ML17329A672

Proposed Tech Specs Tables 4.7-1 & 3.7-4 Associated W/Tech Spec 3.7.1.1 Re Main Steam Safety Valve Tolerance

ML17329A672
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Site:	Cook
Issue date:	11/11/1992
From:	INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
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ML17329A671	List: ML17329A670 ML17329A672 ML17329A673
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NUDOCS 9211170212
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ATTACHMENT 2toAEP:NRC:1169 PROPOSEDREVISEDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGES92iii702i2 92iiiiPDRADOCK050003i5PPDR Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:1169 Page4Lastly,wenotethattheCommission hasprovidedguidanceconcerning determination ofsignificant hazardsbyproviding certainexamples(48FR14780)ofamendments considered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsiderations.

Thesixthoftheseexamplesreferstochangesthateithermayresultinsomeincreasetotheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously analyzedaccidentormayreduceinsomewayasafetymargin,butwheretheresultsofthechangeareclearlywithinthelimitsestablished asacceptable.

Theanalysesthatarereferenced inthissubmittal havebeendemonstrated tocomplywiththelicensing basisoftheplant.Thus,webelievethattheexamplecitedisapplicable andthatthechangesshouldnotinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.

34PLANTSYSTEMSBASES341TURBINECYCLE3411SAFETYVALVESTheOPERABILITY ofthemainsteamlinecodesafetyvalvesensuresthatthesecondary systempressurewillbelimitedtowithinllOXofitsdesignpressureof1085psigduringthemostsevereanticipated systemoperational transient.

Themaximumrelieving capacityisassociated withaturbinetripfrom100XRATEDTHERMALPOWERcoincident withanassumedlossofcondenser heatsink(i.e.,nosteambypasstothecondenser).

Thespecified valveliftsettingsandrelieving capacities areinaccordance withtherequirements ofSectionIIIoftheASMEBoilerandPressureCode,1971Edition.ThesafetyvalveisOPERABLEwithaliftsettingof+3Xaboutthenominalvalue.However,thesafetyvalveshallberesettothenominalvalue+1Xwheneverfoundoutsidethe+1Xtolerance.

Thetotalrelieving capacityforallvalvesonallofthesteamlinesis17,153,800 lbs/hrwhichisapproximately 121percentofthetotalsecondary steamflowof14,120,000 lbs/hrat100XRATEDTHERMALPOWER.Aminimumof2OPERABLEsafetyvalvesperoperablesteamgenerator ensuresthatsufficient relieving capacityisavailable fortheallowable THERMALPOWERrestriction inTable3.7-1.STARTUPand/orPOWEROPERATION isallowable withsafetyvalvesinoperable withinthelimitations oftheACTIONrequirements onthebasisofthereduction insecondary systemsteamflowandTHERMALPOWERrequiredbythereducedreactortripsettingsofthePowerRangeNeutronFluxchannels.

Thereactortripsetpointreductions arederivedonthefollowing bases:For4loopoperation Where:SPreducedreactortripsetpointinpercentofRATEDTHERMALPOWERVmaximumnumberofinoperable safetyvalvespersteamline1,2013.X-Totalrelieving capacityofallsafetyvalvespersteamline-4,288,450 lbs/hour.

YMaximumrelieving capacityofanyonesafetyvalve857,690lbs/hour(109)PowerRangeNeutronFlux-High TripSetpointfor4loopoperation.

COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT1B3/47-1AMENDMENT NO.420 EMERGENCY CORECOOLINGSYSTEMSECCSSUBSYSTEMS

-T~~2350FLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION 3.5.2Twoindependent ECCSsubsystems shallbeOPERABLEwitheachsubsystem comprised of:a.OneOPERABLEcentrifugal chargingpump,b.OneOPERABLEsafetyinjection pumpC.OneOPERABLEresidualheatremovalheatexchanger, d.OneOPERABLEresidualheatremovalpump,e.AnOPERABLEflowpathcapableoftakingsuctionfromtherefueling waterstoragetankonasafetyinjection signalandtransferring suctiontothecontainment sumpduringtherecirculation phaseofoperation, andf.Allsafetyinjection cross-tie valvesopen.APPLICABILITY:

MODES1,2,and3.ACTION:a.WithoneECCSsubsystem inoperable, restoretheinoperable subsystem toOPERABLEstatuswithin72hoursorbeinHOTSHUTDOWNwithinthenext12hours.b.Withasafetyinjection cross-tie valveclosed,restorethecross-tievalvetotheopenpositionorreducethecorepowerleveltolessthanorequalto3250MWwithinonehour.Specification 3.0.4doesnotapply.C.IntheeventtheECCSisactuatedandinjectswaterintotheReactorCoolantSystem,aSpecialReportshallbepreparedandsubmitted totheCommission pursuanttoSpecification 6.9.2within90daysdescribing thecircumstances oftheactuation andthetotalaccumulated actuation cyclestodate.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT23/45-3AMENDMENT NO.

TABLE37-4STEAMLINESAFETYVALVESPERLOOPVALVENUMBERLIFTSETTINGk3X*ORIFICESIZEa.SV-1b.SV-1c.SV-2SV-2e.SV-31065psig1065psig1075psig1075psig1085psig16in.216in.216in.216in.216in.2*Theliftsettingpressureshallcorrespond toambientconditions ofthevalveatnominaloperating temperature andpressure.

COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT23/47-4AMENDMENT NO.

345EMERGENCY CORECOOLINGSYSTEMSBASES3451ACCUMULATORS TheOPERABILITY ofeachRCSaccumulator-ensuresthatasufficient volumeofboratedwaterwillbeimmediately forcedintothereactorcorethrougheachofthecoldlegsintheeventtheRCSpressurefallsbelowthepressureoftheaccumulators.

Thisinitialsurgeofwaterintothecoreprovidestheinitialcoolingmechanism duringlargeRCSpiperuptures.

Thelimitsonaccumulator volume,boronconcentration andpressureensurethattheassumptions usedforaccumulator injection inthesafetyanalysisaremet.Theaccumulator poweroperatedisolation valvesareconsidered tobe"operating bypasses" inthecontextofIEEEStd.279-1971, whichrequiresthatbypassesofaprotective functionberemovedautomatically wheneverpermissive conditions arenotmet.Inaddition, astheseaccumulator isolation valvesfailtomeetsinglefailurecriteria, removalofpowertothevalvesisrequired.

Thelimitsforoperation withanaccumulator inoperable foranyreasonexceptanisolation valveclosedminimizes thetimeexposureoftheplanttoaLOCAeventoccurring concurrent withfailureofanadditional accumulator whichmayresultinunacceptable peakcladdingtemperatures.

Ifaclosedisolation valvecannotbeimmediately opened,thefullcapability ofoneaccumulator isnotavailable andpromptactionisrequiredtoplacethereactorinamodewherethiscapability isnotrequired.

3452and3453ECCSSUBSYSTEMS TheOPERABILITY oftwoindependent

.-ECCS-subsystems

-ensuresthatsufficient emergency corecoolingcapability willbeavailable intheeventofaLOCAassumingthelossofonesubsystem throughanysinglefailureconsideration.

Eithersubsystem operating inconjunction withtheaccumulators iscapableofsupplying sufficient corecoolingtolimitthepeakcladdingtemperatures withinacceptable limitsforallpostulated breaksizesrangingfromthedoubleendedbreakofthelargestRCScoldlegpipedownward.

Inaddition, eachECCSsubsystem provideslongtermcorecoolingcapability intherecirculation modeduringtheaccidentrecoveryperiod.Ifasafetyinjection cross-tie valveisclosed,safetyinjection wouldbelimitedtotwolinesassumingthelossofonesafetyinjection subsystem throughasinglefailureconsideration.

Theresulting loweredflowrequiresadecreaseinTHERMALPOWERtolimitthepeakcladtemperature withinacceptable limitsintheeventofapostulated smallbreakLOCA.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT2B3/45-1AMENDMENT NO.

'I'II 34PLANTSYSTEMSBASES3471TURBINECYCLE3411SAFETYVALVESTheOPERABILITY ofthemainsteamlinecodesafetyvalvesensuresthatthesecondary systempressurewillbelimitedtowithinllOXofitsdesignpressureof1085psigduringthemostsevereanticipated systemoperational transient.

Themaximumrelieving capacityisassociated withaturbinetripfrom100XRATEDTHERMALPOWERcoincident withanassumedlossofcondenser heatsink(i.e.,nosteambypasstothecondenser).

Thespecified valveliftsettingsandrelieving capacities areinaccordance withtherequirements ofSectionIIIoftheASMEBoilerandPressureCode,1971Edition.ThesafetyvalveisOPERABLEwithaliftsettingof+3Xaboutthenominalvalue.However,thesafetyvalveshallberesettothenominalvalue+1Xwheneverfoundoutsidethe+1X"tolerance.

Thetotalrelieving capacityofallsafetyvalvesonallofthesteamlinesis17,153,800 lbs/hrwhichisatleast105percentofthemaximumsecondary steamflowrateat100XRATEDTHERMALPOWER.Aminimumof2OPERABLEsafetyvalvespersteamgenerator ensuresthatsufficient relieving capacityisavailable fortheallowable THERMALPOWERrestriction inTable3.7-1,STARTUPand/orPOWEROPERATION isallowable withsafetyvalvesinoperable withinthelimitations oftheACTIONrequirements onthebasisofthereduction insecondary syst:emsteamflowandTHERMALPOWERrequiredbythereducedreactortripsettingsofthePowerRangeNeutronFluxchannels.

Thereactortripsetpointreductions arederivedonthefollowing bases:For4loopoperation Where:SP-reducedreactortripsetpointinpercentofRATEDTHERMALPOWERVmaximumnumberofinoperable safetyvalvespersteamlineXtotalrelieving capacityofallsafetyvalvespersteamlineinlbs./hours

-4,288,450 Ymaximumrelieving capacityofanyonesafetyvalveinlbs./hour

-857,690109-PowerRangeNeutronFlux-High TripSetpointfor4loopoperation COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT2B3/47-1AMENDMENT NO.8R,434 ATTACHMENT 3toAEP:NRC:1169 CURRENTPAGESMARKED-UP TOREFLECTPROPOSEDCHANGES pnP,s5%16in.16in.16in.oiSV-l16in.16in.$065paigI~boSV~1$065paid~LI1075paiydoSV-0$075peageoSV-3$0l1paiyIs$4!'.>CJ*The1Ctsettingpreaaureaha11oorreapjnd toaahientoonditione oltheva1veatnoaina1operating taaporature andpreaaure'

/47MRVIe~47vvTheOPERhbILZTY oftheaainsteaaltno,codesafecyvavesensuresthatehesecondary syscslspressurevillbolhaicadcovtthtnitadesignpressureof1085pstgduringthesostsevereanticipated systaaopera-tionaltranstonc.

Themaxbausreltevtng cayacttyisassociaeed vtchacurbinetripfroa100%RATEQZHl9WhLPOMERcoincident vtehanassuagedlossofcondenser heatsink(i.e.,nosteaabypasstochecondenser).

0Thespecified valveliftseeetngaandrelieving cayactttes aretnaccordance vtththeroqutroaents ofSectionIIIofeheASIDEboilerandPressureCode,1971Edition.Thetotalrelieving capacityforallvalvesonaoeheaceaNness17.153.800 lba/hrwhichisapproximately 121percentofchecocalsecondary steamflovof14,120,000 lba/hrae,100%RATEDTHECALPORR.AIMeuaof2OPQAILEsafeeyvalvesyoroperahlosceaagenerator ensuresehacsufficient relieving cayacityisavailoforcheallovable THECALPOMERrestriction inTable3.7-1.STARTUPand/orPOMEROPERATION isallovabie vithsafetyvaltnoyerable vtthtneheliateattona ofehoACTZOfrequtrolenta onehebasisofthe.reduction insecondary systaasteaaflovandTHEL%LPSKRrequiredbythereducedreactortripsectingaofthePoverRangeNeutronFluxchannels.

Thereactoreriyseepotntreductions arederivedonthefoll,ovtng bases:For4looyoperaeton

~<ir@here:SPreducedreactortripsecyotne, in.perconc ofRATEDTHKM.POMMERV~eaxhuanuaborofinoperable safecyvalvesperseoaaline1,2or3.X~Totalrelf.evtng capacttyofallsafetyvalvespor,steamline4,288,450lba/hour.

'YNaxiauarelieving cayacityofanyonesafecyvalve~857,690lbs/hour.

(109)PaverRangeNeutronFlux-High TrtySoepoinefor4loopoyeracion.

1.C.COOKUNIT153/4V~1hk92tMENT HO.120 il5NTAI'hesafetyvalveisOPERABLEwithaliftsettingof+3'5abouttheneainalvalue.Hcaevir,thesafetyvalveshallberesettotheneainalvalue+1%wheneverfegdoutsidethe+1%tolerance.

EMERGENCY CORECOOLINGSYSTEMSECCSSUBSYSTEMS

-T350'FLIMITINGCONOITION FOROPERATION 3.5.2Twoindependent ECCSsubsystems shallbeOPERABLEwitheachsubsystem comprised of:a.OneOPERABLEcentrifugal chargingpump,b.OneOPERABLEsafetyinIjection pump,c.OneOPERABLEresidualheatrsnovalheatexchanger, d.OneOPERABLEresidualheatremovalpump,and.e.'nOPERABLEflowpathcapableoftakingsuctionfromtherefueling water.storagetankonasafetyinjection signalandtransferring suctiontothecontainment sumpduringtherecir-culationphaseofoperation.

'i(5c4etVInic.di<~B~s'S-fi~S~ValYeSQPqh.APPLICABILITY:

MOOES1,2and3.ACTION:WithoneECCSsubsystem inoperable, restoretheinoperable sub-systemtoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hoursorbeinHOTSHUTDOWNwithinhenext12hours.IntheeventtheECCSisactuatedandinjectswaterintotheReactorCoolant;System,aSpecialReportshallbepreparedandsubmitted totheCommission pursuanttoSpecification 6.9.2'thin90daysdecribingthecircumstances of'heactuation andthetotalaccumulated actuation cyclestodate.I~~~g4;~-<legtN-i'geVaKVeClead)QCL.i\+ItA-9ic.vatic+o~oregpog,ctIwcI<~eh,~ccc<cqowcc4:W%<e'erW~~aTei~WK3zso8>~fc4cF<c&4Qvl.g,Q,c.)Q~Jg,o'tgyp)~O.C.COOK-UNIT23/45-3 VALVENEERTABLE3.7-4~STEiMlLINESAKTVVALVESPERLOOP810LlFTSETTING-*ORIFICESIZEa.SV-1b.SV-1c.SV-24I.SV-2e.SV-31065psig1065psig1075psig1075psig1085psignl6in.~l6in.~16in.~16in.~~eIif~soHngpressureshallcorrespond toaablentconditions oftheva)veatnoainaloperating temperature.aad pressure.

3/4.59lHKKHCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMSBASES3/4.5.IACCUNlLATORS TheOPERABILITY ofeachRCSaccumulator ensuresthatasufffcfent volumeofborated~aterwillbeimmediately forcedintathereacto~corethrougheachaf,thecoldlegsintheeventtheRCSpressurefallsbelowthepressureoftheaccumulators.

Thisinitialsurgeofwaterintothecoreprovidesthefnitfalcoolingmechanism duringlargeRCSpiperuptures.

Thelimitsonaccumulator volume,baronconcentration andpressureensurethat,theassumptions usedforaccumulator injection inthesafetyanalysisaremet.Theaccumulator poweroperatedisolation valvesareconsidered tcbe"operating bypasses" fnthecontextafIEEEStd.279-1971, whichrequiresthatbypassesofaprotective functionberemovedautomatically wheneverpermissive conditions

.arenotmet.Inaddition, astheseaccumulator isolation valvesfailtameetsinglefaflurecriteria, removalofpowertothevalvesisrequfred.

lThelimitsforaperatfan withanaccumulator inaperable foranyreasonexceptanisolation valveclosedminimizes thetfmeexposureoftheplanttaaLOCAeventaccurring concurrent withfailureafanadditional accumulator whichmayresultinunacceptable peakcladdingtemperatures.

Ifaclasedisolation valvecannotbefmmediately opened,thefullcapability ofcneaccumulator fsnotavailable andpromptactionisrequiredtoplacethereactorinamodewherethiscapability isnotrequired.

3/4.5.2and3/4.5.3ECCSSUBSYSTEMS TheOPERABILITY oftwoindependent ECCSsubsystems ensuresthatsufficient emergency carecaolingcapability willbeavailable intheeventofaLOCAassumingthelassofcnesubsystem thraughanysinglefailurecansideraticn.

Eithersubsystem operating inconjunctian withtheaccumulators iscapableofsupplying sufficfent carecaolfngtalimitthepeakcladdingtemperatures withinacceptable limitsforallpostulatac breaksfzesrangingframthedoubleendedbreakofthelargestRCScoldlegpipedownward.

Inaddition, eachECCSsubsystem pravfdesIongtermcarecoolingcapability intherecircuIation madeduringtheaccident.

recave~period.l~+~g~g~inc,~~(vs~."cho~>gpcQi~i~~+~~~'LQ/c4I~~~~~pc)~Ig~c~~+<~~5+~>.4+s4fcc~g<ALpaA>~,~fp'-lll~~J64A~.\~'pg~$~Cbli~s~HRYHC~~gpp-tc~cr8<<~~+'<"'"'f+"+'req'lC Le~0.C.CQQK-UNIT2B3/4S-1Amendment No.39 IAwf L7347.3a.1.VE5TheOPQAbKITT ofsheas'teanlinecodesafetyvalvesensuresshat.shesecondary systemyressureK11belimitedsovithinll4iofissdesignyressureof10ISysigduringtheaostsevereanticiyated sysseaoyerasional transient.

Theaaxinuirelieving cayacityisassociated vithaturbinetriyfroa100%NhTLOT8LRNALNSLRcoincidens vishanassumedlossofcondenser heatsi!Lk(i~~nosc44$byyasssothecondenser)

~!Thesyecifie4 valveliftsettingssn4relieving cayacities areinaccordance vishtherepaireaeats ofSectionZZZefthehSNEIoilerand~ggggT'pPressureCode,1%71kantianTh>>totalrelieving cayacityotallsafetyvaveson~tbesteaelinesis17,U3,NOlbs/hrvhichisatleast10fyercensofsheSax~secot~sse40f14&rateat100%NAZETHtRHhLPSCR.AIiaCaaof2OtNASLIsafetyvalvesyersteaagenerator ensuresthatsufficient relieving cayacityis<<vailable forthealliable.T!CECAL POMERrestriction inTable3.7l.STAKUtand/orNMKLOPNATBNtsallevabl>>

vishsafetyvalvesinoyerable vithin'the limitations ettheACTZMeapatreaents enthebasisofthereduction in'secondary sysc4$sc448fltcf<<n4TSUllALNIAL'.requiredbythereduce4reactortriysettingsotthePowcRange'eatr flmchannels.

Thereactortziysetyeintreductions aredarive4onthefollowing bases:tor4looyoyeration a(IH)Shore:St~reduce4reactoraiysetyointinyercentotNATQ~QLNOR~+::X~r.SC~aaiaeaahorefiaeyerab4 safetyvalvesyersteaaMae~toeaLrelieving eayacityefallsafetyvalvesyersteaaQaaialbs./hours I,2II,ASO

~auiaerelieving eayacityof~enesafetyvalveiaQa./hour~057,HOXM~-towerRange%easrenquaNighTsiySetyoinsferAlooyeyeration COONlNUCLQRKhNTNZT2i)/i701aaSumCIO.N,<34