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{{#Wiki_filter:ATTACHMENT2ATOC1099-07TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSPAGESMAtuCEDTOSHOWPROPOSEDCHANGES~REVISEDPAGESUNIT13/46-13B3/46-3aPViOi9025b9'Pi0i2PDRADQCK050003i5irm I~~I 3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONSFOROPERATIONANDSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS3/4.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSSURVEILLANCEREUIREMENTSContinuedAtleastonceper18monthsduringshutdown,byverifyingthateachautomaticvalveintheflowpathactuatestoitscorrectpositiononaContainmentPressure--High-Highsignal.Atleastonceper5yearsbyverifyingath'iwater.flowrate)fromthesprayadditivetanktestlinetoeachcontainmentspraysystemwiththespraypumpoperatingonrecirculation.pstg-.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT1tPage3/46-13AMENDMENT407,444,464 3/4BASES3/4.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3/4.6.2DEPRESSURIZATIONANDCOOLINGSYSTEMS3/4.6.2.1CONTAINMENTSPRAYSYSTEMTheOPERABILITYofthecontainmentspraysystemensuresthatcontainmentdepressurizationandcoolingcapabilitywillbeavailableintheeventofaLOCA.Thepressurereductionandresultantlowercontainmentleakagerateareconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedintheaccidentanalysis.3/4.6.2.2SPRAYADDITIVESYSTEMTheOPERABILITYofthesprayadditivesystemensuresthatsufficientNaOHisaddedtothecontainmentsprayintheeventofaLOCA.ThelimitsonNaOHminimumvolumeandconcentration,ensurethatI)theiodineremovalefficiencyofthespraywaterismaintainedbecauseoftheincreaseinpHvalue,and2)corrosioneffectsoncomponentswithincontainmentareminimized.Theseassumptionsareconsistentwiththeiodineremoval'fficiencyassumedintheaccidentanalysis.~::piiiiy"'d'ts'c'ha'i'je:.:"p'regs'ur'e'@2'5'5:':jsi'g.,3/4.6.3CONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVESTheOPERABILITYofthecontainmentisolationvalvesensuresthatthecontainmentatmospherewillbeisolatedfromtheoutsideenvironmentintheeventofareleaseofradioactivematerialtothecontainmentatmosphereorpressurizationofthecontainment.ContainmentisolationwithinthetimelimitsspecifiedensuresthatthereleaseofradioactivematerialtotheenvironmentwillbeconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedintheanalysisforaLOCA.Theopeningofcontainmentpurgeandexhaustvalvesandlockedorsealedclosedcontainmentisolationvalvesonanintermittentbasisunderadministrativecontrolincludesthefollowingconsiderations:(1)stationingaqualifiedindividual,whoisinconstantcommunicationwithcontrolroom,atthevalvecontrols,(2)instructingthisindividualtoclosethesevalvesinanaccidentsituation,and(3)assuringthatenvironmentalconditionswillnotprecludeaccesstoclosethevalvesandthatthisactionwillpreventthereleaseofradioactivityoutsidethecontainment.3/4.6.4COMBUSTIBLEGASCONTROLTheOPERABILITYoftheequipmentandsystemsrequiredforthedetectionandcontrolofhydrogengasensuresthatthisequipmentwillbeavailabletomaintainthehydrogenconcentrationwithincontainmentbelowitsflammablelimitduringpost-LOCAconditions.Eitherrecombinerunitiscapableofcontrollingtheexpectedhydrogengenerationassociatedwith:1)zirconium-waterreactions;2)radiolyticdecompositionofwater;and3)corrosionofmetalswithincontainment.Theacceptancecriterionof10,000ohmsisbasedonthetestbeingperformedwiththeheaterelementatanambienttemperature,butcanbeconservativelyappliedwhentheelementisatatemperatureaboveambient.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT1PageB3/46-3 ATTACHMENT2BTOC1099-07TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSPAGESMARKEDTOSHOWPROPOSEDCHANGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT23/46-12B3/46-3 3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONSFOROPERATIONANDSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS3/4.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSSURVEILL'ANCEREUIREMENTSContinuedAtleastonceper18monthsduringshutdown,byverifyingthateachautomaticvalveintheflowpathactuatestoitscorrectpositiononaContainmentPressure-High-Hightestsignal.+Atleastonceper5yearsbyverifyingathewaterflowrate)fromthesprayadditivetanktestlinetoeachcontainmentspraysystemwiththespraypumpoperatingonrecirculation.p&g-.+TheprovisionsofTechnicalSpecification4.0.8areapplicable.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT2Page3/46-12AMENDMENT45,97,434,458
 
ATTACHMENT3ATOC1099-07PROPOSEDTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSPAGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT13/46-13B3/46-3 (3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONSFOROPERATIONANDSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS3/4.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSSURVEILf;ANCEREUIREMENTSContinuedC.Atleastonceper18monthsduringshutdown,byverifyingthateachautomaticvalveintheflowpathactuatestoitscorrectpositiononaContainmentPressure-High-Highsignal.Atleastonceper5yearsbyverifyingtheflowratefromthesprayadditivetanktestlinetoeachcontainmentspraysystemwiththespraypumpoperatingonrecirculation.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT1Page3/46-13AMENDMENT407,444,464
)'II1k4 3/4BASES3/4.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3/4.6.2DEPRESSURIZATIONANDCOOLINGSYSTEMS3/4.6.2.1CONTAINMENTSPRAYSYSTEMTheOPERABILITYofthecontainmentspraysystemensuresthatcontainmentdepressurizationandcoolingcapabilitywillbeavailableintheeventofaLOCA.Thepressurereductionandresultantlowercontainmentleakagerateareconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedintheaccidentanalysis.3/4.6.2.2SPRAYADDITIVESYSTEMTheOPERABILITYofthesprayadditivesystemensuresthatsufficientNaOHisaddedtothecontainmentsprayintheeventofaLOCA.ThelimitsonNaOHminimumvolumeandconcentration,ensurethat1)theiodineremovalefficiencyofthespraywaterismaintainedbecauseoftheincreaseinpHvalue,and2)corrosioneffectsoncomponentswithincontainmentareminimized.Theseassumptionsareconsistentwiththeiodineremovalefficiencyassumedintheaccidentanalysis.SurveillanceRequirement4.6.2.2.disperformedbyverifyingawaterflowratep20gpmandg50gpmfromthesprayadditivetanktestlinetoeachcontainmentspraysystemwiththespraypumpoperatingonrecirculationwithapumpdischargepressurep255psig.3/4.6.3CONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVESTheOPERABILITYofthecontainmentisolationvalvesensuresthatthecontainmentatmospherewillbeisolatedfromtheoutsideenvironmentintheeventofareleaseofradioactivematerialto'hecontainmentatmosphereorpressurizationofthecontainment.ContainmentisolationwithinthetimelimitsspecifiedensuresthatthereleaseofradioactivematerialtotheenvironmentwillbeconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedintheanalysisforaLOCA.Theopeningofcontainmentpurgeandexhaustvalvesandlockedorsealedclosedcontainmentisolationvalvesonanintermittentbasisunderadministrativecontrolincludesthefollowingconsiderations:(1)stationingaqualifiedindividual,whoisinconstantcommunicationwithcontrolroom,atthevalvecontrols,(2)instructingthisindividualtoclosethesevalvesinanaccidentsituation,and(3)assuringthatenvironmentalconditionswillnotprecludeaccesstoclosethevalvesandthatthisactionwillpreventthereleaseofradioactivityoutsidethecontainment.3/4.6.4COMBUSTIBLEGASCONTROLTheOPERABILITYoftheequipmentandsystemsrequiredforthedetectionandcontrolofhydrogengasensuresthatthisequipmentwillbeavailabletomaintainthehydrogenconcentrationwithincontainmentbelowitsflammablelimitduringpost-LOCAconditions.Eitherrecombinerunitiscapableofcontrollingtheexpectedhydrogengenerationassociatedwith:1)zirconium-waterreactions;2)radiolyticdecompositionofwater;and3)corrosionofmetalswithincontainment.Theacceptancecriterionof10,000ohmsisbasedonthetestbeingperformedwiththeheaterelementatanambienttemperature,butcanbeconservativelyappliedwhentheelementisatatemperatureaboveambient.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT1PageB3/46-3 ATTACHMENT3BTOC1099-07PROPOSEDTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSPAGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT23/46-12B3/46-3 3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONSFOROPERATIONANDSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS3/4.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSSORVEILLANCEREUIREMENTSContinuedAtleastonceper18monthsduringshutdown,byverifyingthateachautomaticvalveintheflowpathactuatestoitscorrectpositiononaContainmentPressure-High-Hightestsignal.'.Atleastonceper5yearsbyverifyingtheflowratefromthesprayadditivetanktestlinetoeachcontainmentspraysystemwiththespraypumpoperatingonrecirculation.+TheprovisionsofTechnicalSpecification4.0.8areapplicable.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT2Page3/46-12AMENDMENT45,97,434,458 3/4BASES3/4.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3/4:6.2DI'.PRESSURIZATIONANDCOOLINGSYSTEMS3/4.6.2.1CONTAINMENTSPRAYSYSTEMTheOPERABILITYofthecontainmentspraysystemensuresthatcontainmentdepressurizationandcoolingcapabilitywillbeavailableintheeventofaLOCA.Thepressurereductionandresultantlowercontainmentleakagerateareconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedintheaccidentanalysis.3/4.6.2.2SPRAYADDITIVESYSTEMTheOPERABILITYofthesprayadditivesystemensuresthatsufficientNaOHisaddedtothecontainmentsprayintheeventofaLOCA.ThelimitsonNaOHvolumeandconcentrationensureapHvalueofbetween8.5and11.0forthesolutionrecirculatedwithincontainmentafteraLOCA.ThispHbandminimizestheevolutionofiodineandminimizestheeffectofchlorideandcausticstresscorrosiononmechanicalsystemsandcomponents.Theseassumptionsareconsistentwiththeiodineremovalefficiencyassumedintheaccidentanalysis.Thecontainedwatervolumelimitincludesanallowanceforwaternotusablebecauseoftankdischargelocationorotherphysicalcharacteristics.SurveillanceRequirement4.6.2.2.disperformedbyverifyingawaterflowratep20gpmandg50gpmfromthesprayadditivetanktestlinetoeachcontainmentspraysystemwiththespraypumpoperatingonrecirculationwithapumpdischargepressurep255psig.3/4.6.3CONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVESITheOPERABILITYofthecontainmentisolationvalvesensuresthatthecontainmentatmospherewillbeisolatedfromtheoutsideenvironmentintheeventofareleaseofradioactivematerialtothecontainmentatmosphereorpressurizationofthecontainment.Containmentisolationwithinthetimelimitsspecifiedensuresthatthereleaseofradioactivematerialtotheenvironmentwillbeconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedintheanalysisfor.aLOCA.Theopeningofcontainmentpurgeandexhaustvalvesandlockedorsealedclosedcontainmentisolationvalvesonanintermittentbasisunderadministrativecontrolincludesthefollowingconsiderations:(1)stationingaqualifiedindividual,whoisinconstantcommunicationwithcontrolroom,atthevalvecontrols,(2)instructingthisindividualtoclosethesevalvesinanaccidentsituation,and(3)assuringthatenvironmentalconditionswillnotprecludeaccesstoclosethevalvesandthatthisactionwillpreventthereleaseofradioactivityoutsidethecontainment.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT2PageB3/46-3AMENDMENT63,465 ATTACHMENT4TOC1099-07NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSCONSIDERATIONEVALUATIONIndianaMichiganPowerCompany(18'),theLicenseeforDonaldC.CookNuclearPlant(CNP)Units1and2,proposestoamendAppendixA,TechnicalSpecifications(T/S),ofFacilityOperatingLicensesDPR-58andDPR-74.I@MproposestoreviseT/SSR4.6.2.2.dforthesprayadditivesystemtorelocatethedetailsassociatedwiththeacceptancecriteriaandtestparameterstotheassociatedT/SBases.Additionally,certainadministrativetextformatchangesarealsobeingproposed.IAMhasevaluatedthisproposedamendmentanddeterminedthatitdoesnotinvolveasignificanthazard.Accordingto10CFR50.92(c),aproposedamendmenttoanoperatinglicenseinvolvesnosignificanthazardsconsiderationifoperationofthefacilityinaccordancewiththeproposedamendmentwouldnot:1.involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated;2.createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanypreviouslyanalyzed;or3.involveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Thedeterminationthatthecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92aremetforthisamendmentrequestisindicatedbelow.1.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?TheproposedchangesrelocatethedetailsassociatedwiththeacceptancecriteriaandtestparametersfromtheT/SSRtotheassociatedBasesanddonotaffectsystemoperabilityorperformance.Theformatchangesinthetextoneachpageareadministrativeinnatureanddonotresultinanychangeinplantoperation.RelocationofthisinformationtotheBasesisadministrativeinnatureanddoesnotaffecttheprobabilityorconsequencesofanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Noactualchangetotherequirementismade.Actualplantoperationisnotaffectedbytheadministrativechanges.Nomethodsofoperationofplantsystems,structuresorcomponentsarechanged.Operationofaccidentmitigationfeaturesisnotchanged.Consequently,thereisnoaffectupontheprobabilityofanypreviouslyanalyzedaccident,transient,accidentinitiators,orprecursorevents.Additionally,becausethereisnoactualchangeinplantdesignoroperation,thereisnoaffectuponradioactivematerialinventories,plantshielding,orefHuentreleasepoints.Therefore,thesechangesdonotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.
p~~~
Attachment4toC1099-07Page22.Doesthechangecreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?TheproposedchangesrelocatethedetailsassociatedwiththeacceptancecriteriaandtestparametersfromtheT/SSRtotheassociatedBasesanddonotaffectsystemoperabilityorperformance.Theformatchangesinthetextoneachpageareadministrativeinnatureanddonotresultinanychangeinplantoperation.Facilityoperationandproceduresarenotchanged.RelocationofthisinformationtotheBasesisadministrativeinnatureanddoesnotaffectcreateanynewaccidentscenarios,accidentinitiators,orprecursorevents.Therefore,theproposedchangesdonotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.Doesthechangeinvolvea'significantreductioninamarginofsafety/TheproposedchangesrelocatethedetailsassociatedwithacceptancecriteriaandtestparametersfromtheT/SSRtotheassociatedBasesanddonotmodifyT/Ssafetysettings,setpoints,orothervalues.Theformatchangesinthetextoneachpageareadministrativeinnatureanddonotresultinanychangeinplantoperation.Thereisnoeffectuponoperatingmarginsandaccidentmarginsbec'ausetheadministrativechangesdono(changethemannerofoperationofplantsystems,structures,orcomponents.Plantemergencyandabnormaloperatingproceduresarenotaffected.;Thereisnochangeofactualtestingmethodology,test'parameters,oracceptancecriteria.Theresponseoftheplanttoaneventisthesame.Potentialoffsitedosesareunaffectedbecause:,operationofthefacilityisunchanged.RelocationofthetestirigdetailstotheBasesisacceptablebecausecontrolsareinplaceforT/SBaseschangeswhichrequireevaluationofchangesundertheprovisionsof10CFR50.59.Therefore,theproposedchangesdonotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Insummary,basedupontheaboveevaluation,I&Mhasconcludedthattheproposedamendmentinvolvesnosignificanthazardsconsideration.
C's\
ATTACHMENT5TOC1099-07ENVIRONMENTALASSESSMENTIndianaMichiganI'owerCompany(IAM)hasevaluatedthislicenseamendmentrequestagainstthecriteriaforidentificationoflicensingandregulatoryactionsrequiringenvironmentalassessmentinaccordancewith10CFR51.21.IRMhasdeterminedthatthislicenseamendmentrequestmeetsthecriteriaforacategoricalexclusionsetforthin10CFR51.22(c)(9).Thisdeterminationisbasedonthefactthatthischangeisbeingproposedasanamendmenttoalicenseissuedpursuantto10CFR50thatchangesarequirementwithrespecttoinstallationoruseofafacilitycomponentlocatedwithintherestrictedarea,'sdefinedin10CFR20,orthatchangesaninspectionorasurveillancerequirement,andtheamendmentmeetsthefollowingspecificcriteria:(i)Theamendmentinvolvesnosignificanthazardsconsideration.AsdemonstratedinAttachment4,theproposedchangesdonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.(ii)Thereisnosignificantchangeinthetypesorsignificant.increaseintheamountsofany,eEuentthatmaybereleasedoA'site.Becausethereisnochangeinplantdesignoroperation,thereisnosignificantchangeinthetypesor,significantincreaseintheamountsofanyefHuentsreleasedoAsite.(iii)Thereisnosignificantincreaseinindividualorcumulativeoccupationalradiationexposure.Thechangesdonotresultinsignificantchangesintheoperationorconfigurationofthefacility.ThereisnochangeinthelevelofcontrolsormethodologyusedforprocessingofradioactiveefHuentsorhandlingofsolidradioactivewaste,nordothechangesresultinanychangeinthenormalradiationlevelswithintheplant.Therefore,thereisnosignificantincreaseinindividualorcumulativeoccupationalradiationexposureresultingfromthesechanges.
yAr'CIl'I}}

Revision as of 03:10, 13 June 2018

Proposed Tech Specs Surveilllance Requirement 4.6.2.2.d for Spray Additive Sys to Relocate Details Associated with Acceptance Criteria & Test Parameters to Associated TS Bases
ML17335A558
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Site: Cook  American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 10/12/1999
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ATTACHMENT2ATOC1099-07TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSPAGESMAtuCEDTOSHOWPROPOSEDCHANGES~REVISEDPAGESUNIT13/46-13B3/46-3aPViOi9025b9'Pi0i2PDRADQCK050003i5irm I~~I 3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONSFOROPERATIONANDSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS3/4.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSSURVEILLANCEREUIREMENTSContinuedAtleastonceper18monthsduringshutdown,byverifyingthateachautomaticvalveintheflowpathactuatestoitscorrectpositiononaContainmentPressure--High-Highsignal.Atleastonceper5yearsbyverifyingath'iwater.flowrate)fromthesprayadditivetanktestlinetoeachcontainmentspraysystemwiththespraypumpoperatingonrecirculation.pstg-.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT1tPage3/46-13AMENDMENT407,444,464 3/4BASES3/4.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3/4.6.2DEPRESSURIZATIONANDCOOLINGSYSTEMS3/4.6.2.1CONTAINMENTSPRAYSYSTEMTheOPERABILITYofthecontainmentspraysystemensuresthatcontainmentdepressurizationandcoolingcapabilitywillbeavailableintheeventofaLOCA.Thepressurereductionandresultantlowercontainmentleakagerateareconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedintheaccidentanalysis.3/4.6.2.2SPRAYADDITIVESYSTEMTheOPERABILITYofthesprayadditivesystemensuresthatsufficientNaOHisaddedtothecontainmentsprayintheeventofaLOCA.ThelimitsonNaOHminimumvolumeandconcentration,ensurethatI)theiodineremovalefficiencyofthespraywaterismaintainedbecauseoftheincreaseinpHvalue,and2)corrosioneffectsoncomponentswithincontainmentareminimized.Theseassumptionsareconsistentwiththeiodineremoval'fficiencyassumedintheaccidentanalysis.~::piiiiy"'d'ts'c'ha'i'je:.:"p'regs'ur'e'@2'5'5:':jsi'g.,3/4.6.3CONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVESTheOPERABILITYofthecontainmentisolationvalvesensuresthatthecontainmentatmospherewillbeisolatedfromtheoutsideenvironmentintheeventofareleaseofradioactivematerialtothecontainmentatmosphereorpressurizationofthecontainment.ContainmentisolationwithinthetimelimitsspecifiedensuresthatthereleaseofradioactivematerialtotheenvironmentwillbeconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedintheanalysisforaLOCA.Theopeningofcontainmentpurgeandexhaustvalvesandlockedorsealedclosedcontainmentisolationvalvesonanintermittentbasisunderadministrativecontrolincludesthefollowingconsiderations:(1)stationingaqualifiedindividual,whoisinconstantcommunicationwithcontrolroom,atthevalvecontrols,(2)instructingthisindividualtoclosethesevalvesinanaccidentsituation,and(3)assuringthatenvironmentalconditionswillnotprecludeaccesstoclosethevalvesandthatthisactionwillpreventthereleaseofradioactivityoutsidethecontainment.3/4.6.4COMBUSTIBLEGASCONTROLTheOPERABILITYoftheequipmentandsystemsrequiredforthedetectionandcontrolofhydrogengasensuresthatthisequipmentwillbeavailabletomaintainthehydrogenconcentrationwithincontainmentbelowitsflammablelimitduringpost-LOCAconditions.Eitherrecombinerunitiscapableofcontrollingtheexpectedhydrogengenerationassociatedwith:1)zirconium-waterreactions;2)radiolyticdecompositionofwater;and3)corrosionofmetalswithincontainment.Theacceptancecriterionof10,000ohmsisbasedonthetestbeingperformedwiththeheaterelementatanambienttemperature,butcanbeconservativelyappliedwhentheelementisatatemperatureaboveambient.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT1PageB3/46-3 ATTACHMENT2BTOC1099-07TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSPAGESMARKEDTOSHOWPROPOSEDCHANGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT23/46-12B3/46-3 3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONSFOROPERATIONANDSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS3/4.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSSURVEILL'ANCEREUIREMENTSContinuedAtleastonceper18monthsduringshutdown,byverifyingthateachautomaticvalveintheflowpathactuatestoitscorrectpositiononaContainmentPressure-High-Hightestsignal.+Atleastonceper5yearsbyverifyingathewaterflowrate)fromthesprayadditivetanktestlinetoeachcontainmentspraysystemwiththespraypumpoperatingonrecirculation.p&g-.+TheprovisionsofTechnicalSpecification4.0.8areapplicable.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT2Page3/46-12AMENDMENT45,97,434,458

ATTACHMENT3ATOC1099-07PROPOSEDTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSPAGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT13/46-13B3/46-3 (3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONSFOROPERATIONANDSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS3/4.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSSURVEILf;ANCEREUIREMENTSContinuedC.Atleastonceper18monthsduringshutdown,byverifyingthateachautomaticvalveintheflowpathactuatestoitscorrectpositiononaContainmentPressure-High-Highsignal.Atleastonceper5yearsbyverifyingtheflowratefromthesprayadditivetanktestlinetoeachcontainmentspraysystemwiththespraypumpoperatingonrecirculation.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT1Page3/46-13AMENDMENT407,444,464

)'II1k4 3/4BASES3/4.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3/4.6.2DEPRESSURIZATIONANDCOOLINGSYSTEMS3/4.6.2.1CONTAINMENTSPRAYSYSTEMTheOPERABILITYofthecontainmentspraysystemensuresthatcontainmentdepressurizationandcoolingcapabilitywillbeavailableintheeventofaLOCA.Thepressurereductionandresultantlowercontainmentleakagerateareconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedintheaccidentanalysis.3/4.6.2.2SPRAYADDITIVESYSTEMTheOPERABILITYofthesprayadditivesystemensuresthatsufficientNaOHisaddedtothecontainmentsprayintheeventofaLOCA.ThelimitsonNaOHminimumvolumeandconcentration,ensurethat1)theiodineremovalefficiencyofthespraywaterismaintainedbecauseoftheincreaseinpHvalue,and2)corrosioneffectsoncomponentswithincontainmentareminimized.Theseassumptionsareconsistentwiththeiodineremovalefficiencyassumedintheaccidentanalysis.SurveillanceRequirement4.6.2.2.disperformedbyverifyingawaterflowratep20gpmandg50gpmfromthesprayadditivetanktestlinetoeachcontainmentspraysystemwiththespraypumpoperatingonrecirculationwithapumpdischargepressurep255psig.3/4.6.3CONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVESTheOPERABILITYofthecontainmentisolationvalvesensuresthatthecontainmentatmospherewillbeisolatedfromtheoutsideenvironmentintheeventofareleaseofradioactivematerialto'hecontainmentatmosphereorpressurizationofthecontainment.ContainmentisolationwithinthetimelimitsspecifiedensuresthatthereleaseofradioactivematerialtotheenvironmentwillbeconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedintheanalysisforaLOCA.Theopeningofcontainmentpurgeandexhaustvalvesandlockedorsealedclosedcontainmentisolationvalvesonanintermittentbasisunderadministrativecontrolincludesthefollowingconsiderations:(1)stationingaqualifiedindividual,whoisinconstantcommunicationwithcontrolroom,atthevalvecontrols,(2)instructingthisindividualtoclosethesevalvesinanaccidentsituation,and(3)assuringthatenvironmentalconditionswillnotprecludeaccesstoclosethevalvesandthatthisactionwillpreventthereleaseofradioactivityoutsidethecontainment.3/4.6.4COMBUSTIBLEGASCONTROLTheOPERABILITYoftheequipmentandsystemsrequiredforthedetectionandcontrolofhydrogengasensuresthatthisequipmentwillbeavailabletomaintainthehydrogenconcentrationwithincontainmentbelowitsflammablelimitduringpost-LOCAconditions.Eitherrecombinerunitiscapableofcontrollingtheexpectedhydrogengenerationassociatedwith:1)zirconium-waterreactions;2)radiolyticdecompositionofwater;and3)corrosionofmetalswithincontainment.Theacceptancecriterionof10,000ohmsisbasedonthetestbeingperformedwiththeheaterelementatanambienttemperature,butcanbeconservativelyappliedwhentheelementisatatemperatureaboveambient.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT1PageB3/46-3 ATTACHMENT3BTOC1099-07PROPOSEDTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSPAGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT23/46-12B3/46-3 3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONSFOROPERATIONANDSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS3/4.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSSORVEILLANCEREUIREMENTSContinuedAtleastonceper18monthsduringshutdown,byverifyingthateachautomaticvalveintheflowpathactuatestoitscorrectpositiononaContainmentPressure-High-Hightestsignal.'.Atleastonceper5yearsbyverifyingtheflowratefromthesprayadditivetanktestlinetoeachcontainmentspraysystemwiththespraypumpoperatingonrecirculation.+TheprovisionsofTechnicalSpecification4.0.8areapplicable.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT2Page3/46-12AMENDMENT45,97,434,458 3/4BASES3/4.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3/4:6.2DI'.PRESSURIZATIONANDCOOLINGSYSTEMS3/4.6.2.1CONTAINMENTSPRAYSYSTEMTheOPERABILITYofthecontainmentspraysystemensuresthatcontainmentdepressurizationandcoolingcapabilitywillbeavailableintheeventofaLOCA.Thepressurereductionandresultantlowercontainmentleakagerateareconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedintheaccidentanalysis.3/4.6.2.2SPRAYADDITIVESYSTEMTheOPERABILITYofthesprayadditivesystemensuresthatsufficientNaOHisaddedtothecontainmentsprayintheeventofaLOCA.ThelimitsonNaOHvolumeandconcentrationensureapHvalueofbetween8.5and11.0forthesolutionrecirculatedwithincontainmentafteraLOCA.ThispHbandminimizestheevolutionofiodineandminimizestheeffectofchlorideandcausticstresscorrosiononmechanicalsystemsandcomponents.Theseassumptionsareconsistentwiththeiodineremovalefficiencyassumedintheaccidentanalysis.Thecontainedwatervolumelimitincludesanallowanceforwaternotusablebecauseoftankdischargelocationorotherphysicalcharacteristics.SurveillanceRequirement4.6.2.2.disperformedbyverifyingawaterflowratep20gpmandg50gpmfromthesprayadditivetanktestlinetoeachcontainmentspraysystemwiththespraypumpoperatingonrecirculationwithapumpdischargepressurep255psig.3/4.6.3CONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVESITheOPERABILITYofthecontainmentisolationvalvesensuresthatthecontainmentatmospherewillbeisolatedfromtheoutsideenvironmentintheeventofareleaseofradioactivematerialtothecontainmentatmosphereorpressurizationofthecontainment.Containmentisolationwithinthetimelimitsspecifiedensuresthatthereleaseofradioactivematerialtotheenvironmentwillbeconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedintheanalysisfor.aLOCA.Theopeningofcontainmentpurgeandexhaustvalvesandlockedorsealedclosedcontainmentisolationvalvesonanintermittentbasisunderadministrativecontrolincludesthefollowingconsiderations:(1)stationingaqualifiedindividual,whoisinconstantcommunicationwithcontrolroom,atthevalvecontrols,(2)instructingthisindividualtoclosethesevalvesinanaccidentsituation,and(3)assuringthatenvironmentalconditionswillnotprecludeaccesstoclosethevalvesandthatthisactionwillpreventthereleaseofradioactivityoutsidethecontainment.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT2PageB3/46-3AMENDMENT63,465 ATTACHMENT4TOC1099-07NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSCONSIDERATIONEVALUATIONIndianaMichiganPowerCompany(18'),theLicenseeforDonaldC.CookNuclearPlant(CNP)Units1and2,proposestoamendAppendixA,TechnicalSpecifications(T/S),ofFacilityOperatingLicensesDPR-58andDPR-74.I@MproposestoreviseT/SSR4.6.2.2.dforthesprayadditivesystemtorelocatethedetailsassociatedwiththeacceptancecriteriaandtestparameterstotheassociatedT/SBases.Additionally,certainadministrativetextformatchangesarealsobeingproposed.IAMhasevaluatedthisproposedamendmentanddeterminedthatitdoesnotinvolveasignificanthazard.Accordingto10CFR50.92(c),aproposedamendmenttoanoperatinglicenseinvolvesnosignificanthazardsconsiderationifoperationofthefacilityinaccordancewiththeproposedamendmentwouldnot:1.involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated;2.createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanypreviouslyanalyzed;or3.involveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Thedeterminationthatthecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92aremetforthisamendmentrequestisindicatedbelow.1.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?TheproposedchangesrelocatethedetailsassociatedwiththeacceptancecriteriaandtestparametersfromtheT/SSRtotheassociatedBasesanddonotaffectsystemoperabilityorperformance.Theformatchangesinthetextoneachpageareadministrativeinnatureanddonotresultinanychangeinplantoperation.RelocationofthisinformationtotheBasesisadministrativeinnatureanddoesnotaffecttheprobabilityorconsequencesofanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Noactualchangetotherequirementismade.Actualplantoperationisnotaffectedbytheadministrativechanges.Nomethodsofoperationofplantsystems,structuresorcomponentsarechanged.Operationofaccidentmitigationfeaturesisnotchanged.Consequently,thereisnoaffectupontheprobabilityofanypreviouslyanalyzedaccident,transient,accidentinitiators,orprecursorevents.Additionally,becausethereisnoactualchangeinplantdesignoroperation,thereisnoaffectuponradioactivematerialinventories,plantshielding,orefHuentreleasepoints.Therefore,thesechangesdonotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.

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Attachment4toC1099-07Page22.Doesthechangecreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated?TheproposedchangesrelocatethedetailsassociatedwiththeacceptancecriteriaandtestparametersfromtheT/SSRtotheassociatedBasesanddonotaffectsystemoperabilityorperformance.Theformatchangesinthetextoneachpageareadministrativeinnatureanddonotresultinanychangeinplantoperation.Facilityoperationandproceduresarenotchanged.RelocationofthisinformationtotheBasesisadministrativeinnatureanddoesnotaffectcreateanynewaccidentscenarios,accidentinitiators,orprecursorevents.Therefore,theproposedchangesdonotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.Doesthechangeinvolvea'significantreductioninamarginofsafety/TheproposedchangesrelocatethedetailsassociatedwithacceptancecriteriaandtestparametersfromtheT/SSRtotheassociatedBasesanddonotmodifyT/Ssafetysettings,setpoints,orothervalues.Theformatchangesinthetextoneachpageareadministrativeinnatureanddonotresultinanychangeinplantoperation.Thereisnoeffectuponoperatingmarginsandaccidentmarginsbec'ausetheadministrativechangesdono(changethemannerofoperationofplantsystems,structures,orcomponents.Plantemergencyandabnormaloperatingproceduresarenotaffected.;Thereisnochangeofactualtestingmethodology,test'parameters,oracceptancecriteria.Theresponseoftheplanttoaneventisthesame.Potentialoffsitedosesareunaffectedbecause:,operationofthefacilityisunchanged.RelocationofthetestirigdetailstotheBasesisacceptablebecausecontrolsareinplaceforT/SBaseschangeswhichrequireevaluationofchangesundertheprovisionsof10CFR50.59.Therefore,theproposedchangesdonotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Insummary,basedupontheaboveevaluation,I&Mhasconcludedthattheproposedamendmentinvolvesnosignificanthazardsconsideration.

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ATTACHMENT5TOC1099-07ENVIRONMENTALASSESSMENTIndianaMichiganI'owerCompany(IAM)hasevaluatedthislicenseamendmentrequestagainstthecriteriaforidentificationoflicensingandregulatoryactionsrequiringenvironmentalassessmentinaccordancewith10CFR51.21.IRMhasdeterminedthatthislicenseamendmentrequestmeetsthecriteriaforacategoricalexclusionsetforthin10CFR51.22(c)(9).Thisdeterminationisbasedonthefactthatthischangeisbeingproposedasanamendmenttoalicenseissuedpursuantto10CFR50thatchangesarequirementwithrespecttoinstallationoruseofafacilitycomponentlocatedwithintherestrictedarea,'sdefinedin10CFR20,orthatchangesaninspectionorasurveillancerequirement,andtheamendmentmeetsthefollowingspecificcriteria:(i)Theamendmentinvolvesnosignificanthazardsconsideration.AsdemonstratedinAttachment4,theproposedchangesdonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.(ii)Thereisnosignificantchangeinthetypesorsignificant.increaseintheamountsofany,eEuentthatmaybereleasedoA'site.Becausethereisnochangeinplantdesignoroperation,thereisnosignificantchangeinthetypesor,significantincreaseintheamountsofanyefHuentsreleasedoAsite.(iii)Thereisnosignificantincreaseinindividualorcumulativeoccupationalradiationexposure.Thechangesdonotresultinsignificantchangesintheoperationorconfigurationofthefacility.ThereisnochangeinthelevelofcontrolsormethodologyusedforprocessingofradioactiveefHuentsorhandlingofsolidradioactivewaste,nordothechangesresultinanychangeinthenormalradiationlevelswithintheplant.Therefore,thereisnosignificantincreaseinindividualorcumulativeoccupationalradiationexposureresultingfromthesechanges.

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