ML20107D523

Detailed Control Room Design Review Summary Rept

ML20107D523
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	02/04/1985
From:	NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:
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ML20107D521	List: ML20107D523
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 TAC-56114, NUDOCS 8502250005
Download: ML20107D523 (83)

Text

.

Cooper Nuclear Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

SUMMARY

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GENERAL OFFICE W Nebraska Public Power District S

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February 4, 1985 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Operating Reactors Branch No. 2 Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Mr. Domenic B. Vassallo, Chief

Subject:

NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 - Detailed Control Roco Design Review (DCRDR) Summary Report In accordance with the requirements of NUREG-0737, Supple tent 1, Nebrashu Public Power District herein submits the Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) Summary Report for Cooper Nuclear Station. This DCRDR Summary Report does not address the recommendations of the NRC's DCRDR I.n-Progress Aucit Team, since NPPD is not yet in receipt of the ::itaff's written report for that audit. District response pertinent to the above will be generated under a separate cover as a supplement to the subject DCRDR Summary Report. .

It should be noted that the scheduled dates for implementation provided herein are considered estimated dates in accordance with our April 15, 1983, response to NUREG-0737 Supplement 1. As defined in Attachment 8 to that document, our NRC Project Manager will be kept informed of all substantive changes in the implementation schedule. Changes in the implementation schedule are anticipated as the integration effort proceeds for all Supplement 1 projects; specifically, Regulatory Guide 1.97. Changes are also anticipated when integrating Equipment Qualification, the ATWS , rule, and Generic Letter 84-23 (Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWR's).

Enclosed are eight copies for the staff's use. Should you have any questions or require additional information, please contact me.

Sincerely, M

Jay M. Pilant Technical Staff Manager Nuclear Power Group JMP/Irb:emz4/2 Enclosures

I

SUMMARY

This document summarizes the Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) for the Nebraska Public Power District's Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS). The report documents the results of the review in three major sections: Methodology, General Findings, and Schedule For Implementation Of Corrective Adions. The Methodology section includes the Review Process, Control Room Survey, Function and Task Analysis, Operating Experience Review, and Assessment. 1 i

l During the DCRDR assessment, Human Engineering Dis'crepancies (HEDs) were identified. HEDs with relatively simple corrections were i designated for enhancement. HEDs assigned for correction by modifi-cation were prioritized according to their importance to plant safety, and corrective actions were formulated based on their safety

' significance.

The following presents a synopsis of HED sources and their distribution, Number Number Safety Importance Priority HED of of (For Modifications Only)

Source Enhance- Modifi- I(High) II(Medium) III(Low or None) .

ments cations Control Room 101 75 2 44 29 Survey Task-Analysis 33 44 8 27 9 E

Operating Exp. 3 13 0 7 6 E Review Total 137 132 10 78 44 i

E

A schedule for the HED corrective actions was developed on the basis of the HED classification, safety importance and implementation leadtime. For the enhancements HEDs, corrections will be started during the present plant autage and are scheduled for completion by the next refueling outage. The HED modifications are assigned for implementation by the end of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th refueling.

The control room enhancements and modifications will be validated and i integrated with other ongoing CNS NUREG-0737 related programs. '

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page

1. INTRODUCTION I 1.1 General Comments 1 1.2 CNS Plant Description And Control Room Layout 4 1.3 Integration With Other NdREG 0737 Related 6 Programs i

2. THE REVIEW TEAM 2.1 Review Team Structure 8 l 2.2 Team Review Process 8

3. DCRDR METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS

, 3.1 Control Room Survey (CRS) 12 3.1.1 CRS Checklists And Human Engineering 12 Observations (HEds) 3.1.2 Screening of HEOs 15 3.1.3 HED Results -

16 3.2 Function And Task Analysis l 3.2.1 Function and Task Analysis Based on 18 i CNS Emergence Operating Procedures 3.2.2 Information And Controls Needs/ 19 Characteristics 3.2.3 CR Inventory And Its Comparison With 25 lE Information and Controls Requirements 3.2.4 HED Results 25 3.3 Operating Experience Review

' 3.3.1 Scram Reports And LER Review 26 3.3.2 Operator Survey 26 3.3.3 HED Results 27

4. HED ASSESSMENT AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 4.1 Correction By Enhancement And Modification 28 4.2 Priorization Of Modifications According To Safety 28 Importance 4.3 Design Versus Other Modifications Categories 32 4.4 HED Verification 33 E

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT'D)

Section Pace E 5. SCHEDULE 5.1 Schedule For Implementation Of Enhancements And 34 Modifications 5.2 Planned DCRDR Validation Program And Remote 34 Shutdown Panel Review

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SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSIONS 36

7. REFERENCES 39 APPENDIX A, Data Sheet Samples I. BWROG Control Room Survey Checklists II. Human Engineering Discrepancy Record III. Task Analysis Data Sheet IV. Operator Interview Questionnaire -

APPENDIX B, RESULTS AND ASSESSMENT

SUMMARY

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LIST OF FIGURES i

iE Figure Title Page i

l 1 CNS Control Room Layout 5 1A Proposed CNS Control Room Layout 5a 2 CNS Control Room Design Review Process 11 3 Control Room Survey Screening Criteria 17 4 DCRDR Task Analysis, Information And Controls 21

, Needs/ Characteristics Identification 5 Prioritization of HEDs According To Safety 31 ,

Importance E

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I l LIST OF TABLES Table Ti tle Pace i

!E I Implementation Schedule - NUREG 0737 7 l5 Related Programs l

II Review Team Structure And 10 Responsibilities III Panel Survey Process 14 l IV Task Analysis Human Factor 22

Characteristics i

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1

GENERAL COMMENT

S This report describes the Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR)

'E for Nebraska Public Power District's (NPPD) Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS). The DCRDR was conducted from August 1983 through November 1984 I to fulfill the requirements of NUREG-0660 (Reference 1), NUREG-0737 (Reference 2), and the NRC Generic Letter 82-33 (Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737, Reference 3).

The review.was performed in accordance with: 1) The DCRDR program plan submitted by NPPD to the NRC in March 1984 (Reference 4), and 2) The NRC response to the program plan of May 1984 (Reference 5). This program represents a vigorous effort to comply with the NRC, BWROG, and INP0 guidelines of References 6-11.

The scope of the DCRDR consisted of:

o Updating the BWROG Control Room Survey (CRS) checklists and completing the checklist supplement panel by p .iel.

o Performance of Function and Task Analysis (F&TA) on CNS l symptom-based Emergency Operating Procedures (E0Ps) through the identification of information and controls needs/

I characteristics for each of the operator tasks per the E0Ps.

This included branching into normal operating procedures to l a point of plant stability or re-entry into the E0Ps.

o On-site inventory of the information and controls available in the control room to alert, inform, and enable the operator to control and mitigate a malfunction or an abnormal event through the use of the E0Ps.

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o Performance of a supplementary experience review of LERs and scram reports to update the 1981 original review.

o Incorporating operators' experience using questionnaires developed by the BWROG and follow-up interviews.

o Quantitative resolution and screening of '.4e Human Engineering Observation (HE0s) resulting from the CRS and operator experience review and identification of the Human I Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs) o Comparison of the suitability of the CR inventory against the Information and Controls needs/ characteristics developed in the F&TA, and identification of the F&TA HEDs.

o . Assessment of the HEDs into enhancements and modifications categories based on the degree of simplicity of the correction, and prioritization of the modifications according to their safety importance. The assessment process included a dedicated week of decision making by a multidisciplinary team (operations manager, senior reactor operator, operator supervisor, system engineer;, program manager and human factors specialist) to discuss, analyze, evaluate, and decide on both specific HEDs and the overall HED effect on the control room.

o Separation of the HEDs modifications into those for correction by the redesign of panels and relocation of controls, by placement on CNS Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) or on Plant Monitoring Information System (PMIS), or by procedures' modifications.

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o Development of an implementation schedule for the HEDs enhancements and modifications based on their category, safety importance, pre-implementation leadtime, and on their interface with other safety-related programs scheduled for correction at CNS.

This report describes the methodology and procedure used in each of I the review phases. It identifies the team review structure /responsi-bilities and provides documentation for each review method.

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1.2 PLANT DESCRIPTION AND CONTROL ROOM LAYOUT Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) is approximately 2 1/2 miles south of the Town of Brownville, Nebraska. The unit is designed to deliver a net electrical output of 778 MWe. General Electric (GE) Company furnished the nuclear steam supply system and Westinghouse Electrical Corporati.on furnished the turbine generator set. The plant has a I Boiling Water Reactor Type 4 (BWR/4), and a Mark I primary containment.

The CNS control room, typical of GE plants, includes the area panels (front and back panels) and the fire panel. The panels are well organized with free space available for future CRTs or SPDS. Figure 1 illustrates the panel layout in the control room.

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E FP ELECTRICAL IC DISTRISUTION FIRE PANEL K

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COMPUTER CONSOLE C SHIFT J lA FEE 0 WATER 8 SUPERVISOR CONCENSATE OFFICE S REACTOR g CONTROL

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t FIG. I C.N.S. CONTROL ROOM LAYOUT C . . _ _ , . _ _ . _ - _ _ . _ _ - - . . _ _ - _ _ . _ . __ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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1.3 INTEGRATION WITH OTHER NUREG-0737 RELATED PROGRAMS l NPPD has submitted its plan (Reference 14) for implementing NUREG-0737 relateu programs including:

Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) l -

Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR)

Regulatory Guide 1.97 Upgraded Emergency Operating Procedures (E0Ps)

Emergency Response Facilities (ERF)

An updated implementation schedule of these programs is given in Table I.

As part of the integration process, the DCRDR task analysis utilized the CNS latest revision of the E0Ps (Revision 3 of the procedures) to identify the needs/ characteristics of the information and controls necessary for E0Ps implementation. A follow-up program of integrating other NUREG-0737 related programs is scheduled in 1985 and 1986.

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TABLE I Implementation Schedule

• NUREG-0737 Related Programs PROGRAM MILESTONE DATE STATUS SPDS Submittal of Safety Analysis March 1984 Complete ,

l SPDS Operable (completion of Feb. 1986 Estimated i 1000-hour field test) '

Operators trained Feb. 1986 Estimated l i

Pre-Implementation Review by

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NRC (Verification & Valida-tion Review) o Start Nov. 1984 Complete o Completion NRC Action DCRDR Submittal of Program Plan March 1984 Complete Submittal of Summary Report Jan. 1985 Estimated Regulatory Guide Submittal of Assessment March 1984 Complete 1.97 Report Implement Requirements (Revised Report will be pro-vided January 1985)

Upgrade E0Ps Submittal of Generic Dec. 1983 Complete Technical Guidel'ines Submittal of Procedures June 1984 Complete E- Generation Package Implementation of E0Ps Sept. 1985 Estimated ERF TSC Fully Functional Agril 1986 Estimated tFFuTly TURR'iHEaT"~~'""" ~~Ap r WlV5B~~~Es tiist.ed ~

OSC Fully Functional -

Complete

• The controlling schedule has been previously submitted. This schedule is presented for information purpose only.

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2.0 THE REVIEW TEAM The Program Plan (Reference 4) identified the review team members and included their resumes. It briefly discussed their responsibilities and functions. A more detailed discussion of the review team structure and the team review process is provided below.

2.1 REVIEW TEAM STRUCTURE The review team is compos.ed of members from CNS and GE, and a human factor consultant. Table II identifies the individuals who partici-pated as well as their responsibilities in the DCRDR program.

The CNS members participated in planning and administrating the

. program, in CR survey and task analysis data collection, and in the HEDs assessment and evaluation of modifications. CNS is presently planning a follow-up program of correcting the HEDs and overall plant integration of NUREG 0737 related programs. .

2.2 TEAM REVIEW PROCESS Review team work was coordinated by the CNS Operations Manager. The review process fol'10wed the flow path identified in Figure 2 and consisted of:

f ---- Mata sources:"BWROG-Survey-CheckHstrFunct+on-a-Tesk------

Analysis And Operating Experience Review Quantitative Resolution And Data Screening .

HED Identification I -

Assessment: HED classification, Prioritization, Corrective Actions & Verifications, and' Schedule for Implementation, i

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i The conduct of the DCRDR for the survey and task analysis was performed by the core review team. After review and discussion by the -

l core group, the results were presented to the entire team in a face-to-face meeting to review the core group's findings and assess the HEDs. The team was able to form a consensus in all deliberations after thorough discussion and follow-up investigation as required.

The full team reviewed the possible solutions, considered other solutions, and assigned follow-up implementation actions for each of the HEDs. _

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TABLE II RESPONSIBILITIES TEM STRUCTURE - .

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e 22 m5-w 2@E 3 e_ 5e 8-m A. Core Review Team K. Wire (CNS) X X X X X X R. Gardner (CNS) X X X X X D. Shallenberger (CNS) X B. Liesemeyer (CNS) X M. Ward (CNS) . X D. Der Kamp (CNS) X M. Edgerton (CNS) X T. Ratzlaff (CNS) X l L. Cade (CNS) X M. Aburomia (GE) X X X X X X X M. Weinstein (GE/HPT) X X X X X X X X E

B. Supporting Personnel

- J .-Hanlon '~~--- ==(GE) - - ---

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-X-l B. Brungardt (CNS) X X X X X-l R. Boyle (CNS) X X X l

D. Bitter (GE) X X J. Weaver (CNS) X X X 1

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M .MMMM MM M DATA SOURCES l BWROG SURVEY FUNCTION 8 TASK

- OPERATING EXT CHECKLIST ANALYSIS

! REVIEW

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' OUANTITATIVE RESOLUTION HQMAN ENGR, AND' DATA SCREENING _ OBS g ,l,0NS t ,

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. _ HED IDENTIFICATION

. HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPENCIES "HEDs" DELETES 4

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O UNABLE TO VERIFY O DElNG CONSOERED UNDEU

OTHER PROGRAMS

-HED Classification' col}RECTION BY CORRECTION BY O OTHERS i

ENHANCEMENT MODIFICATION Enhancements / Modificallons )  !

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t C:legory / Priority CATEGORY CATEGORY SAFETY IMPORTANCE PRIORITY A 8 I

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. 1 1 t Corrective Actions 8 '

Verification ( FIX DESIGN OTHER NO ACTION l ,y 1 MOD, MOD. REQUIRED i,

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O PLACE ON SPDS/PMIS i O REVISE PROCEDURES I O OTHERS (e g. EVALUATE ALTERNATIVES )

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1 Schedule For MAY ( IST j 1mplementation l l ST ,2 ND ,3 RD,4 TH 85 ) REFUELING '

REFUELING 9 i REPORTING DE$1GN REVIEW AND IMPROVEMENT PLAN

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! FIG. 2 CNS DETAILED 3ONTROL ROOM 15fBbVreTMLFf5M@YLJMWrawa__

3.0 DCROR METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 3.1 CONTROL ROOM SURVEY (CRS) 3.1.1 CRS Checklists and Human Engineering Observations (HE0s)

Checklists developed by the BWROG were used to update and complete the 2

existing data of CNS 1981 CRS (Reference 12). The BWROG 1981 original checklists and the 1983 checklist supplement were designed to incorporate criteria included in NUREG-0700. The checklists provided a thorough and efficient method by which direct observations and B' measurement of control room features were undertaken. Examples of BWROG CRS checklists are given in Appendix A, item I.

The subject areas covered in the survey, and the number of checked items for each panel (or CR subject area) are listed below:

Area Surveyed---- -----r --

- -- -1 umber 0f Checked-Items-Panel Layout And Design 64/ Panel Instrumentation And Hardware 78/ Panel Annunciators 35/ Panel E Computers 41 Procedures 68 Control Room Environment 57 i

""--~ Maintenance- And Survettlunce ---- "- ~ ~"- "' ~ ~ 3 0 " " ' " -"~~"" ~ - ~ '

Training And Manning 10 E

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t The following panels in the CNS control room were evaluated using the d checklist methodology:

[ Panel ID Panel Control Function

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9-3 9-4 Reactor & Containment Cooling (ECCS)

PCIS, RWCU, Reactor Recirc., RCIC 9-5 Reactor Control & Feedwater Control

{ Front VBD-A Feed, Condensate, Service & Circulating Water Panels VBD-B Turbine / Generator & Condenser Control n

VBD-C Electrical Distribution FP Fire Panel

{ m I VBD-H PC Atmosphere - Vent & Drywell Inerting VBD-K Gas' Treatment'& Venting Sy' stem l VBD-R H&V Control.

E _____ Back_. 3Ba-N__._.___ Reactor Suilding_ Closed Cooling Water-System - - - -

Panels VBD-J&S Sup. Chamber Press. Relief & Plant Sump Control VBD-P &P Atmos. Containment Atmos. Control (ACAD) 1 2

.VBD-Q&G Indication & Recording Systems For RMV I

9-02 & 9-21 Steam Leak Detection System & Process RM I' Recorders.

9-10 & 9-11 Area & Process, Radiation Monitor I

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-Table .-III."1tisets-the-process ~usednin-surveying each-of'tWne+s >in-"---~~

tenns of updating the 1981, survey, performing the original survey or l completing the checklist supplement. Control room subject areas, other than the panels, were surveyed by the original survey checklist and supplement.

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I TABLE III PANEL SURVEY PROCESS E -

Updating Performing Completing Panel I.D. 1981 Original Checklist Checklist Survey Supplement E

Front Panels 9-3 X X 9-4 X X 9-5 X .X VBD-A X X VBD-B X X

- .VBD-C - - - -

-.. X -- -- - ----

X -- - -

FP X X E Back Panels VBD-H X X

V80-K X ,

X E VBD-R X X

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VBD-J&S X X VBD-P &P X X 1 2 VBD-Q&G X X 9-02 & 9-21 X X 9-10 & 9-11 X X 14 I

The CRS checklists utilize evaluation criteria developed by the BWROG (Reference 10). Each checklist item is evaluated by means of two numerical ratings (Refer to Figure 3): (1) a " degree of non-compliance or a compliance factor (CF)", indicating the degree to which the panel under consideration complies with the listed human factor criteria, and (2) a " potential for error factor (PFE)"

representing the relative likelihood that non-compliance with that checklist item could cause or contribute to operator error. The PFC is a predetermined value for each checklist item based on the work of BWROG, while the CF is a number assigned for each checklist item by the CROR team during the CR survey.

I The two rating factors, the degree of non-compliance and the potential for error, are measures of (but not equal to) the consequences of a deviation from human factors standards and the likelihood of error resulting from that deviation. These two factors are multiplied (Reference 10) to obtain a final Evaluation Product. These evaluation

- - ____,_ , pr.oducts Ace. Atilized..to _fcca a criterion foc_recommendingAchange_in-- a

. m the CR sur'veye'd area. Based on this criteria, any checklist item with an evaluation product greater than 1 (Refer to Figure 3) is identified I as a candidate for correction. These candidates for correction are identified here as Human Engineering Observations (HE0s).

E 3.1.2 Screening Of HEOs k_..,__ .m ,m.Rev.iew af _ the.llE0s.mindicatedethat athe.imadontty=of- the observatiew-- "+m x deviate slightly from the human factor standards, or cause a low to none potential for error on the part of the operator. A criterion for quantitative resolution of the significant HEOs that require correction was adopted by the review team based on the checklist value of the evaluation product (EP). HEOs were screened for EP of 12,9 and

8. Referring to Figure 3, these EPs cover High/High, Medium /High and High/ Medium values of the degree of noncompliance (CF)/ potential for E error (PFE). HE0s covered by this criterion are identified as Human E

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Engineering Descrepancies (HEDs). It is to be noted that the screening criterion was applied only to the survey and the operating experience review HE0s, but not to the task analysis HEOs. HE0s relating to the E0Ps instrumentation and controls were considered as of potential safety importance and were classified as HEDs.

3.1.3 HED Results The results of the control room survey are docurrented in HED indi-E vidual record forms and in summary forms, for the purpose of identifying the HED and to provide accountability and format for HED raanagement. Appendix A, item II, gives a sample of the HED record form for HED No. IS. These forms are used to assign a specific HED number, identify its source and product evaluation number, and further expand on the specific discrepancy.

I The HEDs summary forms for the CRS are given in Appendix B which

. _. . .. include, ..in addition.to .the..liEDs_identificatiort,. their assessment..-~; .;_.,

These tables (sheets 1 to 12) provide a. cross-reference among the various HEDs and their sources. A total of 176 HEDs were identified E from the survey, and are listed in the summary sheets. This number corresponds to 6% of the total checked items.

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l o BWROG CRDR CR ITERI A:

E EVALUATION PRODUCT (EP) = DEGREE OF NONCOMPLIANCE (CF)

,E X POTENTI AL FOR ERROR (PFE) iE

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DEGREE OF NONCOMPLIANCE (CF)

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E FIG. 3 CONTROL ROOM SURVEY SCREENING CRITERI A 1

3.2 FUNCTION AND TASK ANALYSIS (F&TA) l Tne task analysis methodology used in the DCRDR followed the guidelines of Reference 9 and was specifically designed to comply with the recommendations provided in the NRC review of the CNS DCRDR Program Plan (Reference 5).

E 3.2.1 F&TA Based On CNS Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs)

CNS E0Ps are based on the symptom-oriented procedures for BWRs, deve-loped by the BWROG and approved by the NRC. These procedures were made plant specific through the incorporation of CNS data on emergency systems, alternate systems, and their characteristics. They include the identification of plant safety functions and the major subfunctions that the operator must control. The E0P primary functions are:

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.--.m, E0P-1, Reactor _.PressureJesseLControl-m- ..

E0P-2, Primary Containment Control E0P-3, Secondary Containment Control E E0P-4, Radioactivity Release Control The DCRDR task analysis utilizes the E0P procedures in the identifi-cation of plant systems and their functions during emergencies. There are over 60 systems listed in CNS E0Ps, and tiheir functions in m.=<m ~ ,_controll.ing themreacton.. vessel, primary 2containmente secondaryu ~~ -

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containment and radioactivity release are noted in the procedures.

In performing the DCRDR task analysis, the entry conditions to emergencies and the operator tasks to control and mitigate the emergency conditions are taken to follow the E0Ps primary operator E actions and any associated contingency actions (Reference 13). Each of the procedure steps, entry conditions or operator actions were I listed in the 1st and 2nd columns of the task analysis data sheets used by the DCRDR team (see Appendix A, Item III). Other columns of the task analysis data sheets relate to the specification of the 18 E

E information.and controls needs/ characteristics, control room inventory, and suitability assessment of the inventory against the identified needs.

3.2.2 Information And Controls Needs/ Characteristics The NRC task analysis guidelines (Reference 5) defined an acceptable process for conducting the F&TA as:

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o Define the information necessary (e.g., parameter, value, status) for the operators to determine the need to E perform the task, the control capabilities'needed to perform the task and the information necessary to determine that the task has been performed successfully. (Note that no instrumentation has been identified yet; only operator needs derived from the task.)

=_:._===---u- o Analyze-the. operator. needs=(from-above)= tozdetennine-theepem _e characteristics of the information and control capability needed to perform the task. Information characteristics include parameter type, dynamic range, setpoints, resolution / accuracy, speed of response, units, and the need I for trending, alarming, etc. Control characteristics include type (discrete or continuous, rate, gain, response requirements, transfer function, locking functions, and

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--- informationefeedback:-associatedwith=controb use-) .~+=e =--

To meet the above objectives, a human factor engineering model was developed to simulate operators needs and instrument requirements and characteristics. This model is shown in Figure 4 with key steps identified as:

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E0P Phase Control Room Needs II o Alerting - Annunciators h3 o Information - Indicating Meters j

- Recorders B - Indicating Lights -

s o Initiating Actions - Switches'(Pumps, Valves and Relays) 3

- Perfanning Calculations I

- Communication Equipment

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o Controlling Actions - Controllers a 2 g

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For each of the CR hardware needs, specific engineering and human 3

, factors characteristics ar( required for 'the operator to correctly p E

identify and execute the E0P steps. The characteristics are dependent

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on the hardware instrument, associated operator action, and the human 5 factor interface with the instrument. Figure 4 gives the engineering $

characteristics of instruments considered in the DCRDR task analysis. @

Specific human factors characteristics for operator interface with the instrument were determined, and are indicated in Table IV.

g For each of the entry conditions and the E0Ps operator actions listed in the task analysis data sheets, the needs and characteristics of Q

d R information and controls were completed in advance of conducting the 4 g

CR task analysis walk-through. These values were entered in the 3rd

^

and 4th columns of the task analysis data sheets, as noted in Appendix $

A, Item III.

. [

a 20 1 l

4

~

, g g g t

EOP's DECISION MAKING > c MODEL' -

I EOP's E O P's

_ ENTER ALER TING INFORM ATION INITIATING -

CONTROL LING EXIT.,

PHASE PHASE

~

i ACTIONS ACTIONS l PHASE PHASE l

l l l

NEEDS FOR; IDENTIFYING iENTRY EXECUTING EO P's ACTIONS COND. TO EMERGENCIES  : i e ANNUNCIATORS e INDICATING METERS e SWITCH'ES eCONTROLLERS

• RECORDERS ePERFORMING e INDICATING LIGHTS CALCU LATIONS fHARACTERISTICS:  ;, l e COMMUNICATION

- SETPOINTS - UN ITS - MANUAL / AUTO MODES

- HFE CONSIDERATIONS

-RANGE i

- DISCRETE Vs. CONTINUOUS CONTROL

! 'RT,RA i

-NORMAL / ABNORMAL RANGE CHARACTERISTICS IDENTI FICATION - HFE CONSIDERATIONS:

f -N EED FOR TRENDING OC, MN, CL, DT, CN l

2

- ACCURACY

-HFE CONSIDEkATIONS

RV, C R , D i p FIG.L DCRDR TAS K ANALYSIS.,1.NFORMATION AND CONTROLS l NEEDS /CH AR ACTERISTICS I DENTIFICATIO N

TABLE IV - A DCRDR TASK ANALYSIS HUMAN FACTOR CHARACTERISTICS OF INFORMATION AND CONTROLS (OPERATOR ACTION PHASE)

Operation Action Code Description E

RV - Read Value - Procure readout of display CR - Check Read - Readout apprcximate value, direction of movement (increasing, decreasing), pointer position (above,below)

OC - Operate Control - Rotary switches, pushbuttons, potentiometers, controllers MN Maintain a parameter. Co-ordinated use of controls and

- - -.. display -.in . order to obtain adesired-. system = value~-c=-_ - 2 - - -

RT - Read text - Read legend lights, tiles, or printouts CL - Calculate - Perform mental or written arithmetic DT - Determine trend - Review history of parameter CN - Communication - Transfer of information between operators DI - Determine Indicator lamp status RA - Respond to alarm 22 g . , , - , +- - - - - - --- . , . , , , . . - - - , - .--.,--.w - - , - - . , -

w

TABLE IV - B DCRDR TASK ANALYSIS HUMAN FACTOR CHARACTERISTICS OF INFORMATION AND CONTROLS (INFORMATION AND CONTROL PHASES)

Operator Action Code Instrument - Checked Items RV - Digital Meter - Parameter presented, size readability, ID Meter - Parameter, Direction of Movement, Range Scale inter-vals (1,2,5,5x,10,10x), Readability, ID Chart Recorder - Number of Pens, Scale, Color of ink, Range, Size of Paper, Separation of Recordings.

CR - Meter - Parameter, Direction of Movement, Range, Limit Marks (Set Points), Readability, Scale intervals, ID Chart Recorder - Same as RV plus limit marks OC - Discrete - No. of positions, grasp, Feedback of position, accessability, vulnerability, ID, force (feel)

• Continuous (Potentiometers) direction of motion, position feedback, force (feel) grasp, accessability, vulnerability.

Controller - Mode indication MN - All the above plus grouping of units for co-ordinated action, response, tune

.. ...._. . _ .. RT -- -- Annunciator-tiles ;-Reada'bitity;-Information~ contTnt, co10r7-~~~ ~"

flicker, brightness, (General identifiability)

Legend Light - Readability, Information Content, Color,.ID_, _

Number of lights in cluster Printout - No of items on page, format readability CL - Can calculation be performed by system? If not, are work sheets available? Is work space available?

23

TABLE IV - B., Cont'd DCRDR TASK ANALYSIS HUMAN FACTOR CHARACTERISTICS OF INFORMATION AND CONTROLS (INFGRMATION AND CONTROL PHASES)

Operator

~

Action Code Instrument - Checked Items DT - Is a chart recorder or printout available? (A meter is a poor display for establishing a long term trend of more than 10 seconds) (see RV or CR for assessment)

CN - Communication between whom, how. Equipment availability, quality, response time (System load)

DI - Indicator size, brightness, color, ID., Number of indicators in cluster RA - Auditory - loudaess, tone (can it be heard over the ambient noise)

~

Visual - Brightness, flicker, color size (Auditory is superior to Visual for alarm) l

,_g4 . 4y mee am, *A^ *** - '*M *^* ** * ' '

24

3.2.3 CR Inventory And Its Comparison With Information and Controls Requirements 1

During the task analysis walk-through in the control room, the

{

operator read the task, then walked through the task aspects at the  !

control panel. The information and controls availability and specific characteristics were determined from the control room panels. The ,

following specific characteristics were identified: Equipment No.,

Panel No., Parameter, Range Setpoint and Controls' characteristics.

This data was documented in the 5th and 6th columns of the task analysis data sheets under the availability heading (Refer to Appendix A, Item III).

Verification of the suitability of the CR inventory against the Information and Controls needs/ characteristic was performed during the walk-through, and the decision was recorded in the task analysis data sheet. When the suitability criteria were not met, the reason was noted and the- human. engineering. discrepancymasedocumented.-in-4he=c=-- m -

" Notes" column of the task anlaysis data sheets.

E 3.2.4 HED Results The results of the task analysis HEDs are documented in HEDs indivi-dual record forms and in summary forms, similar to the control room survey. Appendix B, sheets 13 to 24 give the task analysis HEDs identif4 cation and their-a-ssessmente A- total-number-of-77 -HEDs were----

identified from t'he task analysis.

25

l s

3.3 OPERATING EXPERIENCE REVIEW 3.3.1 Scram Reports And LER Review CNS scram reports covering the period from Ap.il 21, 1981 through April 19,1984, and LERs covering the period from January 30, 1981 through April 30, 1984 were reviewed by the DCRDR team. Eighteen (18) scrams and seventy four (74) LERs were examined by the team members.

Based on this examination, three (3) scrams and ten (10) LERs were identified as attributed to possible human error. Upon review of B these events, it was concluded that control room-operator interface was not a contributing factor in any of the occurrences.-

3.3.2 Operator Survey An operator survey was conducted to obtain direct operator input in

.._. .._ __ identifying potential . control room deficiencies _The. survey _ utilized __ __ _ .

a prepared questionnaire devised by the BWROG (Reference 10). An example of the operator interview. questionnaire is shown in Appendix A, item IV. Twenty one (21) operators were asked to complete the questionnaires prior.to the arrival of the survey team. Follow-up

_ oral interviews were_ conducted with operators participating in groups, where the written responses were discussed and documented.

.The sampleof-operators . selected._for the.. survey.was dudged-to-.--r;.--

encompass a wide variety of operato'r opinion based on operator experience, physical size, ability and education. The human factor specialist trained in interviewing techniques participated in all the interviews.

26 I 1

E E

3.3.3 HED Results E

The results of the operator survey showed a wide variety of operator opinion, with many of the operators HE0s voiced during the control room survey. Sixteen (16) HEDs were identified to be independent of the CR survey and task analysis HEDs. These HEDs were added to the remaining HEDs, and were subjected to a DCRDR team assessment as noted in section 4 of this report. Appendix 8, sheets 25 and 26 give a summary of operator survey HEDs and their assessment.

O I

E

(

27 L

E 4.0 HED ASSESSMENT AND CORP.ECTIVE ACTIONS 4.1 CORRECTION BY ENHANCEMENT AND MODIFICATIONS The HED assessment phase followed CNS DCRDR process of Figure 2. All the HEDs were sorted into two groups:

E o Those that can be resolved by enhancements and are associated with HEDs of relatively simple correction.

E o Those that generally require movement of instruments or panel modifications, and extend beyond the enhancements-phase.

Some enhancements were judged to be relatively straightforward and do not require a long leadtime for correction (Category A), while others were considered time consuming and costly (Category B). Of all the

_ 269 HEDs identified in this study 137 HEDs were placed_.in the.. . . _ ,.

enhancement group with 73 HEDs of Category A and 64 HEDs of Category B. The remaining 132 HEDs were assigned for correction by modification.

4.2 PRIORITIZATION OF MODIFICATIONS ACCORDING TO SAFETY IMPORTANCE

! HEDs assigned for correction by modifications were subjected to a

._........._- ptioritization scheme._that. assessed their_imparlance..to.. safety lhis .

prioritization scheme enabled the team to formulate a corrective action program and assign an implementation schedule for each of the I

modifications HEDs. Referring to Figure 5, there are three (3) safety importance priorities, I

Importance Priority I The most serious deficiencies fall in this priority classification. A priority I deficiency may impair the operators performance under off-28 l

1 normal conditions. These deficiencies often involved the unavailabi-lity of display information that the operator needs to respond directly to an emergency situation or the failure to provide the controls he needs for timely response. Not all the deficiencies in this priority are in the hardware. Some of the priority I HEDs fell within the procedures, which do not provide the instrument setpoints for plant off-normal operation.

As noted in Appendix B of the HED summary results, the majority of the E priority I HEDs resulted from the DCRDR Task analysis where the control room inventory did not meet the information and controls needs/ characteristics. Of the 132 HEDs assigned for correction by modification, ten (10) HEDs were given a priority I rating. These priority I HEDs are:

o Setpoints and sensor identity not provided in emergency and abnormal procedures.

o Emergency. Procedures i.n place at time of_the_suryey__did not ___m _ .-

provide detailed contingency actions if expected results '

were not achieved under degraded conditions.

E o SLC test tank level indication not available.

o RPV wide range water level trend recording not available.

E o Wide-range torus pressure indication not available.

o Alternate system for baron injection not finalized.

o Manual switches for actuating relays for reopening MSIVs not available. _. -- -

l o NPSH for pumps taking suction from suppression pool at various water levels not available.

o Indications and alarms for secondary containment area levels not available.

I o Ranges for area temperature indications for core spray, RHRs, and HPCI do not extend to emergency limits.

! 29

l l

E Importance Priority II

\

l This class of HEDs is made up of deficiencies that violate one or more of the human factors guidelines used in the~ review, but are unlikely to lead to an irreversible operator error in an off-normal situation.

These deficiencies include items that could lead to operator error under normal conditions. They also include generic deficiencies that individually are not likely to degrade operator performance, but taken together, can be significant. Of the 132 HEDs assigned for correction by modification, 78 HEDs were class II Priority.

Importance Priority III HEDs assigned for correction by modification which are unlikely to affect operator performance irreversibly urider any conditions, were placed in Class III Priority. There are 44 HEDs in this class.

-Classification of-the -importance of the-tiEDs" involved'signtficant"----- -

human factors and engineering judgement of the criteria noted in Figure 5. The classification of deficiencies as to the safety importance, therefore, involved the review team as a whole, with the final classification of each deficiency representing the consensus of the team.

l l

l iE t

30 l

t . - - - - __ __ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _

E E IDENTIFIED g HED E -

NO UNAVAILABILITY OF A SAFETY RELATED E-

,, COMPONENT TEAM REVIEW

.USE DURING NORMAL OR ABNORMAL OPER YES

. POTENTIAL FOR OPERATOR ERROR -

. INDIVIDUAL AND IN. COMBINATION WITH OTHER HEDs CONSEQUENCES I

l IMPACT ON PLANT SAFE OPERATION

~

E . -

E

=

g SAFETY IMPORTANCE PRIORITY

~

l I I E m y 1-I FIG.5 PRIORITIZATION OF HEDs ACCORDING E

TO SAFETY IMPORTANCE

l 4.3 DESIGN VERSUS OTHER MODIFICATIONS CATEGORIES HEDs assigned for correction by modifications were further classified into two (2) categories with implementation actions associated with the corrections, Type of Modification. Implementation Action Design Mod. o Fix, Correct the HED into full compliance E with the guidelines, o Perform feasibility study before pro-ceeding with Design Mod.

Other Mod. o Place on SPDS or on Plant Monitoring Information System (PMIS).

_ _o Provide alternative .for improving the HED. _

o Evaluate / Integrate with other On-going E programs.

o Revise procedures.

o Consider use of a plant unique simulator to ensure an operator, at times of stress, can '

operate the CNS plant.

o None, HED will not be corrected because of its safety insignificance and modification is not warranted.

HEDs with a "None" implementation action belonged to class III I priority. The type of modification and the implementation action for each of the HEDs are listed in the HEDs summary sheets of Appendix B.

(

32 t .

E  :

l 4.4 HED VERIFICATION As part of the DCRDR assessment process HED verification was conducted to ensure that the original discrepancy was addressed. The verifi-cation process addressed the source of the HED, and its resolution for

. correcting the discrepancy in terms of human factors as well as engineering design. The assessment methodology addressed like discre-pancies as a group (Refer to Sheets 1-12 of Appendix B) and cross referenced the HEDs to individual panels, so that class solutions will I be designed. This made the verification relatively simple and effective.

Following the development of detailed design improvements for the enhancement and modifications, additional verification will be conducted. This will ensure that the resolution adequately solves the problem, and will not cause another problem either singly or in combination with another resolution.

4 E

E

~

E 33 E

l 1

l

.l 5.0 SCHEDULE I

5.1 SCHEDULE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ENHANCEMENTS AND MODIFICATIONS l An implementation schedule for the enhancements and modifications was developed by the DCRDR team. The implementation schedule considered the following criteria:

o HED classification: Enhancements or Modifications o Safety Importance Priority of the Modifications

~

o Implementation Leadtime, as estimated by the team members Based on these criteria, an implementation schedule was assigned for each of the corrections. Appendix B gives the implementation schedule for all the enhancements and modifications, which begin in May 85, and continue in the 1st,-2nd, 3rd a'nd 4th refueling following the May 85*

date. The 4th refueling scheduled date was assigned only to the installation of a plant.speci.fic simulator. training facility.(H.ED N0.

E lI' sheet No. 25 of Appendix B).

5.2 PLANNED DCRDR VALIDATION PROGRAM AND REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL

~

REVIEW **

A validation of control room function is planned in 1985 following the implementation of enhancements and the development of detailed designs for the modifications. The validation program will determine whether the operating crew can effectively accomplish their tasks using the improved control room panels. Validation will emphasize the ability of the crew to ascertain and evaluate plant status, and-to diagnose plant transients using the emergency operating procedures. The results of this validation program will be reported as an addendum to this report.

May 85 'is contingent upon the present CNS refueling outage date.

• • Specific implementation is subject to approval by the District's Board of Directors.

34 E

\

The CNS program plan indicated that the remote shutdown panel will be reviewed as a part of the DCROR. Because the remote shutdown panel was not yet built at the time of the survey, the panel was not reviewed. Due to the project awareness of the human factors considerations in panel design, CNS will perform a task analysis or human factors survey of the remote shutdown panel design. The results of the review will be documented.

b a . .. ."

t E

E E

35 l

l 6.0

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSIONS This report summarizes the methodology and results of CNS Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR). The DCRDR was conducted in accordance with the CNS program plan, submitted to the NRC in March 1984 and reviewed by the NRC in May 1984.

The DCRDR methodology consists of:

I -

Identification of Control Room Human Engineering Discre-pancies (HEDs): through the performance of control room E survey, function and task analysis, and operating experience review.

, Assessment of The HEDs and Development of Corrective Actions: through the classification of HEDs into enhancements and modifications, prioritization of the modifications in:accordance with-theirasafety-importance,u==== - - -

sorting of,the modifications into corrections by design, placement on the SPDS/PMIS, or by modifying the procedures.

Development of an Imolementation schedule for Correcting the HEDs: based on the classification of the corrections into enhancements or modifications, prioritization rating of the modifications, and implementation leadtime.

A summary of the enhancements and modification groups and their implementation schedule is given below, E

E l 36 l~ .. __ . . .. .. .___ .

E E -

SUMMARY

CNS CONTROL ROOM HED ENHANCEMENT / MODIFICATION AND SCHEDULE FOR IMPLEMENTATION I

ENHANCEMENT / MODIFICATION IMPLEMENTATION DATE G

= o Development of CR enhancement guidelines (color coding, ccatrol g switches size and shape...etc.)

ko E

Relabeling of panels, controllers and displa'y systems.

I go en Change of recording paper scale and process units identification. (Present Outage) v o Marking of E0P entry conditions and action levels on meters and recorders, o Review of E0P procedures w.r.t. ATWS systems, primary containment hydrogen control, hnd SC area level alarms and indications.

g n Feasibility study of modifying back panels including relocation 9

of lower controls and indicators.

l fM S o Replacement of recorders and meter indications.

Oo Setting-up demarcation lines for control systems groupings, dm and mimicing of existing arrangements. 1st Refueling o Implementation of CR enhancement guidelines w.r.t. color coding and control switches. ,

I o Installation of Wide Range Torus Pressure Indication 37

-_____-- s

g E E E'

SUMMARY

CNS CONTROL ROOM HED ENHANCEMENT / MODIFICATION AND' SCHEDULE F0it IMPLEMENTATION (Cont'd)

ENHANCEMENT / MODIFICATION IMPLEMENTATION DATE o Installation of a rail to guard against inadvertent operation of controls.

T

= o Modification of alarm systems for second alarm reflashing g and functional segregation of alarm tiles!

E

n o Updating, indexing and standardizing of p(ocedures. 2nd Refueling 9

do Installation of redundant communication system

$o Place:aent of E0Ps critical parameters on SPDS/PMIS.

o Installation of digital indications for reactor level and reactor pressure and accident water level indication.

l

% i

-, o Implementation of back panel design modifications.

8:;; o '

Installation of secondary containment sump level indications.

E go Placement of radioactivity release rate calculations on PMIS 3rd Refueling o

go Design improvement of DW oxygen concen,tration indications and installation of SC.HVAC fan flow meter.

l c .

g

. o Installation of a plant specific simulatof 4th Refueling 2=

b h '

s 3 -

38

7.0 REFERENCES

1. NUREG-0660, "NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the TMI-2 E Accident," May 1980, Revision 1, August 1980.

2. NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements,"

November 1980.

3. NRC Generic Letter 82-33, Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737,

" Requirements For Emergency Response Capability", December 1982.

4. '" Program Plan For Detailed Control Room Design Review," Nebraska Public Power District Submittal to the NRC, March 1984.

5. "NRC Staff Comments On The Copper Nuclear Station Detailed Control Room Design Review Program Plan," May 1984.

6. NRC Generic Letter 83-18, "NRC Staff Review of the BWR Owner's Group (BWR0G) Control Room Survey Program," July 1983.

7. NUREG-0700, " Guidelines For Control Room Design Reviews",

September 1981.

8. NUREG-0801 Evaluation Criteria For Detailed Control Room Design Review", October 1981. .

" ~

9. " Task -Analysis Requirements--Ofiupplement-1~ ~to NUREG-0737", MaV=4 Meeting of NRC.With BWR Owners Group. Also " Review of Control Room Design Review Task Analysis Guidelines," Memorandum From A '

Ramey-Smith To V.A. Moore, NRC, April 11, 1984.

10. "8WR Owners' Group Control Room Design Review Program Summary Report, General Electric Report NEDC-30285, October 1983.

11. " Control Room Design Review Implementation Guidelines," NUTAC, INP0 Report No.83-026, July 1983.

12. " Human Factors Design Review Of Cooper Control Room", Sumary Report, BWROG-Control Room Improvement Committee, May 1981/~ -

13. "Emergen:y Operating Procedures", CNS, July 1984.

14. " Response to NUREG 0737 Supplement I Emergency Response Capability, Cooper Nuclear Station," NRC Docket No. 50-298, DPR-46, April 15, 1983 39

i l APPENDIX A DATA SHEETS SAMPLES I. BWROG CONTROL ROOM SURVEY CHECKLISTS a

)

! II. HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY RECORD i

! l III. TASK ANALYSIS DATA SHEET I

IV. OPERATOR INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE i

i e

t' A-1

f. BWROG CONTROL ".00M CHECKLISTS Sheet 1 of 3 Panel A PANEL LAYOITT and DESIGN Al For contro,1 panels:

41.1 does the design generally meet measurement- 4 3 2 1 0 x 2 =

standards per the attached anthropometric

'/ diagrams (complete and attach) m e..... . . .t ,e...J

.7..,+

1 ..J g. ,,p c . . l. . l . .J s .1. <, . I. ,

s** y.y s9 A. . n a. S,-e 6 ..se E,, . TL.. ...l..t.., .rp ' , . s. . ... 11 p. . ,f J........ . . .. sf . . c . f . . ,,) p I. ., - . ., f 5** al e A i. s, s a.2, s s. v.,

i s g, s , a 4,3, g i. :

f A1.2 are they of the same layout and design on 4 3 2 1 0 x 2 =

multi-unit plants (not mirror image) 4e scade w a.I Ant f /aaf A1 3 when panel c x:ponents are pemanently 4 3 2 1 0 x 2 =

removed , are spaces covered to prevent

,-l debris or dust frcan entering panel internals and repainted to avoid visual distinctiveness

- - - Wh el ** t*~f*~N Ir * *

• A * * ~ * * *

• Y : - ~ - ~- - ----

2 A1.4 have sharp corners and edges been 4 3 2 1 0,,, x 1 =

4 eliminated?

p.

A2 Are lines of demarcation, mimics hother ? A*y *I O*** b * ** * % " # '

Eraphic, displays. I a e s efhe & fc.

_,iA2'.1 used toldistinguish between cocineniv shared 4 3 2 1 0 x1=

systems or components in multiple tait ,_ _

control rooms By tia l.C, co - ~en syde-s

, Ida \;t.7 sl.;<.0. .3 li.s be he r. v 's h o, sL.*.] f * * *I*

NA C.

• si p ls v .l p ie.ls

~

w[A2.2 used to anclose related displays 4 3 .2 1 0 x 3 =

Ei

~ o../. g . . l. 6 7 ,7,le T li. . < < y. m fl+ u+4 el e. - o o< /* ** * I' * - I'*** ; A 3 1 '"'

f 4* ca p e.er l. . If.* -s s e l *s WA if no r ela l<l )ssyl sys os oly ee sy s$*

y Ses mise A 2.11,A 1.87 A-2

1 l

Sheet 2 of 3 l I I A PANEL LAYOUT and DESIGN (Continued)

'g VERTICAL PANEL EASUREMENT m (A1.1) Anthropometric Diagram PANEL )

, 4 1

,/ ,

,/

i iE unciator

/"x l sight .

\

\

\

/ ^ l i I w

,E A b 1

^

7 _

display height (min / max) a

1. control height (min / max)

-I-- ~ - '-

c.. <-l. : - --

7, g,[ ,, ( , ) en.bak l .I i E<=

E %l .

u,.,6,, ,,b J. .f t.-:1.

l vp . ,1 e L.I //;4rk n-a,

..u.2. 4 limits measurement #

dimension comments min. max. min. ; max.

E ^ .

a u2 m  ::.n :n

,...,, 6. ...,

b LB 68 ..>...t,, ,.),, t.,

E . _

e -- 88 --

4 ,

i

% ~ / '

E . . . .N.. . . t. , - . . J. - >

l 1

L 1P Y

Sheet 3 of 3 Panel

.A PANEL LAYOUT and DESIGN (Continued) l A2 9 cfearly marked with arrows to show 4 3 2 1 0 x 2 =

diaacticri of " flew" g

yA .4 .. l... v.</

Nh 10 n <- f.'lio - c). r e c k. = ~ ( ** 'y elesir;=~I ~;~I)

E A2.10 identified with starting and end points 4 3 2 1 0 x 2 = -_

h!h .( no lin e s ased if 54,,1.) /, ) yo;ds eleele;'*I ' '

A/ A .. [*. <j . *' ' *' . ' s)

A2.11 used to interrate switches, pumps, manual 4 3 2 1 0 x 2 =

and remotely-operated valves , isolaticn paths , etc .

A,e a ll e n g. a r Is *~s Ll<0 ;- % or3* '= s 0 lay o 4 ? TLo.* d.)]

sa a. e s t.. ~ r Ja.,ty p laa.) ife - s Tk;. (. . L/, . co 7... . b .. v,, f ., .1 js. - el 5

• I's ds.

E_ 5,,..l., A 2.II - - - - -- - - --

A2.12 consistant in the app 1Ecation of symbols 4 3 2 1 0 x 2 :

for pumps, valves and other process M..f 6. r e a , .

• L *.f I- K d. K'k f * * *I E elements (describe on Cement Fon't and ,,j ;g A ,. p . . .ls attach)?

oh it no Li s nl y m pt ..s e

<-y>-z B 4 '- ' c .. -

arbs +

m , .., , , . a. ,, _ ,,, .. ...;

l A3 For controls and displays:

p..y ley 3 . /. ,. b=3 1314 , p.cle-sj re re </* *, ik l <

• I* * *

.A3.1 are they generally samed bv systee - 4 3 2 1 0 x 3 = d_

_ (with identical lay-out for repett tive gmups) -

~E All c. p. ..b d . ~T~l y , ,l.,JJ f. , lej7ft **

yo.p;-y do td 14.ys %*- 6 ,J %.e.t (no r..r***

s--f=s )

A 2. S r e y, <; <* * .),.4;,.I r< tes E *' j' " *3 Tkt. e.17, reyw'.<*s $ r e y i.) 67 sy.f c. , AT3,A'i3(*ll'*-

.. W .'s sy r e.f s A3 2 is ord. vine for ccinponents of simizar 4 3 2 1 0 x 3 =

l ftmetim consistently fmm left-to-right ,_

or top-to-bottom -

co st a a c i : sucoarae7 A- G -* C 6~C-A E I ,

lE  ; >

1

5 II. HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY RECORD HED NO. IS PHOTO NO.

e HED SOURCE:

a. Control Room Survey ( X) Product Eval. Factor 12

b. TaskAnalysis( )

c. Operating Experience Reivew ( )

I e RELATED EQUIPMENT:

Plant System: (Reactor, Containment, Environment,etc.)

Subsystem: (Pumps, Valves, controllers,etc.)

Panel or Item Identifier VBD-H e HED DESCRIPTION: Fanel Layout and Design (A1.1)

1. Several control switches located 19" off the floor

2. Several displays l'ocated above recom limits (81" vs 68")

and other displays located below recom. limits (31: vs.48")

E .

e HED ASSESSMENT:

Enhancement Yes ( ) No ( X)

!akNy bted Nmp Yes ( ) No ( X)

E Priority II MOD e REVIEW COMMENTS:

'l

~

(Interaction With Other HEDs. Integration With 0ther Improvement E "" ' ^' c "' " "" '" " '" "' c-)

Conceptual design of panels will utilize tilting of the .__

instruments and relocation of low controls. -.

e REC 0leENDATION:

Modi fy e IMPLEMENTATION:

Perform feasibility study (1st refund after May '85)

(Final design implementation 3rd refueling)

A-5

M M i M M M M'M -

M MMMMM M M M M M M-

. i  !

j 111. TASK 'APAl.YSIS DATA SPEET gei,,

p g ,7ggg, REACTOR PRES 5URE VESSEL CONTROL (t0P-1) pg gg AUGUST 7. 1984 0 AP"II 4* 1984 R. GARDNER. M. WEINSTEIN. M. ABUROMIA StV. fl0. . II0te tem AND BRUCE A. LIE 5tMETER Entry Conditions / Operator Controls and i Availability 5,gg,,

Prece. Notes re Actlens per 10P's Information lDevice needs/ Characteristics - / Location " No, #

- RPV WATER LEVEL BELOW 12.5 1. A SIGNAL ALERilNG RA e Alara 3-3. "Rm Y INCHES. OR

_ UNKNOWN OPERATOR TO LOW WL & Level High/ Low" APPROACHING (OR REACH- RT at 27.5 in

! ING) 12.5 in. / Panel 9-5-1 l

eSIGNALStTPOINTABOVEl

- Alara 3-1 "Rs OR Ai 12.5 in. Vessel Low Level j

l Trist'at 12.5 in/

Panel 9-5-2 7

cn

2. AN INDICATION CONFIRM- R e Level Indicators:

LI-94A & B & C e WR Level Indicaton LI-85A 8 8 N e Identify the zero reference for each ING MAGNITUDE OF Rs W1. l Indication

, (0-60 laches) (-150 to +60 in) i , e IMOICATION RANGE l / Panel 9-5

" e Identify normal /wg.

b ggg y e Ll-91A & B. WL Recordera

'8"9'S

! D WITH NORMAL (-100

/[MERGENCY tee 200).rero l RFC-LR/PR-97 f, at TAF/ Panel 9-3 /P ne 5

. REGIONS IDENTIFl[0 + Pa dm M e UNITS IN INCHES e Li-86 (0- W ). Range Ind.) agree with recorder g

l / Panel 9-4 horizontal scale

y e ACCURACY 6 2.4" 8 w (MARKING FF SETPOINT i'

Rt f)UIR[0) j l i I

. I

! I i i

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5  !~

1 j ..

EV. OPERATOR INTERV!EM QUEST 30NNAZRE -

(SHEET 1 TO 4)

INTRODUCTION TO QUlEST10NNATRE i

~

. Job Position ~

Years of Experience e 1 Nuclear 6 ,Jossil ,

Date of First License m RO m SRO E Education / Degrees .

E ^ = 5'* * "' 9 "* -

""' = ,

In res'ponse to a post-TMI NRC requirement, your utility, along with other BWR owners, is conducting an updated control room review to identify ar.d correct E design deficiencies in the operator-control room interface to minimize the l potential for human error. This review is performed by a survey team composed i of utility representatives, human factor specialists. and : General Electric- N l E engineers using checklists: prepared by-the Control Room: Improvements Subgroup ~

of the BWR Owners Group.

You are asked to complete the attached questionaire basing your responses on-your operational experience and knowledge of your control room and interfacing systems. You may complete this questionaire in the control room )

E -if you desire bu-t-please do so without discussing your detailed. responses with, other operators completing this survey. If additional space is needed, the W l attached Comment Form is to be used, l Following completion, a survei team representative will review your responses .

with you. Upon completion of all interviews, the survey team will. consolidate.

the information obtained and apply it in their evaluation of your control room

>E, for czpliance with human factor engineering principles. -

l l .

i The b~iographical information requested above will be used .in compiling

, statistics on operating personnel physical characteristics. Current recommendations for panel design are based largely-on data obtained from measurements of military personnel; there are few statistics presently l available on, for example, the average height and weight of operators.

This survey provides you with a valuable opportunity for applying your knowledge and experience toward improving operating conditions in both your 5 control room and future control room designs. Your honest and forthright opinions are not only welecmed, but needed.

1 5

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1. - - 7

. -- A-7 -'.-

. A vs . : '

OPDtATOR INTE2VTET SHEET 2 0F 4 QUESTIONAIRE A.

Venid yon recommend any chssges km the fo11oving area: ,_

t A1 ' training YiZ , On dirr drasaurat i s. ~ -- T. -

E A2 solor soding . ,44 - " - - " -

1 A3 'sontrol room assess M

=

. . Ad oomtrol panel layant er assess [sJ, Aes At4#M 4A/4 /A sC84#47,o.d AN,*r#def/#2 f

~Ce6 ate oc w.rsde.c Kew Wr fundr ArArts.  !

AS eoannuaieation nyatens Yes , /*U rs it. A mut n eds&dt 44'rotewic s shr/

E DrstwAr0 dWeda vt.s.

Ad heating er ventilation d E A7 lighting or noise levels '. M '

E A8 data recording and Iog estries . fss , tu ,,,m s's ,4 4 Aceurses as#r- '

~

dadtf** W m srw & dow m ec A m ar gag s, i

As Latermation flow - W fes. Esim'aser raic AspettcMen/r M Mrd'AW3 'C A&&O :^::.T dWNssier sme .drsed etw$et, ett.

E A10 turniture, ets'peent er workspace '. /sJ. og,ps 4 pt#4t/ Jm*2 ** 888fre

. tee / /tder se

'75r'3 enace rousserwr aMcW doute 41' a,rro re Aw Aloes. Avers. .

\ settary rggG~ dA;ntstag n 44 pVg .pgag.ggg. ggy A11 "'414rnws!4 sempaters ArN' /nsics satte re Anesaur ascerassey penu,gy p;siggg; ssuuness.

No.

E.

A12 other? -

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SHEET 3 0F 4 OPERATOR INTE2VTET GUESTIONAIRE 3 Are any sentrols difficult to operate? /ss, Javeer Misa' b/r4 Maver, ,

%csc ,etr ,saegis-g run.1 s esee ,neori usac' Anta Aseres!.+d s%to CC"Mo' r

\

/3 +4! rWd* frf A*NEL , 7p"sg se:seggs ro,/s2 A rsan mad sho&9 Cod Our *#* & Ji'

~ .. , - ,,- - . .

l C

.E Are any sontrols designed, y sitioned or labeled in a manner that sesses risk of inadverteet operation? grs, raro ,wer s,s,eran A#ds '/d'dr l

~

svisicWe.s c/etair tourtas ** +ec. mot .rasrdes.

e D

l Are any. recorders or indicators diffissit or confaafag to read? res c'e D/'- E*s ? CArk Are Asia ,r e, ear,g,

'" cam *'s ** k'"6 was 4.r.nseaara r, asa. y ,,, m ,,, ,,y,,,

l i

• E Are any important indisators located such takt.they are diffissit~to see during normal or emergency operation? '/Es. ~TJe'**d"r se'd*dFd##' d"#"###

{m on snex Anwess ada war ser, egg prosr n gew postra.

E '

g I

i

! E' F Do you feel any sentrol room displays are saaesessary, provide 1

I i maiaportant information or asedlessly slutter the sontrol panela?

No. * .

! G i

Based en your operational experience, does yes sontrol room lack any '

i. oomtrols or displays meaded in year response to normal or emergency ,

~

situations? Mor teesLY Jur ir men er sist/swe w a'ade r;*'r utscI '

_ Dr6 sins eastMs or sternt Psta** err.tr sua u nd:r sa f.f'.

I Do you seasider the naamasister system to be effeettre la soaveying

• Laportant Lafermation to gen? )?s Atessou.cey ars/vD, veo nun !y E sn/cortwr 4acsueessemes ad esce Aeonts. Suo nWone Aer ad M r33*df *9Arear& 7" of Marfaner sedanRMf onj pygmpg 4;,e/ g glnagg.

E E

y.. : .. . - . . . . = . _ ;. ..

= - .. - - - - .

. = ...

n- -

. .D OPE 2.470t INTE2VTET l

9tT5770NAIt.E I

Do you have any problems locating er using procedures or operational E.

Instructieas? /4 .. . .

N

. ' , Eave ro....re:, you experleased

s. - any problems using er maderstanding your E -

.E Is there a partrientar panet which you seasider more difficult er' ~

E .

somfasing to operate than the others? Mr.r. See N, .

L General Comments:

g ..

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B 4 .

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5 . . . _ . .. . . . . ..

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_ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - ^ ^ ^

APPENDIX B, 1. CONTROL ROOM SURVEY RESULTS AND ASSESSMENT A. PANEL LAYOUT AND DESIGN Sheet 1 of 26 Check- IIE'D Enhance-list Eval. CR./ ment Cate- Implemen- Schedule For Comments / Resolutions Item Panel', Pro- ID. Modifi- gory / tation Implemen-IIED Description No. ID. duct No. cations Priority Action tation Controls, displays and alarms A1.1 & VBD-H 12 .1/IS Design Hod. . II Perform lat Refueling Conceptual design of located outside recommended A3.6 VBD-K 8 2S Feasibilit panels will utilize zones. VBD-M 12 Study (FS)g 3S ' tilting of top instru-VBD-Q6C 8 4S ments and relocation 9-10&9-11 9 5S of lower controls, i Ratated groups of controls or A2.2 9-3 9 2/65 Enhanc. A Fix Ist Refueling displays not set off by VBD-H 7S disarcation lines VBD-Q6G 8S 9-10&9-11 9S

, VBD-P AP IOS Integrate with IIED 41T.

Flow paths and arangements not A2.7 9-3 9 3/11S Enhanc. Fix lat Refueling B Integrate with IIED 6S.

orderly or easily recognized Standardize color &

shape of controls.

, Include in feasibility study of IIED CR.I.

Air ejector air control valves A2.8 & VBD-B 12 4/12S Design Hod. II Fix 2nd Refueling i

are mirror imaged A3.1 Controls and displays of similar A3.2 Fire Pn1 12 5/13S Design Hod. II Fix Ist Refueling functions not grouped in 9-10&9-11 12 14S Integrate with IIED SS.

consistent order.

I Demarcation or sequencing within A3.3 9-3 9 6/15S Enhanc. B Fix lat Refueling Integrate with IIEDs 6S &

eyeten grouping not apparent 11S.

9-10&9-11 16S Integrate with IIED 9S.

l'BD-P &P 17S Integrate with IIED 41T.

(1) Feasibility study (FS) to be performed by 1st refueling after present refueling. Final design implementation expected by 3rd refueling.

I

t APPENDIX B, A. PANEL LAYOUT AND DESIGN (Cont'd)

Sheet 2 of 26 Check- IIED Enhance-list Eval. CR./ ment Cate- Implemen- Schedule For Comments / Resolutions Item Panel Pro- ID. Hodifi- gory / tation Implemen-llED Description No. 1D. duct No. cations Priority Action tation Strings and matrices of compo- A3.4 9-3 9 7/18S Enhanc. B Fix 1st Refueling Integrate with IIED 6S.

, nents of similar functions not differentiated by demarcation or hierarchical labeling.

Himic has no arrows noting A2.9 VBD-A 8 8/19S Enhanc. A Fix 85 direction of flow s I

Controls not adjacent to related A3.7 VBD-Il 12 9/20S Design Hod. II FS 1st Refueling Integrate with IIED IS.

feedback indication. .

No plant standard exists for A4.1 All 12 lb/21S Enhanc. B Fix Ist Refueling Review and implement CR color coding. Panels , design standards.

UIe of colora not consistently A4.2 9-3 9 11/22S Enhanc. B Fix lat Refueling Integrate with IIED 21S.

rpplied on panel. 9-4 23S

' Standardize w.r.t. color,

. VBD-II 24S shape and size.

VBD-H 255 Parmanent labels not used to AS.2 VBD-Q66 9 12/26S Other Hod. No Action III Labels require monthly provide operational limits 9-10&9-11 27S Design Hod. A Fix 85 review.

or warnings. VBD-P &P '

28S B Fix 1st Refueling Labels and legend plates not AS.3 VBD-Q6G 8 13/29S Enhanc. A Fix 85 ured to identify system 9-1069-11 8 30S designation.

Labels not used to identify A5.4 9-10&9-11 B 14/31S Enhanc. A Fix 85 panel by number and function.

Labels and legend plates not A5.9 9-10&9-11 9 15/32S ENhanc. A Fix 85 ca211y read when stationed at panel.

h .

APPENDIX B, A. PANEL LAYOUT AND DESIGN (Cont'd)

Sheet 3 of 26 t

Check- HED Enhance-list Eval. CR./ mer.t Cate- Implemen- Schedule For Coments/ Resolutions Item Panel Pro- ID. Modifi- gory / tation Implemen-HED Description No. ID. duct No. cations Priority Action tation Labels not clear with respect AS.10 VBD-C 9 16/33S Enhanc. A Fix 85 to function or intent VBD-H 34S VBD-P &P 35S B Fix Ist Refueling Labels not consistently AS.11 VBD-Q66 9 17/36S Eqhanc. A Fix 85 positioned on panel, i Labels and escutcheons not size AS.7 VBD-B 8 18/37S Enhanc. A Fix 85 coded in a hierarchical system Extensive tecporary labels used A5.12 VBD-Q&G 8 19/38S Other Hod. III No Action Refer to llED 26S

& A6.1 9-10&9-11 12 39S Enhanc. A Fix 85 Temporary labels not consistent A6.3 VBD-A 8 20/40S Enhanc. A Fix 85 Remove temporary labels in format, color or use. or maire them consistent.

J Temporary labels not periodi- A6.7 VBD-H 8 21/41S Enhanc. A Fix 85 cally reviewed to make VDD-Q&C 42S Other Hod. III No Action Refer to llED 26S permanent or remove. VBD-P &P ,

43S Enhanc. B Fix Ist Refueling Annunciator panels can be seen A7.3 9-3 9 22/44S Other Hod. III Na Action Operator has to walk to but not read from positions VBD-A 45S , panel to silence alarm, other than directly in front VBD-B 46S where he can read annun-of panels. VBD-C 47S clator tile.

Association of feedback to SA3 9-3 9 23/48S Enhanc. II Fix let Refueling Integrate with IIED GR.2.

ralated controle not apparent 'VBD-B 49S  !

through labeling, mimics, Fire Pnl. 50S demarcatiott lines. 9-0269-21 51S VBD-H 52S VBD-K 53S 9-10&9-11 12 54S

M MM MMMM MMMMM M M-l APPENDIX B, B. INSTRUMENTATIC1 AND liARDWARE

, Sheet 4 of 26 Check- IIED Enhance-list Eval. CR./ ment Cate- Implemen- Schedule For Comments / Resolutions Item Panet Pro- ID. d Ho'ifi- gory / tation Implemen-Item Description No. ID. duct No. cations Priority Action tation Controllers requiring manual Bl.1 VBD-R 12 24/55S Design Hod. II FS 1st Refueling operation not easily reached 9-10&9-11 12 56S Integrate with IIED 5S.

Indicators not marked to show B2.1 9-3 9 25/57S Enhanc. A Fix 85 Entry conditions to normal ranges of operation. 9-4 9 58S f emergencies, as spect-9-5 9 59S fled by CNS E0P's, will 9-02&9-21 12 60S be marked on primary

,I VBD-Il 9 61S indicators.

VBD-K 12 62S VBD-N 12 63S VBD-R 12 64S 9-10&9-11 9 65S VBD-P &P 12 66S B Fix Ist Refueling Vzry low indicators on panel B2.2 VBD-H 9 26/67S Design Hod. II FS 1st Refueling Integrate with IIED 3S.

introduce parallax Initruments not scaled in B2.3 VBD-J&S 9 27/68S Enhanc. A Fix 85 - Replace chart paper.

process units relating to 9-10&9-11 69S Other Hod. II Provide Alt. - SPDS will provide the system operation. VBD-P &P 70S Enhanc. B Fix let Refueling information in oper-ational units of Curie /hr.

Digital readings do not corre- B2.8 VBD-Q&C 8 28/71S Design' Hod. II Fix 2nd Refueling Icts with backup indications. ,

Failure mode of instruments : B2.17 VBD-Q&G 9 29/72S Enhanc. A Fix 85 not evident VBD-P &P 9 73S Enhanc. B Fix let 'tefueling i '

Printed values not easily read B3.1 VBD-B 9 30/74S Design Hod. II Fix 85 Discrepancy under 9-02&9-21 9 75S Ist Refueling correction.

VBD-Q6C 9 76S i Ist Retueling

l i

l APPENDIX B, B. INSTRUMENTATION AND llARDWARE (Cont'd)

Sheet 5 of 26 l

l Check- IIED dnhance-j list Eval. GR./ ment Cate- Implemen- Schedule For Comments / Resolutions

Item Panel Pro- ID. Mddift- gory / tation Implemen-l Item Descaiption No. ID. duct No. cations Priority Action tation i

Alarm points not identified on B3.3 9-3 12 31/77S Enhanc. B Fix Ist Refueling Place alarm setpoints

] recorders. 9-4 78S on labels.

9-5 79S VBD-A 80S VBD-B 81S 9-02&9-21 82S VBD-H 83S .

{' VBD-J&S VBD-R 84S 85S

(

VBD-Q&G 86S VBD-P &P 87S

! Recorder scales not marked to B3.15 9-3 12 32/88S Enhanc. A Fix 85 Hark EOPs entry show normal or abnormal ranges VBD-A 89S conditions.

of operations. VBD-B 90S VBD-C 91S 9-02&9-21 92S VBD-Il 93S 1

VBD-J&S 943.

VBD-R 95S VBD-Q&G 9 96S VBD-P &P 12 97S i

i No positive means of disgnosing B4.4 All 8 33/98S Other Hod. III No Action For critical systems, failed indicating lights Panels redundant indications

, available.

are available to dis-i tinguish failed lights.

! For Panel 9.5, control j rod positions will be

, identified on SPDS.

l 1

j APPENDIX B, B. INSTRlffENTATION AND IIARDWARE (Cant'd) i 1 Sheet 6 of 26 Check- IIED . Enhance-list Eval. CR./ ment Cate- Implemen- Schedule for Comments / Resolutions Item Panel Pro- ID. Modifi- gory / tation Implemen-Item Description No. ID. duct No.

Priority Action gcations tation l

Switch positions not clearly B5.2 VBD-QSC 12 34/99S EnNnc. A Fix 85 marked.

Control switches above or B5.3 VBD-!! 12 35/100S Design Hod. II FS Ist Refueling Integrate with IIED below recommended heights. VBD-75S 9 101S CR.I.

VBD-K 102S I

VBD-H 103S 9-10&9-11 104S llandles near edges not B5.4 9-3 12 36/105S' Design Hod. II Fix 2nd Refueling Equip with a rail.

protected with guards to 9-4 12 106S ,

prevent inadvertent operation MSL radiation monitor switch B5.6 9-10&9-11 8 37/107S Design Hod. II Fix 2nd Refueling not durable.

i Coding by size, shape or color B5.10 VBD-A '8 38/108S Enhanc. B Fix lat Refueling Integrate with IIEDs not used to identify switch VBD-II 109S by type of function.

CR's 10 6 11.

VBD-J&S 110S VBD-K lilS VBD-H f

112S ,

VBD-R 113S '

i Switches for emergency or B6.1& 9-4 12 39/114S Enhanc. A Fix 85 abnormal use not B6.2 VBD-A 12 115S consistently-marked. VBD-J&S 12 116S 1 VBD-P &P 117S B Fix 1st Refueling

~

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APPENDIX B, B. INSTRUMENTATION AND llARDWARE (Cont'd)

Sheet 7 of 26 Check- HED Enhance-list Eval. . CR./ ment Cate- Implemen- Schedule For Conssents/ Resolutions Item Panet Pro- ID. Modifi- gory / tation Implemen-Item Description No. ID. duct No. cati-1s Priority Action tation I

Indicator scales not easily SBl.1 9-21 9 40/118S Design Hod. II FS(1) let Refueling Integrate with IIEDs

! read when stationed at the VBD-G 9 119S CR. 1.

panel. 9-10 12 120S 9-11 9 121S Displays reflecting only demand SBl.3 9-4 9 41/122S Enhanc A Fix 85 signal not labeled accordingly 9-5 12 123S  ;

VBD-4 124S l

^

VBD-Il 125S VBD-K 126S i VBD-R 127S VBD-P &P 128S B let Refueling 2

Process units and multipliers SBl.4 9-02 9 42/129S Enhanc. A Fix 85 not specified 9-10 9 130S VBD-P &P 9 131S B Ist Refueling Recorder reading at low-end of SB2.1 VBD-R 8 43/132S En'hanc. A Fix 85 scale not visible through recorder windows. .

Hulti-channel recorder does SB2.2 VBD-A 8 44/133$ Design Hod. II Fix 85 Discrepancy under not display channel being correction.

plotted.

o Procedural provisions to prevent SB3 All 8 45/134S Other Hod. III No Action Normal practice is to interchanging indicating light Panels replace light lenses lenses not available. Individually. Redundant indications available to distinguish inter-changing lenses.

N b

APPENDIX B, ' C. ANNUNCIATORS l Sheet 8 of 26 Check- I!ED Enhance-list Eval. CR./ ment Cate- Implemen- Schedule for Consents / Resolutions Item Panel Pro- ID. Modift- gory / tation Implemen-

) Item Description No. ID. duct No. rations Priority Action tation l

Annunciators not consistently C1.1 9-5 8 46/135S Other Hod. III No Action Training compensates grouped by system within boxes '

Annunciators not grouped above C1.2 VBD-Q&C 8 47/136S Design Hod. II FS 1st Refueling Integrate with HED AS.

related controls and displays W rning and diagnostic alarms C1.3 9-5 8 48/137S Other Hod. III No Action Hinor discrepancies noted not segregated from information VBD-J&S 8 138S i Fix 2nd Ref ueling during verif t:ation - No and advisory alarms. , action required.

Annunciators' nomenclature, C2.1 VBD-H 8 49/139S Enhanc. B Fix Ist Refueling acronyms or abbreviations not standardized.

• Wording not consistent with C2.5 9-5 '9 50/140S Enhanc. B Fix Ist Refueling input signal function. VBD-R 9 141S Alarms no prioritized for C2.8 VBD-A 9 51/142S Other Hod. III No Action Prioritization of all required response level by VBD-B 9 143S alarms not necessary, legend plate color. VBD-J&S 12 144S ,

RPS alarms are color VBD-K 8 145S coded. E0P's entry VBD-H 12 146S coadition will be VBD-Q&C 12 147S ! identified on SPDS.

VBD-P &P 12 148S

~

Alarms not provided with alpha- C2.9 All 8 52/149S Enhanc. B Fix lat Refueling Engrave the alarm titles sawric code for prompt response. Panels by numeric / numeric code.

4

APPENDIX B, C. ANNUNCIATORS (Cont'd) l Sheet 9 of 26 I

Check- HED Enhance-list Eval. CR./ ment Cate- Implemen- Schedule For Coments/ Resolutions Item Panet Pro- ID. Modifi- gory / tation Implemen-Item Description No. ID. duct No. cations Priority Action tation Reset button not provided k C5.3 8 53/150S Design Hod. Fix VBD-Q II let Refueling Location and demarcation of C5.5 VBD-H 8 54/151S Design' Hod. III FS let Refueling Integrate with ILED tnnunciator response buttons VBD-J&S 152S GR.1 is inconsistent with other VBD-H 153S p:nels VBD-R 154S Alarms do not reflash for second C6.3 All 12 55/155S Design Hod. Fix II 2nd Refueling clarm input Panels No standard guide for writing C7.1 All 12 56/156S Enhanc. Fix B Ist Refueling

, (nnunciator procedures is In use Panels }

i No method availab o assure C8.1 VBD-P &P 12 57/157S Design Hod. II Fix 2nd Refueling placing annunciator plate in ,

ccrrect location during bulb '

rrplacement Highly dense annunciator SC1 9 All Pnts 58/158S - Other Hod. III No Action Not a serious problem.

mutrices within panel Fire Pn1 12 159S 1 Operators have adapted.

Annunciator response controls SC2 VBD-C 8 59/160S Enhanc. A Fix 85 not coded for ease of VBD-H 161S  ;

recognition VBD-K 162S l VBD-H 163S

{

VBD-S 164S ,

i

m .

1 i

APPENDIX B', D. PROCEDURES Sheet 10 of 26 Check- IIED Enhance-list Eval. CR./ ment Cate- Implemen- Schedule For Comments / Resolutions Item Panel. Pro- ID. Modifi- gory / tation Implemen-Item Description No. ID. duct No. cations Priority Action tation I

l 1

l E:ch volume or binder does not E2.3 N/A 12 60/165S D'e sign Hod. III Fix 2nd Refueling l leve an index or table of contents f f

Index tabling system within each E2.6 N/A 9 61/166S Dhsign Hod. III Fix 2nd Refueling Combine with IIED 165S procedure binder not convenient to use.

l l

l No administrative procedure in E3 N/A 8 62/167S Enhanc. B Fix let Refueling Integrate with IIED 156S l use to assure standardization of procedure format for type style, nomenclature, as-labeled design- l neton of components entry / exit conditions, or identification of l revision.

Setpoints and sensor identity not E4.14 N/A 9 63/168S Other Hod. I Provide CNS newly developed EOPs provided in emergency and abnor- Alternative will address sensor iden-cal procedures, tity and setpoints.

Procedures do not provide con- E4.16 N/A 9 64/169S Other Hod. I Provide EOPs will cover this tingency actions if expected Alternative discrepancy results are not achieved under degraded conditions.

I Applicable revision of cross - E5.2 N/A 8 65/170S Other Hod. III No Action Only latest revisions of references not identified procedures available in the CR. 1.atest' revisions are verified by computer I

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MM APPENDIX B, E. COtrfROL R00H ENVIRONMENT Sheet 12 of 26 Clieck- ,IIED Enhance-list Eval. CR./ ment Cate- Implemen- Schedule For Consents / Resolutions Item Panel Pro- ID. Modifi- gory / tation Implemen-IIED Description No. ID. duct No. cations Priority Action tation l Cosununication system not F1.1 N/A 9 67/172S Design Hod. II Fix 2nd Refueling A new system being I redundant I installed.

h PA system has no channel F1.4 N/A 9 68/173S Design Hod. II Fix 2nd Refueling Refer to IIED 172S dedicated to opetations.

Communication system not F1.7 N/A 8 69/174S Design Hod. II Fix 2nd Refueling Refer to HED 172S equipped with channel select ,

i F. MAINTENANCE AND SURVEILLANCE & TRAINING AND MANNING Control room operator maintance C1.1 N/A 9 70/175S Enhanc. B Fix Ist Refueling Improve division of cnd surveillance functions' responsibilities responsibilities not clearly established Guidelines defining duties and H2.3 N/A 9 71/176S Enhanc. A Fix 85 A guideline under responsibilities of shift  ! implementation members during emergency l

conditions are very general  !

f

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tp .i:

ss ad M.~  %;.

4Q c[  !:S .A e .,3 *-ta ; . ,$I . S APPENDIX B, 2. TASK ANALYSIS RESULTS AND ASSESSMENT Sheet 13 of 2/

PLANI ENHANCE- IMPLE- ScilEDULE .

E0P SYS1TH llED HENT/ HENTA- FG:1 FUNC- OR PANEL ID. HODIFI- CATEGORY / TION IMPLEMEN-IIED DESCRIPTION TION SUBSYSTEM COMPONENT I.D. NO. CATION PRIORITY ACTION TATION C0ttlENIS/RESOLITTIONS l

WL scale on recorder EOP-1 RPV Level WL Recorde'r 9-5 II Enhanc. A Fix 85 Obtain new chart paper does not match Instr. LR/PR-97 paper indicated scale.

Scale of one Rx press EOP-1 RPV Press. Heter Ind. 9-5 2T Enhanc. A Fix 85 Replace scale or indication meter not PI-90C meter l in agreement with the remaining indications, i

1 Front panels primary E0P-1 Prim. Cont. Press. Rec. 9-4& 3T' Enhanc. A Fix 85 Place a marker to containment press. Press. PC-PR- 9-5 identify E0P entry recorders need to Instr. IA&B conditions.

identify normal /off .

Integrate with IIED normal range of CR.32.

operation Rx scram information is EOP-1 Rx Protec- Scram Group 9-5 4T Other Hod.'III None Not a serious problem.

indicated when the tion system Ind. Lights Redundancy of indi-lights go from "LII" I,2,3,4 cations (4 lights) to "0FF". and plant training

]

suffice.

Pria. Cont. Isolation E0P-1 PCIS Channel A& 9-5 ST Other Hod. III None Same coments as IIED information is indica- B lights 4T.

ted when the lights go f rom "LII" to "0FP'.

I i

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APPENDIX B, 2. TASK ANALYSIS RESULTS AND ASSESSMENT (Cont'd)

Sheet 14 of 26 PLANT ENHANCE- IMPLE- SCHEDULE EOP SYSTEM HED HENT/ MENTA- FOR FUNC- OR PANEL ID. H0DIF1- CATECORY/ TION IMPLEMEN-LED DESCRIPTION TION SUBSYSTEM COMPONENT I . D'. NO. CATION PRIORITY ACTION TATION COMMENTS /RES0ttfr10NS 1

Front panel meter indi- EOP-1 Main steam Heter 6T Other II Add to 2nd Meter Indication cation not available Process Ind. Hod.

i PMIS/ Refueling Available on back Rad. SPDS panels 9-10 & 9-02.

j Ricorder identification EOP-1 Main Steam MS Rad. 9-02 7T Enhanc. A Fix 85 label missing Process Recorder Rad.

Pa ttions of TCVs and EOP-1 Turbine Light Ind. VBD-A ST Other Hod. III None TSVa in the intermediate Redundant indications Control & VBD-B I

rtnges of fully open and available on VBD-A.

Stop

• fully closed valve Valves i porltions are indicated i by the lights going "0FP'.

Scram discharge volume EOP-1 Scram Heter Ind. 9-5 Other Hod. II ST Place on 2nd 3 w tsr level indication Discharge PMIS Refueling j not available volume Intermediate range E0P-1 Int. Range Switches 9-5 10T Enhanc. A Fix 85

) monitor switches need Mon. (IRM) color marking impro- I vesents APRM trip setpoints at E0P-1 APRM Ind. 9-5 11Ti Other II Place on 2nd core flow 100% not setpoints at Hod. PMIS Refueling i directly available (cal- Flow 100%

culctions necessary)

A cignal indicating EOP-1 Rx Protec- An Indication 9-5 12T Other II Place on 2nd Refueling combined occurrence of tion or alarm Hod. PHIS/SPDS Rx ceram demand and System APRM 2.5% (or unde-  !

teruined power level) is not available.

• l _ _ - - - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

,. - ~., _ . . . , , , , . . . . . . . . , . - _ , . , , - - . . , . . . .

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.-af '. s g@  % 7t. @ h il fJ W u -d l

APPENDIX B, 2. TASK ANALYSIS RESULTS AND ASSESSMENT (Cont'd)

Sheet 15 of 26 FIANT ENilANCE- IMPLE- SCllEDULE E0P SYSTFH HED HENT/ HENTA- FOR

}UNC- OR PANEL ID. HODIFI- CATECORY/ TION IMPLEMEN-HED DESCRIPTION TION SUBSYSTEM COMPONENT I.D. NO. CATION PRIORITY ACTION TATION COMMENTS / RESOLUTIONS l

An APRM value of 2.5% E0P-1 Power Range APRM S-5 13T Enhanc. A Fix 85 Mark the scale at is at the low-end of Honitor Recorders l 2.5%

the scale, and dif-ficult to read.

Information lights for E0P-1 Croup' Information 14T Design II Fix 2nd system isolation demand Isolation Lights HoJ. Refueling for groups 2,3,6 and 7 not available. ,

i I f i

! IIPCI and RCIC systems' EOP-1 IIPCI & Alarms 9-3 & 15T Design II Fix 2nd start alarms needed RCIC 9-4 Mod. Refueling RF pump discharge E0P-1 Reactor Meter VBD-A 16T Enhanc. A Fix 85 pressure indication Feed Ind, has incorrect label SLC test tank level E0P-1 SLC System Heter Ind. 17T Other Hod. I To be 1st Integrate with other indication not Evaluated Refueling modifications under available ,

ATWS rule.

} Revise procedures to correct this HED.

RPV Wide Range water EOP-1 RPV level WL 9-5 & 18T Design I Install 2nd Implementation level trend recording Instr. Recorder 9-3 Hod. Recorder Re fueling schedule dictated by not available long leadtime.

Wide range torus E0P-1 Prim. Cont. Press. 19T Design I Fix ist pressure indication Ind. Hod. Refueling not available r

{

I i

i l

APPENDIX B, 2. TASK ANALYSIS RESULTS AND ASSESSMENT (Cont'd)

Sheet 16 of 26 {

PLANT ENilANCE- IMPLE- ScilEDULE EOP SYSTEH HED HENT/ HENTA- FOR FUNC- OR PANEL ID. HODIFI- CATECORY/ TION IMPLEMEN-IIED DESCRIPTION TION SUBSYSTEH COMPONENT I.D. NO. CATION PRIORITY ACTION TATION COPNENTS/ RESOLUTIONS t

SRV label identifi- EOP-1 Safety Labeling ,9-3 20T Enhanc. A Fix 85 i cetion out of sequence Relief l

valves Furctional sepatation E0P-1 Safety Demarcation 9-3 21T Enhanc. A Fix 85 l

between ADS & LLS Relief velves not evident valves l

No direct reading of EOP-1 Rx Core Ind. 9-5 22T Other II E0P's Ist Train operators for Rx subcriticality ,

Hod. Training Refueling observing various sys11able l parameters to verify subcriticality Alternate system for EOP-1 S14 9-5 23T Other Hod. I To be 1st Integrate with IIED boron injection (other evaluated Refueling 177.

thrn SLC) not presently ,

in place.

Low-end of the scale on E0P-1 Rx Neutron SRH 9-5 2t.T Enhanc. A Fix 85 SRM recorders not Monitoring Recorder l idrntified. System ,

I No direct readout of E0P-1 RPV Ind. 25T Other III Place on 2nd Rx cooldown rate . Hod. PHIS Refueling avzilable Suppression pool bulk E0P-1 Supp. Pool Meter Ind. VBD-J 26T Other II Place on 2nd tcaperature indication Hod. SPDS Refueling not directly available (calculations required).

l l

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- c- - - - ... _ an. ras.a.-, -r. -

g s .. ggg gg . - ~  ? -s .. 3 g g ?n. g g g g -g l

APPENDIX B, 2 TASK ANALYSIS RESULTS AND ASSESSHENT (Cont'd)

Sheet 17 of 26 PLANT- ENilANCE- IMPLE- SCllEDULE EOP SYSTEM HED HENT/ HENTA- FOR FUNC- OR PANEL ID. H0DIFI- IION CATEGORY / IMPLEMEN-11ED DESCRIPTION TION SUBSYSTEM COMPONENT I.D. NO. ; CATION PRIORITY ACTION TATION COMMENTS / RESOLUTIONS l

tabel marking of Group EOP-1 Group I Reset 9-5 27Ti Enhanc. A Fix 85 I isolation reset Isol. switches switches needs impro-vesent.

Rod sequence control EOP-1 Rod Seq. Label- 9-5 28T Enhanc. A Fix 85 evitch label needs control

!=provement switch SIE tank level indi- EOP-1 SIE System Heter Ind. 9'-5 29T Enhanc. A Fix 85 Place a fine demar-cation is difficult cation line at 1%

to read at 1% level level Manual switches for EOP-1 MSIVs Switches 9-17 30T Design. I Fix Ist Design a special tool actuating relays for Hod. Refueling for reopening MSIV's.

reopening MSIV's Hodify EOP's, not available SDV alarm tile label EOP-1 SDV Alarm 9-5 31T Enhanc. A Fix 85 does not match alarm procedure Concern regarding not EOP-1 CRD Communica- 32T Design. II Fix 2nd Install phones &

enough phones to ac- tion Link . Hod. Refueling system, count for failure of communication between Rx building and control room.

i.

k

_,. q7 -[. -;

i APPENDIX B, 2. IASK ANALYSIS RESULTS AND ASSESSHENT (Cont'd)

Sheet 18 of 26 PLANT ENilANCE- IMPLE- SCllEDULE EOP SYSTEM HED HENT/ HENTA- FOR FUNC- OR PANEL ID, MODIFI- CATEGORY / TION IMPLEMEN-IIED DESCRIPTION TION SUBSYSTEM COMPONENT I.D. NO.' CATION PRIORITY ACTION TATION COMMENTS / RESOLUTIONS 1

Position lock swicches EOP-1 RCIC, CS, lock 9-4 33T De' sign II FIX 2nd Install locking for RCIC, CS and RIIR RilR's svtiches Hod. & Proc. Refueling sy,s tem.

to prevent automatic Review initiation not available Pointer of fue! zone E0P-1 RPV 1.evel Heter Ind. 9-3 34 Enhanc. A Fik 85 indication too wide - Instr.

covers scale i

RIIR service water EOP-1 RilR SW C6.1 9-3 35T Design II' Fix 2nd Install pump pump controls and Hod. Refueling controla on panel indications are >

9-3 located on back panels rather than panel 9-3 Front panel SP temper- E0P-2 Supp. Pool Alara VBD-J 36T Design II Fix 2nd Place alarm on front sture alarm not avail- Mod Refueling panel able Identify E0Ps entry I condition on SPDS I

DW bulk, temperature Ind. E0P-2 W '

Temp. Ind. VBD-II. 37T Other II Place on 2nd not directly available l Mod. SPDS Refueling (calculations required) '

DW bulk temperature E0P-2 W Alara VBD-Il 38T Design II Fix 2nd Place alarm on front alarm not avaliable Hod. Refueling pr.ne l'

' & local alarma located Identify EOPs entry on back panels condition on SPDS n

i 9

1 x gg a,4 ' gg Q  : . ._ gg 9 U  %

7B @ ^ h E 'S APPENDIX B, 2. TASK ANALYSIS RESULTS AND ASSESSMENT (Cont'd)

Sheet 19 of 26 PLANT ENilANCE- IMPLE- SCIIEDULE EOP SYSTEM llED HENT/ HENTA- FOR FUNC- OR PANEL ID. H0DIFI- CATECORY/ TION IMPLEMEN-ilED DESCRIPTION TION I.D.

SUBSYSTDt COMPONENI NO. CATION PRIORITY ACTION TATION COPMENTS/ RESOLUTIONS SP level alara utilizes EOP-2 Supp. Pool Alarm VBD-H 39T Other Hod. III None No action is neces-conson annunciator for sary. Indications to both high & low levels verify alarms are located on same panel.

Incorrect demarcation of EDP-2 Supp. Pool Level 9-3 40T Enhanc. A Fix 85 alarm setpoints on SP Ind.

level indication Alarm procedures for E0P-2 Prim. Cont. Alarm VBD- 41T Enhanc. B Fix Ist Procedure change of panels P &P spect- Pracedures P &P Refueling of E0Ps primary fying PC nydrogen , containment hydrogen concentration setpoints '

control required.

and operator actions Alarm setpoints should not available be in accordance with E0Ps entry condition.

PC hydrogen concentra- E0P-2 Prim. Cont. H Concen- VBD- 42T Other 11 Place on 2nd tion alarms and indi- tion Ind. P 6P Hod. SPDS Refueling cations are located on back panels.

Incorrect scale on PC EOP-2 Prim. Cont. Recorder B VBD- 43T Enhanc. A Fix d5 hydrogen concentration P &P recarder (ahould read 0-5% not 0-100%)

DW cooling fan switches E0P-2 DW Coolers Fan VBD-K 44T Design II FS let Integrate with fled located 19" from the' Swtiches Hod. Re fueling CR.I. No problem to floar. to operate Torus air temperature E0P-2 Torus Temp & press VBD-J 45T Design II FS let Include in feasibi-and pressure indications Indications Refueling lity study of I!ED located 30" from the CR.1 Not of an floor immediate concern due to redundancy of j ,

indications.

APPENDIX B, 2. TASK ANALYSIS RESULTS AND ASSESSMENT (Cont'd)

Sheet 20 of 26 PLANT ENilANCE- IMPLE- SCllEDULE E0P SYSTEM lied HENT/ HENTA- FOR FUNC- OR PANEL ID. HDDIFI- CATECORY/ TION IMPLEMEN- ,

lied DESCRIPIION TION SUBSYSTEH COMPCNENT I.D. NO. CATION PRIORITY ACTION TATION C0ttiENTS/ RESOLUTIONS I Label differentiation E0P-2 SP & DW Labels 9-3 46T Enhanc. A Fix E5 between SP and DW cystem sprays needed NPSil for pumps taking E0P-2 SP NPSH 47T Other I Hodify 1st suction from SP at curves ,

Hod. Proc. Refueling l various WLs not

]

cyc11able. '

Isdications for the EOP-2 SP & RPV Temp.& Press. 48T Other II Place on 2nd Place all E0Ps two-

"two dimensional" PC Indications Hod. SPDS Refueling dimensional PC limits linits of SP trap. on SPDS. (Refer to llED cnd Rx pressure not 26T for making SP bulk in close proxia.ity temp. available on SPDS).

Torus narrow range E0P-2 Torus Press.Ind. VBD-J 49T Enhanc. A Fix 85 preenure indication has .

en incorrect scale SBCT and ACAD inter- E0P-2 SBCT & Himic & VBD- SOT: Enhanc. B Fix Ist ,

fcca for venting the ACAD demarcation P &P Refueling PC needs a mimic cnd identification cf flow path.

The "two dimensional" E0P-2 SP & RPV Press., Temp., 51T Other 11 Place on 2nd Integrate with PC limits of T vs. Level Ind. Hod. SPDS Refueling IIED 48T SP WL requires per- .

for=ing calculations, tnd indications for input parameters not in close proximity.

g ggg Q% h APPENDIX B, 2. TASK ANALYSIS RESULTS AND ASSESSHENT (Cont'd)

Sheet 21 of 26 PLAfft , EN!!ANCE- IMPLE- SCllEDULE EOP SYSTEM ilED HENT/ HENTA-

, FOR MINC- OR PANEL ID. HODIFI- TION CATECORY/ IMPLEMEN-HED DESCRIPTION TION SUBSYSTEM COMPONE.VI I.D. NO. , CATION PRIORITY ACTION TATION CottfENTS/ RESOLUTIONS Recorder scale of DW E0P-2 Primary Recorder V8D-H 52T Design Fix III 3rd Refueling Atn 0 concentration Cont. Hod. ,

notiddicated-Needs to call to known scale.

, Indication lights of EOP-2 Primary Ind. Lights VBD-H 53T, Design III Fix 3rd Refueling Integrate with IIED sampling locations of Cont. Hod. 52I.

DW Atm. O concen-trctions not bright ,

snough.

Liziting conditione of E0P-2 Radioactive Ind. 547 Other II Place on 2nd Refueling operation (140) radio- Release Hod. PHIS/SPDS cctivity release rate not readily available.

(Calculations required)

Action levels on SP EOP-2 SP, RPV Demarcation 9-3 & 55T' Enhanc. B Fix Ist Refueling Place demarcation tamperature and level 9-4 (nd, Rx level and '

lines as dictated 3

by the EOPs pressure need to be marked i

No functional label for EOP-3 SC Area Temp.Ind. 9-21 56T Enhanc. A Fix 85 sIcondary containment Temp. Heter crea temperature Detection i indication meter.

SC crea temperature E0P-3 SC Area Temp. Ind. 9-21 57T Design II Fix 3rd Refueling Include in the indication meter located Temp. Heter Hod. feasibility study tbove !!ne of sight. Detection +

of ;r GR.1.

SC llVAC exhaust radia- E0P-3 SC llVAC Rad. Ind. 9-10 58T Design II Fix 3rd Refueling Integrate with IIED ction meters A&B located Meter P';4.

CR.I.

15" from the floor.

APPENDIX B, 2. TASK ANALYSYS RESULTS AND ASSESSHENT (Cont'D)

Sheet 22 of 26 PLANT i EHilANCE- 1HPLE- SCliEDULE EOP SYSTEM HED HENT/ HENTA- FOR FUNC- OR PANEL ID. HODIFI- TION CATEGORY / IMPLEHEN-IIED DESCRIPTION TION SUBSYSTEH COMPONENT I.D. NO. CATION PRIORITY ACTION TATION CORfENIS/ RESOLUTIONS Alarm setpoints are E0P-3 SC Area Rad. Temporary 9-11 59T Enhanc. A 85 Fix Replace by permanent temporarily placed Detection Additions labels, below SC area radt-

{

etion indication meters e

Process units not iden- EOP-3 SC Area Rad. Labela 9-02 60T Enhanc. A Fix 85 tified on SC area detection rrdlation recorder Peper scale of SC area E0P-3 SC Area Rad. Radiation 9-02 61T Enhanc. , A Fix 85 Replace chart paper rediation recorder Detection Recorder does not match recorder scale.

• 4 Recorder contains E0P-3 SC Area Rad Radiation 9-02 62T Design 11 Fix 2nd Replace recorder I excessive plots - 1:a Detection Recorder Hod. Refueling

) eingle trend can easily l be distinguishable.

SC sump water level E0P-3 SC Sump Level Ind. VBD-S 63T Design 2nd II Fix Provide sump WL l indication not Hod. Refueling indication av:11able Indications and alarms EOP-3 SC Areas Level Ind. 64T Other I Evaluate 85 Assess the need for for SC area levels ,

Mod. E0P's. identifying this llED (other than the torus) as an independent not svA11able -

entry condition for

! emergencies. (System analysis may be required.)

c l

n 1

g gg' g SSS h APPENDIX B, 2. TASK ANALYSIS RESULTS AND ASSESSMENI (Cont'd)

Sheet 23 of 26

(

PLAlfr ENilANCE- IMPLE- SCllEDULE EOP SYSTEM llED HENT/ HENTA- FOR FUNC- OR PANEL ID. H0DIFI- TION CATECORY/ IMPLEMEN-IIED DESCRIPTION TION SUBSYSTEM COMPONENT I.D. NO. CATION PRIORI 1Y ACTION TATION CONiENIS/RESOLITIIONS Direct indication of SC E0P-3 SC Floor Press. or VBD-S 65T Other Hod. III None llED 63T sump level floor drain sump pump drain sump flow ind. I installation will discharge not available pumps provide necessary in-dication of system functional operation.

4 No additional action required.

SC HVAC controls and EOP-3 SC liVAC Demarcation VBD-R 66T Enhanc. B Fix let displays not set off by lines Refueling desatration lines l

R:nges (50-170*F) of EOP-3 Area Temp. Temp. VBD-R 67T Design 1 Fix 2nd Implementation

- crea temperature Detection Indications Hod. Refueling achedule dictated by indications for CS, } long leadtime.

R!lR's, and IIPCI do .

not extend to emergency -

limits (alert signal 200*F)

Direct indication of SC EOP-3 SC liVAC Flow Ind. VBD-R 68T Design III Fix 3rd IIVAC fan flow not .

Hod. Refueling eva11able

{

't Small print on alara E0P-4 Off-Cas Alarm 9-4 69T Enhanc. A Fix 85 tile for ERP ef fluent effluent  :

monitor Honitor Off gas vent pipe in- EOP-4 Off-Cas Ind. Meter 9-02 70T Design Fix 3rd II Include in the dication meters located K)d . Re fue ling feasibility study 24" from the floor of IIED CR.1.

I i

h APPENDIX B, 2.

l TASK ANALYSIS RESULTS AND ASSESSHENT (Cont'd)

Lheet 24 of 26 PLANT EN11ANCE- IMPLE- SCllEDULE EOP SYSTEM HED HENT/ HEfrIA- FOR FUNC- OR PANEL ID. HODIFI- CATECORY/ TION IMPLEMEN-HED DESCRIPTION TION SUBSYSTEM COMPONENT I.D. NO. CATION PRIORITY ACTION TATION CONiENTS/ RESOLUTIONS location of functional E0P-4 Off-Cas Labels on 9-02 71T Enhanc. A Fix 85 labels of off gas vent vent pipe Ind. Heters  !

pipe indication meters ,

era inconsistent (some- l times above or below meter)

Off-Cas vent pipe EOP-4 Off-Gas Recorder 9-02 72T Enhanc. B Fix Ist rscorder pointer covers vent pipe Refueling rstding on scale Inconsistent functional E0P-4 Service Ind. Hetere 9-02 73T ! Enhanc. A Fix 85 libeling between meter Water 4 Recorders cnd recorder for service Radiation water radiation Honitor monitor Service water radiation IDP-4 Service Radiation 9-02 74T Enhanc. B Fix Ist rscorder pointer covers water Recorder Refueling recding on scale.

Radiation release EOP-4 Radiation Recorder VBD-Q 75T Enhanc. A Fix 85 Replace chart paper monitor recorder paper Release eccle does not match Monitors ,

indicated Vtt. scale.

CNS doae rate assess- EOP-4 Effluent Docu Rate 76T Other II Place on 3rd A backup method ment requires perform- Radiation Values Hod. PHIS Refueling available. Operator ing calculations uses a progransned calculator.

Site boundary dose rate E0P-4 Effluent Dose rate ,

77T Other II Evaluate 85 not directly available - Radiation values , Hod. Procedures Rzquires communication with !!P.

i

i

. APPENDIX B, 3. OPERATOR IlffERVIDJ RESULTS AND ASSESSMENT

. Sheet 25 of 26 PIANT ENilANCE- IMPLE- SCllEDULE SYSTEM HED HENT/ HENTA- FOR OR ID. HODIFI- CATECORY/ TION IMPLEMEN-IIED DESCRIPTION SUBSYSTEM COMPONENT NO. CATION PRIORITY ACTION TATION COMMEffrS/RESOLtrtIONS l

Operators express a serious Training Simulator II Other Hod. III Install Ath Protride plant need for integrated plant Refueling specific simulator training, training Lack of ventilation system Ventilation Filters 21 Design III Instalt 2nd supply filtration Hod. Filters Refueling Lack of an available backup Air Control 'Rous 3I Design III Install 2nd cooling supply for the control conditioning Mod. Refueling room air conditioning system.

i SRH Ramp switch is too small SRH Switch 41' Design III Fix 2nd for holding for 90 seconda Mod. Refueling in surveillance position; need an operator aid.

RFP minimum flow valve control RFP Switch SI Design II Fix 2nd switch installed backwards Hod. Refueling (turn to right to close) l Ite RPS Power supply lights are RPS Indicator 6I' Design II Fix 2nd opposite their respective post- Mod. Refueling tions on the transfer switch.

Sealing steam for main turbine, Main Label 71 Enhane. A Fix 85 Itbel description vague and Turbine unclear.

SBCT damper Positions SBCT tabel 81 Enhanc. A Fix 85 tre " Normal" and " Hand".

" Normal" is actually f'

tim g normal lineup. _

APPENDIX B, 3. OPERATOR INTERVIEW RESULTS AND ASSESSMENT (Cont'd)

Sheet 26 of 26 f

l PLANT ' ENilANCE- IMPLE- SCllEDULE SYSTEM IIED : MENT / MENTA- FOR OR ID. I MODIFI- CATECORY/ TION IMPLEMEN-IIED DESCRIPTION SUBSYSTEM COMPONENT NO. CATION PRIORITY ACTION TATION COMMENTS /RESOLITIIONS Control Rod drive water delta CRD Press. Ind. 9I Design II Fix 2nd Replace with standard-pressure gage has non-standard CRD-DPI-303 Mod. Refueling increments meter increments. .

Need for lower rangc meter for RWCU Flow Ind. 10I Design II Install 2nd accurate operator control of RWCU-FI-134 ' Mod. Refueling blowdown.

RI'R 2/3 core height level per- Rl!R's Label 11I Enhanc. A Fix May 85

. missive manual override switch label confusing Cland seal steam pressure gage Cland seal Press. 12I Design II Fix 2nd Replace gage.

range too large for normal steam Ind. Mod. Refueling operation No direct vessel level instru- Rx. Level Instrument 13I Design III Install 2nd ment on Panel 9-3 or Panel 9-4 Mod. Refueling i

Lack of digital indicators for Rx. Press. Indicators 141 ' Design II Install 2nd Integrate with IIED reactor pressure and reactor Rx. Level Mod. Refueling 18T, 131, ISI.

level (on panel 9-5 above top of fuel matrix)

Lack of direct accident water Rx. Level Indicator 15I Design II Evaluate 2nd Evaluate installation level indication Mod. Refueling of a compensating I

water level system.

Computerized tech specs needed Computer Software 16I Other III Place on 2nd Utilize key word i Mod. Prime search