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{{#Wiki_filter:ATTACHMENT2ATOAEP,:NRC:1322TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSPAGESMARKEDTOSHOWPROPOSEDCHANGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT13/48-9B3/48-1990423012T9904i9PDRADOCK05000815PPDR ELECTRIchLPOVZRSYSTEMSLIMXTIHQCOHDXTIOHFOROPERATIONaminimumthefollovingA.C.electricalpoversourcesshallbeOPERABLZ;a.OnecircuitbetveentheoffsitetransmissionnetvorkaadtheonsiteClass1Edistributionsystem,andb.Onedieselgeneratorvith:l.Adayfueltankcontaiaiagaminimumof70gallonsoffuel,2.Afuelstoragesystemcontainingaminimumindicatedvolumeof46,000gallonsoffuel,aad3.Afueltransferpump.hPPLIChBILXTT:MODES5aad6.hCTZON:WithlessthantheaboveminimumrequiredA.C.electricalrsourcesOPERhBLE,suspendalloperationsinvolvingCOREhLTERATXOHSpositivereactivitychanges+uatiltheminimumrequiredA.C.electricalpoversourcesarerestoredtoOPERhBLEstatus.SURVEILLhHCEREUIR1DKHTS4.8.1.2TheaboverequiredA.C.electricalpoversourcesshallbedemonstratedOPERhBLEbytheperfozmaaceofeachoftheSurveillanceRequirementsof4.8.1.1.1aad4.$.1.1.2exceptforrequirement4.8.1.1.2.a.5.'Porpurposesofthisspecification,additionofvaterfromtheNSTdoesnotconstituteapositivereactivityadditionprovidedtheboronconcentrationintheRUSTisgreaterthantheminimumrequiredbySpecification3.1.2.7.b.2.Commencingin1999duringtheextendedshutdowninitiatedin1997,the18-monthsurveillancerequirements4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a)andb);4.8.1.1.2.e.6.a),b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.8;4.8.1.1.2.e.9.a),b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.10.a)andb);and4.8.1.1.2.e.11,maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4followingtheshutdown.COOKNUCLEhRPLhNT-UHIT13/48-9hM1BRMENTNO.$25,445 3/4BASES3/4.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS\TheOPERABILITYoftheA.C.andD.Cpowersourcesandassociateddistributionsystemsduringoperationensuresthatsufficientpowerwillbeavailabletosupplythesafetyrelatedequipmentrequiredfor1)thesafeshutdownofthefacilityand2)themitigationandcontrolofaccidentconditionswithinthefacility.TheminimumspecifiedindependentandredundantA.C.andD.C.powersourcesanddistributionsystemssatisfytherequirementsofGeneralDesignCriteria17ofAppendixA"to10CFR50.TheACTIONrequirementsspecifiedforthelevelsofdegradationofthepowersourcesproviderestrictionuponcontinuedfacilityoperationcommensuratewiththelevelofdegradation.TheOPERABILITYofthepowersourcesareconsistentwiththeinitialconditionassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesandarebaseduponmaintainingatleastoneofeachoftheonsiteA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociateddistributionsystemsOPERABLEduringaccidentconditionscoincidentwithanassumedlossofoffsitepowerandsinglefailureoftheotheronsiteA.C.sollrce.TheOPERABILITYoftheminimumspecifiedA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociateddistributionsystemsduringshutdownandrefuelingensuresthat1)thefacilitycanbemaintainedintheshutdownorrefuelingconditionforextendedtimeperiodsand2)sufficientinstrumentationandcontrolcapabilityisavailableformonitoringandmaintainingthefacilitystatus.rTheABandCDstationbatterysystemsprovideareliablesourceofcontinuouspowerforsupplyandcontrolofplantloadssuch'asswitchgearandannunciatorcontrolcircuits,staticinverters,valvecontrolcenters,emergencylightingandmotorcontrolcenters.ThedesigndutycyclesofthesebatteriesarecompositeloadprofilesresultingfromthecombinationofthethreehourLossOfCoolantAccident/LossOfOffsitePowerbatteryloadprofilesandthefourhourStationBlackoutbatteryloadprofiles.ThetrainNstationbatterysystemprovidesanindependent250voltDCpowersupplyforpowerandcontroloftheturbinedrivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumptrain.ThelimitingconditionsofoperationforthetrainNbatteryareconsistentwiththerequirementsoftheauxiliaiyfeedwatersystem.ThesurveillancerequirementsforthetrainNbatterysystemareconsistentwiththerequirementsoftheABandCDstationbatteries.ThetrainNbatteryloadsarederivedfmmequipmentintheturbinedrivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumptrainandbatterysizingisconsistentwiththefunctionalrequirementsofthesecomponents.Simulatedloadsforbatterytestsareloadsequivalenttomeasuredactualloads.Specificsurveillancerequirements(SRs)ofSR4.8.1.2maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4followingtheextendedoutagethatcommencedin1997.ThedelayispermittedtorecognizethesignificantongoingmaintenancetosafetysystemsandcomponentsthatwouldberequiredtobeOPERABLEsolelytosupportthereferencedsurveillances.ThedelayrecognizesthereduceddecayheatloadandfissionproductactivitiesresultingfromtheextendedshutdownandconsequentlythesmallbenefitfromperformingthesurveillancespriortothenextentryintoMODE4.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet,butactualperformanceisnotrequireduntiltherequiredsafetysystemsarereadytosupportentryintoMODE4.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT1PageB3/48-1 sh ATTACHHENT2BTOAEP:NRC:1322TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSPAGESMARKEDTOSHOWPROPOSEDCHANGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT23/48-9B3/48"1 E1~  
{{#Wiki_filter:ATTACHMENT 2ATOAEP,:NRC:1322 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGESMARKEDTOSHOWPROPOSEDCHANGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT13/48-9B3/48-1990423012T 9904i9PDRADOCK05000815PPDR ELECTRIchL POVZRSYSTEMSLIMXTIHQCOHDXTIOH FOROPERATION aminimumthefollovingA.C.electrical poversourcesshallbeOPERABLZ; a.Onecircuitbetveentheoffsitetransmission netvorkaadtheonsiteClass1Edistribution system,andb.Onedieselgenerator vith:l.Adayfueltankcontaiaiag aminimumof70gallonsoffuel,2.Afuelstoragesystemcontaining aminimumindicated volumeof46,000gallonsoffuel,aad3.Afueltransferpump.hPPLIChBILXTT:
'EY~CTRICALPOtrEltSYST.SSHUTDOwNLI'MITINGCONDTIONFOR0ERATION3.8.1.2Asaminimum,thefollowingA.C.electricalpowersourcessnailoeOPERABL:-:OnecircuitbetweentheoffsitetransmissionnetworkandtheonsiteClasslEdistributionsystem,andb.Onedieselgeneratorwith:1.Adayfueltankcontainingaminimumof70gallonsoffuel,2.Afuelstoragesystemcontainistgaminimumindicatedvolumeof46,000gallonsoffuel,and3.Afueltransferpump.'ODES5'and6;ACTION:WithlessthantheaboveminimumrequiredA.C.electricalpower"sourcesOPERABLE,suspendalloperationsinvolvingCOREALTERATIONSorpositivereactivitychanges*untiltheminimumrequiredA.C.electricalpowersourcesarerestoredtoOP~LEstatus.SURVEILr<8ICEREUIBAHTS4.8.1.2TheaboverequiredA.C.electricalpo~ersourcesshallbedemonstratedOPERABLEbytheperformanceofeachoftheSurveillanceRequiretaencnof4.8.1.1.1and4.8.1.1.2exceptforrequirexenu4.8.1.1.2.e.g~*Forpurposesofthisspecification,additionofwaterfromtheRWSTdoesnotconstituteapositivereactivityadditionprovidedtheboronconcentrationintheRWSTisgreaterthantheminimumrequiredbySpecification3.1.2.7.b.2.P"Commencingini999duringtheextendedshutdowninitiatedin1997,thelg-monthsurveillancerequirements4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a)andb);4.8.1.1.2.e.6.a),b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.8;~"4.8.1.1.2.e.9.a),b)andc);4.8.1.l.2.e.10.a)andb);and4.8.1.1.2.e.11,maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4followingtheshutdown.COOKNUCLMPLANT-UNIT23/48-9AMENDKEZZNO.
MODES5aad6.hCTZON:WithlessthantheaboveminimumrequiredA.C.electrical rsourcesOPERhBLE, suspendalloperations involving COREhLTERATXOHS positivereactivity changes+uatiltheminimumrequiredA.C.electrical poversourcesarerestoredtoOPERhBLEstatus.SURVEILLhHCE REUIR1DKHTS 4.8.1.2TheaboverequiredA.C.electrical poversourcesshallbedemonstrated OPERhBLEbytheperfozmaace ofeachoftheSurveillance Requirements of4.8.1.1.1 aad4.$.1.1.2exceptforrequirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.5.'Por purposesofthisspecification, additionofvaterfromtheNSTdoesnotconstitute apositivereactivity additionprovidedtheboronconcentration intheRUSTisgreaterthantheminimumrequiredbySpecification 3.1.2.7.b.2.
3/4BASES3/4.8ELECTRICALPOWZRYSTEMSTheOPERABILITYoftheA.C.andD.Cpowersourcesandassociateddistributionsystemsduringoperationensuresthatsufficientpowerwillbeavailabletosupplythesafetyrelatedequipmentrequiredfor1)thesafeshutdownofthefacilityand2)themitigationandcontrolofaccidentconditionswithinthefacility.TheminimumspecifiedindependentandredundantA.C.andD.C.powersourcesanddistributionsystemssatisfytherequirementsofGeneralDesignCriteria17ofAppendix"A"to10CFR50.TheACTIONrequirementsspecifiedforthelevelsofdegradationofthepowersourcesproviderestrictionuponcontinuedfacilityoperationcommensuratewiththelevelofdegradation.TheOPERABILITYofthepowersourcesareconsistentwiththeinitialconditionassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesandarebaseduponmaintainingatleastoneofeachoftheonsiteA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociateddistributionsystemsOPERABLEduringaccidentconditionscoincidentwithanassumedlossofoffsitepowerandsinglefailureoftheotheronsiteA.C.source.TheOPERABILITYoftheminimumspecifiedA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociateddistributionsystemsduringshutdownandrefuelingensuresthat1)thefacilitycanbemaintainedintheshutdownorrefuelingconditionforextendedtimeperiodsand2)sufficientinstrumentationandcontrolcapabilityisavailableformonitoringandmaintainingthefacilitystatus.TheABandCDstationbatterysystemsprovideareliablesourceofcontinuouspowerforsupplyandcontrolofplantloadssuchasswitchgearandannunciatorcontrolcircuits,staticinverters,valvecontrolcenters,emergencylightingandmotorcontrolcenters.ThedesigndutycyclesofthesebatteriesarecompositeloadprofilesresultingfromthecombinationofthethreehourLossOfCoolantAccident/LossOfOffsitePowerbatteryloadprofilesandthefourhourStationBlackoutbatteryloadprofiles.ThetrainNstationbatterysystemprovidesanindependent250voltDCpowersupplyforpowerandcontroloftheturbinedrivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumptrain.ThelimitingconditionsofoperationforthetrainNbatteryareconsistentwiththerequirementsoftheauxiliaryfeedwatersystem.ThesurveillancerequirementsforthetrainNbatterysystemareconsistentwiththerequirementsoftheABandCDstationbatteries.ThetrainNbatteryloadsarederivedfromequipmentintheturbinedrivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumptrainandbatterysizingisconsistentwiththefunctionalrequirementsofthesecomponents.Simulatedloadsforbatterytestsareloadsequivalenttomeasuredactualloads.Specificsurveillancerequirements(SRs)ofSR4.8.1.2maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4followingtheextendedoutagethatcommencedin1997.ThedelayispermittedtorecognizethesignificantongoingmaintenancetosafetysystemsandcomponentsthatwouldberequiredtobeOPERABLEsolelytosupportthereferencedsurveillances.ThedelayrecognizesthereduceddecayheatloadandreducedfissionproductactivitiesresultingfromtheextendedshutdownandconsequentlythesmallbenefitfromperformingthesurveillancespriortothenextentryintoMODE4.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet,butactualperformanceisnotrequireduntiltherequiredsafetysystemsarereadytosupportentryintoMODE4.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT2PageB3/48-1 ATTACHMENT3ATOAEP:NRC:1322PROPOSEDTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSPAGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT13/48-9B3/48-1 C
Commencing in1999duringtheextendedshutdowninitiated in1997,the18-monthsurveillance requirements 4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a) andb);4.8.1.1.2.e.6.a),
3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONSI<OROPERATIONANDSURVEILLANCEREQUIIK<MENTS3/4.8ELE<CTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSSHUTDOWNLIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION3.8.1.2Asaminimum,thefollowingA.C.electricalpowersourcesshallbeOPERABLE:OnecircuitbetweentheoffsitetransmissionnetworkandtheonsiteClass1Edistributionsystem,andOnedieselgeneratorwith:Adayfueltankcontainingaminimumof70gallonsoffuel,Afuelstoragesystemcontainingaminimumindicatedvolumeof46,000gallonsoffuel,andAPPLICABILITY:3.Afueltransferpump.MODES5and6.ACTION:WithlessthantheaboveminimumrequiredA.C.electricalpowersourcesOPERABLE,suspendalloperationsinvolvingCOREALTERATIONSorpositivereactivitychanges'ntiltheminimumrequiredA.C.electricalpowersourcesarerestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.SURVEILLANCEREUIREMENTS4.8.1.2TheaboverequiredA.C.electricalpowersourcesshallbedemonstratedOPERABLEbytheperformanceofeachoftheSurveillanceRequirementsof4.8.1.1.1and4.8.1.1.2exceptforrequirement4.8.1.1.2.a.5.Commencingin1999duringtheextendedshutdowninitiatedin1997,the18-monthsurveillancerequirements4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a)andb);4.8.1.1.2.e.6.a),b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.8;4.8.1.1.2.e.9.a),b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.10.a)andb);and4.8.1.1.2.e.11,maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4followingtheshutdown.'Forpurposesofthisspecification,additionofwaterfromtheRWSTdoesnotconstituteapositivereactivityadditionprovidedtheboronconcentrationintheRWSTisgreaterthantheminimum,requiredbySpecification3.1.2.7.b.2.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT1Page3/48-9AMENDMENT425,445" r)4~~'/4BASES3/4.8ELE<CTRICALPOWI<.RSYSTE<MSTheOPERABILITYoftheA.C.andD.Cpowersourcesandassociateddistributionsystemsduringoperationensuresthatsufficientpowerwillbeavailabletosupplythesafetyrelatedequipmentrequiredfor1)thesafeshutdownofthefacilityand2)themitigationandcontrolofaccidentconditionswithinthefacility.TheminimumspecifiedindependentandredundantA.C.andD.C.powersourcesanddistributionsystemssatisfytherequirementsofGeneralDesignCriteria17ofAppendix"A"to10CFR50.TheACTIONrequirementsspecifiedforthelevelsofdegradationofthepowersourc'esproviderestrictionuponcontinuedfacilityoperationcommensuratewiththelevelofdegradation.TheOPERABILITYofthepowersourcesareconsistentwiththeinitialconditionassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesandarebaseduponmaintainingatleastoneofeachoftheonsiteA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociateddistributionsystemsOPERABLEduringaccidentconditionscoincidentwithanassumedlossofoffsitepowerandsinglefailureoftheotheronsiteA.C.source.TheOPERABILITYoftheminimumspecifiedA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociateddistributionsystemsduringshutdownandrefuelingensuresthatI)thefacilitycanbemaintainedintheshutdownorrefuelingconditionforextendedtimeperiodsand2)sufficientinstrumentationandcontrolcapabilityisavailableformonitoringandmaintainingthefacilitystatus.Specificsurveillancerequirements(SRs)ofSR4.8.1.2maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4followingtheextendedoutagethatcommencedin1997.ThedelayispermittedtorecognizethesignificantongoingmaintenancetosafetysystemsandcomponentsthatwouldberequiredtobeOPERABLEsolelytosupportthereferencedsurveillances.ThedelayrecognizesthereduceddecayheatloadandfissionproductactivitiesresultingfromtheextendedshutdownandconsequentlythesmallbenefitfromperformingthesurveillancespriortothenextentryintoMODE4.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet,butactualperformanceisnotrequireduntiltherequiredsafetysystemsarereadyto'supportentryintoMODE4.TheABandCDstationbatterysystemsprovideareliablesourceofcontinuouspowerforsupplyandcontrolofplantloadssuchasswitchgearandannunciatorcontrolcircuits,staticinverters,valvecontrolcenters,emergencylightingandmotorcontrolcenters.Thedesigndutycyclesofthesebatteriesarecompositeload'profilesresultingfromthecombinationofthethreehourLossOfCoolantAccident/LossOfOffsitePowerbattery'oadprofilesandthefourhourStationBlackoutbatteryloadprofiles.ThetrainNstationbatterysystemprovidesanindependent250voltDCpowersupplyforpowerandcontroloftheturbinedrivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumptrain.ThelimitingconditionsofoperationforthetrainNbatteryareconsistentwiththerequirementsoftheauxiliaryfecdwatersystem.ThesurveillancerequirementsforthetrainNbatterysystemareconsistentwiththerequirementsoftheABandCDstationbatteries.ThetrainNbatteryloadsarederivedfromequipmentin'theturbinedrivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumptrainandbatterysizingisconsistentwiththefunctionalrequirementsofthesecomponents.Simulatedloadsforbatterytestsareloadsequivalenttomeasuredactualloads.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT1PageB3/48-1AMENDMENT86,498 ATTACHMENT3BTOAEP:NRC:1322PROPOSEDTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSPAGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT23/48-9B3/48-1 ff~0l 3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONSFOROPERATIONANDSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS3'/4.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSSHUTDOWNLIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION3.8.1.2Asaminimum,thefollowingA.C.electricalpowersourcesshallbeOPERABLE:a.OnecircuitbetweentheoffsitetransmissionnetworkandtheonsiteClass1Edistributionsystem,andb.Onedieselgeneratorwith:1.Adayfueltankcontainingaminimumof70gallonsoffuel,Afuelstoragesystemcontainingaminimumindicatedvolumeof46,000gallonsoffuel,andAPPLICABILITY:3.Afueltransferpump.MODES5and6.ACTION:WithlessthantheaboveminimumrequiredA.C.electricalpowersourcesOPERABLE,suspendalloperationsinvolvingCOREALTERATIONSorpositivereactivitychanges'ntiltheminimumrequiredA.C.electricalpowersourcesarerestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.SURVEILLANCEREUIREMENTS4.8.1.2TheaboverequiredA.C.electricalpowersourcesshallbedemonstratedOPERABLEbytheperformanceofeachoftheSurveillanceRequirementsof4.8.1.1.1'nd4.8.1.1.2exceptforrequirement4.8.1.1.2.a.5.Commencingin1999duringtheextendedshutdowninitiatedin1997,'the18-monthsurveillancerequirements4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a)andb);4.8.1.1.2.e.6.a),b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.8;4.8.1.1.2.e.9.a),b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.10.a)andb);and4.8.1.1.2.e.II,maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4followingtheshutdown.'Forpurposesofthisspecification,additionofwaterfromtheRWSTdoesnotconstituteapositivereactivityadditionprovidedtheboronconcentrationintheRWSTisgreaterthantheminimumrequiredbySpecification3.1.2.7.b.2.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT2Page3/48-9AMENDMENT448,483,459 3/4BASES314.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSTheOPERABILITYoftheA.C.andD.CpowersourcesandassociateddistributionsystemsduringoperationensuresthatsufficientpowerwillbeavailabletosupplythesafetyrelatedequipmentrequiredforI)thesafeshutdownofthefacilityand2)themitigationandcontrolofaccidentconditionswithinthefacility.TheminimumspecifiedindependentandredundantA.C.andD.C.powersourcesanddistributionsystemssatisfytherequirementsofGeneralDesignCriteria17ofAppendix"A"to10CFR50.TheACTIONrequirementsspecifiedforthelevelsofdegradationofthepowersourcesproviderestrictionuponcontinuedfacilityoperationcommensuratewiththelevelofdegradation.TheOPERABILITYofthepowersourcesareconsistentwiththeinitialconditionassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesandarebaseduponmaintainingatleastoneofeachoftheonsiteA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociateddistributionsystemsOPERABLEduringaccidentconditionscoincidentwithanassumedlossofoffsitepowerandsinglefailureoftheotheronsiteA.C.source.TheOPERABILITYoftheminimumspecifiedA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociateddistributionsystemsduringshutdownandrefuelingensuresthat1)thefacilitycanbemaintainedintheshutdownorrefuelingconditionforextendedtimeperiodsand2)sufficientinstrumentationandcontrolcapabilityisavailableformonitoringandmaintainingthefacilitystatus.Specificsurveillancerequirements(SRs)ofSR4.8.1.2maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4followingtheextendedoutagethatcommencedin1997.ThedelayispermittedtorecognizethesignificantongoingmaintenancetosafetysystemsandcomponentsthatwouldberequiredtobeOPERABLEsolelytosupportthereferencedsurveillances.ThedelayrecognizesthereduceddecayheatloadandreducedfissionproductactivitiesresultingfromtheextendedshutdownandconsequentlythesmallbenefitfromperformingthesurveillancespriortothenextentryintoMODE4.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet.butactualperformanceisnotrequireduntiltherequiredsafetysystemsarcreadytosupportentryintoMODE4.TheABandCDstationbatterysystemsprovideareliablesourceofcontinuouspowerforsupplyandcontrolofplantloadssuchasswitchgearandannunciatorcontrolcircuits,staticinverters,valvecontrolcenters,emergencylightingandmotorcontrolcenters.Thedesigndutycyclesofthesebatteriesarecompositeload,"profilesresultingfromthecombinationofthethreehourLossOfCoolantAccident/LossOfOffsitePowerbatteryloadprofilesandthefourhourStationBlackoutbatteryloadprofiles.ThetrainNstationbatterysystemprovidesanindependent250voltDCpowersupplyforpowerandcontroloftheturbinedrivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumptrain.ThelimitingconditionsofoperationforthetrainNbatteryareconsistentwiththerequirementsoftheauxiliaryfeedwatersystem.ThesurveillancerequirementsforthetrainNbatterysystemareconsistentwiththerequirementsoftheABandCDstationbattcrics.ThetrainNbatteryloadsarederivedfromequipmentintheturbinedrivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumptrainandbatterysizingisconsistentwiththefunctionalrequirementsofthesecomponents.Simulatedloadsforbatterytestsareloadsequivalenttomeasuredactualloads.lCOOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT2Page83/48-1AMENDMENTVB,483 ATTACHMENT4TOAEP:NRC:1322NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSCONSIDERATIONEVALUATION 1AI'I4.
b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.8; 4.8.1.1.2.e.9.a),
Attachment4TOAEP:NRC:1322Page1NoSinificantHazardsConsiderationEvaluationI&Mhasevaluatedthisproposedamendmentanddeterminedthatitinvolvesnosignificanthazardsconsideration.Accordingto10CFR50.92(c),aproposedamendmenttoanoperatinglicenseinvolvesnosignificanthazardsconsiderationifoperationofthefacilityinaccordancewiththeproposedamendmentwouldnot:1.involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated;2.createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanypreviouslyanalyzed;or3.involveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.I&MproposestoreviseT/S3/4.8.1.2,"ElectricalPowerSystems,Shutdown,"anditsassociatedbasestoprovideaone-timeextensionofthe18-monthsurveillanceintervalforspecificsurveillancerequirements(SRs).Inaddition,forunit2only,aminoradministrativechangeisincludedtodeleteareferencetoT/S4.0.8thatisnolongerapplicable.Forunit1only,aneditorialcorrectionismade.Thedeterminationthatthecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92aremetforthisamendmentrequestisindicatedbelow.1.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Adiscussionofeachoftheapplicableaccidentsfollows.FuelhandlinaccidentTheonlytimeafuelhandlingaccidentcouldoccurisduringthehandlingofafuelassembly.ThedesignoffuelhandlingequipmentissuchthataninterruptionofA.C.powerwouldnotcauseafuelelementtobeinadvertentlydropped.Therefore,aninterruptionorlossofA.C.powerdoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofafuelhandlingaccident.Atpresent,fissionproductactivitiesinthefuelassemblypellet-to-claddinggapsaregreatlyreduced.Thefuelhandlingaccidentanalysisconsidersthethyroiddoseatthesiteboundaryandinthelowpopulationzone.Thisdoseisdominatedbytheisotopeiodine131,whichalsodecaysmoreslowlythantheotheriodinecontributorstothedose.Theactivityofiodine131decreasesbyone-halfevery8.05days.Thecurrentshutdownperiodofapproximately18monthsrepresentsover70half-lives.Activityofaradioactivematerialisgenerallyconsideredtobenegligibleafter7half-lives(areductioninactivityof1/128).Bycontrast,theaccidentanalysisassumesaniodinereductionoflessthan1/10(fromactivatedcharcoalfiltration)inthefuelhandlingbuilding,andnoreductioninthecontainment,priortorelease.Therefore,theconsequencesofafuelhandling Attachment4TOAEP:NRC:1322Page2accidentareclearlyboundedbytheexistingsafetyanalysiswithouttakingcreditforanyiodineremovalbycharcoalfiltration.Thegreatlyreducedfissionproductactivityatthecurrenttimeprovidesassurancethattheconsequencesofthiseventareboundedbytheexistinganalysis.Therefore,theconsequencesarenotsignificantlyincreased.AccidentalreleaseofradioactiveliuidsTheinadvertentreleaseofradioactiveliquidwastestotheenvironmentwasevaluatedforthewasteevaporatorcondensateandmonitortanks,condensatestoragetank,primarywaterstoragetank,refuelingwaterstoragetank(RWST),theauxiliarybuildingstoragetanksandthechemicalandvolumecontrolsystem(CVCS)holduptanks.Itwasconcluded,intheUFSARChapter14evaluation,thatlossofliquidfromthesetankstotheenvironmentisnotacredibleaccident.Thisconclusiondoesnotdependonoperatingmode,hence,furtherevaluationofthiseventisnotrequired.WasteasreleaseRadioactivegasesareintroducedintothereactorcoolantbytheescapeoffissionproductsifdefectsexistinthefuelcladding.Theprocessingofthereactorcoolantbyauxiliarysystemsresultsintheaccumulationofradioactivegasesinvarioustanks.Thetwomainsourcesofanysignificantgaseousradioactivitythatcouldoccurwouldbethevolumecontroltank(VCT)andthegasdecaytanks.Itisassumedthat'atankrupturesbyanunspecifiedmechanismafterthereactorhasbeenoperatingforonecorecyclewith1%defectsinthefuelcladding.Thereisnoidentifiedmechanismbywhichaninterruptionorlossofpowercouldresultinatankrupture.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheprobabilityofoccurrenceofatankrupturewouldnotbesignificantlyincreasedbyaninterruptionorlossofA.C.power.Thegreatlyreducedfissionproductactivitiesatthecurrenttimeprovidesassurancethattheconsequencesofthiseventareboundedbythecurrentanalysisandwould,therefore,notbesignificantlyincreased.Uncontrolledrodclustercontrolassembl(RCCA)withdrawalfromasubcriticalconditionThiseventcanonlyoccur,withthereactortripbreakersclosedandthecontrolroddrivemechanisms(CRDMs)energized.Withtheexceptionoftestingorspecialma'ntenance,theroddrivemotorgeneratorsetremainstaggedoutuntilMode3andthisalonewouldprecluderodmovement.Iftheconditionsforrodwithdrawalaremet,twooperablesourcerangeinstrumentsandtworeactortripchannelsandtripbreakersmustbeoperable.AninterruptionorlossofpowerwouldprecludeCRDMmovementandreleasethecontrolrods.Thesourcerangeinstrumentswouldremainavailable.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanuncontrolledRCCAwithdrawalwouldnotbesignificantlyincreasedbyaninterruptionorlossofA.C.powerinModes5or6.Acceptableconsequencesforthiseventrelyonprecludingitsoccurrence.  
b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.
~Cfl Ci~IAttachment4TOAEP:NRC:1322Page3hUncontrolledboron.dilutionThiseventrequiresamalfunctionoftheCVCS.TheCVCSisdesignedtolimit,evenundervariouspostulatedfailuremodes,thepotentialrateofdilutiontoavaluewhichprovidestheoperatorsufficienttimetocorrectthesituationinasafeandorderlymanner.Therateofadditionofunboratedwatermakeuptothereactorcoolantsystemislimitedbythecapacityoftheprimarywaterpumps.Themaximumadditionrateinthiscaseis225gpmwithbothprimarywaterpumpsrunning.AninterruptionorlossofA.C.powerwouldprecludepumpoperationandaccidentaldilution.TheRWSTisnotacredibledilutionsourceasrecognizedbya-footnotetoT/S3/4.8.1.2.Therefore,thepossibilityofanuncontrolledborondilutionisnotsignificantlyincreased.AcceptableconsequencesforthiseventrelyonprecludingitsoccurrenceandbydetectionwiththesourcerangenuclearinstrumentationrequiredbytheT/SinModes5and,6.TheproposedrevisioninvolvesdeferralofcertainsurveillancerequirementswhenshutdownbutdoesnotreducetherequiredoperablepowersourcesoftheLimitingConditionforOperation(LCO),doesnotincreasetheallowedoutagetimeofanyrequiredoperablepowersuppliesanddoesnotreducetherequirementtoknowthatthedeferredSRscouldbemetatalltimes.DeferralofthetestingdoesnotbyitselfincreasethepotentialthatthetestingwouldnotbemetandthepreviouslyevaluatedaccidentsdescribedabovedonotrelyonautomaticstartingorloadingofthesingleoperableEDGpermittedinModes5and6.ThemonthlyEDGstarts,fuellevelchecks,andfueltransferpumpcheckswillcontinuetobeperformedtoprovideadequateconfidencethattherequiredEDGwillbeavailableifneeded.Therefore,itisconcludedthattherequiredA.C.sourceswillremainavailableandthepreviouslyevaluatedconsequenceswillnotbeincreased.Theproposedadministrativechangeforunit2deletesareferencetoT/S4.0.8thatisnolongerapplicableand,thus,doesnotincreasetheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccident.Theeditorialchangetounit1correctsatypographicalerror.Thecorrectionisnotintendedtochangethemeaning.Therefore,basedontheabovediscussion,itisconcludedthattheproposedamendmentdoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated./2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?Theproposedchangesdonotinvolveoperationoftherequiredelectricalpowersourcesinamannerorconfigurationdifferentthanthosepreviouslyrecognizedorevaluated.NonewfailuremechanismsoftheA.C.powersuppliesareintroducedbyextensionofthesubjectsurveillanceintervals.
10.a)andb);and4.8.1.1.2.e.11, maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theshutdown.
COOKNUCLEhRPLhNT-UHIT13/48-9hM1BRMENT NO.$25,445 3/4BASES3/4.8ELECTRICAL POWERSYSTEMS\TheOPERABILITY oftheA.C.andD.Cpowersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringoperation ensuresthatsufficient powerwillbeavailable tosupplythesafetyrelatedequipment requiredfor1)thesafeshutdownofthefacilityand2)themitigation andcontrolofaccidentconditions withinthefacility.
Theminimumspecified independent andredundant A.C.andD.C.powersourcesanddistribution systemssatisfytherequirements ofGeneralDesignCriteria17ofAppendixA"to10CFR50.TheACTIONrequirements specified forthelevelsofdegradation ofthepowersourcesproviderestriction uponcontinued facilityoperation commensurate withthelevelofdegradation.
TheOPERABILITY ofthepowersourcesareconsistent withtheinitialcondition assumptions oftheaccidentanalysesandarebaseduponmaintaining atleastoneofeachoftheonsiteA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsOPERABLEduringaccidentconditions coincident withanassumedlossofoffsitepowerandsinglefailureoftheotheronsiteA.C.sollrce.TheOPERABILITY oftheminimumspecified A.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringshutdownandrefueling ensuresthat1)thefacilitycanbemaintained intheshutdownorrefueling condition forextendedtimeperiodsand2)sufficient instrumentation andcontrolcapability isavailable formonitoring andmaintaining thefacilitystatus.rTheABandCDstationbatterysystemsprovideareliablesourceofcontinuous powerforsupplyandcontrolofplantloadssuch'asswitchgear andannunciator controlcircuits, staticinverters, valvecontrolcenters,emergency lightingandmotorcontrolcenters.Thedesigndutycyclesofthesebatteries arecomposite loadprofilesresulting fromthecombination ofthethreehourLossOfCoolantAccident/Loss OfOffsitePowerbatteryloadprofilesandthefourhourStationBlackoutbatteryloadprofiles.
ThetrainNstationbatterysystemprovidesanindependent 250voltDCpowersupplyforpowerandcontroloftheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrain.Thelimitingconditions ofoperation forthetrainNbatteryareconsistent withtherequirements oftheauxiliaiy feedwater system.Thesurveillance requirements forthetrainNbatterysystemareconsistent withtherequirements oftheABandCDstationbatteries.
ThetrainNbatteryloadsarederivedfmmequipment intheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrainandbatterysizingisconsistent withthefunctional requirements ofthesecomponents.
Simulated loadsforbatterytestsareloadsequivalent tomeasuredactualloads.Specificsurveillance requirements (SRs)ofSR4.8.1.2maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theextendedoutagethatcommenced in1997.Thedelayispermitted torecognize thesignificant ongoingmaintenance tosafetysystemsandcomponents thatwouldberequiredtobeOPERABLEsolelytosupportthereferenced surveillances.
Thedelayrecognizes thereduceddecayheatloadandfissionproductactivities resulting fromtheextendedshutdownandconsequently thesmallbenefitfromperforming thesurveillances priortothenextentryintoMODE4.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet,butactualperformance isnotrequireduntiltherequiredsafetysystemsarereadytosupportentryintoMODE4.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1PageB3/48-1 sh ATTACHHENT 2BTOAEP:NRC:1322 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGESMARKEDTOSHOWPROPOSEDCHANGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT23/48-9B3/48"1 E1~  
'EY~CTRICALPOtrEltSYST.SSHUTDOwNLI'MITING CONDTIONFOR0ERATION3.8.1.2Asaminimum,thefollowing A.C.electrical powersourcessnailoeOPERABL:-:
Onecircuitbetweentheoffsitetransmission networkandtheonsiteClasslEdistribution system,andb.Onedieselgenerator with:1.Adayfueltankcontaining aminimumof70gallonsoffuel,2.Afuelstoragesystemcontainistg aminimumindicated volumeof46,000gallonsoffuel,and3.Afueltransferpump.'ODES5'and6;ACTION:WithlessthantheaboveminimumrequiredA.C.electrical power"sources
: OPERABLE, suspendalloperations involving COREALTERATIONS orpositivereactivity changes*untiltheminimumrequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesarerestoredtoOP~LEstatus.SURVEILr<8ICEREUIBAHTS4.8.1.2TheaboverequiredA.C.electrical po~ersourcesshallbedemonstrated OPERABLEbytheperformance ofeachoftheSurveillance Requiretaencn of4.8.1.1.1 and4.8.1.1.2 exceptforrequirexenu 4.8.1.1.2.e.g~
*Forpurposesofthisspecification, additionofwaterfromtheRWSTdoesnotconstitute apositivereactivity additionprovidedtheboronconcentration intheRWSTisgreaterthantheminimumrequiredbySpecification 3.1.2.7.b
.2.P"Commencing ini999duringtheextendedshutdowninitiated in1997,thelg-monthsurveillance requirements 4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a) andb);4.8.1.1.2.e.6.a),
b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.8;
~"4.8.1.1.2.e.9.a),
b)andc);4.8.1.l.2.e.10.a) andb);and4.8.1.1.2.e.11, maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theshutdown.
COOKNUCLMPLANT-UNIT23/48-9AMENDKEZZ NO.
3/4BASES3/4.8ELECTRICAL POWZRYSTEMSTheOPERABILITY oftheA.C.andD.Cpowersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringoperation ensuresthatsufficient powerwillbeavailable tosupplythesafetyrelatedequipment requiredfor1)thesafeshutdownofthefacilityand2)themitigation andcontrolofaccidentconditions withinthefacility.
Theminimumspecified independent andredundant A.C.andD.C.powersourcesanddistribution systemssatisfytherequirements ofGeneralDesignCriteria17ofAppendix"A"to10CFR50.TheACTIONrequirements specified forthelevelsofdegradation ofthepowersourcesproviderestriction uponcontinued facilityoperation commensurate withthelevelofdegradation.
TheOPERABILITY ofthepowersourcesareconsistent withtheinitialcondition assumptions oftheaccidentanalysesandarebaseduponmaintaining atleastoneofeachoftheonsiteA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsOPERABLEduringaccidentconditions coincident withanassumedlossofoffsitepowerandsinglefailureoftheotheronsiteA.C.source.TheOPERABILITY oftheminimumspecified A.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringshutdownandrefueling ensuresthat1)thefacilitycanbemaintained intheshutdownorrefueling condition forextendedtimeperiodsand2)sufficient instrumentation andcontrolcapability isavailable formonitoring andmaintaining thefacilitystatus.TheABandCDstationbatterysystemsprovideareliablesourceofcontinuous powerforsupplyandcontrolofplantloadssuchasswitchgear andannunciator controlcircuits, staticinverters, valvecontrolcenters,emergency lightingandmotorcontrolcenters.Thedesigndutycyclesofthesebatteries arecomposite loadprofilesresulting fromthecombination ofthethreehourLossOfCoolantAccident/Loss OfOffsitePowerbatteryloadprofilesandthefourhourStationBlackoutbatteryloadprofiles.
ThetrainNstationbatterysystemprovidesanindependent 250voltDCpowersupplyforpowerandcontroloftheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrain.Thelimitingconditions ofoperation forthetrainNbatteryareconsistent withtherequirements oftheauxiliary feedwater system.Thesurveillance requirements forthetrainNbatterysystemareconsistent withtherequirements oftheABandCDstationbatteries.
ThetrainNbatteryloadsarederivedfromequipment intheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrainandbatterysizingisconsistent withthefunctional requirements ofthesecomponents.
Simulated loadsforbatterytestsareloadsequivalent tomeasuredactualloads.Specificsurveillance requirements (SRs)ofSR4.8.1.2maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theextendedoutagethatcommenced in1997.Thedelayispermitted torecognize thesignificant ongoingmaintenance tosafetysystemsandcomponents thatwouldberequiredtobeOPERABLEsolelytosupportthereferenced surveillances.
Thedelayrecognizes thereduceddecayheatloadandreducedfissionproductactivities resulting fromtheextendedshutdownandconsequently thesmallbenefitfromperforming thesurveillances priortothenextentryintoMODE4.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet,butactualperformance isnotrequireduntiltherequiredsafetysystemsarereadytosupportentryintoMODE4.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2PageB3/48-1 ATTACHMENT 3ATOAEP:NRC:1322 PROPOSEDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT13/48-9B3/48-1 C
3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONS I<OROPERATION ANDSURVEILLANCE REQUIIK<MENTS 3/4.8ELE<CTRICAL POWERSYSTEMSSHUTDOWNLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION 3.8.1.2Asaminimum,thefollowing A.C.electrical powersourcesshallbeOPERABLE:
Onecircuitbetweentheoffsitetransmission networkandtheonsiteClass1Edistribution system,andOnedieselgenerator with:Adayfueltankcontaining aminimumof70gallonsoffuel,Afuelstoragesystemcontaining aminimumindicated volumeof46,000gallonsoffuel,andAPPLICABILITY:
3.Afueltransferpump.MODES5and6.ACTION:WithlessthantheaboveminimumrequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesOPERABLE, suspendalloperations involving COREALTERATIONS orpositivereactivity changes'ntil theminimumrequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesarerestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.SURVEILLANCE REUIREMENTS 4.8.1.2TheaboverequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesshallbedemonstrated OPERABLEbytheperformance ofeachoftheSurveillance Requirements of4.8.1.1.1 and4.8.1.1.2 exceptforrequirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.5.
Commencing in1999duringtheextendedshutdowninitiated in1997,the18-monthsurveillance requirements 4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a) andb);4.8.1.1.2.e.6.a),
b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.8; 4.8.1.1.2.e.9.a),
b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.10.a) andb);and4.8.1.1.2.e.
11,maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theshutdown.
'Forpurposesofthisspecification, additionofwaterfromtheRWSTdoesnotconstitute apositivereactivity additionprovidedtheboronconcentration intheRWSTisgreaterthantheminimum,requiredbySpecification 3.1.2.7.b.2.
COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1Page3/48-9AMENDMENT 425,445" r)4~~'/4BASES3/4.8ELE<CTRICAL POWI<.RSYSTE<MSTheOPERABILITY oftheA.C.andD.Cpowersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringoperation ensuresthatsufficient powerwillbeavailable tosupplythesafetyrelatedequipment requiredfor1)thesafeshutdownofthefacilityand2)themitigation andcontrolofaccidentconditions withinthefacility.
Theminimumspecified independent andredundant A.C.andD.C.powersourcesanddistribution systemssatisfytherequirements ofGeneralDesignCriteria17ofAppendix"A"to10CFR50.TheACTIONrequirements specified forthelevelsofdegradation ofthepowersourc'esproviderestriction uponcontinued facilityoperation commensurate withthelevelofdegradation.
TheOPERABILITY ofthepowersourcesareconsistent withtheinitialcondition assumptions oftheaccidentanalysesandarebaseduponmaintaining atleastoneofeachoftheonsiteA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsOPERABLEduringaccidentconditions coincident withanassumedlossofoffsitepowerandsinglefailureoftheotheronsiteA.C.source.TheOPERABILITY oftheminimumspecified A.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringshutdownandrefueling ensuresthatI)thefacilitycanbemaintained intheshutdownorrefueling condition forextendedtimeperiodsand2)sufficient instrumentation andcontrolcapability isavailable formonitoring andmaintaining thefacilitystatus.Specificsurveillance requirements (SRs)ofSR4.8.1.2maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theextendedoutagethatcommenced in1997.Thedelayispermitted torecognize thesignificant ongoingmaintenance tosafetysystemsandcomponents thatwouldberequiredtobeOPERABLEsolelytosupportthereferenced surveillances.
Thedelayrecognizes thereduceddecayheatloadandfissionproductactivities resulting fromtheextendedshutdownandconsequently thesmallbenefitfromperforming thesurveillances priortothenextentryintoMODE4.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet,butactualperformance isnotrequireduntiltherequiredsafetysystemsarereadyto'support entryintoMODE4.TheABandCDstationbatterysystemsprovideareliablesourceofcontinuous powerforsupplyandcontrolofplantloadssuchasswitchgear andannunciator controlcircuits, staticinverters, valvecontrolcenters,emergency lightingandmotorcontrolcenters.Thedesigndutycyclesofthesebatteries arecomposite load'profiles resulting fromthecombination ofthethreehourLossOfCoolantAccident/Loss OfOffsitePowerbattery'oad profilesandthefourhourStationBlackoutbatteryloadprofiles.
ThetrainNstationbatterysystemprovidesanindependent 250voltDCpowersupplyforpowerandcontroloftheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrain.Thelimitingconditions ofoperation forthetrainNbatteryareconsistent withtherequirements oftheauxiliary fecdwater system.Thesurveillance requirements forthetrainNbatterysystemareconsistent withtherequirements oftheABandCDstationbatteries.
ThetrainNbatteryloadsarederivedfromequipment in'theturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrainandbatterysizingisconsistent withthefunctional requirements ofthesecomponents.
Simulated loadsforbatterytestsareloadsequivalent tomeasuredactualloads.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1PageB3/48-1AMENDMENT 86,498 ATTACHMENT 3BTOAEP:NRC:1322 PROPOSEDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT23/48-9B3/48-1 ff~0l 3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOROPERATION ANDSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3'/4.8ELECTRICAL POWERSYSTEMSSHUTDOWNLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION 3.8.1.2Asaminimum,thefollowing A.C.electrical powersourcesshallbeOPERABLE:
a.Onecircuitbetweentheoffsitetransmission networkandtheonsiteClass1Edistribution system,andb.Onedieselgenerator with:1.Adayfueltankcontaining aminimumof70gallonsoffuel,Afuelstoragesystemcontaining aminimumindicated volumeof46,000gallonsoffuel,andAPPLICABILITY:
3.Afueltransferpump.MODES5and6.ACTION:WithlessthantheaboveminimumrequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesOPERABLE, suspendalloperations involving COREALTERATIONS orpositivereactivity changes'ntil theminimumrequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesarerestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.SURVEILLANCE REUIREMENTS 4.8.1.2TheaboverequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesshallbedemonstrated OPERABLEbytheperformance ofeachoftheSurveillance Requirements of4.8.1.1.1'nd 4.8.1.1.2 exceptforrequirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.5.
Commencing in1999duringtheextendedshutdowninitiated in1997,'the 18-monthsurveillance requirements 4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a) andb);4.8.1.1.2.e.6.a),
b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.8; 4.8.1.1.2.e.9.a),
b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.10.a) andb);and4.8.1.1.2.e.
II,maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theshutdown.
'Forpurposesofthisspecification, additionofwaterfromtheRWSTdoesnotconstitute apositivereactivity additionprovidedtheboronconcentration intheRWSTisgreaterthantheminimumrequiredbySpecification 3.1.2.7.b.2.
COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2Page3/48-9AMENDMENT 448,483,459 3/4BASES314.8ELECTRICAL POWERSYSTEMSTheOPERABILITY oftheA.C.andD.Cpowersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringoperation ensuresthatsufficient powerwillbeavailable tosupplythesafetyrelatedequipment requiredforI)thesafeshutdownofthefacilityand2)themitigation andcontrolofaccidentconditions withinthefacility.
Theminimumspecified independent andredundant A.C.andD.C.powersourcesanddistribution systemssatisfytherequirements ofGeneralDesignCriteria17ofAppendix"A"to10CFR50.TheACTIONrequirements specified forthelevelsofdegradation ofthepowersourcesproviderestriction uponcontinued facilityoperation commensurate withthelevelofdegradation.
TheOPERABILITY ofthepowersourcesareconsistent withtheinitialcondition assumptions oftheaccidentanalysesandarebaseduponmaintaining atleastoneofeachoftheonsiteA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsOPERABLEduringaccidentconditions coincident withanassumedlossofoffsitepowerandsinglefailureoftheotheronsiteA.C.source.TheOPERABILITY oftheminimumspecified A.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringshutdownandrefueling ensuresthat1)thefacilitycanbemaintained intheshutdownorrefueling condition forextendedtimeperiodsand2)sufficient instrumentation andcontrolcapability isavailable formonitoring andmaintaining thefacilitystatus.Specificsurveillance requirements (SRs)ofSR4.8.1.2maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theextendedoutagethatcommenced in1997.Thedelayispermitted torecognize thesignificant ongoingmaintenance tosafetysystemsandcomponents thatwouldberequiredtobeOPERABLEsolelytosupportthereferenced surveillances.
Thedelayrecognizes thereduceddecayheatloadandreducedfissionproductactivities resulting fromtheextendedshutdownandconsequently thesmallbenefitfromperforming thesurveillances priortothenextentryintoMODE4.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet.butactualperformance isnotrequireduntiltherequiredsafetysystemsarcreadytosupportentryintoMODE4.TheABandCDstationbatterysystemsprovideareliablesourceofcontinuous powerforsupplyandcontrolofplantloadssuchasswitchgear andannunciator controlcircuits, staticinverters, valvecontrolcenters,emergency lightingandmotorcontrolcenters.Thedesigndutycyclesofthesebatteries arecomposite load,"profiles resulting fromthecombination ofthethreehourLossOfCoolantAccident/Loss OfOffsitePowerbatteryloadprofilesandthefourhourStationBlackoutbatteryloadprofiles.
ThetrainNstationbatterysystemprovidesanindependent 250voltDCpowersupplyforpowerandcontroloftheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrain.Thelimitingconditions ofoperation forthetrainNbatteryareconsistent withtherequirements oftheauxiliary feedwater system.Thesurveillance requirements forthetrainNbatterysystemareconsistent withtherequirements oftheABandCDstationbattcrics.
ThetrainNbatteryloadsarederivedfromequipment intheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrainandbatterysizingisconsistent withthefunctional requirements ofthesecomponents.
Simulated loadsforbatterytestsareloadsequivalent tomeasuredactualloads.lCOOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2Page83/48-1AMENDMENT VB,483 ATTACHMENT 4TOAEP:NRC:1322 NOSIGNIFICANT HAZARDSCONSIDERATION EVALUATION 1AI'I4.
Attachment 4TOAEP:NRC:1322 Page1NoSinificantHazardsConsideration Evaluation I&Mhasevaluated thisproposedamendment anddetermined thatitinvolvesnosignificant hazardsconsideration.
According to10CFR50.92(c),
aproposedamendment toanoperating licenseinvolvesnosignificant hazardsconsideration ifoperation ofthefacilityinaccordance withtheproposedamendment wouldnot:1.involveasignificant increaseintheprobability ofoccurrence orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated; 2.createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously analyzed; or3.involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.I&MproposestoreviseT/S3/4.8.1.2, "Electrical PowerSystems,Shutdown,"
anditsassociated basestoprovideaone-timeextension ofthe18-monthsurveillance intervalforspecificsurveillance requirements (SRs).Inaddition, forunit2only,aminoradministrative changeisincludedtodeleteareference toT/S4.0.8thatisnolongerapplicable.
Forunit1only,aneditorial correction ismade.Thedetermination thatthecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92aremetforthisamendment requestisindicated below.1.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability ofoccurrence orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated?
Adiscussion ofeachoftheapplicable accidents follows.FuelhandlinaccidentTheonlytimeafuelhandlingaccidentcouldoccurisduringthehandlingofafuelassembly.
Thedesignoffuelhandlingequipment issuchthataninterruption ofA.C.powerwouldnotcauseafuelelementtobeinadvertently dropped.Therefore, aninterruption orlossofA.C.powerdoesnotsignificantly increasetheprobability ofafuelhandlingaccident.
Atpresent,fissionproductactivities inthefuelassemblypellet-to-cladding gapsaregreatlyreduced.Thefuelhandlingaccidentanalysisconsiders thethyroiddoseatthesiteboundaryandinthelowpopulation zone.Thisdoseisdominated bytheisotopeiodine131,whichalsodecaysmoreslowlythantheotheriodinecontributors tothedose.Theactivityofiodine131decreases byone-halfevery8.05days.Thecurrentshutdownperiodofapproximately 18monthsrepresents over70half-lives.
Activityofaradioactive materialisgenerally considered tobenegligible after7half-lives (areduction inactivityof1/128).Bycontrast, theaccidentanalysisassumesaniodinereduction oflessthan1/10(fromactivated charcoalfiltration) inthefuelhandlingbuilding, andnoreduction inthecontainment, priortorelease.Therefore, theconsequences ofafuelhandling Attachment 4TOAEP:NRC:1322 Page2accidentareclearlyboundedbytheexistingsafetyanalysiswithouttakingcreditforanyiodineremovalbycharcoalfiltration.
Thegreatlyreducedfissionproductactivityatthecurrenttimeprovidesassurance thattheconsequences ofthiseventareboundedbytheexistinganalysis.
Therefore, theconsequences arenotsignificantly increased.
Accidental releaseofradioactive liuidsTheinadvertent releaseofradioactive liquidwastestotheenvironment wasevaluated forthewasteevaporator condensate andmonitortanks,condensate storagetank,primarywaterstoragetank,refueling waterstoragetank(RWST),theauxiliary buildingstoragetanksandthechemicalandvolumecontrolsystem(CVCS)holduptanks.Itwasconcluded, intheUFSARChapter14evaluation, thatlossofliquidfromthesetankstotheenvironment isnotacredibleaccident.
Thisconclusion doesnotdependonoperating mode,hence,furtherevaluation ofthiseventisnotrequired.
WasteasreleaseRadioactive gasesareintroduced intothereactorcoolantbytheescapeoffissionproductsifdefectsexistinthefuelcladding.
Theprocessing ofthereactorcoolantbyauxiliary systemsresultsintheaccumulation ofradioactive gasesinvarioustanks.Thetwomainsourcesofanysignificant gaseousradioactivity thatcouldoccurwouldbethevolumecontroltank(VCT)andthegasdecaytanks.Itisassumedthat'atankrupturesbyanunspecified mechanism afterthereactorhasbeenoperating foronecorecyclewith1%defectsinthefuelcladding.
Thereisnoidentified mechanism bywhichaninterruption orlossofpowercouldresultinatankrupture.Therefore, itisconcluded thattheprobability ofoccurrence ofatankrupturewouldnotbesignificantly increased byaninterruption orlossofA.C.power.Thegreatlyreducedfissionproductactivities atthecurrenttimeprovidesassurance thattheconsequences ofthiseventareboundedbythecurrentanalysisandwould,therefore, notbesignificantly increased.
Uncontrolled rodclustercontrolassembl(RCCA)withdrawal fromasubcritical condition Thiseventcanonlyoccur,withthereactortripbreakersclosedandthecontrolroddrivemechanisms (CRDMs)energized.
Withtheexception oftestingorspecialma'ntenance, theroddrivemotorgenerator setremainstaggedoutuntilMode3andthisalonewouldprecluderodmovement.
Iftheconditions forrodwithdrawal aremet,twooperablesourcerangeinstruments andtworeactortripchannelsandtripbreakersmustbeoperable.
Aninterruption orlossofpowerwouldprecludeCRDMmovementandreleasethecontrolrods.Thesourcerangeinstruments wouldremainavailable.
Therefore, itisconcluded thattheprobability ofoccurrence ofanuncontrolled RCCAwithdrawal wouldnotbesignificantly increased byaninterruption orlossofA.C.powerinModes5or6.Acceptable consequences forthiseventrelyonprecluding itsoccurrence.  
~Cfl Ci~IAttachment 4TOAEP:NRC:1322 Page3hUncontrolled boron.dilutionThiseventrequiresamalfunction oftheCVCS.TheCVCSisdesignedtolimit,evenundervariouspostulated failuremodes,thepotential rateofdilutiontoavaluewhichprovidestheoperatorsufficient timetocorrectthesituation inasafeandorderlymanner.Therateofadditionofunborated watermakeuptothereactorcoolantsystemislimitedbythecapacityoftheprimarywaterpumps.Themaximumadditionrateinthiscaseis225gpmwithbothprimarywaterpumpsrunning.Aninterruption orlossofA.C.powerwouldprecludepumpoperation andaccidental dilution.
TheRWSTisnotacredibledilutionsourceasrecognized bya-footnotetoT/S3/4.8.1.2.
Therefore, thepossibility ofanuncontrolled borondilutionisnotsignificantly increased.
Acceptable consequences forthiseventrelyonprecluding itsoccurrence andbydetection withthesourcerangenuclearinstrumentation requiredbytheT/SinModes5and,6.Theproposedrevisioninvolvesdeferralofcertainsurveillance requirements whenshutdownbutdoesnotreducetherequiredoperablepowersourcesoftheLimitingCondition forOperation (LCO),doesnotincreasetheallowedoutagetimeofanyrequiredoperablepowersuppliesanddoesnotreducetherequirement toknowthatthedeferredSRscouldbemetatalltimes.Deferralofthetestingdoesnotbyitselfincreasethepotential thatthetestingwouldnotbemetandthepreviously evaluated accidents described abovedonotrelyonautomatic startingorloadingofthesingleoperableEDGpermitted inModes5and6.ThemonthlyEDGstarts,fuellevelchecks,andfueltransferpumpcheckswillcontinuetobeperformed toprovideadequateconfidence thattherequiredEDGwillbeavailable ifneeded.Therefore, itisconcluded thattherequiredA.C.sourceswillremainavailable andthepreviously evaluated consequences willnotbeincreased.
Theproposedadministrative changeforunit2deletesareference toT/S4.0.8thatisnolongerapplicable and,thus,doesnotincreasetheprobability orconsequences ofanaccident.
Theeditorial changetounit1correctsatypographical error.Thecorrection isnotintendedtochangethemeaning.Therefore, basedontheabovediscussion, itisconcluded thattheproposedamendment doesnotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.
/2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated?
Theproposedchangesdonotinvolveoperation oftherequiredelectrical powersourcesinamannerorconfiguration different thanthosepreviously recognized orevaluated.
Nonewfailuremechanisms oftheA.C.powersuppliesareintroduced byextension ofthesubjectsurveillance intervals.
fi~,<
fi~,<
Attachment4TOAEP:NRC:1322Page4Theproposedadministrativechangeforunit2deletesareferencetoT/S4.0.8thatisnolongerapplicableand,thus,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccident.Theeditorialchangetounit1correctsatypographicalerror.Thecorrectionisnotintendedtochangethemeaning.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesdonotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanypreviouslyevaluated.3.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety?Therequiredoperablepowersupplieshavenotbeenreduced.DeferralofthespecifiedSRsdoesnotbyitselfintroduceafailuremechanism,andpastperformanceoftheSRshasdemonstratedreliabilityinpassingthedeferredsurveillances.Therefore,theavailabilityofpowersuppliesassumedforaccidentmitigationisnotsignificantlyreducedandpreviousmarginsofsafetyaremaintained.Theproposedadministrativechangeforunit2deletesareferencetoT/S4.0.8thatisnolongerapplicableandthus,doesnotincreasetheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccident.Theeditorialchangetounit1correctsatypographicalerror.Thecorrectionisnotintendedtochangethemeaning.Therefore,thesechangesdonotinvolveasignificantreductioninthemarginofsafety.Insummary,basedupontheaboveevaluation,I&Mhasconcludedthatthesechangesinvolvenosignificanthazardsconsideration.
Attachment 4TOAEP:NRC:1322 Page4Theproposedadministrative changeforunit2deletesareference toT/S4.0.8thatisnolongerapplicable and,thus,doesnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccident.
ATTACHMENT5TOAEP:NRC:1322ENVIRONMENTALASSESSMENT Attachment5toAEP:NRC:1322Page1EnvironmentalAssessmentI&Mhasevaluatedthislicenseamendmentrequestagainstthecriteriaforidentificationoflicensingandregulatoryactionsrequiringenvironmentalassessmentinaccordancewith10CFR51.21.?&Mhasdeterminedthatthislicenseamendmentrequestmeetsthecriteriaforacategoricalexclusionsetforthin10CFR51.22(c)(9).Thisdeterminationisbasedonthefactthatthischangeisbeingproposedasanamendmenttoalicenseissuedpursuantto10CFR50thatchangesarequirementwithrespecttoinstallationoruseofafacilitycomponentlocatedwithintherestrictedarea,asdefinedin10CFR20,orthatchangesaninspectionorasurveillancerequirement,andtheamendmentmeetsthefollowingspecificcriteria.(i)Theamendmentinvolvesnosignificanthazardsconsideration.Asdemonstratedinattachment4,thisproposedamendmentdoesnotinvolvesignificanthazardsconsideration.(ii)Thereisnosignificantchangeinthetypesorsignificantincreaseintheamountsofanyeffluentthatmaybereleasedoffsite.Asdocumentedinattachment1,therewillbenosignificantchangeinthetypesorsignificantincreaseintheamountsofanyeffluentsreleasedoffsite.(iii)Thereisnosignificantincreaseinindividualorcumulativeoccupationalradiationexposure.Theproposedchangeswillnotresultinsignificantchangesintheoperationorconfigurationofthefacility.Therewillbenochangeinthelevelofcontrolsormethodologyusedforprocessingofradioactiveeffluentsorhandlingofsolidradioactivewaste,norwilltheproposalresultinanychangeinthenormalradiationlevelswithintheplant.Therefore,therewillbenosignificantincreaseinindividualorcumulativeoccupationalradiationexposureresultingfromthischange.
Theeditorial changetounit1correctsatypographical error.Thecorrection isnotintendedtochangethemeaning.Therefore, itisconcluded thattheproposedchangesdonotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously evaluated.
3.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety?Therequiredoperablepowersupplieshavenotbeenreduced.Deferralofthespecified SRsdoesnotbyitselfintroduce afailuremechanism, andpastperformance oftheSRshasdemonstrated reliability inpassingthedeferredsurveillances.
Therefore, theavailability ofpowersuppliesassumedforaccidentmitigation isnotsignificantly reducedandpreviousmarginsofsafetyaremaintained.
Theproposedadministrative changeforunit2deletesareference toT/S4.0.8thatisnolongerapplicable andthus,doesnotincreasetheprobability orconsequences ofanaccident.
Theeditorial changetounit1correctsatypographical error.Thecorrection isnotintendedtochangethemeaning.Therefore, thesechangesdonotinvolveasignificant reduction inthemarginofsafety.Insummary,basedupontheaboveevaluation, I&Mhasconcluded thatthesechangesinvolvenosignificant hazardsconsideration.
ATTACHMENT 5TOAEP:NRC:1322 ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT Attachment 5toAEP:NRC:1322 Page1Environmental Assessment I&Mhasevaluated thislicenseamendment requestagainstthecriteriaforidentification oflicensing andregulatory actionsrequiring environmental assessment inaccordance with10CFR51.21.?&Mhasdetermined thatthislicenseamendment requestmeetsthecriteriaforacategorical exclusion setforthin10CFR51.22(c)(9)
.Thisdetermination isbasedonthefactthatthischangeisbeingproposedasanamendment toalicenseissuedpursuantto10CFR50thatchangesarequirement withrespecttoinstallation oruseofafacilitycomponent locatedwithintherestricted area,asdefinedin10CFR20,orthatchangesaninspection orasurveillance requirement, andtheamendment meetsthefollowing specificcriteria.
(i)Theamendment involvesnosignificant hazardsconsideration.
Asdemonstrated inattachment 4,thisproposedamendment doesnotinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.
(ii)Thereisnosignificant changeinthetypesorsignificant increaseintheamountsofanyeffluentthatmaybereleasedoffsite.Asdocumented inattachment 1,therewillbenosignificant changeinthetypesorsignificant increaseintheamountsofanyeffluents releasedoffsite.(iii)Thereisnosignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposure.
Theproposedchangeswillnotresultinsignificant changesintheoperation orconfiguration ofthefacility.
Therewillbenochangeinthelevelofcontrolsormethodology usedforprocessing ofradioactive effluents orhandlingofsolidradioactive waste,norwilltheproposalresultinanychangeinthenormalradiation levelswithintheplant.Therefore, therewillbenosignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposureresulting fromthischange.
4.i"IPC',h}}
4.i"IPC',h}}

Revision as of 09:14, 29 June 2018

Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.8.1.2, Electrical Power Systems & Associated Bases,Providing one-time Extension of 18-month Surveillance Interval for Specific SRs
ML17325B555
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Site: Cook  American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 04/19/1999
From:
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO.
To:
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ML17325B553 List:
References
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ATTACHMENT 2ATOAEP,:NRC:1322 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGESMARKEDTOSHOWPROPOSEDCHANGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT13/48-9B3/48-1990423012T 9904i9PDRADOCK05000815PPDR ELECTRIchL POVZRSYSTEMSLIMXTIHQCOHDXTIOH FOROPERATION aminimumthefollovingA.C.electrical poversourcesshallbeOPERABLZ; a.Onecircuitbetveentheoffsitetransmission netvorkaadtheonsiteClass1Edistribution system,andb.Onedieselgenerator vith:l.Adayfueltankcontaiaiag aminimumof70gallonsoffuel,2.Afuelstoragesystemcontaining aminimumindicated volumeof46,000gallonsoffuel,aad3.Afueltransferpump.hPPLIChBILXTT:

MODES5aad6.hCTZON:WithlessthantheaboveminimumrequiredA.C.electrical rsourcesOPERhBLE, suspendalloperations involving COREhLTERATXOHS positivereactivity changes+uatiltheminimumrequiredA.C.electrical poversourcesarerestoredtoOPERhBLEstatus.SURVEILLhHCE REUIR1DKHTS 4.8.1.2TheaboverequiredA.C.electrical poversourcesshallbedemonstrated OPERhBLEbytheperfozmaace ofeachoftheSurveillance Requirements of4.8.1.1.1 aad4.$.1.1.2exceptforrequirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.5.'Por purposesofthisspecification, additionofvaterfromtheNSTdoesnotconstitute apositivereactivity additionprovidedtheboronconcentration intheRUSTisgreaterthantheminimumrequiredbySpecification 3.1.2.7.b.2.

Commencing in1999duringtheextendedshutdowninitiated in1997,the18-monthsurveillance requirements 4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a) andb);4.8.1.1.2.e.6.a),

b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.8; 4.8.1.1.2.e.9.a),

b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.

10.a)andb);and4.8.1.1.2.e.11, maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theshutdown.

COOKNUCLEhRPLhNT-UHIT13/48-9hM1BRMENT NO.$25,445 3/4BASES3/4.8ELECTRICAL POWERSYSTEMS\TheOPERABILITY oftheA.C.andD.Cpowersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringoperation ensuresthatsufficient powerwillbeavailable tosupplythesafetyrelatedequipment requiredfor1)thesafeshutdownofthefacilityand2)themitigation andcontrolofaccidentconditions withinthefacility.

Theminimumspecified independent andredundant A.C.andD.C.powersourcesanddistribution systemssatisfytherequirements ofGeneralDesignCriteria17ofAppendixA"to10CFR50.TheACTIONrequirements specified forthelevelsofdegradation ofthepowersourcesproviderestriction uponcontinued facilityoperation commensurate withthelevelofdegradation.

TheOPERABILITY ofthepowersourcesareconsistent withtheinitialcondition assumptions oftheaccidentanalysesandarebaseduponmaintaining atleastoneofeachoftheonsiteA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsOPERABLEduringaccidentconditions coincident withanassumedlossofoffsitepowerandsinglefailureoftheotheronsiteA.C.sollrce.TheOPERABILITY oftheminimumspecified A.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringshutdownandrefueling ensuresthat1)thefacilitycanbemaintained intheshutdownorrefueling condition forextendedtimeperiodsand2)sufficient instrumentation andcontrolcapability isavailable formonitoring andmaintaining thefacilitystatus.rTheABandCDstationbatterysystemsprovideareliablesourceofcontinuous powerforsupplyandcontrolofplantloadssuch'asswitchgear andannunciator controlcircuits, staticinverters, valvecontrolcenters,emergency lightingandmotorcontrolcenters.Thedesigndutycyclesofthesebatteries arecomposite loadprofilesresulting fromthecombination ofthethreehourLossOfCoolantAccident/Loss OfOffsitePowerbatteryloadprofilesandthefourhourStationBlackoutbatteryloadprofiles.

ThetrainNstationbatterysystemprovidesanindependent 250voltDCpowersupplyforpowerandcontroloftheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrain.Thelimitingconditions ofoperation forthetrainNbatteryareconsistent withtherequirements oftheauxiliaiy feedwater system.Thesurveillance requirements forthetrainNbatterysystemareconsistent withtherequirements oftheABandCDstationbatteries.

ThetrainNbatteryloadsarederivedfmmequipment intheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrainandbatterysizingisconsistent withthefunctional requirements ofthesecomponents.

Simulated loadsforbatterytestsareloadsequivalent tomeasuredactualloads.Specificsurveillance requirements (SRs)ofSR4.8.1.2maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theextendedoutagethatcommenced in1997.Thedelayispermitted torecognize thesignificant ongoingmaintenance tosafetysystemsandcomponents thatwouldberequiredtobeOPERABLEsolelytosupportthereferenced surveillances.

Thedelayrecognizes thereduceddecayheatloadandfissionproductactivities resulting fromtheextendedshutdownandconsequently thesmallbenefitfromperforming thesurveillances priortothenextentryintoMODE4.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet,butactualperformance isnotrequireduntiltherequiredsafetysystemsarereadytosupportentryintoMODE4.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1PageB3/48-1 sh ATTACHHENT 2BTOAEP:NRC:1322 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGESMARKEDTOSHOWPROPOSEDCHANGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT23/48-9B3/48"1 E1~

'EY~CTRICALPOtrEltSYST.SSHUTDOwNLI'MITING CONDTIONFOR0ERATION3.8.1.2Asaminimum,thefollowing A.C.electrical powersourcessnailoeOPERABL:-:

Onecircuitbetweentheoffsitetransmission networkandtheonsiteClasslEdistribution system,andb.Onedieselgenerator with:1.Adayfueltankcontaining aminimumof70gallonsoffuel,2.Afuelstoragesystemcontainistg aminimumindicated volumeof46,000gallonsoffuel,and3.Afueltransferpump.'ODES5'and6;ACTION:WithlessthantheaboveminimumrequiredA.C.electrical power"sources

OPERABLE, suspendalloperations involving COREALTERATIONS orpositivereactivity changes*untiltheminimumrequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesarerestoredtoOP~LEstatus.SURVEILr<8ICEREUIBAHTS4.8.1.2TheaboverequiredA.C.electrical po~ersourcesshallbedemonstrated OPERABLEbytheperformance ofeachoftheSurveillance Requiretaencn of4.8.1.1.1 and4.8.1.1.2 exceptforrequirexenu 4.8.1.1.2.e.g~
  • Forpurposesofthisspecification, additionofwaterfromtheRWSTdoesnotconstitute apositivereactivity additionprovidedtheboronconcentration intheRWSTisgreaterthantheminimumrequiredbySpecification 3.1.2.7.b

.2.P"Commencing ini999duringtheextendedshutdowninitiated in1997,thelg-monthsurveillance requirements 4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a) andb);4.8.1.1.2.e.6.a),

b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.8;

~"4.8.1.1.2.e.9.a),

b)andc);4.8.1.l.2.e.10.a) andb);and4.8.1.1.2.e.11, maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theshutdown.

COOKNUCLMPLANT-UNIT23/48-9AMENDKEZZ NO.

3/4BASES3/4.8ELECTRICAL POWZRYSTEMSTheOPERABILITY oftheA.C.andD.Cpowersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringoperation ensuresthatsufficient powerwillbeavailable tosupplythesafetyrelatedequipment requiredfor1)thesafeshutdownofthefacilityand2)themitigation andcontrolofaccidentconditions withinthefacility.

Theminimumspecified independent andredundant A.C.andD.C.powersourcesanddistribution systemssatisfytherequirements ofGeneralDesignCriteria17ofAppendix"A"to10CFR50.TheACTIONrequirements specified forthelevelsofdegradation ofthepowersourcesproviderestriction uponcontinued facilityoperation commensurate withthelevelofdegradation.

TheOPERABILITY ofthepowersourcesareconsistent withtheinitialcondition assumptions oftheaccidentanalysesandarebaseduponmaintaining atleastoneofeachoftheonsiteA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsOPERABLEduringaccidentconditions coincident withanassumedlossofoffsitepowerandsinglefailureoftheotheronsiteA.C.source.TheOPERABILITY oftheminimumspecified A.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringshutdownandrefueling ensuresthat1)thefacilitycanbemaintained intheshutdownorrefueling condition forextendedtimeperiodsand2)sufficient instrumentation andcontrolcapability isavailable formonitoring andmaintaining thefacilitystatus.TheABandCDstationbatterysystemsprovideareliablesourceofcontinuous powerforsupplyandcontrolofplantloadssuchasswitchgear andannunciator controlcircuits, staticinverters, valvecontrolcenters,emergency lightingandmotorcontrolcenters.Thedesigndutycyclesofthesebatteries arecomposite loadprofilesresulting fromthecombination ofthethreehourLossOfCoolantAccident/Loss OfOffsitePowerbatteryloadprofilesandthefourhourStationBlackoutbatteryloadprofiles.

ThetrainNstationbatterysystemprovidesanindependent 250voltDCpowersupplyforpowerandcontroloftheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrain.Thelimitingconditions ofoperation forthetrainNbatteryareconsistent withtherequirements oftheauxiliary feedwater system.Thesurveillance requirements forthetrainNbatterysystemareconsistent withtherequirements oftheABandCDstationbatteries.

ThetrainNbatteryloadsarederivedfromequipment intheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrainandbatterysizingisconsistent withthefunctional requirements ofthesecomponents.

Simulated loadsforbatterytestsareloadsequivalent tomeasuredactualloads.Specificsurveillance requirements (SRs)ofSR4.8.1.2maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theextendedoutagethatcommenced in1997.Thedelayispermitted torecognize thesignificant ongoingmaintenance tosafetysystemsandcomponents thatwouldberequiredtobeOPERABLEsolelytosupportthereferenced surveillances.

Thedelayrecognizes thereduceddecayheatloadandreducedfissionproductactivities resulting fromtheextendedshutdownandconsequently thesmallbenefitfromperforming thesurveillances priortothenextentryintoMODE4.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet,butactualperformance isnotrequireduntiltherequiredsafetysystemsarereadytosupportentryintoMODE4.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2PageB3/48-1 ATTACHMENT 3ATOAEP:NRC:1322 PROPOSEDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT13/48-9B3/48-1 C

3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONS I<OROPERATION ANDSURVEILLANCE REQUIIK<MENTS 3/4.8ELE<CTRICAL POWERSYSTEMSSHUTDOWNLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION 3.8.1.2Asaminimum,thefollowing A.C.electrical powersourcesshallbeOPERABLE:

Onecircuitbetweentheoffsitetransmission networkandtheonsiteClass1Edistribution system,andOnedieselgenerator with:Adayfueltankcontaining aminimumof70gallonsoffuel,Afuelstoragesystemcontaining aminimumindicated volumeof46,000gallonsoffuel,andAPPLICABILITY:

3.Afueltransferpump.MODES5and6.ACTION:WithlessthantheaboveminimumrequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesOPERABLE, suspendalloperations involving COREALTERATIONS orpositivereactivity changes'ntil theminimumrequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesarerestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.SURVEILLANCE REUIREMENTS 4.8.1.2TheaboverequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesshallbedemonstrated OPERABLEbytheperformance ofeachoftheSurveillance Requirements of4.8.1.1.1 and4.8.1.1.2 exceptforrequirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.5.

Commencing in1999duringtheextendedshutdowninitiated in1997,the18-monthsurveillance requirements 4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a) andb);4.8.1.1.2.e.6.a),

b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.8; 4.8.1.1.2.e.9.a),

b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.10.a) andb);and4.8.1.1.2.e.

11,maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theshutdown.

'Forpurposesofthisspecification, additionofwaterfromtheRWSTdoesnotconstitute apositivereactivity additionprovidedtheboronconcentration intheRWSTisgreaterthantheminimum,requiredbySpecification 3.1.2.7.b.2.

COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1Page3/48-9AMENDMENT 425,445" r)4~~'/4BASES3/4.8ELE<CTRICAL POWI<.RSYSTE<MSTheOPERABILITY oftheA.C.andD.Cpowersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringoperation ensuresthatsufficient powerwillbeavailable tosupplythesafetyrelatedequipment requiredfor1)thesafeshutdownofthefacilityand2)themitigation andcontrolofaccidentconditions withinthefacility.

Theminimumspecified independent andredundant A.C.andD.C.powersourcesanddistribution systemssatisfytherequirements ofGeneralDesignCriteria17ofAppendix"A"to10CFR50.TheACTIONrequirements specified forthelevelsofdegradation ofthepowersourc'esproviderestriction uponcontinued facilityoperation commensurate withthelevelofdegradation.

TheOPERABILITY ofthepowersourcesareconsistent withtheinitialcondition assumptions oftheaccidentanalysesandarebaseduponmaintaining atleastoneofeachoftheonsiteA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsOPERABLEduringaccidentconditions coincident withanassumedlossofoffsitepowerandsinglefailureoftheotheronsiteA.C.source.TheOPERABILITY oftheminimumspecified A.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringshutdownandrefueling ensuresthatI)thefacilitycanbemaintained intheshutdownorrefueling condition forextendedtimeperiodsand2)sufficient instrumentation andcontrolcapability isavailable formonitoring andmaintaining thefacilitystatus.Specificsurveillance requirements (SRs)ofSR4.8.1.2maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theextendedoutagethatcommenced in1997.Thedelayispermitted torecognize thesignificant ongoingmaintenance tosafetysystemsandcomponents thatwouldberequiredtobeOPERABLEsolelytosupportthereferenced surveillances.

Thedelayrecognizes thereduceddecayheatloadandfissionproductactivities resulting fromtheextendedshutdownandconsequently thesmallbenefitfromperforming thesurveillances priortothenextentryintoMODE4.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet,butactualperformance isnotrequireduntiltherequiredsafetysystemsarereadyto'support entryintoMODE4.TheABandCDstationbatterysystemsprovideareliablesourceofcontinuous powerforsupplyandcontrolofplantloadssuchasswitchgear andannunciator controlcircuits, staticinverters, valvecontrolcenters,emergency lightingandmotorcontrolcenters.Thedesigndutycyclesofthesebatteries arecomposite load'profiles resulting fromthecombination ofthethreehourLossOfCoolantAccident/Loss OfOffsitePowerbattery'oad profilesandthefourhourStationBlackoutbatteryloadprofiles.

ThetrainNstationbatterysystemprovidesanindependent 250voltDCpowersupplyforpowerandcontroloftheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrain.Thelimitingconditions ofoperation forthetrainNbatteryareconsistent withtherequirements oftheauxiliary fecdwater system.Thesurveillance requirements forthetrainNbatterysystemareconsistent withtherequirements oftheABandCDstationbatteries.

ThetrainNbatteryloadsarederivedfromequipment in'theturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrainandbatterysizingisconsistent withthefunctional requirements ofthesecomponents.

Simulated loadsforbatterytestsareloadsequivalent tomeasuredactualloads.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1PageB3/48-1AMENDMENT 86,498 ATTACHMENT 3BTOAEP:NRC:1322 PROPOSEDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT23/48-9B3/48-1 ff~0l 3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOROPERATION ANDSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3'/4.8ELECTRICAL POWERSYSTEMSSHUTDOWNLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION 3.8.1.2Asaminimum,thefollowing A.C.electrical powersourcesshallbeOPERABLE:

a.Onecircuitbetweentheoffsitetransmission networkandtheonsiteClass1Edistribution system,andb.Onedieselgenerator with:1.Adayfueltankcontaining aminimumof70gallonsoffuel,Afuelstoragesystemcontaining aminimumindicated volumeof46,000gallonsoffuel,andAPPLICABILITY:

3.Afueltransferpump.MODES5and6.ACTION:WithlessthantheaboveminimumrequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesOPERABLE, suspendalloperations involving COREALTERATIONS orpositivereactivity changes'ntil theminimumrequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesarerestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.SURVEILLANCE REUIREMENTS 4.8.1.2TheaboverequiredA.C.electrical powersourcesshallbedemonstrated OPERABLEbytheperformance ofeachoftheSurveillance Requirements of4.8.1.1.1'nd 4.8.1.1.2 exceptforrequirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.5.

Commencing in1999duringtheextendedshutdowninitiated in1997,'the 18-monthsurveillance requirements 4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a) andb);4.8.1.1.2.e.6.a),

b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.8; 4.8.1.1.2.e.9.a),

b)andc);4.8.1.1.2.e.10.a) andb);and4.8.1.1.2.e.

II,maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theshutdown.

'Forpurposesofthisspecification, additionofwaterfromtheRWSTdoesnotconstitute apositivereactivity additionprovidedtheboronconcentration intheRWSTisgreaterthantheminimumrequiredbySpecification 3.1.2.7.b.2.

COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2Page3/48-9AMENDMENT 448,483,459 3/4BASES314.8ELECTRICAL POWERSYSTEMSTheOPERABILITY oftheA.C.andD.Cpowersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringoperation ensuresthatsufficient powerwillbeavailable tosupplythesafetyrelatedequipment requiredforI)thesafeshutdownofthefacilityand2)themitigation andcontrolofaccidentconditions withinthefacility.

Theminimumspecified independent andredundant A.C.andD.C.powersourcesanddistribution systemssatisfytherequirements ofGeneralDesignCriteria17ofAppendix"A"to10CFR50.TheACTIONrequirements specified forthelevelsofdegradation ofthepowersourcesproviderestriction uponcontinued facilityoperation commensurate withthelevelofdegradation.

TheOPERABILITY ofthepowersourcesareconsistent withtheinitialcondition assumptions oftheaccidentanalysesandarebaseduponmaintaining atleastoneofeachoftheonsiteA.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsOPERABLEduringaccidentconditions coincident withanassumedlossofoffsitepowerandsinglefailureoftheotheronsiteA.C.source.TheOPERABILITY oftheminimumspecified A.C.andD.C.powersourcesandassociated distribution systemsduringshutdownandrefueling ensuresthat1)thefacilitycanbemaintained intheshutdownorrefueling condition forextendedtimeperiodsand2)sufficient instrumentation andcontrolcapability isavailable formonitoring andmaintaining thefacilitystatus.Specificsurveillance requirements (SRs)ofSR4.8.1.2maybedelayedonetimeuntiljustpriortothefirstentryintoMODE4following theextendedoutagethatcommenced in1997.Thedelayispermitted torecognize thesignificant ongoingmaintenance tosafetysystemsandcomponents thatwouldberequiredtobeOPERABLEsolelytosupportthereferenced surveillances.

Thedelayrecognizes thereduceddecayheatloadandreducedfissionproductactivities resulting fromtheextendedshutdownandconsequently thesmallbenefitfromperforming thesurveillances priortothenextentryintoMODE4.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet.butactualperformance isnotrequireduntiltherequiredsafetysystemsarcreadytosupportentryintoMODE4.TheABandCDstationbatterysystemsprovideareliablesourceofcontinuous powerforsupplyandcontrolofplantloadssuchasswitchgear andannunciator controlcircuits, staticinverters, valvecontrolcenters,emergency lightingandmotorcontrolcenters.Thedesigndutycyclesofthesebatteries arecomposite load,"profiles resulting fromthecombination ofthethreehourLossOfCoolantAccident/Loss OfOffsitePowerbatteryloadprofilesandthefourhourStationBlackoutbatteryloadprofiles.

ThetrainNstationbatterysystemprovidesanindependent 250voltDCpowersupplyforpowerandcontroloftheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrain.Thelimitingconditions ofoperation forthetrainNbatteryareconsistent withtherequirements oftheauxiliary feedwater system.Thesurveillance requirements forthetrainNbatterysystemareconsistent withtherequirements oftheABandCDstationbattcrics.

ThetrainNbatteryloadsarederivedfromequipment intheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedwater pumptrainandbatterysizingisconsistent withthefunctional requirements ofthesecomponents.

Simulated loadsforbatterytestsareloadsequivalent tomeasuredactualloads.lCOOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2Page83/48-1AMENDMENT VB,483 ATTACHMENT 4TOAEP:NRC:1322 NOSIGNIFICANT HAZARDSCONSIDERATION EVALUATION 1AI'I4.

Attachment 4TOAEP:NRC:1322 Page1NoSinificantHazardsConsideration Evaluation I&Mhasevaluated thisproposedamendment anddetermined thatitinvolvesnosignificant hazardsconsideration.

According to10CFR50.92(c),

aproposedamendment toanoperating licenseinvolvesnosignificant hazardsconsideration ifoperation ofthefacilityinaccordance withtheproposedamendment wouldnot:1.involveasignificant increaseintheprobability ofoccurrence orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated; 2.createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously analyzed; or3.involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.I&MproposestoreviseT/S3/4.8.1.2, "Electrical PowerSystems,Shutdown,"

anditsassociated basestoprovideaone-timeextension ofthe18-monthsurveillance intervalforspecificsurveillance requirements (SRs).Inaddition, forunit2only,aminoradministrative changeisincludedtodeleteareference toT/S4.0.8thatisnolongerapplicable.

Forunit1only,aneditorial correction ismade.Thedetermination thatthecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92aremetforthisamendment requestisindicated below.1.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability ofoccurrence orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated?

Adiscussion ofeachoftheapplicable accidents follows.FuelhandlinaccidentTheonlytimeafuelhandlingaccidentcouldoccurisduringthehandlingofafuelassembly.

Thedesignoffuelhandlingequipment issuchthataninterruption ofA.C.powerwouldnotcauseafuelelementtobeinadvertently dropped.Therefore, aninterruption orlossofA.C.powerdoesnotsignificantly increasetheprobability ofafuelhandlingaccident.

Atpresent,fissionproductactivities inthefuelassemblypellet-to-cladding gapsaregreatlyreduced.Thefuelhandlingaccidentanalysisconsiders thethyroiddoseatthesiteboundaryandinthelowpopulation zone.Thisdoseisdominated bytheisotopeiodine131,whichalsodecaysmoreslowlythantheotheriodinecontributors tothedose.Theactivityofiodine131decreases byone-halfevery8.05days.Thecurrentshutdownperiodofapproximately 18monthsrepresents over70half-lives.

Activityofaradioactive materialisgenerally considered tobenegligible after7half-lives (areduction inactivityof1/128).Bycontrast, theaccidentanalysisassumesaniodinereduction oflessthan1/10(fromactivated charcoalfiltration) inthefuelhandlingbuilding, andnoreduction inthecontainment, priortorelease.Therefore, theconsequences ofafuelhandling Attachment 4TOAEP:NRC:1322 Page2accidentareclearlyboundedbytheexistingsafetyanalysiswithouttakingcreditforanyiodineremovalbycharcoalfiltration.

Thegreatlyreducedfissionproductactivityatthecurrenttimeprovidesassurance thattheconsequences ofthiseventareboundedbytheexistinganalysis.

Therefore, theconsequences arenotsignificantly increased.

Accidental releaseofradioactive liuidsTheinadvertent releaseofradioactive liquidwastestotheenvironment wasevaluated forthewasteevaporator condensate andmonitortanks,condensate storagetank,primarywaterstoragetank,refueling waterstoragetank(RWST),theauxiliary buildingstoragetanksandthechemicalandvolumecontrolsystem(CVCS)holduptanks.Itwasconcluded, intheUFSARChapter14evaluation, thatlossofliquidfromthesetankstotheenvironment isnotacredibleaccident.

Thisconclusion doesnotdependonoperating mode,hence,furtherevaluation ofthiseventisnotrequired.

WasteasreleaseRadioactive gasesareintroduced intothereactorcoolantbytheescapeoffissionproductsifdefectsexistinthefuelcladding.

Theprocessing ofthereactorcoolantbyauxiliary systemsresultsintheaccumulation ofradioactive gasesinvarioustanks.Thetwomainsourcesofanysignificant gaseousradioactivity thatcouldoccurwouldbethevolumecontroltank(VCT)andthegasdecaytanks.Itisassumedthat'atankrupturesbyanunspecified mechanism afterthereactorhasbeenoperating foronecorecyclewith1%defectsinthefuelcladding.

Thereisnoidentified mechanism bywhichaninterruption orlossofpowercouldresultinatankrupture.Therefore, itisconcluded thattheprobability ofoccurrence ofatankrupturewouldnotbesignificantly increased byaninterruption orlossofA.C.power.Thegreatlyreducedfissionproductactivities atthecurrenttimeprovidesassurance thattheconsequences ofthiseventareboundedbythecurrentanalysisandwould,therefore, notbesignificantly increased.

Uncontrolled rodclustercontrolassembl(RCCA)withdrawal fromasubcritical condition Thiseventcanonlyoccur,withthereactortripbreakersclosedandthecontrolroddrivemechanisms (CRDMs)energized.

Withtheexception oftestingorspecialma'ntenance, theroddrivemotorgenerator setremainstaggedoutuntilMode3andthisalonewouldprecluderodmovement.

Iftheconditions forrodwithdrawal aremet,twooperablesourcerangeinstruments andtworeactortripchannelsandtripbreakersmustbeoperable.

Aninterruption orlossofpowerwouldprecludeCRDMmovementandreleasethecontrolrods.Thesourcerangeinstruments wouldremainavailable.

Therefore, itisconcluded thattheprobability ofoccurrence ofanuncontrolled RCCAwithdrawal wouldnotbesignificantly increased byaninterruption orlossofA.C.powerinModes5or6.Acceptable consequences forthiseventrelyonprecluding itsoccurrence.

~Cfl Ci~IAttachment 4TOAEP:NRC:1322 Page3hUncontrolled boron.dilutionThiseventrequiresamalfunction oftheCVCS.TheCVCSisdesignedtolimit,evenundervariouspostulated failuremodes,thepotential rateofdilutiontoavaluewhichprovidestheoperatorsufficient timetocorrectthesituation inasafeandorderlymanner.Therateofadditionofunborated watermakeuptothereactorcoolantsystemislimitedbythecapacityoftheprimarywaterpumps.Themaximumadditionrateinthiscaseis225gpmwithbothprimarywaterpumpsrunning.Aninterruption orlossofA.C.powerwouldprecludepumpoperation andaccidental dilution.

TheRWSTisnotacredibledilutionsourceasrecognized bya-footnotetoT/S3/4.8.1.2.

Therefore, thepossibility ofanuncontrolled borondilutionisnotsignificantly increased.

Acceptable consequences forthiseventrelyonprecluding itsoccurrence andbydetection withthesourcerangenuclearinstrumentation requiredbytheT/SinModes5and,6.Theproposedrevisioninvolvesdeferralofcertainsurveillance requirements whenshutdownbutdoesnotreducetherequiredoperablepowersourcesoftheLimitingCondition forOperation (LCO),doesnotincreasetheallowedoutagetimeofanyrequiredoperablepowersuppliesanddoesnotreducetherequirement toknowthatthedeferredSRscouldbemetatalltimes.Deferralofthetestingdoesnotbyitselfincreasethepotential thatthetestingwouldnotbemetandthepreviously evaluated accidents described abovedonotrelyonautomatic startingorloadingofthesingleoperableEDGpermitted inModes5and6.ThemonthlyEDGstarts,fuellevelchecks,andfueltransferpumpcheckswillcontinuetobeperformed toprovideadequateconfidence thattherequiredEDGwillbeavailable ifneeded.Therefore, itisconcluded thattherequiredA.C.sourceswillremainavailable andthepreviously evaluated consequences willnotbeincreased.

Theproposedadministrative changeforunit2deletesareference toT/S4.0.8thatisnolongerapplicable and,thus,doesnotincreasetheprobability orconsequences ofanaccident.

Theeditorial changetounit1correctsatypographical error.Thecorrection isnotintendedtochangethemeaning.Therefore, basedontheabovediscussion, itisconcluded thattheproposedamendment doesnotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.

/2.Doesthechangecreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated?

Theproposedchangesdonotinvolveoperation oftherequiredelectrical powersourcesinamannerorconfiguration different thanthosepreviously recognized orevaluated.

Nonewfailuremechanisms oftheA.C.powersuppliesareintroduced byextension ofthesubjectsurveillance intervals.

fi~,<

Attachment 4TOAEP:NRC:1322 Page4Theproposedadministrative changeforunit2deletesareference toT/S4.0.8thatisnolongerapplicable and,thus,doesnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccident.

Theeditorial changetounit1correctsatypographical error.Thecorrection isnotintendedtochangethemeaning.Therefore, itisconcluded thattheproposedchangesdonotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously evaluated.

3.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety?Therequiredoperablepowersupplieshavenotbeenreduced.Deferralofthespecified SRsdoesnotbyitselfintroduce afailuremechanism, andpastperformance oftheSRshasdemonstrated reliability inpassingthedeferredsurveillances.

Therefore, theavailability ofpowersuppliesassumedforaccidentmitigation isnotsignificantly reducedandpreviousmarginsofsafetyaremaintained.

Theproposedadministrative changeforunit2deletesareference toT/S4.0.8thatisnolongerapplicable andthus,doesnotincreasetheprobability orconsequences ofanaccident.

Theeditorial changetounit1correctsatypographical error.Thecorrection isnotintendedtochangethemeaning.Therefore, thesechangesdonotinvolveasignificant reduction inthemarginofsafety.Insummary,basedupontheaboveevaluation, I&Mhasconcluded thatthesechangesinvolvenosignificant hazardsconsideration.

ATTACHMENT 5TOAEP:NRC:1322 ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT Attachment 5toAEP:NRC:1322 Page1Environmental Assessment I&Mhasevaluated thislicenseamendment requestagainstthecriteriaforidentification oflicensing andregulatory actionsrequiring environmental assessment inaccordance with10CFR51.21.?&Mhasdetermined thatthislicenseamendment requestmeetsthecriteriaforacategorical exclusion setforthin10CFR51.22(c)(9)

.Thisdetermination isbasedonthefactthatthischangeisbeingproposedasanamendment toalicenseissuedpursuantto10CFR50thatchangesarequirement withrespecttoinstallation oruseofafacilitycomponent locatedwithintherestricted area,asdefinedin10CFR20,orthatchangesaninspection orasurveillance requirement, andtheamendment meetsthefollowing specificcriteria.

(i)Theamendment involvesnosignificant hazardsconsideration.

Asdemonstrated inattachment 4,thisproposedamendment doesnotinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.

(ii)Thereisnosignificant changeinthetypesorsignificant increaseintheamountsofanyeffluentthatmaybereleasedoffsite.Asdocumented inattachment 1,therewillbenosignificant changeinthetypesorsignificant increaseintheamountsofanyeffluents releasedoffsite.(iii)Thereisnosignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposure.

Theproposedchangeswillnotresultinsignificant changesintheoperation orconfiguration ofthefacility.

Therewillbenochangeinthelevelofcontrolsormethodology usedforprocessing ofradioactive effluents orhandlingofsolidradioactive waste,norwilltheproposalresultinanychangeinthenormalradiation levelswithintheplant.Therefore, therewillbenosignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposureresulting fromthischange.

4.i"IPC',h

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