Revision as of 07:17, 1 July 2018

Text

Basis for Proposed Changes. Part 2 of 2
	ML14335A629
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	11/24/2014
From:	; Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML14335A689	List: ML14335A623; ML14335A629; NL-14-1385, Basis for Proposed Changes. Part 1 of 2; NL-14-1385, Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 - Request for Technical Specification Amendment Adoption of Previously NRC-Approved Generic Technical Specification Changes and Other Changes;
References
	NL-14-1385
	Download: ML14335A629 (162)
	v • d • e

Enclosure 2 to NL-14-1385 Marked-Up Technical Specifications PagesAC Sources -Operating 3.8.1SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.13---------------

NOTES---------------

1. This Surveillance shall be performed within10 minutes of shutting down the DG after theDG has operated

> 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months loaded > 4075 kWfor the 4075 kW DGs and _> 2850 kW for the2850 kW DG.Momentary transients below the minimum loadspecified do not invalidate this test.2. All DG starts may be preceded by an engineprelube period.Verify each DG starts and achieves, in < 12 seconds,voltage > 3952 V and frequency

_ 60 Hz.In accordance withthe Surveillance Frequency ControlProgramSR 3.8.1.14I-- -I r------This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. ý,

ITTF283lVerify each DG:a. Synchronizes with o ite power source whileloaded with emergenc loads upon a simulated restoration of offsite po er;b. Transfers loads to offsite ower source; andc. Returns to ready-to-load op ation.In accordance withthe Surveillance Frequency ControlProgramHowever, this surveillance may be performed to reestablish OPERABILITY provided anassessment determines the safety of the plantis maintained or enhanced.

Farley Units 1 and 23.8.1-12Amendment No. r(Unit 1)Amendment No. 9 (Unit 2)

Enclosure 2 to NL-14-1385 Marked-Up Technical Specifications PagesAC Sources--

Operating 3.8.1SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.15 Verify, with a DG operating in test mode and In accordance withconnected to its bus, an actual or simulated ESF the Surveillance actuation signal overrides the test mode by returning Frequency ControlDG to ready-to-load operation.

ProgramSR 3.8.1.16 Verify interval between each sequenced load block is In accordance withwithin +/- 10% of design interval or 0.5 seconds, the Surveillance whichever is greater, for each emergency load Frequency Controlsequencer.

ProgramSR 3.8.1.17----- ---- NOTES-------

1. All DG starts may be preceded by an engineprelube period. normallyVEEKI2. This Surveillance shall not be performed inMODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.Verify on an actual or sim lated loss of offsite powersignal in conjunction with an actual or simulated ESFactuation signal:a. De-energization o emergency buses;b. Load shedding fr m emergency buses; andc. DG auto-starts f m standby condition and:1. energize permanently connected loadsin _< 12 s conds,ITSTF-283 In accordance withthe Surveillance Frequency ControlProgram(continued)

However, portions of the surveillance may beperformed to reestablish OPERABILITY provided an assessment determines the safetyof the plant is maintained or enhanced.

Farley Units 1 and 23.8.1-13Amendment No.'i- (Unit 1)Amendment No. 1 (Unit 2)

Enclosure 2 to NL-14-1385 Marked-Up Technical Specifications PagesDistribution Systems -Operating 3.8.93.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS3.8.9 Distribution Systems -Operating LCO 3.8.9APPLICABILITY:

Train A and Train B AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.ACTIONSCONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIMEA. One or more AC electrical A.1 Restore AC electrical 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months spower distribution power distribution subsystems inoperable, subsystem(s) to AN&OPERABLE status.%-6hos r-from ef failull t-,meet--eeB. One or more AC vitalbuses inoperable.

B.1Restore AC vital bussubsystem(s) toOPERABLE status.8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months sd ,, 0ry [f Fdilut tomest-L-.G C. One Auxiliary Building DC C.1 Restore Auxiliary 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months selectrical power distribution Building DC electrical subsystem inoperable, power distribution AN_-subsystem toOPERABLE status. 46-heUF.er ldVisey of falure LOFarley Units 1 and 23.8.9-1Amendment No. (Unit 1)Amendment No. (Unit 2)

Enclosure 2 to NL-14-1385 Marked-Up Technical Specifications PagesBoron Concentration 3.9.13.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.1 Boron Concentration LCO 3.9.1Boron concentrations of the Reactor Coolant System, the refueling canal,and the refueling cavity shall be maintained within the limit specified in theCOLR.APPLICABILITY:

-..........

...........................-

N O T EMODE 6. Only applicable to the refueling canal and refueling cavity whenconnected to the RCS.-I --------------------------------------------ACTIONSCONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIMEA. Boron concentration not A.1 Suspend CORE Immediately within limit. ALTERATIONS.

ANDA.2 Suspend positive Immediately reactivity additions.

ANDA.3 Initiate action to restore Immediately boron concentration towithin limit.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.1.1 Verify boron concentration is within the limit specified In accordance within COLR. the Surveillance Frequency ControlProgramFarley Units 1 and 23.9.1-1Amendment No. E (Unit 1)Amendment No. W (Unit 2)

Enclosure 2 to NL-14-1385 Marked-Up Technical Specifications PagesContainment Penetrations 3.9.33.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.3 Containment Penetrations LCO 3.9.3The containment penetrations shall be in the following status:a. The equipment hatch is capable of being closed and held in place byfour bolts;b. One door in each air lock is capable of being closed; andc. Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere either:1. closed by a manual or automatic isolation valve, blind flange, orequivalent, or2. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE Containment Purgeand Exhaust Isolation System.ITSTF3 12INSERT -LCO 3.9.3 Note-APPLICABILITY:

During CORE ALTERATIONS, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.

ACTIONSCONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIMEA. One or more containment A.1 Suspend CORE Immediately penetrations not in ALTERATIONS.

required status.ANDA.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuelassemblies withincontainment.

Farley Units 1 and 23.9.3-1Amendment No. l (Unit 1)Amendment No. (Unit 2)

Enclosure 2 to NL-14-1385 Marked-Up Technical Specifications PagesINSERT -LCO 3.9.3 NoteITTF312----------------------

NOTE----------------

Penetration flow path(s) providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere may be unisolated underadministrative controls.

Enclosure 2 to NL-14-1385 Marked-Up Technical Specifications PagesContainment Penetrations 3.9.3SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.3.1 Verify each required containment penetration is in the In accordance required status. with theSurveillance Frequency ControlProgramSR 3.9.3.2 ýerify each required containment purge and exhaust In accordance vaye actuates to the isolation position on an actual or with thesim ated actuation signal. Surveillance Frequency ControlProgramSR 3.9.3.3 ---------------------

NOTE ------------------

In accordance Only re uired for an open equipment hatch. with theSurveillance Verify t e capability to install the equipment Frequency Controlhatch. ProgramFT=284---------

NOTE-- ---------

Not required to be met for containment purge and exhaust valve(s) inpenetrations closed to comply with LCO 3.9.3.c.

1.------------

-- ---- --- --- --------

-IFarley Units 1 and 23.9.3-2Amendment No.= (Unit 1)Amendment No. W (Unit 2)

Enclosure 2 to NL-14-1385 Marked-Up Technical Specifications PagesRHR and Coolant Circulation

-Low Water Level3.9.53.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.5 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation

-Low Water LevelLCO 3.9.5Two RHR loops shall be OPERABLE, and one RHR loop shall be inoperation.

-E_9One RHR loop may be inoperable and no RHR loop may be in the decayheat removal mode of operation for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for required surveillance INSERT -TS 3.9.5 _ .testing.

Note 2 ----------

.-.--- ....--.-.-.------...........-----------.--

-- ---.----- ----- --. ..APPLICABILITY:

MODE 6 with the water level < 23 ft above the top of reactor vessel flange.ACTIONSCONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIMEA. Less than the required A.1 Initiate action to restore Immediately number of RHR loops required RHR loops toOPERABLE.

OPERABLE status.ORA.2 Initiate action to Immediately establish

_> 23 ft of waterabove the top of reactorvessel flange.B. No RHR loop in operation.

B.1 Suspend operations Immediately involving a reduction inreactor coolant boronconcentration.

AND(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 23.9.5-1Amendment No. G (Unit 1)Amendment No. Eýý-(Unit

2)

Enclosure 2 to NL-14-1385 Marked-Up Technical Specifications PagesINSERT -TS 3.9.6 Note 22. All RHR pumps may be de-energized for < 15 minutes when switching from one train to another provided:

a. The core outlet temperature is maintained

> 10 degrees F belowsaturation temperature;

b. No operations are permitted that would cause a reduction of theReactor Coolant System (RCS) boron concentration; andc. No draining operations to further reduce RCS water volume arepermitted.

Enclosure 2 to NL-14-1385 Marked-Up Technical Specifications PagesPrograms and Manuals5.55.5 Programs and Manuals5.5.4 Radioactive Effluent Controls Program (continued)

b. Limitations on the concentrations of radioactive material released in liquideffluents to unrestricted areas, conforming to 10 times the concentration stated in 10 CFR 20, Appendix B (to paragraphs 20.1001-20.2401),

Table 2, Column 2;c. Monitoring,

sampling, and analysis of radioactive liquid and gaseouseffluents in accordance with 10 CFR 20.1302 and with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM;d. Limitations on the annual and quarterly doses or dose commitment to amember of the public from radioactive materials in liquid effluents releasedfrom each unit to unrestricted areas, conforming to 10 CFR 50, Appendix I;e.Beterrmimatiam ef eumiulative and prejeeted dese eenR~ibution3fro radiesetive effluerits for the eurrermt ealemder quarter arid eurreit esl~dar;o~rin coodanee with the methedelegy and pefanmzters in the 00CM at,ea~ e~r~31 dy's;'ITSTF-30q

f. Limitations on the functi nal capability and use of the liquid and gaseouseffluent treatment syste s to ensure that appropriate portions of thesesystems are used to re uce releases of radioactivity when the projected doses in a period of 31 days would exceed 2% of the guidelines for theannual dose or dose c mmitment, conforming to 10 CFR 50, Appendix I;g. Limitations on the do e rate resulting from radioactive material released ingaseous effluents to reas at and beyond the site boundary as follows:1. For noble gase : Less than or equal to a dose rate of 500 mrem/year to the total bo and less than or equal to a dose rate of 3000mrem/year to e skin, and2. For Iodine-1

, Iodine-133,

tritium, and for all radionuclides inparticulate f m with half lives greater than 8 days: Less than or equalto a dose ra of 1500 mrem/year to any organ.h. Limitations on t annual and quarterly air doses resulting from noblegases released n gaseous effluents from each unit to areas beyond thesite boundary, onforming to 10 CFR 50, Appendix I;Determination of cumulative dose contributions from radioactive effluents for the currentcalendar quarter and current calendar year in accordance with the methodology andparameters in the ODCM at least every 31 days. Determination of projected dosecontributions from radioactive effluents in accordance with the methodology in the ODCM at (continued) east every 31 days.Farley Units 1 and 2 5.5-3 Amendment No. -I-I(Unit 1)Amendment No. F (Unit 2)I Enclosure 2 to NL-14-1385 Marked-Up Technical Specifications PagesPrograms and Manuals5.55.5 Programs and Manuals5.5.15 Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP) (continued)

b. Provisions for ensuring the plant is maintained in a safe condition if a lossof function condition exists;c. Provisions to ensure that an inoperable supported system's Completion Time is not inappropriately extended as a result of multiple support systeminoperabilities; andno concurrent loss ofoffsite power or no d. Other appropriate limitations and remedial or compensatory actions.concurrent loss ofonsite diesel A loss of safety function exists when, assuming no concurrent single failure, agenerator(s),

safety function assumed in the accident analysis cannot be performed.

For thepurpose of this program, a loss of safety function may exist when a supportsystem is inoperable, and:a. A required system redundant to the system(s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable; or IrsWhen a loss of safety b. A required system redundant to the system(s) in turn supported by thefunction is caused by inoperable supported system is also inoperable; orinoperability of a singleTechnical Specification

c. A required system redundant to the support system(s) for the supported support system, the systems (a) and (b) above is also inoperable.

appropriate Conditions The SFDP identifies a loss of safety function exists. If a loss of safetyand Required Actions to function is determine to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions andenter are those of the Required Actions of LCO in which the loss of safety function exists aresupport system. required to be entered.5.5.16 Main Steamline Inspection ProgramThe three main steamlines from the rigid anchor points of the containment penetrations downstream to and including the main steam header shall beinspected.

The extent of the inservice examinations completed during eachinspection interval (IWA 2400, ASME Code, 1974 Edition,Section XI) shallprovide 100 percent volumetric examination of circumferential and longitudinal pipe welds to the extent practical.

The areas subject to examination are thosedefined in accordance with examination category C-G for Class 2 piping welds inTable IWC-2520.

5.5.17 Containment Leakage Rate Testing ProgramA program shall be established to implement the leakage rate testing ofcontainment as required by 10 CFR 50.54 (o) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J,(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 5.5-13 Amendment No. Fii(Unit 1)Amendment No. -'(Unit 2)

Enclosure 2 to NL-14-1385 Marked-Up Technical Specifications PagesPrograms and Manuals5.55.5 Programs and Manuals P5.5.17 Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (continued)

Option B, as modified by approved exemptions.

This program shall be inaccordance with the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.163,"Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program,"

dated September 1995,as modified by the following exception to NEI 94-01, Rev. 0, "Industry Guidelines for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J":Seetiong1 .2.3: The next Type A test, efter the MBroh 1004 tect for UnWit 1and the MSroh 1905 test for Unit 2, chall be perfoirmod duninrofuoling outage R22 (SpbRig 2000) for Unit I 8191d durigiefuelfi ouag R2e (Gpiiig 2010) for Un1t 2. This is a ontime emeeeotin.

SectioINSER

,5.5.17The peak calculated containment internal pressure for the design basis loss ofcoolant accident, Pa, is 43.8 psig.The maximum allowable containment leakage rate, La, at Pa, is 0.15% ofcontainment air weight per day.Leakage rate acceptance criteria are:a. Containment overall leakage rate acceptance criterion is _ 1.0 La. Duringplant startup following testing in accordance with this program, the leakagerate acceptance criteria are <_ 0.60 La for the combined Type B and Ctests, and < 0.75 La for Type A tests;b. Air lock testing acceptance criteria are:1. Overall air lock leakage rate is _< 0.05 La when tested at _> Pa.2. For each door, leakage rate is < 0.01 La when pressurized to > 10psig.c. During plant startup following testing in accordance with this program, theleakage rate acceptance criterion for each containment purge penetration flowpath is < 0.05 LaThe provisions of SR 3.0.2 do not apply to the test frequencies specified in theContainment Leakage Rate Testing Program.The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Containment Leakage RateTesting Program.(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 5.5-14 Amendment No. =(Unit 1)Amendment No. -e(Unit 2)I Enclosure 2 to NL-14-1385 Marked-Up Technical Specifications PagesINSERT -Section 5.5.171. The visual examination of containment concrete surfaces intended to fulfill therequirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B testing, will be performed inaccordance with the requirements of and frequency specified by the ASMESection XI Code, Subsection IWL, except where relief has been authorized bythe NRC.2. The visual examination of the steel liner plate inside containment intended tofulfill the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, will be performed inaccordance with the requirements of and frequency specified by the ASMESection Xl code, Subsection IWE, except where relief has been authorized by theNRC.

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant -Units 1 and 2Request for Technical Specification Amendment Adoption of Previously NRC-Approved Generic Technical Specification Changes and Other ChangesEnclosure 3Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases Pages Enclosure 3Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesIndex of Affected Technical Specification Bases Pages vs. .Traveler orChangeTraveler(s) or PageChangeTSTF-273-A B3.0-10TSTF-314-A B3.1.4-7TSTF-315-A B3.1.8-5TSTF-314-A B3.2.4-3TSTF-314-A B3.2.4-5TSTF-355-A B3.3.1-1TSTF-355-A B3.3.1-2TSTF-355-A B3.3.1-4TSTF-355-A B3.3.1-5TSTF-355-A B3.3.1-7TSTF-371

-A B3.3.1-50 TSTF-371

-A B3.3.1-51 TSTF-371-A B3.3.1-52 TSTF-355-A B3.3.1-61 TSTF-355-A B3.3.2-1TSTF-355-A B3.3.2-3TSTF-355-A B3.3.2-4TSTF-355-A B3.3.2-5ISTS Adoption

1 B3.3.2-33 ISTS Adoption

1 B3.3.2-36 TSTF-266-A B3.3.4-2TSTF-266-A B3.3.4-3TSTF-266-A B3.3.4-6TSTF-27-A B3.4.2-3TSTF-87-A B3.4.5-1TSTF-87-A B3.4.5-2TSTF-87-A B3.4.5-4TSTF-87-A B3.4.5-5TSTF-87-A B3.4.9-3TSTF-247-A B3.4.11-4 TSTF-247-A B3.4.11-6 TSTF-284-A B3.4.11-7 TSTF-284-A B3.4.11-8 TSTF-284-A B3.4.12-11 TSTF-325-A B3.5.2-7TSTF-325-A B3.5.2-8Vogtle Change #1 B3.5.5-3Vogtle Change #1 B3.5.5-4TSTF-343-A B3.6.1-4TSTF-46-A B3.6.3-12 TSTF-439-A B3.6.6-6TSTF-439-A B3.6.6-7TSTF-340-A B3.7.5-5TSTF-340-A, B3.7.5-6TSTF-439-A TSTF-245-A B3.7.5-8TSTF-245-A B3.7.5-9TSTF-439-A B3.8.1-8TSTF-439-A B3.8.1-11 TSTF-283-A B3.8.1-20 TSTF-283-A B3.8.1-22 TSTF-283-A B3.8.1-25 TSTF-283-A B3.8.1-27 TSTF-439-A B3.8.9-4TSTF-439-A B3.8.9-5TSTF-439-A 83.8.9-6TSTF-439-A B3.8.9-8TSTF-272-A B3.9.1-3TSTF-272-A B3.9.1-4TSTF-312-A B3.9.3-4TSTF-284-A B3.9.3-6TSTF-349-A 83.9.5-2E3- 1 Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesLCO Applicability B 3.0BASESLCO 3.0.6(continued)

EXAMPLE B3.0.6-2If System 2 of Train A is inoperable, and System 11 of Train B isinoperable, a loss of safety function exists in System 11 which is in turnsupported by System 5.EXAMPLE B3.0.6-3If System 2 of Train A is inoperable, and System 1 of Train B isinoperable, a loss of safety function exists in Systems 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10and 11.If this evaluation determines that a loss of safety function exists, theappropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which theloss of safety function exists are required to be entered.EXAMPLESTRAIN ATRAIN BSystem 4System 2System 5System 1System 6System 3System 7IINSERT -LCO 3.0.6 BasesSystem 8System 9System 10System 11System 12System 13System 14System 15System 1System 4System 2System 5System 6System 3System 7System 8System 9System 10System 11System 12System 13System 14System 15LCO 3.0.7 There are certain special tests and operations required to be performed at various times over the life of the unit. These special tests andoperations are necessary to demonstrate select unit performance characteristics, to perform special maintenance activities, and to performspecial evolutions.

Test Exception LCO 3.1.8 allows specified Technical (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.0-10Revision FV%)

Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesINSERT -LCO 3.0.6 Bases ITSTF-273 IThis loss of safety function does not require the assumption of additional single failures or lossof offsite power. Since operation is being restricted in accordance with the ACTIONS of thesupport system, any resulting temporary loss of redundancy or single failure protection is takeninto account.

Similarly, the ACTIONS for inoperable offsite circuit(s) and inoperable dieselgenerator(s) provide the necessary restriction for cross train inoperabilities.

This explicit crosstrain verification for inoperable AC electrical power sources also acknowledges that supported system(s) are not declared inoperable solely as a result of inoperability of a normal oremergency electrical power source (refer to the definition of OPERABILITY).

When a loss of safety function is determined to exist, and the SFDP requires entry into theappropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety functionexists, consideration must be given to the specific type of function affected.

Where a loss offunction is solely due to a single Technical Specification support system (e.g., loss of automatic start due to inoperable instrumentation, or loss of pump suction source due to low tank level) theappropriate LCO is the LCO for the support system. The ACTIONS for a support system LCOadequately addresses the inoperabilities of that system without reliance on entering itssupported system LCO. When the loss of function is the result of multiple support systems, theappropriate LCO is the LCO for the supported system.

Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesRod Group Alignment LimitsB 3.1.4BASESACTIONS(continued)

B.2.2. B.2.3. B.2.4. B.2.5. and B.2.6For continued operation with a misaligned rod, RTP must be reduced,SDM must periodically be verified within limits, hot channel factors(FQ(Z) and FNH) must be verified within limits, and the safety analysesmust be re-evaluated to confirm continued operation is permissible.

Reduction of power to 75% RTP ensures that local LHR increases due to a misaligned RCCA will not cause the core design criteria to beexceeded.

The Completion Time of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months gives the operatorsufficient time to accomplish an orderly power reduction withoutchallenging the Reactor Protection System.JINSERT -Bases 3.1.4 ActionWhen a rod is known to be misaligned, there is a potential to impactthe SDM. Since the core conditions can change with time, periodicverification of SDM is required.

A Frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is sufficient to ensure this requirement continues to be met.Verifying that Fa(Z) and FAH are within the required limits ensures thatcurrent operation at 75% RTP with a rod misaligned is not resulting inpower distributions that may invalidate safety analysis assumptions atfull power. The Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months allows sufficient time toobtain flux maps of the core power distribution using the incore fluxmapping system and to calculate FQ(Z) and FNH*Once current conditions have been verified acceptable, time isavailable to perform evaluations of accident analysis to determine thatcore limits will not be exceeded during a Design Basis Event for theduration of operation under these conditions.

A Completion Time of5 days is sufficient time to obtain the required input data and toperform the analysis.

The following accident analyses are required to be reevaluated:

1. Rod Cluster Control Assembly Insertion Characteristics;

2. Rod Cluster Control Assembly Misalignment;

3. Loss Of Reactor Coolant From Small Ruptured Pipes or FromCracks In Large Pipes Which Actuates The Emergency CoreCooling System;(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.1.4-7RevisionrF1 Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesINSERT -BASES 3.1.4 Action, as approximated by the steady state and transient FQ(Z),ITsTF-31 4I Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesPHYSICS TESTS Exceptions

-MODE 2B 3.1.8BASESAPPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES(continued) not violated.

When one or more of the requirements specified inLCO 3.1.3, "Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC)," LCO 3.1.4,LCO 3.1.5, LCO 3.1.6, and LCO 3.4.2 are suspended for PHYSICSTESTS, the fuel design criteria are preserved as long as the powerlevel is limited to = 5% RTP, the reactor coolant temperature is kept= 531°F, and SDM is within the limits provided in the COLR.The PHYSICS TESTS include measurement of core nuclearparameters or the exercise of control components that affect processvariables.

Among the process variables involved are AFD and QPTR,which represent initial conditions of the unit safety analyses.

Alsoinvolved are the movable control components (control and shutdownrods), which are required to shut down the reactor.

The limits forthese variables are specified for each fuel cycle in the COLR.PHYSICS TESTS meet the criteria for inclusion in the Technical Specifications, since the components and process variable LCOssuspended during PHYSICS TESTS meet Criteria 1, 2, and 3 of 10CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).

Reference 6 allows special test exceptions (STEs) to be included aspart of the LCO that they affect. It was decided,

however, to retainthis STE as a separate LCO because it was less cumbersome andprovided additional clarity.LCOOne Power RangeNeutron FluxChannel may bebypassed, reducingthe number ofrequired channelsfrom 4 to 3.This LCO allows the reactor parameters of MTC and minimumtemperature for criticality to be outside their specified limits. Inaddition, it allows selected control and shutdown rods to be positioned outside of their specified alignment and insertion limits Operation lTSTF-315 Ibeyond specified limits is permitted for the purpose of PHYSICS TESTS and poses no threat to fuel integrity provided theSRs are met. /The requirements of LCO 3.1.3, LCO 3.1.4, LCO 3.1.5, LCO 3.1.6,and LCO 3.4.2 may be suspended ring the performance ofPHYSICS TESTS provided:

and thei= 5% requiredaLCO 3.3lnctr" inonumber ofchannels for.1, "RTS.ntation,"

s 2, 3, andy be reducedb. SDM is within the limits provided in the COLR; andc. RCS lowest loop average temperature is = 5310F.Function17.e, mato 3Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.1.8-5RevisionED Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesQPTRB 3.2.4BASESACTIONS A.I1With the QPTR exceeding 1.02, limiting THERMAL POWER to> 3% below RTP for each 1% by which the QPTR exceeds 1.00 is aconservative tradeoff of total core power with peak linear power. TheCompletion Time of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months after each determination of QPTR allowssufficient time to identify the cause and correct the tilt. Note that thepower reduction itself may cause a change in the tilted condition.

The maximum allowable THERMAL POWER level initially determined by Required Action A.1 may be affected by subsequent determinations of QPTR in Required Action A.2. Increases in QPTRwould require a THERMAL POWER reduction within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months of QPTRdetermination, if necessary to comply with the decreased maximumallowable THERMAL POWER level. Conversely, decreases in QPTRwould allow raising the maximum allowable THERMAL POWER leveland increasing THERMAL POWER up to this revised limit.A.2After completion of Required Action A. 1, the QPTR alarm may still bein its alarmed state. As such, any additional changes in the QPTR aredetected by requiring a check of the QPTR once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . If theQPTR continues to increase, THERMAL POWER has to be reducedaccording to Required Action A. 1. A 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Completion Time issufficient because any additional change in QPTR would be relatively slow.A.3 INSERT -Bases 3.2.4 ActionThe peaking factors F AH and FQ(Z) are of primary importance in L2ensuring that the power distribution remains consistent with the initialconditions used in the safety analyses.

Performing SRs on FNH andFQ(Z) within the Completion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after achieving equilibrium conditions from a THERMAL POWER reduction requiredby Required Action A.1 ensures that these primary indicators of powerdistribution are within their respective limits. Equilibrium conditions are achieved when the core is sufficiently stable at the intendedoperating conditions to support flux mapping.

The above Completion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after achieving equilibrium conditions from aTHERMAL POWER reduction required by Required Action A.1 takesinto consideration the rate at which peaking factors are likely to(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.2.4-3Revision F1 Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesINSERT -BASES 3.2.4 Action, as approximated by the steady state and transient FQ(Z),

Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesQPTRB 3.2.4BASESACTIONS A.5 (continued) calibration of the NIS or through the use of constants in calculations) in such a manner that the indicated QPTR following normalization isnear 1.00. This is done to detect any subsequent significant changesin QPTR.Required Action A.5 is modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that theQPTR is not restored to within limits until after the re-evaluation of thesafety analysis has determined that core conditions at RTP are withinthe safety analysis assumptions (i.e., Required Action A.4). Note 2states that if Required Action A.5 is performed, then Required ActionA.6 shall be performed.

Required Action A.5 normalizes the excoredetectors to restore QPTR to within limits, which restores compliance with LCO 3.2.4. Thus, Note 2 prevents exiting the Actions prior tocompleting flux mapping to verify peaking factors, per Required ActionA.6. These Notes are intended to prevent any ambiguity about therequired sequence of actions.A.6 IINSERT -Bases 3.2.4 ActionOnce the excore detectors are normalized to restore QPTR to withinlimits (i.e., Required Action A.5 is performed),

it is acceptable to retuto full power operation.

However, as an added check that the corepower distribution at RTP is consistent with the safety analysis FT 3assumptions, Required Action A.6 requires verification that FQ(Z) ndFH are within their specified limits within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after achieving equilibrium conditions at RTP. Required Action A.6 also states thatthe peaking factor surveillance must be performed within 48 hour5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months safter increasing THERMAL POWER above the limit of RequiredAction A.1. This is an added precaution in the event that RTP is notachieved in a timely manner. These Completion Times are intendedto allow adequate time to increase THERMAL POWER to above thelimit of Required Action A. 1, while not permitting the core to remainwith unconfirmed power distributions for extended periods of time.Required Action A.6 is modified by a Note that states that the peakingfactor surveillances may only be done after the excore detectors havebeen normalized to restore QPTR to within limits (i.e., RequiredAction A.5). The intent of this Note is to have the peaking factor(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.2.4-5Revisionr=

r17 1 Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesRTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation BASESBACKGROUND The RTS initiates a unit shutdown, based on the values of selected unitparameters, to protect against violating the core fuel design limits andReactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary during anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs) and to assist the Engineered SafetyFeatures (ESF) Systems in mitigating accidents.

The protection and monitoring systems have been designed to assuresafe operation of the reactor.

This is achieved by specifying limitingsafety system settings (LSSS) in terms of parameters directly monitored by the RTS, as well as specifying LCOs on other reactor system ITSTF-355

+a' rr1ae ,nda lm'4+ r4nr,. aI n s e r t 1 -B a s e s 3 .3 .1 .V "1 " u u io' u lu, u p4u ,,I I , ,I 1,,1J, -tI , ,',I .Background The LSC8, defined in this specifcatio.n as the.p T t.. It...enjunetien with the LCO39, establish the thIFr-hld f-r pr-; r. ,setien to prevent emeeeding eeeeptable limfitG during Design BaiAeeident9 (DB6Ns).~-sys~eti~

During AOOs, which are those events expected to occur one or moretimes during the unit life, the acceptable limits are:1. The Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR) shall bemaintained above the Safety Limit (SL) value to prevent departure from nucleate boiling (DNB);2. Fuel centerline melt shall not occur; and3. The RCS pressure SL of 2735 psig shall not be exceeded.

Operation within the SLs of Specification 2.0, "Safety Limits (SLs)," alsomaintains the above values and assures that offsite dose will be withinthe 10 CFR 50 and 10 CFR 100 criteria during AOOs.Accidents are events that are analyzed even though they are notexpected to occur during the unit life. The acceptable limit duringaccidents is that offsite dose shall be maintained within an acceptable fraction of 10 CFR 100 limits. Different accident categories are allowed(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.3. 1-1Revisionria--i r", 1 Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesInsert I -Bases 3.3.1 Background ITSTF-355 Technical specifications are required by 1OCFR50.36 to contain LSSS defined by theregulation as ".... settings for automatic protective devices..,

so chosen that automatic protective action will correct the abnormal situation before a Safety Limit (SL) isexceeded."

The Analytic Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety actionis initiated, as established by the safety analysis, to ensure that a SL is not exceeded.

Any automatic protection action that occurs on reaching the Analytic Limit therefore ensures that the SL is not exceeded.

However, in practice, the actual settings forautomatic protective devices must be chosen to be more conservative than the AnalyticLimit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the setting at which theautomatic protective action would actually occur.The Trip Setpoint is a predetermined setting for a protective device chosen to ensureautomatic actuation prior to the process variable reaching the Analytic Limit and thusensuring that the SL would not be exceeded.

As such, the Trip Setpoint accounts foruncertainties in setting the device (e.g. calibration),

uncertainties in how the devicemight actually perform (e.g., repeatability),

changes in the point of action of the deviceover time (e.g., drift during surveillance intervals),

and any other factors which mayinfluence its actual performance (e.g., harsh accident environments).

In this manner, theTrip Setpoint plays an important role in ensuring that SLs are not exceeded.

As such,the Trip Setpoint meets the definition of an LSSS (Ref. 23) and could be used to meetthe requirement that they be contained in the technical specifications.

Technical specifications contain values related to the OPERABILITY of equipment required for safe operation of the facility.

Operable is defined in technical specifications as ". ..being capable of performing its safety function(s)."

For automatic protective

devices, the required safety function is to ensure that a SL is not exceeded andtherefore the LSSS as defined by 10 CFR 50.36 is the same as the OPERABILITY limitfor these devices.

However, use of the Trip Setpoint to define OPERABILITY intechnical specifications and its corresponding designation as the LSSS required by10 CFR 50 36 would be an overly restrictive requirement if it were applied as anOPERABILITY limit for the "as found" value of a protective device setting during asurveillance.

This would result in technical specification compliance

problems, as wellas reports and corrective actions required by the rule which are not necessary to ensuresafety. For example, an automatic protective device with a setting that has been foundto be different from the Trip Setpoint due to some drift of the setting may still beOPERABLE since drift is to be expected.

This expected drift would have beenspecifically accounted for in the setpoint methodology for calculating the Trip Setpointand thus the automatic protective action would still have ensured that the SL would notbe exceeded with the "as found" setting of the protective device. Therefore, the devicewould still be OPERABLE since it would have performed its safety function and the onlycorrective action required would be to reset the device to the Trip Setpoint to accountfor further drift during the next surveillance interval.

Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesInsert I -Bases 3.3.1 Background (continued)

Use of the Trip Setpoint to define "as found" OPERABILITY and its designation as theLSSS under the expected circumstances described above would result in actionsrequired by both the rule and technical specifications that are clearly not warranted.

However, there is also some point beyond which the device would have not been ableto perform its function due, for example, to greater than expected drift. This value needsto be specified in the technical specifications in order to define OPERABILITY of thedevices and is designated as the Allowable Value which, as stated above, is the sameas the LSSS.The Allowable Value specified in Table 3.3.1-1 serves as the LSSS such that a channelis OPERABLE if the trip setpoint is found not to exceed the Allowable Value during theCHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (COT). As such, the Allowable Value differs from theTrip Setpoint by an amount primarily equal to the expected instrument loopuncertainties, such as drift, during the surveillance interval.

In this manner, the actualsetting of the device will still meet the LSSS definition and ensure that a Safety Limit isnot exceeded at any given point of time as long as the device has not drifted beyondthat expected during the surveillance interval.

Note that, although the channel is"OPERABLE" under these circumstances, the trip setpoint should be left adjusted to avalue within the established trip setpoint calibration tolerance band, in accordance withuncertainty assumptions stated in the referenced setpoint methodology (as-left criteria),

and confirmed to be operating within the statistical allowances of the uncertainty termsassigned.

If the actual setting of the device is found to have exceeded the Allowable Value the device would be considered inoperable from a technical specification perspective.

This requires corrective action including those actions required by10 CFR 50.36 when automatic protective devices do not function as required.

Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesRTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1BASESBACKGROUND a different fraction of these limits, based on probability of occurrence.

(continued)

Meeting the acceptable dose limit for an accident category isconsidered having acceptable consequences for that event.The RTS instrumentation is segmented into four distinct butinterconnected modules as illustrated in functional diagrams referenced in the FSAR, Chapter 7 (Ref. 1), and as identified below:1. Field transmitters or process sensors:

provide a measurable electronic signal based upon the physical characteristics of theparameter being measured;

2. Signal Process Control and Protection System, including AnalogProtection System, Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS), fieldcontacts, and protection channel sets: provides signal conditioning, bistable setpoint comparison, process algorithm actuation, compatible electrical signal output to protection system devices, andcontrol board/control room/miscellaneous indications;

3. Solid State Protection System (SSPS), including input, logic, andoutput bays: initiates proper unit shutdown and/or ESF actuation inaccordance with the defined logic, which is based on the bistableoutputs from the signal process control and protection system; and4. Reactor trip switchgear, including reactor trip breakers (RTBs) andbypass breakers:

provides the means to interrupt power to thecontrol rod drive mechanisms (CRDMs) and allows the rod clustercontrol assemblies (RCCAs),

or "rods," to fall into the core and shutdown the reactor.

The bypass breakers allow testing of the RTBs atpower. ITSTF-3Field Transmitters or SensorsTo meet the design demands for redundancy and reliability, more thanone, and in some cases as many as four, field transmitters or sensorsare used to measure unit parameters.

To account for the calibration trip setpointtolerances and instrument drift, which are assumed to occur between andcalibrations, statistical allowances are provided in the Allowable The OPERABILITY of each transmitter or sensor b , Allowwhen its "asi feund" oulibrotioin date aro comAparod against its aus..........

d ., ptaneiF' ...&is determined by either "as-found" calibration data evaluated during the CHANNELCALIBRATION or by qualitative assessment of field transmitter or sensor as relatedto the channel behavior observed during performance of the CHANNEL CHECK.(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.3.1-2Revision Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesRTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1BASESBACKGROUND Signal Process Control and Protection System (continued) such that testing required while the reactor is at power may beaccomplished without causing trip. Provisions to allow removing logicchannels from service during maintenance are unnecessary because ofthe logic system's designed reliability.

AValueand RTS Setpoints

[The T,-;p Setpo;irl; aw e the vaue speifed 0I th e Teel , tcalSpecificatins.

The Nonia T i i Setpa;11ts are the target values atwhtieh the field devioee anld bistables are set withim the ealibratien banldthat "9 established en the oonmorvotive side of the TrFip Gctpoint.

Anyfreteotion system ehonnol io eensiderzd te be PFprodry Sdjusted whenthe "as left" value is within the barid for eCl ANNEL= CALIRATION trip setpoints trip seed are based ontheanI i m iti ted inReferences 3 and 6. The selection of these.Ti.t

.is such thatadequate protection is provided when all sensor and processing timedelays are taken into account.

To allow for calibration tolerances, instrumentation uncertainties, instrument drift, and severe environment 1conservative errors for those RTS channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49 (Ref. 6), the AAllowable Values specified in TabI 3.3.11-1 in the accompanying LCO are

ýeseyaivlyaeiuteW~ith respect to the analytical limits. A detail d Vle ndescription of the methodology used to calculate thel~i,ý trpN~l sapondsInsert 2 -Bases 3.3.1 including their explicit uncertainties, is provided in the RTS/ESFAS B-/ackground Set oint Methodoloy Studys(Ref.7)n The.-- fk-j- -A 4uainITrip setpoints consistent detetabe bya CT. re eampe ofsuo a hange in-moasurofment rrorF io drift dur~ing the sur~eillanse intorwal.

if the moasburod setpointAo-I #4~ -vo- f---.lt Allo-wk W.ll-"lIma ti-ia Wa*imtaln iti prni -r44-AIABLE. r- frequirements Ofthe* -ents .... n ; e, ith the Allowable Value ensure that SLs arenot violated during AOOs (and that the consequences of DBAs will beacceptable, providing the unit is operated from within the LCOs at theonset of the AOO or DBA and the equipment functions as designed).

Each channel of the process control equipment can be tested on line toverify that the signal or setpoint accuracy is within the specified (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.3.1-4Revisionl`291 I -I Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesInsert 2 -Bases 3.3.1 Background FTSTF-355 which incorporates all of the known uncertainties applicable to each channel.

The magnitudes of these uncertainties are factored into the determination of each trip setpoint andcorresponding Allowable Value. The trip setpoint entered into the bistable is more conservative than that specified by the Allowable Value (LSSS) to account for measurement errors detectable by the COT. The Allowable Value serves as the Technical Specification OPERABILITY limit forthe purpose of the COT. One example of such a change in measurement error is drift during thesurveillance interval.

If the measured setpoint does not exceed the Allowable Value, the bistableis considered OPERABLE.

The trip setpoint is the value at which the bistable is set and is the expected value to beachieved during calibration.

The trip setpoint value ensures the LSSS and the safety analysislimits are met for the surveillance interval selected when a channel is adjusted based on statedchannel uncertainties.

Any bistable is considered to be properly adjusted when the "'as left"setpoint value is within the band for CHANNEL CALIBRATION uncertainty allowance' (i.e.,+/- rack calibration+

comparator setting uncertainties).

The trip setpoint value is therefore considered a "nominal" value (i.e., expressed as a value without inequalities) for the purposes ofCOT and CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesRTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1BASESand RTS Setpoints BACKGROUND ITm , ,, Ilowable Values (continued) allowance requirements.

Once a designated channel is taken out ofservice for testing, a simulated signal is injected in place of orsuperimposed on the field instrument signal. The process equipment for the channel in test is then tested, verified, and if required, calibrated.

.1-SRs for the channels are specified in the SRs section.The Trip Setpoints and Allowabl, Value listed .i..Table 3.3.1 1 arebased on the methcdelgie3 d.....b.d in Referzncza 7, 8, and 0, which-ateip i all of t .... k...wi ..i. ice, ..i .i .t ..-ppl.abl.

for e h ehennzl.h he magnltudes uf tihee uiii taild -Itid a ,-du, d into thedete miatiom of eah Trp -- it, All f-, t is s ad -:---pF998c6ing oqIUipmon1Rt for there ehonncl3 erc assumcd to apefete within1the ollowanecc of theco uncortainty magnitudo5.

Solid State Protection SystemThe SSPS equipment is used for the decision logic processing of inputsfrom field contacts and control board switches and the signal processing equipment bistables.

To meet the redundancy requirements, two trainsof SSPS, each performing the same functions, are provided.

If one trainis taken out of service for maintenance or test purposes, the secondtrain will provide reactor trip and/or ESF actuation for the unit. If bothtrains are taken out of service or placed in test, a reactor trip will result.The reactor trip may be caused by a General Warning alarm in bothtrains or if both RTB bypass breakers BYA and BYB are racked in andclosed. Each train is packaged in its own cabinet for physical andelectrical separation to satisfy separation and independence requirements.

The system has been designed to trip in the event of aloss of power, directing the unit to a safe shutdown condition.

The SSPS performs the decision logic for actuating a reactor trip or ESFactuation, generates the electrical output signal that will initiate therequired trip or actuation, and provides the status, permissive, andannunciator output signals to the main control room of the unit.The input signals from field contacts, control board switches andbistable outputs from the signal processing equipment are sensed bythe SSPS equipment and combined into logic matrices that represent combinations indicative of various unit upset and accident transients.

Ifa required logic matrix combination is completed, the system will initiatea reactor trip or send actuation signals via master and slave relays to(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.3.1-5Revision E_ý'ffu I Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesRTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, andAPPLICABILITY The RTS functions to maintain the SLs during all AOOs andmitigates the consequences of DBAs in all MODES inwhich the RTBs are closed.Each of the analyzed accidents and transients can be detected by oneor more RTS Functions.

The accident analysis described inReference 3 takes credit for most RTS trip Functions.

RTS tripFunctions not specifically credited in the accident analysis arequalitatively credited in the safety analysis and the NRC staff approvedlicensing basis for the unit. These RTS trip Functions may provideprotection for conditions that do not require dynamic transient analysisto demonstrate Function performance.

They may also serve asbackups to RTS trip Functions that were credited in the accidentanalysis.

Insert -Bases 3.3.1 ASAThe LCO requires all instrumentation performing an RTS Function,

/listed in Table 3.3.1-1 in the accompanying LCO, to be OPERABLE.

Typically, failure of any instrument renders the affected channel(s) iTF_355inoperable and reduces the reliability of the affected Functions.

I JThe LCO generally requires OPERABILITY of two, three, or fourchannels in each instrumentation

Function, two channels of ManualReactor Trip in each logic Function, and two trains in each Automatic Trip Logic Function.

Four OPERABLE instrumentation channels in atwo-out-of-four configuration are required when one RTS channel isalso used as a control system input or functional separation betweenthe protection and control systems must be demonstrated as described in FSAR Section 7.2.2.3.

This configuration accounts for the possibility of the shared channel failing in such a manner that it creates a transient that requires RTS action. In this case, the RTS will still provideprotection, even with random failure of one of the other three protection channels.

Three operable instrumentation channels in atwo-out-of-three configuration are generally required when there is nopotential for control system and protection system interaction that couldsimultaneously create a need for RTS trip and disable one RTSchannel.

The two-out-of-three and two-out-of-four configurations allowone channel to be tripped during maintenance or testing withoutcausing a reactor trip. Specific exceptions to the above generalphilosophy exist and are discussed below.(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.3.1-7RevisionE7'ý-l 11U I Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesInsert -Bases 3.3.1 ASAA channel is OPERABLE with a trip setpoint value outside its calibration tolerance bandprovided the trip setpoint "as-found" value does not exceed its associated Allowable Value and provided the trip setpoint "as-left" value is adjusted to a value within the"as-left" calibration tolerance band of the Nominal Trip Setpoint.

A trip setpoint may beset more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plantconditions.

Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesRTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.3.1.1Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that gross failure ofinstrumentation has not occurred.

A CHANNEL CHECK is normally acomparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similarparameter on other channels.

It is based on the assumption thatinstrument channels monitoring the same parameter should readapproximately the same value. Significant deviations between the twoinstrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument driftin one of the channels or of something even more serious.

ACHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key toverifying that the instrumentation continues to operate properly betweeneach CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are based on a combination of the channelinstrument uncertainties, including indication and readability.

If achannel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor orthe signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit.A Note modifies SR 3.3.1.1.

The Note provides a clarification that thesource range instrumentation surveillance is only required when reactorpower is < P-6 and that 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after power is reduced below P-6 isallowed for performing the surveillance for this instrumentation.

IThe Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.1power range Iheat balance calculation SR 3.3.1.2 Iresults exceedPower range ' SR 3.3.1.2 comp res the calorimetric heat balance c ulation to theTw r channel ou.: pt every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . If the calorimetri llef.eJthelNO4 channel indicated power by more than + 2% RTP, thepower range hannel is not declared inoperable, but must be adjusted If the'power r channel output cannot be properly

adjusted, the chan Isdeclared inoperable.

[AItw calorimetric is performed at part power (< 500/ TP), adjusting the1power range N$L_.l~ channel indication in the increasing power d ction will assure areactor trip below the safety analysis limit (:5 1. % RTP). Making no1power range7 Iadjustment to th RiTchannel indication in e decreasing powerTSF371IThe power range channel output shall be adjustedconsistent with the calorimetric heat balance calculation results if the calorimetric calculation exceeds the powerrange channel output by more than + 2% RTP.(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.3.1-50Revisio-r_'ý F=

Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesRTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1BASESFTSTF-37 101 ID\IEII I AKlf'00 '1 ". 4 13 I,-, +,,-., A%JJI'I, oJI ,J.,I.,I..

wv,. ,,JI /--IowerangeI

")direction due to a part power calorimetr' assures a reactor trip power rangecalorimetric heat consistent with the safety analyses.

T is allowance does no recludelbalance calculation making indicated power adjustments,

desired, when the alorimetric

' a'a.':is

-..is less than the channel indicate ower. Toprovide close agreement between indicated powe ed calorimetric power and to preserve operating margin, the EMhannels are normallyadjusted when operating at or near full power during steady-sto power rangeconditions.

However, discretion must be exercised if the = jrhannelindicated power is adjusted in the decreasing power direction due to a1 er-- ran--g part power calorimetric

(< 50% RTP). This action could introduce aPower rnon-conservative bias at higher power levels which could result in anu reactor trip above the safety analysis limit (> 118% RTP).Noutr of Flue High biewtiyebl iaro cois 5 T: )wooo tho e~eq.I. .-.... .I. ..;s in The ....in p....Reactof Tn O tart Pe veore The Powerange Neutr" on ' Fu4 Hi Th,._post re.___. ".,t p I~fr h ower Range Neutron Flux -HighInsert -BasesSR 3.3.1.2bistables are reset _ 10p% RTP, the NIS channel calibration must beconfirmed based on a c lorimetric performed

> 50% RTP.IIT ,w Notes m. dfy. ,R 3.3.1.2.

The first Note , destes that the NISohanncl output shel! be adjusted consistent with the eelfrimetrie ealeulated pewer if the eaoezrimetrie ealeulated pewef r meeds the-N46RhAnnAI WO- winr- thain .O 2% RTR. Theam-A 1ma.ndL th~atthis Su eillance is required only if reactor power is > 15% 1 iand thatl J 24 hourtJallowed for performing the first Surveillance after rea 9ing15% RTP. A power level of 15% RTP is chosen based on plantstability, i.e., automatic rod control capability and turbine generator synchronized to the grid.The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.3.1.2 ismodified by a Note.IThis Note(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.3.1-51Revisionfw Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesInsert -Bases SR 3.3.1.2ITSTF-371 The cause of the potential non-conservative bias is the decreased accuracy of thecalorimetric at reduced power conditions.

The primary error contributor to the instrument uncertainty for a secondary side power calorimetric measurement is the feedwater flowmeasurement, which is typically a AP measurement across a feedwater venturi.

Whilethe measurement uncertainty remains constant in AP as power decreases, whentranslated into flow, the uncertainty increases as a square term. Thus a 1% flow error at100% power can approach a 10% flow error at 30% RTP even though the AP error hasnot changed.

An evaluation of extended operation at part power conditions wouldconclude that it is prudent to administratively adjust the setpoint of the Power RangeNeutron Flux -High bistables to < 85% RTP when: 1) the power range channel output isadjusted in the decreasing power direction due to a part power calorimetric below 50%RTP; or 2) for a post refueling startup.

The evaluation of extended operation at partpower conditions would also conclude that the potential need to adjust the indication ofthe Power Range Neutron Flux in the decreasing power direction is quite small,primarily to address operation in the intermediate range about P-10 (nominally 10%RTP) to allow enabling of the Power Range Neutron Flux -Low setpoint and theIntermediate Range Neutron Flux reactor trips.0 Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesRTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.3REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.3.1.3 compares the incore system to the NIS channel output. Ifthe absolute difference is a 3% the NIS channel is still OPERABLE, butit must be adjusted

.90 1 ; 16, Eei;11W !ý-, W;-,=ii-,e

1ot,;et-,

% ;-;wrhe excore NIS channel aI.um.d in the cotpoi. t u....t.inty the .hannel.mu.t be.shall be adjusted if the e., ,,,,,a',,ed) based e,- i,-.oe absolute difference between the incore and If the NIS channel cannot be properly

adjusted, the channel is declaredre i 3inoperable.

This Surveillance is performed to periodically verify theexcore AFD is >/= 3%. / "TSTF-371I f(AI) input to the overtemperature AT Function.

I IED-IHERNotes modify SR 31. Note I indicates1 t!ia the exco, e N3ION RU , e AFD) %-. JNot4M, clarifies that the Surveillance isrequired only if reactor power is >_ 50% RTP and that 7 days are allowedfor performing the Surveillance and channel adjustment, if necessary, after reaching 50% RTP. A power level of >_ 50% RTP is consistent withthe requirements of SR 3.3.1.9.

Note Ilows SR 3.3.1.9 to beperformed in lieu of SR 3.3.1.3, since SR3.3.1.9 calibrates (i.e.,requires channel adjustment) the excore c annels to the incorechannels, it envelopes the performance of 3.3.1.3.2For each operating cycle, the initial channel normalization is performed under SR 3.3.1.9.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under theSurveillance Frequency Control Program.SR 3.3.1.4SR 3.3.1.4 is the performance of a TADOT. This test shall verifyOPERABILITY by actuation of the end devices.The RTB test shall include separate verification of the undervoltage tripvia the Reactor Protection System and the local manual shunt tripmechanism.

The bypass breaker test shall include a local manual shunttrip and local manual undervoltage trip. A Note has been added toindicate that this test must be performed on a bypass breaker prior toplacing it in service.

The independent test of undervoltage and shunt(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.3.1-52RevisionFBE Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesRTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1BASESREFERENCES (continued)

17. Westinghouse Technical

Bulletin, NSD-TB-92-03-R1, "Undervoltage Trip Protection."

18. WCAP-13632-P-A, Revision 2, "Elimination of Pressure SensorResponse Time Testing Requirements,"

Jan., 1996.19. WCAP-14036-P-A, Revision 1, "Elimination of Periodic Protection Channel Response Time Tests," Oct., 1998.20. WCAP 12925, Median Signal Selector (MSS).21. WCAP 13807/13808, Elimination of Feedwater Flow trip viaImplementation of MSS.22. SNC Calculation E-35.1A & E-35.2A.I[TF-355_J23. Regulatory Guide 1.105, Revision 3, "Setpoints for Safety-Related lInstrumentation."

IFarley Units 1 and 2B 3.3.1-61RevisionRel Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation BASESBACKGROUND The ESFAS initiates necessary safety systems, based on the valuesof selected unit parameters, to protect against violating core designlimits and the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure

boundary, andto mitigate accidents.

The ESFAS instrumentation is segmented into three distinct butinterconnected modules as identified below:" Field transmitters or process sensors and instrumentation:

provide a measurable electronic signal based on the physicalcharacteristics of the parameter being measured;

" Signal processing equipment including analog protection system,field contacts, and protection channel sets: provide signalconditioning, bistable setpoint comparison, process algorithm actuation, compatible electrical signal output to protection systemdevices, and control board/control room/miscellaneous indications; and* Solid State Protection System (SSPS) including input, logic, andoutput bays: initiates the proper unit shutdown or engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation in accordance with the defined logicand based on the bistable outputs from the signal process controland protection system.Field Transmitters or SensorsInsert 1 -Bases3.3.2 Background To meet the design demands for redundancy and reliability, more thanone, and in some cases as many as four, field transmitters or sensorsare used to measure unit parameters.

In many cases, fieldtransmitters or sensors that input to the ESFAS are shared with the L 1Reactor Trip System (RTS). In some cases, the same channels alsoprovide control system inputs. To account for calibration tolerances and instrument drift, which are assumed to occur betweencalibrations, statistical allowances are provided in the Trip Setpoint.

The OPERABILITY of each transmitter or senso, ia-i, 51 i; e ,iw ait UrI "2a inl-i -Rd" nor.fpdtIdoeumented seeeptaftee-eFitef4.

/cniudInsert 2 -Bases332Background (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.3.2-1RevisionK]

Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesInsert I -Bases 3.3.2 Background The Allowable Value in conjunction with the trip setpoint and LCO establish thethreshold for ESFAS action to prevent exceeding acceptable limits such that theconsequences of Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) will be acceptable.

The Allowable Value-is considered a limiting value such that a channel is OPERABLE if the setpoint isfound not to exceed the Allowable Value during the CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST(COT). Note that, although a channel is "OPERABLE" under these circumstances, theESFAS setpoint must be left adjusted to within the established calibration tolerance band of the ESFAS setpoint in accordance with the uncertainty assumptions stated inthe referenced setpoint methodology, (as-left criteria) and confirmed to be operating within the statistical allowances of the uncertainty terms assigned.

Insert 2 -Bases 3.3.2 Background ITSTF-355 is determined by either "as-found" calibration data evaluated during the CHANNELCALIBRATION or by qualitative assessment of field transmitter or sensor, as related tothe channel behavior observed during performance of the CHANNEL CHECK.

Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2BASES land ESFAS Setpoints ITSTF-355 BACKGROUND Ifl ,;1 howllItdolIowable Values(continued)

Tie Trip 3SepounisL ar the values specifie ithe Technical Speeifiesticrne.

The Ncminol Trip Getpeint arc the taret values atwhieh the field de-Tues aredbst-Wes ae set wothin the a icallimits bamd, that i3 established em the eenscrwafive aide of the TrFip Sctpoint.

Any proeteetion system ohannels ec pnsiderod to be properly adjuctodwhen the "as left" value *9 within the bamd fer CHANNEL=[Fi epit GLIRTO eway trip setpoints TIT ýM~mused are based on the analytica limits red inReferences 3 and 6. The selection of these S lis suchthat adequate protection is provided when all sensor and processing time delays are taken into account.

To allow for calibration tolerances, instrumentation uncertainties, instrument drift, and severeenvironment errors for those ESFAS channels that must function inharsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49 (Ref. 7), the .Alowable Values specified in Table 3.3.2-1 in theaccompanying LCO are adjuted It respect to t eonservative analytical limits. d iii.da"^6"^'t,,

" ... ;"he" ""4R i~g use "f^'.....

.PcAlcuit the Trip Setpone Hncedin thi ~lctuRewaint~

isBssprovided in the RT-SiSSFAS Sotpoit Mohdlgy Study (Rotfi )-ackground Th Ne-minal Trip --tp -int and colib :aticn bond aWe mr-" consc .r.tivcthais t 11 at speeifled by the Allowable Value to account fer ehangec inrandem meascurcment eFrors deteetoblc by a COT. One example efcucsh a change inl moeacUreront orror is drift duFrin the curwoillancz

mterval.

If the messured setpeint dees met emeeed the AIlewablc

h te Stpoi m-~o. ang wwt QRAllowable Value ensure that theluirements of the consequences of Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) will be acceptable, providing the unit is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of theDBA and the equipment functions as designed.

Each channel can be tested on line to verify that the signal processing equipment and setpoint accuracy is within the specified allowance requirements.

Once a designated channel is taken out of service fortesting, a simulated signal is injected in place of or superimposed onthe field instrument signal. The process equipment for the channel intest is then tested, verified, and if required, calibrated.

SRs for thechannels are specified in the SR section.T-he Thp Getpo;mt; amd Allowable Values listed im Table 3.3.2 4 arebased on, OF conservative to, the moethedolegico deseribed-inf Reeene 6, 8, eimd 9, w~hieh ineerperate all of the knownI(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.3.2-3Revision E_ý'rlu 1 Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesInsert 3 -Bases 3.3.2 Background A detailed description of the methodology used to calculate the Allowable Value andESFAS setpoints including their explicit uncertainties, is provided in the plant specificsetpoint methodology study (Ref. 6) which incorporates all of the known uncertainties applicable to each channel.

The magnitudes of these uncertainties are factored into thedetermination of each ESFAS setpoint and corresponding Allowable Value. The nominalESFAS setpoint entered into the bistable is more conservative than that specified by theAllowable Value to account for measurement errors detectable by the COT. TheAllowable Value serves as the Technical Specification OPERABILITY limit for thepurpose of the COT. One example of such a change in measurement error is driftduring the surveillance interval.

If the measured setpoint does not exceed the Allowable Value, the bistable is considered OPERABLE.

The ESFAS setpoints are the values at which the bistables are set and is the expectedvalue to be achieved during calibration.

The ESFAS setpoint value ensures the safetyanalysis limits are met for the surveillance interval selected when a channel is adjustedbased on stated channel uncertainties.

Any bistable is considered to be properlyadjusted when the "as-left" setpoint value is within the band for CHANNELCALIBRATION uncertainty allowance (i.e. calibration tolerance uncertainties).

TheESFAS setpoint value is therefore considered a "nominal" value (i.e., expressed as avalue without inequalities) for the purposes of the COT and CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2BASES n-$-A S pointBACKGROUND

-,and Allowable Values 4continued)

IT"uncert42inties applicable for each channel.

The magnitudoc of thoccu uvi tIailifies

, factored in1to t' t deteirrnimatien1 ef esh Trip Seltpoint.

All field gemserg emdc signal pr~ein cgupmnt for these ehennelsare -ssi 'me-d to oper-te within the a-lol'ncs of these

.... iiu e .. .d is .me sttsis -- :-- :--eSolid State Protection SystemThe SSPS equipment is used for the decision logic processing ofinputs from field contacts and control board switches and the signalprocessing equipment bistables.

To meet the redundancy requirements, two trains of SSPS, each performing the samefunctions, are provided.

If one train is taken out of service formaintenance or test purposes, the second train will provide ESFactuation for the unit. If both trains are taken out of service or placedin test, a reactor trip will result. Each train is packaged in its owncabinet for physical and electrical separation to satisfy separation andindependence requirements.

The SSPS performs the decision logic for most ESF equipment actuation; generates the electrical output signals that initiate therequired actuation; and provides the status, permissive, andannunciator output signals to the main control room of the unit.The input signals from field contacts, control board switches andbistable outputs from the signal processing equipment are sensed bythe SSPS equipment and combined into logic matrices that represent combinations indicative of various transients.

If a required logic matrixcombination is completed, the system will send actuation signals viamaster and slave relays to those components whose aggregate Function best serves to alleviate the condition and restore the unit to asafe condition.

Examples are given in the Applicable SafetyAnalyses, LCO, and Applicability sections of this Bases.Each SSPS train has a built in testing device that can automatically test the selected decision logic matrix functions and the actuation devices while the unit is at power. When any one train is taken out ofservice for testing, the other train is capable of providing unitmonitoring and protection until the testing has been completed.

Thetesting device is semiautomatic to minimize testing time.The actuation of ESF components is accomplished through masterand slave relays. The SSPS energizes the master relays appropriate (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.3.2-4R = Ievision 111ý I Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2BASESBACKGROUND Solid State Protection System (continued) for the condition of the unit. Each master relay then energizes one ormore slave relays, which then cause actuation of the end devices.The master and slave relays are routinely tested to ensure operation.

The test of the master relays energizes the relay, which then operatesthe contacts and applies a low voltage to the associated slave relays.The low voltage is not sufficient to actuate the slave relays but onlydemonstrates signal path continuity.

The SLAVE RELAY TESTactuates the devices if their operation will not interfere with continued unit operation.

For relays with SLAVE RELAY TEST circuits available actual component operation can be prevented and slave relay contactoperation is verified by a continuity check of the circuit containing theslave relay.APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, ANDAPPLICABILITY Each of the analyzed accidents can be detected by one ormore ESFAS Functions.

One of the ESFAS Functions is theprimary actuation signal for that accident.

An ESFASFunction may be the primary actuation signal for more thanone type of accident.

An ESFAS Function may also be a secondary, or backup, actuation signal for one or more other accidents.

Forexample, Pressurizer Pressure--

Low is a primary actuation signal forsmall loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs) and a backup actuation signal for steam line breaks (SLBs) outside containment.

Functions such as manual initiation, not specifically credited in the accidentsafety analysis, are qualitatively credited in the safety analysis and theNRC staff approved licensing basis for the unit. These Functions mayprovide protection for conditions that do not require dynamic transient analysis to demonstrate Function performance.

These Functions mayalso serve as backups to Functions that were credited in the accidentanalysis.

Specific information regarding the ESFAS Functions statusas primary or backup actuation signal for a given accident is providedin FSAR Chapter 15 (Ref. 3).The LCO requires I instrumentation performing an ESFAS Functionto be OPERABLE.Typically, failure of any instrument renders theaffected channel(s) inoperable and reduces the reliability of theaffected Functions.

The LCO generally requires OPERABILITY of two, three or fourchannels in each instrumentation function and two channels in each(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.3.2-5Revision

=Yj Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesInsert -Bases 3.3.2 ASAA channel is OPERABLE with a trip setpoint value outside its calibration tolerance bandprovided the trip setpoint "as-found" value does not exceed its associated Allowable Value and provided the trip setpoint "as-left" value is adjusted to a value within thecalibration tolerance band of the Nominal Trip Setpoint.

A trip setpoint may be set moreconservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plantconditions.

Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2BASESACTIONS B.1. B.2.1 and B.2.2 (continued) must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. This isdone by placing the unit in at least MODE 3 within an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months (54 hours6.25e-4 days 0.015 hours 8.928571e-5 weeks 2.0547e-5 months total time) and in MODE 5 within an additional 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months (84 hours9.722222e-4 days 0.0233 hours 1.388889e-4 weeks 3.1962e-5 months total time). The allowable Completion Times arereasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unitconditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and withoutchallenging unit systems.C.1, C.2.!. and C.2.2Condition C applies to the automatic actuation logic and actuation relays for the following functions:

0 SI; fISTSP 41n aIntrlc Adoption* Containment Spray;* Phase A Isolation; and0 Phase B Isolation.

This Condition is intended to address an inoperability of the actuation logic or relays associated with a given train which affects theintegrated ESFAS response to an actuation signal. This Condition isapplicable whenever more than one ESF system is affected by theinoperable train of logic or relays. However, if one or more inoperable actuation relay(s) in a train affect only a single ESF system, then theACTIONS Condition of the LCO applicable to the affected ESFcomponent or system should be entered and this Condition is notapplicable.

This action addresses the train orientation of the SSPS and themaster and slave relays. If one train is inoperable, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months areallowed to restore the train to OPERABLE status. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months sallowed for restoring the inoperable train to OPERABLE status isjustified in Reference

11. The specified Completion Time isreasonable considering that there is another train OPERABLE, andthe low probability of an event occurring during this interval.

If thetrain cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, the unit must be(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.3.2-33Revision11W& I Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2BASESACTIONS E.1, E.2.1, and E.2.2 (continued)

To avoid the inadvertent actuation of containment spray and Phase Bcontainment isolation, the inoperable channel should not be placed inthe tripped condition.

Instead it is bypassed.

Restoring the channel toOPERABLE status, or placing the inoperable channel in the bypasscondition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , is sufficient to assure that the Functionremains OPERABLE and minimizes the time that the Function may bein a partial trip condition (assuming the inoperable channel has failedhigh). The Completion Time is further justified based on the lowprobability of an event occurring during this interval.

Failure to restorethe inoperable channel to OPERABLE status, or place it in thebypassed condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , requires the unit be placed inMODE 3 within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and MODE 4 within the next6 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based onoperating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from fullpower conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unitsystems.

In MODE 4, these Functions are no longer requiredOPERABLE.

The Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows one additional channel to be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for surveillance testing.Placing a second channel in the bypass condition for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months fortesting purposes is acceptable based on the results of Reference

11. ISTSF.1, F.2.1, and F.2.2 land the P-4 interlock Adoption#1Condition F applies to Manual Initiation of Steam Line Isolation.

land he P-4 Interlock Functions For the Manual Initiation this action addresses the trainorientation of the SSPS. If a train or channel is inoperable, 48 hour5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months sis allowed to return it to OPERABLE status. The specified Completion Time is reasonable considering the nature of these Functions, theavailable redundancy, and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval.

If the Function cannot be returned to OPERABLEstatus, the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months andMODE 4 within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . The allowed Completion Timesare reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the requiredunit conditions from full power in an orderly manner and withoutchallenging unit systems.

In MODE 4, the unit does not have anyanalyzed transients or conditions that require the explicit use of theprotection function noted above.(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.3.2-36Revisionrl'i 1

Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesRemote Shutdown SystemB 3.3.4BASESAPPLICABLE The Remote Shutdown System is considered an important contributor SAFETY ANALYSES to the reduction of unit risk to accidents and as such it has been(continued) retained in the Technical Specifications as indicated in 10 CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO The Remote Shutdown System LCO provides the OPERABILITY requirements of the instrumentation and controls necessary to placeand maintain the unit in MODE 3 from a location other than the controlroom. The instrumentation and controls required are listed in3.3.4-1i i, ti;,

LOC. ITable B 3.3.4-1The controls, instrumentation, and transfer switches (whereapplicable) are required for:" Core reactivity control (initial and long term);* RCS pressure control; ITSTF-266 I" Decay heat removal via the AFW System and SG ARVs;" RCS inventory control via charging flow; and* Safety support systems for the above Functions, including servicewater, component cooling water, and onsite power, including thediesel generators.

Table B 3.3.4-1A Function of a Remote Shutdown System is OPERABLE if allinstrument and control channels needed to support the RemoteShutdown System Function are OPERABLE.

However..

n I troland transfer circuits in every system identified on .4-4 arerequired OPERABLE in order to support the required remoteshutdown function.

For example, the capability to remotely operate asingle AFW pump and associated flow control valve and at least oneassociated SG atmospheric relief valve support an OPERABLE decayheat removal function.

All the control and transfer circuits associated with all three AFW pumps do not have to be OPERABLE to supportan OPERABLE decay heat removal function.

A remote shutdownfunction is not inoperable until insufficient control and transfer circuitsremain OPERABLE to perform the required function.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.3.4-2Revisionr8ý-

I-,, I Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesRemote Shutdown SystemB 3.3.4BASESLCO(continued)

The remote shutdown instrument and control circuits covered by thisLCO do not need to be energized to be considered OPERABLE.

ThisLCO is intended to ensure the instruments and control circuits will beOPERABLE if unit conditions require that the Remote ShutdownSystem be placed in operation.

APPLICABILITY The Remote Shutdown System LCO is applicable in MODES 1, 2,and 3. This is required so that the unit can be placed and maintained in MODE 3 for an extended period of time from a location other thanthe control room.This LCO is not applicable in MODE 4, 5, or 6. In these MODES, thefacility is already subcritical and in a condition of reduced RCSenergy. Under these conditions, considerable time is available torestore necessary instrument control functions if control roominstruments or controls become unavailable.

ACTIONSA Note has been added to the ACTIONS to clarify the application ofCompletion Time rules. Separate Condition entry is allowed for eachFunctionll-td,-,

Ta.`,' 3.3.4 1. The Completion Time(s) of theinoperable channel(s)/train(s) of a Function will be tracked separately for each Function starting from the time the Condition was entered forthat Function.

_.Jthe control and transfer switches forI ITA.1 Ilany required Function.

I~STF-266]

Conditin A addresses the situation where one or more requiredFunctio ,s of the Remote Shutdown System are inoperable.

This(cniudH1, .UU~ 0 iiy .-IL.U -o~land taram 'fer withes,.jA Remote Shutdown System division is inoperable when eachfunction is not accomplished by at least one designated Remote Shutdown System Channel that satisfies theOPERABILITY criteria for the channel's function.

Thesecriteria are outlined in the LCO section of the Bases.(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.3.4-3Revision 100-1 Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesRemote Shutdown SystemB 3.3.4BASESSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.3.4.3CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the monitoring instrument loop and the sensor. The test verifies that the channelresponds to a measured parameter within the necessary range andaccuracy.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 19.ITSTF266I IlNSERT -Bases Table B 3.3.4-1 ilFarley Units 1 and 2B 3.3.4-6Revision"_-ý riz Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesINSERT -Bases Table B 3.3.4-1Table B 3.3.4-1 (page 1 of 1)Remote Shutdown System Instrumentation and ControlsFUNCTION/INSTRUMENT REQUIREDOR CONTROL PARAMETER NUMBER OF CHANNELSMONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

1. Steam Generator Wide Range Level I /SG2. Steam Generator Pressure I /SG3. Pressurizer Water Level 14. Pressurizer Pressure

15. RCS Hot Leg Temperature (Loop A) 16. RCS Cold Leg Temperature (Loop A) 17. Source Range Neutron Flux (Gammametrics)

18. Condensate Storage Tank Level 1TRANSFER AND CONTROL CIRCUITS9. Reactivity Controla. Boric Acid Transfer System10. RCS Pressurea. Pressurizer Heater Control11. RCS Inventory

a. Charging Systemb. Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves 112. Decay Heat Removala. Auxiliary Feedwater System 1b. SG Atmospheric Relief Valves13. Safety Grade Support Systems Required For 1Functions Listed Above Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesRCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality B 3.4.2BASESACTIONSA. 1If the parameters that are outside the limit cannot be restored, theplant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply.To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within30 minutes.

Rapid reactor shutdown can be readily and practically achieved within a 30 minute period. The allowed time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 in an orderlymanner and without challenging plant systems.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS JINSERT -SR 3.4.2.1SR 3.4.2.1ReS loup aveice tem~perature is required to be ve;fied at orabv641 *F evenj 30 minutes when the loW loW TdVy alaFrm IS not rocot andaws" Pr.' Innn T.. !C~ f ýA0~.--I- ' dVyI I It~ i'JtJtfl I IItJUIIIfl~

II Ifl flfl WV. 11 p LII IV IA.~I ILflIIIJ flIIrII LIIJfl IflIlItiflI nttAIr ....-..J..---.------

TSF27is 4f1 21-U 1.1= 10-V 10-Y Iavg 3121l1l1 IS didlI 1111 lJ, rVtO iU00P dvuIdyutcmpefraturz3f eetuld fall below the LCO) requirement without additionali

.ThI ieR to verify RCC 'cop avefege tempzraturzs every30 _Minu~tes is frcglucnt eneugh to prcvent the ino&.zrtcnt vielatien efthe i~eG.REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 4.3 and 15.Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.4.2-3Revision[5:1 Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesINSERT -SR 3.4.2.1 BasesITSTF-27 IRCS loop average temperature is required to be periodically verified at or above 541'F. TheSurveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesRCS Loops -MODE 3B 3.4.5B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)B 3.4.5 RCS Loops -MODE 3BASESBACKGROUND In MODE 3, the primary function of the reactor coolant is removal ofdecay heat and transfer of this heat, via the steam generator (SG), tothe secondary plant fluid. The secondary function of the reactorcoolant is to act as a carrier for soluble neutron poison, boric acid.The reactor coolant is circulated through three RCS loops, connected in parallel to the reactor vessel, each containing an SG, a reactorcoolant pump (RCP), and appropriate flow, pressure, level, andtemperature instrumentation for control, protection, and indication.

The reactor vessel contains the clad fuel. The SGs provide the heatsink. The RCPs circulate the water through the reactor vessel andSGs at a sufficient rate to ensure proper heat transfer and prevent fueldamage.In MODE 3, RCPs are used to provide forced circulation for heatremoval during heatup and cooldown.

The MODE 3 decay heatremoval requirements are low enough that a single RCS loop with oneRCP running is sufficient to remove core decay heat. However, twoRCS loops are required to be OPERABLE to ensure redundant capability for decay heat removal.APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSESWhenever the reactor trip breakers (RTBs) are in the closedposition and the control rod drive mechanisms (CRDMs) areenergized, an inadvertent rod withdrawal from subcritical, resulting ina power excursion, is possible.

Such a transient could be caused bya malfunction of the rod control system. In addition, the possibility ofa power excursion due to the ejection of an inserted control rod ispossible with the breakers closed or open. Such a transient could becaused by the mechanical failure of a CRDM. ITSTF_87Therefore, in MODE 3 with F;Ui, m the..........

RodControl System capable of rod withdrawal, accidental control rodwithdrawal from subcritical is postulated and requires at least twoRCS loops to be OPERABLE and in operation to ensure that theaccident analyses limits are met. For those conditions when the RodControl System is not capable of rod withdrawal, two RCS loops are(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.4.5-1RevisionF]

Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesRCS Loops -MODE 3B 3.4.5BASESAPPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES(continued) required to be OPERABLE, but only one RCS loop is required to be inoperation to be consistent with MODE 3 accident analyses.

Failure to provide decay heat removal may result in challenges to afission product barrier.

The RCS loops are part of the primarysuccess path that functions or actuates to prevent or mitigate aDesign Basis Accident or transient that either assumes the failure of,or presents a challenge to, the integrity of a fission product barrier.RCS Loops -MODE 3 satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCOThe purpose of this LCO is to require that at least two RCS loops beOPERABLE.

In MODE 3 with the JRTs in t-e closed positi. and IRod Control System capable of rod withdrawal, two OPERABLE RCSloops must be in operation.

Two OPERABLE RCS loops are requiredto be in operation in MODE 3 with Rod ControlSystem capable of rod withdrawal due to the postulation of a power Iexcursion because of an inadvertent control rod withdrawal.

Therequired number of RCS loops in operation ensures that the SafetyLimit criteria will be met for all of the postulated accidents.

~87r--ýWhen_V IIVVIII j LII _ IT I J1 III TIIIC UIJII J.UOIUIYI, VI LIIV '.,rXL./IViC)

-IUlRod Control System is not capable of rod withdrawal onlyone OPERABLE RCS loop in operation is necessary to ensure removalof decay heat from the core and homogenous boron concentration throughout the RCS. An additional RCS loop is required to beOPERABLE to ensure that safety analyses limits are met.The Note permits all RCPs to not be in operation for _ 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months per8 hour period. The purpose of the Note is to perform tests that aredesigned to validate various accident analyses values. One of thesetests is validation of the pump coastdown curve used as input to anumber of accident analyses including a loss of flow accident.

Thistest is generally performed in MODE 3 during the initial startup testingprogram, and as such should only be performed once. If, however,changes are made to the RCS that would cause a change to the flowcharacteristics of the RCS, the input values of the coastdown curvemust be revalidated by conducting the test again. Another testperformed during the startup testing program is the validation of roddrop times during cold conditions, both with and without flow.(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.4.5-2Revisiorff]

Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesRCS Loops -MODE 3B 3.4.5BASESAPPLICABILITY (continued)

Operation in other MODES is covered by:LCO 3.4.4, "RCS Loops -MODES 1 and 2";LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops -MODE 4";LCO 3.4.7, "RCS Loops -MODE 5, Loops Filled";LCO 3.4.8, "RCS Loops -MODE 5, Loops Not Filled";LCO 3.9.4, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and CoolantCirculation

-High Water Level" (MODE 6); andLCO 3.9.5, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and CoolantCirculation-Low Water Level" (MODE 6).ACTIONSA._1If one required RCS loop is inoperable, redundancy for heat removalis lost. The Required Action is restoration of the required RCS loop toOPERABLE status within the Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . This timeallowance is a justified period to be without the redundant, nonoperating loop because a single loop in operation has a heattransfer capability greater than that needed to remove the decay heatproduced in the reactor core and because of the low probability of afailure in the remaining loop occurring during this period.B._1If restoration is not possible within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , the unit must be broughtto MODE 4. In MODE 4, the unit may be placed on the Residual HeatRemoval System. The additional Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months iscompatible with required operations to achieve cooldown anddepressurization from the existing plant conditions in an orderlymanner and without challenging plant systems.place the Rod Control Systemin a condition incapable of rodwithdrawal (e.g.,C.1 and C.2If the required RCS IoopJ0 not in operation, and the RT-a-mr-el ,L__od Control System capable of rod withdrawal, the RequiredAction is either to restore the required RCS loop to operation or to ITSTF'87 IJ' de-energize all CRDMs by opening the RTBs or de-energizing themotor generator (MG) sets When the N ii! ,,, P,[ Rod Control Syste able of rod withdrawal, it is postulated that a power excursion ul occur in the event of anis(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.4.5-4Revisionwi Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesRCS Loops -MODE 3B 3.4.5BASESACTIONSC.1 and C.2 (continued)

Rod Control System must berendered incapable of rodwithdrawal place the Rod Control Systemin a condition incapable of rodwithdrawal (e.g.,inadvertent control rod withdrawal.

This mandates having the heattransfer capacity of two RCS loops in operation.

If only one loop is inoperation, n~uht bl uUt,,;d.The Completion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to restore the required RCS loop tooperation or e- W CR 4's adequate to perform theseoperations in an orderly manner wit ut exposing the unit to risk foran undue time period. defeat the Rod Control SystemD.1. D.2, and D.3If two required CS loops are i operable or no RCS loop is inoperation, excet as during c ditions permitted by the Note in theLCO section, al CRDMs mu be de-energized by opening the RTBsor de-energizing the MG sets. All operations involving a reduction ofRCS boron concentration must be suspended, and action to restoreone of the RCS loops to OPERABLE status and operation must beinitiated.

Boron dilution requires forced circulation for proper mixing,and opening the RTBs or de-energizing the MG sets removes thepossibility of an inadvertent rod withdrawal.

The immediate Completion Time reflects the importance of maintaining operation forheat removal.

The action to restore must be continued until one loopis restored to OPERABLE status and operation.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.4.5.1This SR requires verification that the required loops are in operation.

Verification includes flow rate, temperature, and pump statusmonitoring, which help ensure that forced flow is providing heatremoval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under theSurveillance Frequency Control Program.SR 3.4.5.2SR 3.4.5.2 requires verification of SG OPERABILITY.

SGOPERABILITY is verified by ensuring that the secondary side narrowrange water level is > 30% for required RCS loops. If the SG(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.4.5-5Revisionp]

Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesPressurizer B 3.4.9BASESAPPLICABILITY The need for pressure control is most pertinent when core heat cancause the greatest effect on RCS temperature, resulting in thegreatest effect on pressurizer level and RCS pressure control.

Thus,applicability has been designated for MODES 1 and 2. Theapplicability is also provided for MODE 3. The purpose is to preventsolid water RCS operation during heatup and cooldown to avoid rapidpressure rises caused by normal operational perturbation, such asreactor coolant pump startup.A Note has been added to indicate the limit on pressurizer level is notapplicable during short term operational transients such as aTHERMAL POWER ramp > 5% RTP per minute or a THERMALPOWER step > 10% RTP. These conditions represent short termperturbations.

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, there is need to maintain the availability ofpressurizer

heaters, capable of being powered from an emergency power supply. In the event of a loss of offsite power, the initialconditions of these MODES give the greatest demand for maintaining the RCS in a hot pressurized condition with loop subcooling for anextended period. For MODE 4, 5, or 6, it is not necessary to controlpressure (by heaters) to ensure loop subcooling for heat transferwhen the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System is in service, andtherefore, the LCO is not applicable.

f, .A.!,A.2A3 and A.4ACTIONS IA., I d all rods fully insertedand incapable ofwithdrawal.

Additionally, the unitmust be broughtPressurizer water level control malfunctions or other plant evolutions may result in a pressurizer water level above the nominal upper limit,even with the plant at steady state conditions.

within 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months sIf the pressurizer water lev I is not within the limit, wh the limit is TSTF-87applicable, action must be taken to bring the plant to ODE in s Iwhich the LCO does not a ply. To achieve this status, the unit mustbe b ro uht to MODE 3, with,-e f --et 8rFt,.,p b,,8,mmaW p V0, ,tr-h~ur~nto MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . This takes the unit out of theapplicable MODES.The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full powerconditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plantsystems.(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.4.9-3Revisionlý:i Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesPressurizer PORVsB 3.4.11BASESAPPLICABILITY valves or an RCS vent of >_ 2.85 inches squared is used for(continued) overpressure protection in MODES 4, 5, and 6 with the reactor vesselhead in place. LCO 3.4.12 addresses the overpressure protection

'STF-2477 requirements in these MODES. [2 !land block valvesACTIONS A Note has been added to clarify that all pressurizer PORVs aretreated as separate

entities, each with separate Completion Times(i.e., the Completion Time is on a component basis).A.1With the PORVs inoperable and capable of being manually cycled,either the PORVs must be restored or the flow path isolated within1 hour. The block valves should be closed but power must bemaintained to the associated block valves, since removal of powerwould render the block valve inoperable.

Although a PORV may bedesignated inoperable, it may be able to be manually opened andclosed, and therefore, able to perform its function.

PORVinoperability may be due to seat leakage, instrumentation problemsrelated to remote manual operation of the PORVs, or other causesthat do not prevent manual use and do not create a possibility for asmall break LOCA. For these reasons, the block valve may be closedbut the Action requires power be maintained to the valve. ThisCondition is only intended to permit operation of the plant for a limitedperiod of time not to exceed the next refueling outage (MODE 6) sothat maintenance can be performed on the PORVs to eliminate theproblem condition.

Quick access to the PORV for pressure control can be made whenpower remains on the closed block valve. The Completion Time of1 hour is based on plant operating experience that has shown thatminor problems can be corrected or closure accomplished in this timeperiod.(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.4.11-4Revision

=2r 1 Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesPressurizer PORVsB 3.4.11BASESACTIONS D.1 and D.2(continued)

If the Required Action of Condition A, B, or C is not met, then the plantmust be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. Toachieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . The allowedCompletion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, toreach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in anorderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

In MODES 4,5, and 6, the PORVs are not required OPERABLE.

E.1, E.2, E.3, and E.4If more than one PORV is inoperable and not capable of beingmanually cycled, it is necessary to either restore at least one valvewithin the Completion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or isolate the flow path byclosing and removing the power to the associated block valves. TheCompletion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is reasonable, based on the small potential for challenges to the system during this time and provides theoperator time to correct the situation.

If one PORV is restored andone PORV remains inoperable, then the plant will be in Condition Bwith the time clock started at the original declaration of having twoPORVs inoperable.

If no PORVs are restored within the Completion Time, then the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCOdoes not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought toat least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Theallowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full powerconditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plantsystems.

In MODES 4, 5, and 6, the PORVs are not requiredOPERABLE.

F.11 F-/--dt~-1two block valves are-8AITSTF-247 he a," see's- ed P-RY9 em m',.;; i,

' _1, Ire'st'oreat le'as-tone block valve within 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months sla~_nd 8F Fe,, m , a,"n--;,.,.

ble.ek we':-veivFt~hir,

_2 ,h&WIT The Completion

asonable, based on thesmall potential for challenges to the system dl)ýýng this time andprovide the operator time to correct the situation.

_Time is(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.4.11-6Revision=

IF117- 1 Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesPressurizer PORVsB 3.4.11BASESACTIONS G.1 and G.2(continued)

If the Required Actions of Condition F are not met, then the plant mustbe brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achievethis status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within6 hours and to MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach therequired plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderlymanner and without challenging plant systems.

In MODES 4, 5,and 6, the PORVs are not required OPERABLE.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.11.1REQUIREMENTS Block valve cycling verifies that the valve(s) can be closed if needed.The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.FFh bl" e valv a"s" ...........

tieate a,Ion tht. H181- es pable ef being menu l~y eyeled, the OPE=RABILIT-Y oethe bItk valve 6; of ;mpoite, te, beecause epemimg the Weeck Valve is... ...a.. to pef...it thc P.R. t. be used for mAnual oontrol ofi eaeto1 pressure.

if the Weeck valve me elesed to iselate an etherwise

nopefrble PORY, the maximumn Completien Time te restere thePeRY 9ad open the bleek vako is 72 heurc. Furthfhormor, theso tost*cquirememts would be eemplcted by the roopening 6f a Fe3Ontly(I~ Wleek vav apanu estmaption of the PERV to OPERABLEsttu (ie, eempletie*' ef tIhe. Reeluffrd Aetions fulfills the GR).This SR is modified by two Notes. Note 1 modifies this SR by statingthat it is not required to be 1with the block valve closeclnaccordance with the Reqed of this LCO. Note 2 modifiesthis SR to allow entry nti and operat on in MODE 3 prior toperforming the SR. Thi allows the t t to be performed in MODE 3under operating tempjerture c~onditio s, prior to entering MODE 1 or2. V *2. perormedActions In accordance with Reference 3, administrative controls requirethis test to be performed in MODE 3 or 4 to adequately simulate opening temperature and pressure effects on PORVoperation.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.4.11-7RevisionF1 Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesPressurizer PORVsB 3.4.11BASESSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.4.11.2SR 3.4.11.2 requires a complete cycle of each PORV in MODE 3 or 4.The PORVs are stroke tested during MODES 3 or 4 with theassociated block valves closed in order to limit the uncertainty introduced by testing the PORVs at lesser system temperatures thanexpected during actual operating conditions.

Operating a PORVthrough one complete cycle ensures that the PORV can be manuallyactuated for mitigation of an SGTR. The Surveillance Frequency iscontrolled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

TheNote modifies this SR to allow entry into and operation in MODE 3prior to performing the SR. This allows the test to be performed inMODE 3 under operating temperature conditions, prior to enteringMODE 1 or 2.SR 3.4.11.3SR 3.4.11.3 requires a complete cycle of each PORV using thebackup PORV control system. This surveillance verifies the capability to operate the PORVs using the backup nitrogen supply system.Additionally, this surveillance ensures the correct function of theassociated nitrogen supply system valves. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency ControlProgram.IIREFERENCES

1. Regulatory Guide 1.32, February 1977.2. FSAR Sections 5.5 and 15.2.\ _3. Generic Letter 90-06, "Resolution of Generic Issue 70, 'Power-Operated Relief Valve and Block Valve Reliability,'

and Generic Issue94, 'Additional Low-Temperature Overpressure Protection for Light-Water Reactors,'

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f),"

June 25, 1990.Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.4.11-8Revision ffl Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesLTOP SystemB 3.4.12BASESSURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.12.1.

SR 3.4.12.2.

and SR 3.4.12.3 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS pump start such that a single failure or single action will not result inan injection into the RCS. This may be accomplished through the HotShutdown Panel Local/Remote and pump control switches beingplaced in the Local and Stop positions, respectively, and at least onevalve in the discharge flow path being closed with the position ofthese components controlled administratively.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.SR 3.4.12.4Each required RHR suction relief valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying its RHR suction isolation valves (8701A,8701 B, 8702A and 8702B) are open. This Surveillance is onlyrequired to be performed if the RHR suction relief valve is being usedto meet this LCO.The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.SR 3.4.12.5The RCS vent of >_ 2.85 square inches is proven OPERABLE byverifying its open condition.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.The passive vent arrangement must only be open to be OPERABLE.

TSTF-284This Surveillance is required to b if the vent is being used I Ito satisfy the pressure relief of the LCO 3.4.12b.SR 3.4.12.6The RHR relief valves are verified OPERABLE by testing the reliefsetpoint.

The setpoint verification ensures proper relief valvemechanical motion as well as verifying the setpoint.

Testing isperformed in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program which isbased on the requirements of the ASME Code, Section Xl (Ref. 7).(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.4.12-11 Revision 91 Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesECCS -Operating B 3.5.2BASESACTIONS A..1With one or more trains inoperable and at least 100% of the ECCSflow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available, theinoperable components must be returned to OPERABLE status within72 hours. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is based on an NRCreliability evaluation (Ref. 5) and is a reasonable time for repair ofmany ECCS components.

An ECCS train is inoperable if it is not capable of delivering designflow to the RCS. Individual components are inoperable if they are notcapable of performing their design function or supporting systems arenot available.

The LCO requires the OPERABILITY of a number of independent subsystems.

Due to the redundancy of trains and the diversity ofsubsystems, the inoperability of one component in a train does notrender the ECCS incapable of performing its function.

Neither does fTT-325the inoperability of two different components, each in a different train,necessarily result in a loss of function for the ECCS. Th rctft',of the EG , flo ........

itt a .. ..-- _, -n'n^n -A r-,-,r b~t,;&

... .... v°,°,.'L, IThis allows increased flexibility in plant operations under circumstances when components in opposite trains areinoperable.

An event accompanied by a loss of offsite power and the failure of anEDG can disable one ECCS train until power is restored.

A reliability analysis (Ref. 5) has shown that the impact of having one full ECCStrain inoperable is sufficiently small to justify continued operation for72 hours.Reference 6 describes situations in which one component, such as anRHR crossover valve, can disable both ECCS trains. With one ormore component(s) inoperable such that 100% of the flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train is not available, the facility is in acondition outside the accident analysis.

Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 mustbe immediately entered.(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.5.2-7RevisionfFý Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesBASESECCS -Operating B 3.5.2ACTIONS(continued)

Insert -Bases 3.5.2B.1 and B.2If the inoperable trains cannot be returned to OPERABLE statuswithin the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to aMODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, theplant must be brought to MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and MODE 4 within12 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based onoperating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from fullpower conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plantsystems.

ITSTF-325 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.5.2.1Verification of proper valve position ensures that the flow path fromthe ECCS pumps to the RCS is maintained.

Misalignment of thesevalves could render both ECCS trains inoperable.

Securing thesevalves in position by removal of power by locking open the disconnect device to the valve operators ensures that they cannot changeposition as a result of an active failure or be inadvertently misaligned.

These valves are of REQUIREMENTS the type, described inReference 6, that can disable the function of both ECCS trains andinvalidate the accident analyses.

SR 3.5.2.1 is modified by a Notethat specifies when this SR is applicable to valves 8132 A/B. Valves8132 A/B only have the potential to disable both ECCS trains whencentrifugal charging pump "A" is inoperable.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency ControlProgram.SR 3.5.2.2Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, andautomatic valves in the ECCS flow paths provides assurance that theproper flow paths will exist for ECCS operation.

This SR does notapply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured inposition, since these were verified to be in the correct position prior tolocking,

sealing, or securing.

A valve that receives an actuation signalis allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve willautomatically reposition within the proper stroke time. ThisSurveillance does not require any testing or valve manipulation.

Rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.5.2-8r=Revisionluz 1

Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesInsert -Bases 3.6.2CA_Condition A is applicable with one or more trains inoperable.

The allowed Completion Time isbased on the assumption that at least 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a singleOPERABLE ECCS train is available.

With less than 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to asingle OPERABLE ECCS train available, the facility is in a condition outside of the accidentanalysis.

Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesBASESSeal Injection FlowB 3.5.5ACTIONSA. 1 VogtleA.81 8 Change #1With the seal injction flow exceeding its limit, the amount of chargingflow available t the RCS may be reduced.

Under this Condition, action must b aken to restore the flow to below its limit. Theoperator has 4L ours from the time the flow is known to be above thelimit to perform SR 3.5.5.1 and correctly position the manual valvesand thus be in compliance with the accident analysis.

TheCompletion Time minimizes the potential exposure of the plant to aLOCA with insufficient injection flow and provides a reasonable timeto restore seal'injection flow within limits. This time is conservative with respect to the Completion Times of other ECCS LCOs; it is basedon operating experience and is sufficient for taking corrective actionsby operations personnel.

B.1 and B.2When the Required Actions cannot be completed within the requiredCompletion Time, a controlled shutdown must be initiated.

TheCompletion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for reaching MODE 3 from MODE 1 is areasonable time for a controlled

shutdown, based on operating experience and normal cooldown rates, and does not challenge plantsafety systems or operators.

Continuing the plant shutdown begun inRequired Action B.1, an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months is a reasonable time,based on operating experience and normal cooldown rates, to reachMODE 4, where this LCO is no longer applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.5.5.1Verification that the manual seal injection throttle valves are adjustedto give a flow within the limits (operation in the acceptable region ofFigure 3.5.5-1) ensures that proper manual seal injection throttle valveposition, and hence, proper seal injection flow, is maintained.

Adifferential pressure that is above the reference minimum value isestablished between the charging header (PT-121, charging headerpressure) and the pressurizer, and the total seal injection flow isverified to be within the limits determined in accordance with theECCS safety analysis.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.5.5-3Revisionr'--'

IUZ I Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesBASESSeal Injection FlowB 3.5.5SURVEILLANCE 8 SR 3.5.5.1 (continued)

CageREQUIREMENTS

\,RTs noted, the Surveillance is not required to be performed untilhours after the RCS pressure has stabilized within a +/- 20 psig rangeof normal operating pressure.

The RCS pressure requirement isspecified since this configuration will produce the required pressureconditions necessary to assure that the manual valves are setcorrectly.

The exception is limited to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months to ensure that theSurveillance is timely.REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Chapter 6 and Chapter 15.2. 10 CFR 50.46.Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.5.5-4RevisionE Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesContainment B 3.6.1BASES IACTIONS(continued)

B.1In the event containment is inoperable for reasons other than Condition A, containment must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time provides a period of time to correct theproblem commensurate with the importance of maintaining containment during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. This time period also ensures that theprobability of an accident (requiring containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods when containment is inoperable is minimal.C.1 and C.2If containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within therequired Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE inwhich the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant mustbe brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 5 within36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based onoperating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from fullpower conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plantsystems.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.6.1.1 Insert- Bases SR 3.6.1.1Maintaining the containment OPERABLE require compliance withthe visual examinations and leakage rate test r uirements of theContainment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

ailure to meet air lockand purge valve with resilient seal leakage limits specified inLCO 3.6.2 and LCO 3.6.3 does not invalidate the acceptability ofthese overall leakage determinations unless their contribution tooverall Type A, B, and C leakage causes that to exceed limits. As leftleakage prior to the first startup after performing a required Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program leakage test is requiredto be !5 0.6 L, for combined Type B and C leakage, and< 0.75 La for overall Type A leakage.

At all other times betweenrequired leakage rate tests, the acceptance criteria is based on anoverall Type A leakage limit of < 1.0 La. At < 1.0 L, the offsite doseconsequences are bounded by the assumptions of the safety analysis.

SR Frequencies are as required by the Containment Leakage RateTesting Program.

These periodic testing requirements verify that thecontainment leakage rate does not exceed the leakage rate assumed inthe safety analysis.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.6.1-4RevisionFF]

Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesINSERT -BASES SR 3.6.1.1The containment concrete visual examinations may be performed during either poweroperation, e.g., performed concurrently with other containment inspection-related activities such as tendon testing, or during a maintenance or refueling outage. Thevisual examinations of the steel liner plate inside containment are performed duringmaintenance or refueling outages since this is the only time the liner plate is fullyaccessible.

Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesContainment Isolation ValvesB 3.6.3BASESSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.6.3.3This SR requires verification that each containment isolation manualvalve and blind flange located inside containment and not locked,sealed, or otherwise secured and required to be closed during accidentconditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accidentleakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside of the containment boundary is within design limits. For containment isolation valvesinside containment, the Frequency of "prior to entering MODE 4 fromMODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days" is appropriate since these containment isolation valves are operated underadministrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.The SR specifies that containment isolation valves that are open underadministrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the timethey are open. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked,sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position, since these wereverified to be in the correct position upon locking,

sealing, or securing.

Note 1 allows valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areasto be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowingverification by administrative means is considered acceptable, sinceaccess to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, 3, and4, for ALARA reasons.

Therefore, the probability of misalignment ofthese containment isolation valves, once they have been verified to bein their proper position, is small. Note 2 provides an allowance to onlyverify the blind flange on the fuel transfer canal flange after eachdraining of the canal.SR 3.6.3.4 power operatedVerifying that the isolation time of each t ,pm automatic 61containment isolation valve in the IST Program is within limits isrequired to demonstrate OPERABILITY.

The isolation time testensures the valve will isolate in a time period less than or equal to thatassumed in the safety analyses.

The isolation time and Frequency ofthis SR are in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.Any change in the components being tested by this SR will requirereevaluation of STI Evaluation Number 558904 in accordance with theSurveillance Frequency Control Program.(continued)

Farley Units I and 2B 3.6.3-12Revision=1 1117ý1 Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesBASESContainment Spray and Cooling SystemsB 3.6.6APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment and an increase in containment pressure andtemperature requiring the operation of the containment spray trainsand containment cooling trains.In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these eventsare reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of theseMODES. Thus, the Containment Spray System and the Containment Cooling System are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6.ACTIONSA._1With one containment spray train inoperable, the inoperable containment spray train must be restored to OPERABLE status within72 hours. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE spray andcooling trains are adequate to perform the iodine removal andcontainment cooling functions.

The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time takesinto account the redundant heat removal capability afforded by theContainment Spray System, reasonable time for repairs, and lowprobability of a DBA occurring during this period.The, 13 day poto of the eampl et1io Time for Requi.red Aetier1 AA1 isbased upun ungiiiin uyitiL It takesito accun th.UII e lowprobability ef eeineidEn cnt; ino woCnd-itions in this Specification eetupled with the low prbblt fan accident occurring during thestime. Refer tu SeCtIon i.3, "Comtpletioni Tl1Iiue" falit~ inuie detaileddiseussien ef the purpose o~f the "fre ,, isovr of ~failae to, i it 1:L~e0" puitiui o[ tile Comrpletionu Tillie.B.1 and B.2If the inoperable containment spray train cannot be restored toOPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plantmust be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. Toachieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 5 within 84 hours9.722222e-4 days 0.0233 hours 1.388889e-4 weeks 3.1962e-5 months . The allowedCompletion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderlymanner and without challenging plant systems.

The extended interval(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.6.6-6Revision=

r1U_ I I Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesContainment Spray and Cooling SystemsB 3.6.6BASESACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued) to reach MODE 5 allows additional time for attempting restoration ofthe containment spray train and is reasonable when considering thedriving force for a release of radioactive material from the ReactorCoolant System is reduced in MODE 3.C._ 1With one of the required containment cooling trains inoperable, theinoperable required containment cooling train must be restored toOPERABLE status within 7 days. The components in this degradedcondition provide iodine removal capabilities and are capable ofproviding at least 100% of the heat removal needs. The 7 dayCompletion Time was developed taking into account the redundant heat removal capabilities afforded by combinations of theContainment Spray System and Containment Cooling System and thelow probability of DBA occurring during this period. TSTF-439ThIS 0 day puaii, uf t1: C1,,,,pet;ion T i te o,%

Actia C.1 ibased upon cng rinjudgm,,t.

it takes i asucount the lo.p.J I "gtlJ ly of Ul idei it e ity u Lvvu tw U iditiu. l I I in .hi SpecldIUI Icoupled wit! ieI low pi obabflity of 9. 1 eaffden t zcurring duidng thi3time. Refer to. Ceeztii 1.3 fi. a .i i to, detailed dibIcubbicii io h~purpose of the "from dicoo~er; of fai!urz to mzcet the LCO" portion efthe C.mpltion Tirm.D.1With two required containment cooling trains inoperable, one of therequired containment cooling trains must be restored to OPERABLEstatus within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . The components in this degraded condition provide iodine removal capabilities and are capable of providing atleast 100% of the heat removal needs after an accident.

The 72 hourCompletion Time was developed taking into account the redundant heat removal capabilities afforded by combinations of theContainment Spray System and Containment Cooling System, theiodine removal function of the Containment Spray System, and thelow probability of DBA occurring during this period.(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.6.6-7Revision=n M I Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesAFW SystemB 3.7.5BASESLCO(continued) generators are OPERABLE.

This requires that the two motor-driven AFW pump trains be OPERABLE with one shared flow path, eachsupplying AFW to all steam generators.

In addition, the turbine drivenAFW pump train is required to be OPERABLE with redundant steamsupplies from each of two main steam lines upstream of the MSIVs,and shall be capable of supplying AFW to any of the steamgenerators via its associated flow path. The control room manualactuation switches for each AFW pump shall also be OPERABLE.

The piping, valves, instrumentation, and controls in the required flowpaths also are required to be OPERABLE.

A flow path is operablewhen it is capable of supporting the required AFW flow.APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the AFW System is required to beOPERABLE in the event that it is called upon to function when theMFW is lost. In addition, the AFW System is required to supplyenough makeup water to replace the steam generator secondary inventory, lost as the unit cools to MODE 4 conditions.

In MODE 4 the AFW System may be used for heat removal via thesteam generators.

However, the OPERABILITY of the AFW systemin MODE 4 is not assumed in the safety analysis and this LCO doesnot require the AFW system OPERABLE in MODE 4.In MODE 5 or 6, the steam generators are not normally used for heatremoval, and the AFW System is not required.

ACTIONSA Note prohibits the application of LCO 3.0.4b to an inoperable AFWtrain. There is an increased risk associated with entering a MODE orother specified condition in the Applicability with an AFW traininoperable and the provisions of LCO 3.0.4b, which allow entry into aMODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCOnot met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, should not be applied in thiscircumstance.

or if turbine driven pump is inoperable while in MODEA.1 3 immediately following refueling, If one of thV o steam supplies to the turbine driven AFW train isinoperable, action must be taken to restor OPERABLE status within T-STF-347 days. The 7 day Completion Time is re onable, based on thefollowing reasons:

./Ithe inoperable equipment to an (continued)

Farley Units I and 2B 3.7.5-5Revision

=TC117 I Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesBASESAFW SystemB 3.7.5ACTIONSINSERT 1 -TS 3.7.5Bases Action AA.1 (continued)

2. The radundant OPEmRABLE S steam supply to the turbine driyenAFW pump,b. The a.ailability of rzunda^t OPERABLE meter,, di .AAFpumps and-&The low prob9ability of an eyent occurring@

that requireg hinoperable steam cupply to the turbine drivon AFW pumrp.The seconid ompletio-1 Time for Required Action A.14 establishesa limi~t on the m~aximumn time allowed for anY comAbina2tion of Conditions tu be iioupe, able du, iiy a,Iy couiiuuus f'aiuae tou ,,eet t-,t LCG*The 10 day Completion Time pr.vide1 a limit;tien time allowed in thisspecified Condition after of failure to meet the LCO. Thislii i o isiudei, ed , eso, ble Fo, antuations r1 which Conditions Aand B aro entered concIurrently.

The AND connecter hbpeF.on 7! daysINSERT 2 -TS 3.7.5 a d1 asdcae hat -oth CompletionTmcapl B1ases Action A simultaneously, and te mRore restrGictVe mus1t _be met.B. 1With one of the required AFW trains (pump or flow path) inoperable for reasons other than Condition A, action must be taken to restoreOPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . A flow path is inoperable if it isblocked such that the required AFW flow cannot be delivered.

ThisCondition includes the loss of two steam supply lines to the turbinedriven AFW pump. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is reasonable, based on redundant capabilities afforded by the AFW System, timeneeded for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring duringthis time period.The secod Conpletiom Time for Required Actien 0.1 establishes limit en the ..a.iu. ti-m allowed for an comb,,inati, of CG,,,dit,.

to be *neperable durnng emy continuous failure to meet this LOThel10iday Cmpletin Time a limitation timel allowed in thisapeeiffied Condition after diseevery of failure to meet the LCO). Thisi,,ii j f; is cu, idei, ed easuiiable fo- rtut,- ;is,,"i wH Codeom ms A=n R are entered r-oG=L'rrestly.

The AND bhobeo-2 , iouu ...d 10 days di-tat .that beth Complet.Ion Timeis appisimutirlsno'..sly, and the more rectrictive must be mret.(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.7.5-6Revision R]

Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesInsert -TS 3.7.5 Bases Action AInsert 1a. For the inoperability of a steam supply to the turbine driven AFW pump, the 7 dayCompletion time is reasonable since there is a redundant steam supply line forthe turbine driven pump.b. For the inoperability of a turbine driven AFW pump while in MODE 3 immediately subsequent to a refueling, the 7 day Completion time is reasonable due to theminimal decay heat levels in this situation.

c. For both the inoperability of a steam supply line to the turbine driven pump andan inoperable turbine driven AFW pump while in MODE 3 immediately following a refueling, the 7 day Completion time is reasonable due to the availability ofredundant OPERABLE motor driven AFW pumps; and due to the low probability of an event requiring the use of the turbine driven AFW pump.Insert 2Condition A is modified by a Note which limits the applicability of the Condition to whenthe unit has not entered MODE 2 following a refueling.

Condition A allows one AFWtrain to be inoperable for 7 days vice the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time in Condition B. Thislonger Completion Time is based on the reduced decay heat following refueling andprior to the reactor being critical.

Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesAFW SystemB 3.7.5BASESSURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.5.1 (continued)

FTREQUIREMENTS T-

urveivllaiice is modified by a Note th~at provides an emeeptien f3;" UIV MF VV IUW L.ELIU i U VW*V~. i= VII V~IMIUIlaUI Vi =I VV IVV t~UuI1Ivalves in the full open position is not roguirod during low pow@rVe peratien

(:g 10%4 RTP) er when the AFW system Is noet on autermatic ponterol1.

The system is poncidered in autematic oontrOl when it icnIIINSERT -BASESSR 3.7.5.1 NoteJstandby for A6FW aAmalnxftic inifiation andi not being operatord mBAnUSll.

The pr8;'i9o3 of thiS note allow eperltiOn sauh asporm8' unit stafp orF hutd"wn and "-' Uir-- d AFW pump testing a"powcr to be peorformd withetut vieletimg the reoqutirements ef this GR.In addition, this surveillance includes verification that the stop checkvalves 3350A, 3350B, and 3350C are in the open position with thebreaker to the valve operators locked open.The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.SR 3.7.5.2Verifying that each AFW pump's developed head at the flow test pointis greater than or equal to the required developed head ensures thatAFW pump performance has not degraded during the cycle. Flowand differential head are normal tests of centrigufal pumpperformance required by Section XI of the ASME Code (Ref 2). Thistest confirms one point on the pump design curve and is indicative ofoverall performance.

Such inservice tests confirm component OPERABILITY, trend performance, and detect incipient failures byindicating abnormal performance.

Performance of inservice testingdiscussed in the ASME Code, Section Xl (Ref. 2) (only required at 3month intervals) satisfies this requirement.

Any change in thecomponents being tested by this SR will require reevaluation of STIEvaluation Number 558904 in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the SR should bedeferred until suitable test conditions are established.

This deferral isrequired because there is insufficient steam pressure to perform thetest.(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.7.5-8RevisionEm""

P71 1 Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesINSERT- Bases SR 3.7.5.1 NoteThe SR is modified by a Note that states one or more AFW trains may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for steam generator level control, if it is capable ofbeing manually (i.e., remotely or locally, as appropriate) realigned to the AFW mode ofoperation, provided it is not otherwise inoperable.

This exception allows the system to be out ofits normal standby alignment and temporarily incapable of automatic initiation without declaring the train(s) inoperable.

Since AFW may be used during startup,

shutdown, hot standbyoperations, and hot shutdown operations for steam generator level control, and these manualoperations are an accepted function of the AFW system, OPERABILITY (i.e., the intendedsafety function) continues to be maintained.

Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesAFW SystemB 3.7.5BASESSURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.5.3REQUIREMENTS (continued)

This SR verifies that AFW can be delivered to the steam generators inthe event of any accident or transient that generates an ESFAS, bydemonstrating that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates toits correct position on an actual or simulated actuation (automatic pump start) signal. This Surveillance is not required for valves that arelocked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position underadministrative controls.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.SR 3.7.5.3 Note SR 3.7.5.4This SR verifies that the AFW pumps will start in the event of anyaccident or transient that generates an ESFAS by demonstrating that T Ieach AFW pump starts automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal in MODES 1, 2, and 3. The motor-driven pumpsmust be verified to start on SI, SG water level low-low in any SG, andloss of offsite power. The turbine-driven pump must be verified tostart on under-voltage on two out of three RCP buses and SG waterlevel low-low in two SGs. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Programtw Notes. The first NoteThis SR is modified by indicates the SR may be deferreduntil suitable test conditions are established.

This deferral is requiredIINSERT -BASES because there is insufficient steam pressure to perform the test.SR 3.7.5.4 Note SR 3.7.5.5This SR verifies that the air stored in turbine-driven AFW pump steamadmission valve air accumulators is sufficient to open valvesQ1 (2)N12V001A-A and Q1(2)N12V001B-B.

Each steam admission valve has an air accumulator associated with it. The air accumulators provide sufficient air to ensure the operation of the steam admission valves for turbine-driven AFW pump during a loss of power or other(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.7.5-9Revision luz 1 Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesINSERT: Bases SR 3.7.5.3 NoteJTTF245]The SR is modified by a Note that states one or more AFW trains may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for steam generator level control, if it is capable ofbeing manually (i.e., remotely or locally, as appropriate) realigned to the AFW mode ofoperation, provided it is not otherwise inoperable.

This exception allows the system to be out ofits normal standby alignment and temporarily incapable of automatic initiation without declaring the train(s) inoperable.

Since AFW may be used during startup,

shutdown, hot standbyoperations, and hot shutdown operations for steam generator level control, and these manualoperations are an accepted function of the AFW system, OPERABILITY (i.e., the intendedsafety function) continues to be maintained.

INSERT: Bases SR 3.7.5.4 Note~245The second Note states that one or more AFW trains may be considered OPERABLE duringalignment and operation for steam generator level control, if it is capable of being manually (i.e.,remotely or locally, as appropriate) realigned to the AFW mode of operation, provided it is nototherwise inoperable.

This exception allows the system to be out of its normal standbyalignment and temporarily incapable of automatic initiation without declaring the train(s)inoperable.

Since AFW may be used during startup,

shutdown, hot standby operations, and hotshutdown operations for steam generator level control, and these manual operations are anaccepted function of the AFW system, OPERABILITY (i.e., the intended safety function) continues to be maintained.

Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesBASESAC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1ACTIONSA.3 (continued) this Condition,

however, the remaining OPERABLE offsite circuit andDGs are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1 EDistribution System.The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time takes into account the capacity andcapability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs,and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.h d -,uet, , :FiTe fo Requi, Actia, A.3 estb;isl i -lWmi oan the m~aximum time allewed fer any eombimation of requied ACpowcr sources to be inoperable d i ,, ,,,e contguotis occurfenee of failing to meeot the LCO. if Condition A isc cnterod while,for mstence, a 9G is inepeffable and tthat DOG i* cubcoqUontlY roturnodOPERABLE, the CO mRay .lr.ady have boon not mat for up to13 days. This could lead to a total. -f 1 d-y, I-I in WWI failuro toMetthe LCO, to restore the effaite eoreuft.

At this time, a DC couldagaim becm in rable, the eircuit rcstercd O-PERABL=E, and anOdditio*l18 dy (fo Fa total of 23 days) allewed prior to comnplete rst ......_ of the LCO.. The 13 day C '-.potien Time pr.. vid. s a limito the me allowed .a specified d...i.i.

after diseevery of failure tomeet the LCO. This limit is soncidoerod ro-aaconable-for situation-iwhioh Cond^tien^

A and B arc d ooner....tly.

" ,^AND,connactor hotfAoona the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months an~d 13 day Cmlto io onihat buyo, Crnpletiu,,

Tii,,s apply siIImultanIeuusly, dd the iu,"rroStrietive Completion Time must be met.As :-r ..equ .red A ,ti.n A.2, the Complctio Timc SHllOWe foranexception toJ the~ I IIJI tille zia ~" fiji beginning~

the~ alloweid outa~getimon "olook."

This will rosult -H establiching the "time zoro" at the timcthat t. ...... was, iftia::y iot rnet, ;uistead of at the tire ....d.to.. AI Is-eLtereclI B._1The Condition B Required Actions are modified by a Note that isapplicable when only one of the three individual DGs is inoperable.

The note permits the use of the provisions of LCO 3.0.4c. Theallowance provided by this note, to enter the MODE of applicability with a single inoperable DG, takes into account the capacity andcapability of the remaining AC sources and the fact that operation isultimately limited by the Condition B Completion Time for theinoperable DG set.(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.8.1-8Revisionp I

Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesBASESAC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1ACTIONS(continued)

B.4Operation may continue in Condition B for a period that should notexceed 10 days.In Condition B, the remaining OPERABLE DG set and offsite circuits areadequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1 E Distribution System. The 10 day Completion Time takes into account the capacityand capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time forrepairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. FTSTF-439 IThe ..... dCornpletion Time....

RequiIed

...... _, B4 ... .. .. islirn't on the mAximum timoe allowed for anRy combiAh2tion

-of raquiredA C power sources to be inoperable A ,ring a-n single config, in, is..eu...n..

of failing to meet the I GO If COndition B3 i6 ,n÷tr-d w'hile,o;5 instemee, am effsite eircuit b r- prol and that pircuit icsubsequently roctored OPERABL6E, the LCO m~ay already have beennout nr k up iu 72 hiuu,i. Tisb cuuld lead to a tuotal of 13 days, suinei:tia;01faoltUv-tU iuet th~lCOt, tuloretvie thiED. At thioUiniv, ano fit&W .it oauld again bee e inoprable, thoe D .ret.r..d OERABE,and on addfitioa!

72 hor fr oa f 16 days) allowed prior tocoim plet1 estoi stier of the LCO). The 13 day Completien Time przvidesa lIm* oiI time allowle ;m a speIfIied afte1 of failuretu niii, thi LCm. This, ,i,,,t .. ea.,idered

,esonble for ,ituatine*

in"h"h C,,nditi...

A and B arc entered oonzUrrontly.

Tho "AND".....etdar beween the 10 day and 13 day CompletiRn Timro, meansthat beth Cempletion Times apply cimultaneously, and the FAorQ,estritie Completio;n Ti.me must be metAs in RI .uir.d Action 8.2, the ComF)pletion Ti-m-e --2110 fo-r nIl eXceptioLn to t11 IInonl "iII e lUl" I beginning thI allowed tiIme "clock."

Thiswln ='- nelt mt establishifg the "time er," at the time that the L-Or waRnial'nt mat. nta of 2t the time Conditon B woe9 enter'edC.1 and C.2Required Action C.1, which applies when two offsite circuits areinoperable, is intended to provide assurance that an event with acoincident single failure will not result in a complete loss of redundant required safety functions.

The Completion Time for this failure ofredundant required features is reduced to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months from that allowedfor one train without offsite power (Required Action A.2). Therationale for the reduction to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is that Regulatory Guide 1.93(Ref. 6) allows a Completion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for two required offsite(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.8.1-11Revision=

1 IF171 Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesAC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1BASESSURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.5 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The design of fuel transfer systems is such that pumps operateautomatically or must be started manually in order to maintain anadequate volume of fuel oil in the day tanks during or following DGtesting.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under theSurveillance Frequency Control Program.SR 3.8.1.6See SR 3.8.1.2.SR 3.8.1.7Transfer of the unit power supply from the normal offsite circuit to thealternate offsite circuit demonstrates the OPERABILITY of thealternate circuit distribution network to power the shutdown loads.The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

Any change in the components beingtested by this SR will require reevaluation of STI Evaluation Number558904 in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency ControlProgram.This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that, duringoperation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could causeperturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could T -283challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, unit I Isafety systems.-tnsert 1 -Bases3.8.1 SR 3.8.1.8Each DG is provided with an engine overspeed trip to preventdamage to the engine. Recovery from the transient caused by theloss of a large load could cause diesel engine overspeed, which, ifexcessive, might result in a trip of the engine. This Surveillance demonstrates the DG load response characteristics and capability toreject the largest single load without exceeding predetermined voltageand while maintaining a specified margin to the overspeed trip. Thesingle load for each DG is approximately 1000 kW. This Surveillance may be accomplished by:(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.8.1-20Revision=

Flrý Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesInsert 1 -Bases 3.8.1ITTF283IThis restriction from normally performing the Surveillance in MODE 1 or 2 is further amplified to allowthe Surveillance to be performed for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g. post work testingfollowing corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing,and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety ismaintained or enhanced.

This assessment shall, at a minimum, consider the potential outcomes andtransients associated with a failed Surveillance, a successful Surveillance, and a perturbation of theoffsite or onsite system when they are tied together or operated independently for the Surveillance; aswell as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes.

These shall be measuredagainst the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained orenhanced when the Surveillance is performed in MODE 1 or 2. Risk insights or deterministic methodsmay be used for this assessment.

Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesAC Sources--

Operating B 3.8.1BASESSURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.9 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS For instance, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) injection valves are not desired to be stroked open, or high pressure injection systems are not capable of being operated at full flow, or residualheat removal (RHR) systems performing a decay heat removalfunction are not desired to be realigned to the ECCS mode ofoperation.

In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loadingof loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DGsystems to perform these functions is acceptable.

This testing mayinclude any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that theentire connection and loading sequence is verified.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is tominimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing.

For the purpose ofthis testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is,with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and ITSTF-283 temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

The reason for Note 2 is that performing theSurveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service,perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safetysystems.SR 3.8.1.10

-nsert2-Bases3.8.1 This Surveillance demonstrates that the DG automatically starts andachieves the required voltage and frequency within the specified time(12 seconds) from the design basis actuation signal (LOCA signal)and operates for >_ 5 minutes.

The 5 minute period provides sufficient time to demonstrate stability.

SR 3.8.1.10.d and SR 3.8.1.10.e ensurethat permanently connected loads and emergency loads areenergized from the offsite electrical power system on an ESF signalwithout loss of offsite power. Emergency loads are startedsimultaneously by logic in the load sequencers sensing the availability of offsite power.(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.8.1-22Revision=

cai Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesInsert 2 -Bases 3.8.1LITSF28This restriction from normally performing the Surveillance in MODES 1, 2, 3 or 4 is further amplified toallow portions of the Surveillance to be performed for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g.post work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance

testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or enhanced.

This assessment shall, at a minimum, consider thepotential outcomes and transients associated with a failed partial Surveillance, a successful partialSurveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together or operatedindependently for the partial Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope withthese outcomes.

These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup todetermine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when portions of the Surveillance are performed in MODES 1, 2, 3 or 4. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for this assessment.

Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesAC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1BASESSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.8.1.13This Surveillance demonstrates that the diesel engine can restart froma hot condition, such as subsequent to shutdown from normalSurveillances, and achieve the required voltage and frequency within12 seconds.

The 12 second time is derived from the requirements ofthe accident analysis to respond to a design basis large break LOCA.The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.This SR is modified by two Notes. Note 1 ensures that the test isperformed with the diesel sufficiently hot. The requirement that thediesel has operated for at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months at full load conditions prior toperformance of this Surveillance is consistent with the manufacturer recommendations for achieving hot conditions.

Momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Note 2 allowsall DG starts to be preceded by an engine prelube period to minimizewear and tear on the diesel during testing.SR 3.8.1.14As required by Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.(6),this Surveillance ensures that the manual synchronization andautomatic load transfer from the DG to the offsite source can be madeand the DG can be returned to ready to load status when offsitepower is restored.

It also ensures that the autostart logic is reset toallow the DG to reload if a subsequent loss of offsite power occurs.The DG is considered to be in ready to load status when the DG is atrated speed and voltage, the output breaker is open and can receivean autoclose signal on bus undervoltage, and the load sequencetimers are reset.The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

IThis SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that ' -'performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuitfrom service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems.(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.8.1-25RevisionF&P Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesAC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1BASESSURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.17 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform thesefunctions is acceptable.

This testing may include any series ofsequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimizewear and tear on the DGs during testing.

For the purpose of this testing,the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the enginecoolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations for DGs. The reason forNote 2 is that the performance of the Surveillance would remove arequired offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution TSF28 3system, and challenge safety systems.

---SR 3.8.1.18 Insert 2- Bases 3.8.1This Surveillance demonstrates the DG capability to reject a load of1200-2400 kW without overspeed tripping or exceeding thepredetermined voltage limits. The DG load rejection may occurbecause of a system fault or inadvertent breaker tripping.

ThisSurveillance ensures proper engine generator load response underthe simulated test conditions.

This test simulates the loss of the totalconnected load that the DG experiences following a 1200-2400 kWload rejection and verifies that the DG does not trip upon loss of theload. These acceptance criteria provide for DG damage protection.

While the DG is not expected to experience this transient during anevent and continues to be available, this response ensures that theDG is not degraded for future application, including reconnection tothe bus if the trip initiator can be corrected or isolated.

The DG outputbreaker(s) must remain closed such that the DG is connected to atleast one ESF bus. All fuses and breakers on the energized ESFbus(es) must be verified not to trip.This surveillance is modified by a note which states that testing of theshared Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) set (EDG 1-2A or EDG1C) on either unit may be used to satisfy this surveillance requirement (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.8.1-27RevisionE2ýiýl P_-ý I Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesDistribution Systems -Operating B 3.8.9BASESACTIONS A._I (continued) minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor andmaintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure.The overall reliability is reduced,

however, because a single failure inthe remaining power distribution subsystems could result in theminimum required ESF functions not being supported.

Therefore, therequired AC buses, load centers, motor control centers, anddistribution panels must be restored to OPERABLE status within8 hours.Condition A worst scenario is one train without AC power (i.e., nooffsite power to the train and the associated DG inoperable).

In thisCondition, the unit is more vulnerable to a complete loss of AC power.It is, therefore, imperative that the unit operator's attention be focusedon minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining train bystabilizing the unit, and on restoring power to the affected train. The8 hour time limit before requiring a unit shutdown in this Condition isacceptable because of:a. The potential for decreased safety if the unit operator's attention isdiverted from the evaluations and actions necessary to restorepower to the affected train, to the actions associated with taking theunit to shutdown within this time limit; andb. The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of aredundant component in the train with AC power. MITTie secon i, Cmpletitn Time f, r R, ui.ed Action A. 1 aetbahiheis a.lLogl Hati th num.tim allowed fu. any eauinat,,ion, of requiredcitrrbU.i.e subsytosms toe CinOpfablce during any cinglo eeontigereu ccu I rrenc Of fa2i1inAg to moot8_ thQe L-C -. If ConAdition-A

s a ntere d w -h ilisLOTPERABLE, 1:1~ LOCe mayd alieady have beem met met fer up to-iLCO, to restm1 the AC distribution syte At thi ti ..., a DC circuiteO.ld again be..rm. ;maperable, ai.d AC du1 ,uuut,, feuoedOPERABLE.

This cou-ld contnu-e indefinitely.

The Complti, n felan exeipto' n to the "time zcro "fr~r ham.,u lnnn +hm nlnudmAr ni ito ga tima "AntpL- " Thic wuill ract ~it in .....-.-(continued)

Farley Units I and 2B 3.8.9-4Revision V]

Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesDistribution Systems -Operating B 3.8.9BASESACTIONS A.1 (continued)

[Ts'establishing tho "tirn zoro" at the time the LCOQ was initially not mct,i nstead of the t"me Codotg A was e "tefed. The 16 Cmpl-ti"n Time 49 am, seeptable limitatien em this petential te fail t3 meet theB._1With one or more AC vital buses inoperable, and a loss of safetyfunction has not yet occurred, the remaining OPERABLE AC vitalbuses are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the unit and maintain it in the safe shutdowncondition.

Overall reliability is reduced,

however, since an additional single failure could result in the minimum required ESF functions notbeing supported.

Therefore, the required AC vital bus must be restoredto OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months by powering the bus from theassociated inverter via inverted DC or Class 1 E constant voltagetransformer.

Condition B represents one or more AC vital buses without power;potentially both the DC source and the associated AC source arenonfunctioning.

In this situation, the unit is significantly morevulnerable to a complete loss of all noninterruptible power. It is,therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining vitalbuses and restoring power to the affected vital bus.This 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months limit is more conservative than Completion Times allowedfor the vast majority of components that are without adequate vital ACpower. Taking exception to LCO 3.0.2 for components withoutadequate vital AC power, that would have the Required ActionCompletion Times shorter than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months if declared inoperable, isacceptable because of:a. The potential for decreased safety by requiring a change in unitconditions (i.e., requiring a shutdown) and not allowing stableoperations to continue; (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.8.9-5Revisionf&_ý Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesBASESDistribution Systems -Operating B 3.8.9ACTIONSB.1 (continued)

b. The potential for decreased safety by requiring entry into numerousApplicable Conditions and Required Actions for components without adequate vital AC power and not providing sufficient timefor the operators to perform the necessary evaluations and actionsfor restoring power to the affected train; andc. The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of aredundant component.

The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months Completion Time takes into account the importance tosafety of restoring the AC vital bus to OPERABLE status, theredundant capability afforded by the other OPERABLE vital buses, andthe low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. I7Tit: scui,,d Cu,,,;pletion Tim*;e for Requied Act;on 0. 1 establishes alknit on thce -ximum time allowed f. r an7 mb..atiom of require_

ddistribution sbsystCrns~

to be imapervable duim amy sirile earitigueu3 oo~eetrome of failing to mooet the LCO. if Conditien B io entcrcd whioc,,for omstamee, arn AC bus is ineperablc and subsequently rotuno.PERABLE, t! Lte , my a'. , yady have beett mot n efi 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . This eoud Iead tU a total of 16 siroc initial failure afthe LCO), to festcro the vital bus distribuJtion system. At this time, anAG train osuld again beeeme inopefrable, and vital bus distfibution rotrord OPERABlE.

Th GA o ld ..nt..u 'ndA-- itfhis eovto Time* azllows fo, ar exception to tlie nonna i 4 le zeii vrr ni-,e allCowe ,.tagje tome ",l-v k., This will resu it Lestablishing the "timo zero" at the timec the LCO was initially not met,*instoad of the time Condition 13 war, cntercd.

Tho 16 hour1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months Completoen Tim1e is am seeeptable limitatoen on this potontial to fail to- mest theCA1With Auxiliary Building DC bus(es) in one train inoperable, theremaining Auxiliary Building DC electrical power distribution subsystems are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.8.9-6Revisionr=

IV I Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesBASESDistribution Systems -Operating B 3.8.9ACTIONSC.. (continued)

T9he see U onpetion Time fo, Required Acti,, G.. .establishes alimit m ,,the ,,,,,um " ,re aowed fe. any ..mbination of ro..irodd-istri-bu-tion subsystamrs to be inoperable during any single contiguous oAuPcnoez Af failing to mct the LCO. If A enditien C is entered whilefer instenee, an AC bus is inepemble and subsequently rcturnzmed OPERABL6E, the LCO may alrcady have been net met for up to0 how,.Tin; cold lead lo a tetal ef 10 houfs, sinee initial feolurz cf theLCO, to Fcctoro the PIG dictributonA system. At this time, an AC traincould again beceme imapefeble, and 9G diStribution rz~tOFcThis eompet;on Time alkews for am exeeptien to the norfmal "timeizero" foi beg11r.,g the allew~ed autage time "laek~.ll This will resutiestablishim the "tirme rere" at the time the LCOe was initially net met,'m~tead of the tifne CGndifien C was enterzd.

The 16 hour1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months Gompletion I Imeils an ble lIItationI ui IlIsi to I1eet thcD.1 and D.2If the inoperable distribution subsystem(s) addressed by Conditions A,B, or C cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the requiredCompletion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which theLCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be broughtto at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full powerconditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.E. 1With one SWIS DC electrical power distribution subsystem inoperable, the Service Water System train supported by the affected SWIS DCelectrical power distribution subsystem must be declared inoperable.

The capability of the affected SWIS DC electrical power distribution subsystem to fully support the associated train of Service Water is notassured.

Therefore, consistent with the definition of OPERABILITY, the associated train of Service Water must be declared inoperable immediately, thereby limiting operation in this condition to theCompletion Time associated with the affected Service Water Systemtrain.(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.8.9-8RevisionW7 Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesBoron Concentration B 3.9.1BASESLCO(continued) boron concentration limit specified in the COLR ensures that a corekeff of _< 0.95 is maintained during fuel handling operations.

Violation of the LCO could lead to an inadvertent criticality during MODE 6.APPLICABILITY This LCO is applicable in MODE 6 to ensure that the fuel in thereactor vessel will remain subcritical.

The required boronconcentration ensures a keff < 0.95. In other MODES, the LCOs forRod Group Alignment Limits, Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits, ControlBank Insertion Limits, and SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensure that anadequate amount of negative reactivity is available to shut down the 'TSTF-272' reactor and maintain it subcritical.

I2 IACTIONSThe Applicability is modified by aNote. The Note states that thelimits on boron concentration areonly applicable to the refueling canal and the refueling cavitywhen those volumes areconnected to the Reactor CoolantSystem. When the refueling canal and the refueling cavity areisolated from the RCS, nopotential path for boron dilutionexists.A.1 and A.2Continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity additions (including actions to reduce boron concentration) is contingent uponmaintaining the unit in compliance with the LCO. If the boronconcentration of any coolant volume in the filled portions of the RCS,the refueling canal, or the refueling cavity that has direct access to thecore is less than its limit, all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity additions must be suspended immediately.

Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity additions shall not preclude moving a component to a safe position or normalcooling of the coolant volume for the purpose of maintaining systemtemperature.

A.3In addition to immediately suspending CORE ALTERATIONS orpositive reactivity additions, boration to restore the concentration mustbe initiated immediately.

In determining the required combination of boration flow rate andconcentration, no unique Design Basis Event must be satisfied.

Theonly requirement is to restore the boron concentration to its requiredvalue as soon as possible.

In order to raise the boron concentration as soon as possible, the operator should begin boration with the bestsource available for unit conditions.

Once actions have been initiated, they must be continued until theboron concentration is restored.

The restoration time depends on theamount of boron that must be injected to reach the requiredconcentration.

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.9.1-3Revision 17':-'lu- I Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesBoron Concentration 83.9.1BASESland connected portions ofISURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.9.1.1This SR ensures ths, tthe coolant boron concentration in the filledportions of the RCS, 'the refueling canal~nd the refueling cavity athave direct access to the core is within the COLR limits. The boronconcentration of the coolant in each ,volume that has direct access tothe core is determined periodically chemical analysisThe Surveillance Frequency is controlld under the rveillance IFrequency Control Program.

Irequired I ITS'TF-27 REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.2. FSAR, Chapter 15.2.4.Prior to re-connecting portions of the refueling canal or the refueling cavity tothe RCS, this SR must be met per SR 3.0.4. If any dilution has occurred whilethe cavity or canal were disconnected from the RCS, this SR ensures thecorrect boron concentration prior to communication with the RCS.Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.9.1-4RevisionI571 Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesContainment Penetrations B 3.9.3BASESLCO(continued) are terminated, such that radiological doses are within the acceptance limit.The equipment hatch and personnel air locks are considered isolable Iwhen the following criteria are satisfied:

1. the necessary equipment required to close the hatch andpersonnel air locks is available,

2. at least 23 feet of water is maintained over the top of the reactorvessel flange in accordance with Specification 3.9.6,3. a designated trained closure crew is available.

IThe equipment hatch and personnel air locks door openings must becapable of being cleared of any obstruction so that closure can beachieved as soon as possible.

The containment personnel air lock and emergency personnel air lockdoors may be open during movement of irradiated fuel in thecontainment and during CORE ALTERATIONS provided that one doorin each air lock is capable of being closed in the event of a fuelhandling accident.

Should a fuel handling accident occur insidecontainment, one door in each personnel air lock will be closedfollowing an evacuation of containment.

The closure of the equipment hatch and the personnel air locks willINSERT -Bases LCO 3.9.3 completed promptly following a fuel handling accident withinNote N containment.

beITSTF-312I APPLICABILITY The containment penetration requirements are applicable duringCORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment because this is when there is a potential for a fuelhandling accident.

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, containment penetration requirements are addressed by LCO 3.6.1. In MODES 5 and 6, whenCORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment are not being conducted, the potential for a fuelhandling accident does not exist. Therefore, under these conditions norequirements are placed on containment penetration status.Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.9.3-4RevisionE_ý"

1ýý I Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesINSERT -Bases LCO 3.9.3 NoteITTF312IThe LCO is modified by a Note allowing penetration flow paths with direct access fromthe containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere to be unisolated underadministrative controls.

Administrative controls ensure that 1) appropriate personnel areaware of the open status of the penetration flow path during CORE ALTERATIONS ormovement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, and 2) specified individuals are designated and readily available to isolate the flow path in the event of a fuelhandling accident.

Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesContainment Penetrations B 3.9.3BASESSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.9.3.2 (continued) isolation time of each valve is in accordance with the Inservice TestingProgram requirements.

These Surveillances performed duringMODE 6 will ensure that the valves are capable of closing after apostulated fuel handling accident to limit a release of fission product Iradioactivity from the containment.

TSTF-284I The SR is modified by a Notestating that this Surveillance isnot required to be met for valvesin isolated penetrations.

The LCOprovides the option to closepenetrations in lieu of requiring automatic actuation capability.

ISR 3.9.3.3The equipment hatch is provided with a set of hardware, tools, andequipment for moving the hatch from its storage location and installing it in the opening.

The required set of hardware, tools, and equipment shall be inspected to ensure that they can perform the requiredfunctions.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.The SR is modified by a Note which only requires that the surveillance be met for an open equipment hatch. If the equipment hatch isinstalled in its opening, the availability of the means to install the hatchis not required.

REFERENCES

1. GPU Nuclear Safety Evaluation SE-0002000-001, Rev. 0,May 20, 1988.2. FSAR, Section 15.4.5.3. NUREG-0800, Section 15.7.4, Rev. 1, July 1981.4. Regulatory Guide 1.195, "Methods and Assumptions for Evaluating Radiological Consequences of Design Basis Accidents at Light-Water Nuclear Power Reactors,"

May 2003.Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.9.3-6Revisionriz 1

Enclosure 3 to NL-14-1385 Example Marked-Up Technical Specifications Bases PagesRHR and Coolant Circulation

-Low Water LevelB 3.9.5BASESLCO(continued)

An OPERABLE RHR loop consists of an RHR pump, a heatexchanger, valves, piping, instruments and controls to ensure anOPERABLE flow path and to determine the low end temperature.

Theflow path starts in one of the RCS hot legs and is returned to the RCSculu d Itwo Notes. The first Note IThe LCO requirements are modified byaJrNote-wh"hProvides anexception to the requirements for one RHR loop to be OPERABLEand one RHR loop to be in operation.

This exception is necessary to JTSTF-34ensure the RHR System may be realigned as necessary for up to -2 hours to perform the required surveillance testing necessary toverify the RHR System performance in the ECCS injection mode ofoperation.

AAPPLICABILITY wo RHR loops are required to be OPERABLE, and one RHR loopust be in operation in MODE 6, with the water level < 23 ft above the:op of the reactor vessel flange, to provide decay heat removal.Requirements for the RHR System in other MODES are covered byLCOs in Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), andSection 3.5, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS). RHR looprequirements in MODE 6 with the water level >_ 23 ft are located inLCO 3.9.4, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level."ACTIONSThe second Note permits theRHR pumps to be de-energized for </= 15 minuteswhen switching from onetrain to another.

Thecircumstances for stoppingboth RHR pumps are to belimited to situations when theoutage time is short (and thecore outlet temperature islimited to > 10 degrees Fbelow saturation temperature).

The Noteprohibits boron dilution ordraining operations whenRHR forced flow is stopped.A.1 and A.2If less than the required number of RHR loops are OPERABLE, actionshall be immediately initiated and continued until the RHR loop isrestored to OPERABLE status and to operation or until > 23 ft ofwater level is established above the reactor vessel flange. When thewater level is > 23 ft above the reactor vessel flange, the Applicability changes to that of LCO 3.9.4, and only one RHR loop is required tobe OPERABLE and in operation.

An immediate Completion Time isnecessary for an operator to initiate corrective actions.B._1If no RHR loop is in operation, there will be no forced circulation toprovide mixing to establish uniform boron concentrations.

Reducedboron concentrations can occur by the addition of water with a lowerboron concentration than the required boron concentration specified in the COLR. Therefore, actions that could result in the addition ofwater to the RCS with a boron concentration less than the requiredboron concentration specified in the COLR must be suspended immediately.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2B 3.9.5-2Revision=

[p-- I Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant -Units 1 and 2Request for Technical Specification Amendment Adoption of Previously NRC-Approved Generic Technical Specification Changes and Other ChangesEnclosure 4Clean-Typed Technical Specifications Pages Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications Pages1.1 Definitions Definitions 1.1PRESSURE ANDTEMPERATURE LIMITSREPORT (PTLR)QUADRANT POWER TILTRATIO (QPTR)RATED THERMAL POWER(RTP)REACTOR TRIPSYSTEM (RTS) RESPONSETIMESHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)The PTLR is the unit specific document that provides thereactor vessel pressure and temperature limits, including heatup and cooldown rates and the Low Temperature Overpressure Protection System applicability temperature, forthe current reactor vessel fluence period. These pressureand temperature limits shall be determined for each fluenceperiod in accordance with Specification 5.6.6.QPTR shall be the ratio of the maximum upper excoredetector calibrated output to the average of the upper excoredetector calibrated

outputs, or the ratio of the maximum lowerexcore detector calibrated output to the average of the lowerexcore detector calibrated

outputs, whichever is greater.RTP shall be a total reactor core heat transfer.rate to thereactor coolant of 2775 MWt.The RTS RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval fromwhen the monitored parameter exceeds its RTS trip setpointat the channel sensor until loss of stationary gripper coilvoltage.

The response time may be measured by means ofany series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so thatthe entire response time is measured.

In lieu ofmeasurement, response time may be verified for selectedcomponents provided that the components and themethodology for verification have been previously reviewedand approved by the NRC.SDM shall be the instantaneous amount of reactivity by whichthe reactor is subcritical or would be subcritical from itspresent condition assuming:

a. All rod cluster control assemblies (RCCAs) arefully inserted except for the single RCCA of highestreactivity worth, which is assumed to be fully withdrawn.

However, with all RCCAs verified fully inserted by twoindependent means, it is not necessary to account for astuck RCCA in the SDM calculation.

With any RCCA notcapable of being fully inserted, the reactivity worth of theRCCA must be accounted for in the determination ofSDM; and(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 21.1-5Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesCompletion Times1.31.3 Completion TimesDESCRIPTION (continued) limits, the Completion Time(s) may be extended.

To apply thisCompletion Time extension, two criteria must first be met. Thesubsequent inoperability:

a. Must exist concurrent with the first inoperability; andb. Must remain inoperable or not within limits after the firstinoperability is resolved.

The total Completion Time allowed for completing a Required Action toaddress the subsequent inoperability shall be limited to the morerestrictive of either:a. The stated Completion Time, as measured from the initial entry intothe Condition, plus an additional 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ; orb. The stated Completion Time as measured from discovery of thesubsequent inoperability.

The above Completion Time extensions do not apply to thoseSpecifications that have exceptions that allow completely separatere-entry into the Condition (for each train, subsystem, component, orvariable expressed in the Condition) and separate tracking of Completion Times based on this re-entry.

These exceptions are stated in individual Specifications.

The above Completion Time extension does not apply to a Completion Time with a modified "time zero." This modified "time zero" may beexpressed as a repetitive time (i.e., "once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ," where theCompletion Time is referenced from a previous completion of theRequired Action versus the time of Condition entry) or as a time modifiedby the phrase "from discovery..."

Farley Units 1 and 21.3-2Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesCompletion Times1.31.3 Completion TimesEXAMPLES(continued)

EXAMPLE 1.3-3ACTIONSCONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIMEA. One A.1 Restore 7 daysFunction X Function X traintrain to OPERABLEinoperable, status.B. One B.1 Restore 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months sFunction Y Function Y traintrain to OPERABLEinoperable, status.C. One C.1 Restore 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months sFunction X Function X traintrain to OPERABLEinoperable, status.AND OROne C.2 Restore 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months sFunction Y Function Y traintrain to OPERABLEinoperable, status.(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 21.3-6Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications Pages1.3 Completion TimesCompletion Times1.3EXAMPLESEXAMPLE 1.3-3 (continued)

When one Function X train and one Function Y train are inoperable, Condition A and Condition B are concurrently applicable.

The Completion Times for Condition A and Condition B are tracked separately for eachtrain starting from the time each train was declared inoperable and theCondition was entered.

A separate Completion Time is established forCondition C and tracked from the time the second train was declaredinoperable (i.e., the time the situation described in Condition C wasdiscovered).

If Required Action C.2 is completed within the specified Completion Time,Conditions B and C are exited. If the Completion Time for RequiredAction A.1 has not expired, operation may continue in accordance withCondition A. The remaining Completion Time in Condition A is measuredfrom the time the affected train was declared inoperable (i.e., initial entryinto Condition A).It is possible to alternate between Conditions A, B, and C in such amanner that operation could continue indefinitely without ever restoring systems to meet the LCO. However, doing so would be inconsistent withthe basis of the Completion Times. Therefore, there shall beadministrative controls to limit the maximum time allowed for anycombination of Conditions that result in a single contiguous occurrence offailing to meet the LCO. These administrative controls shall ensure thatthe Completion Times for those Conditions are not inappropriately extended.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 21.3-7Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesFrequency 1.41.0 USE AND APPLICATION

1.4 Frequency

PURPOSE The purpose of this section is to define the proper use and application ofFrequency requirements.

DESCRIPTION Each Surveillance Requirement (SR) has a specified Frequency in whichthe Surveillance must be met in order to meet the associated LCO. Anunderstanding of the correct application of the specified Frequency isnecessary for compliance with the SR.The "specified Frequency" is referred to throughout this section and eachof the Specifications of Section 3.0, Surveillance Requirement (SR)Applicability.

The "specified Frequency" consists of the requirements ofthe Frequency column of each SR as well as certain Notes in theSurveillance column that modify performance requirements.

Sometimes special situations dictate when the requirements of aSurveillance are to be met. They are "otherwise stated" conditions allowed by SR 3.0.1. They may be stated as clarifying Notes in theSurveillance, as part of the Surveillance, or both.Situations where a Surveillance could be required (i.e., its Frequency could expire),

but where it is not possible or not desired that it beperformed until sometime after the associated LCO is within itsApplicability, represent potential SR 3.0.4 conflicts.

To avoid theseconflicts, the SR (i.e., the Surveillance or the Frequency) is stated suchthat it is only "required" when it can be and should be performed.

With anSR satisfied, SR 3.0.4 imposes no restriction.

The use of "met" or "performed" in these instances conveys specificmeanings.

A Surveillance is "met" only when the acceptance criteria aresatisfied.

Known failure of the requirements of a Surveillance, evenwithout a Surveillance specifically being "performed,"

constitutes aSurveillance not "met." "Performance" refers only to the requirement tospecifically determine the ability to meet the acceptance criteria.

SomeSurveillances contain notes that modify the Frequency of performance orthe conditions during which the acceptance criteria must be satisfied.

Forthese Surveillances, the MODE-entry restrictions of SR 3.0.4 may notapply. Such a Surveillance is not required to be performed prior toentering a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of theassociated LCO if any of the following three conditions are satisfied:

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 1.4-1 Amendment No. (Unit 1)Amendment No. (Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesFrequency 1.41.4 Frequency DESCRIPTION (continued)

a. The Surveillance is not required to be met in the MODE or otherspecified condition to be entered; orb. The Surveillance is required to be met in the MODE or otherspecified condition to be entered, but has been performed withinthe specified Frequency (i.e., it is current) and is known not to befailed; orc. The Surveillance is required to be met, but not performed, in theMODE or other specified condition to be entered, and is known notto be failed.Examples 1.4-3, 1.4-4, 1.4-5, and 1.4-6 discuss these special situations.

EXAMPLESThe following examples illustrate the various ways that Frequencies arespecified.

In these examples, the Applicability of the LCO (LCO notshown) is MODES 1, 2, and 3.EXAMPLE 1.4-1SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months sExample 1.4-1 contains the type of SR most often encountered in theTechnical Specifications (TS). The Frequency specifies an interval(12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ) during which the associated Surveillance must be performed atleast one time. Performance of the Surveillance initiates the subsequent interval.

Although the Frequency is stated as 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , an extension ofthe time interval to 1.25 times the stated Frequency is allowed bySR 3.0.2 for operational flexibility.

The measurement of this intervalcontinues at all times, even when the SR is not required to be met perSR 3.0.1 (such as when the equipment is inoperable, a variable is outsidespecified limits, or the unit is outside the Applicability of the LCO). If theinterval specified by SR 3.0.2 is exceeded while the unit is in a MODE orother specified condition in the Applicability of the LCO, and theperformance of the Surveillance is not otherwise modified (refer toExample 1.4-3), then SR 3.0.3 becomes applicable.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 21.4-2Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesFrequency 1.41.4 Frequency EXAMPLESEXAMPLE 1.4-1 (continued)

If the interval as specified by SR 3.0.2 is exceeded while the unit is not ina MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of the LCO forwhich performance of the SR is required, then SR 3.0.4 becomesapplicable.

The Surveillance must be performed within the Frequency requirements of SR 3.0.2, as modified by SR 3.0.3, prior to entry into theMODE or other specified condition or the LCO is considered not met (inaccordance with SR 3.0.1) and LCO 3.0.4 becomes applicable.

EXAMPLE 1.4-2SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Verify flow is within limits. Once within12 hours after 25% RTPAND24 hours thereafter Example 1.4-2 has two Frequencies.

The first is a one time performance Frequency, and the second is of the type shown in Example 1.4-1. Thelogical connector "AND" indicates that both Frequency requirements mustbe met. Each time reactor power is increased from a power level< 25% RTP to > 25% RTP, the Surveillance must be performed within12 hours.The use of "once" indicates a single performance will satisfy the specified Frequency (assuming no other Frequencies are connected by "AND").This type of Frequency does not qualify for the 25% extension allowed bySR 3.0.2. "Thereafter" indicates future performances must be established per SR 3.0.2, but only after a specified condition is first met (i.e., the"once" performance in this example).

If reactor power decreases to< 25% RTP, the measurement of both intervals stops. New intervals startupon reactor power reaching 25% RTP.(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 21.4-3Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1) I(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesFrequency 1.41.4 Frequency EXAMPLES(continued)

EXAMPLE 1.4-3SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY

NOTE --------------

Not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after_> 25% RTP.Perform channel adjustment.

7 daysThe interval continues, whether or not the unit operation is < 25% RTPbetween performances.

As the Note modifies the required performance of the Surveillance, it isconstrued to be part of the "specified Frequency."

Should the 7 dayinterval be exceeded while operation is < 25% RTP, this Note allows12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after power reaches > 25% RTP to perform the Surveillance.

The Surveillance is still considered to be performed within the "specified Frequency."

Therefore, if the Surveillance were not performed within the7 day (plus the extension allowed by SR 3.0.2) interval, but operation was< 25% RTP, it would not constitute a failure of the SR or failure to meetthe LCO. Also, no violation of SR 3.0.4 occurs when changing MODES,even with the 7 day Frequency not met, provided operation does notexceed 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months with power _> 25% RTP.Once the unit reaches 25% RTP, 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months would be allowed forcompleting the Surveillance.

If the Surveillance were not performed within this 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months interval, there would then be a failure to perform aSurveillance within the specified Frequency, and the provisions ofSR 3.0.3 would apply.(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 21.4-4Amendment No. 170 (Unit 1)Amendment No. 163 (Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications Pages1.4 Frequency Frequency 1.4EXAMPLES(continued)

EXAMPLE 1.4-4SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY

NOTE --------------

Only required to be met in MODE 1.Verify leakage rates are within limits. 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months sExample 1.4-4 specifies that the requirements of this Surveillance do nothave to be met until the unit is in MODE 1. The interval measurement forthe Frequency of this Surveillance continues at all times, as described inExample 1.4-1. However, the Note constitutes an "otherwise stated"exception to the Applicability of this Surveillance.

Therefore, if theSurveillance were not performed within the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months interval (plus theextension allowed by SR 3.0.2), but the unit was not in MODE 1, therewould be no failure of the SR nor failure to meet the LCO. Therefore, noviolation of SR 3.0.4 occurs when changing MODES, even with the 24hour Frequency

exceeded, provided the MODE change was not madeinto MODE 1. Prior to entering MODE 1 (assuming again that the 24 hourFrequency were not met), SR 3.0.4 would require satisfying the SR.EXAMPLE 1.4-5SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY

NOTE --------------

Only required to be performed in MODE 1.Perform complete cycle of the valve. 7 days(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 21.4-5Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications Pages1.4 Frequency Frequency 1.4EXAMPLESEXAMPLE 1.4-5 (continued)

The interval continues, whether or not the unit operation is in MODE 1, 2,or 3 (the assumed Applicability of the associated LCO) betweenperformances.

As the Note modifies the required performance of the Surveillance, theNote is construed to be part of the "specified Frequency."

Should the 7day interval be exceeded while operation is not in MODE 1, this Noteallows entry into and operation in MODES 2 and 3 to perform theSurveillance.

The Surveillance is still considered to be performed withinthe "specified Frequency" is completed prior to entering MODE 1.Therefore, if the Surveillance were not performed within the 7 day (plusthe extension allowed by SR 3.0.2) interval, but operation was not inMODE 1, it would not constitute a failure of the SR or failure to meet theLCO. Also, no violation of SR 3.0.4 occurs when changing MODES, evenwith the 7 day Frequency not met, provided operation does not result inentry into MODE 1.Once the unit reaches MODE 1, the requirement for the Surveillance tobe performed within its specified Frequency applies and would requirethat the Surveillance had been performed.

If the Surveillance were notperformed prior to entering MODE 1, there would then be a failure toperform a Surveillance within the specified Frequency, and the provisions of SR 3.0.3 would apply.EXAMPLE 1.4-6SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY

-NOTE ----------------------------

Not required to be met in MODE 3.Verify parameter is within limits 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 21.4-6Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications Pages1.4 Frequency Frequency 1.4EXAMPLESEXAMPLE 1.4-6 (continued)

Example 1.4-6 specifies that the requirements of this Surveillance do nothave to be met while the unit is in MODE 3 (the assumed Applicability ofthe associated LCO is MODES 1, 2, and 3). The interval measurement for the Frequency of this Surveillance continues at all times. Asdescribed in Example 1.4-1, however, the Note constitutes an "otherwise stated" exception to the applicability of this Surveillance.

Therefore, if theSurveillance were not performed within the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months interval (plus theextension allowed by SR 3.0.2), and the unit was in MODE 3, there wouldbe no failure of the SR nor failure to meet the LCO. Therefore, noviolation of SR 3.0.4 occurs when changing MODES to enter MODE 3,even with the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Frequency

exceeded, provided the MODE changedoes not result in entry into MODE 2. Prior to entering MODE 2(assuming again that the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Frequency were not met), SR 3.0.4would require satisfying the SR.Farley Units 1 and 21.4-7Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesRod Group Alignment Limits3.1.4ACTIONSCONDITION R REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIMEB. (continued)

B.2.1.2 Initiate boration torestore SDM to withinlimit.ANDB.2.2Reduce THERMALPOWER to 75% RTP.ANDB.2.3 Verify SDM to be withinthe limits provided in theCOLR.ANDB.2.4 Perform SR 3.2.1.1 andSR 3.2.1.2.ANDB.2.5 Perform SR 3.2.2.1.ANDB.2.6 Re-evaluate safetyanalyses and confirmresults remain valid forduration of operation under these conditions.

1 hour2 hoursOnce per12 hours72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months s72 hours5 daysC. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months sassociated Completion Time of Condition B notmet.Farley Units 1 and 23.1.4-2Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesPHYSICS TESTS Exceptions-MODE 23.1.83.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS3.1.8 PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions-MODE 2LCO 3.1.8 During the performance of PHYSICS TESTS, the requirements ofLCO 3.1.3, "Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC)";LCO 3.1.4, "Rod Group Alignment Limits";LCO 3.1.5, "Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits";LCO 3.1.6, "Control Bank Insertion Limits";

andLCO 3.4.2, "RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality" may be suspended and the number of required channels for LCO 3.3.1,"RTS Instrumentation,"

Functions 2, 3, and 17.e, may be reduced to 3,provided:

a. THERMAL POWER is < 5% RTP;b. SDM is within the limits provided in the COLR; andc. RCS lowest loop average temperature is a 531'F.APPLICABILITY:

MODE 2 during PHYSICS TESTS.ACTIONSCONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIMEA. SDM not within limit. A.1 Initiate boration to Immediately restore SDM to withinlimit.ANDA.2 Suspend PHYSICS 1 hourTESTS exceptions.

B. THERMAL POWER not B. 1 Open reactor trip Immediately within limit, breakers.

Farley Units 1 and 23.1.8-1Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications Pages3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS3.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO (QPTR)QPTR3.2.4LCO 3.2.4The QPTR shall be < 1.02.APPLICABILITY:

MODE 1 with THERMAL POWER 50% RTP.ACTIONSCONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIMEA. QPTR not within limit. A.1 Limit THERMAL 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months after eachPOWER to _> 3% below QPTR determination RTP for each 1% ofQPTR > 1.00.ANDA.2 Determine QPTR. Once per 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months sANDA.3 Perform SR 3.2.1.1, SR 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after3.2.1.2, and SR 3.2.2.1.

achieving equilibrium conditions withTHERMAL POWERlimited by RequiredAction A. 1ANDOnce per 7 daysthereafter AND(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 23.2.4-1Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesQPTR3.2.4ACTIONSCONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIMEA. (continued)

A.6 -----------

NOTE------

Perform RequiredAction A.6 only afterRequired Action A.5 iscompleted.

Perform SR 3.2.1.1, SR 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after3.2.1.2, and SR 3.2.2.1.

achieving equilibrium conditions at RTPORWithin 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months afterincreasing THERMALPOWER above thelimit of RequiredAction A. 1B. Required Action and B.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months sassociated Completion POWER to < 50% RTP.Time not met.Farley Units 1 and 23.2.4-3Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesRTS Instrumentation 3.3.1SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTE-Refer to Table 3.3.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each RTS Function.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1 -------------------

NOTE ----------------

Not required to be performed for source rangeinstrumentation until 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after THERMAL POWERis < P-6.Perform CHANNEL CHECK. In accordance withthe Surveillance Frequency ControlProgramSR 3.3.1.2 -------------------

NOTE ---------------

Not required to be performed until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months afterTHERMAL POWER is >_ 15% RTP.Compare results of calorimetric heat balance In accordance withcalculation to power range channel output. Adjust the Surveillance power range channel output if calorimetric heat Frequency Controlbalance calculation results exceed power range Programchannel output by more than +2%.SR 3.3.1.3 -------------------

NOTES---------------

1. Not required to be performed until 7 days afterTHERMAL POWER is _> 50% RTP.2. Performance of SR 3.3.1.9 satisfies this SR.Compare results of the incore detector In accordance withmeasurements to Nuclear Instrumentation System the Surveillance (NIS) AFD. Adjust NIS channel if difference is Frequency Control>! 3%. ProgramFarley Units 1 and 23.3.1-9Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesTable 3.3.1-1 (page 1 of 8)Reactor Trip System Instrumentation RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1APPLICABLE MODES OR NOMINALOTHER TRIPSPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE SETPOINTFUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUEManual Reactor 1,2 2 B SR 3.3.1.12 NA NATrip3 (a), 4 (a), 5 (a) 2 C SR 3.3.1.12 NA NA2. Power RangeNeutron Fluxa. High 1,2 4 D SR 3.3.1.1 < 109.4% RTP 109%SR 3.3.1.2 RTPSR 3.3.1.7SR 3.3.1.10SR 3.3.1.14b. Low 1(b),2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 25.4% RTP 25% RTPSR 3.3.1.8SR 3.3.1.10SR 3.3.1.143. Power Range 1,2 4 D SR 3.3.1.7 5.4% RTP 5% RTPNeutron Flux High SR 3.3.1.10 with time with timePositive Rate SR 3.3.1.14 constant constant> 2 sec ? 2 sec4. Intermediate 1(b), 2(c) 2 F,G SR 3.3.1.1 5 40% RTP 35% RTPRange Neutron SR 3.3.1.8Flux SR 3.3.1.102(d) 2 H SR 3.3.1.1 <40% RTP 35% RTPSR 3.3.1.8SR 3.3.1.10(a)(b)(c)(d)With Reactor Trip Breakers (RTBs) closed and Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal.

Below the P-10 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.

Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.

Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.

Farley Units 1 and 23.3.1-14Amendment No. 189 (Unit 1)Amendment No. 184 (Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesRTS Instrumentation 3.3.1Table 3.3.1-1 (page 2 of 8)Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OROTHER NOMINALSPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIPFUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINTSource Range 2(d) 2 I,J SR 3.3.1.1 1.3 E5 cps 1.0 E5 cpsNeutron Flux SR 3.3.1.8SR 3.3.1.103(a) 4(a), 5(a) 2 J,K SR 3.3.1.1 <1.3 E5 cps 1.0 E5 cpsSR 3.3.1.7SR 3.3.1.103(e), 4(e),5(e) 1 L SR 3.3.1.1 N/A N/ASR 3.3.1.106. Overtemperature 1,2 3 E SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to Refer toAT SR 3.3.1.3 Note 1 (Page Note 1 (PageSR 3.3.1.7 3.3.1-20) 3.3.1-20)

SR 3.3.1.9SR 3.3.1.10SR 3.3.1.147. Overpower AT 1,2 3 E SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to Refer toSR 3.3.1.7 Note 2 (Page Note 2 (PageSR 3.3.1.10 3.3.1-21) 3.3.1-21)

SR 3.3.1.14(a)(d)(e)With RTBs closed and Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal.

Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.

With the RTBs open. In this condition, source range Function does not provide reactor trip but does provide indication.

Farley Units 1 and 23.3.1-15Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesRTS Instrumentation 3.3.1Table 3.3.1-1 (page 3 of 8)Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OROTHER NOMINALSPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIPFUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT8. Pressurizer Pressurea. Low 1 ) 3 M SR 3.3.1.1 _1862 psig 1865 psigSR 3.3.1.7SR 3.3.1.10SR 3.3.1.14b. High 1,2 3 E SR 3.3.1.1 5 2388 psig 2385 psigSR 3.3.1.7SR 3.3.1.10SR 3.3.1.149. Pressurizer Water 1 () 3 M SR 3.3.1.1 _92.4% 92%Level -High SR 3.3.1.7SR 3.3.1.1010. Reactor Coolant 1() 3 per loop M SR 3.3.1.1 89.7% 90%Flow- Low SR 3.3.1.7SR 3.3.1.10SR 3.3.1.14(0) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock.

Farley Units 1 and 23.3.1-16Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesRTS Instrumentation 3.3.1Table 3.3.1-1 (page 4 of 8)Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OROTHER NOMINALSPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIPFUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT11. Not usedl(f)12. Undervoltage 3 M SR 3.3.1.6 >_ 2640 V 2680 VRCPs SR 3.3.1.10i(f)13. Underfrequency 3 M SR 3.3.1.6 _> 56.9 Hz 57 HzRCPs SR 3.3.1.1014. Steam 1,2 3 per SG E SR 3.3.1.1 > 27.6% 28%Generator (SG) SR 3.3.1.7Water Level -SR 3.3.1.10Low Low SR 3.3.1.14(f) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock.

Farley Units 1 and 23.3.1-17Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesRTS Instrumentation 3.3.1Table 3.3.1-1 (page 5 of 8)Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OROTHER NOMINAL ISPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIPFUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT15. Turbine Tripa. Low Auto Stop 1IW 3 P SR 3.3.1.10

>43 psig 45 psigOil Pressure SR 3.3.1.13b. Turbine Throttle 1 (i) 4 Q SR 3.3.1.10 NA NAValve Closure SR 3.3.1.1316. Safety Injection (SI) 1,2 2 trains R SR 3.3.1.12 NA NAInput fromEngineered SafetyFeature Actuation System (ESFAS)17. Reactor TripSystem Interlocks

a. Intermediate 2 (d) 2 T SR 3.3.1.10 6 6E-1I amp 1E-10 ampRange Neutron SR 3.3.1.11Flux, P-6b. Low Power 1 1 per train U NA NA NAReactor TripsBlock, P-7c. Power Range 1 4 U SR 3.3.1.10

_30.4% RTP 30% RTPNeutron Flux, SR 3.3.1.11P-8d. Power Range 1 4 U SR 3.3.1.10

<50.4% RTP 50% RTPNeutron Flux, SR 3.3.1.11P-9e. Power Range 1,2 4 T SR 3.3.1.10 7.6% RTP 8% RTPNeutron Flux, SR 3.3.1.11 and andP-10 < 10.4% RTP 10% RTP If. Turbine Impulse 1 2 U SR 3.3.1.1 _ 11% 10%Pressure, P-13 SR 3.3.1.10 turbine turbineSR 3.3.1.11 power power(d) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.

(i) Above the P-9 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.

Farley Units 1 and 23.3.1-18Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesRTS Instrumentation 3.3.1Table 3.3.1-1 (page 6 of 8)Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OROTHER NOMINAL ISPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIPFUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT18. Reactor Trip 1,2 2 trains S, W SR 3.3.1.4 NA NABreakers (i)3 (a) 4 (a) 5 (a) 2 trains C. W SR 3.3.1.4 NA NA19. Reactor Trip 1,2 1 each per V SR 3.3.1.4 NA NABreaker RTBUndervoltage and 3 (a), 4 (a), 5 (a) C SR 3.3.1.4 NA NAShunt Trip 1 each perMechanisms RTB20. Automatic Trip 1,2 2 trains R, W SR 3.3.1.5 NA NALogic3 (a), 4(a), 5(a) 2 trains C, W SR 3.3.1.5 NA NA(a)(J)With RTBs closed and Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal.

Including any reactor trip bypass breaker that is racked in and closed for bypassing an RTB.Farley Units 1 and 23.3.1-19Amendment No. (Unit 1)Amendment No. (Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesRTS Instrumentation 3.3.1Table 3.3.1-1 (page 7 of 8)Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Note 1: Overtemperature ATThe Overtemperature AT Function Allowable Value shall not exceed the following nominal TripSetpoint by more than 0.4% of AT span.AT (I+TO)<AT_)K-2(I+TS (I + 5s) ( "S(I+ IrJs) -T'I+K3(P- P')'fl(AI)}

Where: AT is measured loop AT, OF.ATo is the indicated loop AT at RTP and reference Tavg, OF.s is the Laplace transform

operator, sec-'.T is the measured loop average temperature, OF.T' is the reference Tavg at RTP, <

OF.P is the measured pressurizer

pressure, psig.P' is the nominal pressurizer operating pressure

=

psig.K,-t1 -* sec4

secK2 = */°FT2 <

secT5_

secK3 */psiT6

secf1(AI) is a function of the indicated difference between top and bottom detectors of thepower-range nuclear ion chambers; with gains to be selected based on measuredinstrument response during plant startup tests such that:f1(Al) = *{*+ (qt- qb)}*% of RTP*{(qt- qb) -*}when (qt -qb) * % RTPwhen *% RTP < (qt -qb)< *% RTPwhen (qt -qb)> *% RTPWhere qt and qb are percent RTP in the upper and lower halves of the core,respectively, and qt + qb is the total THERMAL POWER in percent RTP.*as specified in the COLRFarley Units 1 and 23.3.1-20Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesRTS Instrumentation 3.3.1Table 3.3.1-1 (page 8 of 8)Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Note 2: Overpower ATThe Overpower AT Function Allowable Value shall not exceed the following nominal Trip Setpointby more than 0.4% of AT span.______ I'i*3s rwAT (I + T4s) <AT0 K4-K5 1'3S I + )(I + Ts) I + Z'3s 'I + 6T-IK6 L T1-Tj-1 f2(A 1)}Where: AT is measured loop AT, OF.ATo is the indicated loop AT at RTP and reference Tvg, OF.s is the Laplace transform

operator, sec-'.T is the measured loop average temperature, OF.T" is the reference Tavg at RTP, <

OF.K4= *K5 = */OF for increasing TavgK5= */OF for decreasing TavgK6 = */OF when T > T"K6= */OF when T _ T"T3

sec=

secT5 <

secT6 _<

secf2(AI) = *% RTP for all Al.* as specified in the COLRFarley Units 1 and 23.3.1-21Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2Table 3.3.2-1 (page 1 of 4)Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OROTHER NOMINALSPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIPFUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT1. Safety Injection

a. Manual Initiation

b. Automatic Actuation Logicand Actuation Relaysc. Containment Pressure

-High 1d. Pressurizer Pressure

-Low1,2,3,41,2,3,422 trains1,2,33B SR 3.3.2.6C SR 3.3.2.2SR 3.3.2.3SR 3.3.2.8D SR 3.3.2.1SR 3.3.2.4SR 3.3.2.7SR 3.3.2.9D SR 3.3.2.1SR 3.3.2.4SR 3.3.2.7SR 3.3.2.9NANANANAs 4.5 psig 4.0 psig> 1847 psig 1850 psig3e. Steam LinePressure(1) Low(2) HighDifferential PressureBetweenSteamLines1 per steamline3 per steamlineD SR 3.3.2.1SR 3.3.2.4SR 3.3.2.7SR 3.3.2.9D SR 3.3.2.1SR 3.3.2.4SR 3.3.2.7SR 3.3.2.9575(c) psig 585(c) psigS 112 psig 100 psig1,2,3I(a) Above the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock.

(b) Above the P-12 (Tavg -Low Low) interlock.

(c) Time constants used in the lead/lag controller are t, - 50 seconds and t2 < 5 seconds.Farley Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-9Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2Table 3.3.2-1 (page 2 of 4)Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OROTHER NOMINALSPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIPFUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT2. Containment Spraya. Manual Initiation

b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays1,2,3,41,2,3.422 trainsB SR 3.3.2.6C SR 3.3.2.2SR 3.3.2.3SR 3.3.2.8E SR 3.3.2.1SR 3.3.2.4SR 3.3.2.7SR 3.3.2.9NANANANAc. Containment PressureHigh -31,2,34< 28.3 psig 27 psig I3. Containment Isolation

a. Phase A Isolation (1) ManualInitiation (2) Automatic Actuation Logicand Actuation Relays(3) Safety Injection

b. Phase B Isolation 1,2,3,41,2,3,422 trainsB SR 3.3.2.6C SR 3.3.2.2SR 3.3.2.3SR 3.3.2.8NANANANARefer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.

(1) ManualInitiation (2) Automatic Actuation Logicand Actuation Relays(3) Containment PressureHigh -31,2,3,41,2,3,422 trainsB SR 3.3.2.6C SR 3.3.2.2SR 3.3.2.3SR 3.3.2.8E SR 3.3.2.1SR 3.3.2.4SR 3.3.2.7SR 3.3.2.9NANANANA1,2,345 28.3 psig 27 psig IFarley Units 1 and 23.3.2-10Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2Table 3.3.2-1 (page 3 of 4)Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OROTHER NOMINALSPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIPFUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT4. Steam Line Isolation 1 per steama. Manual Initiation 1,2(d),3(d) line F SR 3.3.2.6 NA NAb. Automatic 1,2(d),3(d) 2 trains G SR 3.3.2.2 NA NAActuation Logic SR 3.3.2.3and Actuation SR 3.3.2.8Relaysc. Containment 1,2(d), 3(d) 3 D SR 3.3.2.1 5 17.5 psig 16.2 psigPressure

-High 2 SR 3.3.2.4SR 3.3.2.7SR 3.3.2.9d. Steam Line 1,2(d),3(b)(d) 1 per steam D SR 3.3.2.1 _ 575(c) psig 585(c) psigPressure Low line SR 3.3.2.4SR 3.3.2.7SR 3.3.2.9e. High Steam Flow 1,2(d),3(d) 2 per steam D SR 3.3.2.1 (e) (f)in Two Steam line SR 3.3.2.4Lines SR 3.3.2.7Coincident with 1,2(d),3(d) 1 per loop D SR 3.3.2.1 -542.6°F 543°FTavg -Low Low SR 3.3.2.4SR 3.3.2.7Above the P-12 (Tavg -Low Low) interlock.

Time constants used in the lead/lag controller are tI > 50 seconds and t2 < 5 seconds.Except when one MSIV is closed in each steam line.Less than or equal to a function defined as AP corresponding to 40.3% full steam flow below 20% load, AP increasing linearly from 40.3% fullsteam flow at 20% load to 110.3% full steam flow at 100% load.Less than or equal to a function defined as AP corresponding to 40% full steam flow between 0% and 20% load and then a AP increasing linearlyfrom 40% steam flow at 20% load to 110% full steam flow at 100% load.(b)(c)(d)(e)(f)Farley Units 1 and 23.3.2-11Amendment No. (Unit 1)Amendment No. (Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2Table 3.3.2-1 (page 4 of 4)Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OROTHER NOMINALSPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIPFUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT5. Turbine Trip andFeedwater Isolation 1,22 trainsa. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relaysb. SG Water Level -High High (P-14)c. Safety Injection H SR 3.3.2.2SR 3.3.2.3SR 3.3.2.8NANA1,2 3 per SGSR 3.3.2.1SR 3.3.2.4SR 3.3.2.7SR 3.3.2.9s 82.4%82% 1Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.

6. Auxiliary Feedwater

a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relaysb. SG Water Level-Low Lowc. Safety Injection

d. Undervoltage Reactor CoolantPumpe. Trip of all MainFeedwater Pumps1,2,31,2,32 trains3 per SGG SR 3.3.2.2SR 3.3.2.3SR 3.3.2.8D SR 3.3.2.1SR 3.3.2.4SR 3.3.2.7SR 3.3.2.9(g)

NA>27.6%NA28%Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.

1,23I SR 3.3.2.5SR 3.3.2.7SR 3.3.2.9J SR 3.3.2.10>_ 2640 volts 2680 volts I1 2 per pumpNANA7. ESFAS Interlocks

a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relaysb. Reactor Trip, P-4c. Pressurizer

Pressure, P-11d. Tavg -Low Low, P-12(Decreasing)

(Increasing) 1,2,31,2,31,2,31,2,32 trainsI per train, 2trains31 per loopL SR 3.3.2.2SR 3.3.2.3SR 3.3.2.8F SR 3.3.2.6K SR 3.3.2.4SR 3.3.2.7K SR 3.3.2.4SR 3.3.2.7NANA NA I< 2003 psig 2000 psig INA_ 542.6°F< 545.4°F543*F545*F(g) Applicable to MDAFW pumps only.Farley Units 1 and 23.3.2-12Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesRemote Shutdown System3.3.43.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.4 Remote Shutdown SystemLCO 3.3.4APPLICABILITY:

The Remote Shutdown System Functions shall be OPERABLE.

MODES 1, 2, and 3.IACTIONSI

liII--II---------------------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIMEA. One or more required A.1 Restore required Function 30 daysFunctions inoperable, to OPERABLE status.B. --------NOTE --------B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months sNot applicable to SourceRange Neutron Flux ANDfunction.

B.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months sRequired Action andassociated Completion Time not met.Farley Units 1 and 23.3.4-1Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesRCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality 3.4.23.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)3.4.2 RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality LCO 3.4.2APPLICABILITY:

Each RCS loop average temperature (Tavg) shall be > 541OF.MODE 1,MODE 2 with keff 1.0.ACTIONSCONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIMEA. Tav9 in one or more RCS A.1 Be in MODE 3. 30 minutesloops not within limit.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.2.1 Verify RCS Tavg in each loop > 541OF. In accordance withthe Surveillance Frequency ControlProgramFarley Units 1 and 23.4.2-1Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesRCS Loops -MODE 33.4.5ACTIONSCONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIMEC. One required RCS loop C.1 Restore required RCS 1 hournot in operation, with Rod loop to operation.

Control System capableof rod withdrawal.

ORC.2 Place the Rod Control 1 hourSystem in a condition incapable of rodwithdrawal.

D. Two required RCS loops D.1 Place the Rod Control Immediately inoperable.

System in a condition incapable of rodOR withdrawal.

No RCS loop in ANDoperation.

D.2 Suspend all operations Immediately involving a reduction ofRCS boron concentration.

ANDD.3 Initiate action to restore Immediately one RCS loop toOPERABLE status andoperation.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.5.1 Verify required RCS loops are in operation.

In accordance withthe Surveillance Frequency ControlProgramSR 3.4.5.2 Verify steam generator secondary side water levels In accordance withare > 30% (narrow range) for required RCS loops, the Surveillance Frequency ControlProgram(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 23.4.5-2Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesRCS Loops-- MODE 33.4.5SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.5.3 Verify correct breaker alignment and indicated power In accordance withare available to the required pump that is not in the Surveillance operation.

Frequency ControlProgramFarley Units 1 and 23.4.5-3Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesPressurizer 3.4.93.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)3.4.9 Pressurizer LCO 3.4.9The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with:a. Pressurizer water level < 63.5% indicated; andb. Two groups of pressurizer heaters OPERABLE with the capacity ofeach group > 125 kW and capable of being powered from anemergency power supply.APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.---------------------

NOTE -----------------------

Pressurizer water level limit does not apply during:a.b.THERMAL POWER ramp > 5% RTP per minute; orTHERMAL POWER step > 10% RTP.----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ACTIONSCONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIMEA. Pressurizer water level A.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months snot within limit.AND 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months sA.2 Fully insert all rods.AND 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months sA.3 Place Rod ControlSystem in a condition incapable of rodwithdrawal.

AND 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months sA.4 Be in MODE 4.B. One required group of B.1 Restore required group of 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months spressurizer heaters pressurizer heaters toinoperable.

OPERABLE status.(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 23.4.9-1Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL.14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesPressurizer 3.4.9ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIMEC. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months sassociated Completion Time of Condition B not ANDmet.C.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months sSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.9.1 Verify pressurizer water level is 5 63.5% indicated.

In accordance withthe Surveillance Frequency ControlProgramSR 3.4.9.2 Verify capacity of each required group of pressurizer In accordance withheaters is > 125 kW. the Surveillance Frequency ControlProgramSR 3.4.9.3 Verify required pressurizer heaters are capable of In accordance withbeing powered from an emergency power supply. the Surveillance Frequency ControlProgramFarley Units 1 and 23.4.9-2Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesPressurizer PORVs3.4.113.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)3.4.11 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)LCO 3.4.11APPLICABILITY:

Each PORV and associated block valve shall be OPERABLE.

MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONS--------------------

NOTE -----------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each PORV and each block valve.CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIMEA. One or more PORVs A.1 Close and maintain 1 hourinoperable and capable of power to associated being manually cycled, block valve.B. One PORV inoperable and B.1 Close associated block 1 hournot capable of being valve.manually cycled.ANDB.2 Remove power from 1 hourassociated block valve.ANDB.3 Restore PORV to 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months sOPERABLE status.Farley Units 1 and 23.4.11-1Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesPressurizer PORVs3.4.11ACTIONSCONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIMEF. Two block valves F.1 Restore one block valve to 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months sinoperable.

OPERABLE status.G. Required Action and G.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months sassociated Completion Time of Condition F not ANDmet.G.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months sSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.11.1

NOTES---------------

1. Not required to be performed with block valveclosed in accordance with the Required Actions ofthis LCO.2. Only required to be performed in MODES 1 and2.Perform a complete cycle of each block valve. In accordance withthe Surveillance Frequency ControlProgramFarley Units 1 and 23.4.11-3Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesLTOP System3.4.12SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.12.1 Verify a maximum of one charging pump is In accordance withcapable of injecting into the RCS when one or more the Surveillance RCS cold legs is 5 1800F. Frequency ControlProgramSR 3.4.12.2 Verify a maximum of two charging pumps are In accordance withcapable of injecting into the RCS when all RCS cold the Surveillance legs are > 1800F. Frequency ControlProgramSR 3.4.12.3 Verify each accumulator is isolated.

In accordance withthe Surveillance Frequency ControlProgramSR 3.4.12.4 Verify RHR suction isolation valves are open for each In accordance withrequired RHR suction relief valve, the Surveillance Frequency ControlProgramSR 3.4.12.5

NOTE ----------------

Only required to be met when complying withLCO 3.4.12.b.

Verify RCS vent > 2.85 square inches open. In accordance withthe Surveillance Frequency ControlProgramSR 3.4.12.6 Verify each required RHR suction relief valve In accordance withsetpoint.

the Inservice Testing ProgramANDIn accordance withthe Surveillance Frequency ControlProgramFarley Units 1 and 23.4.12-4Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesECCS -Operating 3.5.23.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)3.5.2 ECCS-Operating LCO 3.5.2 Two ECCS trains shall be OPERABLE.

II-jr-n ---------------------------------------------

1. In MODE 3, the Residual Heat Removal or the Centrifugal ChargingPump flow paths may be isolated by closing the isolation valves forup to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to perform pressure isolation valve testing perSR 3.4.14.1.

2. Upon entry into MODE 3 from MODE 4, the breaker or disconnect device to the valve operators for MOVs 8706A and 8706B may belocked open for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months to allow for repositioning from MODE 4requirements.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONSCONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIMEA. One or more trains A.1 Restore train(s) to 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months sinoperable.

OPERABLE status.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months sassociated Completion Time not met. ANDB.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months sC. Less than 100% of the C.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately ECCS flow equivalent toa single OPERABLEECCS train available.

Farley Units 1 and 23.5.2-1Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesSeal Injection Flow3.5.53.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)3.5.5 Seal Injection FlowLCO 3.5.5Reactor coolant pump seal injection flow shall be within limits.APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONSCONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIMEA. Seal injection flow not A.1 Adjust manual seal 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months swithin limit, injection throttle valves inaccordance withSR 3.5.5.1.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months sassociated Completion Time not met. ANDB.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months sFarley Units 1 and 23.5.5-1Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesSeal Injection Flow3.5.5SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.5.1 ----------

NOTE---------------

Not required to be performed until 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months after theReactor Coolant System pressure stabilizes at_ 2215 psig and _ 2255 psig.Verify manual seal injection throttle valves are In accordance withadjusted to give a flow within the limits of Figure the Surveillance 3.5.5-1 with the seal water injection flow control Frequency Controlvalve full open. ProgramIFarley Units 1 and 23.5.5-2Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesContainment Isolation Valves3.6.3SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.3.3 -------------------

NOTES ----------------

1. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areasmay be verified by use of administrative means.2. The blind flange on the fuel transfer canalflange is only required to be verified closedafter each draining of the canal.Verify each containment isolation manual valve and Prior to enteringblind flange that is located inside containment and MODE 4 fromnot locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and MODE 5 if notrequired to be closed during accident conditions is performed withinclosed, except for containment isolation valves that the previousare open under administrative controls.

92 daysSR 3.6.3.4 Verify the isolation time of each automatic power In accordance withoperated containment isolation valve in the IST the Inservice Program is within limits. Testing ProgramSR 3.6.3.5 Perform leakage rate testing for containment In accordance withpenetrations containing containment purge valves the Surveillance with resilient seals. Frequency ControlProgramANDWithin 92 daysafter opening thevalveSR 3.6.3.6 Verify each automatic containment isolation valve In accordance withthat is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the Surveillance

position, actuates to the isolation position on an Frequency Controlactual or simulated actuation signal. ProgramFarley Units 1 and 23.6.3-6Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesContainment Spray and Cooling Systems3.6.63.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS3.6.6 Containment Spray and Cooling SystemsLCO 3.6.6Two containment spray trains and two containment cooling trains shall beOPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.ACTIONSCONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIMEA. One containment spray A.1 Restore containment 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months strain inoperable, spray train to OPERABLEstatus.B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months sassociated Completion Time of Condition A not ANDmet.B.2 Be in MODE 5. 84 hour9.722222e-4 days 0.0233 hours 1.388889e-4 weeks 3.1962e-5 months sC. One containment cooling C.1 Restore containment 7 daystrain inoperable, cooling train toOPERABLE status.IFarley Units 1 and 23.6.6-1Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications Pages3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS3.7.5 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) SystemAFW System3.7.5LCO 3.7.5APPLICABILITY:

Three AFW trains shall be OPERABLE.

MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONSNOTE-LCO 3.0.4b is not applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIMEA. One steam supply to A.1 Restore affected equipment 7 daysturbine driven AFW pump to OPERABLE status.inoperable.

OR-NOTE -----------

Only applicable if MODE2 has not been enteredfollowing refueling.

One turbine driven AFWpump inoperable inMODE 3 following refueling.

B. One AFW train B.1 Restore AFW train to 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months sinoperable for reasons OPERABLE status.other than Condition A.Farley Units 1 and 23.7.5-1Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesAFW System3.7.5ACTIONS (continued).

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIMEC. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months sassociated Completion Time for Condition A or B ANDnot met.C.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months sORTwo AFW trainsinoperable.

D. Three AFW trains D.1 ----------

NOTE -------inoperable.

LCO 3.0.3 and all other LCORequired Actions requiring MODE changes aresuspended until one AFWtrain is restored toOPERABLE status.Initiate action to restore Immediately one AFW train toOPERABLE status.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.5.1 ---------------------

NOTE ----------------

AFW train(s) may be considered OPERABLE duringalignment and operation for steam generator levelcontrol, if it is capable of being manually realigned tothe AFW mode of operation.

Verify each AFW manual, power operated, and In accordance automatic valve in each water flow path, and in both with thesteam supply flow paths to the steam turbine driven Surveillance pump, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise Frequency secured in position, is in the correct position.

Control ProgramFarley Units 1 and 23.7.5-2Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesAFW System3.7.5SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.5.2 --------------------

NOTE -----------------

Not required to be performed for the turbine drivenAFW pump until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after ?_ 1005 psig in thesteam generator.

Verify the developed head of each AFW pump at the In accordance flow test point is greater than or equal to the required with the Inservice developed head. Testing Program.SR 3.7.5.3 --------------------

NOTE -------------------

In accordance AFW train(s) may be considered OPERABLE during with thealignment and operation for steam generator level Surveillance

control, if it is capable of being manually realigned to Frequency the AFW mode of operation.

Control ProgramVerify each AFW automatic valve that is not locked,sealed, or otherwise secured in position, actuates tothe correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.SR 3.7.5.4 -------------------

NOTES -----------------

1. Not required to be performed for the turbinedriven AFW pump until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after >_ 1005 psigin the steam generator.

2. AFW train(s) may be considered OPERABLE In accordance during alignment and operation for steam with thegenerator level control, if it is capable of being Surveillance manually realigned to the AFW mode of Frequency operation.

Control ProgramVerify each AFW pump starts automatically on anactual or simulated actuation signal.SR 3.7.5.5 Verify the turbine driven AFW pump steam admission In accordance valves open when air is supplied from their respective with theair accumulators.

Surveillance Frequency Control ProgramFarley Units 1 and 23.7.5-3Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesAC Sources -Operating 3.8.1ACTIONSCONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIMEA. (continued)

A.3 Restore required offsite 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months scircuit to OPERABLEstatus.B. One DG set inoperable.

NOTE -------------------

LCO 3.0.4c is applicable whenonly one of the three DGs isinoperable.

B.1ANDB.2ANDB.3.1Perform SR 3.8.1.1 forthe required offsitecircuit(s).

Declare requiredfeature(s) supported bythe inoperable DG setinoperable when itsrequired redundant feature(s) is inoperable.

Determine OPERABLEDG set is not inoperable due to common causefailure.2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months sANDOnce per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months sthereafter 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months fromdiscovery ofCondition Bconcurrent withinoperability ofredundant requiredfeature(s) 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months sOR(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 23.8.1-2Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesAC Sources -Operating 3.8.1ACTIONSCONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIMEB. (continued)

B.3.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.6 for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months sOPERABLE DG set.ANDB.4 Restore DG set to 10 daysOPERABLE status.C. Two required offsite C.1 Declare required 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months fromcircuits inoperable, feature(s) inoperable discovery ofwhen its redundant Condition Crequired feature(s) is concurrent withinoperable.

inoperability ofredundant requiredfeaturesANDC.2 Restore one required 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months soffsite circuit toOPERABLE status.Farley Units 1 and 23.8.1-3Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesAC Sources -Operating 3.8.1SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.7--------------------

NOTE --------------------------------

This Surveillance shall not normally be performed inMODE 1 or 2. However, this surveillance may beperformed to reestablish OPERABILITY provided anassessment determines the safety of the plant ismaintained or enhanced.

Verify manual transfer of AC power sources from thenormal offsite circuit to the alternate required offsitecircuit.In accordance withthe Surveillance Frequency ControlProgramSR 3.8.1.8 Verify each DG rejects a load greater than or equal to In accordance withits associated single largest post-accident load, and: the Surveillance

a. Following load rejection, the speed is < 75% of Frequency Controlthe difference between nominal speed and the Programoverspeed trip setpoint; andb. Following load rejection, the voltage is> 3740 V and 5 4580 V.Farley Units 1 and 23.8.1-8Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesAC Sources -Operating 3.8.1SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.9---------------

NOTES ---------------

1. All DG starts may be preceded by an engineprelube period.2. This Surveillance shall not normally beperformed in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. However,portions of the surveillance may be performed to reestablish OPERABILITY provided anassessment determines the safety of the plantis maintained or enhanced.

Verify on an actual or simulated loss of offsite powersignal:a. De-energization of emergency buses;b. Load shedding from emergency buses;c. DG auto-starts from standby condition and:1. energizes permanently connected loadsin < 12 seconds,2. energizes auto-connected shutdownloads through automatic load sequencer,

3. maintains steady state voltage> 3740 V and< 4580 V,4. maintains steady state frequency

> 58.8 Hz and 61.2 Hz, and5. supplies permanently connected andauto-connected shutdown loads for_> 5 minutes.In accordance withthe Surveillance Frequency ControlProgramFarley Units 1 and 23.8.1-9Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesAC Sources -Operating 3.8.1SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.13----------------

NOTES ---------------

1. This Surveillance shall be performed within10 minutes of shutting down the DG after theDG has operated

>_ 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months loaded > 4075 kWfor the 4075 kW DGs and _> 2850 kW for the2850 kW DG.Momentary transients below the minimum loadspecified do not invalidate this test.2. All DG starts may be preceded by an engineprelube period.Verify each DG starts and achieves, in 5 12 seconds,voltage > 3952 V and frequency

> 60 Hz.In accordance withthe Surveillance Frequency ControlProgramSR 3.8.1.14-----------------

NOTE ---------------

This Surveillance shall not normally be performed in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. However, this surveillance may be performed to reestablish OPERABILITY provided an assessment determines the safety of theplant is maintained or enhanced.

Verify each DG:a. Synchronizes with offsite power source whileloaded with emergency loads upon a simulated restoration of offsite power;b. Transfers loads to offsite power source; andc. Returns to ready-to-load operation.

In accordance withthe Surveillance Frequency ControlProgramFarley Units 1 and 23.8.1-12Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesAC Sources -Operating 3.8.1SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.15 Verify, with a DG operating in test mode and In accordance withconnected to its bus, an actual or simulated ESF the Surveillance actuation signal overrides the test mode by returning Frequency ControlDG to ready-to-load operation.

ProgramSR 3.8.1.16 Verify interval between each sequenced load block is In accordance withwithin +/- 10% of design interval or 0.5 seconds, the Surveillance whichever is greater, for each emergency load Frequency Controlsequencer.

ProgramSR 3.8.1.17

NOTES---------------

1. All DG starts may be preceded by an engineprelube period.2. This Surveillance shall not normally beperformed in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. However,portions of the surveillance may be performed to reestablish OPERABILITY provided anassessment determines the safety of the plantis maintained or enhanced.

Verify on an actual or simulated loss of offsite power In accordance withsignal in conjunction with an actual or simulated ESF the Surveillance actuation signal: Frequency Controla. De-energization of emergency buses; Programb. Load shedding from emergency buses; andc. DG auto-starts from standby condition and:1. energizes permanently connected loadsin < 12 seconds,(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 23.8.1-13Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesDistribution Systems -Operating 3,8.93.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS3.8.9 Distribution Systems -Operating LCO 3.8.9APPLICABILITY:

Train A and Train B AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.ACTIONSCONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIMEA. One or more AC electrical A.1 Restore AC electrical 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months spower distribution power distribution subsystems inoperable, subsystem(s) toOPERABLE status.B. One or more AC vital B.1 Restore AC vital bus 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months sbuses inoperable, subsystem(s) toOPERABLE status.C. One Auxiliary Building DC C.1 Restore Auxiliary 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months selectrical power distribution Building DC electrical subsystem inoperable, power distribution subsystem toOPERABLE status.Farley Units 1 and 23.8.9-1Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesBoron Concentration 3.9.13.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.1 Boron Concentration LCO 3.9.1APPLICABILITY:

Boron concentrations of the Reactor Coolant System, the refueling canal,and the refueling cavity shall be maintained within the limit specified in theCOLR.MODE 6.----------------------------------

NOTE ------------------------------

Only applicable to the refueling canal and refueling cavity when connected to the RCS.ACTIONSCONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIMEA. Boron concentration not A.1 Suspend CORE Immediately within limit. ALTERATIONS.

ANDA.2 Suspend positive Immediately reactivity additions.

ANDA.3 Initiate action to restore Immediately boron concentration towithin limit.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.1.1 Verify boron concentration is within the limit specified In accordance within COLR. the Surveillance Frequency ControlProgramFarley Units 1 and 23.9.1-1Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesContainment Penetrations 3.9.33.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.3 Containment Penetrations LCO 3.9.3 The containment penetrations shall be in the following status:a. The equipment hatch is capable of being closed and held in place byfour bolts;b. One door in each air lock is capable of being closed; andc. Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere either:1. closed by a manual or automatic isolation valve, blind flange, orequivalent, or2. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE Containment Purgeand Exhaust Isolation System.------------------

NOTE -----------------------------------------------------------

Penetration flow path(s) providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outsideatmosphere may be unisolated under administrative controls.

APPLICABILITY:

During CORE ALTERATIONS, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.

ACTIONSCONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIMEA. One or more containment A.1 Suspend CORE Immediately penetrations not in ALTERATIONS.

required status.ANDA.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuelassemblies withincontainment.

Farley Units 1 and 23.9.3-1Amendment No. (Unit 1)Amendment No. (Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesContainment Penetrations 3.9.3SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.3.1 Verify each required containment penetration is in the In accordance required status. with theSurveillance Frequency ControlProgramSR 3.9.3.2 ---------------------

NOTE ------------------

In accordance Not required to be met for containment purge and with theexhaust valve(s) in penetrations closed to comply Surveillance with LCO 3.9.3.c.1.

Frequency ControlProgramVerify each required containment purge and exhaustvalve actuates to the isolation position on an actual orsimulated actuation signal.SR 3.9.3.3 ---------------------

NOTE ------------------

In accordance Only required for an open equipment hatch, with theSurveillance Verify the capability to install the equipment Frequency Controlhatch. ProgramFarley Units 1 and 23.9.3-2Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesRHR and Coolant Circulation

-Low Water Level3.9.53.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.5 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation

-Low Water LevelLCO 3.9.5Two RHR loops shall be OPERABLE, and one RHR loop shall be inoperation.

NOTES ---------------------

1. One RHR loop may be inoperable and no RHR loop may be in thedecay heat removal mode of operation for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for requiredsurveillance testing.2. All RHR pumps may be de-energized for < 15 minutes whenswitching from one train to another provided:

a. The core outlet temperature is maintained

> 10 degrees F belowsaturation temperature.

b. No operations are permitted that would cause a reduction of theReactor Coolant System (RCS) boron concentration; andc. No draining operations to further reduce RCS water volume arepermitted.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 6 with the water level < 23 ft above the top of reactor vessel flange.ACTIONSCONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIMEA. Less than the required A.1 Initiate action to restore Immediately number of RHR loops required RHR loops toOPERABLE.

OPERABLE status.ORA.2 Initiate action to Immediately establish

> 23 ft of waterabove the top of reactorvessel flange.(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 23.9.5-1Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesRHR and Coolant Circulation

-Low Water Level3.9.5ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION I REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIMEB. No RHR loop in operation.

I B.1Suspend operations involving a reduction inreactor coolant boronconcentration.

ANDB.2Initiate action to restoreone RHR loop tooperation.

ANDI, ~D.0ANDB.4Close equipment hatchand secure with fourbolts.Close one door in eachair lock.Immediately Immediately 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months s4 hours4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months s4 hoursANDB.5.1 Close each penetration providing direct accessfrom the containment atmosphere to theoutside atmosphere witha manual or automatic isolation valve, blindflange, or equivalent.

ORB.5.2 Verify each penetration iscapable of being closedby an OPERABLEContainment Purge andExhaust Isolation System.Farley Units 1 and 23.9.5-2Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesPrograms and Manuals5.55.5 Programs and Manuals5.5.4 Radioactive Effluent Controls Program (continued)

b. Limitations on the concentrations of radioactive material released in liquideffluents to unrestricted areas, conforming to 10 times the concentration stated in 10 CFR 20, Appendix B (to paragraphs 20.1001-20.2401),

Table 2, Column 2;c. Monitoring,

sampling, and analysis of radioactive liquid and gaseouseffluents in accordance with 10 CFR 20.1302 and with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM;d. Limitations on the annual and quarterly doses or dose commitment to amember of the public from radioactive materials in liquid effluents releasedfrom each unit to unrestricted areas, conforming to 10 CFR 50, Appendix I;e. Determination of cumulative dose contributions from radioactive effluents for the current calendar quarter and current calendar year in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM at least every 31 days.Determination of projected dose contributions from radioactive effluents inaccordance with the methodology in the ODCM at least every 31 days.f. Limitations on the functional capability and use of the liquid and gaseouseffluent treatment systems to ensure that appropriate portions of thesesystems are used to reduce releases of radioactivity when the projected doses in a period of 31 days would exceed 2% of the guidelines for theannual dose or dose commitment, conforming to 10 CFR 50, Appendix I;g. Limitations on the dose rate resulting from radioactive material released ingaseous effluents to areas at and beyond the site boundary as follows:1. For noble gases: Less than or equal to a dose rate of 500 mrem/year to the total body and less than or equal to a dose rate of 3000mrem/year to the skin, and2. For lodine-131, lodine-133,

tritium, and for all radionuclides inparticulate form with half lives greater than 8 days: Less than or equalto a dose rate of 1500 mrem/year to any organ.h. Limitations on the annual and quarterly air doses resulting from noblegases released in gaseous effluents from each unit to areas beyond thesite boundary, conforming to 10 CFR 50, Appendix 1;(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 5.5-3 Amendment No. (Unit 1)Amendment No. (Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesPrograms and Manuals5.55.5 Programs and Manuals5.5.15 Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP) (continued)

b. Provisions for ensuring the plant is maintained in a safe condition if a lossof function condition exists;c. Provisions to ensure that an inoperable supported system's Completion Time is not inappropriately extended as a result of multiple support systeminoperabilities; andd. Other appropriate limitations and remedial or compensatory actions.A loss of safety function exists when, assuming no concurrent single failure, noconcurrent loss of offsite power or no concurrent loss of onsite dieselgenerator(s),

a safety function assumed in the accident analysis cannot beperformed.

For the purpose of this program, a loss of safety function may existwhen a support system is inoperable, and:a. A required system redundant to the system(s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable; orb. A required system redundant to the system(s) in turn supported by theinoperable supported system is also inoperable; orc. A required system redundant to the support system(s) for the supported systems (a) and (b) above is also inoperable.

The SFDP identifies where a loss of safety function exists. If a loss of safetyfunction is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions andRequired Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists arerequired to be entered.

When a loss of safety function is caused by inoperability of a single Technical Specification support system, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions to enter are those of the support system.5.5.16 Main Steamline Inspection ProgramThe three main steamlines from the rigid anchor points of the containment penetrations downstream to and including the main steam header shall beinspected.

The extent of the inservice examinations completed during eachinspection interval (IWA 2400, ASME Code, 1974 Edition,Section XI) shallprovide 100 percent volumetric examination of circumferential and longitudinal pipe welds to the extent practical.

The areas subject to examination are thosedefined in accordance with examination category C-G for Class 2 piping welds inTable IWC-2520.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 5.5-13 Amendment No. (Unit 1)Amendment No. (Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesPrograms and Manuals5.55.5 Programs and Manuals5.5.17 Containment Leakage Rate Testing ProgramA program shall be established to implement the leakage rate testing ofcontainment as required by 10 CFR 50.54 (o) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J,Option B, as modified by approved exemptions.

This program shall be inaccordance with the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.163,"Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program,"

dated September 1995,as modified by the following exception to NEI 94-01, Rev. 0, "Industry Guidelines for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J":1. The visual examination of containment concrete surfaces intended to fulfillthe requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B testing, will beperformed in accordance with the requirements of frequency specified bythe ASME Section XI Code, Subsection IWL, except where relief has beenauthorized by the NRC.2. The visual examination of the steel liner plate inside containment intendedto fulfill the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, will beperformed in accordance with the requirements of and frequency specified by the ASME Section XI Code, Subsection IWE, except where relief hasbeen authorized by the NRC.The peak calculated containment internal pressure for the design basis loss ofcoolant accident, Pa, is 43.8 psig.The maximum allowable containment leakage rate, La, at Pa, is 0.15% ofcontainment air weight per day.Leakage rate acceptance criteria are:a. Containment overall leakage rate acceptance criterion is _< 1.0 La. Duringplant startup following testing in accordance with this program, the leakagerate acceptance criteria are '_ 0.60 La for the combined Type B and Ctests, and _< 0.75 La for Type A tests;b. Air lock testing acceptance criteria are:1. Overall air lock leakage rate is _< 0.05 La when tested at >_ Pa.2. For each door, leakage rate is _ 0.01 La when pressurized to _> 10psig.c. During plant startup following testing in accordance with this program, theleakage rate acceptance criterion for each containment purge penetration flowpath is _< 0.05 La.(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 5.5-14 Amendment No. (Unit 1)Amendment No. (Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesPrograms and Manuals5.55.5 Programs and Manuals5.5.17 Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (continued)

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 do not apply to the test frequencies specified in theContainment Leakage Rate Testing Program.The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Containment Leakage RateTesting Program.5.5.18 Control Room Integrity Program (CRIP)A Control Room Integrity Program (CRIP) shall be established and implemented to ensure that the control room integrity is maintained such that a radiological event, hazardous chemicals, or a fire challenge (e.g., fire byproducts, halon, etc.)will not prevent the control room operators from controlling the reactor duringnormal or accident conditions.

The program shall require testing as outlinedbelow. Testing should be performed when changes are made to structures, systems and components which could impact Control Room Impact (CRE)integrity.

These structures, systems and components may be internal or externalto the CRE. Testing should also be conducted following a modification or arepair that could affect CRE inleakage.

Testing should also be performed if theconditions associated with a particular challenge result in a change in operating mode, system alignment or system response that could result in a new limitingcondition.

Testing should be commensurate with the type and degree ofmodification or repair. Testing should be conducted in the alignment that resultsin the greatest consequence to the operators.

A CRIP shall be established to implement the following:

a. Demonstrate, using Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.197 and ASTM E741, thatCRE inleakage is less than the below values. The values listed below donot include 10 cfm assumed in accident analysis for ingress / egress.i) 43 cfm when the control room ventilation systems are aligned in theemergency recirculation mode of operation, ii) 600 cfm when the control room ventilation systems are aligned in theisolation mode of operation, andiii) 2,340 cfm when the control room ventilation systems are aligned in thenormal mode of operation;

b. Demonstrate that the leakage characteristics of the CRE will not result insimultaneous loss of reactor control capability from the control room andthe hot shutdown panels;(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 5.5-15 Amendment No. (Unit 1)Amendment No. (Unit 2)

Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesPrograms and Manuals5.55.5 Programs and Manuals5.5.18 Control Room Integrity Program (CRIP) (continued)

c. Maintain a CRE configuration control and a design and licensing basescontrol program and a preventative maintenance program.

As a minimum,the CRE configuration control program will determine whether the i) CREdifferential pressure relative to adjacent areas and ii) the control roomventilation system flow rates, as determined in accordance with ASMEN510-1989 or ASTM E2029-99, are consistent with the values measured atthe time the ASTM E741 test was performed.

If item i or ii has changed,determine how this change has affected the inleakage characteristics of theCRE. If there has been degradation in the inleakage characteristics of theCRE since the E741 test, then a determination should be made whether thelicensing basis analyses remain valid. If the licensing basis analysesremain valid, the CRE remains OPERABLE.

d. Test the CRE in accordance with the testing methods and at thefrequencies specified in RG 1.197, Revision 0, May 2003.The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are applicable to the control room inleakage testingfrequencies.

5.5.19 Surveillance Frequency Control ProgramThis program provides controls for Surveillance Frequencies.

The program shallensure that Surveillance Requirements specified in the Technical Specifications are performed at intervals sufficient to assure the associated Limiting Conditions for Operation are met.a. The Surveillance Frequency Control Program shall contain a list ofFrequencies of those Surveillance Requirements for which the Frequency iscontrolled by the program.b. Changes to the Frequencies listed in the Surveillance Frequency ControlProgram shall be made in accordance with NEI 04-10, "Risk-Informed Method for Control of Surveillance Frequencies,"

Revision 1.c. The provisions of Surveillance Requirements 3.0.2 and 3.0.3 are applicable to the Frequencies established in the Surveillance Frequency ControlProgram.Farley Units 1 and 2 5.5-16 Amendment No. (Unit 1)Amendment No. (Unit 2)

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant -Units 1 and 2Request for Technical Specification Amendment Adoption of Previously NRC-Approved Generic Technical Specification Changes and Other ChangesEnclosure 5Summary of Regulatory Commitments Enclosure 5Summary of Regulatory Commitments The following table identifies the regulatory commitments in this document.

Anyother statements in this submittal represent intended or planned actions.

Theyare provided for information purposes and are not considered to be regulatory commitments.

REGULATORY COMMITMENTS DUE DATE / EVENT1. Administrative controls will be established to ensure Prior toappropriate personnel are aware of the open status of the implementation ofpenetration flow path(s) during core alterations or movement of the LAR.irradiated fuel assemblies within the containment.

2. Existing administrative controls for open containment airlock Prior todoors will be expanded to ensure specified individuals are implementation ofdesignated and readily available to isolate any open the LAR.penetration flow path(s) in the event of an FHA insidecontainment.

3. SNC commits to revise Operations procedure FNP-0-SOP-0.

13 Prior toto include a statement similar to the following:

"Alternating implementation ofbetween LCO Conditions, in order to allow indefinite continued the LAR.operation while not meeting the LCO, is not allowed."

E5 -I

@@ Line 17: / Line 17: @@
 =Text=
-{{#Wiki_filter:
+{{#Wiki_filter:Enclosure 2 to NL-14-1385 Marked-Up Technical Specifications PagesAC Sources -Operating 3.8.1SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.13---------------
+NOTES---------------
+: 1. This Surveillance shall be performed within10 minutes of shutting down the DG after theDG has operated
+> 2 hours loaded > 4075 kWfor the 4075 kW DGs and _> 2850 kW for the2850 kW DG.Momentary transients below the minimum loadspecified do not invalidate this test.2. All DG starts may be preceded by an engineprelube period.Verify each DG starts and achieves, in < 12 seconds,voltage > 3952 V and frequency
+_ 60 Hz.In accordance withthe Surveillance Frequency ControlProgramSR 3.8.1.14I-- -I r------This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. &#xfd;,
+ITTF283lVerify each DG:a. Synchronizes with o ite power source whileloaded with emergenc loads upon a simulated restoration of offsite po er;b. Transfers loads to offsite ower source; andc. Returns to ready-to-load op ation.In accordance withthe Surveillance Frequency ControlProgramHowever, this surveillance may be performed to reestablish OPERABILITY provided anassessment determines the safety of the plantis maintained or enhanced.
+Farley Units 1 and 23.8.1-12Amendment No. r(Unit 1)Amendment No. 9 (Unit 2)
+Enclosure 2 to NL-14-1385 Marked-Up Technical Specifications PagesAC Sources--
+Operating 3.8.1SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.15 Verify, with a DG operating in test mode and In accordance withconnected to its bus, an actual or simulated ESF the Surveillance actuation signal overrides the test mode by returning Frequency ControlDG to ready-to-load operation.
+ProgramSR 3.8.1.16 Verify interval between each sequenced load block is In accordance withwithin +/- 10% of design interval or 0.5 seconds, the Surveillance whichever is greater, for each emergency load Frequency Controlsequencer.
+ProgramSR 3.8.1.17----- ---- NOTES-------
+: 1. All DG starts may be preceded by an engineprelube period. normallyVEEKI2. This Surveillance shall not be performed inMODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.Verify on an actual or sim lated loss of offsite powersignal in conjunction with an actual or simulated ESFactuation signal:a. De-energization o emergency buses;b. Load shedding fr m emergency buses; andc. DG auto-starts f m standby condition and:1. energize permanently connected loadsin _< 12 s conds,ITSTF-283 In accordance withthe Surveillance Frequency ControlProgram(continued)
+: However, portions of the surveillance may beperformed to reestablish OPERABILITY provided an assessment determines the safetyof the plant is maintained or enhanced.
+Farley Units 1 and 23.8.1-13Amendment No.'i- (Unit 1)Amendment No. 1 (Unit 2)
+Enclosure 2 to NL-14-1385 Marked-Up Technical Specifications PagesDistribution Systems -Operating 3.8.93.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS3.8.9 Distribution Systems -Operating LCO 3.8.9APPLICABILITY:
+Train A and Train B AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE.
+MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.ACTIONSCONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIMEA. One or more AC electrical A.1 Restore AC electrical 8 hourspower distribution power distribution subsystems inoperable, subsystem(s) to AN&OPERABLE status.%-6hos r-from ef failull t-,meet--eeB. One or more AC vitalbuses inoperable.
+B.1Restore AC vital bussubsystem(s) toOPERABLE status.8 hoursd ,, 0ry [f Fdilut tomest-L-.G C. One Auxiliary Building DC C.1 Restore Auxiliary 2 hourselectrical power distribution Building DC electrical subsystem inoperable, power distribution AN_-subsystem toOPERABLE status. 46-heUF.er ldVisey of falure LOFarley Units 1 and 23.8.9-1Amendment No. (Unit 1)Amendment No. (Unit 2)
+Enclosure 2 to NL-14-1385 Marked-Up Technical Specifications PagesBoron Concentration 3.9.13.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3
 * psig.K,-t1 -* sec4
 * secK2 = */&deg;FT2 <
 * secT5_
 * secK3  */psiT6
-* secf1(AI) is a function of the indicated difference between top and bottom detectors of thepower-range nuclear ion chambers; with gains to be selected based on measuredinstrument response during plant startup tests such that:f1(Al) = *{*+ (qt- qb)}*% of RTP*{(qt- qb) -*}when (qt -qb) * % RTPwhen *% RTP < (qt -qb)< *% RTPwhen (qt -qb)> *% RTPWhere qt and qb are percent RTP in the upper and lower halves of the core,respectively, and qt + qb is the total THERMAL POWER in percent RTP.*as specified in the COLRFarley Units 1 and 23.3.1-20Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)   to NL-14-1385Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesRTS Instrumentation3.3.1Table 3.3.1-1 (page 8 of 8)Reactor Trip System InstrumentationNote 2: Overpower ATThe Overpower AT Function Allowable Value shall not exceed the following nominal Trip Setpointby more than 0.4% of AT span.______ I'i*3s rwAT (I + T4s) <AT0  K4-K5 1'3S I + )(I + Ts) I + Z'3s 'I + 6T-IK6 L T1-Tj-1 f2(A 1)}Where: AT is measured loop AT, OF.ATo is the indicated loop AT at RTP and reference Tvg, OF.s is the Laplace transform operator, sec-'.T is the measured loop average temperature, OF.T" is the reference Tavg at RTP, <
+* secf1(AI) is a function of the indicated difference between top and bottom detectors of thepower-range nuclear ion chambers; with gains to be selected based on measuredinstrument response during plant startup tests such that:f1(Al) = *{*+ (qt- qb)}*% of RTP*{(qt- qb) -*}when (qt -qb) * % RTPwhen *% RTP < (qt -qb)< *% RTPwhen (qt -qb)> *% RTPWhere qt and qb are percent RTP in the upper and lower halves of the core,respectively, and qt + qb is the total THERMAL POWER in percent RTP.*as specified in the COLRFarley Units 1 and 23.3.1-20Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)
+Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesRTS Instrumentation 3.3.1Table 3.3.1-1 (page 8 of 8)Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Note 2: Overpower ATThe Overpower AT Function Allowable Value shall not exceed the following nominal Trip Setpointby more than 0.4% of AT span.______ I'i*3s rwAT (I + T4s) <AT0  K4-K5 1'3S I + )(I + Ts) I + Z'3s 'I + 6T-IK6 L T1-Tj-1 f2(A 1)}Where: AT is measured loop AT, OF.ATo is the indicated loop AT at RTP and reference Tvg, OF.s is the Laplace transform
+: operator, sec-'.T is the measured loop average temperature, OF.T" is the reference Tavg at RTP, <
 * OF.K4= *K5 = */OF for increasing TavgK5= */OF for decreasing TavgK6 = */OF when T > T"K6= */OF when T _ T"T3
 * sec=
 * secT5 <
 * secT6 _<
-* secf2
+* secf2(AI) = *% RTP for all Al.* as specified in the COLRFarley Units 1 and 23.3.1-21Amendment No.Amendment No.(Unit 1)(Unit 2)
+Enclosure 4 to NL-14-1385 Clean-Typed Technical Specifications PagesESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2Table 3.3.2-1 (page 1 of 4)Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OROTHER NOMINALSPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIPFUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT1. Safety Injection
+: a. Manual Initiation
+: b. Automatic Actuation Logicand Actuation Relaysc. Containment Pressure
+-High 1d. Pressurizer Pressure
+-Low1,2,3,41,2,3,422 trains1,2,33B SR 3.3.2.6C SR 3.3.2.2SR 3.3.2.3SR 3.3.2.8D SR 3.3.2.1SR 3.3.2.4SR 3.3.2.7SR 3.3.2.9D SR 3.3.2.1SR 3.3.2.4SR 3.3.2.7SR 3.3.2.9NANANANAs 4.5 psig 4.0 psig> 1847 psig 1850 psig3e. Steam LinePressure(1) Low(2) HighDifferential PressureBetweenSteamLines1 per steamline3 per

ML14335A629: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 07:17, 1 July 2018

Text

1.4 Frequency

Navigation menu

ML14335A629: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 07:17, 1 July 2018

Text

1.4 Frequency

Navigation menu

Search