ML17262B143

Corrected 1992 Rept of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments Conducted W/O Prior Approval for Aug 1991 Through Jul 1992.

ML17262B143
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	07/31/1992
From:	ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
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ML17262B142	List: ML17262B141 ML17262B143
References
NUDOCS 9301220130
Download: ML17262B143 (206)

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1992REPORTOFFACILITYCHANGES,TESTSANDEXPERIMENTS CONDUCTED WITHOUTPRIORAPPROVALFORAUGUST1991THROUGHJULY1992SECTIONASECTIONBSECTIONCSECTIONDSECTIONESECTIONFCOMPLETED ENGINEERING WORKREQUESTS(EWR)ANDTECHNICAL STAFFREQUESTS(TSR)COMPLETED STATIONMODIFICATIONS (SM)TECHNICAL EVALUATIONS (TE)TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS PROCEDURE CHANGESCOMPLETED SPECIALTESTS(ST)ANDEXPERIMENTS R.E.GINNANUCLEARPOWERPLANTDOCKETNO.50-244ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION DATEDDECEMBER18,19929301220130 930ii3PDRADQCK05000244RPDR I

SECTIONA-COMPLETED ENGINEERING WORKREQUESTS(EWRs)ANDTECHNICAL STAFFREQUESTS(TSRs)Thissectioncontainsadescription ofmodifications inthefacilityasdescribed inthesafetyanalysisreport,andasummaryofthesafetyevaluation forthosechanges,pursuanttotherequirements of10CFR50.59(b).

Thebasisforinclusion ofanEWRorTSRinthissectionisclosureofthecompleted modification packageintheDocumentControlDepartment.

XH)~4~0OZCIONSTOTHEPLANTSECURITYSYSTEMTHISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEUPGRADEOFTHEPLANTSECURITYSYSTEM.INFORMATION CONCERNING SPECIFICS OFTHISMODIFICATION ARECONSIDERED SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION, ANDWILLBEADMINISTRATIVELY CONTROLLED UNDERCURRENTGSPROCEDURES.

REVISION1TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATES THECHANGESTODOORg44WHICHWILLBRINGTHEINVOLVEDSECURITYAREAINTOCOMPLIANCE WITHTHEEXISTINGACCESSCONTROLSYSTEM.REVISION2TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCLUDESADDINGPOSITIONALARMSWITCHES'ANDASSOCIATED CONDUITTOFIREDOORSF12/F13'14'ND F15'HICHACCESSTHETECHNICAL SUPPORTCENTERATTHESOUTHANDNORTHENDS'HETURBINEBUILDINGMEZZANINE TOTHETECHNICAL SUPPORTCENTERNORTHHALL,ANDTHETURBINEBUILDINGMEZZANINE NORTHWEST TOTHESERVICEBUILDING.

THISISBEINGDONEDUETOPRESSUREDIFFERENTIALS THATEXISTWHENTHETURBINEBUILDINGEXHAUSTFANSAREACTIVATED, WHEREASTHESEFIREDOORSARENOTABLETOCLOSEANDLATCHPROPERLY.

THEREFORE, THEADDEDPOSITIONALARMSALLOWFORADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLSTOBEPLACEDUPONTHESEFIREDOORS.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRZNG ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION INCLUDE(1)FIRESANDAPPENDIXRLEVELSOFPROTECTION FROMFIRES)(2)SECURITY.

THETYPESOFACCIDENTS ANDTHEIRCONSEQUENCES ASEVALUATED INTHEUFSARAREUNAFFECTED BYTHISMODIFICATION.

THESECURITYSYSTEMISPOWEREDFROMANON-SAFEGUARDS BUSWITHBACKUPFROMAPOWERSOURCEDEDICATED TOTHESECURITYSYSTEM.SEISMICCATEGORYISYSTEMSgSTRUCTURES gORCOMPONENTS AREONLYAFFECTEDBYMODIFICATIONS TOTHEACCESSCONTROLSYSTEMS,ANDTHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATSAFETYRELATEDSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS/ANDCOMPONENTS AREINNOWAYDEGRADED.

FIREPROTECTION REQUIREMENTS FORTHISMODIFICATION SHALLBEMETASOUTLINEDINTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.

THEREFORE, THEREWILLBENOINCREASEINFIRELOADINGORFIREHAZARD,ANDNOEXISTINGEQUIPMENT REQUIREDTOMEET10CFR50APPENDIXRREQUIREMENTS WILLBEAFFECTED.

INTERIMMEASURESDURINGCONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES WILLBEADMINISTRATIVELY CONTROLLED TOPREVENTDEGRADATION OFFIREANDSECURITYBARRIERS.

UiIrIt*

THUS,THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTAFFECTANYSAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT NORDOESITAFFECTTHEOPERATION OFSUCHEQUIPMENT.

THISMODIFICATION NEITHERINCREASES THECONSEQUENCES, NORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1~FIREPROTECTION FEATURES2.PLANTSECURITYBASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGINNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ZTHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

XKI=RCSOVERPRESSURE PROTECTION PHASE2THISENGINEERING WORKREQUESTADDRESSES THEREPLACEMENT OFCHECKVALVESFORTHERCSOVERPRESSURE PROTECTION

-PHASE2.AREVIEWHASBEENPERFORMED OFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONUPDATEDFINALSAFETYANALYSISREPORT.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE:1)2)3)4)FIRESSEISMICEVENTSINADVERTENT OPENINGORFAILURETOCLOSEOFAPRESSURIZER PORVEFFECTONTHELOWTEMPERATURE OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION (LTOP)SYSTEMTHEMODIFICATION WILLNOTINCREASETHEPROBABILITY OF,ORTHEEFFECTSOF,AFIRESINCETHEMATERIALS USEDWILLMEETCRITERIAEQUALTOORGREATERTHANTHOSEPRESENTLY INSTALLED.

THEREPLACEMENT CHECKVALVESWILLCONTINUETOBESEISMICALLY SUPPORTED ANDTHEREFORE WILLNOTAFFECTSAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT.

THEMODIFICATION WILLNOTALTERTHECURRENTOPERATION OFTHEINSTRUMENT AIRSYSTEMORTHENITROGENACCUMULATOR SYSTEMANDWILLNOTINCREASETHEPROBABILITY OFANEVENTASSOCIATED WITHTHEINADVERTENT OPENINGORFAILURETOCLOSEOFAPRESSURIZER PORV.THEMODIFICATION WILLNOTAFFECTTHENITROGENSUPPLYTOTHELTOPSYSTEM.NEITHERTHENITROGENQUANTITYNORTHENITROGENPRESSUREWILLBEAFFECTEDBYTHEINSTALLATION OFTHECHECKVALVES.THEPERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS OFTHEPRESSURIZER PORVACTUATION LINESENSURETHATTHEASSUMPTIONS USEDINTHELTOPEVALUATION ARENOTVIOLATED.

THEREFORE, LTOPISNOTAFFECTEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.

4'~iv.y4~h BASEDONTHEABOVEANALYSIS:

A.ALLSAFETYREQUIREMENTS AREMETANDTHEMODIFICATION ISINACCORDANCE WITHTHEGINNASTATIONLICENSING DESIGNBASIS.B.THEMARGINOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATING ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCED.CTHESTRUCTURES gSYSTEMSgANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACC1DENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS AREADEQUATE.

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUZREMENTS OFGINNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOF.STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

El6~3.'~4 DCFUSECOORDINTONTHISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEUPGRADEOFTHE125VOLTDCDISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.REVISION4TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISADDRESSES THETRANSFEROFLOADSFROMONEFUSE/SWITCH POSITIONTOANOTHERINTHESAMEDCDISTRIBUTION PANEL.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATINGTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE:(1)LOSSOFDCCONTROLPOWER,(2)NATURALEVENTS(FIREANDEARTHQUAKE)

AND(3)UFSARCHAPTER15ACCIDENTS ANDTRANSIENTS.

THEFIRSTEVENTTHATHASBEENANALYZEDISTHELOSSOFDCCONTROLPOWER.THEPRIMARYPURPOSEOFTHEPROPOSEDFUSECHANGESARETOINSURETHATTHEFUSESSUPPLYING CLASS1ELOADSWILLDOSOUNDERALLDESIGNBASISCONDITIONS.

INADDITION, THEPROPOSEDFUSESTHATSUPPLYNONCLASS1ELOADSWILLFUNCTIONASISOLATION DEVICES.THATIS,THEYWILLCLEARANYFAULTOROVERLOADCONDITION WITHOUTCAUSINGTHELOSSOFTHESAFEGUARD LOADSONTHESYSTEM.THISWILLBEACCOMPLISHED THROUGHPROPERFUSECOORDINATION ASDESCRIBED IN.THEDESIGN'RITERIA.

THEREFORE, AVAILABILITY, OFTHECLASS1EDCDISTRIBUTION SYSTEMISNOTDEGRADED.

NATURALEVENTS'AND CHAPTER15ACCIDENT/TRANSIENT ANALYSES.

h THEFUSESSELECTEDTOREPLACEEXISTINGFUSESWILLBESIZEDTOCLEARMAXIMUMFAULTCURRENTSATRATEDVOLTAGEASWELLASENSURESYSTEMOPERABILITY.

THEREFORE, THEFUSESWILLBEABLETOPERMITTHEPROPERFUNCTIONING OFTHESAFETYSYSTEMSUSEDTOMITIGATEUFSARCHAPTER15ACCIDENTS ANDTRANSIENTS.

INADDITION, CORRECTLY SIZEDFUSESWILLINSURETHATSUSTAINED ARCINGWILLNOTOCCURDURINGFAULTCONDITIONS.

THEREFORE'HE CONSEQUENCES OFAFIREISNOTINCREASED.

ANYADDITIONAL WIRINGFORTRANSFERRING THESUPPLYTOACIRCUITFROMONEFUSE/SWITCH POSITIONTOANOTHERWILLUSECABLEINCOMPLIANCE WITHIEEE383-1974FLAMETEST.SUCHCABLEWILLBEONLYWITHINADCDISTRIBUTION PANELAND>>THUSWILLNOTINCREASETHEFIRELOADING.INTHEAREA.ALLFUSESUSEDONTHE125VDCDISTRIBUTION SYSTEMWILLBESHOWNTOFUNCTIONWITHOUTDISCONTINUITY, CONSISTENT WITHTHESEISMICTESTINGREQUIREMENTS OFGOULDINC.,FUSEQUALIFICATION SPECIFICATIONFORCLASS1EEQUIPMENTS GEFD001iREVISZONBgDECEMBER' 981~INADDITIONiFUSECLIPSANDREDUCERSWILLBESIZEDCONSISTENT WITHMANUFACTURER'S REQUIREMENTS.

THEREFOREi THEREISNOSIGNIFICANT INCREASEINFUSEFAILURESDUETOASEISMICEVENT.SECTION12.1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAALLOWSTHEUSEOFEXISTINGFUSESINTHE,DCSYSTEMPROVIDEDTHEYAREOFTHECORRECTSIZEANDTYPE.SPECIFICALLY, EXISTINGFUSESMEETINGALLSYSTEMCOORDINATION REQUIREMENTS ASDESCRIBED INSECTION17'OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDHAVINGBEENEVALUATED FORUSEINCLASS1EAPPLICATIONS DONOTREQUIREREPLACEMENT.

BASEDUPONTHERESULTSOFTHETESTINGPROGRAMFORNEWFUSES,THERELIABILITY OFTHEEXISTING'FUSESISDETERMINED TOBEAPPROPRIATE FORCONTINUED USEINTHEDCSYSTEM.THEREFORE iBASEDUPONTHEABOVEANALYSESiITHASBEENDETERMINED THAT:(A)THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCEDAND(B)THESTRUCTURES iSYSTEMSiANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS AREADEQUATE.

THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE ANDTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTARENOTINCREASED.

THEPOSSIBILITY OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFATYPEDIFFERENT FROMANYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSISHASNOTBEENCREATED.THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ISNOTREDUCED.

EWR-3~50ODONOFSTATION13ATHISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEMODERNIZATION OFSTATION13AINORDERTOMEETMINIMUMREQUIREMENTS FORRELIABILITY ANDSECURITYASDEVELOPED INTHENORTHEAST POWERCOORDINATING COUNCILANDNEWYORKPOWERPOOLRELIABILITY CRITERIAASITAPPLIESTOPROTECTIVE RELAYS.REVISION2TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISISBASICALLY THEREPLACEMENT OFTHERELAYSFORCIRCUITS911AND912WITHNEWSTATICDISTANCEPROTECTION TYPES,USEDASASECONDARY PROTECTION SYSTEMSTHESEMODELS'HE QUADRAMHO gMANUFACTURED BYGECMEASUREMENTSi INCORPORATE ATWEAKINFEEDFEATUREnTHATPERMITSOPERATION OFTHERELAYWITHAWEAKSUPPLYSOURCE.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.EVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREASFOLLOWS:1)LOSSOFEXTERNALLOAD2)LOSSOFOFFSITEPOWERTHELOSSOFEXTERNALLOADHASBEENANALYZEDINTHEGINNAUFSAR.THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTEFFECTTHERESULTSOFTHATANALYSISINADDITION, THISMODIFICATION WILLINCREASETHEREDUNDANCY ANDSEPARATION OFEXISTINGPROTECTIVE RELAY'YSTEMS FORTHE115KVLINES.THUSTHISMODIFICATION DOESNOTINCREASETHEPROBABILITY OFALOSSOFEXTERNALLOADS.THEPOWERCONTROLSCHEMEWILLNOTBEMODIFIEDZNANYWAY.THISMODIFICATION WILLINCREASETHEREDUNDANCY ANDSEPARATION OFTHEEXZSTZNGPROTECTIVE RELAYINGFORTHEOFFSITEPOWERSOURCES.THEPOWERCONTROLSCHEMEWILLNOTBEMODIFIEDINANYWAY.THUSTHISMODIFICATION DOESNOTINCREASETHEPROBABILITY OF'LOSSOFOFFSITEPOWER.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSAR,ZTHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMSANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-40ICOONZTOONOFKEYPHASOR PROXZITYTRANSDUCERS NTOCVBRAZOSYSTTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEINCORPORATION OFAKEYPHASOR PROXIMITY TRANSDUCER INTOTHERCPVIBRATION MONITORING SYSTEMOFEACHRCP.EACHKEYPHASOR PROXIMITY TRANSDUCER WILLPROVIDERCPVIBRATION DATAVALUABLEFORDIAGNOSTIC TESTINGPURPOSES.

THEREARENOCONTROLFUNCTIONS ASSOCIATED WITHTHISMODIFICATION.

REVISIONOiOFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWEREPRESENTED ANDAPPROVEDBYPORC.ONJANUARY24,1985,PORCITEMNUMBER6.1.0-85-009-001.

UNDERREVISION1iPARAGRAPHS 1~1i1~3i8~0iAND23~1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAHAVEBEENREVISEDTOINCLUDESEISMICREQUIREMENTS FORTHEINSTALLATION OFNEWCONDUITAND/ORENCLOSURES LOCATEDINTHEVICINITYOFSEISMICCATEGORY1EQUIPMENT WILLBEINSTALLATED INACCORDANCE WITHREGULATORY GUIDE1.29SECTIONC.2.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGZNNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULA-TORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREMAJORANDMINORFIRESANDSEISMICEVENTS.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPH 3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS, ITHAS,THEREFORE, BEENDETERMINED THATADEQUATEMARGINSOFSAFETYEXISTDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATION,ANDTHEREAREADEQUATESTRUCTURES, SYSTEMSANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS.

~ERR-067115KVBENCHBOARD MODIFICATION THISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION WHICHINVOLVESTHEREPLACEMENT OFTHEEXISTING(9SECTIONS) 115KVBENCHBOARD FROMTHECONTROLROOM.ALLDIRECTBREAKERCONTROLFEATURES, NOWLOCATEDONTHE115KVBENCHBOARD WILLBEREMOVED.EXISTINGBREAKERCONTROLSWITCHESONTHEMCBWILLBEUNAFFECTED BYTHISMODIFICATION.

THE9SECTION115KVBENCHBOARD WILLBEREPLACEDWITHASTATUSDISPLAYPANEL.THESTATUSDISPLAYPANELWILLBEADDEDTOTHEMCRANDWILLPROVIDESTATUSLIGHTSASSOCIATED WITHBREAKERPOSITIONS LOCATEDATSUBSTATION 13A.REVISION0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWEREPRESENTED ANDAPPROVEDBYPORCONJANUARY30,1985,PORCITEMNUMBER6.1.0-85-011-003.

~ig'a4r HASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE:1)SEISMICEVENTS,2)MAJORANDMINORFIRES,3)LOSSOFEXTERNALELECTRICAL LOADAND4)LOSSOFOFFSITEA.CDPOWER.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPH 3'TO4'OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS/

ITHASTHEREFOREt BEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDFORTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDEWR-4265CONTINMENTPOSTACCIDENTlA&1BCHARCOALFILTERSYSTEMSODIFICAONTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION WHICHMODIFIEDTHEAANDBTRAINCONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION SYSTEMS.INTHEEVENTOFALARGEBREAKLOCASCENARIOgTHEREISTHEPOTENTIAL FORTHEAANDBTRAINCONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION CHARCOALFILTERFANSYSTEMOPERABILITY TOBESEVERELYRESTRICTED DUETOTHEFLOODINGOFTHESYSTEMDUCTWORKLOCATEDINTHEBASEMENTOFCONTAINMENT.

THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATION ISTOUPGRADETHEAANDBTRAINCONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION SYSTEMSTOENSUREADEQUATEAIRDISTRIBUTION OFTHERECIRCULATION AIRTHROUGHTHECHARCOALFILTERSTOTHECONTAINMENT VESSELOPERATING FLOOR-INORDERTOENSUREADEQUATEAIRDISTRIBUTION OFTHERECIRCULATION AIRTHROUGH'HE CHARCOALFILTERSTOTHEOPERATING FLOOR,SIX(6)ADDITIONAL AIRDISCHARGE OPENINGSARETOBEADDEDTOTHE1AAND1BPOSTACCIDENTCHARCOALFILTERDISCHARGE DUCTWORK.

ALLOFTHEOPENINGSARETOBEONTHEDISCHARGE SIDEOFTHECHARCOALFILTERSANDBEFORETHELOCATIONOFTHEDUCTWORKWHICHCOULDPOTENTIALLY FLOODANDRESTRICTTHEDELIVERYOFTHEAIRTOTHECONTAINMENT OPERATING FLOOR.ALLOFTHEOPENINGSARETOBELOCATEDABOVETHECONTAINMENT OPERATING FLOORINORDERTOENSUREADEQUATEDELIVERYOFTHEFILTEREDAIRTOTHISAREA.REVISION0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWASPRESENTED ANDAPPROVEDBYPORCONAPRIL29,1987PORCNUMBER6.1'-87-068-001.

THEPURPOSEOFREVISION1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.ANDSAFETYANALYSISISTOCORRECTTYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORSINREVISION0.

8WA1 AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARELISTEDASFOLLOWS:1)INTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTSSUCHASFIRE,FLOODS,STORMS,ANDEARTHQUAKES')

SYSTEMFUNCTIONAL OPERATION DURINGALOCASCENARIO.

BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPHS 3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'T HASTHEREFORE/

BEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

~g-4~5STATON13AFIBEROPTICCOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEINSTALLATION OFFIBEROPTICCOMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT ATTHESTATION13RADIOTOWERANDATSTATION13AANDFIBEROPTICCABLEBETWEENTHETWOLOCATIONS.

THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATION ISTOREPLACETHEPRESENTLEASEDTELEPHONE LINECOMMUNICATING SYSTEMATSTATION13AWITHAFIBEROPTICCOMMUNICATION SYSTEMTHATWILLTZEINTOTHEPRESENTMICROWAVE SYSTEMLOCATEDATSTATION13'HISMODIFICATION INVOLVESTHEINSTALLATION OFFIBEROPTICMULTIPLEXING ANDCHANNELBANKEQUIPMENT TOBEINSTALLED ATTHESTATION13RADIOTOWERANDATSTATION13AANDBECONNECTED BYALINKOFFIBEROPTICCABLEBETWEENTHETWOLOCATIONS THISSYSTEMWILLTIEINTOTHEPRESENTMICROWAVE SYSTEMLOCATEDATSTATION13,ANDWILLALSOBEAPARTOFRG&E'SOVERALLTELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORK.FIBEROPTICCABLEWILLBEINSTALLED BETWEENSTATION13AANDTHERADIOTOWERATSTATION13.THECABLEWILLBEINSTALLED UNDER-GROUNDWITHALLNECESSARY TRENCHING DONEOUTSIDEOFTHESECURITYFENCINGATGINNASTATION.THEOVERHEADPARTOFTHEINSTALLATION WILLBECONSTRUCTED ONANEXISTINGPOLELINELOCATEDOUTSIDEOFTHESECURITYFENCING.THESYSTEMSWORKONAHOTSTANDBYPRINCIPAL, ZNWHICHTHEFAILUREOFASINGLEELECTRICAL COMPONENT ORFIBERWILLNOTMAKETHESYSTEMINOPERATIVE.

TOTALFAILUREOFTHESYSTEMWOULDHAVETHESAMEAFFECTTOSTATION13ASTELEPHONE CABLEFAILUREWOULDHAVEONTHESTATIONUNDERPRESENTCONDITIONS.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNAFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYTHEUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE:(1)SEISMICEVENT(2)LOSSOFEXTERNALELECTRICAL LOAD(3)LOSSOFOFFSITEA.C.POWER(4)MAJORANDMINORFIRESTHISMODIFICATION DOESNOTINSTALLANYNEWORMODIFYANYEXISTINGEQUIPMENT NECESSARY FORTHESAFESHUTDOWNOFTHEPLANT.NEWEQUIPMENT WILLNOTBELOCATEDINANYAREATHATCONTAINSSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENTS THEMODIFICATION ISiTHEREFORE'ESIGNATED ASNON-SEISMIC.

THISMODIFICATION WILLIMPROVEANDPROVIDEREDUNDANCY INEQUIPMENT COMMUNICATIONS TO/FROMSTATION13A.THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTCHANGEANYOFTHECONTROLORINDICATION FUNCTIONS ASSOCIATED WITHSTATION13ATHEREFORE'O NEWFAILUREMODESTBEYONDTHOSEASSOCIATED WITHTHEORIGINALCONTROLSCHEMES,WILLBEINTRODUCED BYTHEMODIFICATION RELATIVETOLOSSOFEXTERNALELECTRICAL LOADORLOSSOFOFFSITEACPOWER.THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTINVOLVETHEINSTALLATION OFANYEQUIPMENT INAGZNNAFIREAREA.ANAPPENDIXREVALUATION IS,THEREFORE, NOTREQUIRED.

INACCORDANCE WITHTHEDESIGNCRITERIA, THECABLEROUTINGWILLBEENTIRELYOUTSIDEOFTHESECURITYFENCEPERIMETER.

THEREFORE, NOUNDERGROUND SAFETYRELATEDCIRCUITSWITHINTHESECURITYFENCEBOUNDARYWILLBEAFFECTED.

ITHASBEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

60V34.5KVBREAKERSWITCHLOCATIOlTHISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THERELOCATION OF4160VAND34.5KVBREAKERSWITCHESONTHEMCB.THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION WILLMINIMIZETHEPOTENTIAL FOROPERATORERRORSBYRELOCATING BREAKERSWITCHESONTHEMCBiSOTHATTHEYARECONSISTENT WITHTHEBREAKERCONFIGURATION ONTHE4160VOLTBUSES.

HASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70'HEEVENTSRELATINGTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE:1)LOSSOFOFFSITEACPOWER.2)NATURALEVENTS/FIRE ANDEARTHQUAKE THEFIRSTEVENTTHATHASBEENANALYZEDFORTHISMODIFICATION CONCERNSTHELOSSOFOFFSITEACPOWER.THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTCHANGEANYELECTRICAL CIRCUITDESIGNORDESIGNINTENTASSOCIATED WITH4160VOLTOR34.5KVBUSES.THEREFORE, THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTDEGRADETHEEXISTINGCAPABILITY TODEALWITHTHEOFF-SITEACPOWERLOSSINCIDENT.

THESECONDEVENTANALYZEDISTHEEFFECTOFAFIREONTHEPLANTDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.

NONEWWIRINGISANTICIPATED, BUTINTHEEVENTANYNEWWIRINGISREQUIREDITSHALLMEETTHEREQUIREMENTS OFIEEESTD383-1974FLAMETEST.THUSTHEREISNOSIGNIFICANT INCREASEINTHEFIRELOADINGDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.

THETHIRDEVENTANALYZEDISTHEEFFECTOFASEISMICEVENTONTHEPLANTDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.

THEEXISTINGCONTROLSWITCHESWILLBEREARRANGED WITHMINIMALDISTURBANCE OFEXISTINGWIRING'HE SEISMICANALYSISPERFORMED UNDEREWR2831STILLAPPLIESFORTHISMODIFICATION.

THEREFORE, C2OFREGULATORY GUIDE1.29WILLBEMETTHUSTHECONSEQUENCES OFAFAILUREDUETOASEISMICEVENTAREMITIGATED.

BASEDUPONTHEABOVEANALYSIS, ITHASBEENDETERMINED THAT:A)THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCEDANDB)THESTRUCTURES gSYSTEMSgANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS AREADEQUATE.

THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE ANDTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTARENOTINCREASED.

E~4~55OFSITPOWERRECONFIGURATION THISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEIMPROVEMENT OFTHEGINNASTATIONOFFSITEPOWERSUPPLYSYSTEM.THISWILLINVOLVESPLITTING THE34.5KVBUSINTOTWOSECTIONSWITHNOTIEBREAKER.ONEBUSSECTIONWILLRECEIVEPOWERFROMEXISTINGOFFSITECIRCUIT751(STATION204)THROUGHA34.5KVBREAKERANDSUPPLYSTATIONAUXILIARY TRANSFORMER 12A,WHILETHEOTHERSECTIONISFEDBYCIRCUIT767(STATION13A)TOSUPPLYSTATIONAUXILIARY TRANSFORMER 12B.'

STATIONAUXILIARY TRANSFORMER WILLPROVIDETHENORMALFEEDTOONE4160VOLTSAFETYSOURCEBUSANDFUNCTIONASTHEALTERNATE FEEDTOTHEOTHER4160VOLTSAFETYSOURCEBUS.AUTOMATIC TRANSFERS WILL'BEMADEBETWEENNORMALANDALTERNATE SOURCESWITHOUTUNNECESSARY DIESELSTARTS.REVISION1TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATES CHANGESFROMREVISION0,TOCORRECTTYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS,TOINCLUDEALLMODIFICATIONS PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED UNDEREWR4522,TOADDADDITZONALREFERENCES gCODESANDSTANDARDS gTOADDMISSINGFIGURESgTOFINALIZESECTIONSOFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWHICHHADPREVIOUSLY NOTBEENAPPROVED.

EMOTE:PREVIOUSLY PORCAPPROVALOFREVISION1OFDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISHADBEENLIMITEDTOTHOSESECTIONSRELATEDTOTHEINSTALLATION OFSWITCHGEAR'ND BUSDUCTSUPPORTFOUNDATIONS ANDSCREENWALL PENETRATION.

REVISION2TOTHEDESIGNCRITERIAINCORPORATES CHANGESFROMREVISION1,TOPROVIDECLARIFICATION OFFIREPROTECTION REQUIREMENTS ANDTODESCRIBETHEMEASURESTOBETAKENTOENSURETHATTHEMODIFICATION WILLNOT,DEGRADEEXISTINGFIREBARRIERSORAFFECTTHEPERFORMANCE OFANYEXISTINGFIREPROTECTION EQUIPMENT.

THESAFETYANALYSISDATED1/25/89REVISION2SUPERCEDES REVISION1SENTOUTFORPRE-PORCREVIEW.REVISION2CORRECTED TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORSINPARAGRAPHS 1~118'gAND3'DELETEDTHEFIRSTSENTENCEOFPARAGRAPH 3.3.1ANDCHANGEDTHREESUCCESSIVE TOTWOSUCCESSIVE INPARAGRAPH 3.4.1.REVISION3OFTHESAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATES CHANGESFROMREVISION2TOUPDATETHEREVISIONOFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAINSECTION2.0REFERENCE DOCUMENTS.

REVISION4OFTHESAFETYANALYSISREPLACESSECTION3.2.2,APPENDIXRREQUIREMENTS, TOCOINCIDEWITHTHECHANGESINDESIGNCRITERIAREVISION2.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREFIREANDEARTHQUAKE, LOSSOFOFFSITEPOWERANDLOSSOFELECTRICAL LOAD.FIREANDEARTHQUAKE AREREVIEWEDASFOLLOWS:SECTION27.3OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIADETAILSCARETOBETAKENWITHFIRESTOPSNEWWIRINGANDCABLEWILLBEREQUIREDFORTHISMODIFICATION WHICHCOULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANT,ANDBECAUSEOFTHISPOTENTIAL, THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLSUCHCABLEMEETTHEIEEE-383-1974 FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.

THEREFORE, THISMODIFICATION WILLCAUSENOSIGNIFICANT INCREASEINFIREPROPAGATION HAZARD.

PlP~A THISMODIFICATION HASBEENREVIEWEDPERASSUMPTIONS OFAPPENDIXRALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWNSYSTEMTOENSURETHATFAILUREOFANYELECTRICAL CABLEINSTALLED ASAPARTOFTHISMODIFICATION WILLNOTRESULTINTHEDISABLING OFVITALEQUIPMENT NEEDEDTOSAFELYSHUTDOWNTHEPLANTDURINGPOSTULATED FIRES.FAULTDUTIESRESULTING FROMTHISMODIFICATION TOTHEOFFSITEPOWERSYSTEMWILLNOTCAUSETHEDESIGNREQUIREMENTS OFCONTAINMENT ELECTRICPENETRATION ASSEMBLIES ASSPECIFIED INIEEE-317-1983 TOBEEXCEEDED.

THISMODIFICATION ZSCLASSIFIED NON-CLASS 1ECONSISTENT WITHTHECLASSIFICATION OFTHEOFFSITEPOWERSYSTEM.THISCLASSIFICATION ISACCEPTABLE BECAUSEOFFSITEPOWERZSNOTNEEDEDFORSAFESHUTDOWN.

CHANGESTOTHEMCBREQUIREDBYTHISMODIFICATION AREACCEPTABLE BECAUSETHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHEYNOTDEGRADEMCBSEISMICCAPABILITY.

LOSSOFOFFSITEPOWERISREVIEWEDASFOLLOWS:THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATION ISTOINCREASETHEINDEPENDENCE OFTHEINCOMINGSUPPLIESTOTHEPPSWITHOUTCHANGINGTHEPRIORITYFORTHROWOVER SEQUENCEINSUPPLYTOTHESAFETYBUSES.THECONSEQUENCE OFASINGLECONTINGENCY (FAILUREOFACOMPONENT)

INTHEPPSWILLBEAUTOMATIC TRANSFERTOASECONDPPSCIRCUIT.THISWILLREDUCETHEPROBABILITY FORTRANSFEROFSAFETYRELATEDLOADSTOTHEEMERGENCY POWERSYSTEMTHEMARGINOFSAFETYiINTERMSOFRELIABILITY ORNUMBEROFAUTOMATIC TRANSFERS TOALTERNATE SUPPLIESPRIORTODEPENDENCE UPONDIESELGENERATORS ISINCREASED.

THEPROBABILITY OFLOSSOFPPSISDECREASED ANDTHEDESIGNADEQUACYASDOCUMENTED INTHEUFSARISENHANCED.

BASEDONSECTION17.2.2OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIABOTHOFFSITETRANSMISSION SOURCES(CIRCUIT767AND751)AREEACHREQUIREDTOHAVEADEQUATEPOWERCAPABILITIES TOSUPPLYALLCLASS1EANDNON-CLASS1EPLANTLOADS.THISISVERIFIEDBYTESTSINSECTION23.1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.

SINCEBOTHOFTHEOFFSZTESOURCESEACHHAVEADEQUATEPOWERCAPABILITIES ANDORIGINATE FROMDIFFERENT SWITCHING

STATIONS, THEYARETRULYINDEPENDENT SOURCESOFOFFSITEPOWER.THEREFORE, THISMODIFICATION WILLRESULTINADECREASEINTHEPROBABILITY OFLOSSOFOFFSITEPOWER.

Pl LOSSOFELECTRICAL LOADZSREVIEWEDASFOLLOWS:UPONLOSSOFELECTRICAL LOADUNITAUXILIARY LOADSARETRANSFERRED FROMTHE11TRANSFORMER TOTHEPPS.THECONSEQUENCE OFASINGLECONTINGENCY INTHEPPSWILLBEASDESCRIBED IN3.3.1.EACHOFTHEPPSSUPPLIESISCAPABLEOFCARRYINGFULLSAFETYANDUNITAUXILIARY ELECTRICAL LOADS.THISWILLREMAINUNCHANGED BYTHISMODIFICATION ANDASPRESENTED INTHEUFSAR.ADOUBLECONTINGENCY (FAILUREOF.TWOPPSCOMPONENTS)

WILLBEREQUIREDFORBLACKOUTOFTHEPPS.THEMARGINOFSAFETYFORTHISEVENTISTHEREFORE, ALSOENHANCEDASDESCRIBED IN3.3.1.ONLYAFTERTWOSUCCESSIVE INDEPENDENT SUPPLIESBECOMEUNAVAILABLE WILLCLASS1EDEPENDENCE ONEMERGENCY DIESELGENERATORS OCCUR.THEREFORE, THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTWILLBEENHANCED'HE ADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCZDENTS ANDFORTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE ORTHECONSEQUENCE OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETY,PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLBEREDUCEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.

THEPOSSIBILITY OFANACCIDENTORAMALFUNCTION OFADIFFERENT TYPETHANANYEVALUATED PREVIOUSLY INTHESAFETYANALYSISWILLNOTBECREATEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.

THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WILLNOTBEREDUCEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.

~EWR-46GSUDAAACUISITIONTHISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES ANEVALUATION OFTHEPRESENTEQUIPMENT USEDTOMONITORTHEGENERATOR STEP-UPTRANSFORMER GSU)REVEALEDANINACCURACY OFATLEAST10oCITISIMPORTANT TOMAINTAINTHETEMPERATURE OFTHEGSUWITHINTHEPROPEROPERATING TEMPERATURE LIMITS.THISMODIFICATION WILLREPLACETHEEXISTINGGSUTOPOILTEMPERATURE GAUGEANDTHERMOCOUPLE COMBINATION.

THEFUNCTIONOFTHEREPLACEMENT INSTRUMENTATION ISTOMOREACCURATELY MONITORTHETOPOILTEMPERATURE OFTHEGSUTRANSFORMER.

THEREPLACEMENT INSTRUMENTATION WILLPROVIDELOCALINDICATION, ALARMCONTACTOUTPUTS'ND TWOANALOGOUTPUTSPROPORTIONAL TOTHETEMPERATURE BEINGMONITORED.

ONEANALOGOUTPUTWILLBESENTTOTHEPLANTPROCESSCOMPUTERSYSTEM(PPCS).THESECONDANALOGOUTPUTWILLNOTBEUSEDATTHISTIME.

J4S AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE3..70.THEEVENTSRELATINGTOTHISMODIFICATION AREMAJORANDMINORFIRESANDASEISMICEVENT.EQUIPMENT INSTALLED UNDERTHISMODIFICATION ISNOTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGORAFTERACCIDENTCONDITIONS.

NEWWIRINGANDCABLEWHICHMAYBEREQUIREDFORTHISMODIFICATION COULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANT~THEREFORE'HE DESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLSUCHCABLESMEETIEEE383-1974FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.

FIRESTOPSWILLBETREATEDASIDENTIFIED INSECTION28.2OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.

BECAUSEOFTHIS,THEREWILLBENOSIGNIFICANT INCREASEINTHEFIRELOADINGCAUSEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.

ANAPPENDIXRCONFORMANCE REVIEWSHALLBEPREPAREDTODETERMINE THATTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION DOESNOTIMPACTAPPENDIXRCOMPLIANCE.

BASEDONREGULATORY GUIDE1.29ANDCONSISTENT WITHAPPENDIXAOFTHEGZNNASTATIONQUALITYASSURANCE MANUALTHISMODIFICATION SHALLBENON-SEISMIC.

THISMODIFICATION ISNOTREQUIREDFORTHESAFESHUTDOWNOFTHEREACTOR.WHEREAPPLICABLE, THOSEPORTIONSOFTHISMODIFICATION WHOSEFAILURECOULDPRECLUDESAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT FROMPERFORMING THEIRSAFETYRELATEDFUNCTIONS, SHALLBERESTRAINED ANDSUPPORTED INAMANNERCOMPARABLE TOSEISMICCATEGORYI.THISSHALLBEPERFORMED SUCHTHATSAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT ISNOTPREVENTED FROMPREFORMING ITSINTENDEDFUNCTIONBEFORE,DURINGORAFTERASAFESHUTDOWNEARTHQUAKE (SSE)~ITHASBEENDEMONSTRATED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATION ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGZNNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBY,THEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

k'KgCAm E~4~7CBAORCRDRTHISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEREPLACEMENT OFTHEMAINCONTROLBOARDEXISTINGALARMBUZZERWITHANADJUSTABLE ALARM.REVISION2TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISADDRESSES SETTINGTHENEWCONTROLROOMANNUNCIATOR ALARMATLEAST5dBAABOVEBACKGROUND WITHTHEOTHERMCBALARMSWITHINABANDOF+/-2.5dBAAROUNDTHEANNUNCIATOR LEVEL.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYRG&EENGINEERING PROCEDURE QE311SECTION3.2.2.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE:1)SEISMICEVENT2)FIRESTHISMODIFICATION DOESNOTINSTALLANYNEWORMODIFYANYEXISTINGEQUIPMENT NECESSARY FORTHESAFESHUTDOWNOFTHEPLANTASIDENTIFIED INTHEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTAL.

ANYPORTIONOFTHISMODIFICATION INVOLVING THEMAINCONTROLBOARDISDESIGNATED SEISMICCATEGORYZ.THEREMAINING WORKFORTHISMODIFICATION WILLBEDESIGNEDTOMEETTHEREQUIREMENTS OFUSNRCREGULATORY GUZDE1.29,POSITIONC.2THISMODIFICATION INVOLVESTHEINSTALLATION OFEQUIPMENT ANDCABLEINTHECONTROLBUILDING, FIREAREACCZONECR.AREVIEWWILLBEPERFORMED TOASSURECONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITH10CFR50,APPENDIXR.ALLNEWWIRINGWILLBEQUALIFIED TOIEEE383-1974FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.

FIREBARRIERPENETRATIONS WILLBEREPAIREDORREPLACEDINACCORDANCE WITHEXISTINGPLANTPROCEDURES.

THEREFORE EXISTINGSEALSWILLNOTBEDEGRADED.

THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTAFFECTTHESAFESHUTDOWNANALYSISINTHEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTAL FORTHEFOLLOWING REASONS:A)THEMODIFICATION INVOLVESE{}UIPMENT WHICHISNOTIDENTIFIED ASSAFESHUTDOWNE{}UIPMENT INTHEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTAL.

B)THEREISNOEFFECTONSEPARATION OFEXISTINGCIRCUITS, ASSOCIATED

CIRCUITS, ORFIREAREABOUNDARIES ASANALYZEDIN/HEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTAL.

~i'I'i/

THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTAFFECTTHECAPABILITIES OFTHEALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWNSYSTEMFURTHERMOREi NONEOFTHEEXISTINGPROCEDURES FOROBTAINING ANALTERNATIVE SAFESHUTDOWNWILLBEEFFECTIVE'HIS MODIFZCATIONi THEREFOREi COMPLIESWITH10CFR50iAPPENDIXR.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGINNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDED'OR THEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWg-4~5GMASTIGNGCABLREPLACEMENT THISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION TOREMOVE,ANTZFALLDEVICESANDTHEREPLACEMENT OFTHELIGHTFIXTURELIFTINGCABLESONLIGHTINGPOLESg1,3,4,5,6AND7.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.EVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION:

(1)LOSSOFALLEXTERNAL(OFFSITE)

ACPOWERTOTHESTATION;(2)INTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTS/FIREi FLOODiSTORMEDOREARTHQUAKE THEFIRSTEVENTCONSIDERED IS"LOSSOFALLEXTERNAL(OFFSITE)

ACPOWERTOTHESTATION".

THEMOTORDRIVENLIFTMECHANISMS AREFEDFROMNON-1ESAFETYRELATEDBUSSESSINCETHEREZSNOCHANGETOTHE1ESAFETYRELATEDBUSSES,THEPROBABILITY OFALOSSOFACPOWERHASNOTBEENINCREASED.

THESECONDEVENTCONSIDERED IS"INTERNAL ANDEXTERNALEVENTS/FIREi FLOOD,STORM,OREARTHQUAKE".

THISMODIFICATION ZSNOTREQUIREDTOBE1ENORSEISMIC.THEFAILUREOFTHELIFTMECHANISM WILLNOTAFFECTSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT.

THISMODIFICATION ISOUTSIDETHEPERIMETER OFANYFIREAREAS.THEREISNOIMPACTONAPPENDIXROROTHERFIREPROTECTION REQUIREMENTS ANDNOADDITIONAL APPENDIXRREVIEWISREQUIRED.

BASEDUPONTHEABOVEANALYSIS, ITHASBEENDETERMINED THAT:A)THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCEDANDB)THESTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS AREADEQUATE.

THEPROBABILITY PFOCCURRENCE ANDTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTARENOTINCREASED.

EWg4809ESLEUMPTRCHARGETHISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEREPLACEMENT OFTHEBATTERYCHARGERFORTHEDIESELFIREPUMP.THEDESIGNOFTHEEXISTINGCHARGERISTHATTHROUGHATIMINGCAMiTHEAANDBBATTERIES'OR STARTINGTHEDIESELFIREPUMPiAREALTERNATELY CHARGEDFORABOUTTWOMINUTESEVERYOTHERHOUR.THENEWBATTERYCHARGERCONTINUOUSLY FLOATCHARGESTHEBATTERIES.

ITWOULDHAVETHECAPABILITY TOEQUALIZEORRECHARGETHEBATTERIES ANDAFTERTHEREQUIREDCHARGEPERIODRETURNTOTHEFLOATLEVELAUTOMATXCALLY.

THISWOULDPROVIDEBETTERCONTROLANDPROLONGBATTERYLXFE.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDXNTHEGINNAUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70'HEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREASFOLLOWS:1)SEISMICEVENT2)FIREZNTHEPLANTTHEFIRSTEVENTANALYZEDISTHEEFFECTOFASEISMICEVENT.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHENEWBATTERYCHARGERTOBESEISMICALLY MOUNTEDTOCATEGORY1CRITERIA.

THEREFORE, THEMODIFICATION WILLNOTADVERSELY AFFECTTHESYSTEMDURINGASEISMICEVENT.THESECONDEVENTANALYZEDISTHEEFFECTOFAFIREZNTHEPLANTDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.

THECONTROLWIRINGUSEDFORTHISMODIFICATION ZSREQUIREDTOMEETTHEREQUIREMENTS OFZEEESTANDARD383-1974, FLAMETESTSPECIFICATION.

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSAR,ANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFTHEGINNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

@~4~3TDCCVVEPLACEETHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEREPLACEMENT OFVALVES4003AND4004,EVALUATION OFTHEEFFECTSOFVALVEREPLACEMENTS ANDTHEADDITION/MODIFICATION OFPIPESUPPORT(S)

IFDEEMEDNECESSARY.

Jl AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1'0'VENTSRELATEDTOTHISANALYSISARE-A)B)C)D)E)F)G)H)I)FIRESSEISMICEVENTSPIPEBREAKSOUTSIDETHECONTAINMENT BUILDINGPIPEBREAKSINSIDETHECONTAINMENT BUILDINGLOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENTLOSSOFALLA.C.POWERCOOLDOWNSTEAMGENERATOR TUBERUPTURELOSSOFMAINFEEDWATER THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTCAUSETHEDEGRADATION OFEXISTINGFIREBARRIERS'ATERIALS USEDWILLMEETCRITERIAEQUALTOORGREATERTHANTHOSEPRESENTLY INSTALLED.

FURTHERMORE, THISMODIFICATION WILLBEREVIEWEDAGAINSTTHEASSUMPTIONS OF10CFR50APPENDIX"R TOASSURETHATALLEXISTINGFIREPROTECTION FEATURESREQUIREDTOCOMPLYWITHANDMAINTAINEQUIVALENT LEVELSOFPROTECTION WILLBEMETDURINGANDFOLLOWING THEMODIFICATION.

ALLPIPINGANDANYPIPESUPPORTMODIFICATIONS WILLBEEVALUATED, INREGARDTOASEISMICEVENT,TOCRITERIAIDENTICAL TOTHEEWR2512SEISMICUPGRADEPROGRAMSOASTOEQUALORIMPROVETHESYSTEMSCAPABILITY TOWITHSTAND ASEISMICEVENTREPLACEMENT OFTHEEXISTINGCHECKVALVESINTHEAUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEMWILLNOTADVERSELY AFFECTAUXILIARY FEEDWATER PERFORMANCE INRESPONSETOPZPEBREAKS,LOCA,STEAMGENERATOR TUBERUPTUREANDLOSSOFMAINFEEDWATER.

PREVIOUSPIPEBREAKREQUIREMENTS WILLNOTBEAFFECTED, ASTHESYSTEMWILLBEHYDROSTATICALLY TESTEDTOPROVEINTEGRITY PRIORTOTURNOVERFORUSE.ALLACCIDENTS LISTED(ETHROUGHIABOVE)ARENOTADVERSELY AFFECTED.

THEREDUCTION INLEAKAGEBETWEENSTEAMGENERATORS (UNDERTHISMODIFICATION)

WILLINFACTREDUCETHEIMPACTOFTHESEEVENTS.THUS,THISMODIFICATION NEITHERINCREASES THECONSEQUENCES, NORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR,1)EQUIPMENT REQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWING ASEISMICEVENT,2)AFFECTTHELEVELSOFPROTECTION FROMFIRESDURINGANDFOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS TOTHETDAFWPPIPINGSYSTEM,3)ALTERTHEPERFORMANCE OFTHESYSTEM'NRESPONSETOPIPEBREAKSINSIDEANDOUTSIDECONTAINMENT, INCLUDING LOCASiLOSSOFMAINFEEDWATERi COOLDOWNANDSTEAMGENERATOR TUBERUPTURE,AND4)THEREPLACEMENT OFTHETDAFWPDISCHARGE CHECKVALVESWILLNOTBEAFFECTEDBYLOSSOFALLA.C.POWERDUETOTHEIRPASSIVEDESIGNFEATURES.

glS1 BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCEDITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

K~5025CESWITCHESCONTROTHISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES LER89-016,WHICHIDENTIFIED APOTENTIAL COMMONMODEFAILUREDUETOANOT-2CONTACTBLOCKPLUNGERMECHANISM MALFUNCTION.

ASINGLEOT-2SWITCHONTHEMCBISUSEDTOCONTROLTHESAFETYINJECTION BLOCK/NORMAL/UNBLOCK FUNCTIONFORBOTHTRAINSOFSAFETYINJECTION (SI).AMALFUNCTION COULDRESULTINTHEBLOCKINGOFSOMEAUTOMATIC ACTUATION FEATURESOFSI.TOCORRECTTHEDEFICIENCY, THEPRESENTSIBLOCKFUNCTIONWILLBEMODIFIEDTOPROVIDEASEPARATEBLOCK/NORMAL/UNBLOCK SWITCHFOREACHTRAIN.AREVIEWWASPERFORMED TOIDENTIFYANYADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS SUBJECTTOASIMILARCOMMONMODEFAILURE.THERESULTSCONCLUDED THATTHESIRESET,CONTAINMENT SPRAYRESET,CONTAINMENT ISOLATION RESETANDCONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION RESETSWITCHESHAVESIMILARDESIGNDEFICIENCIES.

TOCORRECTTHEDEFICIENCIES ANDPROVIDEASEPARATION OFTRAINS,THEWIRINGOFTHESWITCHESWILLBERECONFIGURED.

INADDITION, THEGARDCOMMITTEE HASRECOMMENDED THATTHEKEYPUSHBUTTONS FORCONTAINMENT ISOLATION RESETANDCONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION RESETBEREPLACEDWITHNON-KEYPUSHBUTTONS.

ASARESULTOFTHESECHANGESANDTHEGARDCOMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION, CONGESTED AREASOFTHELEFTFRONTSECTIONWILLBEREARRANGED TOPROVIDEBETTERSEPARATION OFFUNCTIONS ANDUTILIZATION OFMCBSPACE.THEDEVICESTOBERELOCATED ARE:THEEXISTINGSIBLOCK/NORMAL/UNBLOCK, AMSACSYSTEMRESET,BOTHMANUALCONTAINMENT SPRAYVENTISOLATION, DIESELGENERATOR ASTART/DIESELGENERATOR BSTART,BASTLO-LOLOCKOUTRESET,MANUALSI,MANUALCONTAINMENT ISOLATION ANDREACTOREMERGENCY TRIP.ALSO'HELEFTFRONTSECTIONOFTHEMAINCONTROLBOARD(MCB)WILLBEREARRANGED TOPROVIDEACONSISTENT PHYSICALRELATIONSHIP BETWEENVALVESTHATHAVEBOTHKEYANDCONTROLSWITCHES.

THEVALVESARE:MOV852AgMOV852BgMOV896AgMOV896BgANDMOV856'NORDERTOPROVIDETHESPACEONTHEMCB,THECONTAINMENT SPRAYCHARCOALFILTERDOUSEMOTOROPERATEDVALVECONTROLSWILLBERELOCATED TOBLANKAREAONTHELEFTFRONTBENCHBOARD.

THEYAREMOV-875A, MOV875BgMOV876AJANDMOV876B~

REVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATINGTOTHISMODIFICATION ARESEISMIC/FIRE,ANDLOSSOFPOWER.THEFIRSTEVENTANALYZEDISTHEEFFECTOFASEISMICEVENTONTHEPLANTDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.

THENEWSAFETYINJECTION (SI)BLOCK/NORMAL/UNBLOCK SELECTORSWITCHANDANYREPLACEDDEVICESWILLBEQUALIFIED TOMEETTHESTANDARDS SETFORTHBYIEEESTD.344-1975.

THEREFORE, THECONSEQUENCES OFAFAILUREDUETOASEISMICEVENTWILLBEMITIGATED.

THESECONDEVENTANALYZEDISTHEEFFECTOFAFIREONTHEPLANTDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.

THEREPLACEDORADDITIONAL AMOUNTOFCONTROLWIRINGNECESSARY FORTHISMODIFICATION ISMINIMALANDWILLBEREQUIREDTOMEETIEEESTD.383-1974, VERTICALFLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.

THEADDITIONAL FIRELOADINGISINSIGNIFICANT; THUS,THELIKELIHOOD ORTHESEVERITYOFFIRERESULTING WILLNOTINCREASED.

THETHIRDEVENTANALYZEDISTHEEFFECTOFLOSSOFPOWERTOTHESYSTEMS.THERISKOFLOSINGPOWERWILLNOTBEINCREASED BYTHISMODIFICATION SINCETHEADDITIONAL SIBLOCK/MANUAL/UNBLOCK SWITCHWILLBEINSTALLED TOPROVIDEASEPARATION OFTRAINSANDWILLOPERATEINTHESAMEMANNERUNDERVARIOUSPLANTCONDITIONS ASTHEORIGINALCONFIGURATION.

THEUFSARSECTIONREVIEWEDWAS7.1.2.TOPROVIDEBETTERSEPARATION OFTRAINS~THESZRESETSCONTAINMENT SPRAYRESETgCONTAINMENT ISOLATIONRESETgANDCONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION RESETPUSHBUTTONS WILLBEREWIREDTOESTABLISH INDIVIDUAL SWITCHSECTIONSSUPPLYING SIGNALTOEACHTRAIN.THESERESETSIGNALSDONOTAUTOMATICALLY STARTSYSTEMSTHEINITIATION OFASYSTEMZSASEPARATEOPERATION.

MANUALOPERATION OFEACHSYSTEMISALWAYSAVAILABLE.

REPLACING THECONTAINMENT ISOLATION RESETANDTHECONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION RESETKEYPUSHBUTTONS WITHNON-KEYPUSHBUTTONS WILLREQUIREACHANGETOTHEUFSAR'SECTION6.2.4.4.3.

THEORIGINALCONTROLCONFIGURATION OFTHECONTAINMENT ISOLATION ANDCONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION RESETSLOCKEDOUTSOMEAUTOMATIC ACTUATION SIGNALSONCETHEYWERERESET.EWR2950CORRECTED THATDEFICIENCY BYREMOVINGTHELOCKOUTRELAY.PRESENTLY THESYSTEMSCANNOTBERESETUNTILTHEINITIATING SIGNALHASCLEAREDMAKINGTHEPROCEDURE TOHAVEAKEYTORESETTHEMOBSOLETE.

ADDITIONAL UFSARSECTIONSREVIEWEDWERE6~2~4~4~2g6~2~4~4~4g73g7'3~92ANDTABLE7'-1.

SINCETHEREWILLBENOCHANGETOTHECONTROLORMODESOFOPERATION FORMOV852AiMOV852BgMOV875AgMOV875BgMOV876AiMOV876BgMOV-896A, MOV-896B, AMSACSYSTEMRESET,BOTHMANUALCONTAINMENT SPRAYVENTISOLATION, DIESELGENERATOR ASTART,DIESELGENERATOR BSTARTSBASTLOLOLOCKOUTRESETSMANUALSZiMANUALCONTAINMENT ISOLATION ANDREACTOREMERGENCY TRIPTHEREWILLBENOINCREASED RISKDUETOALOSSOFPOWER.ITEMSABOVEENSURETHATTHISMODIFICATION DOESNOTDEGRADETHECAPABILITY OFANYSAFETYSYSTEMTOPERFORMITSFUNCTION.

THEASSUMPTIONS ANDCONCLUSIONS OFEXISTINGANALYSESAREUNCHANGED.

NONEWTYPESOFEVENTSAREPOSTULATED.

THEREFORE, ITHASBEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACY, OFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMSiANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGINNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

/~5~56PESIERZNSTIONTHISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEREMOVALOFEXISTINGPRESSURIZER INSULATION ANDREPLACEMENT WITHREMOVABLE TYPEREFLECTIVE INSULATION TOFACILITATE VISUALEXAMINATION OFTHEPRESSURIZER WELDS.THEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWASREVISEDTOINCORPORATE PLANTCOMMENTS, FORREVISION0ANDTHEFOLLOWING ADDITIONAL CHANGES:SECTION1.3.3OFDESIGNCRITERIAADDEDREFERENCE TOTECH.SPEC.SECTION3.1.1.5REQUIREMENT OF100KWMIN.HEATERCAPACITYFOROPERATION ABOVE350oFSECTION2.10.4ADDEDWORKSHEET SCA-2TOREFERENCES.

SECTION5'OFDESIGNCRITERIACLASSIFIED ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS TOPRESSURIZER HEATERSASSAFETYSIGNIFICANT.

T' SECTION15.2WASADDEDTOTHEDESIGNCRITERIAHYDRAULIC REQUIREMENTS ASFOLLOWS:THEDESIGNOFTHEINSULATXON SHOULDCONSIDERCLOGGINGOFCONTAINMENT SUMPWHICHSHOULDNOTBEBLOCKEDBYDEBRISOFINSULATION FOLLOWING ALOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT.

SECTION17.0WASCHANGEDFROMN/ATOTHEFOLLOWING:

17.0ELECTRXCAL REURENTSPRESSURIZER HEATERELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS SHALLNOTBEDEGRADEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.

NON-FUNCTIONAL PRESSURIZER HEATERSSHALLBECONSIDERED FORRESTORATION TOSERVICEINACCORDANCE WITHUFSARREQUIREMENTS.

SECTION3.1OFSAFETYANALYSISADDEDLOCATOTHEDESXGNBASISEVENTSASSOCIATED WITHTHISWORK.SECTION3.2.3OFTHESAFETYANALYSISADDEDASFOLLOWS:3.2.3THEEFFECTSOFLOCAHAVEBEENADDRESSED INSECTION15.2OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.

ASDESCRIBED INTHEDESIGNCRITERIATHEINSULATION SHALLBEDESIGNEDSUCHTHATTHECONTAINMENT SUMPWILLNOTBECLOGGEDBYDEBRISOFINSULATION FOLLOWING ALOCAEVENT.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFTHEDESIGNBASISEVENTSTODETERMINE THOSERELATEDTOTHEMODIFICATION.

THEEVENTSASSOCIATED WITHTHISWORKARE:1)FIRES2)SEISMICEVENTS3)LOCATHEMODIFICATION WILLNOTINCREASETHEPROBABILITY OFTHEEFFECTSOFFIRESINCEEXISTINGFXREBARRIERSWILLNOTBEDEGRADEDANDTHEMATERIALS USEDINTHEMODIFICATXON SHALLNOTINCREASETHEPROBABILITY ORCONSEQUENCE OFAFIREANDWILLNOTAFFECTTHEPERFORMANCE OFANYEXXSTINGFIREPROTECTION EQUIPMENT.

INADDITION, THEMODIFICATION WILLBEREVXEWEDAGAINSTTHEASSUMPTIONS OF10CFR50APPENDIXR.DEVIATIONS WILLBEANALYZEDTOASSURECONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITHAPPENDIXR.THEREFORE, THEMODIFICATIONS WILLNOTSIGNIFICANTLY ALTERTHEAREAFIRELOADING'HE SOURCESOFFIREINITIATION'OR THEACCEPTABILITY OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFAFIRE.

MODIFICATION WILLNOTADVERSELY AFFECTTHESEISMICQUALIFICATION

'OFTHEPRESSURIZER, ITSASSOCIATED PIPING'RTHEREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM.SINCETHEINSULATION ASSEMBLYSHALLBEDESIGNEDTOWITHSTAND DYNAMICEFFECTSANDACCELERATIONS DUETOSEISMICANDSYSTEMOPERATIONAL TRANSIENTS.

THISSHALLINCLUDEAREVIEWOFTHEEXISTINGPIPINGANALYSISANDASSOCIATED SUPPORTSFORANYEFFECTSTHATTHECHANGEININSULATION WEIGHTMAYHAVEONTHEANALYSIS'HE MODIFICATION WILLNOTADVERSELY AFFECTTHEEFFECTSOFLOCABECAUSETHEINSULATION SHALLBEDESIGNEDSUCHTHATTHECONTAINMENT SUMPWILLNOTBECLOGGEDBYDEBRISOFINSULATION FOLLOWING ALOCAEVENT.BASEDONTHEABOVEANALYSIS:

1)THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATION ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCEDDUETOTHISMODIFICATION 2)THESTRUCTURES gSYSTEMSgANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS CONTINUETOREMAINADEQUATE.

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGINNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ZTHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACY, OFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-5162INSTLBALANCEDMAGNETICSWZTCSTHISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEINSTALLATION OFBALANCEDMAGNETICSWITCHES(BMS)ONDOORSS54ANDS55~AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNAUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYTHEUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE:1)SEISMICEVENT2)MAJORANDMINORFIRES3)INDUSTRIAL SECURITYTHISMODIFICATION DOESNOTINSTALLANYNEWORMODIFYANYEXISTINGEQUIPMENT NECESSARY FORTHESAFESHUTDOWNOFTHEPLANT.NEWEQUIPMENT WILLNOTBELOCATEDINANYAREATHATCONTAINSSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT.

THEMODIFICATION IS,THEREFORE, DESIGNEDASNON-SEISMIC.

~fV'W THISMODIFICATION INVOLVESTHEINSTALLATION OFEQUIPMENT INAGINNAFIREAREA.ANAPPENDIXREVALUATION IS,THEREFORE, REQUIRED'HE INSTALLATION OFADDITIONAL BMSDOESNOTEFFECTSECURITYOPERATIONS ANDPROVIDESGREATERPROTECTION TOTHEVITALAREA.ITEMSABOVEENSURETHATTHISMODIFICATION DOESNOTDEGRADETHECAPABILITY OFANYSAFETYSYSTEMTOPERFORMITSFUNCTION.

THEASSUMPTIONS ANDCONCLUSIONS OFEXISTINGANALYSESAREUNCHANGED.

NONEWTYPESOFEVENTSAREPOSTULATED.

THEREFORE, ITHASBEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGINNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THAT'THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED.

THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

Qgk-5340GTSTP-TRANSFOMOFCONSTHISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THECOOLERSONTHEGENERATOR STEP-UPTRANSFORMER (GSU)ATGINNAWHICHAREOILTOAIRHEATEXCHANGERS DESIGNEDTOREMOVEHEATFROMTHEINTERIOROFTHETRANSFORMER.

HEATISGENERATED BYCOREANDWINDINGMATERIALS USEDFORCONSTRUCTION OFTHETRANSFORMER.

THEREAREELEVEN(11)COOLERSONTHETRANSFORMER WITHEACHCOOLERCONSISTING OFTHREE(3)FANSANDONE(1)OILPUMP.THEFANSANDPUMPSAREDRIVENBY440VOLT,3PHASEELECTRICMOTORS.THEINSULATION ONTHEWIRINGSUPPLYING POWERTOTHESEFANSANDPUMPSHASDETERIORATED ANDWILLBEREPLACEDWITHNEWWIRING.DETERIORATION OFTHEINSULATION HASBEENCAUSEDBYHEATGENERATED BYTHEGSU.ASTUDYHASINDICATED THATCIRCUITBREAKERSFORPROTECTION OFCOOLERMOTORSANDSUPPLYSOURCESTOTHECOOLERGROUPSWILLOPERATESIMULTANEOUSLY FORAFAULTONASINGLECOOLERMOTOR.THISACTIONRESULTSINLOSSOFPOWERTO504OFTHECOOLERSONTHEGSUCIRCUITBREAKERSPROVIDING PROTECTION FOREACHCOOLERANDCIRCUITBREAKERSPROVIDING PROTECTION FOR5AND6COOLERGROUPS.WILLBEREPLACEDWITHPROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT THATWILLPROVIDETHEPROPERCOORDINATION.

INSPECTION PFWIRINGUSEDTOEXTENDCURRENTTRANSFORMER SECONDARY WIRINGTOTHECONTROLCABINETHASREVEALEDDETERIORATION OFTHEINSULATION FORTHISWIRING.THISWIRINGLOCATEDINARACEWAYBETWEENTHECONTROLCABINETANDCURRENTTRANSFORMER JUNCTIONBOXfWILLBEREPLACEDWITHNEWWIRING.DETERIORATION OFTHEINSULATION HASBEENCAUSEDBYHEATGENERATED BYTHEGSU.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARiCHAPTER8'ELECTRICALi CHAPTER3'DES1GNOFSTRUCTURES, SECTION3.1ANDCHAPTER9-AUXILIARY SYSTEMSiSECTION9.5.1-FIREPROTECTION SYSTEMS.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARELOSSOFEXTERNALELECTRICAL LOAD,LOSSOFOFFSITEPOWER,FIRES,ANDSEISMICEVENTS.LOSSOFOFFSITEPOWERISREVIEWEDASFOLLOWS:WORKONCIRCUITS751AND767,BOTHSOURCESOFOFFSITEPOWER,WILLNOTBEREQUIREDASPARTOFTHISMODIFICATION.

INADDITION, WORKONTRANSFORMERS 12AAND12BWILLNOTBEREQUIREDASPARTOFTHISMODIFICATION.

THEWORKONTHEGSUCOOLERSWILLBESCHEDULED AROUNDOUTAGESOFTHEDIESELGENERATORS ATGINNA.THEGSUISABACKUPSOURCEOFPOWERFORTHEDIESELGENERATORS.

THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTINCREASETHEPROBABILITY OFLOSSOFOFFSITEPOWERLOSSOFEXTERNALELECTRICAL LOADEVENTSAREREVIEWEDASFOLLOWS:THISMODIFICATION WILLBEPERFORMED DURINGTHE1991GINNAREFUELING OUTAGEWHENGINNAISOFF-LINE.

THISMODIFICATION, AFTERCOMPLETION, WILLNOTINCREASETHEPROBABILITY OFALOSSOFEXTERNALELECTRICAL LOAD.SEISMICEVENTSAREREVIEWEDASFOLLOWS:THEGSUISNOTNEEDEDFORSAFESHUTDOWNDURINGORAFTERASEISMICEVENT.FIRES.AREREVIEWEDASFOLLOWS:THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTINVOLVEWIRINGASSOCIATED WITHTHEGSUFIREPROTECTION SYSTEMORFIREBARRIERSANAPPENDIXRCONFORMANCE VERIFICATION WILLBEPERFORMED TODEMONSTRATE CONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITHAPPENDIXRREQUIREMENTS.

THEREFORE, THISMODIFICATION HASNOEFFECTONFIRESATGINNA.

4 FOREgTHEMARGINSOFSAFETY DURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMSi ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCXDENTS ANDTHEMXTIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGINNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATZONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ZTHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATXON OFTHISMODIFICATION.

TSR90-186SPRNKLERHEADEATCOLLECTOR XNSTALLAT ONTHISTECHNICAL STAFFREQUEST(TSR)ADDRESSES THEADDITIONOFHEATCOLLECTORS TOSHIELDTHESPRINKLER HEADSLOCATEDINTHEAREAOFTHEGRATINGAROUNDTHECONDENSATE STORAGETANKSINTHESERVICEBUILDING.

THEFUNCTXONOFTHEHEATCOLLECTORS ISTOSHIELDTHESPRINKLER HEADSFROMPOSSIBLESOURCESOFCOOLINGFROMABOVETHEGRATING.THEHEATCOLLECTORS WILLACTTOTRAPHEATINTHEINSTANCEOFAFIREANDWILLCAUSETHESPRINKLER TOCONTINUETODISCHARGE EFFECTIVELY INTHEEVENTOFAFIRE.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEUFSARANDZNTABLES1AND2OFPROCEDURE A-303ASWELLASTHOSEREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUXDE1.70.THEEVENTRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ISAFIRE.THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTALTERASSUMPTIONS INANYSAFETYANALYSISINTHEUFSARANDITSSUPPLEMENTS ANDWILLNOTADVERSELY AFFECTTHEWAYINWHICHTHEFIREPROTECTION SYSTEMFUNCTIONS.

ZTWILLPROVIDEAMEANSTOENSURETHATTHEAPPLICABLE SPRINKLER HEADSWILLOPERATEXNTHEMANNERORIGINALLY DESIGNEDFOR.THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE OFAFIREINTHISAREAWILLNOTBEAFFECTEDBYTHISMODIFICATION BECAUSETHEFUNCTIONOFTHEFXREPROTECTION SYSTEMWILLNOTBEALTEREDASTHEMODIFICATION INCORPORATES NOCOMBUSTIBLE MATERIALS.

ANYCONSEQUENCES OFAFIREWILLREMAINTHESAMEANDTHISMODZFXCATION WILLHAVENOADDITIONAL EFFECTONTHOSECONSEQUENCES.

ALLEXISTINGFIREPROTECTION FEATURESREQUIREDTOASSURECOMPLIANCE WITH10CFR50iAPPENDIXRiORTOMAINTAINEQUIVALENT LEVELSOFPROTECTION FROMFIRESWILLNOTBEALTEREDDURINGANDFOLLOWING IMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

Ai~I0 THUS/THISMODIFICATION NEITHERINCREASES THECONSEQUENCES, NORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFORFIREPROTECTXON FEATURES.

THEINSTALLATION OFHEATCOLLECTORS ISANINSIGNIFICANT ADDITIONTOANEXXSTINGSYSTEMTHATWILLIMPROVETHEABILITYOFTHESYSTEMTOFUNCTIONPROPERLY.

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGINNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATXONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED'T HASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURESg SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITXGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

NSTRUMENAZRISOLATION VALVEADDITIONTHISTSR(TECHNICAL STAFFREQUEST)ADDRESSES MODIFICATION OFTHEEXISTINGINSTRUMENT AIRLINEBYINSTALLING AMANUALVALVEWHICHWILLPROVIDEISOLATION CAPABILITY TOEACHTURBINEBUILDINGHEADER.INADDITION, FITTINGSWILLBEADDEDTOALLOWTHEWORKAREATOBEJUMPEREDDURINGINSTALLATION SOTHATTHEINSTRUMENT AIRSERVICEWILLNOTBECOMPLETELY INTERRUPTED.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70ANDGINNAPROCEDURE A-303.THEDESIGNBASISEVENTSTHATAREAPPLICABLE TOTHISMODIFICATION ARE:LOSSOFALLACPOWERTOTHESTATIONAUXILIARIES LOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATER FLOWINCREASEINHEATREMOVALBYTHESECONDARY SYSTEMWHILETHEINSTRUMENT AIRSYSTEMISCLASSIFIED ASNON-SAFETY RELATED,XTCONTROLSSAFETYANDNON-SAFETY RELATEDAOVs.THEVALVESCONTROLLED FAILTOASAFEPOSITION, PROVIDING ASSURANCE AGAINSTLOSSOFFEEDWATER FLOWAND/ORINCREASEINHEATREMOVALBYTHESECONDARY SYSTEM.THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTIMPACTTHEFUNCTIONOFTHEINSTRUMENT AIRSYSTEMBYINSTALLING THENEWVALVEANDFITTINGSCONSISTENT WITHTHESYSTEMDESIGNSPECIFICATIONS, THEREWILLBENOIMPACTONSYSTEMFUNCTIONS DURINGNORMALORACCIDENTCONDITIONS.

THEREFORE'LANT RESPONSETOANYDESIGNBASISACCIDENTWILLREMAINUNCHANGED.

THUS,THEMODIFICATION NEITHERINCREASES THECONSEQUENCES~

NORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINOFSAFETYFORINTERNALEVENTSINVOLVING:

LOSSOFALLACPOWERTOTHESTATXONAUXILIARIES LOSSOF,NORMALFEEDWATER FLOWINCENSEINHEATREMOVALBYTHESECONDARY SYSTEM BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFPROCEDURE A-303ANDGINNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATWITHNOEFFECTONEITHERINSTRUMENT AIRORANYSAFETYSYSTEMiTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

SECTIONB-COMPLETED STATIONMODIFICATIONS (SMS)Thissectioncontainsadescription ofstationmodification procedures performed inthefacilityasdescribed inthesafetyanalysisreport.Stationmodification procedures arewrittentocompleteaportionofanEngineering WorkRequest(EWR)orTechnical StaffRequest(TSR)identified bythesameparentnumber.StationModifications arereviewedbythePlantOperations ReviewCommittee toensurethatnounreviewed safetyquestions orTechnical Specification changesareinvolvedwiththeprocedure.

Thebasisforinclusion ofanSMinthissectionisclosureoftheSMwhereportionsoftheparentEWRorTSR,intheformofotherSMsorotherdocumentation, remaintobecompleted.

THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWPERMANENT PIPESUPPORTSADDEDTOTHE3/4"DISUPPLYLINEAND3/4"SERVICEAIRSUPPLY.LINETOTHEAUXILIARY BUILDINGOPERATING FLOOR.OUS0SS0TANTNSTOTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFA21/2INCHDIAMETERLINEWITHAPPROPRIATE VALVINGFROMTHEDISCHARGE OFTHEAANDBREGENERATION SLUICEPUMPSTOTHEDISCHARGE OFTHECONDENSATE TRANSFERPUMPUPSTREAMOFCHECKVALVE9505G.S--20USTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHISMODIFICATION WHICHINVOLVESANUPGRADETOANEXISTINGCONDUITSUPPORTFORTHEAUXILIARY BUILDINGEXHAUSTFANBANDALLOWREMOVALOFTHESUPPORTWHENMAINTENANCE ISREQUIREDONTHEFAN.THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFSICHECKVALVE1828TESTCONNECTION.

S-250.7CCCESTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEELECTRICAL ACCEPTANCE TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFTHECONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE EXHAUSTSYSTEMATPENETRATION 132ANDTHESTATUSLIGHTSFORV5869,V5879,ANDV5392.S-250GSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHECONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE SYSTEM.W0INCOSW-0SERVCTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFPIPESUPPORTMODIFICATIONS TOTHESERVICEWATERLINEFORMINGSUCTIONANDSUCTIONCROSS-TIE FEEDTOTHE"D"SAFWPUMPNOTPREVIOUSLY COMPLETED UNDERSM-2512.127.

A10CFR50.59 REVIEW WASCONDUCTED ANDBASEDONAREVXEWOFTECH.SPECS.DESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

S-14SEZCUPGIPESUPOTS-OR0FEEDWATER SUPPORSFWU-7FWU-ONANALYSISI-3THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEISTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFMODIFICATIONS TOPIPESUPPORTSFWU-37ANDFWU-41ONMAINFEEDWATER PIPING.0SWTES0500>>VWTAUIBULDING-ANSSNW-00THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFSUPPORTSWU-153FORTHE20"SERVICEWATERLINEINTHEAUXILIARY BUILDINGATELEVATION 265'-3>>.WSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFVALVEf4644SEXSMZCSUPPORTINACCORDANCE WITHNCR91-060.S-355.OOTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGAND,TURNOVER OFTHEMODIFICATIONS MADETOTHECONTROLROOMVENTILATION SYSTEMANDVENTILATION MONITORS.

-35THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTUBINGPROTECTION ONTHEFLOORBETWEENTHEINSTRUMENT PANELSANDDIESELGENERATOR SKIDSFORTHEAANDBDIESELGENERATORS'HE HJRPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEMECHANICAL UPGRADEANDTURNOVEROFTHEAIRSTARTSYSTEMFORTHE"B"DIESELGENERATOR.

ENGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFD/G"A"AIRSTARTSYSTEMUPGRADE.THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHED/G"B"AIRSTARTSYSTEMUPGRADE.THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE XSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFGUARDRAILS AROUNDTHEDAYTANKLEVELTRANSMITTERS ANDINSTRUMENT TUBXNGFORTHEAANDBDXESELGENERATORS.

XNSLLAIONOFPULLPOINTSFORTHGSUTRANSFORMER REPLACTHELIAISONENGINEERPRESENTED THISPROCEDURE FORFINALCLOSEOUTANDDELETION.

THISWORKWASCOMPLETED IN1986ANDTHEPROCEDURE SUBSEQUENTLY LOST.AWALKDOWNOFTHECONSTRUCTION WASRECENTLYPERFORMED BYALIAISONENGINEERANDANESDENGINEERTOVERIFYPROPERXNSTALLATION.

SSTE0UL00N0THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION iTESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFMODIFICATIONS TOTHEMRPISYSTEMTOPROVIDEMONITORING FORSYSTEMFAULTSS0CANTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE, ISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHESIRECIRCSYSTEM.SSTRE-THELIAISONENGINEERPRESENTED THISPCNTOTHECOMMITTEE.

ITREQUESTED CHANGESBEMADETORE-PERFORM SIFULLFLOWVERIFICATION TEST.THEPURPOSEOFTHXSPROCEDURE XSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEBORICACIDSTORAGETANK(S)OVERFLOWPIPINGMODIFICATION.

GUGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFSAFETYINJECTION RECIRCUZATION PRESSUREGAUGES(PI912i913i914iAND915)RELOCATION ANDVALVE874BREPLACEMENT.

S-3ULDNGG0FCONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHERELOCATION/INSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFTHEBELOWGRADEROOFDRAINS,BELOWGRADEFIRESERVICEWATERLZNEiBELOWGRADEOUTDOORGROUNDING'ND ALTERNATE COOINGWATERSUPPLYSTUB-UPSADJACENTTOTHEDIESELGENERATOR BUILDINGALSOINCLUDEDARETHECIVILWORKSTHROUGHANDINCLUDING EXCAVATION, FOOTERS,STEMWALLS,GRADEBEAMSiBACKFILL(ASREQUIRED)

ANDMISCELLANEOUS APPURTENANCES.

THISPROCEDURE GENERICALLY COMPLETES THEBELOWGRADEANDFOUNDATION ERECTIONITEMSPREVIOUSLY COMMENCED iUNDERSM-3990'.DSG0BULDG-0C0STHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEDIESELGENERATOR BUILDINGPARAPETSANDWALLS.C00IONLDTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, ANDTURNOVEROFTHED/GBUILDINGROOFSLAB,INCLUDING MUFFLERPIPINGREWORKSHVACCOMPONENTS'OOF DRAINSANDSTRUCT(JRAL STEELCOMPONENTS THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFSPRINKLER SYSTEMSADDITIONS INTHEDIESELGENERATOR BUILDING.

THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFTHEFIRESERVICEYARDLOOPFORNEWTRAILERS.

00PURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFADDITIONAL LIGHTINGFIXTURESLOCATEDINTHEPERSONNEL DOORALCOVES.S-068.8ONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOPROVIDEINSTRUCTION FORTHEREPLACEMENT OFTHEDETECTORPMWHPMODULEINTHERMSAREAMONITORS.

S-6J0RAD0OVT0THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEELECTRICAL PORTIONOFTHENEWR-15,AIREJECTORRADIATION MONITORDETECTORMODIFICATION.

C0ICZONS000THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEELECTRICAL PORTIONOFTHENEWR-16,CONTAINMENT FANCOOLZNGRADIATION MONITORDETECTORMODIFICATION.

S-400THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEELECTRICAL PORTIONOFTHENEWR-17,COMPONENT COOLINGWATERRADIATION MONITORDETECTORMODIFICATION.

S-60-CZCOVATHEHJRPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEMECHANICAL PORTIONOFTHENEWR-18,WASTELIQUIDRADIATION MONITORDETECTORMODIFICATION.

ALSO,THEWESTINGHOUSE EXPERIMENTAL Ge(Li)LIQUIDWASTEDETECTOR(LOCATEDJUSTSOUTHOFTHEEXISTINGR-18)WILLBEREMOVED.DRADI0EMOVALSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEELECTRICAL PORTIONOFTHENEWR-18,WASTELIQUIDRADIATION MONITORDETECTORMODIFICATION.

TOSEOV0MOXTORDEEOR-THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEELECTRICAL PORTXONOFTHENEWR-19'TEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWNRADIATION MONITORDETECTORMODIFICATION.

-20ASPENTFUEPOOTGE""SERVCEWATERRADIATION CCREOVALSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEMECHANICAL PORTIONOFTHENEWR-20A,SPENTFUELPOOLHEATEXCHANGER "A"SERVICEWATERRADXATZON MONITORDETECTORMODIFICATION.

S-06GtltlWOVTHEKJRPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEELECTRICAL PORTIONOFTHENEWR-20A,SPENTFUELPOOLHEATEXCHANGER ttA"SERVICEWATERRADIATION MONITORDETECTORMODIFICATION S-6THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEELECTRICAL MODIFICATIONS TORMS-1ANDRMS-3CABINETS.THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEFUNCTIONAL TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFR-15,AIREJECTORRADIATION MONITOR.THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEFUNCTIONAL TESTXNGANDTURNOVER'OF R-16,CONTAINMENT FANCOOLINGRADZATXON MONITOR.THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEFUNCTIONAL TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFR-17,COMPONENT COOLINGWATERRADZATZON MONITOR.1

THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISFORR-18FUNCTIONAL TEST.ONSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEFUNCTIONAL TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFR-19,STEAMGENERATOR BLOWDOWNRADIATION MONITOR.S-08.OATSTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEFUNCTIONAL TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFR-20A,SFPHEATEXCHANGER ARADIATION MONITORR-20IOTESTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEFUNCTIONAL TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFR-20B,SFPHEATEXCHANGER BPROCESSMONITOR.0GTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFNEWLIGHTINGFIXTURESONTHEAUXILIARY BUILDINGOPERATING LEVELS-4THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFSTEAMGENERATOR LEVELINSTRUMENTATION TUBINGSUPPORTSASSOCIATED WITHLT-460ANDLT-460A.EOttff0TUNGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTODOCUMENT/DIRECT REWORKOFLT-472TUBINGANDSUPPORTS' EGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONS TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFSTEAMGENERATOR LEVELINSTRUMENTATION TUBINGANDRE{}UIRED SUPPORTS.

ASSOCIATED WITHWIDERANGE 11 TRANSMITTEEK LT-470iINTHE"B"SS00THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION/

TESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFPERMANENT ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS BETWEENTRANSMITTERS PZT-510/511 ANDPPCSMUXCABINET1,TOINCLUDEALLCABLEiCONDUITANDSUPPORTS'ONNECTIONS ANDMODULEINSTALLATION INFOXBORORACK$3.RTN0TANCONTROL00THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHERETENTION TANKpHCONTROLDRAINTRENCHMODIFICATION.

INSTESTINGOF00DCES'7HEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFAMPTECTOR OVERCURRENT DEVICESFORTHEDB-25,DB-50,ANDDB-75WESTINGHOUSE BREAKERS.

NSTTNTESTIGOFCAS0S80VBREKERSONBUSBUS1THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTODIRECTINSTALLATION'ND TESTINGOFLOCALPUSHBUTTONS.

STIONCAZON3ANUONFOTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOVERIFYTHEINSTALLATION ANDTOPERFORMTESTINGOFLOCALPUSHBUTTONS FORLISTEDBREAKERSONBUSES13AND15.S-4THEPUNG'OSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFANAMPTECTOR OVERCUEKENT DEVICEFORTHEDB-25WESTINGHOUSE BREAKERONBUS13,POSITION7D(GENERATOR TRANSFORMER AUX.POWERSUPPLY1A)EMPLOYING ANAMPTECTOR FROMKIT48184A50G08.

f,-t,I THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONi TESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFANAMPTECTOR OVERCURRENT DEVICEFORTHEDB-25WESTINGHOUSE BREAKERONBUS15,'POSITION 3D(GENERATOR TRANSFORMER AUX.POWERSUPPLY1B)EMPLOYING ANAMPTECTOR FROMKIT48184A50G08.

SBEATHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONS TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFANAMPTECTOR KIT,APPLIEDTOASPAREBREAKERSUITEDFORTHESUPPLYOFTHE"C"SIPUMPFROMEITHERBUS14ORBUS16.SGWDOWNVLVEINDICATIONS REWO-NCG8-70THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEREWORK,TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEAANDBS/GBLOWDOWNMANUALFLOWCONTROLVALVESFCV-5725A ANDFCV-5725B VALVEPOSITIONINDICATION LIGHTSONTHES/GBLOWDOWNPANEL.DG0SSTEPUMPINGS0TIONELECTRICTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOINSTALLTHEELECTRICAL PORTIONOFTHED/GFUELOILSYSTEMPUMPSTATIONINSTRUMENTATION.

THECOMMITTEE REVIEWEDANDRECOMMENDED APPROVALOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE THEFOLLOWING DOCUMENTATION ISPROVIDEDASJUSTIFICATION FORCOMPLIANCE WITH10CFR50.59.

REFERENCES:

UFSAR,TECH.SPECS.JUSTIFICATION:

THISMODIFICATION ISADDEDTOGIVEANINDICATION OFTRANSFERPUMPDISCHARGE PRESSUREANDSUCTIONSTRAINERDP.THOSEPORTIONSAFFECTING SAFETYSYSTEMSAREQUALIFIED, OTHERPORTIONSDONOTAFFECTPLANTSAFETYIAUTOTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFTHEELECTRICAL PORTIONOFTHEDAYTANKINSTRUMENTATION UPGRADEPHASE2ONTHE1ADIESELGENERATOR.

INADDITION, THISPROCEDURE WILLPROVIDEINSTRUCTION FORFILLANDBYPASSSOLENOIDVALVEDETERM/RETERM ANDMODIFICATION OFFUELTRANSFERPUMPSTARTCIRCUIT.S-6.0Y IIP THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE XSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFTHEELECTRICAL PORTIONOFTHEDAYTANK.INSTRUMENTATION UPGRADEPHASE2ONTHE1BDIESELGENERATOR.

INADDITION, THISPROCEDURE WILLPROVIDEINSTRUCTION FORFXLLANDBYPASSSOLENOIDVALVEDETERM/RETERM ANDMODIFICATION OFFUELTRANSFERPUMPSTARTCIRCUIT.S0SYSTEUPCL0CTINTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFTHEELECTRICAL PORTIONOFTHE"A"DIESELGENERATOR ZNSTRUMENTATZON UPGRADE,INCLUDING THEFOLLOWING:

DAYTANKFILL/RECIRC SOLENOIDVALVEWIRING,FUELOILTRANSFERPUMPDISCHARGE PRESSURETRANSMITTER, FUELOILTRANSFERSTRAINERD/PTRANSMITTER, DAYTANKLEVELTRANSMITTER.

DGtttt0SSTEUPGRADEP3CMOICATONSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHECOMPLETION OFTHEINSTALLATION OFTHEELECTRICAL'PORTION OFTHE"B,"DXESELGENERATOR INSTRUMENTATION UPGRADE,INCLUDING THEFOLLOWING DAYTANKFILL/RECIRC SOLENOIDVALVEWIRING,FUELOILTRANSFERPUMPDISCHARGE PRESSURETRANSMITTER, FUELOILTRANSFERSTRAINERD/PTRANSMITTER, DAYTANKLEVELTRANSMITTER TEUGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHE"A"DIESELGENERATOR FUELOILSYSTEMELECTRICAL ANDMECHANICAL UPGRADE.S-6.0SEUPGDTHEPUNG'OSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGgANDTURNOVEROFTHE"B"DIESELGENERATOR FUELOILSYSTEMELECTRICAL ANDMECHANXCAL UPGRADE.DPWTHEPURPOSEOFTHXSPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEMAINFEEDPUMPROOMDAMPERWINDSCREENSANDWALLHYDRANTEXTENSIONS

~THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEMAINFEEDPUMPROOMWINDOWREPLACEMENT.

TSTA0THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEnAnCOMPONENT COOLINGWATERHEATEXCHANGER TESTINSTRUMENTATION INSTALLATION.

nAnRCSOTFLOWORRECTZULZGWNSTRTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGASSOCIATED WITHFIELDDATAVERIFICATION OFTHEnAnRCSHOTLEGLOOPLEVELCORRECTION ASARESULTOFRHRFLOW.THISTESTISBEINGPERFORMED INCONJUNCTION WITHPROCEDURE 0-2.31.Sl:.3"VALVERESSURERELEIGSSGDETHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHREENEWSEISMICSUPPORTSONTHERHR-300BYPASSLINESnnSUMSCGEC0ISALLAZONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFTHEANNUBARINTHEnAnSFPPUMPDISCHARGE LINE.S0ES0ECT0SV2-CVCSCHARGNGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFHYDROTESTCONNECTIONS FORCVCSCHARGINGLINEVENTVALVE2209ANDDRAINVALVE2205THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFTHEMODIFICATION TOINSTALLAKEYSWITCHFORCONTROLPOWERTOMOV856.THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGOFCONTROLPOWERKEYSWITCHFORMOV856' IgC THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTINGiANDTURNOVEROFTHEREACTORCOOLANTDRAINTANKPUMPACONTROLSWITCH.THESWITCHISTOBERELOCATED FROMTHEMCBCENTERSECTIONTOTHELEFTSECTION.S-770OR00BCONTROSWZTCTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFTHEREACTORCOOLANTDRAINTANKPUMPBCONTROLSWITCH.THESWITCHISTOBERELOCATED FROMTHEMCBCENTERSECTIONTOTHELEFTSECTIONSM-4773.7 LOONOFCONMEDPONASWITCHESTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFTHECONTAINMENT ANDPLANTEVACUATION ALARMSWITCHES.

THESWITCHESARETOBERELOCATED FROMTHEMCBFRONTLEFTSECTIONTOTHELEFTSIDEOFTHEMCB.SM-4773.8 0OT0RAC0FI0THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFTHEMODIFICATION TOTHEREACTORPROTECTION RACKR2iPLPRACKiANDSDRACKPROJECTSPERSONNEL WILLREMOVE/INSTALL/SPLICE CABLEWHILEI&CPERSONNEL WILLREMOVEOLDFOXBOROMODULESANDINSTALLNEWISOLATION AMPLIFIERS WITHASSOCIATED WIRING.SM-4773.9 REA0OT0CKWMC0THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFTHEMODIFICATION TOTHEREACTORPROTECTION RACKW2,PLPRACK,ANDSDRACK.PROJECTSPERSONNEL WILLREMOVE/INSTALL/SPLICE CABLE'HILE I&CPERSONNEL WILLREMOVEOLDFOXBOROMODULESANDINSTALLNEWZSOLATZON AMPLIFIERS WITHASSOCIATED WIRING.S-77THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFTHEMODIFICATION TOTHEREACTORPROTECTION RACKY2,PLPRACK,ANDSDRACK.PROJECTSPERSONNEL WILLREMOVE/INSTALL/SPLICE CABLEWHILEI&CPERSONNEL WILLREMOVEOLDFOXBOROMODULESANDINSTALLNEWISOLATION AMPLIFIERS WITHASSOCIATED WIRING.

IL11,'W~'<

THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE XSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFCONDUITANDCABLESFORTHES/GAINSTRUMENTATION PORTIONOFTHEADFCSMODIFICATION.

THISNEWINSTRUMENTATION ISFT498tLT460'T504ANDLT505'NTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFCONDUIT,ANDCABLESFORTHES/GAINSTRUMENTATION PORTIONOF.THEADFCSMODIFICATION.

THISNEWINSTRUMENTATION ISFT-499,LT-470,LT-506ANDLT-507.CVAFODCTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE XSTOCONTROLTHEDISCONNECTION ANDTURNOVEROFCABLEANDCOMPUTERTAPSNOLONGERREQUIREDDUETOTHEADFCSMODIFICATION.

RVLMSRACK1CABLEXNSTALLATZO FORSGWIDERANGELEVENSONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFCONDUXTANDCABLESFORTHEWIDERANGES/GLEVELINSTRUMENTATION PORTIONOFTHEADFCSMODIFICATION.

THISNEWINSTRUMENTATION WILLBELOCATEDINTHERVLMSRACK1.RVLMSRAC2BLEINSTALLATXO FOSGWIDERANGELEVELTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFCONDUITANDCABLESFORTHEWIDERANGES/GLEVELINSTRUMENTATION PORTIONOFTHEADFCSMODIFICATION.

THISNEWINSTRUMENTATION WILLBELOCATEDINTHERVLMSRACK2~OVSO0THEPURPOSEOFTHXSPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEREMOVAL,TESTINGiANDTURNOVEROFTHEFEEDWATER ISOLATION RESETPUSHBUTTONS ANDASSOCIATED WIRING.THEABANDONED HOLESSHALLBEUTILIZEDBYEWR-5025.00ANDVTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALIATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFTHEMSIV1AANDMSIV1BCONTROLSWITCHES.

THESWITCHESARETOBERELOCATED FROMTHEMCBLEFTSECTIONTOTHECENTERSECTION.

BIST0CTOTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEMCBANNUNCIATOR ANDBISTABLESTATUSLIGHTMODIFICATIONS FORADFCS.THES/GLOWLEVELCOINCIDENT WITHSTEAMFLOW/FEED FLOWMISMATCHTRIPWILLBEREMOVEDFROMTHERXTRIPLOGICALONGWITHASSOCIATED ALARMS.SM-4773.21 DIATEBUGLECWTDSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFCONDUITFORTHENEWFEEDWATER ANDSTEAMFLOWINSTRUMENTATION PORTIONOFTHEADFCSMODIFICATION.

UUGLECEWAPSSINSTTATIOTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFCONDUITANDCABLESFORTHENEWFEEDWATER PRESSUREINSTRUMENTATION PORTIONOFTHEADFCSMODIFICATION.

VOSC0THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFTHEMFWI/PTRANSDUCER ANDVALVEPOSITIONINDICATION CABLEMODIFICATION.

SM-7BEGULAINGVBST0REPLACEMENT THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFBAILEYVALVEPOSITIONERS FORTHEMFWREGULATING VALVES(FCV-466)

ANDFCV-476)ANDTHEMFWBYPASSREGULATING VALVES(FCV-480ANDFCV-481).

SM-77ESGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTESTINGOFNEWMODULESINTERNALTOTHEFOX3RACKFORTHEAMSACSYSTEM.THISWILLBEDONEASARESULTOFTHEINSTALIATION OFTHEADVANCEDDIGITALFEEDWATER CONTROLSYSTEM.73SCTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFTHEREACTORLOGICRACKANDRODSPEEDCONTROL(RSC)RACKMODIFICATIONS.

THES/GLOWLEVELCOINCIDENT Pfr WITHSTEAMFLOW/FEED FLOWMISMATCHTRIPWILLBEREMOVEDASARESULTOFTHEINSTALLATION OFTHEADVANCEDIGITALFEEDWATER CONTROLSYSTEM.SASCSNERPCOICTONCLETONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFMANHOLESg CONDUIT,ANDFIBEROPTICCABLESBETWEENTHEFOLLOWING AREAS:THESIMULATOR

BUILDING, BROOKWOOD TRAININGCENTER,THETECHNICIAN SUPPORTCENTER,ANDTHEGUARDHOUSE.

0ENHANCEMENTS

-MECZCTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFTHEINSTRUMENTATION ANDASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT INCONNECTION WITHTHE"B"RHRSYSTEM.REPCENTOFEATRACECZRCUTBOCACIDBLENDERARETHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWCHEMELEXSELFREGULATING HEATTRACECABLEFORCIRCUITf29(BORICACIDBLENDERAREAPIPING).SM-437.7THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWCHEMELEXSELF-REGULATING HEATTRACEFORCIRCUITgE-6(BORICACIDFILTER).JGLACGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFAGASTATTIMEDELAYRELAYREPLACEMENTS SCHEDULED TOBEREPLACEDDURINGTHE1990OUTAGE.AGSRELAYREPCT-3D-1BTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFAGASTATTIMEDELAYRELAYREPLACEMENT FORTDR-1A3ANDTDR-1B3DURINGTHE1991OUTAGE.THESPECIFICTESTINGTOBEDONEWILLENSURETHATTHECIRCUITRY FORTHEDCAUXILIARY OILPUMPSTOTHEMAINFEEDWATER PUMPSWILLBEOPERATIONAL FORTHECONDITIONS CONTROLLED BYTHEAGASTATTIMEDELAYRELAYSTDR-1A3ANDTDR-1B3.S-6SS r~S THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION/

TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFAGASTATTIMEDELAYRELAYREPLACEMENTS FORTHEFEEDWATER PUMP(FWP)LOSSOFSEALWATER'RIP.

THETIMEDELAYFORTRXPOFTHEFWPFOLLOWING ALOSSOFSEALWATERWILLALSOBECHANGEDFROM5TO60SECONDSTOPREVENTUNNECESSARY TRIPSOFTHEFWPs.SM-5078.1 NTS0DT0SYST-GUD0THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOINSTALLANEWnEnFIELDPERIMETER ONTHEGUARDHOUSE.UCOTECICU0ODICATONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEUNIT1ARECIRCULATION PLENUMMODIFICATION.

nnSTGEERATORNSULATIOTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEnAnSTEAMGENERATOR INSULATION.

nnSTGNSUTXOSUSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFTHEnAnSTEAMGENERATOR INSULATION SUPPORTSTEEL.SCRE0CHGTALTXOTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISXNSTALLCHLORINEINJECTION PXPINGINTHESCREENHOUSE FLOORAREATOPROVIDEZEBRAMUSSELCONTROL.SCWATESUNTOELECTICTHEPUE&OSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEELECTRICAL PORTIONOFTHESERVICEWATERSUPPLYCHLORINEMONITORINTHESCREENHOUSE.

SVCWCCATHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEELECTRICAL PORTIONOFTHESERVICEWATERDISCHARGE CHLORINEMONITORINTHETURBINEBUILDING.

H1f~

S-8.INTUDNGSEVCWATSCGECHLORNMOZTORTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEELECTRICAL PORTIONOFTHESERVICEWATERDISCHARGE CHLORINEMONITORINTHEINTERMEDXATE BUILDINGMO0SNGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEELECTRICAL INSTALLATION OFTHESCREENHOUSE CHLORINEMONITOR.SM-5168.14 INTRMEDIEBUILDINGSERVICEWATSCGCHRINONITOTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEINSTALLATION OFTHEINTERMEDIATE BUILDINGSERVICEWATERDXSCHARGE CHLORINEMONITOR.MSVCONDUTCBLEE-ROUDSGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFCABLEANDCONDUITRE-ROUTING FORCONTROLPOWERTOBOTHAANDBMSIVSOLENOXDVALVES.S-5ELECTRICISZBUTZONSYSTEMSMENTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOOBTAXNDATATOVERIFYCOMPUTERMODELSOFGINNASTATIONWHICHSIMULATEVOLTAGEANDSHORTCIRCUITCURE&NTLEVELSDURINGALLPLANTOPERATING CONDXTIONS ANDTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFMEASUREMENT EQUIPMENT TOBETEMPORARXLY INSTALLED FORTHISMODIFICATION.

THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEDATACOLLECTION FROMTHERECORDING EQUIPMENT INSTALLED DURINGTHEOUTAGE'0CN0STHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOOBTAINDATATOVERIFYCOMPUTERMODELSOFGINNASTATIONSAFETYRELATEDMOTORSANDTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFMEASUREMENT EQUIPMENT TOBETEMPORARILY INSTALLED FORTHISMODXFICATION.

THEINSTALLATION OFALLSUPPORTING TESTINSTRUMENTATION ISNON-INTRUSIVE ANDWILLHAVENO IMPACTONTHEASSOCIATED EQUIPMENTS OPERABILITY.

S-59FOSLEDEUNURINGTHEESEG0SAEGUTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOOBTAINDATATOVERIFYCOMPUTERMODELSOFTHEGINNAEMERGENCY LOADSANDDIESELGENERATORS ASWELLASTO'ONTROL THEINSTALLATION ANDREMOVALOFTHETEMPORARILY INSTALLED MEASUREMENT EQUIPMENT.

ADASESFOSANSAUEUENCSGTHIETHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISOBTAINDATATOVERIFYCOMPUTERMODELSOFTHEGINNAEMERGENCY LOADSANDDIESELGENERATORS ASWELLASTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDREMOVALOFTHETEMPORARILY INSTALLED MEASUREMENT EQUIPMENT..

GLCCSYSTEISNATIOREOVTHEPUEFOSE OFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEREMOVALOFTEMPORARILY INSTALLED INSTRUMENTATION THATWASUSEDFORDATACOLLECTION INRESPONSETOTHEELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMFUNCTIONAL SAFETYINSPECTION SM-5393.1 UNISnnREPLACNTS"BnCONAICLAONOTOCOOLETHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEREMOVAL,INSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEnAnANDrrBnCONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION FANMOTORCOOLERS.

SECTIONC-CONpLETED TECHNICAL EVALUATIONS (TEs)Thissectioncontainsadescription ofchangestothefacilityasdescribed inthesafetyanalysisreportperformed astechnical evaluations.

Thesearetypically smallchangesthatdonotrequirethefullcontrolsofamodification.

Technical StaffEngineering Evaluations arereviewedbythePlantOperations ReviewCommittee toensurethatnounreviewed safetyquestions orTechnical Specification changesareinvolved.

Thebasisforinclusion ofaTEinthissectionispresentation tothePORC,closureoftheassociated TSR,andsubmittal totheDocumentControlDepartment.

SZ TSR90-TECHNICAL STAFFENGINEERING EVALUATION DATED~93~9REV0THEPURPOSEOFTHISEVALUATION ISTOJUSTIFYTHEINSTALLATION OFVALVE9519F,(TURBINEDRIVENAUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPTHROTTLEVALVEDRAIN/TRAP INLETDRAINVALVE)ANDADDITIONAL MINORPIPINGONAPREVIOUSLY CAPPEDNIPPLEDOWNSTREAM OFSTEAMDRAINLINE1SOLATION VALVE3529ASINSTALLED UNDERMWRTR89-3669'SR90-140SPENTFUEL00COOLNGSKOUNDNSTTECHNICAL STAFFENGINEERING EVALUATION DATED~82~69+REV1UNDEREWR1594B,ASKIDMOUNTEDPUMPWASTEMPORARILY INSTALLED INTHEBASEMENTOFTHEAUXILIARY BUILDINGTOSERVEINSPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGLOOP3.THISLOOPSERVESASABACKUPTOTHEPERMANENT LOOPS1AND2.ITISREQUIREDTOBEOPERABLEWITHINSEVERALHOURSOFALOOP2FAILUREDURINGCERTAINREFUELING SCENARIOS.

INORDERTOMINIMIZEINSTALLATION TIMEANDEFFORTITISDESIREDTOLOCATETHEPUMPPERMANENTLY INITSCURRENTLOCATION.

THEPUMPISSEISMICALLY MOUNTEDTOTHEBUILDINGSTRUCTURE ANDISISOLATEDFROMANYPROCESSLINESORTHEELECTRICAL SYSTEM.THEREFORE, THEREISNOPOTENTIAL IMPACTTOSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT INTHEAREADURINGNORMALORACCIDENTCONDITIONS.

TSR91-174SAFWPCANDDCOOLINGUNITSTESTPOINTINSTALLATION TECHNICAL STAFFENGINEERING EVALUATION DATED~9169REV0PRESENTLY, AMETHODDOESNOTEXISTTOMEASURETHEAIRFLOWTHESAFWPCANDDCOOLINGUNITS.THEINSTALLATION OFTHETESTPOINTSISNECESSARY INORDERTOVERIFYACCEPTABLE HEATEXCHANGER PERFORM-ANCE.THISEVALUATION WILLPROVIDEEQUIVALENCY BETWEENTHEORIGINALCONDITION OFTHESUCTIONSIDEDUCTINGANDTHEPROPOSEDADDITION1/2"DIAMETERHOLESWITH1/2"METALHOLEPLUGS.TSR91-189LEVVE5477WSETPOZNTICRESETECHNICAL STAFFENGINEERING EVALUATION DATED~24~REV0THERELIEFSETPOINTOFVALVE5477WISCURRENTLY SETAT.100PSI.PERREFERENCE OMM-051,WESTINGHOUSE RECOMMENDS THATTHESETTINGBEINCREASED TOAVALUEOFUPTO125PSIMAXIMUM.THISISTOBEDONETOSOLVEPROBLEMSEXPERIENCED SUCHASHIGHOILTEMPERATURES ANDINADVERTENT OPENINGOFTHERELIEFVALVEDURINGNORMALOPERA-TION.NORMALOPERATING PRESSUREDOWNSTREAM OFTHEHYDROGENSIDESEALOILPUMPISHIGHERTHANTHECURRENTRELIEFSETTING,ANDTHUSTHERELIEFVALVEDOESNOTANDCANNOTSERVEITSDESIGNFUNCTION.

UX.B.CRANEMANHOOKSHEAVEPZNLUBRICATONSYSTTECHNICAL STAFFENGINEERING EVALUATION DATED~9209REV0THISTSEEWILLEVALUATETHEADDITIONOFMANUALLUBRICATION PORTTHROUGHTHECENTEROFTHEMAINHOOKHEADBLOCK SHEAVEPINTOENHANCETHELUBRICATION OFTHESELF-LUBRICATING BUSHINGONTHESHEAVEPZN.THISLUBRICATION ENHANCEMENT WILLAUGMENTTHESELF-LUBRICATING BUSHINGSBYPROVIDING APOSITIVEFLOWOFGREASEINTOTHEAREAUNDEREACHSHEAVEPINBUSHINGANDELIMINATING THEPOTENTIAL FORTHESHEAVESTOFREEZETOTHEPIN.THISFEATPREADDITIONWILLNOTCOMPROMISE THEABILITYOFTHECRANETOWITHSTAND ADESIGNBASISEARTHQUAKE.

THEPOTENTIAL FORCONTAMINATION OFTHESFPFROMCHEMICALLEACHINGWHENTHEHEADBLOCK ISIMMERSEDINTHEPOOLHASBEENANALYZEDANDFOUNDTOBEACCEP-TABLE'~THELUBRICATION FEATUREWILLIMPROVECRANEPERFORMANCE ANDRELIABILITY.

THEMACHINING REQUIREDFORLUBRICATION PORTINSTALLATION HASBEENEVALUATED STRUCTURALLY ANDWILLNOTAFFECTCRANEDESIGNLOADINGS.

TSR91-135PZ-2212RELOCATION TECHNICAL STAFFENGINEERING EVALUATION DATED~9309REV0PI-2212PROVIDESINDICATION TOTHEOPERATOROFTHEPRESSUREDOWNSTREAM OFAOV-3806(SEALWATERPRESSURECONTROLAOVTOVALVESEALINGSYSTEM).WHENPLACINGTHEAOVINSERVICEORWHENUSINGTHEBYPASSGLOBEVALVEFORCONTROL,THEOPERATORMUSTOBSERVEPI-2212.HOWEVER,ITISLOCATEDAPPROXIMATELY 25FEETAWAYANDISNOTVISIBLEFROMTHELOCATIONOFTHEACLV.THEPURPOSEOFTHISEVALUATION ISTORELOCATETHEPRESSUREGAUGECLOSERTOTHEAOV.THISWILLINVOLVETHEREPLACEMENT OFSOMEOFTHEPIPING,REMOVALOFALENGTHOFTUBINGANDANEWATTACHMENT INTOTHERUNPIPEFORTHEGAUGECONNECTION THISCHANGEAFFECTSONLYANON-SAFETY RELATEDSYSTEM(CONDENSATE)

ANDISLOCATEDSUCHTHATITHASNOPOTENTIAL IMPACTTOSAFETYRELATEDSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMSORCOMPONENTS.

NOSYSTEMFUNCTIONWILLCHANGEASARESULTOFTHEGAUGERELOCATION.

NRHDRAINLINESNIPPLEANDCAPDDI0TECHNICAL STAFFENGINEERING EVALUATION DATED~101091REV0VALVES2232AND2233,NRHXINLETANDOUTLET(RESPECTIVELY)

DRAINVALVES,HAVEEXPERIENCED SEATLEAKAGEWHICHHASINTURNRESULTEDINTHERELEASEOFBOTHCONTAMINATED WATERANDRADIOACTIVE GASSESTOTHEENVIRONMENT OFTHEAUXILIARY BUILDINGDURINGPERIODSWHENTHEAUXILIARY BUILDINGVENTILATION SYSTEMISOUTOFSERVICE.

We~~

THISEVALUATION WILLPROVIDEJUSTIFICATION FORTHEADDITIONOFTWO3/4"NPT3"LONGNIPPLESANDTWO3/4"NPTTHREADEDCAPS,ONETOBEATTACHEDTOTHEDOWNSTREAM SIDEOFVALVE2233ANDTHESECONDTOBEATTACHEDTOTHEOPENTEEDOWNSTREAM OFVALVE2232'SR91-002EHRESERVOIR IMMERSION HEATERINSTALTIONTSR91-002WILLINSTALL,DURINGTHISSHUTDOWN, ANIMMERSION HEATERINTHEEHRESERVOIR.

THEPURPOSEOFTHEHEATERISTOBRINGEHFLUIDCLOSERTOOPERATING TEMPERATURE PRIORTOSTARTUP.ITISINTENDEDTOENERGIZETHEHEATERONLYDURINGPRE-STARTUPOFTHEEHCSYSTEM.THEHEATERWILLBEMOUNTEDONANEXISTINGFLANGETHATWASINSTALLED DURINGTHE1991SHUTDOWNPERTHISTSRANEXISTING208VACRECEPTACLE gCURRENTLY USEDONLYFORTHEEHOILTRANSFERPUMP~WILLBEUPGRADEDFROMAHANGINGCORDCAP"TOAPANELMOUNTEDFLANGEDRECEPTACLE-THERECEPTACLE CANTHENBEUTILIZEDTOPOWERTHEEHCTRANSFERPUMPQgTHEIMMERSION HEATER.ITISNOTANTICIPATED THATBOTHDEVICESWILLBEREQUIREDSIMULTANEOUSLY.

ATSEEAND50.59ARECOMPLETEPERA-305.TSR92-057TEMPORARY CONNECTION OFMONTORINGEUPMENTTOEXSTNGSTPOINTSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISANALYSISISTOEVALUATETHESAFETYCONSEQUENCES OFCONNECTING TEMPORARY MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION TOEXISTINGTESTPOINTS.UNDERTHESCOPEOFA-1406,CONNECTING TEMPORARY RECORDERS FOREXTENDEDPERIODSOFTIMEISCONSIDERED ATEMPORARY MODIFICATION.

THISEVALUATION ISBASEDONUSINGMONITORING INSTRUMENTATION WITHHIGHIMPEDANCE ISOLATEDINPUTSCONNECTED TOESTABLISHED TESTPOINTS.TSR92-094VALVE405BFLANGEINSTLLATZONTECHNICAL STAFFENGINEERING EVALUATION DATED~4~92REV0THISEVALUATION WILLJUSTIFYTHEPERMANENT INSTALLATION OFACARBONSTEELPLATEATTHEBOLTEDFLANGEDOWNSTREAM OFVALVE4051,MAINCONDENSER "B"CONDENSATE FILLMANUALVALVE.

SECTIOND-TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS Thissectioncontainsdescriptions andsummaries ofsafetyevaluations oftemporary changespursuanttotherequirements of10CFR50.59(b)~

8/16/91SERVICEWATERPUMPCANDDDISCHARGE PT-2028PRESSURESENSINGLINEREPLACEMENT 91-204ThepressuresensinglineforPT-2028hasbeenisolatedatthe1inchrootvalveontheServiceWaterPumpCandDdischarge header,duetoaleakatacontactpointwithtubetrack.Inordertoreturnthepressuretransmitter toservice,ithasbeenproposedtoreplacetheexistingtubingrun.Drawing33013-1250 Sh.1indicates thisasASMEClass3andassuch,issafety-relatedasdescribed inQualityControlManualsection2.1.14b.Thelinespecification fortubingrequiresthatthisbeseamless, handdrawncopper,ASTMB75typeDHP,with.035inchwallthick-ness,forupto200psigapplication.

Theproposedreplacement istobeoutsidethetubetrack,eliminating thepotential foratubetrackcontactproblemandsharpbends.ItisproposedtouseASTMB-2803/8inchcoppertubing'ith.032inchwallthickness, fastenedwithtie-wraptoconduitinthearea.PerdrawingC-381-358 Sht.35,thetubingdownstream ofvalve4506wasnotseismically

analyzed, thusthetemporary installation doesnotrequiretobeseismically securedandwillberetainedthroughtheuseoftiewrapsasindicated.

Asthi'sisnotaseismicinstallation thetemporary tubingwillbeinstalled andsupported inaccordance withtherequirements ofANSIB31.1-1986.

Stressexperienced inthetemporary linewillconsistofcomponents duetopressureandsustained loads.Thestressexperienced fromdesignpressureoftheservicewatersystemis:Sp=PDo=150si0.375in=439psi4tn4(0.032in)Thestressexperienced fromthesustained loadofthetubingis:Ss=0.75iMmaxZWherethemaximumbendingmovementMmaxisdetermined fromamaximumunsupported lengthof36",thusMmaxequals;Mmax=Wx(L-X)=0.086bin36in(36in-18in)22=28inlbThusSs=128inlb=10300psi0.0027inandStotal=Sp+Ss=439+10300=10739psi 93.-20ThetensilestrengthofsoftannealedAS'280seamlesscoppertubingis30,000psi.Thusthetemporary replacement oftheoriginaltubingwiththeabovementioned materialwillyieldanacceptable factorofsafetyproviding thatthetubingissupported

'withtiewrapsatamaximumof36"intervals.

Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved.

Basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetothefacilityorprocedures asdescribed intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecausedetailsinvolvedwiththesupportoftheoriginaltubingwerenotdiscussed orlistedandthistemporary installation altersonlythephysicalconfiguration ofthetubing.Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becausethepressuretransmitter PT2028isnotaTechSpecinstrument andtheconnection isisolablefromtheservicewatersystemthroughvalve4506.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecausetheinstalled tubingwillbeplacedandrunsuchthatstresslevelsremainwellbelowmaximumvaluesassociated withthematerial; thus,theprobability offailureo'fthereplace-menttemporary tubingwillbenomorethantheoriginal.

Durati'on oftheinstallation willbeshortterm(approx.2months)thusprobability ofafailureisnoteffected.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecausethereplacement (temporary) tubinghasbeendetermined tobeadequateforit'sintendeduseandwillbeconnected tothesameisolation valvethatwouldhaveisolatedtheoriginaltubingrunintheeventofafailure(valve4506).Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification becausethetemporary installation willbeadequately supported suchthatstresslevelswithinthematerialdonotexceedthetensilestrengthandthusundernormalconditions nopostulated failuresareexpected.

ThedesignbasiseventsanalysisintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEvents "JW'h"~W

~hP~~~h~*A~~~h~hhAhhP.Ahead.<8 CATEGORYJOBFOREFERENCE PROC~hP,gA'1402r'hREQUEST>>:

S+'OCIIESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONgyPASSPFSAFETYFUHGTioHANDJUMPERCONTROLDAlEJUMPERWIRE0FUNCTIONfQ+rFUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0OTHER0LOCATIO~lieQl~v'-""Ql0'l&~lSAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED; 0YESGf$IOSKETCHATTACHED:

JKYES0NO~SOAA~t~~PORCDATE(IFREQUIRED)'ECHNICAL MANAGER:DATE'.(t'tlib<ICSHIFTSUPERVISOR INSTALLATION DATEaTIME--/404ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSIINSTALLED BY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARYJ

&8SMCnJMS&GDQCJREMOVALDATE:DATEaTIME:IENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY'ERIFIED BY;UISOelnJv~W~iZ&8SCNCC'rVV/HRu=umCTlOPS(AC:v~sC.

PLICA/7AjguVI~ICElVI'RAL RECORDS lptp~l'a40

~Q3MTE55A+~~

REVIEWEOREFERENCE PAOCEDIPA1402ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRCOINNASTATION.gyPASSPFSAFFlYr'i4CI'loNANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFORDATE~~REQUESTS:

JUMPERWIRE0FUNCTIONLIFTEDWIRE+FUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0OTHERCivy?.P'OCATIO+rM+d.ssvarrst.ufoNssauwsoavaswhoPORCDATE(IFREQUIREPJ TECHNICAL MANAGERSHIFTSUPERVISOR INSTALLATION DATEaTIME@~~+~*ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSTAINSTALlED BY'ERIFIED BY:SKETCHATTACHED:

$fYES0NODATE:DATE:~/G~DATE4TIME:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARYI 8&lm~~~=Mca~~mH4~Arnto&A/ICCC.<-DtSc-i<f/LRECGRD5Attachaddttpagets)ssneceseey 44\0 go'f/0/gq>XT%FCATEGORYREVIEWEDREFERENCE PROCEDuRE A.1%2ROCHE~sRGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJuMPERCONTROLJUMPERWIRE0FUNCTIONUFTEDWIRE0'zSIJOBFOREMADATE5ifw///3/ft/REQUEST¹F/Y4FUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0OTHER6t/C0PURPOSEo~ecclooLOCATIOCc/SAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

EYES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED)'ECHNICAL MANAGERSHIFTSUPERVISOR INSTALlATION DATEILTIME8IIENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTABSINSTAINSTALLED BY:<<~CnVERIFIEDBY:RENEW(ASNECESSAREMOVALDATE5TIMF'ATEDATE:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:-99-IC-/CJSKETCHATTACHED:

0YESENO/nJPcu.~-i'lHimr8e'Co4'ttach addltfcnal papa(a)aanecaaaary QA~=DSPCQTION-5%%

PPKO,cwP04M0 p~"-~~~+~a~~~

REVIEWEDREFERENCE PROCEDURE h14027aROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICOS%ASTATION'YPASSOFSAFETYF'vHGTION ANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOJUMPERWIREIBcFUNCTIONFUSESPULLED0MoAoWREQUESTS:

STATESBLOCKOTHEPg8FooI.OCATIOeSAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

I(YESPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED)'

ga'ECHNICAI.

MANASHIFTSUPERVISOR INSTALLATION DATEaTIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTINSTALLED BY;VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)

P4V4c~LDMPlg.0V0NOSKETCHATTACHED:

'0YES'NOc'"DATE:DATE:II4(2./iI~AaVmsENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;CENTRALRECO%%eEROF TAGSD:QAPN-5VRSIOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:81l.~t(lJAO(wkt'Attachaddltkeaf pege(e)aenecessary

$~0 REFERENCE PROCEOURE A-1402ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATlONByPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJUMPERWIRE0FUNCTIONuFTEDWIRE0FUSESPULLED00aREQUEST4:STATESBLOCK0OTHER)ilVIPURPOSEourowLOCATIOSAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

SYES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED)'ECHNICAL MANAGERSHIFTSUPFRVISOR INSTALLATION DATEaTIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSIN~LLED:INSTALLED BY:4'ERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)

SKETCHATTACHED:

0YESE40DATEDATE-EK/REMOVALDATE4TIME:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSRPPVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:I5Vr/DIrVI5&H~h3DOL-.C48Attachadditional yaga(a)aa-5YRS A1406'3TEMPORARy MODIFICATION EVALUATION parICoornaor)~No.:9-urr',iZ~Title://zP178'artII(Intaor)~e:Electrical

==

Description:==

/8W"1erAbFl'+idstruc:g~~g

/5/c4?/weber~~PartIII(StationEngineer)

DesignInputs(i.e.Press,Temp,Corrosion, Wind@Seismicetc.)'pro'pi'5S-2'Flax5/DE-/~5p~~sz~-/Pd5Whoareseche<(r/nc.bee/~emBPD&/dS5Wo9-/a28//'~yeÃ~co//~~d~-/'c'wc~I'~4P'e.ac(ac4~ACL4'i/6C'/beb~iNPC.DVeJ-tMhblk.ulcc SCyelledmpldm-i'.eBI/g">/uc.'Lt4s/cup~<4Arch5/e~p~~s~a.V<A'eY4'4'<'/y/Ng~(<'4g~Abepc+~~~gu"/eorchocoCo~~f-g~~<~g,os~le~~~oP~~/pi~+gfj~~/~cS'~/r.'ive.gA~Q~0/gdf~pg+//gg

• A A-1406:14m,'/lace+ccleE~~/Ccvorb/~gRegefremente:

I(+8or.i.,sJl.-s(cAJf,c~-(e(ec.-.JM~endle~IC:,osAo(Jac:RedA4,i~4o~SafetyAnalysis:

ManaRaatmictionas PREPAREDBY:REVIEWEDBY:APPROVEDBY:PORCAPPROVALMEETING:ccII,('wlYO 0)I-ILlgDATE:~~7<<DATE:/~~+~oDATE:IDATSUN SAFETYANALYSISTEMPORARY MODIFICATION 91-05f4FLANGEHEATINGSTEAMRETURNELBOWREPARev.0ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION GINNASTATIONDecember10,1991Preparedby:Reviewedby:Reviewedby:ManaApprovedby:StaffEngieeeactorEngineerchnicaEineeringrimChairman, PORClZiu+/DteDateDalzIs~lDate 1.0gaAv'C.ol'COPEOFANALYSISTheHPturbineflangeheatingreturnlinetothecondenser hasa3/4"elbowwithasmallpinholeleak.Thepurposeofthisanalysisistoevaluatethesafetyconsequences ofweldingacouplingornippletotheelbowandinserting aplugtostoptheleak.Replacement oftheelbowwouldrequireshuttingtheunitdownsinceitisunisolatable.

2.0eerences2.1GINNAPAID33013-123/2 geP2.2GinnaUFSARsection10.1.3.1, 15.13.0StuctuesSstemsandComonentsAffectedSSC3.1TheMainSteamsystemistheonlysystemaffectedbythistemporary modification.

4.0 SetFunctions

ofAfectedSSCs4.1TheonlySafetyfunctiontheMainSteamsystemprovidesistoremoveReactorDecayHeatuponaReactortripviatheMSsafetyreliefvalves.4.2AspartoftheMSsystem,theMSIV'sprovideMSheaderisolation intheeventofHighsteamflowwithanSIsignalandlowTavgorHighHighsteamflowwithanSIsignal.5'ectsoSet5.1Theproposedtemporary modification willnothaveanaffect.ontheMSsafetyfuctionsinceitsdownstreamoftheMSIV's.5.2Theadditionofthenipple/coupling andplug<totheelbowwillnotrerouteanyflangeheatingsteamflownorwillincreaseordecreasethelinescapacity.

Thetemporary modification willrestoretheintegrity ofthepressureboundarywithmaterialmeetingorexceeding theMSlinespecification SP-5291600-1.Theflangeheatingreturnlineisnotrequiredtobeseismically installed.

Consequently, thesmallamountofwieghtaddedbythecouplingandplug/vA>ae.

willbewellwithintheANSIB31.1codeallowables.

SafetyAnalysis.

TempMod~~05Pageg~o~Revision0Date~1~09 6'6~1UeewedSetuestionConcusionvaleTheadditionofthecoupling/nipple andplug~totheflangeheatingsteamreturnlinewillnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurances ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecausetheaddedmaterialwillmeettheMSpipingspecification andB31.1stressallowables, the3/4"dialineisbelowtheminimumlinesizeforhighenergypiping,andthelinescapacitywillnotbeincreaseordecreased.

6.2Theadditionofthecoupling/nipple andplugtotheflangeheatingsteamreturnlinewillnotincreasetheprobability y<~p"consequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecausetheaddedmaterialwillmeettheMSpipingspecification andB31.1stressallowables, the3/4"dialineisbelowtheminimumlinesizeforhighenergypiping,andthelinescapacitywillnotbeincreaseordecreased.

Sincethelinecapacityisnotincreased, therewillnotbeanincreaseinthesecondary heatremoval.6'6'Theadditionofthecoupling/nipple andplugtotheflangeheatingsteamreturnlinewillnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurances ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecausetheaddedmaterialwillmeettheMSpipingspecification andB31.1stressallowables, the3/4"dialineisbelowtheminimumlinesizeforhighenergypiping,andthelinescapacitywillnotbeincreaseordecreased.

Consequently, theoriginaldesignfunctionofthelinewillbemaintained andtherfore, noincreaseinequipment malfunctions arepossible.

Theadditionofthecoupling/nipple and'lugtotheflangeheatingsteamreturnlinewillnotincreasetheofcon-sequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecausetheaddedmaterialwillmeettheMSpipingspecification andB31.1stressallowables, the3/4"dialineisbelowtheminimumlinesizeforhighenergypiping,andthelinescapacitywillnotbeincreaseordecreased.

Sincethelinecapacityisnotin-creased,therewillnotbeanincreaseinthesecondary heatremoval.6'Theadditionofthecoupling/nipple andplugtotheflangeheatingsteamreturnlinewillnotcreateapossibility foranaccidentofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheUFSARbecausetheoperation andthefunctionofthelinewillnotbechanged.SafetyAnalysisTemPMod~9-05Page2of3Revision0Date~~0 6.6Theadditionofthecoupling/nipple andplugtotheflangeheatingsteamreturnlinewillnotcreateapossibility foramalfunction ofequipment ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheUFSARbecausethefunctionandcapacityofthereturnlinewillnot,bechangedandtheexistingpipebreakanalysisenvelopes 3/4"lines6.7Theadditionofthecoupling/nipple andplugtotheflangeheatingsteamreturnlinewillnotreduceanymarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesofanytechnical specification becausetheturbineflangeheatingisnotpartofthebasesofanyTechnical Specification Theadditionofanipple/coupling andplugtotheturbineflangeheatingreturnlinedoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionbasedonthediscussion presented insection6.SafetyA'nalysis TempMod~9-05Page~30Revision0Date~~9 4'g ATTACHMENT 1TEMPORARY MODIFICATION EVALUATION A1406:13partI(TMCoordinator)

TMNo.:~D>~Date:/'itle:rb)wePartII(Instigator)

TYpe:<lectrical FluidStructural

==

Description:==

g'>CzA'C"~('uiPWe'dg~cipacc'creen(yhc~LSOPartIII(StationEngineer)

DesignInputs(i.e.Press,Temp,Corrosion, Wind,Seismicetc.)'~ce~sv~~

':/885.'go4Pg2cz'Mid t4 TTACECONIDA-1406:14Evaluation:

c'eafcka4eeTestingRequirements:

SafetyAnalysis:

ttachdocumeta'oe-30ModeRestrictions:

PREPAREDBX:REVIEHEDBY:APPROVEDBY:PORCAPPROVALMEETING:DATE:DATE./Z-iZKlDATE:DATE:

SAFETYANALYSISTEMPOYMODIFICATION 9-d845I+V7vuggrlvckffrtusTPÃ6JlvRARev.0ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION GINNASTATIONDecember12,1991Preparedby:Reviewedby:Reviewedby:Approvedby:StafEinerReactorEngineernager,Technical EginrChairman, PORC'lZfZDate(~trialDate/A.rDate

~(l1 1.0SCOPEOFANALYSISThepurposeofthisanalysisistoevaluatethesafetyconsequences associated withperforming temporary leakrepairsonsecondary non-safety relatedsystems.Repairswillbeperformed byeitherapplyingamechanical clamporbyweldingashortlengthofpipewithavalveorplug/capovertheleaktoisolateit.Pipesizewillbelimitedto2"nominalpipediameterorsmaller.2.0References 2.1ANSIB31.1PowerPipingCode19833.0Structures SstemsandComonentsfectedSSC3.1Thetemporary leakrepairwillnot,affectanySSCsinceititwillbeappliedtononsafetyrelatedsystemsonly,itwillnotchangeanysystemperformance andwillnotbelocatedsuchthatitcouldimpactsafetyrelatedequipment.

4.0SfetunctiosofAfectedSSCs4.1None5.0EectsonSafet5.1Theproposedtemporary modification willnothaveanaffectonanysafetyfuctionssinceitwillbeadeadlegpipe,thematerials shallmeettheapplicable linespecification andanyresulting additional loadswillbewithintheANSIB31.1codeallowables.

Sincetheaddedpipeisa2"orlessdeadleg,nonewflowpathsorincreased capacitywillbeintroduced andanypipebreakswillbeevelopedbytheexistingsecondary pipebreakanalysisandisolatedbytheMSIV'SorMainFeedwater checkvalves5.2Bypreventing thetemporary modification frombeinginstalled suchthatitcouldphisically impactsafetyrelatedequipment, theseismicqualification ofsafetyrelatedequipment willnotbeaffected.

SafetyAnalysisTempMod~~05Page~o~gRevision0Date~~

6.0UevewedSafetuestionConclus'on 6.16.26.36.4Theadditionofthepipingwithvalveormechanical clamptonon-safety relatedsecondary systemswillnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurances ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecausetheaddedmaterialwillmeetthepipingspecification andB31.1stressallowables, the3/4"dialineisbelowtheminimumlinesizeforhighenergypiping,andthelinescapacitywillnotbeincreaseordecreased.

Theadditionofthepipingwithvalveormechanical clamptonon-safety relatedsecondary systemswillnotincreasetheprobability ofconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecausetheaddedmaterialwillmeettheMSpipingspecification andB31.1stressallowables, the2"dialineisbelowtheminimumlinesizeforhighenergypiping,andthelinescapacitywillnotbeincreaseordecreased.

Sincethelinecapacityisnotincreased, therewillnotbeanincreaseinthesecondary heatremoval.Theadditionofthepipingwithvalveormechanical clamptonon-safety relatedsecondary systemswillnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurances ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecausetheaddedmaterialwillmeettheMSpipingspecific-ationandB31.1stressallowables, the3/4"dialineisbelowtheminimumlinesizeforhighenergypiping,andthelinescapacitywillnotbeincreaseordecreased.

Consequen-tly,theoriginaldesignfunctionofthelinewillbemaintained andtherfore, noincreaseinequipment malfunctions arepossible.

Theadditionofthepipingwithvalveormechanical clamptonon-safety relatedsecondary systemsnotincreasetheofconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecausetheaddedmaterialwillmeettheMSpipingspecification andB31.1stressallowables, the2"dialineisbelowtheminimumlinesizeforhighenergypiping,andthelinescapacitywillnotbeincreaseordecreased.

Sincethelinecapacityisnotin-creased,therewillnotbeanincreaseinthesecondary heatremoval.6~5Theadditionofthepipingwithvalveormechanical clamptonon-safety relatedsecondary systemswillnotcreateapossibility foranaccidentofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheUFSARbecausetheoperation and'thefunctionofthelinewillnotbechanged.SafetyAnalysisTempMod~-0~5Page2of3RevisiongDate~21292 6.6Theadditionofthepipingwithvalveormechanical clamptonon-safety relatedsecondary systemswillnotcreateapossibility foramalfunction ofequipment ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheUFSARbecausethefunctionandcapacityofthereturnlinewillnotbechangedandtheexistingpipebreakanalysisenvelopes 2"lines6.7Theadditionofthepipingwithvalveormechanical clamptonon-safety relatedsecondary systemswillnot'reduceanymarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesofanytechnical specification becausethetemporaymodification willnotchangethefunctionanysystemandthereforwillnotaffectthebasesofanyTechnical Specification.

Theadditionofthepipingandvalveormechanical clampdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionbasedonthediscussion presented insection6.SafetyAnalysisTempNod~~5page~o~RevisiongDate~~

A-1406:13T~O~y<ODIFICATION EVALUATION PartITMNo.:Title:Coornaor)Date:F'LL)ZWd%hiVfiiFdOhiiPartII(Instigator)

Type:Electrical Fluid7structural

==

Description:==

M/FIKla~Ma'lucI6loerUd':e.~le"55m'eco4,~IOZhIa.O'Rl'e'ti-JoaCgX.>+in~lOtmoc'iinrva<A.4/t0nnra)hC)5~gC5)~ionOC$4arlaeelh~ic.i0ia~ig'3'33PartIIX(StationEngineer)

DesignInputs(i.e.Press,Temp,Corrosion, Hind,Seismicetc.)eC3SVBCFDur+30/3-lh7P~SSu~-azeOsi'~~-CSa+~bc'M-5&i'~'l~ws.+~~i+<hi~SST134'0r9Ql3o~PlW0f3GGS~a().Vatvc55gl'g/c.55%7"3/Q.6ted<i'5h-5Ci'5~(Q40ASH A-1406:14 Zy4n~TestingRequirements:

Ce</c~(~z8mg5g'~ggggg4sW~s~(SafetyAnalysis:

cdo2ee~&c.h~cD0ModeRestrictions:

PREPAREDBY:REVIEWEDBY:APPROVEDBY:PORCAPPROVALMEETING:DATE:/8PZ EVALUATIpN FORTEMPORARY MODIFICATION 92-01PCV-1022A FILTERANDISpLATION VALVEINSTALLATION l,2,Q+5add(CnTheinstallation shownontheattachedsketches>

preparedbytheI/Cshop(SteveStinson)istobeinstalled tothenon-codeclassportionofthewastegassystemperdrawing33013-1273, sheet2.isconsidered tobenon-seismic, howeverpositionc(2)ofUSNRCRegulatory

'Guide1.29willbeconsidered intheinstallation andwillbediscussed laterinthisevaluation.

Thelinespecification forthissectionoftubingis2505.Thistranslates toadesignpressureof2500psigat650degreesF.TheWasteGassystem(tanksandrelatedpiping)isdesignedfor150psigperGilbertSpec5291.TheGasDecayTankshavereliefsandrupturediskswhichlimitpressureto:150psig.Operating pressureisgenerally 110psigorlessandoperating temperature is50-140degreesF.Theprimarycomponents tobeusedinthismodification arestainless steeltubing,anisolation valveandafilterassembly.

Thetubingistobestainless steel,3/8"O.D.gwitha.065"wallthickness inaccordance withthelinespecific-ation.Theisolation valveistobeaWhiteySS-1VS4,ratedfor3435psigat450degreesF.Bothofthesecomponents meetorexceedallpressurerequirements.

ThefilterisaBalstontype45S6,maximumpressure250psigat220degreesF.Thismeetsthesystempressurerequirements.

Thenewbracket,filterandhousingweighsapproximately 6pounds.Itwillbemountedtothewallusingembeddedunistrutandtwo1/4"fasteners.

Thisfastening systemismorethancapableofrestraining theweightofthenewcomponents asis,requiredfortemporary modifications.

Inaddition, theonlyitemswhichwouldbeimpactediftherestraining deviceweretofailduringaseismiceventarethecopperairsupplylinestovalves1036B,1037B,1038B,and1039B.SinceInstrument Airisnotaseismicsystem,impacttotheselinesisnotdeemedtobeasafetyconcern.Allotheritemsintheareaaresufficiently protected fromimpactofthenewcomponents.'he modification involvesportionsofthenon-codeclasslinesasshownbytheP&ID.Howevertheworkisclassified assafetysignificant pertheGinnaMasterEquipment DatabaseandLicensing classification.

TheGinnaQAprogramistherefore applicable tothemodification.

However,QAmaterialisnotrequired.

Thisisinaccordance withparagraph 3.4.2.2ofprocedure A-1406andappropriate forthefunctionthatthesecomponents willserve.AsagoodpracticeQAmaterialshouldbeusedifpossible.

Flowto(andfrom)thewastegasanalyzeriscontrolled bythreepressureregulators, avacuumpump,bypassflowfeaturesandneedlevalvesatthetwoanalyzers.

Theadditionofafilterandisolation valvewillinduceanewpressuredropintothesystem.~~~~~Cgheyarelocatedupstreamofthepressureregulator.

Therefore

$8~sincethereisalarge(80-100psig)pressuredropacrosstheregulators anynewdropsatthelowflowvaluesexperienced (6

cfh)willbeadjustedforbytheregulators.

Thiswillensurethatflowtotheanalyzers iswithinthesystemdesignrequire-ments.

SAFETYANALYSISTEMPORARY MODIFICATION PCV-1022A FILTERANDISOLATION VALVEINSTALLATION REVISION0ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION GINNASTATIONJANUARY3,1991Preparedby:Reviewedby:Reviewedby:Approvedby:StaEnineerReactorEngineerMe,TenicalSct'onChairman, PORCDateDateate]/)/tz-Date 1.0ScoeofAnalsis-ThePurposeofthisanalysisistoevaluatethesafconsequences associated andisolation valveupstreamofPCV-1022A.

Theseitemsarenecessary toprotectthecontrolvalvefrompartic-ulatematterthathasbeenfoulingit,causingfrequentcorrective maintenance.

1.2PCV-1022A isthepressurecontrolvalveinthesampleheaderoftheGasDecayTankstotheMSAGasAnalyzer.

Itislocatedinthetubingdownstream oftheASMEclassbreak.Thecomponents ofthismodification arelocatedinthetubingalso,ensuringthatthereisnoeffectontheseismic,class3pipingfurtherupstream.

2.0

References:

2~1USNRCRegulatory Guide1.29,SeismicDesignClassifica-tion.2'2'2.42.52.62.7RG&EDrawing33013-1273, sheet2,WasteDisposal-Gas.GilbertSpecification 5291.GinnaMasterEquipment Database.

SwagelokManualW-1287-4Procedure A-1406,ControlofTemporary Modifications.

GinnaUFSAR,section3.9.2.1.3, 15.7.1,11.32.8GinnaTechnical Specifications, sections4.12.2,5.5.2.3.0Structures SstemsandComonentsAffected:

3.1Thismodification istobeinstalled inthewastegassystemconnected totheMSAGasAnalyzer.

Itwillbelocateddownstream oftheASMECodeClassbreakandtherefore hasnoeffectonsafetyrelatedsystems,structures orcomponents.

TheonlySSCintheimmediate vicinitytothemodification arevalves1036B,1037B,1038B,and1039B.Theseare3/4"NPSvalveswhichareofhighersectionmodulusthanthetubingofthemodification andarelargeenoughcomponents tobeconsidered protected fromimpactofthemodificationitemsabove(reference evaluation sectionofTemporary Permit92-01).Thenewfilterwillbeadequately securedinaccordance withnormalrequirements foratemporary modification.

4.04.1SafetFunctions oAffectedSSCsThe(4)valvesinthevicinityremotelyisolatethefourgasdecaytanksfromthesampleheaderandformtheASMEclassbreak.5.0EffectsonSafet5.15.2Thelocationofthenewandmodifiedcomponents isinthenon-codeclasstubingsectionofthesamplinglines.Thisensuresthatthereisnodirecteffectonthelinesupstreamoftheairoperatedisolation valves(1036B,1037B,1038B,1039B)whicharesafetyrelatedandformthepressureboundaryoftheGasDecayTanks.Aspreviously discussed, theASMEClass3linesarelargeenoughtoaffordinherentprotection againstafailureduringaseismiceventofthetubingandcomponents above.Thenewcomponents willmeetthelinepressurerequire-mentsandwillnoeffecttheultimateflowdelivered tothegasanalyzerthroughtheoperation oftheregulating valves.Therefore nosystemfunctionwillchangeduetothismodification.

6.0 Unreviewed

SafetuestionConclusion:

6.16.26.36~4Theadditionofafilterandisolation valvetothewastegassystemwillnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecauseitislocateddownstream oftheremoteisolation valvesoftheGasDecayTanks.Inadditionitwillmeetalltherequirements forpressureretaining capability.

Theadditionofthesecomponents willnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecauseitaffectsannon-codeclasssectionofthewastegassystemandtherefore isboundedbythecurrentanalysisforagasdecaytankrupture.Thismodification willnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUFSARsinceithasbeshowntohavenoeffectonsuchitemsinthevicinity.

Thismodification willnotincreasetheconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUFSARsinceithasbeenshowntohavenoeffectonsuchitemsinthevicinity.

6.56.66.7Thismodification willnotcreateaPossibility foranaccidentofadifferent typethananyevaluated previo-uslyintheUFSARbecausethesystemfunctionwillnotbeaffectedandthereisnoeffectonsurrounding structures, systemsorcomponents.

Thismodification willnotcreateapossibility foramalfunction ofequipment ofadifferent typethananyevaluated intheUFSARbecauseitwillenhancetheoperation andmaintenance ofthesystemandwillhavenoeffectonsurrounding equipment.

Thismodification willnot,reduceanymarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanyTechnical Specification becauseitwillnotaffectthefunctionofanysystemandtherefore thebasisforanyTechnical Specification.

7.0 Conclusion

7.1Theimplementation ofthistemporary modification doesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionbasedonthediscussion presented intheprevioussection.

i'/A-1406:13ATTACHMENT 1TEMPORARY MODIFICATION EVALUATION partI(TMCoordinator) 002TMNo.:Date:Title:/~PartII(Instigator)

Type:Electrical

~FluidStructural

==

Description:==

(O(<+Co~Q(tC++OP<<~5Cow&(C)Ci0P.SC.R04-Y~C~~iA.>Wi<~+lh<Oi.a~QCH(~}PQo]HCv~-P+~i~OWaJ~efMA,~CQ3(s~57.)RefCH9-(4~1L.H-PR~lw-ICHaa")P+~~-A.OC)'51%QPW~Sg~~~galPalPartIII(StationEngineer)

DesignInputs(i.e.Press,Temp,Corrosion, Wind,Seismicetc.)~s>>~~0s~s~~i~~he0.5c.A.gt.ka%i~>a~Eeif'-aCQ'lLCrC.bXVORAS,0CS+

A-1406:14 TTACHMENT 1CONTENDEvaluation:

TestingRequirements:

/VSafetyAnalysis:

Attachdocumentation erA-303ModeRestrictions:

PREPAREDBY:DATEREVIEWEDBY:64&a~APPROVEDBY'ATE:uJp8~pDATE:~SA'v'8'd+'5 DATE:~KC~JyD~ChRrHNrA PORCAPPROVALMEETING:p-PZ SAFETYEVALUATION TEMPORARY MODIFICATION l2-002Connection ofMonitoring Equipment ToExistingTestPointsRodControlSystemRev.0GinnaStationRochester GasandElectricCorporation 89EastAveRochester, NewYork14649January19,1992Preparedby:Reviewedby:9Reviewedby:StaffEngineerReactorEnerManager,Tech'Engineerin DateDateDateApprovedby:Chairman, PlantOperatiPock&dyF~sReviewCommittee Date

1.0 ScopeofAnalysisThepurposeofthistemporary

modification istoconnectmonitoring instrumentation toexistingtestpointsintherodcontrolsystem.Thismodification isrequiredtomonitorforspurioussignalsintherodcontrolsystemcausingademandforrodoutmovement.

2'References 2.1PlantProcedure A-1406,ControlofTemporary Modifica-tions2.2FoxboroDrawing,CD-122.3UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport,Section7.73.04.0Structures, Systems,andComponents Affected(SSC)Thesystemaffectedbythismodificatiion istheautorodcontrolsystem.SafetyFunctionofAffectedSSC'sThefunctionoftherodcontrolsystemistoautomatically respondtochangesinreactorcoolantsystemtemperature andnuclearpower(loadpWrbations) tocontrolreactivity andmaintainorrecoverstableplantconditions withRCSTavgwithin1.5degreesofprogramTavg.5.06.0EffectsonSafetyTheproposedmodification willconnecta6penGouldrecorderto6existingtestpointsintheRSCrack(seereference 2.2).Normalmonitoring thevoltagedropacrosstheresistoratthetestpointbythehighimpedance recorderwillhavenoeffect.ontheloopsignalsgenerated intheautorodcontrolsystem.Failureofthetestequipment wouldhavenoeffecton5ofthe6signalloops.Oneofthesixloopsisavoltageloopwherethepotential failurewouldaffectthevariablegaininputcausingrodsnottomoveattherequiredspeed.Shouldrodcontrolbeinautoduringthisevent,operatorawareness ofthetestconfiguration andnormalmonitoring providesassurance thatoperatormanualcontrolofrodswouldmaintaintheplantstability.

Unreviewed SafetyQuestionConclusions The'proposed modification willnotincreasetheprobability o'foccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecausenormalmonitoring oftheloopsignalsbythis testequipment willnotaffectthefunctionofautorodcontrol.Theproposedmodification willnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecausethereisnoaffectontheradiological barrierstoareleaseoffissionproducts.

Theproposedmodification willnotincreasetheprobability orconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUFSAR.Thepurposeofthismodification istoidentifythesourceofanequipment malfunction.

Thetestequipment willnotnormallyaffectthesignalsbeingmonitored totherodcontrolsystem.Shouldatestequipment failureoccur,operatorawareness ofthemodifiedsystemconfiguration andnormaloperatorresponsetorodcontrolmalfunctions willpreventconsequences outsidethoseevaluated intheUFSAR.'Theproposedmodification willnotcreatethepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment ofadifferent typethananyevaluated intheUFSAR.Theproposedmodification onlyaffecttherodcontrolsystemoperation inauto.Uncontrolled rodmovementisevaluated inthe.UFSARinChapter15whichboundsanypotential eventresulting fromthismodification.

Theproposedmodification willnotreduceanymarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanyTechnical Specification.

Rodcontrolmalfunctions areaddressed intheUFSARasdiscussed above.Theproposedmodification doesnotaffectanymarginsofsafety.7.0Conclusion Basedontheabovediscussion theproposedmodification doesnotpresentanunreviewed safetyquestion.

A-1406:13 ATACHMENORARYMODIFICATION EVALUATION PartI(TMCoordinator)

TMNo.:f2-003Date:23'F2Title:BorI'I'C(7rate'serR//~PartII(Initiator)

Type:Electrical Fluidstructural vDescription:

ercuba,~Aaca%~everPartIII(StationEngineer)

DesignInputs(i.e.Press;Temp,Corrosion, Wind,Seismicetc.)Pucue'~>,W~

Wmq"a+~~*.r~AU"zI1j'.:~TECHNICAL Category'eviewed TCcoA-1406:14Evaluation:

Ar~~ofhngCr'owe/P"urk"TestingRequirements:

SafetyAnalysis:

ttachdocumentatio eA-30ModeRestrictions:

PREPAREDBY:REVIEWEDBY:APPROVEDBY:PORCAPPROVALMEETING:DATE:~~~2DATEPATE:S5<ZDATE:

SAFETYEVALUATION TEMPORARY MODIFICATION Temporary RiggingtoRemoveThe"A"BoricAcidTransferPump92-003February2,1992Rev.0GinnaStationRochester GasandElectricCorporation 89EastAveRochester, NewYork14649.Preparedby:StaffEngineerReviewedby:ReactEngineerReviewedbycicalgineering ManageApprovedby:Chairman, PlatOperations eviewCommittee yzDate2-DateDateat 1.0ScopeofAnalysisThepurposeofthisanalysisistoevaluatethesafetyconsequences ofattaching temporary riggingtothegratingovertheABoricAcidtransferpump.UnderthescopeofA-1406,connecting temporary riggingtonon-rigging identified pointsisconsidered atemporary modification.

2.0 References

2.1PlantProcedure A-1406,ControlofTemporary Modifica-tions2.2Interoffice Correspondence, datedMarch30,1987,SubjectAFCAR86-12:RDItemg2Anchorage ofTemporary Equipment atGinna,FromLeonardSucheskiToJ.Widay2.3GinnaTechnical Specifications section3.2.2and3'.1~1'3.0Structures, Systems,andComponents Affected(SSC)TheboricAcidtransfersystemcouldbeaffectedbythisTemporary Modification.

4.0SafetyFunctionofAffectedSSC'sTheboricAcidtransfersystemprovidesboricacidtotheECCSsystemfornegativereactivity additionandshutdownmargin.5.0EffectsonSafetySincethetemporary riggingislocated11/2timesitsheightfromtheoppositetrainofboricacidtransfercomponents andanyothersafetyrelatedequipment, damagetothesurrounding equipment underaseismiceventisprevented.

Inadditionbasedontheevaluation oftheriggingattachment providedintheTempModevaluation, theriggingiswithintheloadratingofthegrating.TheAtrainBAsystemisalreadyoutofserviceandcoveredbyaTechSpecLCO.6.0Unreviewed SafetyQuestionConclusions 6.1Theproposedmodification willnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccident.

previously evaluated intheUFSARbecausethesurrounding equipment willnotbeaffected.

TempMod92-003PagegRev~

6.2Theproposedmodification willnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecauseonlytheoutofservicetrainoftheboricacidsystemwillbeaffected6.3Theproposedmodification willnotincreasetheprobability orconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUFSARevaluated intheUFSARbecauseonlytheoutofservicetrainoftheboricacidsystemwillbeaffected6.4Theproposedmodification willnotcreatethepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment ofadifferent typethananyevaluated intheUFSARbecauseonlytheoutofservicetrainoftheboricacidsystemwillbeaffected6.5Theproposedmodification willnotreduceanymarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanyTechnical Specification.

becauseonlytheoutofservicetrainoftheboricacidsystemwillbeaffectedandLCOactionsarealreadyinplace.7.0Conclusion Basedontheabovediscussion theproposedmodification doesnotpresentanunreviewed safetyquestion.

TempMod92-003Page2~00~Rev~

A-1406:13ATTACHMEN TEMPORARY MODIFICATION EVALUATION PartI(TMCoordxnatoz)

TMNo.:Date:2(P@c2.Title:>~r>:<+mV¹OwloFrZe~8QAC<~~'iEC.<-.ii~C;u~A~(PartII(Instigator)

TYPe:Electrical

'luidEtrucuraluPMuMiDescription:

• CAN/~L~(

~~QQ~~'I/Qg~(0~PO/rV7~~>

PartIII(StationEngineer)

DesignInputs(i.e.Press,Temp,Corrosion, Wind,Seismicetc.)Duuic.~9/LJz.RssrL)<NDe/-Ic.'.

iA-'8RDZ TTACHMECONT'DA-1406:14 Evaluation:

'77~~.L~Pczf-'b"-

p-~i=(V(rJ'~>i-/ci~DM)l)1(~~i~>~y(j<JHG~6.~M/JC3CM&('i<Hidi~~i0Di='wir2at-Z/7TestingRequirements:

GAUL'.8'C SafetyAnalysis:

Attachdocumentation erA-303Crh=i3SW~~i~Vrku&r7&Ll ModeRestrictions:

PREPAREDBY:REVIEWEDBY:APPROVEDBY:PORCAPPROVALMEETING:DATE:DATE:HDATE~CDATE:D~F~

SAFETYEVALUATION TEMPORARY MODIFICATION Temporary Connection ofRecording Equipment forTroubleshooting theMag-A-Stat VoltageRegulator 92-00402/06/92REV.0GinnaStationRochester Gas&ElectricCorporation Preparedby:StaffEngineerDateReviewedby:ReactorgineerateReviewedby:Manager,Technical Engineering DaeIApprovedby:tc><t~sIo1/jChairman, PORCDate 1~0ScopeofAnalysis1'Thepurposeofthisanalysisistoevaluatethesafetyconsequences ofconnecting temporary recording equipment tovariouspointsintheMag-A-Stat VoltageRegulator.

Therecording equipment willgatherdataoveranundetermined lengthoftime,forthepurposeoftrouble-shootingtheRegulator.

Thefollowing pointswillbemonitored:

>Regulator InputVoltage>FieldBreakerVoltage>Trinistat InputVoltage>Trinistat

-ExciterFieldVoltage>Trinistat

-ExciterFieldCurrent2.0References 2~1PlantProcedure A-1406,ControlofTemporary Modifications 2.22.33.0GinnaStationUFSAR,Sections10.2.2&10.7.6.8GinnaStationTechnical Specifications, Section3.7Structures, Systems,andComponents Affected(SSC)TheMag-A-Stat VoltageRegulator andGenerator FieldExcitation couldbeaffectedbythismodification.

4~04.14'4.3SafetyFunctionofAffectedSSC'sTheMag-A-Stat VoltageRegulator doesnotprovideanyfunctionnecessary forthesafeshutdownoftheplant.TheGinnaStationUFSAR,insection10.7.6.8addresses theGenerator ExciterCoolingsystemindescriptive formonly.TheGinnaStationTechnical Specifications donotaddressGenerator Excitation insection3.7,Auxiliary Electrical Systems.TempMod92-004Page102/06/92Rev0 4'TheGinnaStationUFSAR,insection10.2.2addresses Generator excitation indescriptive formonly.5.05.15.26.06.16.26'6.4EffectsonSafetySincetheMag-A-Stat VoltageRegulator providesnosafetyfunction, therewillbenoeffectonplantsafetybythetemporary installation ofrecording equipment.

Therecording equipment utilizedwillhaveisolated, highimpedance inputssothatnoinadvertent failureoftheVoltageRegulator, duetotherecording equipment isanticipated.

Unreviewed SafetyQuestionConclusions Theproposedtemporary modification willnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence of.anaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecausethesystemaffectedisnotrequiredforthesafeshutdownoftheplant.Theproposedtemporary modification villnotincreasetheprobability orconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecausethesystemaffectedisnotrequiredforthesafeshutdownoftheplant.Theproposedtemporary modification willnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccident.

previously evaluated intheUFSARbecausethesystemaffectedisnotrequiredforthesafeshutdownoftheplant.Theproposedtemporary modification willnotcreatethepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment ofadifferent typethananyevaluated intheUFSARbecauseonlytheMag-A-Stat VoltageRegulator andGenerator Excitation couldbeaffected.

6.5The-proposed temporary modification villnotreduceanymarginofsafetyasdefinedonthebasisofanyTechnical Specification becauseonly'Generator ExciterCoolingisaddressed inTechnical Specifications onadescription basisonly.TempMod92-004Page202/06/92Rev0 7.07.1conclusion Basedontheabovediscussion, theproposedtemporary modification doesnotpresentanunreviewed safetyquestion.

TempMod92-004Page302/06/92Rev0 A140613TEMPORARY MODIFICATION EVALUATION PartI<oornaorTMNo.:'72-gO5pate:OZ/8'itle:ÃEv0PartII(Intaor)Type:Electrical FluidXStructural pitio:THER'SRLCRKIN7HE'/GVTLINE'RYSRHEWN7BB7QQ787BEEdh!DBVI'H2.

7%7ECdULDZE7Mrorrrass=

HENEr.~~LLH8OErP47MaNooem)7-N';INJTQLI.8N/iPlFVP7PDEear.LINED~bLdIIS.kJP"7R9W.PartIII(StationEngineer)

DesignInputs(i.e.Press,Temp,Corrosion, MinC,Seismicetc.)S~5o-I/4ZPO'Pang/y'2zA/iTPl'~55<4'atc

A-1406:14Evaluation:

R.+M~~lrrI'rCalfk,~~gcogAcpA/'oVc5'~i~*++~~scAPcc~l4&tc.

41.$'kcrpTestingRequirements:

ucc@lC.e7.cKci'~~orQDnNSafetyAnalysis:

cdocl5wuSv'alAJ0ModeRestrictions.

PREPAREDBY:REVIEWEDBY:APPROVEDBY:PORCAPPROVALMEETING:DATE:0(2Dam:

ATTACHMEN TEMPpRARyEDIFICATION EVALUATION A-1406:13 PartI.(TMCoordinator)

THNo.:Tittle;telPo<~Date:Qowg~rCM(Mc0Pc~f/V-ulPM~i&cZc.d.~>7~fP-PartXI(Instigator)

Type:Electricel MFluidStructurel

==

Description:==

>/94ECTd'e.Q)ZQIIUK~P<~rV78&PartIII(StationEngineer)

DesignInputs(i.e.Press,Temp,Corrosion, Hind,Seismicetc.)'@CH<Cat,eSo>~

Re@ieared TTACECOW"A-1406:14 Evaluation:

C.M-I~us+(onJ/ACIL~~(.'rZ.c.~~yu=nJD~uiPnn<~i(~rV~~~~~ia=a~~-N~~ic-(M~KZ3TestingRequirements:

m'c)/L'mSafetyAnalysis:

Attachdocumentatio e-30f9-6=tVP9cuA1.7 AJModeRestrictions:

PREPAREDBY:REVIEWEDBY:APPROVEDBY:PORCAPPROVALMEETING:DATE:DATE:DATE:Z-ZSVWWcDATE SAFETYEVALUATION TEMPORARY MODIFICATION Temporary Connection ofRecording Equipment forTroubleshooting ErraticOperation ofHeatTraceCircuitE8P92-006Q/gQ/fG.gyMi><c~4Ic7->pP02/28/92REV.0GinnaStationRochester Gas6ElectricCorporation Preparedby:StafEngineerDateReviewedby:ReactorEngineerDateReviewedby:rTechn'lEngineering DteApprovedby:W(c~Chairman, PORCZ/zH/gZDate 1.0ScopeofAnalysis1'1.3Thepurposeofthisanalysisistoevaluatethesafetyconsequences ofconnecting temporary recording equipment toHeatTraceCircuitE8P.Thiscircuithasexperienced erraticoperation.

Thefollowing pointswillbemonitored:

>SpareContactonE8PThermostat Controller

>E8PThermocouple mVInputPerProcedure S-3.6,circuitE8PisheattraceforBoricAcidPumpg1,primary,Recorder14Ainputpoint18.2.0References 2~1GinnaProcedure A-1406,ControlofTemporary Modifications 2~22.32.4GinnaStationUFSAR,Sections9.3.4.2.6 and9.3.4.3.3.5 GinnaStationTechnical Specifications, Section3.2.3GinnaStationProcedure S-3.6,Auxiliary BuildingHeatTracingSystemOperation 3.0Structures, Systems,andComponents Affected(SSC)TherearenoSSC'saffectedbythisTemporary Modification.

Sinceasparecontactwillbeutilizedontheheattracecontroller, theheattracecircuitwillnotbeaffected.

Sincearecorderwithanisolated, highimpedance inputwillbeusedtomonitorthethermocouple input,thecontroller inputandRecorder14A,point18willnotbeaffected.

4.04.1SafetyFunctionofAffectedSSC'sTheGinnaStationUFSAR,inSection9.3.4.2.6, addresses HeatTraceSystemsassociated withCVCS.Thissectiondoesnotspecifically addressheattraceassociated withBoricAcidPumpg1.TempMod92-006Page102/28/92Rev0 4.2TheGonna9.3.4'.3'/Pumps.ThisaddressheatStationUFSAR,inSectionaddresses theBoricAcidTransfersectiondoesnotspecifically traceassociated withthepump.4.3TheGinnaStationTechnical Specification, inSection3.2.3(b),addresses limitingconditions foroperation regarding theBoricAcidPumps.ShouldHeatTraceCircuitE8Pfail,BoricAcrA'PumpP1mayhavetobedeclaredinoperable.

lfitremainsinoperable formorethan24hours,thereactormustbebroughttoHotShutdown.

5.05.1"6'6.1EffectsonSafetyHeattraceassociated withtheBoricAcidPsinherently providesnodirectsafetyfunction.

Failureofheattraceononepmpumpsoperationally coveredbySpecifications.

Connection ofrecording equipment willnotcauseinadvertent failureoftheheattracecircuit(seeparagraph 3.0,above).Unreviewed SafetyQuestionConclusions Theproposedtemporary modification willnotincreasetheprobability of.occurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecausethisheattracecircuitdoesnotdirectlyprovideanaccidentmitigating function.

6.26.3Theproposedtemporary modification willnotincreasetheprobability orconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecausethisheattracecircuitdoesnotdirectlyprovideasafetyfunction.

Theproposedtemporary modification willnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecauseisolatedrecording techniques willbeusedandthus,willnotcauseheattracecontroller failure.TempMod92-006Page202/28/92Rev0 6~46.57.0Theproposedtemporary modification willnotcreatethepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment ofadifferent typethananyevaluated intheUFSARbecauseisolatedrecording techniques willbeusedandthus,willnotcauseheattracecontroller orBoricAcidPumpfailure.Theproposedtemporary modification willnotreduceanymarginofsafetyasdefinedonthebasisofanyTechnical Specification becauseisolatedrecording techniques willbeusedandthus,willnotcauseheattracecontroller failure.Shouldthecontroller orheattracefailduringthetroubleshooting period,causingBoricAcidPumpg1tobeinoperable, Technical Specifications providethecriteriafortaking.thereactortoshutdown.

Conclusion 7~1Basedontheabovediscussion, theproposedtemporary modification doesnot.presentanunreviewed safetyquestion.

TempMod92-004Page302/06/92Rev0

T~~YMODIFICATION EVALUATION A-1406:13partITNNo.:Title:coornator)7II/3kSL'"Wit'-.Fc LWl'~~4cbYPartZZ(Instigator)

Type:Electrical FluidStructural

==

Description:==

EVALUATE779EZN~LgP77ygyg~7-p~)yyLEHkREI'AIRfLPNPDIUTHE'N)P7pipe~PartIII(StationEngineer)

DesignInputs(i.e.Press,Temp,Corrosion, Mind,Seismicetc.)7CC'Sic:./~3~tl1Li++'>-I

A-1406:14

~aluation-('1TestingRequirements:

(/,c,g.,!(mSrC.'&Cn@(C%/~Os6IW~v(<(v>.=l"-'SafetyAnalysis:

tachdocu~W~(CQ/C~g/<~WOOMPg/IL~tc;m(~ModeRestrictions:

PREPAREDBY:REVIEWEDBY:APPROVEDBY:DATE:DATE:DATE:PORCAPPROVALMEETING:(I-/>X'N",l-OS'ATg.

A-1406:13 TEMPORARY MODIFICATION EVALUATION PartI(TMCoordonator)TMHo.:Date:Title:FiePOPartIIInltzator)

Type:Electrical FluidStructural

==

Description:==

FliteVRcvE-005tPZ&iU('j&c T'e~sbaurc"asza.~rAet4~vd.ueWrn4I88'A'~PartIII(StationEngineer)

DesignInputs(i.e.Press,Temp,Corrosion, Mind,Seismicetc.)Vo-l~e',LI-'~u"~<3op.a;'t-<.8.'-A.'sCi5 TTACHHENCONT'DA-1406:14 Evaluation:

P8mf~pg>>/~~wed's4crcgI-e~~~VISt'mgas'sg/a)c.~estingRhquirements:

SafetyAnalysis:

~cattacdocumentat'o e-30MadeRestrictions PREPAREDBY:HDATE:3czgZ-REVIEWEDBY:APPROVEDBY:PORCAPPROVALNEETING:Z.-CcWDATE:DATEDATE:

ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION 89EASTAVENUEROCHESTER

~NEWYORK14649GZNNASTATIONSAFETYANALYSISFORTEMPORARY MODZFZCATION REVISION0MARCH11,1992TEMPORARY RIGGINGTOREMOVE/INSTALL FIRESYSTEMVALVE9209PREPAREDBY:ResponsbleStaffEngineerDateREVIEWEDBY:ReactorEngineerDateREVIEWEDBY:teAPPROVEDBY:Chairman, PlantOperations RevievCommittee lff~Date S0YSZB:Thepurposeofthisanalysisistoevaluatethesafetyconsequences ofattaching temporary riggingtoastructural memberoftheTurbineBuildinglocatedaboveFireProtection Systemvalve9209.2.02'2~22'2'REPERENCES A-1406,ControlofTemporary Modifications.

A-303Preparation, ReviewandApprovalofSafetyAnalysisforMinorModifications forSpecialTests.Interoffice Correspondence, datedMarch30,1987/Sub)ectAFCAR86-12:RDItemg2Anchorage ofTemporary Equipment atGinnaStation,FromL.SucheskitoJ.Widay.Technical Specifications Section3.14.3.0SUCTURESSYSTEMSCOMPONESECSSC3.1Structures, systemsandcomponents affecteddirectlyorindirectly bythemodification areastabledbelow.TurbineBldg~setemFireProtection otsValve92094'SAPETPUNCTZONOPAPPECTEDSSCsF14.2ThisareaoftheTurbineBuildingpresently servesnosafetyfunction.

It'sprimarypurposeistoprovideprotection ofsecondary plantequipment.

TheFireProtection Systemandvalve9209areclassified asSafetySignificant.

TheirsafetyfunctionistoprovideasupplyofwaterforFireProtection.

SafetyAnalysisPage~Revision0

5.1Thistemporary modification willnotadversely affectanyothercomponents orequipment withanysafetyfunctions.

Thistemporary modification willnotadversely affecttheTurbineBuilding, asitservesnosafetyfunction.

Thistemporary modification willnotadversely affecttheFireProtection System,asthisportionofthesystemwillbetakenoutofserviceformaintenance ofvalve9209.Thetemporary modification willinturnberemovedwhenmaintenance iscompleted andcanthusnotaffecttheinservice FireProtection System.6.0UNREVISED SAFETYUESTIONCONCLUSONS6.1Theproposedmodification willnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSAR.Onlythestructure oftheTurbineBuildingandtheoutofserviceportionoftheFireProtection Systemwillbeaffectedandothersurrounding equipment isnotutilizedforanyaccidents evaluated intheUFSAR.6.26.3Theproposedmodification willnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecauseonlytheTurbineBuildingstructure andtheoutofserviceportionoftheFireProtection Systemwillbeaffected.

Theproposedmodification willnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecauseonlytheTurbineBuildingstructure andtheoutofserviceportionoftheFireProtection Systemwillbeaffected.

6.46'Theproposedmodification willnotincreasethecon-sequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecauseonlytheTurbineBuildingstructure andtheoutofserviceportionoftheFireProtection Systemwillbeaffected.

Theproposedmodification willnotcreateapossibility foranaccidentofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheUFSARbecauseonlytheTurbineBuildingstructure andtheoutofserviceportionoftheFireProtection Systemwillbeaffectedandtherequirements ofTechnical Specifications havebeenconsidered.

SafetyAnalysis~009Page~Revision~

'.7Theproposedmodification willnotcreateapossibility foramalfunction ofequipment ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheUFSARbecausethismodification onlyaffectstheTurbineBuildingstructure andtheoutofserviceportionoftheFireProtection System.Theproposedmodification willnotreduceanymarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanyTechnical Specifi-cationbecauseonlytheTurbineBuildingstructure andtheoutofserviceportionoftheFireProtection Systemisaffected, thetemporary modification willberemovedandthesystemrestoretoservicefollowing maintenance ofthevalve.'.0 CONCLUBION 7~1Thismodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbaseduponthediscussion contained withinthisdocument.

SafetyAnalysis92-009Page~Revision0JI2LUlK TEMPORARY MODIFICATION EVALUATION PARTITMNo:92-010Title:NSTALLffAffMFSEADate:~03239Rev.0ECODPARTZITypo!Electrical

~Pluid~Structural

==

Description:==

IN ORDERTOMONTORMFPSSTARTUPINSTALLATEMPORARY TRANSMITT GSOWNANDUBINGANDTHREEWAYBLOCKVALVEDOWNSTREAMOFROOTVALV3810D3810CFORPS-205AMFPSDPPRESSURESW0STEMPORARY WIREROMTOUTUTOFP-215POIT-6LOCAEDNHELOCDPSMRN0AGOULDRECORDERLOCATE0SEST0PUTFROEPUTETOTWATERCOTROLPAN.WDENEWWLBSUPL0VW00LETHESMEBEINGIVffffOWSEADPWILLBEDEFEATEDSeettacheSetcamakedudws3303-9051627195fodetasPARTZZZDesignInputs:Sealwater IectodesSealwater I'ect'oesFluid:CondensaewCode:ANSIB3.9essu:400siteeature:375FEvaluationt CHANICAL-stealte304o6and'tt'eseasssta'nless sbwacmessiof'tt'e36or30'setseeeatureressuendcodedesicondt'oseG'scSP-863hevvestenewtsGewoodAssNo25-257-50te1Swaistrumetblocvavew'tthesstecodeteeratueTeewtansm'eshalbesmmodetas'tte'smadefo6SSthree'smeetse'ets.B.his0siwoessue'sasoeenewts'ttew'esuottothe'newtubinadvalveseevadeateaectsothepage1of3 TEMPORARY MODIFICATION 92-010Evaluation (cont.)nevtubiisnotaconsideationsinceesset'athetubinwi1beatamb'entterneratueduetonoowtouhthenewtubiandthereissufficient flexibilit

'etub'nruntoaccommodate anthermalexansion.Sketch1oviestenecessarinstallation instructions.

BELECTRICAL-ternorarwirewilbeconectedattestointT-6eerenceRG&Edw3303-1627wtteeedwateanelocateditheFProomaditoeteoraGoudrecodeisolocate'hFrooSceT-6'saestabishedtestointandtheGouldmodel22005hssoatednutscontrocircuitswillnotbeaffectedbancabeauts.headditioofteRosemount DPtransmitter willoinutoteGouldrecorderandconseuentlvillalsonotaffectcotolcircuits.

IordertoreventanfalselowseaDPs'otr'nthe"A"MFPwh'lethenewtransmitter tubiisbeinfilledandveedtheDPs'wibebasseuttewtas'tte's'ervice.iswibeaccomsedboetestatesdecoteinals1andontermblocatedirelarackRA-2frontforthecotactromea-58whichclosestomakeuthe"A"MFPtric'rcuit.Tsw1reventtheAR-58contactitheMFPtricircuitromcosadenerizintet'oil.RelaAR-58isdeee'we-5'sclosewicthenclosescontact-58'eutc'ts.seeattacheddrawis33013-1959 sh110905-0030 sad10905-318 foeferenceCOPERATIONS-Asacomensatormeasurew'leteowsealDPisdefeatedanAux'liar0eatorshallbesatedocalltomonitor"A"MFPseaDP.TestingRequirements:

Thenewtub'ncoectionsshabecheckedforleakaMFPsealDtriiostatinlowvavatnsmitter8afetyReview:Seeattachedsafetevaluatoo9-010DesignReview:TheDesiconsidered andalasatisfacto ilmet.MoleRestriction:

oneReviewCeckistesbeelicable'temshavebeeaddressepage2of3 TEMPORARY MODIFICATION 92-.010Evaluation (cont.)PREPAREDBY!REVIEWEDBY:REVIEWEDBY:APPROVEDBY.PORCAPPROV~MEETZNg:DATE!DATE:5<<iFKDATE!849FQDATE!35~DATE!Z5Page3of3 SAFETYANALYSISTemporary Connection ofaPressureTransmitter to"A"MFPSealDifferential PressureSwitchandTemporary DefeatofLowSealDPMFPTripGinnaStationRochester GasandElectricCorporation 89EastAveRochester, NewYork14649TEMPORARY MODIFICATION

~92-00Rev.0March23,1992Preparedby:Reviewedby:StafgieReactorEngineer~/ePzDateDateReviewedby:ManagerTecicalEng'ering Approvedby:Chairman, PlantOprat1onsReviewCommittee 3~tWz-Daeat

1.0ScopeofAnalysisThepurposeofthisanalysisistoevaluatethesafetyconsequences oftemporarily connecting apressuretransmitter acrossthe"A"mainfeedwaterpump(MFP)sealinjection differential pressure(DP)switchPS-2051.1.2Inaddition, theaffectsoftemporarily defeating the"A"MFPlowsealDPpumptripwhilefillingandventingthenewtransmitter willalsobeevaluated.

1'Thesafetyconsequences oftemporarily connecting arecordertotestpoint6inthefeedwaterpanelhasalreadybeenreviewedunderTSR92-057andfoundtobeacceptable.

Therefore, thisanalysiswillnotaddresstherecorder2.0References 2.1PlantProcedure A-1406,ControlofTemporary Modifications 2.2GinnaUFSARsections10.4.4,10.4.5,15.2.62.3Temporary Modification 92-0103.0Structures, Systems,andComponents Affected(SSC)The"A"MainFeedWaterPumpisaffectedbythisTemporary modification 4.0SafetyFunctionofAffectedSSC's4.1TheMFPdoesnotperformanysafetyfunctions 4.2ThefunctionofthelowsealDPtripissolelytopreventpumpsealdamageduetolossofcooling.Itdoesnotprovideanysafetyfunctions 5.0EffectsonSafety5.1Thepurposeofaddingapressuretransmitter tothesealpressureswitchistorecordpressuretransients duringunitshutdownandstartup.Onseveraloccasions duringpressuretransients associated withstartupandshutdownofthefeedwatersystemlowsealDPtripshaveoccurredonthe"A"MFP.Havingahardcopyofthetransients mayprovideinformation whichcouldattribute thepressurefluctuations toequipment manipulations.

SafetyAnalysisTempMod92-010Page1Rev.003/23/92 5.25.3PertheTemporary Modification Evaluation, allthenewtubing,fittings, valves,andthetransmitter meetthedesignrequirements fortemperature andpressurefortheSealWaterInjection system.Inadditionthenewcomponents willbeproperlysupported topreventanystructural damage.Asaprecautionary measure,whilethenewequipment isbeingfilledandvented,thelowsealDPtothe"A"MFPwillbedefeatedtoprecludeanyfalsesignals.Asacompensatory measure,localindication willbemonitored toalerttheoperators toanyreallowDPsignals.Thesemeasureswillpreventanyspuriousorfalselossoffeedwater.6.0Unreviewed SafetyQuestionConclusions 6.16.26.36~46.5Theproposedmodification willnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecausethenewequipment meetsallthesystemdesignrequirements andduringinstallation measureswillbeprovidedtopreventanyfalsepumptripsignalsthatcouldresultinapartiallossoffeedwater.Theproposedmodification willpotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecauseAuxiliary Feedwater isunaffected bythismodification anditprovidesthesafetyfunctionforalossofmainfeedwater.

Theproposedmodification willnotincreasetheprobability orconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecauseanypotential false.signalsfromduringinstallation ofthismodification willbedefeatedanddirectcontinuous operatormonitoring willbeprovidethepumpprotection function.

Theproposedmodification willnotcreatethepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment ofadifferent typethananyevaluated intheUFSARbecausethefeedwatersystemfunctionanddesignwillnotbechanged.Theproposedmodification willnotreduceanymarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanyTechnical Specification becausethemainfeedwaterpumpsarenotpartofTechnical Specifications noraretheypartofanyofthebasis.7.0Conclusion Basedontheabovediscussion theproposedmodification doesnotpresentanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyAnalysisTempMod92-010Page2Rev.003/23/92 TECHNICAL R".C0RDgCategoryTEMPORARY MODIFICATION EVAIUATZON ReviewedPARTITMNo92-011Datt:~032692Rev.0Title:TEMPORARY CHILLERSYSTEMPARTIZType:Electrical xFluidxStructural

==

Description:==

SeeAttachedPARTZZZ'...:.'.",:.-DesignInputs:ServiceWaterd@sznressure:150sidesinternerature:200FFuid:aewaterCode:SIB31.11955ChiledWaterdes'ssur75s'esinterneatue:100FFlu'lcoadWaterCode:ANSIB31.11955Evaluation:

Seeattachement 1TestingRequirements:

Thenewhosesvalvesandiinconnections shalbecheckedfoleakaeiortooerat'hesstem.SafetyReview:Seeattachedsafetevaluatofor92-01DesignReview:TheDesinReviewChecklist considered andallalicableitemshavbeeerA-304hasbeensatsactor'et.

ModeRestriction:

NonePage1of2 Ca,tete>F

~~TEMPORARY MODIFICATION 92-011PREPAREDBY:REVIEWEDBY:DATEs327~>DATE:5iZAPPROVEDBY:PORCAPPROVALMEETINGDATEsDATE:page2of2 i7d'MQ~p/PgJ$gjg~+onlpg~~QPcEA37 TEMPORARY SYSTEMCHILLEDWATERDESCRIPTION:

TheCh'liedHaterSystemprovidescoolingforthecontrolroom.Heatedairandcooledairaremixedinproperproportions withdamperstomaintainacomfortable airtemperature.

Thepurposeofthistemporary systemistomaintaxnchilledwaterprimarily tothecontrolroomandsecondarily tothesevicebuildingHVACsystemswhiletheChilledWaterheatexchangers (SCI03AandB)areremovedfromserviceformaintenance.

ChilledWaterwillbecooledbySex'viceWaterthroughtemporary redundant heatexchangers andrecirculated bytemporary pumps.Eachheatexchanger iscapableofremovingenoughheattoservicethecontrolroom.O1thchilledwaterwillbeeffected, airbalancesandfiltration willremainunchanged fromthenormalHVnyeAC.configuration.

1.5"hoseswillbeconnected betweenServiceWaterandthetubesideofeachheatexchanger.

Theservicewatersystemhasamplecapacitytosupplythisflow.ChilledWaterwillberoutedfromdrainvalvesonthereturnheader(valves5836Aand5836B)tothesuctionsideoftwopumpswithtemporary piping.Thedischarge fromthesepumpswillberoutedtotheshellsideoftheheatexchangers.

TheshellsideoutletswillberoutedtotheChilledWatersupplyheader(valves5834Band5634C),closingtheloop.Thehotandcolddeckcontrollers willfunctionnormallyandcanbeadjustedtomaintainalevelcomfortintheControlRoom.OtherChilledWaterloadswillbesupported butcanbeisolatedorthrottled ifnecessaxy tosupportthedemandoftheControlRoom.DESIGNCRITERIA:

ThefunctionoftheControlRoomHVACSystemistoprovideacontrolled environment forthesafetyandcomfortofthecontrolroompersonnel andtoensuretheoperability ofthecontrol.roomcomponents duringnormaloperating, anticipated operational transient, anddesignbasisaccidentconditions.

CALCULATION:

g=HcphTwhere:Q=heat-transferM=f2owrateCp=specific-heathT=temperature-change (100GPM)(1BTU/LBF)(10F)(8LB/GAL)(60MIN/HR)~480~000BTU/HRWaterflowthroughthetemporary chillwatersystemislimitedbythepressuredrops,50GPMisexpectedforeachofthetwoloops,oratotalof100GPM.TheTemperature oftheServiceWater(LakeOntarioTemperature) istypically lessthan40degforthistimeofyear.TheServiceWaterflowratewillbe100GPMperheatexchanger oratotalof200GPM.TheChilledWaterdeltaTdesiredis10degforatotalheattransferrateof480,000BTU/HR(bothheatexchangers).

theServiceWatertemperature willincrease5degforthisheattransfer.

Thecontrolroomheatloadwasfoundtobe48,700BTU/HasreportedintheDevonrueEnvironmental Study.Theestimated heattransferrateofthistemporary systemisadequatetomaintainalevelofcomfortinthecontrolroom.ExcesscoolingcapacitywillbeusedbytheservicebuildingHVACunits.

EVALUATION:

pg~~a/7Maintaining thecontrolroomsafetyandcomfortisthesafetysignificant functionofthecontrol,roomHVACsystem.Thistemporary systemwillremovetheheatnecessary tomaintainthelevelofcomfortinthecontrolroom.Thissystemismadeupofredundant independent heatexchangers andpumps.Ifanysinglecomponent shouldfail,theredundant systemiscapableofsupplying thecontrolroomHVACcooling.InthelossofServiceWate1snonewcondition introduce

,anentsystemalsousesSWas~theheatsiever,fireisavailable asanaleheatsinkforthetemporary Inthecaseofthelossofoffsitepowerthechillersystemispoweredby.<gus13and15which~~tiedtosafeguards bussesbut~~beautomatically disconnected fordieselloadingconditions.

Analternative powersupplycouldbeobtainedwithinamatterofhoursforthetemporary pump(s).Ifatemporary heatexchanger shouldleak,theturbinebuildingdrainsareadequatetopreventflooding.

TheServiceWaterandChilledWaterSystemsarebothratedat150psianddonotposeanoverpressurization questionshouldtherebeatubetoshellleak.Normalmakeuptothechilledwatersystemwillremaininservicepreventing alossofinventory.

Themaximumheadofthetemporary pumpsiswellbelowthedesignpressureofthepiping.Ate~IP>pQ~$'cg,geops(Aw(.QV4P(4'cuserating6ggppQg+7>aFThetwoSystemsinquestionarenothighenergy,andabreakinthetemporary pipingdoesnotrepresent asafetyhazardtopersonnel inthearea.Thestructural loadsintroduced bythistemporary systemareminor,themajorityoftheweightwillbesupported bytheturbinebuildingbasementconcretefloor.Eachpump,heatexchanger andassociated piping(excluding firehose)willweighlessthan280poundsfullofwater.temporary systemdoesnotposeansewedsafetyquestion.

tdoesnotincreasetheailityofoccurrence ofanaccidenmalfunctio equipment important tosafetypreviously evaluatesafetyanalysisreport.Itdoesnotcreatetheilxanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent ethananyevaluateviouslyinthesafetyanasreport.Itdoesnotreducetheofsafetyasefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specifica

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SAFETYANALYSISTemporary ChillerSystemGinnaStationRochester GasandElectricCorporation 89EastAveRochester, NewYork14649TEMPORARY MODIFICATION

~92-01Rev.0March26,1992Preparedby:Reviewedby:Reviewedby:StaffEngineerReactEnineerManager,Tech'calngineering DateD28'PzDte'32atApprovedby:Chairman, PlantOperations ReviewCommittee at Temporary ChillerSystem1'ScopeofAnalysisThepurposeofthisanalysisistoevaluatethesafetyconsequencesoftemporarily connecting achillersystemfortheControlRoomHVACsystemwhileServicewatervalvChillervalvesarebeingreplacedinthepermanent system.Thesystemwillbeconnected forapproximately oneweek.2.0References 2'2'2032.42'PlantProcedure A-1406,ControlofTemporary Modifications GinnaUFSARsections6.4,9.4.3Temporary Modification 92-011GinnaTechnical Specifications sections3.3.5,3.5.6DevonrueEnvironmental Study3'4'Structures, Systems,andComponents Affected(SSC)TheChilledWaterSystemwillbeaffectedbythistemporary modification.

ThechillersystemprovidescoolingtothecontrolroomandservicebuildingHVACunits.TheChillersystemisaclosedloopsystemcooledbyServiceWaterthroughtwo1004capacityredundant heatexchangers andpumpsSafetyFunctionofAffectedSSC'sXntheeventofadesignbasisaccident, theControlRoomventilation systemprovidessufficient radiation protection, ventilation, filtering andToxicgasdetection toensurethatcontrolroompersonnel canperformallrequiredsafetyfunctions fromtheControlRoom.4.25'AlthoughControlRoomcoolingisnotrequiredbytheTechnical Specifications, undercertainlimitingControlRoomheatloadandoutsideairtemperature conditions, thechillersarerequiredtomaintainControlRoomtemperature withindesignlimits.(ref2.5)EffectsonSafety5~1TheControlRoomchillersystemisacommercial gradenon-safetyrelatednon-class 1EsystemandisnotrequiredbythecontrolroomHVACsystemtoperformsafetyfunction4.1.SafetyAnalysisTempMod92-011Page1Rev.003/26/92 Temporary ChillerSystem5.2Thechillersystemisasafetysignificant system.Conseque-ntly,thetemporary systemwillbeprovidedwithredundant pumpsandheatexchangeQpowered frombus13and15similar.tothepermanent chillersystem.ServicewatercoolingwillbesuppliedwithfirehosesfromtheTurbineBuildingheader.TheTurbinebuildingHeaderhassupplyconnections frombothServicewaterheaderssimilartotheIntermediate buildingheaderwhichsuppliesthepermanent Chillersystem.Thetemporary systemmeetsboththeServicewaterandtheChilledwatersystempressureandtemperature requirements.

5.35.45.5Thistemporary systemprovidesredundant chillercapacitysufficient toremoveheatfromControlRoomloads.According tothetemporary modification evaluation (ref2.3),thetemporary systemwithbothheatexchangers operating willprovideapproximately 1/3(480,000BTU/HR)thecapacityoftheexistingsystem.Basedontestdata,reference 2.5,the1004powerheatloadfortheControlRoomisapproximately 49,000BTU/HR.Theremainder oftheheatloadisfromtheservicebuilding.

Duetotheweatherconditions duringthemonthsofMarchandAprilandthereducedheatloadsasaresultofshutdown, thisisconsidered sufficient capacitytopreventelevatedtemperatures inbothareas.However,shouldtemperatures increaseintheControlRoom,coolingflowtotheServicebuildingwillbethrottled orisolated.

Thiswillensurethatasaminimum,thecontrolroomwillhavesufficient.

cooling.Previousoperational historyduringshutdowns wi.ththechillersystemtotallyisolatedforshortdurationdidnotcauseanyappreciable ControlRoomheatup.Shouldanyleaksdevelopineitherthetemporary SWorChillerpiping/hoses, theassociated volumesareenveloped bya,breakinthe36"Circulating Waterpiping.Nowatersprayhazardswillbeintroduced sincethetemporary hoseswillnotberoutedintheareaofanysafegaurds buses.6.0F1Unreviewed SafetyQuestionConclusions Theproposedmodification willnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecausereplacement ofthepermanent commercial gradeChilledWatersystemwiththeredundant looptemporary systemdoesnotreducethemarginsofsafety.SafetyAnalysisTempMod92-011Page2Rev.003/26/92 Q

ATTACHMENT TEMPORARY MODZPZCATION EVALUATION PARTIoatoqlezTMNo:92-029&89%0/9ITitle:DisableCET'sA-7,B-5,C-8,G-4,H-13,K-3>-i4-J<PARTIZType:E1ectrical

==

Description:==

Intermittent and/orfailedCET'sarecausingspuriousalarms,erroneous indication, orfailedindication.

DisableCETinputs,aslistedabove,atIncoreRackg4asfollows:A-7:T2BB-5:T2AC-8T1BG-4:T1BH-13:T1AK-3:T1Bg->O,'IATerminals Terminals Terminals Terminals Terminals Terminals 5/63/421/2231/3223/245/69/>>PARTZZIDesignInputs:RGEDrawing33013-1569 WR/TR9200911UFSARTable7.5-1,Note2UFSARSection7.7.2.6.4.5 Technical Specification Table3.5-3Evaluation:

GinnaTechnical Specifications requireaminimumoffourCETchannelspercorequadranttobeoperable.

TheGinnaUFSARindicates thatonecoremapperhourisgenerated andstoredinhePlantProcessComputerSystem(PPCS).Disabling theaboveCET'swillnotaffectTechnical Specification compliance orcreateanunreviewgjl safetyconfiguration.

Astheattachedsketchindicates, morethqgHfour CET'sperquadrantremainavailable andthedisabledCET'swillnotaffectPPCSmapping.7@~z4aYi'c<<<Pf'a8TpgP+lE'JCaS TestingRequirements:

Ensurethattheremaining CET'sareoperating normally.

SafetyRev3.ew:RefertoattachedSafetyEvaluation.

DesignReview:Alltheapplicable itemsinFigure1ofA-304havebeenadequately addressed andnootherissuesareofconcern.PModeRestriction:

NoneTE.PORCAPPROVALMEETING:DATE:/dkavI.7<(oX ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION 89EASTAVENUEROCHESTER, NEWYORK14649GINNASTATIONSAFETYEVALUATION FORTEMPORARY MODIFICATION 92-029REVISION0JULY9i1992DISABLECOREEXITTHERMOCOUPLES PREPAREDBY~~rRespona.bleStaffEngineerDateREVIEWEDBY:ReactorEngineerDateREVIEWEDBY:Technical ManagerateAPPROVEDBY:hairman,PlantOperations ReviewCommittee 7/5ate DISABLECOREEXITTHERMOCOUPLES

.SAFETYANALYSIS1.01.2SCOPEOFANALYSIS:

Thispurposeofthisanalysisistoevaluatethesafetyconsequences oftemporarily disabling uptoallbutfourCoreExitThermocouples (CET's)perquadrantwiththeexception thatRVLISCET'sinlocations E-6,F-8,G-7,H-6,J-8andJ-9willnotbedisabled.

Thethermocouples aretypically disabledduetotheproduction oferroneous indication leadingtospuriousalarmsorbasicthermocouple failure.2.02.12~22.32.

42.5REFERENCES

A-1406,ControlofTemporary Modifications.

A-303,Preparation, ReviewandApprovalofSafetyAnalysis.

GinnaStationUFSAR,Sections7.3.2.3,7.6.5,7.7.2.6.4.5andTable7.5-1,Note2.RG&EDrawing33013-1569.

GinnaStationTechnical Specifications, Table3.5-3.3'STRUCTtH&S SYSTEMSANDCOMPONENTS AFFECTEDSSC3.1Mappingoverallcoretemperature willbeaffectedslightlybydisabling uptoallbutfourthermocouples perquadrant.

Aslongasaminimumoffourthermocouples perquadrantremain,eachquadrantwillbeadequately monitored fortemperature.

4.0SAFETYFUNCTIONOFAFFECTEDSSCs4.14.2TheCET'sarepositioned tomeasurefuelassemblycoolanttemperatures atpreselected corelocations forthepurposesofmappingandforinputtotheRVLIS.TheGinnaStationUFSARindicates thatonecoremapperhourisgenerated andstoredinthePlantProcessComputerSystem(PPCS).Disabling allbutfourCET'sSafetyAnalysisTempMod92-029Page1Revision0 willhaveaminimalaffectonthismapping-4'TheGinnaStationTechnical Specifications requireaminimumoffourcETchannelspercorequadranttobeoperableandfortwochannelsoftheRVLIStobeoperable-Disabling allbutfourCET'spercorequadrantandensuringthattheRVLgpCET'sasindicated inSection1.1arenotdisabled~hot affectTechnical Specification compliance.

5.0EFFECTSONSAFETY5.1PerSection4.0,noeffectonplantsafetyisanticipated.

6.0 UNEUVIEWEDSAFETYUESTIONCONCLUSIONS

6.16.2TheproposedTemporary Modification willnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecauseoverallcoretemperature willstillbeadequately monitored.

TheproposedTemporary Modification willnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecausetheCETsystemwillbeminimally affectedandtheRVLISsystemwillbeunaffected.

6.36.4TheproposedTemporary Modification willnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUFSAR.Nootherequipment important tosafetyisaffectedbythistemporary modification totheCETsystem(otherthancoretemperature monitoring) becausetheCET'srequiredfortheRVLISwillnotbedisabled.

TheproposedTemporary Modification willnotincreasetheconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUFSAR.Noother,equipment important, tosafetyisaffectedbythistemporary modification totheCETsystem(otherthancoretemperature monitoring) becausetheCET'srequiredfortheRVLISwillnotbedisabled.

6'Theproposedmodification willnotcreateapossibility foranaccidentofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheUFSAR.Noequipment isaffectedbythistemporary modification totheCETsystem(otherthancoretemperature monitoring) duetotherequirement thattheCET'sfortheRVLISwillnotbedisabled.

SafetyAnalysisTempMod92-029Page2Revision0 Qi0 6.66.7TheproposedTemporary Modification willnotcreateapossibility foramalfunction ofequipment ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheUFSARbecausethisinstallation hasbeenshowntonotimpactanyequipment important tosafety.TheproposedTemporary Modification willnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanyTechnical Specification.

Eachcorequadrantwillbeadequately monitored byaminimumoffourCET's.Inaddition, CET'srequiredfortheRVLISwillnotbedisabled.

7.0CONCLUSION

F1Basedontheaboveanalysis, theproposedTemporary Modification doesnotpresentanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyAnalysisTempMod92-029Page3Revision0

I(ATTACHMENT 3.TEMPORARY MODZPZCATZON EVALUATZON PARTZII/I//9j':~dJIgf4TZTLE:AOV-9553B AVTRinseDrainValveReplacement PARTXIType:Electrical RluidXStructural

==

Description:==

DuetoAOV-9553B leakingthrough,atemporary manualdrainvalvehasbeeninstalled.

TheAOVwasreplacedwitha4inchflangewitha2inchpipeandvalve.Whenanappropriate replacement valveisavailable, thetemporary valvewillberemoved.iPARTXXXDesignXnputs:LineSpec300-1;perDWG33013-1911 Shtl;Condensate pumpdis-charge:DesignPressure=400psig,designTemp=150DegFOperating Pressure=300psig,Operating Temp=100DegFValve=HhvRVyearaaSoi,gageCranevalvecatalogThisinstallation isnon-QA,non-Seismic, non-SafetyClassandnon-ASMECodeClass.Evaluation:

TheAVTsystemwasavendoxsuppliedsystemandspecificdesignconditions arenotxeadilyavailable.

However,theinterfacing Condensate systemdesignparameters envelopetheAVTsystem,consequently, theCondensate Pumpsuctionoperating conditions willbeused.Duringnormalopexation, valve9553Bisisolatedviaupstreamvalvesfromeachvessel,consequently, itdoesnotseenormalcondensate pxessure.

Duringoperation oftheflushingcyclethereisapxessurereducingorificeupstreamofdrainvalve9553B.Assuch,thedrainvalvedoesnotexperience the300llP~~IId'Ithisapplication.

toom'~TestingRequirements:

NoneSafetyReview:SeePCN91T-1254forprocedure T-6.1DesignReview:Thedesignreviewchecklist, perA-304hasbeenreviewedandallapplicable itemshavebeenmet.ModeRestriction:

NoneATEePORCAPPROVALMEETINGHS4~il"/8-DATE'rep~el.

Sg:Mvoe~eg5g;4ppra~ck4~le5Aczz ATTACHMENT 1TEMPORARY MODIFICATION EVALUATION PARTITMNo:92-045Date:06/04/92Rev:0TITLE:AOV-9553B AVTRinseDrainValveReplacement PARTIIType:Electrical PluidXStructural

==

Description:==

DuetoAOV-9553B leakingthrough,atemporary manualdrainvalvehasbeeninstalled.

TheAOVwasreplacedwitha4inchflangewitha2inchpipeandvalve.Whenanappropriate replacement valveisavailable, thetemporary valvewillberemoved.PARTIIIDesignInputs:LineSpec300-1;perDWG33013-1911 Sht1;Condensate pumpdis-charge:DesignPressure=400psig,designTemp=150DegFOperating Pressure=300psig,Operating Temp=100DegFValve=Lunkenheimer 150S,300WOGCranevalvecatalogThisinstallation isnon-QA,non-Seismic, non-Safety Classandnon-ASMECodeClass.Evaluation:

TheAVTsystemwasavendorsuppliedsystemandspecificdesignconditions arenotreadilyavailable.

However,theinterfacing Condensate systemdesignparameters envelopetheAVTsystem,consequently, theCondensate Pumpsuctionoperating conditions willbeused.Duringnormaloperation, valve9553Bisisolatedviaupstreamvalvesfromeachvessel,consequently, itdoesnotseenormalcondensate pressure.

Duringoperation oftheflushingcyclethereisapressurereducingorificeupstreamofdrainvalve9553B.Assuch,thedrainvalvedoesnotexperience the300psigpressureandthe300WOGratingisconsidered adequateforthisapplication.

TestingRequirements:

NoneSafetyReview:SeePCN91T-1254forprocedure T-6.1DesignReview:Thedesignreviewchecklist, perA-304,hasbeenreviewedandallapplicable itemshavebeenmet.ModeRestriction:

NonePREPAREDBY.REVIEWEDBY:DATE:APPROVEDBYPORCAPPROVALMEETING:/~5'0sl"/8DATEDATE:/

SECTIONE-PROCEDURE CHANGESThissectionistocontainadescription ofthechangestoprocedures asdescribed intheUFSARandasummaryofthesafetyevaluation pursuanttotherequirements of10CFR50.59(b).

PROCEDURE PCN9Items1,2,or6If"yes"isansweredforItems1or2,providethetypeof"inconsequential change"orthereferenced 10CFR50.59 safetyevaluation below:ChangeType:If"no"wasansweredforItem6,providethebasisforexclusion below:BasisforExclusion:

00vau-Item7Zf"no"hasbeenansweredforeachquestioninitemsthischangeisnotanUnreviewed SafetyQuestion.

.)ustification fortheseconclusions below.Listreferencer'.

inthespaceprovided.

WrittenJustification:

7athrough7gDocumenttheanymaterialhr~frr~9a-zz.eeeso.s-9If"yes"wasansweredforItem3,checkthisboxIf"yes",wasansweredforItem7,pORCshallreviewandapprovethissubmittal.

ThisproposedchangeisanUnreviewed SafetyQuestion(USQ)andrequiressubmittal totheNRCfortheirreview.Submitted By:

gggg/"oA~agp+Z/<ridZROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION Inter-Office Correspondence February6,1992

SUBJECT:

AxialRepositioning oftheControlBanksAandBSafetyEvaluation per10CFR5059TO:PORCOnOctober16,1991,bymeetingf91-135,PORCapprovedthesafetyevaluation forrepositioning theShutdownBankofrodsto227.Thebasisforthisapprovalwasthatwith227stepswithdrawn remaining abovetheactivefuelregion,thereactivity effectofthechangeinbankpositionwasnegligible.

Thiswasconfirmed duringrepositioning fromobserving nochangeineitherRCStemperature oraxialfluxdistribution.

Thepurposeofthisevaluation istoaddresstherepositioning oftheControlBanksAandBto228and229stepsrespectively asthefullywithdrawn position.

Thiswouldbeeffective withstartupfollowing the1992outageandwouldresult,withthefulloutpositions foreachbankasfollows:ShutdownBankControlBankAControlBankBControlBankCControlBankD227228229230230Therefore, withthenormalrotationofRCCA'sbetweenbanksthatresultswitheachrefueling, thewearlocations ontherodletswouldbedifferent eachyear.Asdiscussed fortheShutdownBankandobservedduringrepositioning, thereactivity effectofthechangeinthefullywithdrawn positionforCB'sAandBwillhavenoeffectonshutdownmarginandpowerdistribution.

Therefore therewillbenoaffectonthedesignbasiseventsofrodejection, uncontrolled rodwithdrawal ordroppedrod.Technical Specification 3.10.1.3requiresthatthecontrolbankpositionsatisfytheinsertion limitcurvesofTSFigure3.10-1andthatthebanksmovesequentially witha100(+5)stepoverlap.Figure3.10-1showsrodpositionintermsofpercentwithdr-awn.Similartotheinterpretation of"fullywithdrawn" fortheshutdownbank,NuclearSafetyandLicensing interprets the100withdrawn asnotinconsistent withthepositionof228orhigher.Thebankoverlapunitiscurrently settobeginwithdrawal

ofacontrolbankwhenthepreceding bankisat130steps.The1ppstepoverlapisfrom13pto230steps.Itisproposedthatthis130steppositionforinitiation ofoverlapnotbechanged,butthattheAandBbankpositionforstoppingwithdrawal besetat228and229.Sincethereisnoreactivity worthfrom228to230,thischangewillhavenoeffectonthecombinedreactivity worthperstepforbothbanksmovingsequentially andtherefore noeffectonpowerdistribution orcontrol.Also,the2stepvariation fromthe100stepoverlapiswithinthevarianceof+5steps'allowedbyTechnical Specifications.

Thisproposedchangetothe100percentwithdrawn positionforControlBanksAandBhasbeenevaluated inaccordance withthecriteriaof10CFR50.59.

Thischangedoesnotpresentanunreviewed safetyquestionforthefollowing reasons:Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSARwillnotbeincreased.

Therepositioning ofthecontrolbankswillhavenoreactivity effectduetotherodsremaining abovetheactivefuelregionintheproposedfullwithdrawn position.

Thiswas,confirmed duringtherepositioning oftheShutdownBankwherenoeffectonRCStemperature oraxialfluxdistribution wasobserved.

Sincetherodpositionforinitiation ofsucceeding bankwithdrawal willnotbechanged(130steps),therewillbenochangetothecombinedreactivity worthperstepforrodsmovinginsequenceandoverlap.Therefore therewillbenochangeintheroddedpowerdistribution duringwithdrawal andthebasisfortheTechnical Specifica-tionissatisfied.

Adjusting thethumbwheel switches(S2andS4)inthebankoverlapunittoterminate movementofCBAandBat228and229respectively willhavenoeffectontheprobability ofoccurrence ofauncontrolled rodwithdrawal, rodejectionorroddrop.Sincethereisnoreactivity effectoflowerpositionofBankAandB,therecanbenoaffectontheconsequences oftheseevents.Theprobability ofoccurrence, ortheconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetywillnotbeaffected.

Asdiscussed above,adjusting thethumbwheel switchesonthebankoverlapunitwillhavenoeffectontheprobability ofamalfunction oftherodcontrolsystem.Thisadjustment willnotplacetheunitinaconfiguration notoriginally intended.

Asdiscussed abovetherewillbenoaffectontheconsequences ofarodcontrolsystemmalfunction.

Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment ofadifferent typethananyevaluated intheUFSARwillnotbecreated.Repositioning thefullywithdrawn positionofControlBankAandBwillhavenoeffectontherodcontrolorreactorprotection systems.Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification willnotbereduced.Asdiscussed above,bymaintaining thebankpositionatwhichsucceeding bankwithdrawal isinitiated (130steps),therewillbenoeffectonthecombinedreactivity worthpersteporthepowerdistribution.

Therefore themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification isnotreduced.xc:SteveAdamsJeffWaylandJohn.CookReactorEngineer SECTIONF-COMPLETED SPECIALTESTS(ST)ANDEXPERIMENTS Thissectionistocontainadescription ofspecialtestsandexperiments performed inthefacility, pursuanttotherequire-mentsof10CFR50.59(b).

Withinthetimeframeofthisreport,therewerenoneconducted.

CONCLUSIONS:

AlloftheabovewerereviewedbythePORCcommittee withrespecttotheTechnical specifications andthecommittee hasdetermined thatnoTechnical Specification changesorviolations wereinvolved.

Additionally, thesechangeswerereviewedincommittee todetermine iftheypresented anUnreviewed SafetyQuestionandthegeneralsummations ofthesereviewsareasfollows:Thesechangesdonotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence, ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyaspreviously evaluated intheUFSAR,because:2~Thesechangeswereperformed toensurecontinued operability/

availability ofplantequipment andwillnotresultinanyequipment beingoperatedoutsideofitsnormaloperating range.Thisresultsincontinued operability/availability ofequipment important tosafety.Thesechangesadditionally willnotresultinachangeofoperating characteristics ofequipment usedinthetransient/accident mitigation whichprecludes anincreaseintheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccident.

Becausethesechangesensurecontinued availability ofplantequipment, thelimitsshownintheTechnical Specifications, andtheassumptions ofthesafetyanalysesoftheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReportcontinuetobemet.Asaresultthereisnoincreaseintheconsequences ofanypresently postulated accident.

Thesechangesdonotcreatethepossibility foranewordifferent kindofaccident, oramalfunction ofadifferent typefromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecause:3~Thechangesdonotpresentnewfailuremechanisms outsideofthosepresently anticipated, andareboundedbytheeventscontained intheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport.Thechangesdonot.reducethemarginofsafetybecause:Presentmarginsascontained intheTechnical Specifications arevalid,andthesechangesareperformed withinthoselimits.Thesechangeswillnot.resultinviolating thebaselineassumptions madeforequipment availability intheTechnical Specifications, andtheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport.