ML20106F391

Human Factors Engineering Detailed Control Room Design Review In-Progress Audit,Cooper Nuclear Station

ML20106F391
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	12/28/1984
From:	Johnson G LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY
To:	NRC
Shared Package
ML20106F394	List: ML20106F391
References
TAC-56114, NUDOCS 8502130522
Download: ML20106F391 (16)

Text

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ENCLOSURE HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW IN-PROGRESS AUDIT NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT COOPER NUCLEAR STATION

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Gary L. Johnson L. Rolf Peterson Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory December 28, 1984

1 Human Factors Engineering Det&iled Control Room Design Review In-Progress Audit Nebraska Public Power District Cooper Nuclear Station 1.

INTRODUCTION On November 27 through 30, 1984, Detailed Control Roon. Design Review (DCRDR) by Nebraska Public (NPPD) for the Cooper Nuclear Station.

will (sprove the DCRDR and further its ultimate acc staff.

evaluation [1] of the Cooper DCRDR Program Plan [2].Of particul The audit team was composed of two persons from the RC Human Factors Laboratory, acting as consultants to the NRC. Engineering Branch

-During the course of the audit, the 15tC audit team discussed all aspects of the DCRDR program with NPPD and their DCRDR consultant, General Electric Documentation of the Control Room Survey, Function and Task Analysis, and H Assessment process was reviewed in detail.

visited the control room to audit the extent to which the survey discoveredA

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and documented human engineering deficiencies (HEDs), and to evaluate how the Assessment process identified HEDs that are significant and warrant correction.

A discussion of NPPD activities in each DCRDR topic area, identified by Supplement I to.NUREG-0737, and the corresponding audit team assessment each area 'follows.

2.

DISCUSSION 2.1.

DCRDR REVIEW TEAM 2.1.1.

Requirement multidisciplinary review team to conduct a DCRDR. Supplement Guidelines for review team selection are found in NUREG-0700, Draft NUREG-0801, and Appendix A to S 18.1 of the Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800 i

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2.1.2.

Audit Team Observations The core of the Cooper DCRDR team consists of:

The Station Operations Manager e

A Shift Technical Advisor with previous experience as a Shift e

Supervisor A Senior Systems Engineer from General Electric A Human Factors Scientist as a Consultant to General Electric e

Each member of this core team participated in the majority of DCRDR activities, i

Individuals with expertise in the areas of operations, systems engineering, human factors engineering, and instrumentation, and control provided support to the core team.

DCRDR team management and administration is provided by the NPPD Dperations Manager.

equipment, and facilities required to support the DCRDR effort.Th It was'noted that most DCRDR documentation is currently in the possession of General Electric.

2.t.3.

Audit Team Assessment r-The audit resolved questions regarding the composition of the review team

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raised in Reference 1.

complied with the DCRDR team requirements of NUREG-0737, Su NPPD should note that they will eventually be required to have copie documentation in the CNS files for quality assurance (OA) purposes. s of DCRDR i

i documentation should also be made readily available to the individuals and This organizations responsible for correcting HEDs.

2.2.

FUNCTIDN AND TASK ANALYSIS 2.2.1.

Requirement Supplement I to NUREG-0737 requires the applicant to perform systems function and task analyses to identify control room operator tasks and to identify control room operator information and control requirements during emergency operations.

Supplesent 1 to NUREG-0737 recommends the use of function and operating procedures technical guidelines and plant-spe operating procedures to define these requirements.

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2.2.2.

Audit Team Observations The DCRDR team identified operator instrument and control needs to per Operating Procedures (EOPs). emergency operations tasks defined in the These E0Ps were derived from generic symptom-based Emergency Procedure Guidelines (EPGs) developed by the BWR and included consideration of instrument loop accuracy during accident up conditions in the establishment of operator action, control, and caution points.

and task analysis to support development of the EPGs and a varying degree of detail as determined necessary b

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conducting this effort.

Characteristics related to indicator resolution or accuracy, and the availability of instrument and control loops under various plant power supply and environmental conditions, generally were not identified.

carried through to emergency and normal procedu E0Ps and explicitly referenced by the E0Ps the event-based Emergency Procedures curren. This effort was not extended to performance of the E0Ps but referenced only implicitly before the E0Ps are finally im WPPD indicated that existing Emergency Procedures.plemented they may be revised to incorporate They also expect to make procedure chan Management Information System (PMIS), and instru

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requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.97 (R.G.1.97).

2.2.3.

Audit Team Assessment The acceptability of basing the definition of informa without reyfewing the supporting task analysis.

separate IstC review of the E0P Task Analysis. Branch of the 1

The methodology used to define the characteristics of information and required to perform the E0Ps was generally acceptable.

s information and control characteristics were not adequ This methodology was analysis should be supplemented as follows to resolve these concerns:.

NPPDs

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Characteristics relating to operability requirements (e.g.,

o quality and equipment qualification) under accident conditier.

• r should be defined.

Requirements relating to indicator resolution should be defined for e

tasks in which the operator must determine the value of a parameter 3

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or compare the value of a parameter against a action, control caution point.

, or The level of detail in which required information and cont e

characteristics are defined should be consistent throughout rol analysis.

conducted through coordFnation with the Revaluation of in must ensure that R.G.1.97 indications req.G.1.97 program.tions umy be relationship to associated controls. suitably engineered from j support of the DCRDR. programs that will provide the required evaluatio n proper i

operability in The Function and Task Analysis must be carried through to i referenced normal operating procedures required to support perf and existing Emergency Procedures to the extent they adil be u alone procedures after the E0Ps are in place.

mance of E0Ps Revision of the E0P Task Analysis also may be req stand-Emergency Procedures are incorporated into the E0Ps or if the existing gency procedures.

with the,EOPs.

used in conjunction of SPDS and PMIS prThe Function and Task Analysis process m suggested, however,ocedures that support emergency operations.

e n the generation that NPPD apply this technique to all SPDS and PMIS It is procedures.

NPPD's Summary Report should address how resolu or will be incorporated into the DCRDR program, tion of these comments has b 2.3 COMPARIS0N OF CONTROL AND DISPLAY RE 1

i INVENT 0RY 2.3.1.

Reavirement M

Supplament 1 to NUREG-0737 requires the applicant to com

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display and control requirements determined from the task pare the operator control room inventory to determine missing controls and displa analyses with the in NUREG-0700 also calls for a review of the humae l

instruments and controls used to satisfy operator iaforfactors suitability o ys. Guidance i

requirements.

mation and control 4

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1 2.3.2.

Audit Team Observations the E0P steps, were compared against the instrum 4

r the control room during a series of EOP walkthroughs.

a e in walkthroughs the human factors suitability of controls and displays su During these E0P steps was subjec control room survey.tively evaluated by the review team, as a backup to the ng 2.3.3.

Audit Team Assessment The audit team concluded the NPPD method for comparing operator i

information requirements with the control room inventory can be used t satisfy the requirements of NUREG-0737, Supplement 1.

o Function and Task Analysis.information and control needs were not However, detailed Thus the rigorous and systematic r.ompar,ison required to determine th instruments and controls are. suitable to perform all operator tarks d e

emergency conditions Therefore, as the Function and Task Analysis is revised uring to address the concer.ns raised in the previous section, this comparison of information and control requirements with the characteristics of insta instruments and controls should be repeated to ensure all requirements e

identified by the Function and Task Analysis have been addressed The evaluation of human factors suitability conducted as part of the number of " survey type" HEDs identified during this effo 2.4 CONTROL ROOM SURVEY 2.4.1.

Requirement j

Supplement I to NUREG-0737 requires that a control room survey be c identify deviations from accepted human factors principles.

onducted to provides pidelines and criteria for conducting a control room survey NUREG-0700 objective of the control room survey is to identify for assessment and The possible correction the characteristics of displays panel layout, annunciators and alarms, control room,layoutcontrols, equipment ambient conditions that do not conform to good human engineering p

, and control room 2.4.2 Audit Team Observa M ons The Cooper Control Room Survey was conducted in three parts:

1)

A survey by a BWR Owners' Group (BWROG) team in 1981 was conducted against the BWROG survey checklist and included most but not all, control room panels.

2) Completion of the BWROG checklist by the NPPD DCRDR team not included in the original survey, and review of significant human s

factors deviations identified by the BWROG survey.

This effort took 5

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place in 1984 survey w0re not reviewed by the NPPD team. Items rated as low lev 3)

NPPD team control room survey against a supplemental BWROG checklist but not in the original Owners' Group checklist. developed t i

in 1984 This was also done The plant computer consoles were not included in the control room survey l

because the existing plant computer is to be replaced in the near future i

the human factors principles contained in NUREG-0700The BW the specific evaluation criteria are different and imprecise.y cases, however, In man The 1981 BWROG and the 1984 NPPD survey evaluated each control room against the principles and criteria contained in the BWROG checklist and supplement.

rating between one and four for each panel evaluated by th number' rating assigned represented the degree of conformance for the pane The a whole.

Thus, a panel containing severe deviations from human factors principles could be deemed "nearly in compliance" by the reviewer if the number of-deviations on the panel was small compared to the number of item which the principle applied.

generally not recorded except for items assessed to be significant to allow clear identification of the problem by individua HED review team.

As noted previously, the survey was supplemented by additional NPPD review team observations of human factors suitability during their comparison of inforination and control requirements with the control room inventory During a control room inspection, the audit team noted the following HEDs i areas where complete, or near complete, compliance with the corresponding) checklist principles was indicated by the NPPD and BWROG surveys:

Panels VBD-A and VBO-C:

o Several switch directions of movement are reversed from expected convention and from other switches on the

boards, e

Panel VBD-A:

Suction Temperature Indicator. Nonlinear, homemade, scale on Reactor Fe

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Panels VBD-A and VRD-C:

e view of position indices and labels on switch escutcheons.Roun e

Panel VBD-C:

Test, Reset, and Ground Reset Switches.No demarcation of Switchya 6

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_ Audit Team Assessment As discussed in References 1 and 3, the use of the BWRO can be used to fulfill the survey requirements of NUREG-0737. Supplement 1.

The audit team concluded, however, that documenting the degree of compliance I

as an " average" for an entire panel, and failing to document observed deviations from human factors principles in sufficient detail to establish a basis for the degree of compliance ratings assigned, is a misapplication of the survey guideline.

This averaging approach may have caused specific or individual items which should have been HEDs to be dropped without adequate assessment.

This concern will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

Further, finding the HEDs noted above, that were neither identified by the NPPD survey nor the NPPD review of the 1981 BWROG survey, causes the audit Survey was conducted. team some concern about the consistency with which the C NPPD should determine if the apparently und HEDs indicate a systematic problem with the Cooper survey process.ocumented recousnend that their findings and actions be discussed in the Summary Report.

We Resolution of these items may require resurvey of the Cooper control room.

' criteria comparable to the NUREG-0700 checklists would survey that is superior to the BWROG checklist criteria.

Since the PMIS and SPDS are not yet installed and thus conventions applied to the control room as well as the NUREG-0700 principles relating to computers are applied to these new additions.

The audit team noted that a number of changes that'may affect the control room environment and couswnications are anticipated.

j be adversely affected by the environment is to be installed.Also, new equipment that may modifications are completed, the environment and consnunications surveys should After these be repeated. Agairi basis for these surv,eys that is superior to the BWROG checklist.we sugge During breathing apparatus and respirators should be evaluated, resurvey The audit team is concerned that the level of detail in the HED reco insufficient to allow Engineering to develop modifications that will adequately correct HEDs without significant input from members of the DCRDR team.

possible that team input may not be available towards the eni of detail in which HEDs are documented to the point where e process.

clearly understood from the written documentation alone.

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2.5.

ASSESSMENT OF HEDS 2.5.1.

Requirement Supplement I to NUREG-D737 requires that HEDs be assessed to determine which HEDs are significant and should be corrected.

j for the assessment process.

NUREG-0700 contains guidelines i

2.5.2.

Audit Team Observations NPPD's DCRDR assessment of HEDs was conducted in two parts.

Deviations from human factors principles identified during the control room surveys were screened by multiplying a number (one to four) assigned to the likelihood that violation of the particular principle involved i

result in operator error.

If the resultant, the Evaluation Product, was further assessment. greater than eight, the deviation was considered to be an HED and called Human Engineering Observations (HE0s) and dropped from fu consideration Discrepancies identified by the Task Analysis or Operator Surveys were c.

onsidered to be HEDs and were not subject to the screening process.

Cooper's DCRDR team then split EDs into two categories:

those that can be corrected by enhancement and those that will require a design modification to HEDs that can be corrected by enhancement.The DCRDR team is recome correct.

I medium, or low /none safety importance categories based i

potential impact upon safe operations, potential for error, and cumulative and interactive effects among HEDs.

of high or medium safety significance be corrected and that many lowT significance'HEDs' also be corrected.

In particularly difficult ceses, a feasibility study is recomended as the first step towards HED correction 2.5.3.

Audit Team Assessment The audit team generally agrees with MPPD's process for assessing HEDs once they were categorized as such.

We believe, however, that the safety significance of the lack of lamp test capability was understated and recomend that the decision not to correct this HED be reevaluated.

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The audit team does not agree with the methodology for segregating HEDs and HEOs during the control room survey for the following reasons:

The assignment of the degree of noncompliance number based upon the o

suveyor's judgment of the " average" for an entire panel tends to mask significant HEDs.

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Failure to document the specifics of the HE0s identified made the e

screening process unauditable by NRC General Electric Ouality Assurance,, NPPD Ouality Assurance, or The screening process masks HEDs that should be corrected'to conform o

with control room human engineering conventions. Cor,ventions, not applied uniformly, are not conventions at all.

NPPD may resolve this issue by documenting the specifics of each HED in their DCRDR Summary Report and providing, for review, justification for each item not corrected.

BWROG position that HEDs identified by the control room survey w evaluated on an item-to-item basis [3).

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2.6.

SELECTION OF DESIGN IMPROVEMENTS 2.6.1 Requirement Supplement I to NUREG-0737 requires selection of control room design improvements that will correct significant HEDs.

It also states that improvements that can be accomplished with an enhancement program should be done promptly.

2.4.2.1 Audit Team Observations designated for correction by the assessment process,NPPD has no The Cooper DCRDR team has made specific recommendat bas about which HEDs f(-

should be corrected. WPPD management has not yet approved these recommendations or made specific commitments to 15tC regarding correction of 1

HEDs.

The DCRDR team generally recommended that all high and moderate significance, and many of the less significant, HEDs be corrected.

following scheduling philosophy was noted in the DCRDR team's recommendation:

The Most enhancements should be completed before return to power from e

the current outage.

l The most safety significant HEDs should be corrected prior to return e

to power from the next refueling, if design and equipment lead times permit.

within two operating cycles.All HEDs in this category are recommended f i

Correction of moderate significance HEDs is recommended prior to e

restart from the second refueling outage after the current one.

few items are deferred to the third refueling to allow coordination A

with other modifications.

The less significant HEDs to be corrected aae reconnended for e

correction within three operating cycles.

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complete by the fourth refueling after the current e

studies was recomended to identify appropriate modific cases, the ultimate schedule for correction will be developed by the studies In these 2.6.3.

Audit Team Assessment The audit team agrees with the general philosophy for selecting HEDs t corrected and scheduling completion dates.

applied to the results of the HED assessment.The same philosophy should be i

The recommendation to build a plant-specific simulator is commendable Training on this facility will provide further improvement in operator performance beyond that attainable by implementation of uniform contr conventions and correction of significant HEDs and HEOs.

provide schedule commitments for their cogletion.NPPDs S 1

and of cor'rective action and schedule for installation m Where modification approval Opon completion of the studies.

Safety Feature information and controls located on g neered particularly difficult.

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schedules.y studies before committing to specific modifications e

feasibilit

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implemented to correct these items.Nevertheless, we expect that timely mo 2.7 VERIFICATION OF CONTROL ROOM DESIGN IMPROVEMENTS 2.7.1.

Requirement design improvements will provide the necessary corr oom risk, unreviewed safe *y questions, or temporary r

, will not reased 2.7.2.

Audit Team Observations The process for verifying control room design improvements has not defined in g: eater detail than that provided in the program plan een i

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2.7.3.

Audit Team Assessment NPPD should submit the details of the verification process as part of the Sumary Report.

Particular emphasis should be given to identifying differences between the final program and that described by the Program Plan and to addressing the mix of personnel involved in the verification.

2.8 COORDINATION OF CONTROL ROOM IMPROVEMENTS WITH OTHER PROGRAM 2.8.1.

Requirement i

Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 requires that control r coordinated with changes from other programs; e.g.oom improvements be system (SPDS), operator trainir.g. Regulatory Guide 1.97 (R.G.1.97), and, safety paramet emergency operating procedures (EOPs).

2.8.2.

Audit Team Observations NPPD has developed a overall schedule for arjor NUREG-0737, Sopplement 1 items.

audite. The stated goal of this schedule is "to complete f he 5D Regulatory Guide 1.97 assessment, and writing of plant-s operating procedures at approximately the same time.. pecific emergency, supplementary work that is required as a result of the control room defian

. including any review" [4).

2.8.3.

Audit Team Assessment

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not apparent that NPPD has a positive program to ensure th happen in a coordinated manner.

the working level for these projects may be necessary to make the schedul come together.

P A schedule update for SPDS,~ PMIS, procedures,Teemor training, and K G modifications required to support the EGPs should be included in the Surunary 1.97 Report to show coordination tuong these itses.

Items of particular interest are that:

relabeling of control boards to establish nomenclature conventions happens concurrently with and are coordinated with procedure changes to ensure consistercy between control boards and procedures; installation of R.G.1.97 instrumentation required-to support E0Ps will be co@leted in time; and traihing will be adr.quately' coordinated with procedtfe an? Pardware changes 2.9 OTHER ITEMS s

The DCRDR team conductsj en operating experiente reiiew experience at Cooper Station and identified no HEDs.

of CNS operating experience-noted the good operating record of the plant.The eudit tea t

I identified no HEDs.is, therefore, not surprising that the DCRDR operating experience revie

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provide insight that would result in changed priorities fexp s and or certain HEDs.

NPPD is currently in the process of designing the re for CNS.

Although it is not currently a NRC requirementmote shutdown capability recomends that human engineering principles be applied to desi, the IftC a specification, and selection of equipment used for remote shutd the remote shutdown panels.

gn, conventions and nomenclature be maintained between the contr shutdown equipment.

om and remote For remote shutdown, PMIS, SPDS, and the Emergenc has a unique opportunity to infuse human factors priy Response Facilities, N conventions during the original design phase.

nciples and plant

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3 CONCl.USIONS the DCRDR requirements of NUREG-0737, Supplement rected towards fulfilling The ecceptsMiity of basing the CNS Task Analysis upon E0P evaluated. durin Cooper's EOPs. g-the audit.

Some revisions to the Task Analysis may be neede steps could not be of this review.

esult A number of concerns with the DCRDR process were identifi d b NRC audit team recommends, to NPPD, the following acti

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DCRDR program and foster its ultimate acceptance e

y the audit. The ons to improve their to these recommendations should be discussed as partNPPD's actions with re s '

Report.

of the DCRDR Summary characteristics for the E0Ps should:The task analysis defin e

e Define requirements for operability under accid noitions instrument and control loops located in harsh en i e

v ronments).

Identify requirements on indicator resolution for tasks th e

require the operator to determine the value of a parameter o at compare the value of a parameter against a action caution point.

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, control, or Maintain a consistent level of detail throughout th e

e analysis.

The Function and Task. Analysis should be carried thr e

i ough to:

required to support performance of E0Ps. Normal Proc j-e a are t

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in use after implementation of the EOPs. Existing Em Revised COPS, if significant revisions are required prior to implementation, SPDS and PMIS procedures required to support performance of e

E0Ps.

The apparent oversights noted in the Control Room Survey should reviewed to determine if they are indicative of a systematic proble e

with the survey process, and appropriate action should be taken The control room environment and consnunications survey should e

repeated after completion of planned modifications that will affect the environment (e.g., PMIS, SPDS, and a new communications system).

consnunicate while wearing self-contained breath

.s respirators.-

Human factors principles, conventions and plant nomenclature e

. consistent with that used in the control room should be implemen

. in the design of the SPDS and PMIS.

The safety significance of the lack of lamp test capability sho ld e

i be reassessed.

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The specifics of each HE0 identified by the Control Room Su e

should be documented and justification provided for any HEOs t are not corrected.

It should be verified that R.G.1.97 instruments required for e

and that relabeling of Control Boards and proce happening in a manner that ensures consistent nomenclature bet the procedures and boards.

w en Certain portions of the DCRDR program were not sufficiently mature of audit to allow assessment beyond that provid review.

e time in sufficient detail to allow MRC review and determinati

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requirements of Supplement I to NUREG-0737 have been met.on whether the DC ems i

Modifications planned to resolve HEDs should be described and e

completion schedule commitments provided.

Summary Report will be needed to provide descriptions and sch A supplement to the for modification plans resulting from feasibility studies The details of NPPD's verification process for HED corrections e

should be included.

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be included.An updated schedule for NUREG-0737 e

This update shows the interrelationship, Sup tasks.

Finally, the audit team submits the f l s among these consideration in areas not directly relat do lowing suggestions f NtlREG-D737, Supplement 1 to the DCRDR requirements of e

DCRDR documentation should be obtaiCopi ysis worksheets, and other individuals and organizations respoorganized ned from General Electric and modif1 cations and other related effortnsible for HE team members and s.

HED records should be u e

adequate to provide nonpgraded so the written document DCRDR team members a clear un each HED.

T e is W

Any portions of the Control Room Sur ng of should omke use of the !WREG-0700 checklistsvey t

• Further coordination of SPDS e

the working level should be c,onsidePMIS, DCRDR, R.

red.

The operating experience review should b e

experience at other BWRs similar to Coopee extended to in I

Human factors engineering principles e

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i of the CNS remote shutdown capability

, including the remote shutd panels.

Design conventions and nomenclature a e

equ.ipment should be consistent with thosepplied to remote s used in the control room.

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REFERENCES 1.

Nuclear Station Detailed Control Room Design

" Review of the Cooper Submittal," dated June 4, 1984 ew Program Plan 2.

Letter J. M. Pilant (NPPD) to D. G. Eisenhut (NRC)

Supplement 1 - Detailed Control Room Design Review (D "NUREG-0737, March 1, 1984 dated 3

i Permit Holders, "NRC Staff ReviaLetter D. G. Eisenhut (NR

. Applic Control Room Survey Program (generic letter 83-18)w of the Group (RWROG)

, dated April 19, 1983 4

Letter J. M. P11 ant (NPPD) to D. G. Eisenhut (NRC 0737, Sup Station,"plement 1 Emergency Response Capability, Cooper N dated April 15, 1983 9

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e 15

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