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{{#Wiki_filter:ATTACHMENT2TOAEP:NRC:1275CURRENTPAGESMARKED-UPTOREFLECTPROPOSEDCHANGESTOTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS9803060382980303PDRADQCK050003i5PPDR 3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONSFOROPERATIONANDSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS3/4.6'ONTAINMENTSYSTEMSVerifyingduringarecombinersystemfunctionaltestthattheheatersheathtemperatureincreasestoa1200'Fwithin5hoursandismaintainedforatleast4hours.4.Verifyingtheintegrityofallheaterelectricalcircuitsbyperformingacontinuityandresistancetogroundtestmtnediately-followingtheaboverequiredfunctionaltest.Theresistancetogroundforanyheaterphaseshallbea10,000ohms.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT1Page3/46-25 3/4BASES3/4.6'ONTAINMENTSYSTEMSTheOPERABILITYoftheequipmentandsystemsrequiredforthedetectionandcontrolofhydrogengasensuresthatthisequipmentwillbeavailabletomaintainthehydrogenconcentrationwithincontainmentbelowitsflammablelimitduringpost-LOCAconditions.Eitherrecombinerunitiscapableofcontrollingtheexpectedhydrogengenerationassociatedwith'.1)zirconium-waterreactions;2)radiolyticdecompositionofwater>~and3)corrosionofmetalswithincontainment.ThesehydrogencontrolsystemsareconsistentwiththerecommendationsofRegulatoryGuide1.7,"ControlofCombustibleGasConcentrationsinContainmentFollowingaLOCA,"March1971.Theacceptancecriterionof10,000ohmsisbasedonthetestbeingperformedwiththeheaterelementatanambienttemperature,butcanbeconservativelyappliedwhentheheaterelementisatatemperatureaboveambient.aJdelTherequirementsassociatedwitheachofthecomponentsoftheicecondenserensurethattheoverallsystemwillbeavailabletoprovidesufficientpressuresuppressioncapabilitytolimitthecontainmentpeakpressuretransienttolessthan12psigduringLOCAconditions.TheOPERABILITYoftheicebedensuresthattherequirediceinventorywill1)bedistributedevenlythroughthecontainmentbays,2)containsufficientborontoprecludedilutionofthecontainmentsumpfollowingtheLOCAand3)containsufficientheatremovalcapabilitytocondensethereactorsystemvolumereleasedduringaLOCA.Theseconditionsareconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedintheaccidentanalyses.Theminimumweightfigureof1333poundsoficeperbasketcontainsa5%conservativeallowanceforicelossthroughsublimation.Intheeventthatobservedsublimationratesareequaltoorlowerthandesignpredictionsafterthreeyearsofoperation,theminimumicebasketsweightmaybeadjusteddownward.Inaddition,thenumberoficebasketsrequiredtobeweighedeach18monthsmaybereducedafter3yearsofoperationifsuchareductionissupportedbyobservedsublimationdata.TheOPERABILITYoftheicebedtemperaturemonitoringsystemensuresthatthecapabilityisavailableformonitoringtheicetemperature.Intheeventthemonitoringsystemisinoperable,theACTIONrequirementsprovideassurancethattheicebedheatremovalcapacitywillberetainedwithinthespecifiedtimelimits.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT2PageB3/46QAMENDMENT4,~,904 ATTACHMENT3TOAEP:NRC:1275PROPOSEDCHANGESTOTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS t3/4BASES3/4.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSTheOPERABILITYofthecontainmentspraysystemensuresthatcontainmentdepressurizationandcoolingcapabilitywillbeavailableintheeventofaLOCA.Thepressurereductionandresultantlowercontainmentleakagerateareconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedintheaccidentanalyses.TheOPERABILITYofthesprayadditivesystemensuresthatsufficientNaOHisaddedtothecontainmentsprayintheeventofaLOCA.ThelimitsonNaOHminimumvolumeandconcentration,ensurethat1)theiodineremovalefficiencyofthespraywaterismaintainedbecauseoftheincreaseinpHvalue,and2)corrosioneffectsoncomponentswithincontainmentareminimized.Theseassumptionsareconsistentwiththeiodineremovalefficiencyassumedintheaccidentanalyses.TheOPERABILITYofthecontainmentisolationvalvesensuresthatthecontainmentatmospherewillbeisolatedfromtheoutsideenvironmentintheeventofareleaseofradioactivematerialtothecontainmentatmosphereorpressurizationofthecontainment.ContainmentisolationwithinthetimelimitsspecifiedensuresthatthereleaseofradioactivematerialtotheenvironmentwillbeconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedintheanalysesforaLOCA.Theopeningofcontainmentpurgeandexhaustvalvesandlockedorsealedclosedcontainmentisolationvalvesonanintermittentbasisunderadministrativecontrolincludesthefollowingconsiderations:(1)stationingaqualifiedindividual,whoisinconstantcommunicationwithcontrolroom,atthevalvecontrols,(2)instructingthisindividualtoclosethesevalvesinanaccidentsituation,and(3)assuringthatenvironmentalconditionswillnotprecludeaccesstoclosethevalvesandthatthisactionwillpreventthereleaseofradioactivityoutsidethecontaimnent.TheOPERABILITYoftheequipmentandsystemsrequiredforthedetectionandcontrolofhydrogengasensuresthatthisequipmentwillbeavailabletomaintainthehydrogenconcentrationwithincontainmentbelowitsflammablelimitduringpost-LOCAconditions,Eitherrecombinerunitiscapableofcontrollingtheexpectedhydrogengenerationassociatedwith',1)zirconium-waterreactionst2)radiolyticdecompositionofwatered3)corrosionofmetalswithincontainment.Theacceptancecriterionof10,000ohmsisbasedonthetestbeingperformedwiththeheaterelementatanambienttemperature,butcanbeconservativelyappliedwhentheheaterelementisatatemperatureaboveambient.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNITIPageB3/46-3 3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONSFOROPERATIONANDSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS3/4.6'ONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3.Verifyingduringarecombinersystemfunctionaltestthattheheatersheathtemperatureincreasestoa1200'Fwithin5hoursandismaintainedforatleast4hours.4.Verifyingtheintegrityofallheaterelectricalcircuitsbyperformingacontinuityandresistancetogroundtestfollowingtheaboverequiredfunctionaltest.Theresistancetogroundforanyheaterphaseshallbea10,000ohms.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNITIPage3/46-25 3/4,BASES3/4.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSTheOPERABILITYofthecontainmentspraysystemensuresthatcontainmentdepressurizationandcoolingcapabilitywillbeavailableintheeventofaLOCA.Thepressurereductionandresultantlowercontainmentleakagerateareconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedintheaccidentanalyses.TheOPERABILITYofthesprayadditivesystemensuresthatsufficientNaOHisaddedtothecontainmentsprayintheeventofaLOCA.ThelimitsonNaOHminimumvolumeandconcentration,ensurethat1)theiodineremovalefficiencyofthespraywaterismaintainedbecauseoftheincreaseinpHvalue,and2)corrosioneffectsoncomponentswithincontainmentareminimized.Theseassumptionsareconsistentwiththeiodineremovalefficiencyassumedintheaccidentanalyses.TheOPERABILITYofthecontainmentisolationvalvesensuresthatthecontainmentatmospherewillbeisolatedfromtheoutsideenvironmentintheeventofareleaseofradioactivematerialtothecontainmentatmosphereorpressurizationofthecontainment.ContainmentisolationwithinthetimelimitsspecifiedensuresthatthereleaseofradioactivematerialtotheenvironmentwillbeconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedintheanalysesforaLOCA.Theopeningofcontainmentpurgeandexhaustvalvesandlockedorsealedclosedcontainmentisolationvalvesonanintermittentbasisunderadministrativecontrolincludesthefollowingconsiderations:(1)stationingaqualifiedindividual,whoisinconstantcommunicationwithcontrolroom,atthevalvecontrols,(2)instructingthisindividualtoclosethesevalvesinanaccidentsituation,and(3)assuringthatenvironmentalconditionswillnotprecludeaccesstoclosethevalvesandthatthisactionwillpreventthereleaseofradioactivityoutsidethecontainment.TheOPERABILITYoftheequipmentandsystemsrequiredforthedetectionandcontrolofhydrogengasensuresthatthisequipmentwillbeavailabletomaintainthehydrogenconcentrationwithincontainmentbelowitsflammablelimitduringpost-LOCAconditions.Eitherrecombinerunitiscapableofcontrollingtheexpectedhydrogengenerationassociatedwith:1)zirconium-waterreactions;2)radiolyticdecompositionofwater;and3)corrosionofmetalswithincontainment.Theacceptancecriterionof10,000ohmsisbasedonthetestbeingperformedwiththeheaterelementatanambienttemperature,butcanbeconservativelyappliedwhentheheaterelementisatatemperatureaboveambient.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT1Page83/46-3 3/4BASES3/4.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSTheOPERABILITYoftheequipmentandsystemsrequiredforthedetectionandcontrolofhydrogengasensuresthatthisequipmentwillbeavailabletomaintainthehydrogenconcentrationwithincontainmentbelowitsflammablelimitduringpost-LOCAconditions.Eitherrecombinerunitiscapableofcontrollingtheexpectedhydrogengenerationassociatedwith:1)zirconium-waterreactions;2)radiolyticdecompositionofwater;and3)corrosionofmetalswithincontainment.ThesehydrogencontrolsystemsareconsistentwiththerecommendationsofRegulatoryGuide1.7,"ControlofCombustibleGasConcentrationsinContainmentFollowingaLOCA,"March1971.Theacceptancecriterionof10,000ohmsisbasedonthetestbeingperformedwiththeheaterelementatanambienttemperature,butcanbeconservativelyappliedwhentheheaterelementisatatemperatureaboveambient.Therequirementsassociatedwitheachofthecomponentsoftheicecondenserensurethattheoverallsystemwillbeavailabletoprovidesufficientpressuresuppressioncapabilitytolimitthecontainmentpeakpressuretransienttolessthan12psigduringLOCAconditions.TheOPERABILITYoftheicebedensuresthattherequirediceinventorywill1)bedistributedevenlythroughthecontainmentbays,2)containsufficientborontoprecludedilutionofthecontainmentsumpfollowingtheLOCAand3)containsufficientheatremovalcapabilitytocondensethereactorsystemvolumereleasedduringaLOCA.Theseconditionsareconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedintheaccidentanalyses.Theminimumweightfigureof1333poundsoficeperbasketcontainsa5%conservativeallowanceforicelossthroughsublimation.Intheeventthatobservedsublimationratesareequaltoorlowerthandesignpredictionsafterthreeyearsofoperation,theminimumicebasketsweightmaybeadjusteddownward.Inaddition,thenumberoficebasketsrequiredtobeweighedeach18monthsmaybereducedafter3yearsofoperationifsuchareductionissupportedbyobservedsublimationdata.TheOPERABILITYoftheicebedtemperaturemonitoringsystemensuresthatthecapabilityisavailableformonitoringtheicetemperature.Intheeventthemonitoringsystemisinoperable,theACTIONrequirementsprovideassurancethattheicebedheatremovalcapacitywillberetainedwithinthespecifiedtimelimits.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT2PageB3/46-4AMENDMENTi.,~,SH ATTACHMENT4TOAEP:NRC:1275WESTINGHOUSELETTERDESCRIBINGTHEHYDROGENRECOMBINERRESISTANCETOGROUNDTEST J/
{{#Wiki_filter:ATTACHMENT 2TOAEP:NRC:1275 CURRENTPAGESMARKED-UP TOREFLECTPROPOSEDCHANGESTOTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 9803060382 980303PDRADQCK050003i5PPDR 3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOROPERATION ANDSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.6'ONTAINMENT SYSTEMSVerifying duringarecombiner systemfunctional testthattheheatersheathtemperature increases toa1200'Fwithin5hoursandismaintained foratleast4hours.4.Verifying theintegrity ofallheaterelectrical circuitsbyperforming acontinuity andresistance togroundtestmtnediately-following theaboverequiredfunctional test.Theresistance togroundforanyheaterphaseshallbea10,000ohms.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1Page3/46-25 3/4BASES3/4.6'ONTAINMENT SYSTEMSTheOPERABILITY oftheequipment andsystemsrequiredforthedetection andcontrolofhydrogengasensuresthatthisequipment willbeavailable tomaintainthehydrogenconcentration withincontainment belowitsflammable limitduringpost-LOCA conditions.
4123744811TO8161669'75574P.82i83~@WestinghouseElectricCompany,adivisionofCBScorporationEnergySystemsMuolearSeniioesOivisionBox355Pittsburgh,Pennsytvania152304355~Mr.BobVaseyAmericanElectricPowerD.C.CookNuclearPlantOneCookPlaceBridgman,Michigan49106AEP-98-023NSD-SAE-ESI-98-079February20,1998AMERICANELECTRICPOWERDONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTUNITS1&2HdroenRecambinerSstemSurvelllanceTest
Eitherrecombiner unitiscapableofcontrolling theexpectedhydrogengeneration associated with'.1)zirconium-water reactions; 2)radiolytic decomposition ofwater>~and 3)corrosion ofmetalswithincontainment.
Thesehydrogencontrolsystemsareconsistent withtherecommendations ofRegulatory Guide1.7,"ControlofCombustible GasConcentrations inContainment Following aLOCA,"March1971.Theacceptance criterion of10,000ohmsisbasedonthetestbeingperformed withtheheaterelementatanambienttemperature, butcanbeconservatively appliedwhentheheaterelementisatatemperature aboveambient.aJdelTherequirements associated witheachofthecomponents oftheicecondenser ensurethattheoverallsystemwillbeavailable toprovidesufficient pressuresuppression capability tolimitthecontainment peakpressuretransient tolessthan12psigduringLOCAconditions.
TheOPERABILITY oftheicebedensuresthattherequirediceinventory will1)bedistributed evenlythroughthecontainment bays,2)containsufficient borontoprecludedilutionofthecontainment sumpfollowing theLOCAand3)containsufficient heatremovalcapability tocondensethereactorsystemvolumereleasedduringaLOCA.Theseconditions areconsistent withtheassumptions usedintheaccidentanalyses.
Theminimumweightfigureof1333poundsoficeperbasketcontainsa5%conservative allowance foricelossthroughsublimation.
Intheeventthatobservedsublimation ratesareequaltoorlowerthandesignpredictions afterthreeyearsofoperation, theminimumicebasketsweightmaybeadjusteddownward.
Inaddition, thenumberoficebasketsrequiredtobeweighedeach18monthsmaybereducedafter3yearsofoperation ifsuchareduction issupported byobservedsublimation data.TheOPERABILITY oftheicebedtemperature monitoring systemensuresthatthecapability isavailable formonitoring theicetemperature.
Intheeventthemonitoring systemisinoperable, theACTIONrequirements provideassurance thattheicebedheatremovalcapacitywillberetainedwithinthespecified timelimits.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2PageB3/46QAMENDMENT 4,~,904 ATTACHMENT 3TOAEP:NRC:1275 PROPOSEDCHANGESTOTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS t3/4BASES3/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMSTheOPERABILITY ofthecontainment spraysystemensuresthatcontainment depressurization andcoolingcapability willbeavailable intheeventofaLOCA.Thepressurereduction andresultant lowercontainment leakagerateareconsistent withtheassumptions usedintheaccidentanalyses.
TheOPERABILITY ofthesprayadditivesystemensuresthatsufficient NaOHisaddedtothecontainment sprayintheeventofaLOCA.ThelimitsonNaOHminimumvolumeandconcentration, ensurethat1)theiodineremovalefficiency ofthespraywaterismaintained becauseoftheincreaseinpHvalue,and2)corrosion effectsoncomponents withincontainment areminimized.
Theseassumptions areconsistent withtheiodineremovalefficiency assumedintheaccidentanalyses.
TheOPERABILITY ofthecontainment isolation valvesensuresthatthecontainment atmosphere willbeisolatedfromtheoutsideenvironment intheeventofareleaseofradioactive materialtothecontainment atmosphere orpressurization ofthecontainment.
Containment isolation withinthetimelimitsspecified ensuresthatthereleaseofradioactive materialtotheenvironment willbeconsistent withtheassumptions usedintheanalysesforaLOCA.Theopeningofcontainment purgeandexhaustvalvesandlockedorsealedclosedcontainment isolation valvesonanintermittent basisunderadministrative controlincludesthefollowing considerations:
(1)stationing aqualified individual, whoisinconstantcommunication withcontrolroom,atthevalvecontrols, (2)instructing thisindividual toclosethesevalvesinanaccidentsituation, and(3)assuringthatenvironmental conditions willnotprecludeaccesstoclosethevalvesandthatthisactionwillpreventthereleaseofradioactivity outsidethecontaimnent.
TheOPERABILITY oftheequipment andsystemsrequiredforthedetection andcontrolofhydrogengasensuresthatthisequipment willbeavailable tomaintainthehydrogenconcentration withincontainment belowitsflammable limitduringpost-LOCA conditions, Eitherrecombiner unitiscapableofcontrolling theexpectedhydrogengeneration associated with',1)zirconium-water reactionst 2)radiolytic decomposition ofwatered3)corrosion ofmetalswithincontainment.
Theacceptance criterion of10,000ohmsisbasedonthetestbeingperformed withtheheaterelementatanambienttemperature, butcanbeconservatively appliedwhentheheaterelementisatatemperature aboveambient.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT IPageB3/46-3 3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOROPERATION ANDSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.6'ONTAINMENT SYSTEMS3.Verifying duringarecombiner systemfunctional testthattheheatersheathtemperature increases toa1200'Fwithin5hoursandismaintained foratleast4hours.4.Verifying theintegrity ofallheaterelectrical circuitsbyperforming acontinuity andresistance togroundtestfollowing theaboverequiredfunctional test.Theresistance togroundforanyheaterphaseshallbea10,000ohms.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT IPage3/46-25 3/4,BASES3/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMSTheOPERABILITY ofthecontainment spraysystemensuresthatcontainment depressurization andcoolingcapability willbeavailable intheeventofaLOCA.Thepressurereduction andresultant lowercontainment leakagerateareconsistent withtheassumptions usedintheaccidentanalyses.
TheOPERABILITY ofthesprayadditivesystemensuresthatsufficient NaOHisaddedtothecontainment sprayintheeventofaLOCA.ThelimitsonNaOHminimumvolumeandconcentration, ensurethat1)theiodineremovalefficiency ofthespraywaterismaintained becauseoftheincreaseinpHvalue,and2)corrosion effectsoncomponents withincontainment areminimized.
Theseassumptions areconsistent withtheiodineremovalefficiency assumedintheaccidentanalyses.
TheOPERABILITY ofthecontainment isolation valvesensuresthatthecontainment atmosphere willbeisolatedfromtheoutsideenvironment intheeventofareleaseofradioactive materialtothecontainment atmosphere orpressurization ofthecontainment.
Containment isolation withinthetimelimitsspecified ensuresthatthereleaseofradioactive materialtotheenvironment willbeconsistent withtheassumptions usedintheanalysesforaLOCA.Theopeningofcontainment purgeandexhaustvalvesandlockedorsealedclosedcontainment isolation valvesonanintermittent basisunderadministrative controlincludesthefollowing considerations:
(1)stationing aqualified individual, whoisinconstantcommunication withcontrolroom,atthevalvecontrols, (2)instructing thisindividual toclosethesevalvesinanaccidentsituation, and(3)assuringthatenvironmental conditions willnotprecludeaccesstoclosethevalvesandthatthisactionwillpreventthereleaseofradioactivity outsidethecontainment.
TheOPERABILITY oftheequipment andsystemsrequiredforthedetection andcontrolofhydrogengasensuresthatthisequipment willbeavailable tomaintainthehydrogenconcentration withincontainment belowitsflammable limitduringpost-LOCA conditions.
Eitherrecombiner unitiscapableofcontrolling theexpectedhydrogengeneration associated with:1)zirconium-water reactions; 2)radiolytic decomposition ofwater;and3)corrosion ofmetalswithincontainment.
Theacceptance criterion of10,000ohmsisbasedonthetestbeingperformed withtheheaterelementatanambienttemperature, butcanbeconservatively appliedwhentheheaterelementisatatemperature aboveambient.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1Page83/46-3 3/4BASES3/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMSTheOPERABILITY oftheequipment andsystemsrequiredforthedetection andcontrolofhydrogengasensuresthatthisequipment willbeavailable tomaintainthehydrogenconcentration withincontainment belowitsflammable limitduringpost-LOCA conditions.
Eitherrecombiner unitiscapableofcontrolling theexpectedhydrogengeneration associated with:1)zirconium-water reactions; 2)radiolytic decomposition ofwater;and3)corrosion ofmetalswithincontainment.
Thesehydrogencontrolsystemsareconsistent withtherecommendations ofRegulatory Guide1.7,"ControlofCombustible GasConcentrations inContainment Following aLOCA,"March1971.Theacceptance criterion of10,000ohmsisbasedonthetestbeingperformed withtheheaterelementatanambienttemperature, butcanbeconservatively appliedwhentheheaterelementisatatemperature aboveambient.Therequirements associated witheachofthecomponents oftheicecondenser ensurethattheoverallsystemwillbeavailable toprovidesufficient pressuresuppression capability tolimitthecontainment peakpressuretransient tolessthan12psigduringLOCAconditions.
TheOPERABILITY oftheicebedensuresthattherequirediceinventory will1)bedistributed evenlythroughthecontainment bays,2)containsufficient borontoprecludedilutionofthecontainment sumpfollowing theLOCAand3)containsufficient heatremovalcapability tocondensethereactorsystemvolumereleasedduringaLOCA.Theseconditions areconsistent withtheassumptions usedintheaccidentanalyses.
Theminimumweightfigureof1333poundsoficeperbasketcontainsa5%conservative allowance foricelossthroughsublimation.
Intheeventthatobservedsublimation ratesareequaltoorlowerthandesignpredictions afterthreeyearsofoperation, theminimumicebasketsweightmaybeadjusteddownward.
Inaddition, thenumberoficebasketsrequiredtobeweighedeach18monthsmaybereducedafter3yearsofoperation ifsuchareduction issupported byobservedsublimation data.TheOPERABILITY oftheicebedtemperature monitoring systemensuresthatthecapability isavailable formonitoring theicetemperature.
Intheeventthemonitoring systemisinoperable, theACTIONrequirements provideassurance thattheicebedheatremovalcapacitywillberetainedwithinthespecified timelimits.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2PageB3/46-4AMENDMENT i.,~,SH ATTACHMENT 4TOAEP:NRC:1275WESTINGHOUSE LETTERDESCRIBING THEHYDROGENRECOMBINER RESISTANCE TOGROUNDTEST J/
4123744811TO8161669'75574 P.82i83~@Westinghouse ElectricCompany,adivisionofCBScorporation EnergySystemsMuolearSeniioesOivisionBox355Pittsburgh, Pennsytvania 152304355
~Mr.BobVaseyAmericanElectricPowerD.C.CookNuclearPlantOneCookPlaceBridgman, Michigan49106AEP-98-023 NSD-SAE-ESI-98-079 February20,1998AMERICANELECTRICPOWERDONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTUNITS1&2HdroenRecambinerS stemSurvelllance Test


==DearMr.Vasey:==
==DearMr.Vasey:==
TheElectricHydrogenRecombinerSystemsurveillancetestprogramincludesanumberoftestswhich,alltogether,provideassuranceoftheoperabilityofthesystem.AsameanstoprovideindicationthattheheaterelectricpowercircuitswithintheElectricHydrogenRecombiner(EHR)Systemhavemaintainedtheirintegrity,aninsulationresistancetestisincludedwithintheEHRsurveillancetestprogram.ThisinsulationresistancetestisperformedattheEHRSystempowersupplycabinet,andincludesalloftheplantcabling,internalcabling,containmentpenetration(s),andalloftheheaterelementswhichmakeupallthreepowerphasesofthesy'templusneutral.Thistestissequencedtofollowthefulltemperatureheat-uptest,however,theinsulationresistancetestisindependentoftheheat-uptest.ItissequencedinthismannerinthetechnicalspecificationssothatanyunexpecteddegradationoftheheatercircuitintegrityduetotheEHRfulltemperatureheat-upwouldbeidentified.Thereisnointentiontoimposeatimerequirementbetweenthecompletionoftheheat-uptestandtheperformanceoftheinsulationresistancetest.Theacceptancecriteriafortheinsulationresistancetestisthatthemeasuredresistanceshallbegreaterthanorequalto10,000ohms.Thisacceptancecriteriatakesintoconsiderationthelargenumberofheaterelementsthatarebeingtestedinparallelandisappropriatetoprovideindicationofadequateintegrityoftheinsulationresistanceoftheheaterelements,cabling,andothercomponentswithintheheaterpowercircuits.Thisacceptancecriteriaisbasedonthetestbeingperformedwiththeheaterelementsatanambienttemperature,butcanbeconservativelyappliedwhentheheaterelementsareatanaboveambienttemperature.Theinsulationmaterialusedwithintheheaterelementsismagnesiumoxide.Basedonoperationalexperiencefortheseheaters,itisexpectedandconsiderednormalthattheheaterelementinsulationresistancewilldecreaseasthetemperatureoftheelementsisincreased.Thisisdue,tosomeextent,totheslightreductionintheelectricalresistancepropertiesofthemagnesiumoxidematerialattemperaturesinexcessof1000'F.Itwouldnotbeconsidered NSD-SAE-ESl-98-079AEP-98%23February20,1998unusualorunacceptablefortheinsulationresistanceasmeasuredduringthisinsulationresistancetesttofallbelowthe10,000ohmcriteriawhentheheaterelementsareatareveryneartheiroperatingtemperatureof1200'F.Whatcouldbeofconcern,orpossibleindicationofaprobiem,wouldbeadownwardtrendingofthemeasuredinsulationresistanceoveranumberofsurveillancetestperiodswhenthemeasurementsaremadewiththeheatersatapproximatelythesametemperaturefromoneperiodtothenext.Shouldyouhaveanyquestions,pleasecontactMr.DonPeck(412-374-5683)orme.VeryTru)yYours,0EP/kkNancyKuryCustomerProjectsManagerCC:MikeFinissiMarkAckermanSteveBrewerJohnOlveraVanceYanderBurg-CookPlant-CookPlant-AEP-AEP-AEPeeTOTALPAGE.83++}}
TheElectricHydrogenRecombiner Systemsurveillance testprogramincludesanumberoftestswhich,alltogether, provideassurance oftheoperability ofthesystem.Asameanstoprovideindication thattheheaterelectricpowercircuitswithintheElectricHydrogenRecombiner (EHR)Systemhavemaintained theirintegrity, aninsulation resistance testisincludedwithintheEHRsurveillance testprogram.Thisinsulation resistance testisperformed attheEHRSystempowersupplycabinet,andincludesalloftheplantcabling,internalcabling,containment penetration(s),
andalloftheheaterelementswhichmakeupallthreepowerphasesofthesy'templusneutral.Thistestissequenced tofollowthefulltemperature heat-uptest,however,theinsulation resistance testisindependent oftheheat-uptest.Itissequenced inthismannerinthetechnical specifications sothatanyunexpected degradation oftheheatercircuitintegrity duetotheEHRfulltemperature heat-upwouldbeidentified.
Thereisnointention toimposeatimerequirement betweenthecompletion oftheheat-uptestandtheperformance oftheinsulation resistance test.Theacceptance criteriafortheinsulation resistance testisthatthemeasuredresistance shallbegreaterthanorequalto10,000ohms.Thisacceptance criteriatakesintoconsideration thelargenumberofheaterelementsthatarebeingtestedinparallelandisappropriate toprovideindication ofadequateintegrity oftheinsulation resistance oftheheaterelements, cabling,andothercomponents withintheheaterpowercircuits.
Thisacceptance criteriaisbasedonthetestbeingperformed withtheheaterelementsatanambienttemperature, butcanbeconservatively appliedwhentheheaterelementsareatanaboveambienttemperature.
Theinsulation materialusedwithintheheaterelementsismagnesium oxide.Basedonoperational experience fortheseheaters,itisexpectedandconsidered normalthattheheaterelementinsulation resistance willdecreaseasthetemperature oftheelementsisincreased.
Thisisdue,tosomeextent,totheslightreduction intheelectrical resistance properties ofthemagnesium oxidematerialattemperatures inexcessof1000'F.Itwouldnotbeconsidered NSD-SAE-ESl-98-079 AEP-98%23 February20,1998unusualorunacceptable fortheinsulation resistance asmeasuredduringthisinsulation resistance testtofallbelowthe10,000ohmcriteriawhentheheaterelementsareatareveryneartheiroperating temperature of1200'F.Whatcouldbeofconcern,orpossibleindication ofaprobiem,wouldbeadownwardtrendingofthemeasuredinsulation resistance overanumberofsurveillance testperiodswhenthemeasurements aremadewiththeheatersatapproximately thesametemperature fromoneperiodtothenext.Shouldyouhaveanyquestions, pleasecontactMr.DonPeck(412-374-5683) orme.VeryTru)yYours,0EP/kkNancyKuryCustomerProjectsManagerCC:MikeFinissiMarkAckermanSteveBrewerJohnOlveraVanceYanderBurg
-CookPlant-CookPlant-AEP-AEP-AEPeeTOTALPAGE.83++}}

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ATTACHMENT 2TOAEP:NRC:1275 CURRENTPAGESMARKED-UP TOREFLECTPROPOSEDCHANGESTOTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 9803060382 980303PDRADQCK050003i5PPDR 3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOROPERATION ANDSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.6'ONTAINMENT SYSTEMSVerifying duringarecombiner systemfunctional testthattheheatersheathtemperature increases toa1200'Fwithin5hoursandismaintained foratleast4hours.4.Verifying theintegrity ofallheaterelectrical circuitsbyperforming acontinuity andresistance togroundtestmtnediately-following theaboverequiredfunctional test.Theresistance togroundforanyheaterphaseshallbea10,000ohms.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1Page3/46-25 3/4BASES3/4.6'ONTAINMENT SYSTEMSTheOPERABILITY oftheequipment andsystemsrequiredforthedetection andcontrolofhydrogengasensuresthatthisequipment willbeavailable tomaintainthehydrogenconcentration withincontainment belowitsflammable limitduringpost-LOCA conditions.

Eitherrecombiner unitiscapableofcontrolling theexpectedhydrogengeneration associated with'.1)zirconium-water reactions; 2)radiolytic decomposition ofwater>~and 3)corrosion ofmetalswithincontainment.

Thesehydrogencontrolsystemsareconsistent withtherecommendations ofRegulatory Guide1.7,"ControlofCombustible GasConcentrations inContainment Following aLOCA,"March1971.Theacceptance criterion of10,000ohmsisbasedonthetestbeingperformed withtheheaterelementatanambienttemperature, butcanbeconservatively appliedwhentheheaterelementisatatemperature aboveambient.aJdelTherequirements associated witheachofthecomponents oftheicecondenser ensurethattheoverallsystemwillbeavailable toprovidesufficient pressuresuppression capability tolimitthecontainment peakpressuretransient tolessthan12psigduringLOCAconditions.

TheOPERABILITY oftheicebedensuresthattherequirediceinventory will1)bedistributed evenlythroughthecontainment bays,2)containsufficient borontoprecludedilutionofthecontainment sumpfollowing theLOCAand3)containsufficient heatremovalcapability tocondensethereactorsystemvolumereleasedduringaLOCA.Theseconditions areconsistent withtheassumptions usedintheaccidentanalyses.

Theminimumweightfigureof1333poundsoficeperbasketcontainsa5%conservative allowance foricelossthroughsublimation.

Intheeventthatobservedsublimation ratesareequaltoorlowerthandesignpredictions afterthreeyearsofoperation, theminimumicebasketsweightmaybeadjusteddownward.

Inaddition, thenumberoficebasketsrequiredtobeweighedeach18monthsmaybereducedafter3yearsofoperation ifsuchareduction issupported byobservedsublimation data.TheOPERABILITY oftheicebedtemperature monitoring systemensuresthatthecapability isavailable formonitoring theicetemperature.

Intheeventthemonitoring systemisinoperable, theACTIONrequirements provideassurance thattheicebedheatremovalcapacitywillberetainedwithinthespecified timelimits.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2PageB3/46QAMENDMENT 4,~,904 ATTACHMENT 3TOAEP:NRC:1275 PROPOSEDCHANGESTOTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS t3/4BASES3/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMSTheOPERABILITY ofthecontainment spraysystemensuresthatcontainment depressurization andcoolingcapability willbeavailable intheeventofaLOCA.Thepressurereduction andresultant lowercontainment leakagerateareconsistent withtheassumptions usedintheaccidentanalyses.

TheOPERABILITY ofthesprayadditivesystemensuresthatsufficient NaOHisaddedtothecontainment sprayintheeventofaLOCA.ThelimitsonNaOHminimumvolumeandconcentration, ensurethat1)theiodineremovalefficiency ofthespraywaterismaintained becauseoftheincreaseinpHvalue,and2)corrosion effectsoncomponents withincontainment areminimized.

Theseassumptions areconsistent withtheiodineremovalefficiency assumedintheaccidentanalyses.

TheOPERABILITY ofthecontainment isolation valvesensuresthatthecontainment atmosphere willbeisolatedfromtheoutsideenvironment intheeventofareleaseofradioactive materialtothecontainment atmosphere orpressurization ofthecontainment.

Containment isolation withinthetimelimitsspecified ensuresthatthereleaseofradioactive materialtotheenvironment willbeconsistent withtheassumptions usedintheanalysesforaLOCA.Theopeningofcontainment purgeandexhaustvalvesandlockedorsealedclosedcontainment isolation valvesonanintermittent basisunderadministrative controlincludesthefollowing considerations:

(1)stationing aqualified individual, whoisinconstantcommunication withcontrolroom,atthevalvecontrols, (2)instructing thisindividual toclosethesevalvesinanaccidentsituation, and(3)assuringthatenvironmental conditions willnotprecludeaccesstoclosethevalvesandthatthisactionwillpreventthereleaseofradioactivity outsidethecontaimnent.

TheOPERABILITY oftheequipment andsystemsrequiredforthedetection andcontrolofhydrogengasensuresthatthisequipment willbeavailable tomaintainthehydrogenconcentration withincontainment belowitsflammable limitduringpost-LOCA conditions, Eitherrecombiner unitiscapableofcontrolling theexpectedhydrogengeneration associated with',1)zirconium-water reactionst 2)radiolytic decomposition ofwatered3)corrosion ofmetalswithincontainment.

Theacceptance criterion of10,000ohmsisbasedonthetestbeingperformed withtheheaterelementatanambienttemperature, butcanbeconservatively appliedwhentheheaterelementisatatemperature aboveambient.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT IPageB3/46-3 3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOROPERATION ANDSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.6'ONTAINMENT SYSTEMS3.Verifying duringarecombiner systemfunctional testthattheheatersheathtemperature increases toa1200'Fwithin5hoursandismaintained foratleast4hours.4.Verifying theintegrity ofallheaterelectrical circuitsbyperforming acontinuity andresistance togroundtestfollowing theaboverequiredfunctional test.Theresistance togroundforanyheaterphaseshallbea10,000ohms.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT IPage3/46-25 3/4,BASES3/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMSTheOPERABILITY ofthecontainment spraysystemensuresthatcontainment depressurization andcoolingcapability willbeavailable intheeventofaLOCA.Thepressurereduction andresultant lowercontainment leakagerateareconsistent withtheassumptions usedintheaccidentanalyses.

TheOPERABILITY ofthesprayadditivesystemensuresthatsufficient NaOHisaddedtothecontainment sprayintheeventofaLOCA.ThelimitsonNaOHminimumvolumeandconcentration, ensurethat1)theiodineremovalefficiency ofthespraywaterismaintained becauseoftheincreaseinpHvalue,and2)corrosion effectsoncomponents withincontainment areminimized.

Theseassumptions areconsistent withtheiodineremovalefficiency assumedintheaccidentanalyses.

TheOPERABILITY ofthecontainment isolation valvesensuresthatthecontainment atmosphere willbeisolatedfromtheoutsideenvironment intheeventofareleaseofradioactive materialtothecontainment atmosphere orpressurization ofthecontainment.

Containment isolation withinthetimelimitsspecified ensuresthatthereleaseofradioactive materialtotheenvironment willbeconsistent withtheassumptions usedintheanalysesforaLOCA.Theopeningofcontainment purgeandexhaustvalvesandlockedorsealedclosedcontainment isolation valvesonanintermittent basisunderadministrative controlincludesthefollowing considerations:

(1)stationing aqualified individual, whoisinconstantcommunication withcontrolroom,atthevalvecontrols, (2)instructing thisindividual toclosethesevalvesinanaccidentsituation, and(3)assuringthatenvironmental conditions willnotprecludeaccesstoclosethevalvesandthatthisactionwillpreventthereleaseofradioactivity outsidethecontainment.

TheOPERABILITY oftheequipment andsystemsrequiredforthedetection andcontrolofhydrogengasensuresthatthisequipment willbeavailable tomaintainthehydrogenconcentration withincontainment belowitsflammable limitduringpost-LOCA conditions.

Eitherrecombiner unitiscapableofcontrolling theexpectedhydrogengeneration associated with:1)zirconium-water reactions; 2)radiolytic decomposition ofwater;and3)corrosion ofmetalswithincontainment.

Theacceptance criterion of10,000ohmsisbasedonthetestbeingperformed withtheheaterelementatanambienttemperature, butcanbeconservatively appliedwhentheheaterelementisatatemperature aboveambient.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1Page83/46-3 3/4BASES3/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMSTheOPERABILITY oftheequipment andsystemsrequiredforthedetection andcontrolofhydrogengasensuresthatthisequipment willbeavailable tomaintainthehydrogenconcentration withincontainment belowitsflammable limitduringpost-LOCA conditions.

Eitherrecombiner unitiscapableofcontrolling theexpectedhydrogengeneration associated with:1)zirconium-water reactions; 2)radiolytic decomposition ofwater;and3)corrosion ofmetalswithincontainment.

Thesehydrogencontrolsystemsareconsistent withtherecommendations ofRegulatory Guide1.7,"ControlofCombustible GasConcentrations inContainment Following aLOCA,"March1971.Theacceptance criterion of10,000ohmsisbasedonthetestbeingperformed withtheheaterelementatanambienttemperature, butcanbeconservatively appliedwhentheheaterelementisatatemperature aboveambient.Therequirements associated witheachofthecomponents oftheicecondenser ensurethattheoverallsystemwillbeavailable toprovidesufficient pressuresuppression capability tolimitthecontainment peakpressuretransient tolessthan12psigduringLOCAconditions.

TheOPERABILITY oftheicebedensuresthattherequirediceinventory will1)bedistributed evenlythroughthecontainment bays,2)containsufficient borontoprecludedilutionofthecontainment sumpfollowing theLOCAand3)containsufficient heatremovalcapability tocondensethereactorsystemvolumereleasedduringaLOCA.Theseconditions areconsistent withtheassumptions usedintheaccidentanalyses.

Theminimumweightfigureof1333poundsoficeperbasketcontainsa5%conservative allowance foricelossthroughsublimation.

Intheeventthatobservedsublimation ratesareequaltoorlowerthandesignpredictions afterthreeyearsofoperation, theminimumicebasketsweightmaybeadjusteddownward.

Inaddition, thenumberoficebasketsrequiredtobeweighedeach18monthsmaybereducedafter3yearsofoperation ifsuchareduction issupported byobservedsublimation data.TheOPERABILITY oftheicebedtemperature monitoring systemensuresthatthecapability isavailable formonitoring theicetemperature.

Intheeventthemonitoring systemisinoperable, theACTIONrequirements provideassurance thattheicebedheatremovalcapacitywillberetainedwithinthespecified timelimits.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2PageB3/46-4AMENDMENT i.,~,SH ATTACHMENT 4TOAEP:NRC:1275WESTINGHOUSE LETTERDESCRIBING THEHYDROGENRECOMBINER RESISTANCE TOGROUNDTEST J/

4123744811TO8161669'75574 P.82i83~@Westinghouse ElectricCompany,adivisionofCBScorporation EnergySystemsMuolearSeniioesOivisionBox355Pittsburgh, Pennsytvania 152304355

~Mr.BobVaseyAmericanElectricPowerD.C.CookNuclearPlantOneCookPlaceBridgman, Michigan49106AEP-98-023 NSD-SAE-ESI-98-079 February20,1998AMERICANELECTRICPOWERDONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTUNITS1&2HdroenRecambinerS stemSurvelllance Test

DearMr.Vasey:

TheElectricHydrogenRecombiner Systemsurveillance testprogramincludesanumberoftestswhich,alltogether, provideassurance oftheoperability ofthesystem.Asameanstoprovideindication thattheheaterelectricpowercircuitswithintheElectricHydrogenRecombiner (EHR)Systemhavemaintained theirintegrity, aninsulation resistance testisincludedwithintheEHRsurveillance testprogram.Thisinsulation resistance testisperformed attheEHRSystempowersupplycabinet,andincludesalloftheplantcabling,internalcabling,containment penetration(s),

andalloftheheaterelementswhichmakeupallthreepowerphasesofthesy'templusneutral.Thistestissequenced tofollowthefulltemperature heat-uptest,however,theinsulation resistance testisindependent oftheheat-uptest.Itissequenced inthismannerinthetechnical specifications sothatanyunexpected degradation oftheheatercircuitintegrity duetotheEHRfulltemperature heat-upwouldbeidentified.

Thereisnointention toimposeatimerequirement betweenthecompletion oftheheat-uptestandtheperformance oftheinsulation resistance test.Theacceptance criteriafortheinsulation resistance testisthatthemeasuredresistance shallbegreaterthanorequalto10,000ohms.Thisacceptance criteriatakesintoconsideration thelargenumberofheaterelementsthatarebeingtestedinparallelandisappropriate toprovideindication ofadequateintegrity oftheinsulation resistance oftheheaterelements, cabling,andothercomponents withintheheaterpowercircuits.

Thisacceptance criteriaisbasedonthetestbeingperformed withtheheaterelementsatanambienttemperature, butcanbeconservatively appliedwhentheheaterelementsareatanaboveambienttemperature.

Theinsulation materialusedwithintheheaterelementsismagnesium oxide.Basedonoperational experience fortheseheaters,itisexpectedandconsidered normalthattheheaterelementinsulation resistance willdecreaseasthetemperature oftheelementsisincreased.

Thisisdue,tosomeextent,totheslightreduction intheelectrical resistance properties ofthemagnesium oxidematerialattemperatures inexcessof1000'F.Itwouldnotbeconsidered NSD-SAE-ESl-98-079 AEP-98%23 February20,1998unusualorunacceptable fortheinsulation resistance asmeasuredduringthisinsulation resistance testtofallbelowthe10,000ohmcriteriawhentheheaterelementsareatareveryneartheiroperating temperature of1200'F.Whatcouldbeofconcern,orpossibleindication ofaprobiem,wouldbeadownwardtrendingofthemeasuredinsulation resistance overanumberofsurveillance testperiodswhenthemeasurements aremadewiththeheatersatapproximately thesametemperature fromoneperiodtothenext.Shouldyouhaveanyquestions, pleasecontactMr.DonPeck(412-374-5683) orme.VeryTru)yYours,0EP/kkNancyKuryCustomerProjectsManagerCC:MikeFinissiMarkAckermanSteveBrewerJohnOlveraVanceYanderBurg

-CookPlant-CookPlant-AEP-AEP-AEPeeTOTALPAGE.83++

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