ML20084L628

Motion for Summary Disposition of Eddleman Contention 132C(II).No Genuine Issue of Matl Fact Exists & Applicant Entitled to Favorable Decision.Related Correspondence

ML20084L628
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	05/09/1984
From:	Carrow H CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML20084L630	List: ML20084L628 ML20084L654 ML20084L656
References
OL, NUDOCS 8405140555
Download: ML20084L628 (8)

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RELuc.D< 1 "Gi4DENf May 9,1984 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 00}g}[0 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSINWARD14 A10:28 In the Matter of ) CFFEOTTjQ-l-000/ETtigg

)

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY )

AND NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN ) Docket Nos. 50-400 OL MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY ) 50-401 OL

)

(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, )

Units 1 & 2) ) ,

APPLICANTS' MOTION FOR

SUMMARY

DISPOSITION OF EDDLEMAN CONTENTION 132C(II) t I. INTRODUCTION Carolina Power & Light Company and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power t

Agency (" Applicants") hereby move the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, pursuant to l 10 C.F.R. S 2.749, for Summary. Disposition in Applicants' favor of Wells Eddleman's Contention 132C(II). As grounds for their motion, Applicants assert that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be heard with respect to Contention 132C(II), and that Applicants are entitled to a decision in their favor on this contention as a matter of law.

This motion is supported by :

1. " Applicants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motions for Summary .

Disposition on Intervenor Eddleman's Contention 64(f), 75, 80, 'and 83/84," dated September 1,1983;

2. " Applicants' Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Issue

-t to be Heard on Wells Eddleman's Contention 132C(II)"; ,

3. " Affidavit of Robert W. Prunty, Jr."

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• H. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The Applicants' " Human Factors Design Evaluation Report of the Shearon Harris Unit 1 Control Room," (hereinafter "DCRDR") was first issued January 23,1983.1 In his

" Motion Concerning DCRDR Information," dated January 8,1983, Mr. Eddleman proposed his original contentions on the DCRDR. These contentions were based on the recently promulgated Supplement I to NUREG-0737, Requirements for Emergency Response Capability (December 1982) which Applicants had not yet had an opportunity to address.

By subsequent agreement of the parties and the Board, it was decided that a supplement to the DCRDR which Applicants intended to file on June 1,1983, would serve as the

" trigger" for amended, revised or reasserted contentions on the DCRDR. See Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Cost Saving Contentions, Discovery Disputes, and Scheduling Matters), dated May 27,1983, at 25. On July 2,1983, Mr. Eddleman filed his

" Response to 1983 Updated DCRDR Including Revised and New Contentions" which contained seven numbered contentions on the DCRCR. i i

Contention 132C(II), alleging that the DCRDR failed to comply with NUREG-0737, Supplement' 1, in several respects, contained seven different subparts. In its  !

Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Wells Eddleman's Proposed Contentions Concerning Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR), Richard Wilson's Motion to Withdraw Contentions, and the Conservation Council of North Carolina's Motion to Withdraw '

r Coittentions), dated October 6,1983 (" October 6 Order") the Board rejected all Eddleman Contentions on the DCRDR including all subparts of Eddleman Contention 132C(II) except subpart 4 on the layout of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP) control room.  !

t i Eddleman 132C(II) as admitted states as follows: i With respect to layout [of the control room], [ Applicants 3 proposal arranges control and display cabinets such that they  ;

l A copy was provided to the Board by letter dated January 21,1983.

block or impede the view of some others (See figure 2, page 12, where view of/from panels 8,9,10 and 11 is obscured by numbers 12,13,14 and 15 from numbers 6, 7, and 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.

Numbers 6 and 7 are hidden from operators by 1 and 2 (as well as 3, 4 and 5). Numbers 16 and 17, the incore instrumentation and nuclear instrumentation system are almost totally behind the two blocks 1 through 5 and 6-7 with respect to the radiation  :

monitoring equipment panels 12 through 15, the 8-11 block (start-up and generator) and the 1-5 block's sections 1 through 4 and possibly 5. Operator inability to see, read accurately, or integrete the information on these panels can imperil public safety in an accident.

During discovery on this contention, Applicants served two sets of interrogatories on Mr. Eddleman. " Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents to Wells Eddleman Concerning Eddleman Contentions 9,11, and 132C(II)" (January 24, 1984);

" Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents on Wells Eddleman's k Contention 132C(II) (Second Set)" (March 15, 1984). Mr. Eddleman filed his responses on  ;

March 7 and on ' April 12 respectively.

Mr. Eddleman filed and served his " General Interrogatories and Interrogatories on Contentions 9,11, 41, 45,116,~ and 132CII to Applicants Carolina Power & Light el aj."

on March 26,1984. Applicants responded to these interrogatories on April 17,1984.

Discovery has now been completed on this contention and has failed to reveal any basis for the allegations or factualinformation that cells into issue any material facts.

III. ARGUMENT

, A. Standards for Summary Disposition I The general standards by which motions for Summary Disposition are judged are set forth in " Applicants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motions for Summary Disposition I on Intervenor Eddleman's Contentions 64(f),75,80 and 83/84," dated September 1,1983, which is incorporated herein by reference.

B. There Is No Genuine Issue Of Material Fact As To Eddlemen 132C(II) i r

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Pursuant to the Board's October 6 Order, of the numerous issues raised by Mr. Eddleman concerning Applicants' DCRDR, only one narrow contention remains.

Eddleman Contention 132C(II) alleges that the layout of the SHNPP control room is such that public safety might be imperilled during an accident due to the inability of the control room operators to read and " integrate" information contained on various control i room panels. It is true that certain panels could be obscured from the view of a control  !

room operator, if he were to locate himself across the room from the panels in question, [

in the vicinity of or behind other control room panels. Affidavit of Robert W. Prunty, Jr.

("Prunty Affidavit") at 3-4. This, however, is not a design flaw which will in any way hamper the operators in responding to emergency operating procedures. In fact the control room layout was finalized only after extensive human factors analysis to assure protection of public safety during both routine and emergency situation operation.

Prunty Affidavit at 2; see also NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, at 10 ("The objective of the r I

control room design review is to ' improve the ability of nuclear power plant control room  ;

operators to prevent accidents or cope with accidents if they occur by improving information provided to them'(from NUREG-0660, Item I.D.1).") {

it is inevitable that regardless of the configuration of a control room, some scenario could be postulated whereby a control room operator could locate himself where he would not be able to view some of the control panels. However, the public safety will ,

remain protected by other design features of the control room. That is one purpose of the human factors analysis performed in the DCRDR: to configure the control room in i

such a way as to best protect public safety given physical and mental limitations of  !

human control room operators. NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 at 10. Mr. Eddleman has not challenged the methodology which led to the layout of the SHNPP control room.

NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, requires that a qualified multidisciplinary review team (S 5.1.b.(i)) prepare a review program incorporating accepted human engineering  !

principles. From April 1980 to January 1981, a review team consisting of CP&L, Ebasco l

Services, Inc., Westinghouse Corporation, and Essex Corporation performed a comprehensive human factors review of the SHNPP control room. Prunty Affidavit at

2. Appendix D of the Applicants' DCRDR (attached to the Prunty Affidavit as Exhibit 2) contains the Recommended Control Room Equipment Arrangement. That report used three primary positions for control operators whereby close proximity to Reactor Controls, Emergency Safeguards, and Emergency Power controls and displays and optimum viewing angles for all panels other than the Main Control Board are maintained. Prunty Affidavit at 2-3; DCRDR, Appendix D at 8-11. These three operating positions are indicated on Exhibit 3 to the Prunty Affidavit. Changes that were effected as a result of the review included bringing panels 1 through 5, panels 12 through 15, and panels 8 through 11 closer to operator positions. Prunty Affidavit at 3.

These changes significantly reduced signal densities and error rate probabilities.

DCRDR, Appendix D at 10.

The contention postulates that the view of certain control panels is obscured when or if an operator is located in various positions around the control room primarily away  ;

from the Main Control Board. Mr. Eddleman picks three positions in the control room where he asserts an operator would have his view of some control panels blocked by others. See " Wells Eddleman's Response to Applicants' Interrogatories Concerning Contentions 9,11, and 132(c)(2)" at Response 132(c)(2)-1(a)("The contention does not say the operator is at the desk. Rather, it refers to the fact that an operator standing, e.g.

by one of panels 1 through 5 . . . has a view of panel 10 . . . blocked (apparently) by panels 12 through 15.") i Specifically, the contention alleges first, that panels 12 through 15 block the view of panels 8 through 11 from an operator standing at panels 1 through 5 and 6 and 7, or vice versa. Second, it is asserted that Panels 6 and 7 are blocked by panels 1 through 5 f from the view of an operator who is presumably located near the Main Control Board.

Finally, the contention states that an operator standing near panels 1 through 5,12 through 15, or 8 through 11 could have his view blocked of panels 16 and 17. ,

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A Note, however, in only onetof these three' scenarios (#2) is the postulated operator

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F ,'. position even close to one of the DCRDR primary positions at the Main Control Board.

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y While SHNPP. is[ operating, there will be at all times a minumum of two licensed g ,.

y , operators - a reactor operator and a senior operator -in the control room.10 C.F.R. S

) 50.54(h(()(i) and (iii). It is anticipated that much of the time, Applicants will have two

!.- s reactor,'oierators, one senior operator, and one shift foreman in the control room. l e

Prunty Affidavit 5t 3. 'Of the operators on duty in the control room, one must be at the i controls at all timp 10 C.'F'R. S 50.54(mX2Xiii). Accordingly, it is anticipated that one wv of the operators will work at the, opt::ator desk much of the time. Prunty Affidavit at 3.

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t E' . , Therefore, v:hile Mr. Eddleman hyppthesizes'tfiat the view of panels 8 through 11 may be obscured for an operator located 'al' panels 1 through-5, this is simply not a o , ,

norinsi position for even one of the control room operators; furthermore, if an operator s s 5 N,.

k ' ' were to be in this position, the other operator (s) would still have a commanding view of 3

panels 8 through 11 if needed. Prunty Affidavit at 4. The same analysis applies to the concern that the view of panels 16 and 17 may be otx3cuced from various postulated operator positions near panels 1 through 5, or 12 through 15, or 8 through 11. This is not n ws

, a typical paition where any of the operators would remain. IA at 4. Again, should an b[V "

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,OS6"ator find himself in such a position,'there wouM ' be one or more other operators in 4,a* 1- '

} y, th'e control room who would be able toyonitor,the equipment as necessary. IA

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scenario hypctkdied in Contention 132C(II) - an obscured view of

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[ 41 pQnels 6 and 7 - is clearly not 'd cone'ech ~since panel 7 (Condensate Booster Hydraulic

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Coupling) contains no controls or ', displays whatsoever on the front of the panel Id.,;

st l ,;DCRDR, Appendix D at 5 and 11. Panel 0 (Cooling T'o'wer and River Water Make-Up it Os Cfntrol) contains few controls an'd was\ evaluated as havinglninimal requirements for s i ,

even occasional monitoring. Prunty Affidavit at 4; DCRDR, ippendix D at 5 and 11. In 8  %,

fact, neither of these panels is safety related nor required to be operated in an accident l

scenario. Prunty Affidavit at 4.',8imilarly, panels 16 (Incore Instrumentation) and 17

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(Nuclear Instrumentation) require very little, if any, monitoring. M. There are even duplicate readouts of panel 17 on the Main Control Board. &

When questioned as to what specific information on these panels was necessary for i the operator, "to see, read accurately, or integrate," Mr. Eddleman was unable to come up with a factual answer. See Wells Eddleman's Response to Applicants Interrogatories [

re 9,11, and 132(cX2)," dated April 12, 1984 at Response 132(cX2)-1(b). Nor was Mr.

Eddleman able to be more specific on any of the panels he claimed were obscured from  ;

view. When asked under what circumstances an operator was required to have an i unobstructed view of information on the panels he was concerned about, he responded, "This c' alls for more detailed analysis; read the contention for the basic info." Id.,at l Response 132(cX2)-1(bXii). I It should be noted that Applicants began assessing the control room design from a i

human factors perspective even before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff issued j i

final guidance on the subject. A thorough and adequate human factors review, meeting i

all NRC requirements, has been performed on the SHNPP control room. Indeed, certain changes in the control room layout were made as a result of the human factors review.

Such changes contribute "to a significant reduction of risk and enhancement in the safety of operation." NUREG-0737 at 10. Thus, although some control panels may be obscured ,

from the view of an operator located in certain positions in the control room, this does  ;

i not raise a safety issue: one panel (#7) has no displays; another (#17) has duplicate displays on the main control board; and two others (#6 and #16) require little to no monitoring. Panels 6 and 7, the only panels obscured from an operator positioned near the operator desk and/or Main Control Board are not safety related and are not required Most important, the operator positions to be operated in an accident scenario.

postulated by Mr. Eddleman for any of the control room panels to be obscured are not i i

typical operator positions, and even if one operator found himself in such a position, another operator would be in a position with an unobscured view.

0- Therefore, Applicants have demonstrated that there are no remaining issues of 1 material fact related to Eddleman Contention 132C(II). l

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IV. CONCLUSION ,

Based on the foregoing, Applicants respectfully request that tneir Motion for p

, Summary Disposition of Eddleman Contention l'J2C(II) be granted.

f, This the hday of 'hb.li8Y. v-

.- Respectfully submitted,

, -4 j, ~

Hill Carrow

' $_. Attorney o' Carolina Power & Light Compaiy

,. Post Office Box 1551

< ..- Raleigh, Nort.'t Carolina 2'Z602

, (919) 836-6839', -

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Attorneys for Applietmts:. f

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' Thomas A. Baxter

. " John H. O'Nelli, Jr. .. .

'F Shaw, PJttman, Potts & Trowbridge 1800 M 5troet, N.W. a

.r Waghington, D.C. 20036

, }' f/ .'. (20*.) 822-1000- ,

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. A " Richard E. Jonea . "

. . "- [, ' ' Ssmantha Francis Flynn .

. > > J; Carolina Power & Light Company ' ~ , ,.

U ' ; Post Office Box 1551 .

,rRaleigh, Forth Carolina 27602

~ ' '(919) 836-6517 o, a a

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