ML20084L656

Affidavit of RW Prunty in Support of Applicant Motion for Summary Disposition of Eddleman Contention 132C(II). Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20084L656
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	05/09/1984
From:	Prunty R CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20084L630	List: ML20084L628 ML20084L654 ML20084L656
References
OL, NUDOCS 8405140574
Download: ML20084L656 (44)

Text

.

TED UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RC NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSl%G R$A1(D A10 :28 f In the Matter of )

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CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY )

AND NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN ) Docket Nos. 50-400 OL MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY ) 50-401 OL

)

(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, ) ,

Units 1 & 2) )  ;

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT W. PRUNTY, JR.,IN SUPPORT OF  :

APPLICANT'S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY

DISPOSITION OF EDDLEMAN CONTENTION 132C(II)  !

i County of. Wake )

) s.s.

State of North Carolina ) .

i ROBERT W. PRUNTY, JR., bring duly sworn according to law, deposes and says as follows:  !

1. I am employed by Carolina Power. & Light Company (CP&L) as Principal

• Engineer - Electrical in the Harris Plant Engineering Section of the Harris Nuclear Project Department, New Hill, North Carolina. I have personal knowledge of the matters l

set forth herein and believe them to be true and correct to the best of my information, knowledge, and belief. A summary of my professional qualifications and experience is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. .

2. Mr. Eddleman, in his Contention 132C(II), criticizes the layout of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP) Control Room. Specifically, Mr. Eddleman I

contends that certain control and display ~ cabinets " block or impede" the view of others such that " operator inability to see, read accurately, or integrate the information on these panels can imperil public safety in an accident."

8405140574 840509 PDR ADOCK 05000400 g

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3. The purpose of this affidavit is to support the Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition of Eddleman 132C(II) and to demonstrate that the configuration of the panels in Applicants' SHNPP control room has been thoroughly analyzed by experts from a  !

4 human factors perspective in compliance with NRC regulations and in satisfaction of regulatory guidance, and is designed to assure operator protection of public safety.

4. A comprehensive human factors review of the SHNPP control room was conducted by CP&L, together with Ebasco Services, Inc. (Architect-Engineer),

Westinghouse Corp. (Nuclear Steam Supply System vendor) and Essex Corp. (human i factors consultants), from April 1980 to January 1981. This review was initiated by CP&L prior to the issuance of NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, Requirements for Emergency Response Capability (December 1982), which contains the specific direction for performing a control room design review, and prior to NUREG-0700, Guidelines for Control Room Design Reviews (September 1981), which contains guidance for conducting j the review itself. Draft NUREG/CR-1580 was used as the primary source of criteria for the Shearon Harris control room review.

5. As the result of this review and per the recommendation of the resulting

" Human Factors Design Evaluation Report for the Shearon Harris Unit 1 Control Room" l (hereinafter DCRDR), first issued in January,1981, at Appendix D (attached hereto as Exhibit 2), major equipment rearrangement was effected. Construction work in the area was halted until the layout design could be changed to reflect the equipment arrangement proposed by the DCRDR. ,

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6. As stated in Appendix D of the DCRDR at page 8, three operating positions were chosen at the Main Control Board from which optimum viewing angles were determined for all panels other than the Main Control Board. The control room layout with the 'three operating positions indicated is contained in Exhibit 3. (Panel names and [

functions are described in Exhibit 2.) These positions were purposely chosen because of i

their proximity to Reactor Controls, Emergency Safeguards and Emergency Power

i controls and displays. Viewing angles and distances were calculated. Signal densities and associated error rates, short term memory effects, label credibility and indicator light l f

t 2 and flag discriminability were considered.

7. Changes made to maximize viewing angles were as follows:

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1. Equipment panels 1 through 5 were moved closer to the  !

three operator positions with positions 1 and 2 being the f most important and position 3 being the least important,

2. Equipment panels numbers 12 through 15 were moved closer [

i to all three positions; and

3. Equipment panels numbers 8 through 11 were moved closer

. to position 3.  ;

These changes significantly reduced signal densities and error rate probabilities.

! DCRDR, Appendix D at 10.

8. Nevertheless, Mr. Eddleman asserts in Eddleman Contention 132C(II) that panels a numbered 8,9,10 and 11 are obscured by panels numbered 12,13,14 and 15. This is true j only if one is standing at panels 1 through 5 or at panels 6 and 7. NRC regulations require that for any operating nuclear power plant, a minimum of two operators including I i

a senior operator must be in the control room at all times.10 C.F.R. S 50.54(mX2Xi) and l i

(iii). It is anticipated that Applicants will have as many as three operators and a shift ,

i foreman in the control room a majority of the time. Of the operators on duty in the l

! control room, at least one must be at the controls at all times. 10 C.F.R. S (

50.54(mX2Xiii). Accordingly, Applicants expect one of the operators to work at the l

?

', operator desk itself much of the time. {

! 9. Therefore, the operator position which Mr. Eddleman postulated located at j panela 1 through 5 is not a typical position at which any of the operators required to man I

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the control room would remain. Should one of the operators be in this position, the other i operator (s) would have a commanding view of panels 8 through 11 if needed.

I

10. Mr. Eddleman contends that panels 6 and 7 are obscured by panels 1 through 5.

This is true, but the evaluation contained in DCRDR, Appendix D, indicates that l

equipment panels 6 and 7 (Cooling Tower and . River Water Make-up Control and Condensate Booster Hydraulic Coupling Control) were deemed to have " minimal '

requirements for even occasional monitoring." DCRDR, Appendix D Lt 5 and 11. The t Cooling Tower and River Water Make-up Control panel (#6) contains only a few controls

- and displays, id., , and those will be utilized very infrequently. The Condensate Booster Hydraulic Coupling panel (#7) contains no controls or displays on the front of the panel.

& Neither of these panels is safety related nor required to be operated in an accident 4

scenario. I

, 11. Mr. Eddleman contends that the Incore Instrumentation panels (#16) and i Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) panels (#17) are obscured by panels 1-5 and 6 and 7, and/or panels 12 through 15, and/or panels 8 through 11 positions. In this regard, Mr.

Eddleman's contention assumes the location of the operator at various positions across the room from panels 16 and 17. First, these are not typical operating positions at which any of the required control operators manning the control room would remain. Second, the other operator (s) would have a commanding view of these panels (16 and 17) If [

needed. Third, although qualified to operate the Incore Instrumentation panels (#16), an l operator is very seldom called upon to do so, as indicated by experience in other CP&L i facilities. The operation of these panels is primarily an engineering function. Finally, f the NIS panels (#17) have duplicate readouts on Main Control Board (MCB) section IC, thereby requiring very infrequent access.

12. Applicants are in the process of finalizing the SHNPP Emergency Operating 4

! Procedures (EOPs). Various generic task analyses and verification and validation testing have been performed. Applicants have been involved in such analyres and testing of 1

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Westinghouse emergency response guidelines and the H.B. Robinsor. Unit 2 EOPs. The control room has been laid out such that immediate actions and indication monitoring for design basis accidents will be accomplished from the Main Control Board, so that Applicants are unaware of any EOP which could be impeded by an obstructed view of the ,

panels which are the subject of Contention 132C(II).

13. Thus CP&L's actions are in compliance with all NRC guidance and regulations i to ensure a well designed, human engineered control room.

14. Accordingly, there will be no impediments to the control room operators' l ability to read information off the control room panels and ensure safety of the public in routine or accident situations.

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1 This is thebday of M di "

,1984

~

4 -. s Robert W. Prunty, Jr.

Sworn to and subscribcd before '

[K me tht< #( day of May,1984.

Y#g f //n>,k- . s

$0TARY e.e h

Y Y rn,0 r Not'a ry Publia

dj  %$L1C 4 My commission expires 10 // 9,[JW ['

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Ex. 1

( ROBERT WAYNE PRUNTY, JR.

\- Principal Engineer BIRTH DATE: August 3, 1948 I. EDUCATION:

A. B.S. Degree in Electrical Engineering from University of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina - 1971 II. EXPERIENCE:

A. August 1971 to June 1979

1. U.S. Navy

a. Student in Nuclear Power School -

August 1971 to September 1972

b. Nuclear Submarine Officer -

October 1972 to September 1974

c. Student in Submarine Officer's Advanced Coursa - October 1974'to April 1975

d. Nuclear Submarine Officer - May 1975 to May 1977

e. Staff Instructor, Naval Nuclear Power School - June 1977 to june 1979

- - - - - - - ~

B. --July-1979,to'Present -

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1. Carolina Power & Light Company 1

a.- Employed as Senior Engineer in the Engineering Pool Section of the Power Plant Engineering Department

b. December 1, 1979 - Transferred as Senior Engineer to the Harris Plant Engineering Section of the Nuclear Power Plant Engineering Department

c. April 5, 1980 - Promoted to Project Engineer -

Harris Plant Engineering Section Nuclear Power Plant Engineering Department-located at New Hill, N.C.

d. August 8, 1981 - Promoted to Principal, Engineer-Electrical in the Harris Plant Engineering Sec-tion, Nuclear Plant Engineering Department, New Hill, N.C.

t-

Ex L APPENDIX D RECOMMENDED CONTROL ROOM EQUIPMENT ARRANGEMENT

. = . . . - - - = - . -

i 9

t A FINAL REPORT ON THE HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING '

ANALYSIS OF THE SHNPP UNIT 1 CONTROL ROOM EQUIPMENT ARRANGEMENT ,

o Prepared For:

Carolina Power and Light Raleigh, North Carolina Prepared By:

Walter T. Ta!!ey -

Essex Corporation i

333 North Fairfax Street Alexandria, Virginia 22314 16 January 1981 Revised 11 February 1981

" - - - - - . . - . *d _* - _. ,

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TABLE OF CONTENTS .

t Section Page LIST OF TABLES il r

1

1.0 INTRODUCTION

c 2.0 FINAL ANALYSES 2

.2.1 General 2 2.2 Equipment Location Desirability 5 2.3 Monitoring Accuracy 5 2.4 Short-Term Memory Effects on Operator Performance 11 2.5 Desk and Storage Cabinet Location 17 3.0 RECOMMENDATIONS 19 3.1 Equipment Arrangements 19 BIBLIOGRAPHY 20 ADDENDUM l - APPROXIMATE EQUIPMENT SIZES

_ __ADDENDUAL2_ _QVERVIEW OF THE INITIAL ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS __

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LIST OF TABLES Page c TABLE 1 - EQUIPMENT NUMBER IDENTIFICATION USED IN FINAL ANALYSES 3 l

TABLE 2 - LOCATION CLASSIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT 6 .

TABLE 3 - ESTIMATEDI DECREASES IN SIGNAL DENSITIES FOR EQUIPMENT NUMBERS 1 THROUGH 5,8 THROUGH 11, AND 12 THROUGH 15 FROM ARRANGEMENTS SHOWN IN FIGURE 1 TO THOSE SHOWN IN FIGURE 2 10 TABLE 4 - RECOMMENDED VIEWING DISTANCES FOR FIVE LETTER HEIGHTS UNDER THREE VIEWING CONDITIONSI AND TWO LABEL LEVELS OF IMPORTANCE2 ,3 TABLE 5 - ESTIMATES OF VIEWING DISTANCES FOR LIGHTS AND SWITCH FLAGS FOR RELIABLE STATE DISCRIMINATION 15 TABLE 6 - ESTIMATE MOVEMENT TIMES FROM THREE OPERATOR POSITIONSI TO VARIOUS EQUIPMENT CABINETS2 IN THE CONTROL ROOM FOR THE EBASCO PROPOSED ROOM ARRANGEMENT -

TABLE 7 - ESTIMATED MOVEMENT TIMES FROM THREE OPERATOR POSITIONSI TO VARIOUS EQUIPMENT CABINETS 2 IN THE CONTROL ROOM FOR THE ESSEX PROPOSED ROOM ARRANGEMENT 18 ,

__ _ _ _ . . . _ _ . __ _ _ _ . -. _ m, _ = . _

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SECTION

1.0 INTRODUCTION

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Background

a. An initial review of the SHNPP-1 control room (CR) design in June-July 1980 i revealed possible human engineering (HE) problems associated with the arrangement of f some of the CR furnishings, particularly the location of the Radiation Monitor cabinets and the vertical equipment cabinets along the east wall. This preliminary analysis was based upon the information contained on EBASCO drawing CAR-2166 G-324 Rev 2,4  ;

78 (Reactor Auxiliary Building Control Room Equipment Arrangement) and an incomplete set of cabinet outline drawings. A draft report submitted on 18 July 1980 documented the [

analysis of these problems and an alternative equipment arrangement which significantly I

improved visual access to these cabinets. Addendum 2 contains an overview of the initial analyses and recommendations.

b. At review meetings held with SHNPP Engineering and EBASCO on and after 25 .

July 1980 updated information was furnished which affected the initial analyses and l recommendations. This new information consisted of additional cabinet outline drawings, i

sketches, and discussions concerning changes being made to EBASCO drawing CAR-2166 G-324 Open Rev 3 ("open" referring to a status of subject-to-change). In addition,  ;

staffing requirements were clarified which eliminated the need for a view window and rapid access between CRs I and 2, and the requirements for inclusion of a visitor's gallery were made mandatory.

c. New analyses were made and recommendations revised. In order to minimize the impact _uportconstruction. schedules, final recommendations were doc.umented by ~

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memorandum on 13 August 1980, with documentation of the additional analyses tifollow at a later date.

d. The main body of this report documents the final analyses and recommenda- l l

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SECTION 2.0 FINAL ANALYSES 2.1 General

a. A review of the new engineering information listed in Addendum I indicated that, in spite of the movement of the Radiation Monitor cabinets (equipment numbers 12 through 15 in Table 1) to the north wall (Figure 1), some potential human factors problems still remained. The major areas of concern were:

e Monitoring accuracy of instruments in the string of vertical cabinets near the east and north walls e Readability of displays and labels on the vertical cabinets and Radiation Monitors from various locations in the CR e Adverse effects on operator short-term memory because of move-ment distances between various equipments e Discrimination problems for simple indicators and/or nonilluminated flags on various instruments due to viewing distances e Adverse effects upon display and label reading due to viewing distances.

b. Two major problems which limited the extent to which these new analyses could be developed (and also placed limitations upon the preliminary analyses) were a lack of clear operational understanding as to the criticality or importance of the majority of the vertical cabinets and the complete lack of adequate front panel detail which would have identified the controls, displays, and instruments contained thereon - the second lack compounding the problem of defining operational requirements. Therefore, certain

-- assumptions- were mader -These assumptions, listed below, will provide -the baste , ,

environmental definition on which the subsequent analyses were performed.

1) Relative importance of a particular cabinet or panel was estimated independent of any frequency-of-use or time criticality criteria as such criteria were not available. An assumption was made that if the equipment cabinet had front-mounted components, it would be used by the operator under some possible conditions.

l 2) Equipment cabinet names and possible functions were used to determine their application. This hypothesized application was used to determine preferred locations relative to the main control board. As an example, it appeared more reasonable for the start-up transformer and generator relay cabinets to be located closer to the turbine-generator area of the control board than elsewhere. Discussions with opera-tionally experienced personnel attempted to impose some operational validity on these types of classifications.

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!f TABLEI EQUIPMENT NUMBER IDENTIFICATION USED IN FINAL ANALYSES (Sea Figures I and 2) f Equipment No. Nomenclature 3

e 1 RCP Vibration Monitor Cabinet f 2 Gross Failed Fuel Detection Console

' 3 Loose Parts Monitor Cabinet 4 Seismic Monitor Cabinet 5 Axial Power Distr & Monitor Panel 6 Cooling Tower and River Make-Up Control Cabinet g

7 Cond Booster Hyd Coupling Cont Cab 8 Generator Relay Panel I A

' 9 Generator Relay Panel IB 10 Startup Transformer Relay Panel l A j

( 11 Startup Transformer Relay Panel IB 12 Radiation Monitor Panel SA f

13 Radiation Monitor Panel SB

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14 Radiation Monitor Console 15 Radiation Monitor Printer 16 incore Instrumentation 17 Nuclear instrumentation System

_m - _ _ 18-- Operator's Desk _

19 Operator's Computer Console L 20 Log and Alarm Typewriters and Console 7

21 Shif t Foreman's Desk 22 Air Pack and Respirator Storage L

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3) Where some definition of types of instruments and their placement upon the panels could be found, such information was used.

2.2 Equipment Location Desirability

a. Equipment was classified for location desirability' by using the criteria outlined in paragraph 2.lb, above. These classifications, which appear in Table 2, guided the analyses and subsequent recommendations.

b. Two cabinets, in particular, were estimated to have little or no significance in being located in the control room. The Condensate Booster Hydraulic Control Cabinet, which appeared not to have any front panel controls, and the Cooling Tower and River Water Make-up Control Cabinet, with few controls, were estimated to have minimal requirements for even occasional monitoring.

c. The Incore Instrumentation and Nuclear Instrumentation System cabinets were estimated to be located in an acceptable area based on discussions with operations personnel; therefore, no analyses were performed upon these,

d. The Radiation Monitoring consoles and cabinets were judged to have important use requirements associated with them. Additional information concerning their front panel characteristics was used to determine their need for a central location close to the control board, e.g., they contain large numbers of small monitor display readouts and l alarm lights. A review of the front panel characteristics of these consoles is contained in i the design evaluation file, index number 5.06.4.

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! 2.3 Monitoring Accuracy a.7e-accuracy and-speed with which signals are detected by the human have. _: -

been shown to be related to various elements of a complex monitoring task (complexity defined loosely as more than a single event occurring repetitiously). Some of these elements are frequency of event (or signal) occurrence; signal density (i.e., the total area wherein signals may occur, density increasing with the number of different signals which may occur within a given area); and irrelevant information (occurrence of signals that may be ignored at least temporarily). Accuracy of signal detection also appears to interact with the length of time on the monitoring task; however, the evidence is less clear in this area for complex monitoring tasks than it is for simple monitoring tasks. A significant increase in detection errors occurs when frequency of occurrence is low, density is high, and irrelevant signals may occur. This could possibly be further compounded by time on the task in excess of 1/2 to I hour. A search of relevant 5

TABLE 2 LOCATION CLASSIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT Equip Equipment Preferred No. Nomenclature Location 1 RCP Vib Monitor Close to associated CB Equip 2 Gross Failed Fuel Det Close to associated CB Equip ,

3 Loose Parts Monitor Close to associated CB Equip 4 Seismic Monitor Close to associated CB Equip 5 APDM Close to the Incore Instr 6 Clg Twr & River M-U Cont Little or no request (see Text)  ;

7 Cond Booster Hyd Cpig Cont No requirement (see Text) 8 Gen Relay - 1 A Close to Turbine-Gen on CB 9 Gen Relay - IB Close to Turbine-Gen on CB 10 S-U Xfmr - I A Close to Turbine-Gen on CB 11 5-U Xfmr - IB Close to Turbine-Gen on CB 12 Rad Mon SA Centrally located (see Text) 13 Rad Mon SB Centrally located (see Text) 14 Rad Mon Console Centrally located (see Text) 15 Rad Mon Printer Centrally located (see Text) 16 Incore Instr Either end of CB OK '

17 NIS Either end of CB OK 18 Operator's Desk Centrally located-close to CB 19 Op's Comp Console Close to operator's desk 20 Log & Alarm Equip Close to operator's desk 21 Shif t Supvr's Desk Clear view of control board 22 Air Pack & Resp Equip Low Emer Traffic Area, Easy Access l

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literature shows that signal densities have been varied from 4 to 46, occurrence frequencies have been varied from 10 to 100 per hour with intersignal intervals varying from 30 to 3C0 seconds, and relevant-to-irrelevant signal ratios shif ted from 1:9 to 2:1 for a number of different investigations. These investigations also looked at signal hetero-geneity, display (signal field) formats, response requirements, and kinds of signals (add vs.

omit).

b. The control room of an NPP has frequently been defined as containing many of the following elements: low signal frequencies, as plants generally operate quite stably I and well for the majority of time; signals occurring which do not require immediate responses; high signal densities due to enormous quantities of information present; and long monitoring periods. The placement of equipment cabinets I through 11 in a row as shown in Figure I would potentially aggravate problems of errors when monitoring their  ;

instruments. This also applies to equipment numbers 12 through 15. A major variable that appears controllable by moving cabinets around is the signal density (relative to tne observer). This variable appears significant in affecting error rates for signal densities of from 4 to 32 in an area subtending a visual angle for the viewer of 200 An approximate doubling of the density approximately doubles the error rate, and for higher densities appears to triple the error rate. It can be seen that, given a fixed area in which a fixed number of signals can occur, varying the distance from the obherver to the area will vary

the relative area presented to the central field of vision of the observer and, therefore, vary the observed signal density. The farther away the area is from the observer, the higher the signal density relative to the observer due to tne increased area in the observer's central field of vision. This assumes detectability of all signals at the various

- -- distances-If visual angles could be increased (i.e.,. the relative size of the area in_the _. . .

central field of vision decreased) by moving equipment closer to the observer, a resultant decrease in signal density relative te the central field of visioa will result. Assuming some monitoring error rate probability exists for the arrangement of Figure 1, then the probability of error should decrease if the equipment were closer to the viewer. The relationship of signal density to error rate previously discussed indicated an approximate direct relationship. Therefore, a decrease of signal density by 50 percent should result in a predicted decrease in error probability of approximately 50 percent. Three possible conditions could preclude the utility of this approach. First, given no error rate associated with the Figure 1 arrangement, obviously no predicted improvement would be made. This condition is highly unlikely based on past human performance data under highly varied conditions: it is almost a theoretical axiom that human performance has a 7

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" built-in" error rate. Second, given that a predicted decrease in error rate probability was so small no significance could be assumed, the expense of moving equipment would be- (

unjustified. ~And third, given an extremely high error rate associated with the arrange- [

ment, any decrease in error probabilities would still result in unacceptably high levels of  ;

i predicted errors.  ;

c. Based on the preceding synthesis, visual angles for various operator positions [

were calculated for equipment numbers 1 through 15 for the EBASCO arrangement shown  ;

in Figure 1. These visual angles were then assumed to represent a correlate with the l approximate signal densities and their associated error rate probabilities for these various i I pieces of equipment. The following three positions were used for these calculations:

1) Position 1 - at the junction of panel sections IAI and 1A2 which placed i the operator approximately center of the primary loop and emergency safeguard systems. j l

2) Position 2 - in front of panel section ICI which contains the reactor  ;

l system instruments.

3) Position 3 - at the junction of panel sections IBB and IDI which placed the operator approximately center of the two emergency diesel generators with the turbine-generator, the secondary system instrumentation to . the left, and heating, ventihtion, and air conditioning instrume.its to the right. f Equipment was then rearranged on sketches to a configuration approximating i I d. i that shown in Figure 2. This was done with the following criteria in mind:  ;

1) Attempt to bring equipment numbers 1 through 5 (RCP Vibration Monitor, f l Gross Failed Fuel Detection, Loose Parts Monitor, Seismic Monitor, and Axial Power i

1 Distribution and Monitor) all closer to the three operator positions with positions  ;

- - prioritized-asrpositions.1 and 2 most important and position 3 least important;,(refer _i_o .j para' graph c, above, for control board instruments relative to these positions). f

2) Attempt to bring equipment numbers 12 through 15 (Radiation Monitoring i 4

. equipment) closer to all three positions, no position of higher priority. ,

i

3) Attempt to bring equipment numbers 8 through 11 (Start-Up Transformer t I

Relays and Generator Relays) closer to operator position 3, which is near all generator instrumentation.

e. After the equipment was rearranged, new visual angles were calculated for the

- same three operator positions. These new angles were then compared to the old ones for f the same cabinets, and an estimate of the percentage of reduction in signal densities (with associated error rate probabilities) was calculated. These estimated percentages appear 3 in Table 3. As can be seen, the movement of the start-up transformer and generator relay

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o TABLE 3 ESTIMATED IDECREASES IN SIGNAL DENSITIES FOR EQUIPMENT NUMBERS 1 THROUGH 5,3 THROUGH 11, AND 12 THROUGH 15 FROM ARRANGEMENTS SHOWN IN FIGURE 1 TO THOSE SHOWN IN FIGURE 2 Estimated lDecrease in Signal Densities Equipment and Associated Error Rate Probabilities (%)

Number CB POS 1 CB POS 2 CB POS 3 1 thru 5 50 % 37 % 25 %

8 thru 11 -22 % 2 3% 16 %

12 thru 13 45% 32 % 28%

A i 1. Estimates based on the different visual angles, i.e., the dif-

• ference in relative area seen by the observer, for different distances from the observer to the equipment (see text for discussion). Note also that the estimated decrease in error rate probabilities are percentages of an unknown rate.

2. This minus percentage indicates an increase in error rate probability.

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A cabineta resulteg in'a probable ~

increase in error rate relative to position 1; however, the

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relationship to that FOsition is rninima. l whereas the cabinets' relationship to position 3 is a

much more relevant. -

4

, ss Equipment numbers)6 and 7 (Cooling' Tower and River Water Make-Up Control ~

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s and Condensate Do. oste; Myosaulic Coupling Control) were deemed to havellittle if any monitoring required. Discussions with EBASCO and CP&L Operations and Engineering staff indicated the former contained few, if any, front panel components nd'the latter 5

contained none. ,

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- f. *Jsing the EbASCO-proposed arrangement and the Essex-proposed preliminary 9 r ,'

rearrangement, additional comparative analyses were performed which addressed the q issues of display and label readability, simple indicator and nonilluminated flag discrimi-

- i f nability, and 3hort-term memory eff-cts upon operator performance. ~

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3 2A Short-Term Memo y,EIfects cc Operatar Performance

a. When equipent is loca ed in such a way as to require considerable movement

'.  : - \.

between two or more pieces of equipment in order to evaluate a condition, short-term

memory can become a limiting factor for equipinent separations elf human performance is not to be degraded. Short-term memory refsrs to the transient an

1 limited capacity for f ( information storage in tbe human when learning does not take placq There are numerous.

>c <

'y everyday examples of this phenomenon. A typical one would be to look up a phone number

,I.n the directory, close the directory, have someone laterrupt with a question, and af ter

'. answering, attempt to dial the number. Frequently the number has been forgotten.

' Within the control roomWs phsnomenon can occur when an operator attempts to read t

l' various displayflocated around the' room and then attempts to integrate'all~ readings-in =

'o der to make a"Jension concerning plant status or condition. Human factors and  %

$ \

psychologicalinvittigations hav- determined a number of reasonably reliable and predict-l l

able characteristics concernin'g short-term memory, one of which is the fading or

- ' forgetting over time that occtfrs. ,s_ N \<

'. 4,

b. In-depth discussions concerningqis phenomenon of short-term memory and its interaction with long-term memor) stray be found in the. literature listed in the

\ ,t -

v

. bibliography. For purposes in thh rep.1 t,' 'an exam;.le taken from an investigation by B.B.

' t ..

\ t,s Murdock, Jr. illustrates this principle quite welf.N( His data show that within 3 seconds af ter being presented with a series of three consonant .o units (i.e., a series of three groups l , ,

pf consonants) or presdmed with a triac of worA, subjects were only able to recall 75

percent of the informahon presented. This percentage decreases rapidly to about 30

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percent at around 10 seconds and then slowly decreases to around 25 percent at 12 to 14 seconds. This is typical of much of the data on short-term memory retention rates.

Other studies have used different presentation strategies and information, but most all show a marked degradation in retention within seconds after presentation.

c. Movement time between cabinets, or from the control board to a cabinet and return can be considered a significant factor in efficient, speedy, and accurate operator performance. Distances in excess of 28 to 30 feet walked at a fairly rapid pace can take approximately 6 seconds. In that period of time, retention probabilities can drop below 50 percent.

d. Before attempting to compare the two proposed arrangements on the basis of short-term memory it was necessary to determine readability characteristics of labels and discriminability characteristics of simple indicator lights and nonilluminated flags. These characteristics could allow for the distance traveled by an operator to be considerably reduced given optimum labels, lights, and flags.

i l 2.4.1 Label Readability I The ability of an operator to read a label is dependent upon such factort as a.

character size, character-to-surround contrast, ambient lliumination levels, and exposure i

times. In the case of transilluminated displays and CRTs, ambient illumination levels 1

j interact with the display luminance. A low display luminance and/or a high ambient light level can reduce character-to-surround contrast. High ambient light levels can also f

j compound the problems of direct and specular glare on all displays and labels. Recom-i j mended viewing distances for various character heights under different viewing conditions

_ and-levels-of-label-(or display) importance can be calculated using various procedures _

l developed for that purpose. .

b. Table 4 lists viewing districes for five character heights under three viewing conditions and two levels of label importance. Experience has shown that few important labels or displays (other than possibly annunciators on the control board) will have character heights larger than 1/2 inch. In fact,1/8-inch-high characters and smaller tend I to predominate. Because of a lack of display and label information on the equipment cabinets under analysis, a conservative assumption was made that 1/8-inch-high labels would predominate and, therefore, operators must get within 21/2 feet of a cabinet in order to read displays and labels to any reasonable degree of accuracy. This adjustment was made in the movement distances discussed in paragraph 2.3.3 below.

12

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TABLE 4 RECOMMENDED VIEWING DISTANCES FOR FIVE LETTER HECHTS UNDER TdREE VIEWING CONDITIONSI AND TWO LABEL LEVELS OF IMPORTANCE2,3 Recommended Viewing Distances (Ft.)

, Let:er Optimum Nominal Adverse Hrt (In) Norm High Norm High Norm High 2 000 73 71 70 67 66 63 1.000 36 33 32 29 28 25 .

0.500 17 14 13 10 9 6 7

0.250 7 4 3 0.58 - -

. 0.125 2.5 - - - - -

i

/

1. Viewing conditions (columns OPTIMUM, NOMINAL, and ADVERSE) -

are defined as: '

, . OPTIMUM = illumination above litC, with favorable reading conditions  !

NOMINAL = illumination above litC, with unfavorable reading conditions or illumination below i f tC, with favorable reading conditions ADVERSE = illumination below litC, with unfavorable reading conditions.

-- --2n-1;abetimportance (columns NORM and HIGH) are defined as.

l,. - - - -- --

l

. HIGH = critical labels necessary for accurate identifi-cation, such as scales on a continuous rotary control or emergency labels NORM = all others.

, 3. From G.A. Peters and B.B. Adams (Product Engineering, 25 May

( 1959, pages 55-57), and E.3. McCormick (Human Factors in Engineering and Design,4th Edition,1976).

13 c

2.4.2 Indicator Light and Flag Discriminability  !

The ability to discriminate the on-off condition of a simple indicator light depends on numerous variables, some of which are size, luminance, exposure time, light color,  ;

other background lights, and flash rates (if applicable). Nonilluminated flags have similar variables associated with them such as flag-to-surround contrast, size, exposure time, and other irrelevant shapes in the immediate surround. By adjusting ambient illumination to a nominal level, using adequately detectable light diameters and luminance characteristics, flag sizes and contrasts of acceptable values, and long exposure times with no flash rates for lights, distances for reliable detection can be estimated. Based on good viewing conditions, lights with good luminance characteristics should subtend a visual angle of approximately 1.2 minutes of arc to be detected 95 percent of the time. This would be approxim'ately 1/8 inch in diameter for a viewing distance of 35 feet (note that luminance ,

levels for such a light must exceed 1 millilambert). Sizes for corresponding flags should be possibly doubled to ensure adequate detection at 35 feet. Table 5 lists viewing

distances where 95 percent detection of the on-off state for various diameter lights and condition states for flags of various square areas would seem reasonable. This table was developed assuming good to excellent luminance characteristics for lights and contrast ratios for flags. As can be seen, lights of 1/4-inch diameter and flags approximately i l 1/2-inch square have been estimated as detectable 95 percent of the time from a distance of 70 feet. Except for the Radiation Monitors, which are known to have a number of small (approximately 1/8-inch diameter) alarm lights of possible low luminance, detect-ability or change-of-state discriminability would not appear to be a major problem within the control room given the typical simple indicator lights and rotary switch flags currently in use.

2.4.3 Summary of Analyses for Short-Term Memory

a. In order to read a display on the vertical equipment panels and return to the control board, an operator must walk from the control board to the selected cabinet, read l the display, and return to a desired position at the control board. Regardless of the I starting position, the time required to return to a selected control board location can have f

, an effect on the retention of information in the operator's short-term memory. Time l! estimates were made for movement distances between various equipment cabinet locations (shown in Figure 1) and the control board. These times are shown in Table 6 and l represent movement time estimated between the three operator positions defined in  !

paragraph 2.3.c and equipment numbers 2 and 11, and 12 through 15. The times shown for r

14 -

TABLE 5 ESTIMATES OF VIEWING DISTANCES FOR LIGHTS AND SWITCH FLAGS FOR RELIABLE STATE DISCRIMINATION Light Flag Viewing Diameter (In) Area (In2)1 Distance (Ft) 1.000 4.000 233  !

0.500 1.000 119 0.250 0.250 72 0.125 0.0625 36 l  ;

h 1. Flags are assumed to be approximately square in i

[ shape, e.g., a 0.0625 sq in flag is 0.250 inches per q side.

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a 15

=

P TABLE 6 ESTIMATED MOVEMENT TIMES FROM THREE OPERATOR POSITIONSI TO VARIOUS EQUIPMENT CABINETS 2 IN THE CONTROL RCOM FOR THE EBASCO PROPOSED ROOM ARRANGEMENT Operator Equipment Estimated Position Number Travel Time (Sec) ,

1 2 8(3) 2 2 10 (3) 3 2 8(3) 1 11 4 2 11 6 3 11 7 1 12 thru 15 8(3) 2 12 thru 15 7 3 12 thru 15 5

1. Operator positions are defined in paragraph 2.3.c. . . -

= _ . _ - _ _ -

2. Equipment names are in Table 2, locations are shown in Figure 2.  ;

3. These times have I second added to com-pensate for a change in direction required to  :

avoid desks. ,

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16

the control board positions to equip nent r4 umbers 2 and 11 represent ranges such that estimated times for all other cabinets in that row would fa!! within those ranges. The times shown for the Radiation Memtors (equipment numbers 12 through 15) represent distances from the three control board positions to a position centered in front of this row of cabinets. All distances were adjusted for normal viewing distances as discussed in paragraph 2.3.2. Movement times in excess of 6 seconds (the time in which retention probabilities can drop below 50 percent) would probably be unacceptable for optimum operator performance, as decrements in information retention appear highly probable. Of the nine conditions shown, only three meet the criteria of 6 seconds or less.

b. Table 7 lists estimated movement times for the same three control board positions but to the rearranged cabinets shown in Figure 2. Decrements could still occur in information retention for 6-second retention intervals; however, these times appear to be a significant improvement. The one time in excess of 6 seconds also appears to have a low probability of occurrence as it would indicate that, somehow, relay equipment for the start-up transformers or generators was displaying information required by an operator at the control board area where the primary loop and emergency safeguard instrumentation are contained.

c. The only equipment where the discriminability of indicator lights (i.e., Is the light illuminated or not?) may be a problem in the EBASCO-proposed arrangement is the Radiation Monitors (equipment numbers 12 through 15) and then only for comrol board position 1. This distance is approximately 36 feet, the maximum for 1/8-inch diameter light detection given good light luminance. The Essex proposal, however, reduces this distance to approximately 23 feet, thereby increasing the probability of detection.

2.5 Desk and Storage Cabinet Locations

a. The operator's desk and operator's computer console with the log and alarm typers appear to be adequately located to support the operator's job requirements.

b. Based on a .CP&L requirement for the shift supervisor to scan the control board, the supervisor's desk location better meets this requirement for the arrangement shown in Figure 2 than for the arrangement shown in Figure 1.

c. In Figure 1 the location of the Air Pack and Respirator Storage cabinet (equipment number 22) appears to be where traffic could interfere with operator access to it. The location shown in Figure 2 eliminates this potential problem.

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TABLE 7 ESTIMATED MOVEMENT TIMES FROM THREE OPERATOR POSITIONSI TO VARIOUS EQUIPMENT CABINETS 2 IN THE CONTROL ROOM FOR THE ESSEX PROPOSED ROOM ARRANGEMENT Operator Equipment Estimated Position Number Travel Time (Sec) 1 I thru 5 3 2 1 thru 5 4 3 1 thru 5 6 1 8 thru 11 7(3) 2 8 thru 11 6 3 8 thru 11 5 1 12 thru 15 4(3) i 2 12 thru 15 6(3) 3 12 thru 15 4

1. Operator positions are defined in paragraph

.2.3.c. ~ -

2. Equipment names are in Table 2, locations are shown in Figure 4.

( 3. These times have I second added to compensate for a change in direction required to avoid desks.

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SECTION 3.0 RECOMMENDATluNS 3.1 Equipment Arrangements

a. Analyses indicate that possible error rates associated with across-the-room monitoring of the vertical cabinets as shown in Figure 1 could be lowered with the equipment arrangement shown in Figure 2. This is insed on assumptions concerning the front panel instruments on the cabinets that could not be adequately verified by available engineering and technical information; however, given an associated error rate of some significance for the Figure 1 arrangement, the Figure 2 arrangement is superior.

b. The analyses also indicate possible improvements in information retention rates for short-term memory (as a function of movement time) for the arrangement in Figure 2. Additionally, an improvement in the detection of alarm lights on the Radiation Monitors could be hypothesized from these analyses for the Figure 2 arrangement.

c. Essex recommends that the proposed arrangement shown in Figure 2 be adopted for the control room equipment in the SHNPP Unit 1. Latitude of placement from those locations shown for most equipment can be made to accommodate building structures such as steel beams and supports. Such accommodations should not exceed 6 inches forward or backward, or left or right for equipment numbers I through 5, 8 through 11,12 through 15, and 18 through 21. Equipment numbers 6 and 7 may be moved back (east) to the limit needed for rear door access. They may also be moved left (north) 8 to 10 feet with no impact. Equipment' number 22 should remain approximately where it is; however, aligning the long side against the east wall would be acceptable.

? - -- - - - . .. _ - . . - -

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i 19

BIBLIOGRAPHY Atkinson, R.C. & Shiffrin, Human memory: A proposed system and its control processes.

In K.W. Spence and 3.T. Spence (Eds.) The_ Psychology of Learning and Motivation, Vol. 2, New York: 1966, Academic Press, pp.90-197.

Atkinson, R.C. & Shiffrin, R.M., The control of short-term memory, Sci Am, Aug.1971, 225,82-90.

Benzer, S., Genetic dissection of behavior, Sci Am, Dec. 1973, 229, 24-37.

Bransford,3. & Franks,3., The abstraction of linguistic ideas, Cognative Psychol,1971,2, 331-350.

Butter, C.M., Neuropsychology: The Study of Brain and Behavior, Belmont, Calif.:

1968, Brooks / Cole, chap. 8.

Christman, R.J., Sensorv Experience, Scranton, Pa.: 1971, Intext Publishers.

Cooper, J.R., Bloom, F.E., & Roth, R.H., The Biochemical Basis of Neuropharmacology, New York: 1970, Oxford University Press, chap. 9.

Dallett, K.M., Practice effects in free and order recall,3 Exp Psychol, 1963, 66, 65-71.

Deese, 3. & Hulse, S.H., The Psychology of Learning, New York: 1967, McGraw-Hill, chap 11.

Epstein, W., Mechanisms of directed forgetting, In G.H. Bower (Ed.), The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, Vol. 6, New York: 1972, Academic Press, pp. 147-192.

Fergenson, P.E. & Teichner, W.H., Short-long-term memory interaction with underlearned long-term storage,3 gen Psychol,1971, M,51-61.

l Fronkin, V.A., Slips of the tongue, Sci Am, Dec 1973, 229, 110-117.

Geldard, F.A., The Human Senses, Ne York: 1972, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Montague, W.E., Elaborative " Strategies in verbal learning and memory. In G.H. Bower l

(Ed.) The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, Vol. 6, New York: 1972, Academic Press, 225-302.

Murdock, B.B., Jr., The retention of individual items,3 exp Psychol, 1961,62,619.

Norman, D.A., Memory and Attention: An Introduction to Human information Processing, New York: 1969, John Wiley & Sons.

Rundus, D., Analysis of rehearsal processes in free recall,3 exp Psychol, 1971, 8_9, 63-77.

I 20 I

v Sci, 1970a, 168, Shiffrin, R.M., Forgetting: Trace erosion or retrieval failure?

1601-1603.

Shiffrin, R.M., Memory search, in D.A. Norman (Ed.), Models ci Human Memory, New York,1970b, pp. 375-450. ,

l 1968,76, i

Slamecka, N.3., An examination of trace storage in free recall, 3 exp Psychol, 504-513.

Sperling, G., The information available in brief visual presentations, Psychol M 74, No. 493. >

1967, 7_3, 3 39-44.

Waugh, N.C., Presentation time in free recall,3 exp Psychol, 1965,72,89-104.

Waugh, N.C. & Norman, D.A., Primary memory, Psychol Rev, i

-= .- - = .

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l' ADDENDUM 1 .

APPROXIMATE EQUIPMENT SIZES 1

" ' et I

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APPROXIMATE EQUIPMENT SIZES Dimensions (In)

Equipment Type Hgt Width Depth Sourcel RCP Vib Mon Cab 90 24 30 Estimated Gross Failed Fuel Det Console 90 24 30 Estimated Loose Parts Mon Cab 91 5/16 22 1/16 30 1/2 EBASCO 1364-21756RO Seismic Mon Cabinet 90 23 1/8 30 Vendor Drawing APDM Panel 90 24 30 Estimated Cig Twr and River MU Cont Cab 90 44 30 EBASCO CAR 1364 ATT"B" Cond Boost Hyd Cpig Cont Cab 90 24 30 Estimated Gen Relay Pnl I A 96 42 30 EBASCO 1364-21823RO Gen Relay Pnl IB 96 42 30 EBASCO 1364-21824RO SU Xfmr Relay Pn' 1A 96 36 30 EBASCO 1364-21854RI SU Xfmr Relay Pnl IB 96 36 30 EBASCO 1364-21855RI Rad Mon Pnl SA (2 ea) 81 5/16 24 30 EBASCO 1364-35048RI Rad Mon Pnl SB (2 ea) 81 5/16 24 30 EBASCO 1364-35049RI -

Rad Mon Console 52 22 22 Vendor Drawing j Rad Mon Printer 34 28 24 Vendor Drawing incore Instr Cabs 90 22 30 Estimated NIS Cabinets 90 22 30 Estimated SRO Desk 27 48 30 Estimated RO's Comp Console 27 86 3/4 44 EBASCO 1364-4630RO

~: --- Comp Prliirer (Console Top)c 12 28 1/2 22 5/16 EBASCO-1354-4630RO 2. -

Log and Alarm Console 27 62 3/4 44 TELECON FROM EBASCO 7-29-80 Log and Alarm Typer (Console 15 19 15 HARRIS SIMULATOR Top)

Shift Supervisor's Desk 27 84 44 Estimated l

Air Pack & Resp Storage 90 80 36 Estimated l

Note 1: Estimated dimensions except for heights were developed from measurements made on EBASCO drawing CAR-2166 G-324 open Rev 3 as of 25 July 1980.

Heights for cabinets were estimted at 90 inches, desk heights were estimated at 27 inches.

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i i, DWGS RCV'D FROM EBASCO ON 25 3ULY 80 Title and/or Identification DWG No.

Westinghouse 8846D49 -

Operator's Console Assembly s (Cabinet Outline Only) EBASCO 1364-4630RO 3/8/78  !

Generator Protective Relay Frank Elec. Corp. E7-3964 EBASCO 1364-21823RO 7/11/79 Panel I A - Construction Generator Protective Relay Frank Elec. Corp. E7-3964-ll"D" EBASCO 1364-21824R3 2/11/80 Panel IB - Construction P Frank Elec. Corp. E7-3964-2"A" Start-Up Transformer Protective Relay Panel 1 A EBASCO 1364-21854R18/27/79 Construction Frank Elec. Corp. E7-3964-3"A" Start-Up Transformer Protective Relay Panel IB EBASCO 1364-21855R18/27/79 Construction Outline - Unit I A & 4A General Atomic Co. 0352-0500"1" Control Room Panel EBASCO 1364-35048R14/16/80 Outline - Unit IB & 4B General Atomic Com 0352-0505"1" Control Room Panel EBASCO 1364-35049R14/16/80 Westinghouse 1542E53 Digital Metal Impact Monitoring System Cabinet EBASCO 1364-21756RO 7/11/79 Outline Cooling Tower and River Makeup CAR 1364 SH-IN-15-1 Rev.1

-- ~ 10/11/79, Att. "B," Sheet 1 of 3___ _ _ _ _ _

~

Control Panel U5it No.~1)

System Interconnect and Kinemetrics Inc. 104189 - 9/7/79 Cabinet Outline (outline for the Seismic Mon).

(

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Y

r INFORMATION RCV'D FROM EBASCO 25 3ULY 80 Ref Dwg Car-2166 G-324 Rev 3 (open)

1. Radiation Monitors SA, SB, NNS have a combined length of 12'-2".

2. Monitors will be located 3'-6" to the left of dividing wall (between units 1 and 2, ref.

beam line 43) and centered on beam line C.

0

3. Computer Operator's Console will be rotated 180 .

INFORMATION RCV'D FROM EBASCO 29 3ULY 80 (TELCON)

I

1. Equipment dimensinns for the Gen Relay Panels I A & IB, Start Up X four Relay Panel IB, and Clg Tw & Riv MV Cont Cabinet are correct on vendor dwgs, incorrect on control room layout dwg (CAR-2166 G-324).

2. Computer Oper. Console is actually 2 pieces Operator's Console assy (West We do 8846D49, EBASCO 4630) and Printer Console (West 8846D65, EBASCO 4580).

not have the Printer console drawings.

I 3. Dimensions of the Computer Oper's Console are as shown on Vendor dwg and the Printer Console dimensions are 44" deep by 62.69" wide. The combined width (or l

i length) of the two are approximately as shown on CAR-2166 G-324).

i The RAD MON unit identified as NNS on CAR-2166 G-324 consists of just the

4. Outline RM-Il Display Console shown on General Atomics dwg 0352-0600.

200-43-22 Equipment with dimensional corrections as shown for Stantron Cat. No.

(Section 5, Page 3 of the Vertical Cabinet "200" Series).

--- 5. _ N& components are .mtd on face of Cond Boost Hyd. Cont. Cab. = --.; _ _

DWGS NOT SUPPLIED i

1. Gross Failed Fuel Detection Cabinet.

2. RCP Vibration Monitor Panel.

3. Seismic Monitor Panel.

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O O

J ADDENDUM 2 OVERVIEW OF THE INITIAL ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS i

s-- - - . . . _ . - _ - . _ . _ .

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OVERVIEW OF THE INITIAL ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Documented in draft report submitted 18 July 1980)

The original EBASCO centrol rcom equipment arrangement in Figure A shows the Radiation Monitor cabinets blocking the operator's view of the row of vertical cabinets located near the east wall. This problem can be solved by moving the Radiation Monitor Cabinets. However, an additional problem then surfaces.

Due to the distances from the operator's desk and control board sections 1 A2,1C, IB1,1B2, IBB, and HVAC to these vertical cabinets, a large expanse of cabinet fronts, all on the same approximate visual plane, would be presented to the viewer's central visual field (the foveal area of the retina). Herein is the second problem. In attempting to look at any particular spot in this expanse of front panels, virtually all other predominant features on the panels would significantly compete for the observer's attention as these features are all in visual focus and in the central field of vision.

The Essex-proposed rearrangement shown in Figure B attempts to partially solve both problems. While part of the Radiation Monitor equipment is moved a little farther from the operator's desk and the control panel, it no longer significantly blocks the view to the vertical cabinets from the control board. Additionally, the long string of cabinets has been separated into two groups, reducing by half the amount of cabinet front panel area presented to the viewer when looking in either direction.

Other features of this proposed rearrangement would be: 1) to place the Generator and Start-Up Transformer Relay cabinets in a more accessible location to their related areas of the control board (sections IB2 and IBB which contain the main and emergency generators and the bus distribution controls and displays); and 2) to place the shif t

[ foreman's desk closer to the control board. This second feature better supports the CP&L operating philosophy of maintaining good visual access to the control board (for the shif t supervisor) than does the EBASCO arrangement.

i k

n

O TABLE A EQUIPMENT NUMBER IDENTIFICATION USED IN INITIAL ANALYSES (See Figures A and B)

Equipment No. Back Panet Nomenclature 1 Condensate Booster Hydraulic Coupling Control Cabinet 1

i 2 Gross Failed Fuel Detection Console 3 Loose Parts Monitor Cabinet 4 RCP Vibration Monitor Cabinet 5 Seismic Monitor Cabinet 6 Cooling Tower and River Make-Up Control Cabinet 7 Generator Relay Panel IB 8 Generator Relay Panel I A 9 Startup Transformer Relay Panel IB 10 Startup Transformer Relay Panel I A 11 Radiation Monitor Panel SA 12 Radiation Monitor Panel NNS 13 Radiation Monitor Panel SB 14 Radiation Monitor Console 15 CRO Desk r

16 Log and Alarm Typewriters and Computer Console

~

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{

18 Incore Instrumentation 19 Nuclear Instrumentation System l

20 Air Pack and Respirator St ; rage k

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- FIGURE B 1

1 ESSEX-PROPOSED CONTROL ROOM EQUIPMENT REARRANGEMENT.

SEE ThBLE A FOR EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION.

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_L

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

)

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY )

AND NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN ) Docket hos. 50-400 OL MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY ) 50-401 OL  ;

)

(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, )

Units 1 & 2) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition of Eddleman Contention 132C(II)", " Applicants Statement of Material Fact As To Which There Is No Genuine Issue" and " Affidavit of Robert W. Prunty, Jr." were served this 9th day of May,1984 by hand delivery to Wells Eddleman; by hand delivery on the 10th day of May,1984 to the NRC Staff; by deposit in the United States mail, on the 9th day of May, 19843 first class, postage prepaid, to other parties on the attached Service List.

Hill Carrow Attorney Carolina Power & Light Company Post Office Box 1551 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 (919) 836-6839 Dated: May 9,1984  !

i

SERVICE LIST James L. Kelley, Esquire M. Travis Payne, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Edelstein and Payne U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Post Office Box 12643 We.shington, D. C. 20555 Raleigh, North Carolina 27605 Mr. Glenn O. Bright Dr. Richard D. Wilson Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 729 Hunter Street .

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Apex, North Carolina 27502 Washington, D. C. 20555 Mr. Wells Eddleman Dr. James H. Carpenter 718-A Iredell Street Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Durham, North Carolina 27705 i U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Thomas A. Baxter, Esquire John H. O'Neill, Jr., Escuire Charles A. Barth, Esquire Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge  !

Myron Karman, Esquire 1800 M Street, NW Office of Executive Legal Director Washington, D.C. 20036 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Bradley W. Jones, Esquire

• U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Docketing and Service Section Region II Office of the Secretary 101 Marietta Street U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Washington, D. C. 20555 ,

Robert P. Gruber Mr. Daniel F. Read, President Executive Director Chapel Hill Anti-Nuclear Public Staff Group Effort North Carolina Utilities Commission '

5707 Waycross Street Post Office Box 991 i Raleigh, North Carolina 27606 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Dr. Linda Little Governor's Waste Management Board 513 Albemarle Building 325 Salisbury Street Releigh, North Carolina 27611 Mr. Steven Crockett, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing

,. Board Panel U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l Washington, D. C. 20555  ;

John D. Runkle, Esquire Conservation Councilof North Carolina i 307 Granville Road i Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514 .

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