgon, Washlfon, Dc 2055 0001~and to the Papenvork Reduction Pro ect (31504104) |
| Forwardcommentsregarding burdeestimatetotheRocordsManagement Branch(T4)F33),USNuclearRegulatory Commlsgon,
| | (Ãioo of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.an information collection does not display a currently vali OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, FACILITY NAME 11)R.E.Ginna Power Plant TITLE (I)DOCKET NUMBER (2)05000244 PAGE I3)I OF 9 Radon Build-up During Temperature Inversion Results in Actuations of Control Room Emergency Air Treatment Systems F,Ãlfh BFR RFPORTDA F.OTHF.RF CI IT Fe)INVO.D MONDI 09 DAY YEAR 04 1998 SEOVENDAL REvISION NIIMBER NDMBER 1998-003-01 MONI DAY 11 25 1998 PACILBY NAME PACILIIY NAME 05000 05000 OPERATINC htoDE (9)POWER LEVEL (10)100 THIS FPO TISSlJBMITTRD 20.2201(b) 20.2203 a I 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 20.2203 a 3 i 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73 a 2 ii 50.73(a)(2)(iii) |
| : Washlfon, Dc20550001~andtothePapenvork Reduction Proect(31504104)
| | RS)ANT O I F F UIRF IF SO 10 P'U 50.73(a)(S0.73 a 73.71 20.2203 a 2 ii 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) |
| (ÃiooofManagement andBudget,Washington, DC20503.aninformation collection doesnotdisplayacurrently valiOMBcontrolnumber,theNRCmaynotconductorsponsor,FACILITYNAME11)R.E.GinnaPowerPlantTITLE(I)DOCKETNUMBER(2)05000244PAGEI3)IOF9RadonBuild-upDuringTemperature Inversion ResultsinActuations ofControlRoomEmergency AirTreatment SystemsF,ÃlfhBFRRFPORTDAF.OTHF.RFCIITFe)INVO.DMONDI09DAYYEAR041998SEOVENDAL REvISIONNIIMBERNDMBER1998-003-01MONIDAY11251998PACILBYNAMEPACILIIYNAME0500005000OPERATINC htoDE(9)POWERLEVEL(10)100THISFPOTISSlJBMITTRD 20.2201(b) 20.2203aI20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 20.2203a3i20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73a2ii50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | NAME John St.Martin-Technical Assistant 20.2203 a 4 50.36(c)(l) 50.36(c)(2) |
| RS)ANTOIFFUIRFIFSO10P'U50.73(a)( | | LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)50.73 a 2 iv 50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 1ELEPHONE NUMBER (hetude Area Code)(716)771-3641 OTHER specify ia eaieae deicer<<ia Nac Fsns aeea COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COhIPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)cAusE S YSTEhf COMPONENT MANVPACIURER REPORTABLE TO EPIX SYSIEM COMPONENT 0 SUPPI,FMRNTAI RFPORT RXPI?CTFD 14 YES gf yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).X NO EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 1S sinaiospaced typcNTitten lines)(16)On September 4, 1998, at approximately 0740 EDST, the plant was in Mode 1 at approximately 100%steady state reactor power.Control Room Radiation Monitors reached their alarm setpoints, and actuated the Control Room Emergency Air Treatment System to isolate the Control Room atmosphere to and from outside a3.r.The same event occurred on September 15, 1998 at approximately 0051 EDST, and September 18, 1998 at 0452 EDST, and, October 27, 1998 at 0706 EST.On these dates, an atmospheric temperature inversion was present, and an unusually high concentration of Radon built up that was trapped due to the inversion. |
| S0.73a73.7120.2203a2ii20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) | | Control Room Radiation Monitors alarmed due to the presence of this unusually high concentration of naturally occurring radioactive Radon and Radon decay products'mmediate action was taken to determine the source of radiation. |
| NAMEJohnSt.Martin
| | In these events,"air samples were taken which determined that the source of radiation was naturally occurring Radon and Radon decay products.These air samples confirmed that fission product activ3.ty was not the cause.No immediate'corrective actions were required.A Root Cause Analysis was conducted. |
| -Technical Assistant 20.2203a450.36(c)(l) 50.36(c)(2) | | The results of the Root Cause Analysis are outlined in Section III.C.Corrective action to prevent recurrence is outlined in Section V.B.'F812070106 |
| LICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER(12)50.73a2iv50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 1ELEPHONE NUMBER(hetudeAreaCode)(716)771-3641 OTHERspecifyiaeaieaedeicer<<iaNacFsnsaeeaCOMPLETEONELINEFOREACHCOhIPONENT FAILUREDESCRIBED INTHISREPORT(13)cAusESYSTEhfCOMPONENT MANVPACIURER REPORTABLE TOEPIXSYSIEMCOMPONENT 0SUPPI,FMRNTAI RFPORTRXPI?CTFD 14YESgfyes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE).XNOEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE(15)ABSTRACT(Limitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximately 1Ssinaiospaced typcNTitten lines)(16)OnSeptember 4,1998,atapproximately 0740EDST,theplantwasinMode1atapproximately 100%steadystatereactorpower.ControlRoomRadiation Monitorsreachedtheiralarmsetpoints, andactuatedtheControlRoomEmergency AirTreatment SystemtoisolatetheControlRoomatmosphere toandfromoutsidea3.r.ThesameeventoccurredonSeptember 15,1998atapproximately 0051EDST,andSeptember 18,1998at0452EDST,and,October27,1998at0706EST.Onthesedates,anatmospheric temperature inversion waspresent,andanunusually highconcentration ofRadonbuiltupthatwastrappedduetotheinversion.
| | 'i)81i24 PDR ADQCK 05000244 8 PDR I 1 NRC FORM 366A I6-1999)LICENSEE EVENT.REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 50-244 SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER'UMBER 1998-oas-01 2 OF 9 TEXT flf more speceis required, use edditionel copies of NRC Form 366Ai I17)I.PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS: |
| ControlRoomRadiation Monitorsalarmedduetothepresenceofthisunusually highconcentration ofnaturally occurring radioactive RadonandRadondecayproducts'mmediate actionwastakentodetermine thesourceofradiation.
| | On September 4, 1998, at approximately 0740 EDST, the plant was in Mode 1 at approximately 1009 steady state reactor power.Unrelated to plant activities, an atmospheric temperature inversion was present.A temperature inversion limits the dispersion of matter from the ground into the upper atmosphere. |
| Intheseevents,"air samplesweretakenwhichdetermined thatthesourceofradiation wasnaturally occurring RadonandRadondecayproducts.
| | II.DESCRIPTION OF EVENT: A.DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES OF MAJOR OCCURRENCES: |
| Theseairsamplesconfirmed thatfissionproductactiv3.ty wasnotthecause.Noimmediate
| | 0 0 0 September 4, 1998, 0740 EDST: First event date and time.September 4, 1998, 0740 EDST: Discovery date and time.September 1 5 r 1 998 r 005 1 EDST Second event date and time.September 15, 1998, 0051 EDST: Discovery date and time.0 0 September 18, 1998, 0452 EDST: Third event date and time.September 18, 1998, 0452 EDST: Discovery date and time.0 0 September 18, 1998, 1631 EDST: Invalid actuation of Control Room Emergency Air Treatment System.October 20, 1998, 0403 EDST:,Invalid actuation of Control Room Emergency Air Treatment System.October 27, 1998, 0706 EST: Fourth event date and time.0 October 27, 1998, 1050 EST: Fourth event discovery date and, time.B.EVENT The Control Room Radiation Monitors monitor outside air in the vicinity of the Control Room.A high radiation signal on one of these monitors will initiate the Control Room Emergency Air Treatment System (CREATS)filtration train and isolate each air supply path to and from the Control Room.NRC FORM 366A I6-1998) |
| 'corrective actionswererequired. | |
| ARootCauseAnalysiswasconducted.
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| TheresultsoftheRootCauseAnalysisareoutlinedinSectionIII.C.Corrective actiontopreventrecurrence isoutlinedinSectionV.B.'F812070106
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| 'i)81i24PDRADQCK050002448PDR I1 NRCFORM366AI6-1999)LICENSEEEVENT.REPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant50-244SEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBER'UMBER1998-oas-012OF9TEXTflfmorespeceisrequired, useedditionel copiesofNRCForm366AiI17)I.PRE-EVENT PLANTCONDITIONS: | |
| OnSeptember 4,1998,atapproximately 0740EDST,theplantwasinMode1atapproximately 1009steadystatereactorpower.Unrelated toplantactivities, anatmospheric temperature inversion waspresent.Atemperature inversion limitsthedispersion ofmatterfromthegroundintotheupperatmosphere.
| |
| II.DESCRIPTION OFEVENT:A.DATESANDAPPROXIMATE TIMESOFMAJOROCCURRENCES: | |
| 000September 4,1998,0740EDST:Firsteventdateandtime.September 4,1998,0740EDST:Discovery dateandtime.September 15r1998r0051EDSTSecondeventdateandtime.September 15,1998,0051EDST:Discovery dateandtime.00September 18,1998,0452EDST:Thirdeventdateandtime.September 18,1998,0452EDST:Discovery dateandtime.00September 18,1998,1631EDST:Invalidactuation ofControlRoomEmergency AirTreatment System.October20,1998,0403EDST:,Invalid actuation ofControlRoomEmergency AirTreatment System.October27,1998,0706EST:Fourtheventdateandtime.0October27,1998,1050EST:Fourtheventdiscovery dateand,time.B.EVENTTheControlRoomRadiation MonitorsmonitoroutsideairinthevicinityoftheControlRoom.Ahighradiation signalononeofthesemonitorswillinitiatetheControlRoomEmergency AirTreatment System(CREATS)filtration trainandisolateeachairsupplypathtoandfromtheControlRoom.NRCFORM366AI6-1998)
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| NRCFORM366AI6-199BIOIU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION LlCENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant50-244SEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1998-oo3-013OF9TEXT/Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366A/I17IOnSeptember 4,1998,theplantwasinMode1atapproximately 1004steadystatereactorpower.Duetothetemperature inversion, therewasanunusually highconcentration ofnaturally occurring radioactive RadonandRadondecayproductsintheloweratmosphere.
| | NRC FORM 366A I6-199BI OI U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LlCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 50-244 SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 1998-oo3-01 3 OF 9 TEXT/If more spaceis required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A/I17I On September 4, 1998, the plant was in Mode 1 at approximately 1004 steady state reactor power.Due to the temperature inversion, there was an unusually high concentration of naturally occurring radioactive Radon and Radon decay products in the lower atmosphere. |
| Atapproximately 0740EDST,ControlRoomRadiation Monitorsreachedtheiralarmsetpoints.
| | At approximately 0740 EDST, Control Room Radiation Monitors reached their alarm setpoints. |
| TheCREATSactuatedandisolatedtheControlRoomatmosphere toandfromoutsideairuponreachingthesesetpoints.
| | The CREATS actuated and isolated the Control Room atmosphere to and from outside air upon reaching these setpoints. |
| Samplesweretakentodetermine theisotopiccontentoftheairintheControlRoom.Thesesamplesdetermined thattherewasanunusually highconcentration ofRadonandRadondecayproductsfromtheoutsideair,andindicated thatfissionproductactivitywasnotthecauseoftheincreaseinradioactivity.
| | Samples were taken to determine the isotopic content of the air in the Control Room.These samples determined that there was an unusually high concentration of Radon and Radon decay products from the outside air, and indicated that fission product activity was not the cause of the increase in radioactivity. |
| OnSeptember 15,1998,atapproximately 0051EDST,ControlRoomRadiation Monitorsreachedtheiralarmsetpoints andtheCREATSisolatedtheControlRoomatmosphere toandfromoutsideair.Again,atemperature inversion waspresent,andsamplesdetermined thattherewasanunusually highconcentration ofRadonandRadondecayproductsfromtheoutsideair.OnSeptember 18,1998,atapproximately 0452EDST,ControlRoomRadiation Monitorsreachedtheiralarmsetpoints andtheCREATSisolatedtheControlRoomatmosphere toandfromoutsideair.Forathirdtime,atemperature inversion waspresent,andsamplesdetermined thattherewasanunusually highconcentration ofRadonandRadondecayproductsfromtheoutsideair.OnOctober27',1998,atapproximately 0706EST,ControlRoomRadiation Monitorsreachedtheiralarmsetpoints.
| | On September 15, 1998, at approximately 0051 EDST, Control Room Radiation Monitors reached their alarm setpoints and the CREATS isolated the Control Room atmosphere to and from outside air.Again, a temperature inversion was present, and samples determined that there was an unusually high concentration of Radon and Radon decay products from the outside air.On September 18, 1998, at approximately 0452 EDST, Control Room Radiation Monitors reached their alarm setpoints and the CREATS isolated the Control Room atmosphere to and from outside air.For a third time, a temperature inversion was present, and samples determined that there was an unusually high concentration of Radon and Radon decay products from the outside air.On October 27', 1998, at approximately 0706 EST, Control Room Radiation Monitors reached their alarm setpoints. |
| Priortothistime,theCREATShadbeenmanuallyisolatedfortroubleshooting oftheControlRoomRadiation Monitors.
| | Prior to this time, the CREATS had been manually isolated for troubleshooting of the Control Room Radiation Monitors.Therefore, when the radiation alarms occurred, no CREATS actuation or Control Room alarm occurred.Later that morning (at approximately 1050 EST), Instrument and Control (I&C)technicians observed the radiation monitor alarm on a local panel outside the Control Room, and notified Control Room operators of the alarm.Another temperature inversion was determined to be present.NRC FORM 366A I6-1998) |
| Therefore, whentheradiation alarmsoccurred, noCREATSactuation orControlRoomalarmoccurred. | |
| Laterthatmorning(atapproximately 1050EST),Instrument andControl(I&C)technicians observedtheradiation monitoralarmonalocalpaneloutsidetheControlRoom,andnotifiedControlRoomoperators ofthealarm.Anothertemperature inversion wasdetermined tobepresent.NRCFORM366AI6-1998)
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| NRCFORM366AI6.199BILICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant50-244SEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1998-oos-014OF9TEXTflfmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366A/1171Inadditiontothesevalidevents,thereweretwo(2)invalidCREATSactuations thatoccurredintherecentpast.OnSeptember 18,1998,atapproximately 1631EDST,aninvalidCREATSactuation occurred.
| | NRC FORM 366A I6.1 99 BI LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 50-244 SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 1998-oos-01 4 OF 9 TEXT flf more spaceis required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A/1171 In addition to these valid events, there were two (2)invalid CREATS actuations that occurred in the recent past.On September 18, 1998, at approximately 1631 EDST, an invalid CREATS actuation occurred.Control Room operators checked the Control Room Radiation Monitors locally, and discovered that there was no alarm condition. |
| ControlRoomoperators checkedtheControlRoomRadiation Monitorslocally,anddiscovered thattherewasnoalarmcondition.
| | There was no temperature inversion present, and there had been no significant increase in radioactivity as monitored by the Control Ro'om Radiation Monitors.It was determined that this event (September 18 at 1631 EDST)was an invalid actuation. |
| Therewasnotemperature inversion present,andtherehadbeennosignificant increaseinradioactivity asmonitored bytheControlRo'omRadiation Monitors.
| | On October 20, 1998, at approximately 0403 EDST, another invalid CREATS actuation occurred.Control Room operators determined that one of the Control Room Radiation Monitor channels had spiked above the alarm setpoint.There was no temperature inversion present, and there had been no significant increase in radioactivity as monitored by the Control Room Radiation Monitors.It was determined that this event (October 20 at 0403 EDST)was an invalid actuation. |
| Itwasdetermined thatthisevent(September 18at1631EDST)wasaninvalidactuation.
| | C~I NOPERABLE STRUCTURES r COMPONENTS r OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRI BUTED TO THE EVENT: None D.OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED: None E.METHOD OF DISCOVERY: |
| OnOctober20,1998,atapproximately 0403EDST,anotherinvalidCREATSactuation occurred.
| | The events of September 4, 15, and 18 were immediately apparent due to the actuation of CREATS to isolate the Control Room atmosphere to and from outside air.The event.of October 27 was not apparent to Control Room operators, since there was no CREATS actuation and no alarm in the Control Room.This event was discovered by I&C technicians. |
| ControlRoomoperators determined thatoneoftheControlRoomRadiation Monitorchannelshadspikedabovethealarmsetpoint.
| | NRC FORM 366A I6-1998) |
| Therewasnotemperature inversion present,andtherehadbeennosignificant increaseinradioactivity asmonitored bytheControlRoomRadiation Monitors.
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| Itwasdetermined thatthisevent(October20at0403EDST)wasaninvalidactuation.
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| C~INOPERABLE STRUCTURES rCOMPONENTS rORSYSTEMSTHATCONTRIBUTEDTOTHEEVENT:NoneD.OTHERSYSTEMSORSECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED: | |
| NoneE.METHODOFDISCOVERY:
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| TheeventsofSeptember 4,15,and18wereimmediately apparentduetotheactuation ofCREATStoisolatetheControlRoomatmosphere toandfromoutsideair.Theevent.ofOctober27wasnotapparenttoControlRoomoperators, sincetherewasnoCREATSactuation andnoalarmintheControlRoom.Thiseventwasdiscovered byI&Ctechnicians.
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| NRCFORM366AI6-1998)
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| NRCFORM366A(6.1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant50-244'SEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1998-oo3-015OF9TEXT/lfmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRC&rm366AlI17lF.OPERATORACTION:DuringtheeventsofSeptember 4,15,and18,theControlRoomoperators acknowledged MainControlBoardannunciators associated withtheradiation monitoralarmsandactuation oftheCREATS,enteredAlarmResponseProcedure AR-E-11(ControlRoomHVACIsola'tion),
| | NRC FORM 366A (6.1998)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 50-244'SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 1998-oo3-01 5 OF 9 TEXT/lf more spaceis required, use additional copies of NRC&rm 366Al I17l F.OPERATOR ACTION: During the events of September 4, 15, and 18, the Control Room operators acknowledged Main Control Board annunciators associated with the radiation monitor alarms and actuation of the CREATS, entered Alarm Response Procedure AR-E-11 (Control Room HVAC Isola'tion), and notified higher supervision and the NRC.They confirmed that Control Room Radiation Monitor R-37 (which measures particulate radiation) was locked in to the alarm condition. |
| andnotifiedhighersupervision andtheNRC.Theyconfirmed thatControlRoomRadiation MonitorR-37(whichmeasuresparticulate radiation) waslockedintothealarmcondition.
| | Independent air samples were requested, and when the results of these air samples confirmed the presence of radioactivity (Radon and Radon decay'products), the Control Room operators determined that, valid actuations of the CREATS had occurred.For the event which occurred on October 27, no operator response or action was warranted. |
| Independent airsampleswererequested, andwhentheresultsoftheseairsamplesconfirmed thepresenceofradioactivity (RadonandRadondecay'products), | | The Shift Supervisor subsequently notified the NRC per,10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(ii), non-emergency four hour notification, at approximately 1115 EDST on September 4, 1998.On September 15, 1998, the NRC was notified at approximately 0442 EDST.On September 18, 1998, the NRC was notified at approximately 0915 EDST.This last notification was slightly beyond the four hour timeframe due to delays in confirming the presence of Radon and Radon decay products.On October 27, 1998, the NRC was notified at approximately 1439 EST.G.SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES: |
| theControlRoomoperators determined that,validactuations oftheCREATShadoccurred.
| | I For the events of September 4, 15, and 18, the CREATS actuated to isolate the Control Room atmosphere to and from outside air when the radiation monitors reached their alarm setpoints. |
| FortheeventwhichoccurredonOctober27,nooperatorresponseoractionwaswarranted.
| | For the event on October 27, the CREATS was already actuated as a prerequisite for troubleshooting the system, so no response occurred.III.CAUSE OF EVENT: A.IMMEDIATE CAUSE: The immediate cause of the actuation of the CREATS was Control Room Radiation Monitors reaching their alarm setpoints, resulting in isolation of the Control Room atmosphere to and from outside air.(On October 27, no actuation occurred.) |
| TheShiftSupervisor subsequently notifiedtheNRCper,10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii),non-emergency fourhournotification, atapproximately 1115EDSTonSeptember 4,1998.OnSeptember 15,1998,theNRCwasnotifiedatapproximately 0442EDST.OnSeptember 18,1998,theNRCwasnotifiedatapproximately 0915EDST.Thislastnotification wasslightlybeyondthefourhourtimeframe duetodelaysinconfirming thepresenceofRadonandRadondecayproducts.
| | NRC FORM 366A I6-1998) |
| OnOctober27,1998,theNRCwasnotifiedatapproximately 1439EST.G.SAFETYSYSTEMRESPONSES:
| | NRC FORM 366A (6-1996)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILERI TEXT CONTINUATiON. |
| IFortheeventsofSeptember 4,15,and18,theCREATSactuatedtoisolatetheControlRoomatmosphere toandfromoutsideairwhentheradiation monitorsreachedtheiralarmsetpoints.
| | U.S.NUCLEAR REGUlATORY COMMISSION R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 50-244 SEOUENTIaL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 1998-oo3-O1 6 OF 9 TEXT Iif more speceis required, use edditionel copies of NRC Form 366AI I17)B.INTERMEDIATE CAUSE: The intermediate cause of the radiation monitors reaching their alarm setpoints was increased radioactivity of the outside air, due to an unusually high concentration of Radon and Radon decay products.C.ROOT CAUSE: There were valid and invalid CREATS actuations during the recent past.For the valid actuations, the underlying cause of the unusually high concentration of Radon and Radon decay products was an atmospheric temperature inversion; which trapped the naturally occurring Radon in the lower atmosphere, limiting the dispersion of matter from the ground into the upper atmosphere. |
| FortheeventonOctober27,theCREATSwasalreadyactuatedasaprerequisite fortroubleshooting thesystem,sonoresponseoccurred.
| | Samples taken confirmed that the CREATS actuation was due to the temperature inversion, and not due to fission product activity.Also, the alarm setpoints for R-36 and R-37 have been evaluated to be unnecessarily conservative, which resulted in CREATS actuations. |
| III.CAUSEOFEVENT:A.IMMEDIATE CAUSE:Theimmediate causeoftheactuation oftheCREATSwasControlRoomRadiation Monitorsreachingtheiralarmsetpoints, resulting inisolation oftheControlRoomatmosphere toandfromoutsideair.(OnOctober27,noactuation occurred.) | | Due to the invalid CREATS actuations, troubleshooting and root cause analysis were performed. |
| NRCFORM366AI6-1998)
| | As a result, additional factors were identified that contributed to the invalid CREATS actuations. |
| NRCFORM366A(6-1996)LICENSEEEVENTREPORTILERITEXTCONTINUATiON.
| | The Control Room Radiation Monitor is actually three (3)separate channels that analyze a common sample of outside air being supplied to the CREATS.Channel R-36 monitors noble gas.Channel R-37 monitors particulate. |
| U.S.NUCLEARREGUlATORY COMMISSION R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant50-244SEOUENTIaL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1998-oo3-O16OF9TEXTIifmorespeceisrequired, useedditionel copiesofNRCForm366AII17)B.INTERMEDIATE CAUSE:Theintermediate causeoftheradiation monitorsreachingtheiralarmsetpoints wasincreased radioactivity oftheoutsideair,duetoanunusually highconcentration ofRadonandRadondecayproducts. | | Channel R-38 monitors iodine.IGC personnel identified that the detector for R-37 was grounded.They also discovered a damaged detector cable for R-37, and found damaged insulation on the power supply cable to the Control Room Radiation Monitor.IV.ANALYSIS OF EVENT: These events are reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73,, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv), which requires a report of,"any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF)including the Reactor Protection System (RPS)".CREATS is listed in NUREG-1022 as an example system of what the NRC staff considers to be a system"provided.to.mitigate the consequences of a significant event." NRC FORM 366A IS-1998) |
| C.ROOTCAUSE:TherewerevalidandinvalidCREATSactuations duringtherecentpast.Forthevalidactuations, theunderlying causeoftheunusually highconcentration ofRadonandRadondecayproductswasanatmospheric temperature inversion; whichtrappedthenaturally occurring Radonintheloweratmosphere, limitingthedispersion ofmatterfromthegroundintotheupperatmosphere. | |
| Samplestakenconfirmed thattheCREATSactuation wasduetothetemperature inversion, andnotduetofissionproductactivity.
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| Also,thealarmsetpoints forR-36andR-37havebeenevaluated tobeunnecessarily conservative, whichresultedinCREATSactuations. | |
| DuetotheinvalidCREATSactuations, troubleshooting androotcauseanalysiswereperformed.
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| Asaresult,additional factorswereidentified thatcontributed totheinvalidCREATSactuations.
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| TheControlRoomRadiation Monitorisactuallythree(3)separatechannelsthatanalyzeacommonsampleofoutsideairbeingsuppliedtotheCREATS.ChannelR-36monitorsnoblegas.ChannelR-37monitorsparticulate.
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| ChannelR-38monitorsiodine.IGCpersonnel identified thatthedetectorforR-37wasgrounded.
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| Theyalsodiscovered adamageddetectorcableforR-37,andfounddamagedinsulation onthepowersupplycabletotheControlRoomRadiation Monitor.IV.ANALYSISOFEVENT:Theseeventsarereportable inaccordance with10CFR50.73,,LicenseeEventReportSystem,item(a)(2)(iv),whichrequiresareportof,"anyeventorcondition thatresultedinmanualorautomatic actuation ofanyEngineered SafetyFeature(ESF)including theReactorProtection System(RPS)".CREATSislistedinNUREG-1022 asanexamplesystemofwhattheNRCstaffconsiders tobeasystem"provided
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| .to.mitigate theconsequences ofasignificant event."NRCFORM366AIS-1998) | |
| I\ | | I\ |
| NRCFORM366A(8-1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant50-244SEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1998-,,oos-017OF9TEXT/Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCFarm366AiI17)Anassessment wasperformed'onsidering boththesafetyconsequences andimplications ofthiseventwiththefollowing resultsandconclusions:
| | NRC FORM 366A (8-1998)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 50-244 SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 1998-,, oos-01 7 OF 9 TEXT/If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Farm 366Ai I17)An assessment was performed'onsidering both the safety consequences and implications of this event with the following results and conclusions: |
| Therewerenooperational orsafetyconsequences orimplications attributed toCREATSactuation because:oTheCREATSprovidesaprotected environment fromwhichoperators cancontroltheplantfollowing anuncontrolled releaseofradioactivity.
| | There were no operational or safety consequences or implications attributed to CREATS actuation because: o The CREATS provides a protected environment from which operators can control the plant following an uncontrolled release of radioactivity. |
| Therewasnouncontrolled releaseofradioactivity whichoccurredonSeptember 4,September 15,September 18,andOctober27.0TheCREATSactuation wasinresponsetoincreased radioactivity inthevicinityoftheControlRoom.However,theincreased radioactivity wasduetonaturally occurring RadonandRadondecayproducts.
| | There was no uncontrolled release of radioactivity which occurred on September 4, September 15, September 18, and October 27.0 The CREATS actuation was in response to increased radioactivity in the vicinity of the Control Room.However, the increased radioactivity was due to naturally occurring Radon and Radon decay products.The increase in radiation detected was not due to any plant activity.Specifically, it was not due to an increase in fission product activity nor an uncontrolled release of radioactivity. |
| Theincreaseinradiation detectedwasnotduetoanyplantactivity.
| | 0 CREATS functioned as per design, to isolate the Control Room in response to levels of radioactivity that resulted in reaching the alarm setpoints on the Control Room Radiation Monitors.Based on the above, it can be concluded that the plant operated as designed, that there were no unreviewed safety questions, and that the public's health and safety was assured at all times.V.CORRECTIVE ACTION: A.ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS: At the conclusion of the three temperature inversions in September, and after the Control Room Radiation Monitors decreased below their alarm setpoints, the CREATS actuation signal was reset, and normal ventilation was restored to the Control Room.For the event of October 27, no CREATS actuation occurred,'and no actions were warranted. |
| Specifically, itwasnotduetoanincreaseinfissionproductactivitynoranuncontrolled releaseofradioactivity. | | NRC FORM 366A I6-1998) |
| 0CREATSfunctioned asperdesign,toisolatetheControlRoominresponsetolevelsofradioactivity thatresultedinreachingthealarmsetpoints ontheControlRoomRadiation Monitors.
| |
| Basedontheabove,itcanbeconcluded thattheplantoperatedasdesigned, thattherewerenounreviewed safetyquestions, andthatthepublic'shealthandsafetywasassuredatalltimes.V.CORRECTIVE ACTION:A.ACTIONTAKENTORETURNAFFECTEDSYSTEMSTOPRE-EVENT NORMALSTATUS:Attheconclusion ofthethreetemperature inversions inSeptember, andaftertheControlRoomRadiation Monitorsdecreased belowtheiralarmsetpoints, theCREATSactuation signalwasreset,andnormalventilation wasrestoredtotheControlRoom.FortheeventofOctober27,noCREATSactuation occurred,'and noactionswerewarranted.
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| NRCFORM366AI6-1998)
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| NRCFORM366AI6-1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant50-244SEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1998-oo3-018OF9TEXTllfmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofiVRCRearm'366AlI17)B~ACTIONTAKENORPLANNEDTOPREVENTRECURRENCE; 0Therootcauseofthevalidactuations wastheunusually highconcentration ofRadonandRadondecayproductsduringanatmospheric temperature inversion, whichtrappedthenaturally occurring Radonintheloweratmosphere, limitingthedispersion ofmatterfromthegroundintotheupper'tmosphere.
| | NRC FORM 366A I6-1998)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 50-244 SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 1998-oo3-01 8 OF 9 TEXT llf more space is required, use additional copies of iVRC Rearm'366Al I17)B~ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE; 0 The root cause of the valid actuations was the unusually high concentration of Radon and Radon decay products during an atmospheric temperature inversion, which trapped the naturally occurring Radon in the lower atmosphere, limiting the dispersion of matter from the ground into the upper'tmosphere. |
| Thisisanaturalphenomenon.
| | This is a natural phenomenon. |
| 0ThesetpointforR-37willbeadjustedtoeliminate unnecessary conservatism inthesetpointforactuation oftheCREATS.00ThesetpointforR-36hasbeenevaluated todetermine ifthereisunnecessary conservatism inthesetpoint.
| | 0 The setpoint for R-37 will be adjusted to eliminate unnecessary conservatism in the setpoint for actuation of the CREATS.0 0 The setpoint for R-36 has been evaluated to determine if there is unnecessary conservatism in the setpoint.The R-36 setpoint will remain unchanged. |
| TheR-36setpointwillremainunchanged.
| | Contributing factors to the invalid CREATS actuations, which were due to spiking on these radiation monitors, have been addressed by the following actions: 1.The grounded R-37 detector and the damaged R-37 detector cable have been replaced.2.The damaged insulation on the power supply cable has been replaced.VI.ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: |
| Contributing factorstotheinvalidCREATSactuations, whichwereduetospikingontheseradiation | | A.FAILED COMPONENTS: |
| : monitors, havebeenaddressed bythefollowing actions:1.ThegroundedR-37detectorandthedamagedR-37detectorcablehavebeenreplaced.
| | The failed components included the R-37 particulate detector (failed due to being grounded)and the detector cable (failed due to cold-working). |
| 2.Thedamagedinsulation onthepowersupplycablehasbeenreplaced. | | These components were manufactured by or supplied by Nuclear Research Corporation. |
| VI.ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: | | The detector is Model No.MD-34DT.B.PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS: A similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results: No documentation of similar LER events with the same root cause at Ginna Station could be identified. |
| A.FAILEDCOMPONENTS: | | NRC FORM 366A I6-1998I |
| Thefailedcomponents includedtheR-37particulate detector(failedduetobeinggrounded) andthedetectorcable(failedduetocold-working).
| |
| Thesecomponents weremanufactured byorsuppliedbyNuclearResearchCorporation.
| |
| ThedetectorisModelNo.MD-34DT.B.PREVIOUSLERsONSIMILAREVENTS:AsimilarLEReventhistorical searchwasconducted withthefollowing results:Nodocumentation ofsimilarLEReventswiththesamerootcauseatGinnaStationcouldbeidentified.
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| NRCFORM366AI6-1998I
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| NRCFORM366AI6-1999)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant50-244SEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1998-003-019OF9TEXT(Ifmorespeceisrequired, useadditional copiesol'VRCForm366AlI17),C.SPECIALCOMMENTS:
| | NRC FORM 366A I6-1999)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 50-244 SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 1998-003-01 9 OF 9 TEXT (If more speceis required, use additional copies ol'VRC Form 366Al I17), C.SPECIAL COMMENTS: Until 1998, Ginna Station did not consider the CREATS to be an ESF.In 1998, new NRC guidance was promulgated in NUREG-1022, Revision 1.NRC specifically listed the Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning System for Control Room as an example of an ESF system.Therefore, Ginna Station reporting procedures were revised in 1998 to be in accordance with this NRC guidance.Individuals recall that, prior to 1998, there were some CREATS actuations at Ginna Station.However, these actuations were not reportable at=-those times.Since these earlier actuations were not reportable, no documents exist to confirm any of these earlier occurrences. |
| Until1998,GinnaStationdidnotconsidertheCREATStobeanESF.In1998,newNRCguidancewaspromulgated inNUREG-1022, Revision1.NRCspecifically listedtheHeating,Ventilating andAirConditioning SystemforControlRoomasanexampleofanESFsystem.Therefore, GinnaStationreporting procedures wererevisedin1998tobeinaccordance withthisNRCguidance.
| | NRC FORM 366A I6-1998)}} |
| Individuals recallthat,priorto1998,thereweresomeCREATSactuations atGinnaStation.However,theseactuations werenotreportable at=-thosetimes.Sincetheseearlieractuations werenotreportable, nodocuments existtoconfirmanyoftheseearlieroccurrences. | |
| NRCFORM366AI6-1998)}}
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LER 98-003-01:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Systems (Creats) Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored to CRML17265A469 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Ginna ![Constellation icon.png](/w/images/b/be/Constellation_icon.png) |
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Issue date: |
11/25/1998 |
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From: |
ST MARTIN J ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
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To: |
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Shared Package |
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ML17265A468 |
List: |
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References |
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LER-98-003, LER-98-3, NUDOCS 9812070106 |
Download: ML17265A469 (17) |
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Similar Documents at Ginna |
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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML17265A7541999-09-22022 September 1999 LER 99-011-00:on 990823,small Tears Were Discovered in Flexible Duct Work Connector at Inlet of CR HVAC Sys Return Air Fan (AKF08).Caused by in-leakage Greater than That Assumed.Implemented Temporary Mod 99-029.With 990922 Ltr ML17265A7431999-08-24024 August 1999 LER 99-004-01:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Chevron Separator Vanes Were Installed Backwards.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg.Moisture Separator Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A7181999-07-23023 July 1999 LER 99-007-01:on 990423,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Instrument & Control Technicians Inadvertently Pulling Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Channel.Setpoint Adjustments Were Completed by Different Crew of Technicians ML17265A7081999-07-22022 July 1999 LER 98-003-02:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Was Noted Due to Invalid Causes.Caused by Various Degraded Components in CR RM Sys.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored ML17265A7031999-07-19019 July 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990617,determined That Temporary Unescorted Access Had Been Granted to Contractor Employee.Caused by Incomplete Info Re Circumstances of Individual Military Separation.Individual Access Was Revoked.With 990719 Ltr ML17265A7021999-07-15015 July 1999 LER 99-010-00:on 990615,ventilation Isolation of Auxiliary Bldg Occurred When Auxiliary Bldg Gas Radiation Monitor R-14 Reached High Alarm Setpoint.Cr Operators Rest Auxiliary Bldg Ventilation Isolation Signal.With 990715 Ltr ML17265A6851999-06-21021 June 1999 LER 99-001-01:on 990222,deficiencies in NSSS Vendor steam- Line Brake Mass & Energy Release Analysis Results in Plant Being Outside Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Deficiencies in W.Temporary Administrative Replaced.With 990621 Ltr ML17265A6661999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-009-00:on 990503,instrumentation Declared Inoperable in Multiple Channels Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts. Caused by Unanticipated High Frequency AC Voltage Ripple. Entered TS LCO 3.0.3.With 990602 Ltr ML17309A6541999-05-27027 May 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990427,overtemperature Delta T Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Faulted Bistable During Calibr of Redundant Channel.Plant Was Stabilized in Mode 3 & Faulted Bistable Was Subsequently Replaced.With 990527 Ltr ML17265A6631999-05-24024 May 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990423,technicians Inadvertently Pulled Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Cahnnel,Causing Reactor Trip,Due to High Range Flux Trip.Caused by Personnel Error. Labeling Scheme Improved ML17265A6601999-05-21021 May 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990421,start of turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Was Noted.Caused by MOV Being Left in Open Position.Closed Manual Isolation Valve to Secure Steam to Pump.With 990521 Ltr ML17265A6441999-05-13013 May 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990413,undervoltage Signal of Safeguards Bus During Testing Resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg. Caused by Personnel Error.Blown Fuse Was Replaced & Offsite Power Was Restored to Safeguards Bus 17.With 990513 Ltr ML17265A6431999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Moisture Separator Vanes Were Incorrectly Installed,Per 10CFR21.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg. Subject Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A6141999-03-31031 March 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990301,two Main Steam non-return Check Valves Were Declared Inoperable Due to Exceedance of Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Changes in Methodology & Matls.Packing Gland Torque Will Be Adjusted.With 990331 Ltr ML17265A6131999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990227,discovered That Surveillance Had Not Been Performed at Frequency,Per Ts.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure O-6.13 Will Be Evaluated for Enhancement Documentation of Completion of ITS Srs.With 990329 Ltr ML17265A6061999-03-24024 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990222,plant Was Noted Outside Design Basis.Caused by Deficiencies in NSSS Vendor Slb Mass & Energy Release.Placed Temporary Administrative Restriction 40 Degrees F Max on Screenhouse Bay Temp ML17265A4951998-12-21021 December 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 981120,loss of 34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751,resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg.Caused by Faulted Cable Splice.Performed Appropriate Actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1.With 981221 Ltr ML17265A4931998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 971030,determined That Improperly Performed Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Procedure non-adherence.Appropriate Calibr Procedures Were Properly Performed with 24 H of Condition Discovery ML17265A4691998-11-25025 November 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Systems (Creats) Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored to CR ML17265A4271998-10-0505 October 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Air Samples Were Taken & Determined That Source of Radiation Was Naturally Occurring Radon.With 981005 Ltr ML17265A3671998-07-14014 July 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 971019,CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Actuating Function Was Not Operable.Caused by Mispositioned Switch.Revised Procedure CPI-MON-R37.W/980714 Ltr ML17265A1921998-03-11011 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980209,discovered That Boraflex Degradation in SPF Was Greater than Was Assumed.Caused by Dissolution of Boron on Boraflex Matrix,Per 10CFR50.21.Removed Spent Fuel Assemblies from Selected Degraded Storage Rack Cells ML17265A1641998-02-0606 February 1998 LER 97-007-01:on 971117,reactor Engineer Recognized That Neutron Flux Low Range Trip Circuitry for Channel Was Not in Tripped Condition as Required.Caused by Technical Inadequacies.Channel Defeat Will Be Identified ML17265A1601998-02-0606 February 1998 LER 97-006-01:on 971103,verification of B Concentration Was Not Performed Due to Misinterpretation of Event Sequence. Audible Count Rate Function Was Restored to Operable Status ML17264B1441997-12-17017 December 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 971117,NF Low Range Trip Circuitry for Channel N-44 Was Not Placed in Tripped Condition.Caused by Technical Inadequacies in Procedures.Implemented EWR 4862 to Resolve Design deficiency.W/971217 Ltr ML17264B1291997-12-0303 December 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 971103,NIS Audible Count Rate Function Was Inoperable.Caused by Misinterpretation of Event Sequence Due to Not Verifying Boron Concentration.B Verification Occurred Every 12 H Per ITS LCO Action 3.9.2.C.3.W/971203 Ltr ML17264B1271997-12-0101 December 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 971031,undetected Unblocking of SI Actuation Signal Occurred at Low Pressure Condition,Due to Faulty Bistable Which Resulted in Inadvertent SI Actuation Signal.Sias,Ci & CVI Signals Were Reset ML17264B1211997-11-24024 November 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 971024,radiation Monitor Alarm Were Noted Due to Higher than Normal Radioactive Gas Concentration Resulted in Cvi.New R-12 Alarm Setpoint Was Maintained for Duration of Refueling Outage ML17264B0461997-09-29029 September 1997 LER 97-003-01:on 970730,bistable Instrument Trip Setpoint Could Have Exceeded Allowable Value.Caused by Insufficient Existing Margin Between Trip Setpoint & Allowable Value. Held Switches in Tripped configuration.W/970929 Ltr ML17264B0111997-08-27027 August 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970730,high Steam Flow Bistable Instrument Setpoint Plus Instrument Uncertainty Could Exceed Allowable Value in ITS Was Identified.Caused by Entry Into ITS LCO 3.0.3.Switches Placed in Tripped configuration.W/970827 Ltr ML17264A9941997-08-19019 August 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970720,34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751 Was Lost.Caused by Automatic Actuation of B Emergency DG Due to Undervoltage on Safeguards Buses 16 & 17.Offsite Power Restored to Safeguards Buses 16 & 17.W/970819 Ltr ML17264A9911997-08-11011 August 1997 LER 96-009-02:on 960723,determined That Leak Rate Outside Containment Was Greater than Program Limit.Caused by Weld Defect.Isolated Leak & Cut Out & Replaced Leaking Pipe ML17264A8271997-03-0303 March 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970131,discovered Service Water Temp Was Less than Specified Value.Caused by non-representative Method of Monitoring.Increased Water Temp in Screenhouse Bay to Greater than 35 Degrees F.W/970303 Ltr ML17264A8071997-01-22022 January 1997 LER 96-015-00:on 961223,discovered Thermally Induced Overpressure Transient Could Occur.Caused by Thermal Expansion of Fluid During Design Basis Accident Condition. Installed Relief Valve on Affected line.W/970122 Ltr ML17264A7471996-11-27027 November 1996 LER 96-013-00:on 961029,circuit Breakers Closed While in Mode 3 & Resulted in Condition Prohibited by TS Due to Personnel Error.Circuit Breakers for MOV-878B & MOV-878D Were re-opened.W/961127 Ltr ML17264A6051996-09-19019 September 1996 LER 96-012-00:on 960820,feedwater Transient Occurred,Due to Closure of Feedwater Regulating Valve,Causing Lo Lo Steam Generator Level Reactor Trip.Sgs Were Restored & Missing Screw in 1/P-476 Was replaced.W/960919 Ltr ML17264A6061996-09-19019 September 1996 LER 96-009-01:on 960723,leakage Outside Containment Occurred,Due to Weld Defect,Resulting in Leak Rate Greater than Program Limits.Source of Leakage Isolated from RWST by Freeze Seal,Allowing Exit from ITS LCO 3.0.3.W/960919 Ltr ML17264A5911996-09-0505 September 1996 LER 96-011-00:on 960807,improper Configuration of Circuit Breaker Occurred,Due to Undetected Internal Interference, Resulting in Automatic Start of Both Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.Running AFW Pumps Were secured.W/960905 Ltr ML17264A5921996-09-0505 September 1996 LER 96-010-00:on 960806,latching of Main Turbine While in Mode 4 Occurred,Due to Defective Procedure,Resulting in Automatic Start of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.Caused by Defective Maint Procedure.Procedure revised.W/960905 Ltr ML17264A5891996-08-22022 August 1996 LER 96-009-00:on 960723,determined Leak on Piping Sys Outside Containment Greater than Program Limit.Caused by Weld Defect.Pipe & Socket Welds Were Cut Out & Replaced. W/960822 Ltr ML17264A5781996-08-0606 August 1996 LER 96-008-00:on 960707,main Feedwater Pump Breakers Opened. Caused by Change in Seal Water Differential Pressure Occurred During Sys Realignment.Afw Flow Controlled as Desired to Maintain S/G level.W/960806 Ltr ML17264A5561996-07-12012 July 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 960612,CR Operators Identified Control Rods Misaligned & Not Moving in Proper Sequence.Caused by Faulty Firing Circuit Card in Rod Control Sys.Faulty Firing Circuit Card in 1BD Power Cabinet replaced.W/960712 Ltr ML17264A5421996-06-20020 June 1996 LER 96-006-00:on 960521,discovered Containment Penetration Not in Required Status.Caused by Personnel Error.Installed Flange Inside Containment Penetration 2.W/960620 Ltr ML17264A5411996-06-17017 June 1996 LER 96-005-00:on 960516,PORC Determined Deficient Procedures Do Not Meet SRs for Testing safety-related Logic Circuits. Caused by Inadequancies in Individual Testing Procedures. Procedures Re Improved TSs revised.W/960617 Ltr ML17264A5051996-05-17017 May 1996 LER 96-003-01:on 960308,identified That Both Pressurizer PORVs Inoperable Concurrently Due to Disconnection of Flex Hose to Both PORV Actuators to Install air-sets for Benchset & Limit Switch Activities.Hpes Completed ML17264A4481996-04-0808 April 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960308,both Pressurizer Relief Valves Inoperable.Hpes Evaluation Is Being Conducted to Determined Cause of Event.C/As:Both PORVs restored.W/960408 Ltr ML17264A4471996-04-0808 April 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960307,secondary Transient Occurred.Caused by Loss of B Condenser Circulating Water Pump.C/As: Thermography performed.W/960408 Ltr ML17264A4101996-03-18018 March 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 950504,inservice Test Not Performed During Refueling Outage.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Surveillance Frequency.Valve Test Performed & Disassembled. W/960318 Ltr ML17264A2971995-12-14014 December 1995 LER 95-009-00:on 950817,surveillance Was Not Performed Due to Improper Application of TS Requirements Resulting in TS Violation.Testing of MOV-515 Was Performed on 951115.W/ 951214 Ltr ML17264A1711995-09-25025 September 1995 LER 95-008-00:on 950825,secondary Transient Occurred.Caused by Loss of B Condenser Circulating Water Pump That Resulted in Manual Rt.Returned S/G Levels to Normal Operating levels.W/950925 Ltr 1999-09-22
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17265A7541999-09-22022 September 1999 LER 99-011-00:on 990823,small Tears Were Discovered in Flexible Duct Work Connector at Inlet of CR HVAC Sys Return Air Fan (AKF08).Caused by in-leakage Greater than That Assumed.Implemented Temporary Mod 99-029.With 990922 Ltr ML17265A7431999-08-24024 August 1999 LER 99-004-01:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Chevron Separator Vanes Were Installed Backwards.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg.Moisture Separator Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A7181999-07-23023 July 1999 LER 99-007-01:on 990423,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Instrument & Control Technicians Inadvertently Pulling Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Channel.Setpoint Adjustments Were Completed by Different Crew of Technicians ML17265A7081999-07-22022 July 1999 LER 98-003-02:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Was Noted Due to Invalid Causes.Caused by Various Degraded Components in CR RM Sys.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored ML17265A7031999-07-19019 July 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990617,determined That Temporary Unescorted Access Had Been Granted to Contractor Employee.Caused by Incomplete Info Re Circumstances of Individual Military Separation.Individual Access Was Revoked.With 990719 Ltr ML17265A7021999-07-15015 July 1999 LER 99-010-00:on 990615,ventilation Isolation of Auxiliary Bldg Occurred When Auxiliary Bldg Gas Radiation Monitor R-14 Reached High Alarm Setpoint.Cr Operators Rest Auxiliary Bldg Ventilation Isolation Signal.With 990715 Ltr ML17265A6851999-06-21021 June 1999 LER 99-001-01:on 990222,deficiencies in NSSS Vendor steam- Line Brake Mass & Energy Release Analysis Results in Plant Being Outside Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Deficiencies in W.Temporary Administrative Replaced.With 990621 Ltr ML17265A6661999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-009-00:on 990503,instrumentation Declared Inoperable in Multiple Channels Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts. Caused by Unanticipated High Frequency AC Voltage Ripple. Entered TS LCO 3.0.3.With 990602 Ltr ML17309A6541999-05-27027 May 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990427,overtemperature Delta T Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Faulted Bistable During Calibr of Redundant Channel.Plant Was Stabilized in Mode 3 & Faulted Bistable Was Subsequently Replaced.With 990527 Ltr ML17265A6631999-05-24024 May 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990423,technicians Inadvertently Pulled Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Cahnnel,Causing Reactor Trip,Due to High Range Flux Trip.Caused by Personnel Error. Labeling Scheme Improved ML17265A6601999-05-21021 May 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990421,start of turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Was Noted.Caused by MOV Being Left in Open Position.Closed Manual Isolation Valve to Secure Steam to Pump.With 990521 Ltr ML17265A6441999-05-13013 May 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990413,undervoltage Signal of Safeguards Bus During Testing Resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg. Caused by Personnel Error.Blown Fuse Was Replaced & Offsite Power Was Restored to Safeguards Bus 17.With 990513 Ltr ML17265A6431999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Moisture Separator Vanes Were Incorrectly Installed,Per 10CFR21.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg. Subject Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A6141999-03-31031 March 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990301,two Main Steam non-return Check Valves Were Declared Inoperable Due to Exceedance of Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Changes in Methodology & Matls.Packing Gland Torque Will Be Adjusted.With 990331 Ltr ML17265A6131999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990227,discovered That Surveillance Had Not Been Performed at Frequency,Per Ts.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure O-6.13 Will Be Evaluated for Enhancement Documentation of Completion of ITS Srs.With 990329 Ltr ML17265A6061999-03-24024 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990222,plant Was Noted Outside Design Basis.Caused by Deficiencies in NSSS Vendor Slb Mass & Energy Release.Placed Temporary Administrative Restriction 40 Degrees F Max on Screenhouse Bay Temp ML17265A4951998-12-21021 December 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 981120,loss of 34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751,resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg.Caused by Faulted Cable Splice.Performed Appropriate Actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1.With 981221 Ltr ML17265A4931998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 971030,determined That Improperly Performed Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Procedure non-adherence.Appropriate Calibr Procedures Were Properly Performed with 24 H of Condition Discovery ML17265A4691998-11-25025 November 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Systems (Creats) Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored to CR ML17265A4271998-10-0505 October 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Air Samples Were Taken & Determined That Source of Radiation Was Naturally Occurring Radon.With 981005 Ltr ML17265A3671998-07-14014 July 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 971019,CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Actuating Function Was Not Operable.Caused by Mispositioned Switch.Revised Procedure CPI-MON-R37.W/980714 Ltr ML17265A1921998-03-11011 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980209,discovered That Boraflex Degradation in SPF Was Greater than Was Assumed.Caused by Dissolution of Boron on Boraflex Matrix,Per 10CFR50.21.Removed Spent Fuel Assemblies from Selected Degraded Storage Rack Cells ML17265A1641998-02-0606 February 1998 LER 97-007-01:on 971117,reactor Engineer Recognized That Neutron Flux Low Range Trip Circuitry for Channel Was Not in Tripped Condition as Required.Caused by Technical Inadequacies.Channel Defeat Will Be Identified ML17265A1601998-02-0606 February 1998 LER 97-006-01:on 971103,verification of B Concentration Was Not Performed Due to Misinterpretation of Event Sequence. Audible Count Rate Function Was Restored to Operable Status ML17264B1441997-12-17017 December 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 971117,NF Low Range Trip Circuitry for Channel N-44 Was Not Placed in Tripped Condition.Caused by Technical Inadequacies in Procedures.Implemented EWR 4862 to Resolve Design deficiency.W/971217 Ltr ML17264B1291997-12-0303 December 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 971103,NIS Audible Count Rate Function Was Inoperable.Caused by Misinterpretation of Event Sequence Due to Not Verifying Boron Concentration.B Verification Occurred Every 12 H Per ITS LCO Action 3.9.2.C.3.W/971203 Ltr ML17264B1271997-12-0101 December 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 971031,undetected Unblocking of SI Actuation Signal Occurred at Low Pressure Condition,Due to Faulty Bistable Which Resulted in Inadvertent SI Actuation Signal.Sias,Ci & CVI Signals Were Reset ML17264B1211997-11-24024 November 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 971024,radiation Monitor Alarm Were Noted Due to Higher than Normal Radioactive Gas Concentration Resulted in Cvi.New R-12 Alarm Setpoint Was Maintained for Duration of Refueling Outage ML17264B0461997-09-29029 September 1997 LER 97-003-01:on 970730,bistable Instrument Trip Setpoint Could Have Exceeded Allowable Value.Caused by Insufficient Existing Margin Between Trip Setpoint & Allowable Value. Held Switches in Tripped configuration.W/970929 Ltr ML17264B0111997-08-27027 August 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970730,high Steam Flow Bistable Instrument Setpoint Plus Instrument Uncertainty Could Exceed Allowable Value in ITS Was Identified.Caused by Entry Into ITS LCO 3.0.3.Switches Placed in Tripped configuration.W/970827 Ltr ML17264A9941997-08-19019 August 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970720,34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751 Was Lost.Caused by Automatic Actuation of B Emergency DG Due to Undervoltage on Safeguards Buses 16 & 17.Offsite Power Restored to Safeguards Buses 16 & 17.W/970819 Ltr ML17264A9911997-08-11011 August 1997 LER 96-009-02:on 960723,determined That Leak Rate Outside Containment Was Greater than Program Limit.Caused by Weld Defect.Isolated Leak & Cut Out & Replaced Leaking Pipe ML17264A8271997-03-0303 March 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970131,discovered Service Water Temp Was Less than Specified Value.Caused by non-representative Method of Monitoring.Increased Water Temp in Screenhouse Bay to Greater than 35 Degrees F.W/970303 Ltr ML17264A8071997-01-22022 January 1997 LER 96-015-00:on 961223,discovered Thermally Induced Overpressure Transient Could Occur.Caused by Thermal Expansion of Fluid During Design Basis Accident Condition. Installed Relief Valve on Affected line.W/970122 Ltr ML17264A7471996-11-27027 November 1996 LER 96-013-00:on 961029,circuit Breakers Closed While in Mode 3 & Resulted in Condition Prohibited by TS Due to Personnel Error.Circuit Breakers for MOV-878B & MOV-878D Were re-opened.W/961127 Ltr ML17264A6051996-09-19019 September 1996 LER 96-012-00:on 960820,feedwater Transient Occurred,Due to Closure of Feedwater Regulating Valve,Causing Lo Lo Steam Generator Level Reactor Trip.Sgs Were Restored & Missing Screw in 1/P-476 Was replaced.W/960919 Ltr ML17264A6061996-09-19019 September 1996 LER 96-009-01:on 960723,leakage Outside Containment Occurred,Due to Weld Defect,Resulting in Leak Rate Greater than Program Limits.Source of Leakage Isolated from RWST by Freeze Seal,Allowing Exit from ITS LCO 3.0.3.W/960919 Ltr ML17264A5911996-09-0505 September 1996 LER 96-011-00:on 960807,improper Configuration of Circuit Breaker Occurred,Due to Undetected Internal Interference, Resulting in Automatic Start of Both Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.Running AFW Pumps Were secured.W/960905 Ltr ML17264A5921996-09-0505 September 1996 LER 96-010-00:on 960806,latching of Main Turbine While in Mode 4 Occurred,Due to Defective Procedure,Resulting in Automatic Start of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.Caused by Defective Maint Procedure.Procedure revised.W/960905 Ltr ML17264A5891996-08-22022 August 1996 LER 96-009-00:on 960723,determined Leak on Piping Sys Outside Containment Greater than Program Limit.Caused by Weld Defect.Pipe & Socket Welds Were Cut Out & Replaced. W/960822 Ltr ML17264A5781996-08-0606 August 1996 LER 96-008-00:on 960707,main Feedwater Pump Breakers Opened. Caused by Change in Seal Water Differential Pressure Occurred During Sys Realignment.Afw Flow Controlled as Desired to Maintain S/G level.W/960806 Ltr ML17264A5561996-07-12012 July 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 960612,CR Operators Identified Control Rods Misaligned & Not Moving in Proper Sequence.Caused by Faulty Firing Circuit Card in Rod Control Sys.Faulty Firing Circuit Card in 1BD Power Cabinet replaced.W/960712 Ltr ML17264A5421996-06-20020 June 1996 LER 96-006-00:on 960521,discovered Containment Penetration Not in Required Status.Caused by Personnel Error.Installed Flange Inside Containment Penetration 2.W/960620 Ltr ML17264A5411996-06-17017 June 1996 LER 96-005-00:on 960516,PORC Determined Deficient Procedures Do Not Meet SRs for Testing safety-related Logic Circuits. Caused by Inadequancies in Individual Testing Procedures. Procedures Re Improved TSs revised.W/960617 Ltr ML17264A5051996-05-17017 May 1996 LER 96-003-01:on 960308,identified That Both Pressurizer PORVs Inoperable Concurrently Due to Disconnection of Flex Hose to Both PORV Actuators to Install air-sets for Benchset & Limit Switch Activities.Hpes Completed ML17264A4481996-04-0808 April 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960308,both Pressurizer Relief Valves Inoperable.Hpes Evaluation Is Being Conducted to Determined Cause of Event.C/As:Both PORVs restored.W/960408 Ltr ML17264A4471996-04-0808 April 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960307,secondary Transient Occurred.Caused by Loss of B Condenser Circulating Water Pump.C/As: Thermography performed.W/960408 Ltr ML17264A4101996-03-18018 March 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 950504,inservice Test Not Performed During Refueling Outage.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Surveillance Frequency.Valve Test Performed & Disassembled. W/960318 Ltr ML17264A2971995-12-14014 December 1995 LER 95-009-00:on 950817,surveillance Was Not Performed Due to Improper Application of TS Requirements Resulting in TS Violation.Testing of MOV-515 Was Performed on 951115.W/ 951214 Ltr ML17264A1711995-09-25025 September 1995 LER 95-008-00:on 950825,secondary Transient Occurred.Caused by Loss of B Condenser Circulating Water Pump That Resulted in Manual Rt.Returned S/G Levels to Normal Operating levels.W/950925 Ltr 1999-09-22
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17265A7601999-10-0505 October 1999 Part 21 Rept Re W2 Switch Supplied by W Drawn from Stock, Did Not Operate Properly After Being Installed on 990409. Switch Returned to W on 990514 for Evaluation & Root Cause Analysis ML17265A7621999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 991008 Ltr ML17265A7531999-09-23023 September 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Corrective Action & Closeout of 10CFR21 Rept of Noncompliance Re Unacceptable Part for 30-4 Connector. Unacceptable Parts Removed from Stock & Scrapped ML17265A7541999-09-22022 September 1999 LER 99-011-00:on 990823,small Tears Were Discovered in Flexible Duct Work Connector at Inlet of CR HVAC Sys Return Air Fan (AKF08).Caused by in-leakage Greater than That Assumed.Implemented Temporary Mod 99-029.With 990922 Ltr ML17265A7471999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 990909 Ltr ML17265A7431999-08-24024 August 1999 LER 99-004-01:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Chevron Separator Vanes Were Installed Backwards.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg.Moisture Separator Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A7341999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 990806 Ltr ML17265A7291999-07-29029 July 1999 Interim Part 21 Rept Re safety-related DB-25 Breaker Mechanism Procured from W Did Not Pas Degradatin Checks When Drawn from Stock to Be Installed Into BUS15/03A.Holes Did Not line-up & Tripper Pan Bent ML17265A7181999-07-23023 July 1999 LER 99-007-01:on 990423,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Instrument & Control Technicians Inadvertently Pulling Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Channel.Setpoint Adjustments Were Completed by Different Crew of Technicians ML17265A7081999-07-22022 July 1999 LER 98-003-02:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Was Noted Due to Invalid Causes.Caused by Various Degraded Components in CR RM Sys.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored ML17265A7131999-07-22022 July 1999 Special Rept:On 990407,radiation Monitor RM-14A Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Failed Communication Link from TSC to Plant Process Computer Sys.Communication Link Was re-established & RM-14A Was Declaed Operable on 990521 ML17265A7031999-07-19019 July 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990617,determined That Temporary Unescorted Access Had Been Granted to Contractor Employee.Caused by Incomplete Info Re Circumstances of Individual Military Separation.Individual Access Was Revoked.With 990719 Ltr ML17265A7211999-07-19019 July 1999 ISI Rept for Third Interval (1990-1999) Third Period, Second Outage (1999) at Re Ginna Npp. ML17265A7021999-07-15015 July 1999 LER 99-010-00:on 990615,ventilation Isolation of Auxiliary Bldg Occurred When Auxiliary Bldg Gas Radiation Monitor R-14 Reached High Alarm Setpoint.Cr Operators Rest Auxiliary Bldg Ventilation Isolation Signal.With 990715 Ltr ML17265A7661999-06-30030 June 1999 1999 Rept of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments Conducted Without Prior NRC Approval for Jan 1998 Through June 1999, Per 10CFR50.59.With 991020 Ltr ML17265A7011999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 990712 Ltr ML17265A6851999-06-21021 June 1999 LER 99-001-01:on 990222,deficiencies in NSSS Vendor steam- Line Brake Mass & Energy Release Analysis Results in Plant Being Outside Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Deficiencies in W.Temporary Administrative Replaced.With 990621 Ltr ML17265A6761999-06-16016 June 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Defects & noncompliances,10CFR21(d)(3)(ii), Which Requires Written Notification to NRC on Identification of Defect or Failure to Comply. Relays Were Returned to Eaton for Evaluation & Root Cause Analysis ML17265A6661999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-009-00:on 990503,instrumentation Declared Inoperable in Multiple Channels Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts. Caused by Unanticipated High Frequency AC Voltage Ripple. Entered TS LCO 3.0.3.With 990602 Ltr ML17265A6681999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990608 Ltr ML17265A6651999-05-27027 May 1999 Interim Rept Re W2 Control Switch,Procured from W,Did Not Operate Satisfactorily When Drawn from Stock to Be Installed in Main Control Board for 1C2 Safety Injection Pump. Estimated That Evaluation Will Be Completed by 991001 ML17309A6541999-05-27027 May 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990427,overtemperature Delta T Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Faulted Bistable During Calibr of Redundant Channel.Plant Was Stabilized in Mode 3 & Faulted Bistable Was Subsequently Replaced.With 990527 Ltr ML17265A6631999-05-24024 May 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990423,technicians Inadvertently Pulled Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Cahnnel,Causing Reactor Trip,Due to High Range Flux Trip.Caused by Personnel Error. Labeling Scheme Improved ML17265A6601999-05-21021 May 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990421,start of turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Was Noted.Caused by MOV Being Left in Open Position.Closed Manual Isolation Valve to Secure Steam to Pump.With 990521 Ltr ML17265A6591999-05-17017 May 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Relay Deficiency Detected During pre-installation Testing.Caused by Incorrectly Wired Relay Coil.Relays Were Returned to Eaton Corp for Investigation. Relays Were Repaired & Retested ML17265A6441999-05-13013 May 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990413,undervoltage Signal of Safeguards Bus During Testing Resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg. Caused by Personnel Error.Blown Fuse Was Replaced & Offsite Power Was Restored to Safeguards Bus 17.With 990513 Ltr ML17265A6431999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Moisture Separator Vanes Were Incorrectly Installed,Per 10CFR21.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg. Subject Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A6381999-05-0707 May 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Replacement Turbocharger Exhaust Turbine Side Drain Port Not Functioning as Design Intended.Caused by Manufacturing Deficiency.Turbocharger Was Reaasembled & Reinstalled on B EDG ML17265A6391999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990510 Ltr ML17265A6361999-04-23023 April 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Power Supply That Did Not Work Properly When Drawn from Stock & Installed in -25 Vdc Slot.Power Supply Will Be Sent to Vendor to Perform Failure Mode Assessment.Evaluation Will Be Completed by 991001 ML17265A6301999-04-18018 April 1999 Rev 1 to Cycle 28 COLR for Re Ginna Npp. ML17265A6251999-04-15015 April 1999 Special Rept:On 990309,halon Systems Were Removed from Svc & Fire Door F502 Was Blocked Open.Caused by Mods Being Made to CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys.Continuous Fire Watch Was Established with Backup Fire Suppression Equipment ML17265A6551999-04-0909 April 1999 Initial Part 21 Rept Re Mfg Deficiency in Replacement Turbocharger for B EDG Supplied by Coltec Industries. Deficiency Consisted of Missing Drain Port in Intermediate Casing.Required Oil Drain Port Machined Open ML17265A6291999-03-31031 March 1999 Rev 0 to Cycle 28 COLR for Re Ginna Npp. ML17265A6241999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Ginna Station.With 990409 Ltr ML17265A6141999-03-31031 March 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990301,two Main Steam non-return Check Valves Were Declared Inoperable Due to Exceedance of Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Changes in Methodology & Matls.Packing Gland Torque Will Be Adjusted.With 990331 Ltr ML17265A6131999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990227,discovered That Surveillance Had Not Been Performed at Frequency,Per Ts.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure O-6.13 Will Be Evaluated for Enhancement Documentation of Completion of ITS Srs.With 990329 Ltr ML17265A6061999-03-24024 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990222,plant Was Noted Outside Design Basis.Caused by Deficiencies in NSSS Vendor Slb Mass & Energy Release.Placed Temporary Administrative Restriction 40 Degrees F Max on Screenhouse Bay Temp ML17265A5661999-03-0101 March 1999 Rev 26 to QA Program for Station Operation. ML17265A5961999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990310 Ltr ML17265A5371999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990205 Ltr ML17265A5951998-12-31031 December 1998 Rg&E 1998 Annual Rept. ML17265A5001998-12-21021 December 1998 Rev 26 to QA Program for Station Operation. ML17265A4951998-12-21021 December 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 981120,loss of 34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751,resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg.Caused by Faulted Cable Splice.Performed Appropriate Actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1.With 981221 Ltr ML17265A4931998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 971030,determined That Improperly Performed Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Procedure non-adherence.Appropriate Calibr Procedures Were Properly Performed with 24 H of Condition Discovery ML17265A4761998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 981210 Ltr ML17265A4691998-11-25025 November 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Systems (Creats) Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored to CR ML17265A4531998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 981110 Ltr ML17265A4271998-10-0505 October 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Air Samples Were Taken & Determined That Source of Radiation Was Naturally Occurring Radon.With 981005 Ltr ML17265A4291998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 981009 Ltr 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
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NRC FORM 366!5-1999)U.UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)APPRO BY OMB NO.31RMRBC 06/30/2001 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandato Information collection request: 50 hrs.Reported lesson learned are incorporated into the licensing process and f back to industry.Forward comments regarding burde estimate to the Rocords Management Branch (T4)F33), US Nuclear Regulatory Commlsgon, Washlfon, Dc 2055 0001~and to the Papenvork Reduction Pro ect (31504104)
(Ãioo of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.an information collection does not display a currently vali OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, FACILITY NAME 11)R.E.Ginna Power Plant TITLE (I)DOCKET NUMBER (2)05000244 PAGE I3)I OF 9 Radon Build-up During Temperature Inversion Results in Actuations of Control Room Emergency Air Treatment Systems F,Ãlfh BFR RFPORTDA F.OTHF.RF CI IT Fe)INVO.D MONDI 09 DAY YEAR 04 1998 SEOVENDAL REvISION NIIMBER NDMBER 1998-003-01 MONI DAY 11 25 1998 PACILBY NAME PACILIIY NAME 05000 05000 OPERATINC htoDE (9)POWER LEVEL (10)100 THIS FPO TISSlJBMITTRD 20.2201(b) 20.2203 a I 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 20.2203 a 3 i 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73 a 2 ii 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
RS)ANT O I F F UIRF IF SO 10 P'U 50.73(a)(S0.73 a 73.71 20.2203 a 2 ii 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
NAME John St.Martin-Technical Assistant 20.2203 a 4 50.36(c)(l) 50.36(c)(2)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)50.73 a 2 iv 50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 1ELEPHONE NUMBER (hetude Area Code)(716)771-3641 OTHER specify ia eaieae deicer<<ia Nac Fsns aeea COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COhIPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)cAusE S YSTEhf COMPONENT MANVPACIURER REPORTABLE TO EPIX SYSIEM COMPONENT 0 SUPPI,FMRNTAI RFPORT RXPI?CTFD 14 YES gf yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).X NO EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 1S sinaiospaced typcNTitten lines)(16)On September 4, 1998, at approximately 0740 EDST, the plant was in Mode 1 at approximately 100%steady state reactor power.Control Room Radiation Monitors reached their alarm setpoints, and actuated the Control Room Emergency Air Treatment System to isolate the Control Room atmosphere to and from outside a3.r.The same event occurred on September 15, 1998 at approximately 0051 EDST, and September 18, 1998 at 0452 EDST, and, October 27, 1998 at 0706 EST.On these dates, an atmospheric temperature inversion was present, and an unusually high concentration of Radon built up that was trapped due to the inversion.
Control Room Radiation Monitors alarmed due to the presence of this unusually high concentration of naturally occurring radioactive Radon and Radon decay products'mmediate action was taken to determine the source of radiation.
In these events,"air samples were taken which determined that the source of radiation was naturally occurring Radon and Radon decay products.These air samples confirmed that fission product activ3.ty was not the cause.No immediate'corrective actions were required.A Root Cause Analysis was conducted.
The results of the Root Cause Analysis are outlined in Section III.C.Corrective action to prevent recurrence is outlined in Section V.B.'F812070106
'i)81i24 PDR ADQCK 05000244 8 PDR I 1 NRC FORM 366A I6-1999)LICENSEE EVENT.REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 50-244 SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER'UMBER 1998-oas-01 2 OF 9 TEXT flf more speceis required, use edditionel copies of NRC Form 366Ai I17)I.PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS:
On September 4, 1998, at approximately 0740 EDST, the plant was in Mode 1 at approximately 1009 steady state reactor power.Unrelated to plant activities, an atmospheric temperature inversion was present.A temperature inversion limits the dispersion of matter from the ground into the upper atmosphere.
II.DESCRIPTION OF EVENT: A.DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES OF MAJOR OCCURRENCES:
0 0 0 September 4, 1998, 0740 EDST: First event date and time.September 4, 1998, 0740 EDST: Discovery date and time.September 1 5 r 1 998 r 005 1 EDST Second event date and time.September 15, 1998, 0051 EDST: Discovery date and time.0 0 September 18, 1998, 0452 EDST: Third event date and time.September 18, 1998, 0452 EDST: Discovery date and time.0 0 September 18, 1998, 1631 EDST: Invalid actuation of Control Room Emergency Air Treatment System.October 20, 1998, 0403 EDST:,Invalid actuation of Control Room Emergency Air Treatment System.October 27, 1998, 0706 EST: Fourth event date and time.0 October 27, 1998, 1050 EST: Fourth event discovery date and, time.B.EVENT The Control Room Radiation Monitors monitor outside air in the vicinity of the Control Room.A high radiation signal on one of these monitors will initiate the Control Room Emergency Air Treatment System (CREATS)filtration train and isolate each air supply path to and from the Control Room.NRC FORM 366A I6-1998)
NRC FORM 366A I6-199BI OI U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LlCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 50-244 SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 1998-oo3-01 3 OF 9 TEXT/If more spaceis required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A/I17I On September 4, 1998, the plant was in Mode 1 at approximately 1004 steady state reactor power.Due to the temperature inversion, there was an unusually high concentration of naturally occurring radioactive Radon and Radon decay products in the lower atmosphere.
At approximately 0740 EDST, Control Room Radiation Monitors reached their alarm setpoints.
The CREATS actuated and isolated the Control Room atmosphere to and from outside air upon reaching these setpoints.
Samples were taken to determine the isotopic content of the air in the Control Room.These samples determined that there was an unusually high concentration of Radon and Radon decay products from the outside air, and indicated that fission product activity was not the cause of the increase in radioactivity.
On September 15, 1998, at approximately 0051 EDST, Control Room Radiation Monitors reached their alarm setpoints and the CREATS isolated the Control Room atmosphere to and from outside air.Again, a temperature inversion was present, and samples determined that there was an unusually high concentration of Radon and Radon decay products from the outside air.On September 18, 1998, at approximately 0452 EDST, Control Room Radiation Monitors reached their alarm setpoints and the CREATS isolated the Control Room atmosphere to and from outside air.For a third time, a temperature inversion was present, and samples determined that there was an unusually high concentration of Radon and Radon decay products from the outside air.On October 27', 1998, at approximately 0706 EST, Control Room Radiation Monitors reached their alarm setpoints.
Prior to this time, the CREATS had been manually isolated for troubleshooting of the Control Room Radiation Monitors.Therefore, when the radiation alarms occurred, no CREATS actuation or Control Room alarm occurred.Later that morning (at approximately 1050 EST), Instrument and Control (I&C)technicians observed the radiation monitor alarm on a local panel outside the Control Room, and notified Control Room operators of the alarm.Another temperature inversion was determined to be present.NRC FORM 366A I6-1998)
NRC FORM 366A I6.1 99 BI LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 50-244 SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 1998-oos-01 4 OF 9 TEXT flf more spaceis required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A/1171 In addition to these valid events, there were two (2)invalid CREATS actuations that occurred in the recent past.On September 18, 1998, at approximately 1631 EDST, an invalid CREATS actuation occurred.Control Room operators checked the Control Room Radiation Monitors locally, and discovered that there was no alarm condition.
There was no temperature inversion present, and there had been no significant increase in radioactivity as monitored by the Control Ro'om Radiation Monitors.It was determined that this event (September 18 at 1631 EDST)was an invalid actuation.
On October 20, 1998, at approximately 0403 EDST, another invalid CREATS actuation occurred.Control Room operators determined that one of the Control Room Radiation Monitor channels had spiked above the alarm setpoint.There was no temperature inversion present, and there had been no significant increase in radioactivity as monitored by the Control Room Radiation Monitors.It was determined that this event (October 20 at 0403 EDST)was an invalid actuation.
C~I NOPERABLE STRUCTURES r COMPONENTS r OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRI BUTED TO THE EVENT: None D.OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED: None E.METHOD OF DISCOVERY:
The events of September 4, 15, and 18 were immediately apparent due to the actuation of CREATS to isolate the Control Room atmosphere to and from outside air.The event.of October 27 was not apparent to Control Room operators, since there was no CREATS actuation and no alarm in the Control Room.This event was discovered by I&C technicians.
NRC FORM 366A I6-1998)
NRC FORM 366A (6.1998)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 50-244'SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 1998-oo3-01 5 OF 9 TEXT/lf more spaceis required, use additional copies of NRC&rm 366Al I17l F.OPERATOR ACTION: During the events of September 4, 15, and 18, the Control Room operators acknowledged Main Control Board annunciators associated with the radiation monitor alarms and actuation of the CREATS, entered Alarm Response Procedure AR-E-11 (Control Room HVAC Isola'tion), and notified higher supervision and the NRC.They confirmed that Control Room Radiation Monitor R-37 (which measures particulate radiation) was locked in to the alarm condition.
Independent air samples were requested, and when the results of these air samples confirmed the presence of radioactivity (Radon and Radon decay'products), the Control Room operators determined that, valid actuations of the CREATS had occurred.For the event which occurred on October 27, no operator response or action was warranted.
The Shift Supervisor subsequently notified the NRC per,10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(ii), non-emergency four hour notification, at approximately 1115 EDST on September 4, 1998.On September 15, 1998, the NRC was notified at approximately 0442 EDST.On September 18, 1998, the NRC was notified at approximately 0915 EDST.This last notification was slightly beyond the four hour timeframe due to delays in confirming the presence of Radon and Radon decay products.On October 27, 1998, the NRC was notified at approximately 1439 EST.G.SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES:
I For the events of September 4, 15, and 18, the CREATS actuated to isolate the Control Room atmosphere to and from outside air when the radiation monitors reached their alarm setpoints.
For the event on October 27, the CREATS was already actuated as a prerequisite for troubleshooting the system, so no response occurred.III.CAUSE OF EVENT: A.IMMEDIATE CAUSE: The immediate cause of the actuation of the CREATS was Control Room Radiation Monitors reaching their alarm setpoints, resulting in isolation of the Control Room atmosphere to and from outside air.(On October 27, no actuation occurred.)
NRC FORM 366A I6-1998)
NRC FORM 366A (6-1996)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILERI TEXT CONTINUATiON.
U.S.NUCLEAR REGUlATORY COMMISSION R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 50-244 SEOUENTIaL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 1998-oo3-O1 6 OF 9 TEXT Iif more speceis required, use edditionel copies of NRC Form 366AI I17)B.INTERMEDIATE CAUSE: The intermediate cause of the radiation monitors reaching their alarm setpoints was increased radioactivity of the outside air, due to an unusually high concentration of Radon and Radon decay products.C.ROOT CAUSE: There were valid and invalid CREATS actuations during the recent past.For the valid actuations, the underlying cause of the unusually high concentration of Radon and Radon decay products was an atmospheric temperature inversion; which trapped the naturally occurring Radon in the lower atmosphere, limiting the dispersion of matter from the ground into the upper atmosphere.
Samples taken confirmed that the CREATS actuation was due to the temperature inversion, and not due to fission product activity.Also, the alarm setpoints for R-36 and R-37 have been evaluated to be unnecessarily conservative, which resulted in CREATS actuations.
Due to the invalid CREATS actuations, troubleshooting and root cause analysis were performed.
As a result, additional factors were identified that contributed to the invalid CREATS actuations.
The Control Room Radiation Monitor is actually three (3)separate channels that analyze a common sample of outside air being supplied to the CREATS.Channel R-36 monitors noble gas.Channel R-37 monitors particulate.
Channel R-38 monitors iodine.IGC personnel identified that the detector for R-37 was grounded.They also discovered a damaged detector cable for R-37, and found damaged insulation on the power supply cable to the Control Room Radiation Monitor.IV.ANALYSIS OF EVENT: These events are reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73,, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv), which requires a report of,"any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF)including the Reactor Protection System (RPS)".CREATS is listed in NUREG-1022 as an example system of what the NRC staff considers to be a system"provided.to.mitigate the consequences of a significant event." NRC FORM 366A IS-1998)
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NRC FORM 366A (8-1998)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 50-244 SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 1998-,, oos-01 7 OF 9 TEXT/If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Farm 366Ai I17)An assessment was performed'onsidering both the safety consequences and implications of this event with the following results and conclusions:
There were no operational or safety consequences or implications attributed to CREATS actuation because: o The CREATS provides a protected environment from which operators can control the plant following an uncontrolled release of radioactivity.
There was no uncontrolled release of radioactivity which occurred on September 4, September 15, September 18, and October 27.0 The CREATS actuation was in response to increased radioactivity in the vicinity of the Control Room.However, the increased radioactivity was due to naturally occurring Radon and Radon decay products.The increase in radiation detected was not due to any plant activity.Specifically, it was not due to an increase in fission product activity nor an uncontrolled release of radioactivity.
0 CREATS functioned as per design, to isolate the Control Room in response to levels of radioactivity that resulted in reaching the alarm setpoints on the Control Room Radiation Monitors.Based on the above, it can be concluded that the plant operated as designed, that there were no unreviewed safety questions, and that the public's health and safety was assured at all times.V.CORRECTIVE ACTION: A.ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS: At the conclusion of the three temperature inversions in September, and after the Control Room Radiation Monitors decreased below their alarm setpoints, the CREATS actuation signal was reset, and normal ventilation was restored to the Control Room.For the event of October 27, no CREATS actuation occurred,'and no actions were warranted.
NRC FORM 366A I6-1998)
NRC FORM 366A I6-1998)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 50-244 SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 1998-oo3-01 8 OF 9 TEXT llf more space is required, use additional copies of iVRC Rearm'366Al I17)B~ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE; 0 The root cause of the valid actuations was the unusually high concentration of Radon and Radon decay products during an atmospheric temperature inversion, which trapped the naturally occurring Radon in the lower atmosphere, limiting the dispersion of matter from the ground into the upper'tmosphere.
This is a natural phenomenon.
0 The setpoint for R-37 will be adjusted to eliminate unnecessary conservatism in the setpoint for actuation of the CREATS.0 0 The setpoint for R-36 has been evaluated to determine if there is unnecessary conservatism in the setpoint.The R-36 setpoint will remain unchanged.
Contributing factors to the invalid CREATS actuations, which were due to spiking on these radiation monitors, have been addressed by the following actions: 1.The grounded R-37 detector and the damaged R-37 detector cable have been replaced.2.The damaged insulation on the power supply cable has been replaced.VI.ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
A.FAILED COMPONENTS:
The failed components included the R-37 particulate detector (failed due to being grounded)and the detector cable (failed due to cold-working).
These components were manufactured by or supplied by Nuclear Research Corporation.
The detector is Model No.MD-34DT.B.PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS: A similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results: No documentation of similar LER events with the same root cause at Ginna Station could be identified.
NRC FORM 366A I6-1998I
NRC FORM 366A I6-1999)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 50-244 SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 1998-003-01 9 OF 9 TEXT (If more speceis required, use additional copies ol'VRC Form 366Al I17), C.SPECIAL COMMENTS: Until 1998, Ginna Station did not consider the CREATS to be an ESF.In 1998, new NRC guidance was promulgated in NUREG-1022, Revision 1.NRC specifically listed the Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning System for Control Room as an example of an ESF system.Therefore, Ginna Station reporting procedures were revised in 1998 to be in accordance with this NRC guidance.Individuals recall that, prior to 1998, there were some CREATS actuations at Ginna Station.However, these actuations were not reportable at=-those times.Since these earlier actuations were not reportable, no documents exist to confirm any of these earlier occurrences.
NRC FORM 366A I6-1998)