ML20199C843
| ML20199C843 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 06/12/1986 |
| From: | SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORP. (FORMERLY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20199C828 | List: |
| References | |
| 502-8500108-52, 502-8500108-52-RC, TAC-51232, NUDOCS 8606180271 | |
| Download: ML20199C843 (238) | |
Text
AGR EEMENT NO. 83A-C5 1323 05-766-XX I
NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT Plant Management Information System
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Cooper Nuclear Station 5
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSES REVISION, C DOCUMENT NO. 502-8500108-52 i
E JUNE 6,1986 E ',
REVISED BY flPPD Oft JUNE 12, 1986 Technical Review
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- ' U Configuration Manager Date Q. A. Manager I'
Date Project Engineer
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Manager Systems Engi'neering
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Date 8606100271 860613 PDR ADOCK 05000298 P
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2109 W. Clinton Avenue, Suite 800, Huntsville, AL 35805 * (205) 533 5900
E-RECORD OF REVISIONS
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REVISION LETTER DATE PAGES INVOLVED CHANGE NUMBER Oraft 5/22/85 Entire Document Change No. 1 A
8/22/85 Entire Document Change No. 2 B
4/5/86 Entire Document Change No. 3 C
6/6/86 Pages iv, v Appendix C and Change No. 4 Appendix 0 NPPD 6/12/86 Pages 23, C-5 E
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INTRODUCTION 1
- 1. 1 PURPOSE 1
E
- 1. 2 SCOPE 1
- 1. 3 TECHNICAL APPROACH 2
2 PMIS BLOCA DIAGRAM AND DESCRIPTION 2
8
- 2. 1 PMIS BLOCK DIAGRAM 2
- 2. 2 PMIS HARDWARE OVERVIEW / LOGIC ARCHITECTURE 2
2.2.1 Data Acquisition Hardware / Physical Location 5
2.2.2 PMIS Computer System Hardware 5
5 2.2.3 PMIS Display Hardware / Physical Location 10 3
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) 15
- 3. 1 INTRODUCTION 15 5
- 3. 2 PMIS FAILURE MODES 15
- 3. 3 GENERAL FAILURE MODE EFFECTS.
15 3.3.1 Introduction 16 3.3.2 Loss of Input Data / Display Capability by 5
Failure Mode 16
- 3. 4 SPECIFIC PMIS FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS 18 3.4.1 Control Room Area Device Assignment 18 E
3.4.2 Non Control Room Area Device Assignment 18
- 3. 5.1 Reliability of PMIS Prime Power System 19
- 3. 6 PMIS FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS 19 5
- 3. 7.1 Spare Part List 23 E
APPENDIX A FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION A.1 DATA ACQUISITION EGUIPMENT A-2 A. 2 INFORMATION PROCESSING AND ARCHIVING A-14 A. 3 INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING A-35 A. 4 INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EQUIPMENT A-70 APPENDIX D CONTROL ROOM DISPLAY SYSTEM E
APPENDIX C CONTROL ROOM DISPLAY SYSTEM POWER SUPPLY lg C.1 INTRODUCTION C-1
'3 C. 2 GENERAL C-1 C. 3 CLASS 1E MULTIPLEXER POWER SUPPLY C-4 lIl
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C. 4 POWER SOURCE RELIADILITY COMPUTATIONS C-7 C.4.1 Case 1 C-7 C. 5 CONCLUSIONS C-12 APPENDIX D PMIS "AS BUILT" SPARE PARTS LIST F
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1 INTRODUCTION
- 1. 1 PURPOSE This report documents the results of a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) investigation conducted relative to the Nebraska E
Public Power District (NPPD) Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS)
Plant Management Information System (PMIS).
Some ob Jectives of a FMEa are to:
E o
Identify possible system failure modes ano to consider their effects on system operactonal success.
o List potential failures and identify the magnicuce of their offacts.
o Provide material for quantitative availability and reliability analyses.
o Assist in the objective evaluation of design E
requirements related to redundancy, fatlure detection systems, and fail-safe characteristics.
E o
Provide a
basis for a
final spare parts recommendation.
o Assist in the development of a planned maincanance E
program.
E
- 1. 2 SCOPE
,E The analysis has been limited to the PMIS and its suosystems.
l The effect of this limitation is the excluston of interface I
computer systems and related equipment which are not anysically a
part of the PMIS.
Equipment which is required for interfaces with the excluded computers and related systems is included in this analysis.
E l
The analysis is 41so limited to the failure of mcdul+s i.i r minimum immediately replaceable parts) of the FNIS and the consequences of such a failure.
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- 1. 3 TECHNICAL APPROACH The
- FMIS, its mission and operating environment will be examined.
E A functional block diagram has been developed and is presented to show the functional interdependencies of the PMIS so that :ne effects of failures may be easily tracked.
A module by module failure analysis is completed and shoun in Appendir A upon which the FMEA is based.
I 2
PMIS DLOCK DIAGRAM AND DESCRIPTION
- 2. 1 PMIS DLOCK DIAGRAM E
A block diagram of the PMIS is shown in Figure 2-1.
This diagram is based on the PMIS requirements and functional specifications.
The functional block diagram is useful for visualizing the effects of a system failure.'
The conditions for PMIS success or operational status over and against a
degraded /down (failed) status is described below.
I
1.
Data Acquisition Hardware 2.
Computer System Hardware t
3.
Display /Hardcopy Hardware The Data Acquisition Hardware includes the multiplexer c;u ime t s fiber optic communication links and data concentrators.
All are I
products of Computer Products, Inc.
(CPI).
The computer cy. item hardware is based on two Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) VAi 11/780 computers-operating in a
redundant configuration as E
" prime" and "back-up" machines.
The Display System Hardwara is based on Model 2310 color-graphics display terminals suppl:ed ny Industrial Data Terminals (IDT).
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l The PMIS hardware outlined above is shown in the PMIS Block I
Diagram Gigure 2-1) and described generally in the following sections.
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502-9500109-52 REV LTR D Page 5 PMIS BLOCK DIAGRAM AND DESCRIPTION 5 Aortl 1996 2.2.1 Data Acouisition Hardware /Phusical Location The Data Acquisition Hardware consists of multiplezers in five (5) locations tnroughout the Cooper plant.
Data from eacn multiplexer is routed via separate fiber optic data links to E
redundant Data Concentrators located in the computer room.
Each multiplexer at each plant location consists of one_ or more multiplerer cabinets.
Each cabinet contains:
1.
The termination interface for the analog / digital field wiring inputs from field sensors.
I 2.
The electronics for signal scanning, conditioning, and digitizing the signal inputs.
3.
The communication and control equipment for each E
location.
I The Data Concentrator is a
high-performance microprocessor subsystem which receives, decodes and buffers the data collected from up to ten (10) multiplexer data links and stores the data E
for use by the host computers.
Two Data Concentrator Subsystems provide a high degree of system redundancy.
E Each Data Concentrator Subsystem communicates witn each multiplexer via a high-speed fiber, optic link.
Figure 2-2 is a block diagram showing the general data acquisition system configuration.
I 2.2.2 PMIS Comouter Sustem Hardware The Computer System consists of two DEC VAX 11/780 computers.
The System computers are confioured in a hardware cluster with 5
dual ported disk units, a
communications line switch and a
variety of peripherals.
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^ san rat ti$* a* camputer =v=* a hardware is siven in Taole g
2-1.
The equipment listed in Tab l e 2-1 is configurea to support failover to backup units for critical hardware to p r o v 3.i e maximum hardware sveilability for the PMIS.
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LIST OF COMPUTER SYSTEM HARDWARE j
1.
Computer System (two each) o VAX 11/790 Central Processing Unit (CPU) l o
6 Megabytes MOS Memory o
High-speed Floating Point Accelerator l
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o Magnetic Tape Controller and Magnetic Tape Drive l
- o DEC LA-100 Console o
Host Interfaces for Computer Proaucts Data i
o 40 Asynchronous Communications I/O Linus l
o 5
RS-232 Synchronous Communications I/O Links o
5 Parallel Ports for Line Printers o
Dual Cluster Interface (CI 790) l 2.
Shared Hardware / Common to Doth Computer Systems l
o 4 456 MD RAG 1 Disk Drives /HSC50 Controllers a
DR11-W High-speed Data Link (HSDL) for Inter-CPU Communications o
LP32 600 LPN Line Printer o
IDS Communications Line Switch j __ = ~ ^
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LA 100 Printers o
IDT Display Systems IL Fu I
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The DEC VAX 11/7G0 compucer is a
high-speed general purpose computer s p e c i f i.: a ll y designed for data acquisition ana realtime applications.
The VAX 11/780 consists of a standard CPU wien l
the High-Speed Floating-Point Accelerator (HFPA).
The HFPA nas the capability to perform mathematical functions in parallel with the CPU.
I The VAX 11/780 has a large instruction set that includes ftved I
and floating point arithmetic instructions.
A special lookaneaa feature (cache) and instruction pipelining enables the CPU to l
overlap instruccion execution with memory accessing.
This feature reduces program execution time, General features of the VAX 11/790 computer are:
1.
Byte-oriented memory (8-bit byte plus one parity bit) which can be addressed and altered as bit,
- byte, halfword (2-byte),
word (4-byte),
and doubleword (8-byte) quantities.
2.
Virtual memory support l
3.
Sixteen (16) general purpose registers that may be used for arithmetic, logical shift and floating point operations.
4.
Realtime priority interrupt system.
l 5.
Automatic traps (for error or fault conotetons)
I that have masking capability and maximum recoverability under program control.
6.
A comprehensive instruction set that includes the following:
o Bit, byte, halfword, word and doubleword operations o
Register-to-register operations o
Memory-to memory operations o
Auto-increment and auto-decrement of addresses
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o Fixed-point integer arithmetic oprrations e
in single and double precision formats o
Full complements of logical operations (AND, OR, EXCLUSIVE OR) for byte, halfword, I
word and doubleword operations o
Comparison operations for oit c y ce, halfword and doubleword operations o
DEC PDP-11 compatibility mode to allow execution of programs for PDP-11's unoer the RSX-11M operating system o
Shift operations (left and rignt) of word or doubleword, including logical, circular and arithmetic shifts E
7.
Built-in reliability and maintainability features:
E memory failures o
Full error correction of all single-oit o
Full error detection of all couble-uit memory failures o
Error history registers to record all failures i
I 9.
CPU traps which provide for detection of a variaty of CPU and system fault conditions to enable a high degree of system recoverability 2.2.3 PMIS Disolau Hardware /Ahusical Location The Display Subsystem consists of color-graphic display units E
mounted in consoles located in the Control Room ana Tecnntcol Support Center (TSC) and mounted in the Emergency Operattons Facility (EOF) console.
Included in the Display Suosystem ore E
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at CNS Chemistry and Health Physics.
Floor-mounted DEC LA-100 typers are located in the Control Room, the Technical Support Center (TSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
Also I
included with the Display Subsystem is the communication equipment required for the data communications from the various locations to the computers in the Computer Room.
A general list of the hardware at each location is shown in Table 2-2.
Five display units are located'in the Control Rooms one in a
turret in the Reactor Operator's consoles two in the balance of plant (BOP) console (one in a turret and one fixed) and tuo fixed in the Engineering console.
The communication link to the various displays and character I
printers located in the computer room is via direct R5-232 cables and limited distance (short-haul) modems to the Control
The three communication lines to the Offsite ECF are via long-haul modems and three leased lines.
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TABLE 2-2.
PLANT LOCATION OF DISPLAY HARDWARE 1.
Computer Room lL o
IDS RS-232 Communication Line Switch e
o Gandalf RN 3319 (rack-mounted) short-haul L
modems o
Three long-haul modems for the offsite ECF L
o Programmer's VT220 Alphanumeric CRT o
Programmer's LA-100 typer 2.
Control Room o
Reactor Operator's Console (NSSS) 1 IDT 2310 Color Graphic Terminal 1
DEC LA-100 typer 2
Gandalf LDS 319 short-haul modems 1
o 80P Operator's Console 2
IDT 2310 color Graphic Terminals 1
DEC LA-100 Typer 3
Gandalf LDS 319 short-haul modems o
Engineering Console 2
IDT 2310 color Graphic Terminals 2
DEC LA-100 Typer
{
1 SAIDT MUX 1
Versatec V-GO printer / plotter 5
Candale L')S 319 sh ort-naul mod ems
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PLANT LOCATION OF DISPLAY HARDWARE (Continued) 3.
Technical Support Center (TSC) o Two operator consoles with:
2 IDT 2310 Color Graphic Terminals 1
SAIDT MUX 1
Versatec V-GO printer / plotter i
DEC LA-100 typer 4
Candalf LDS 319 short-haul modems 4
Onsite Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) 1 IDT 2310 Color Graphics Terminal 1
SAIDT MUX 1
Versatec V-90 printer / plotter i
DEC LA-100 typer 3
Wandalf LDS 319 short-haul modems 5.
OHitte Emergency Operations Facility 3
song-haul modems All the equipment from the Onsite EOF except the modems will be transported as required l
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PMIS BLOCK DIAGRAM AND DESCRIPTION 5 April 1796 i
TABLE 2-2.
PLANT LOCATION OF DISPLAY HARDWARE (Continued) 6.
CNS Engineering 3
Programmer's VT220 Alphanumeric CRTs 3
Candale LDS 319 short-haul modems 7.
Chemistry / Health Physics 2
Programmer's VT220s 2
Gandale LDS 319 short-haul modems E
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1 3
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA)
3.1 INTRODUCTION
A FMEA is concerned with failure modes in a
system and the subsequent results of these failures.
The FMEA is also useful in providing (1) the basis for a spare parts recommendation and (2) to assist in the development of a planned maintenance program.
I J. 2 PMIS FAILURE MODES Failure points in the PMIS that are considered in the FMEA are I
as follows:
o DAS Multiplexers L
o DAS Processors o
Host Central Processors 1
o Disk Units o
Magnetic Tape Units l
o Dat.s Links l
o Display Consoles a
Hard Copy Terminals o
Power to any Single Device.
- 3. 3 GENERAL FAILURE MODE EFFECTS 3.3.1 Introduction The PMIS point scans include primary and secondary variaoles.
Primary variables are those monitored variables that provide tne 5
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most direct indication needed to assess the status /value of a
safety parameter.
Secondary variables are those monitored variables which provide additional information about a
safety parameter.
The secondary variables provide information to i
perform one or more of the following functions:
l 1.
Determine the cause of the degradation of a safety parameter.
2.
Obtain warning, regarding possible degraoation.
3.
Achieve better resolution in the measurement of :ne safety parameters.
4.
Provides a
means of validation of tne safety parameter status /value determined by the primary variables.
Validation is a procedure designed to increase the assurance that an indicated value represents the true value of a process variable.
Loss of data because of a PMIS failure mode has been minimi:ed by PMIS design.
3.3.2 Loss of Inout Data /Disolau Caoabilitu bu Failure Mooe If it is assumed that all input variable data is present at the input terminals of the PMIS, the data or display capability may
(
be lost by various PMIS failure modes.
These data /disolay l
capability losses may be categorized generally as follows:
1 i
1.
Loss of an individual, signal conditioning amplifier.
Loss of up to eight analog or up to sixteen digital data input variables.
2.
Loss of one multiplexer.
Loss of minimum group of data variables.
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Loss of an optical link from one multiple <er cabinet to DAS data concentrator.
Loss of one link out of nine paths.
A redundant path is available.
Minimal data loss.
4.
Loss of one data concentrator.
Loss of nine optical link inputs.
Redundant data concentrator.
Minimal data loss.
5.
Failure of one PMIS computer or disk system.
Redundant computer / disk path available.
Minimal data loss.
6.
A hardware failure in the display data I/O system will fault from one to all displays in the Control Room Displays. TSC, EOF and other PMIS areas.
The display I/O system is redundant, consequently unacceptable display system faults may be bypassed.
No input variables lost.
7.
A hardware failure in the peripheral switch syscem will not fault the display system proper but mau reduce peripheral switching to manual mode.
No redundancy.
No input-variables lost.
G.
Individual display /hardcopy failure.
Loss of l
display /hardcopy only.
No input varianles lost.
In categories 1 and 2 some data will be lost until these single I
point system failures are repaired.
These data losses are partially offset by redundant sensor signals routec into the system by independent signal paths and multiplexers.
Categories 3, 4,
5, and 6 are redundant system paths and cata losses will be minimal in these areas.
Category 7 is a single point failure system where one or more groups of peripherals must be switched ma n u a. l l y.
The peripherals on a system will always be switcha01e or latched on one side of the PMIS computers.
Category 0 is composed of highly redundant display systems and individual display failures do not represent critical losses of capability.
1 1
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- 3. 4 SPECIFIC PMIS FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS An objective of the FMEA is to evaluate the reliability /availablity by analyzing the effects of particular failure modes on the PMIS.
- 3. 4.1 Control Room Area Device Assianment Each of the five IDTS in the control room are served from one of the five DMF32-AD intelligent communications controllers.
To I
fault the Control Room Display System (at least two IDTs operative) four out of five controllers must fail simultaeously.
This is an extremely unlikely event in one path of this redundant system.
The control room display s i g r.a l paths pass througn enree peripheral switch control switches.
In this case two IDTS are I
served by switch 40s two by switch #1 and one by switch #2.
For l
a Control Room Display failure, two out-of-three switc9es.nust fail su.ch that tne IDTs they control are not available to cne Control Room Display System.
More specifically, tne two B
switches must be switch #0 and #1.
Any other combination of two switch failures will leave two IDTs operative which does not constitute a Control Room Display System failure.
A similar situation exists for the Control Room IDT signal patns through the Candalf Rack mounted short-haul modems.
Two of tne IDT signals pass through modem chassis #0s two enrough chassis E
- 1 and one through chassis #2.
As a result only a power suoply failure (PS3100) in chassis #0 and #1 simulataneously can fault the Control Room Display System (four out-of-five displays inoperative).
The UNIBUS - 2 interface between the PMIS computer and ene DMF32-AB controllers is the only other failure path in tha control room device I/O system and this module is common to all PMIS displays and hardcopy devices.
3.4.2 Non Control Room Area Device Assianment Failure mode and efforts analysis was used to develop the cevice assignments.
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- 3. 5 ADDITIONAL PMIS FMEA CONSIDERATIONS 3.5.1 Reliabilitu of AMIS Prime Power Sustem The increase in reliability of the Control R'oom Display prime power supply provided by the Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) has been investigated and the results of this analysis is gisen in Appendix C.
- modular, the FMEA was conducted on a
module by module basis in order from the cata acquisition section of the PMIS through the data processing section to the data display / recording system.
The FMEA is concerned wihh failures in all areas of the
- PMIS, the effect on the system and system return to normal stacus.
Each time the PMIS fails, a series of steps are requitec to me E
completed to repair or restore the system to its full oprational status again.
These steps include failure detection, fault isolation, disassembly to gain access to the faulty item, repair (or replacement). reassembly and test as shown in Figure 3-3.
Since the PMIS is highly modular, the failed part is locali:ed to a module, that module replaced with a module from spares and I
the failed module sent to a repair shop for offline repair.
Following repair the repaired module is returned to spares.
If the failed part is not a part of a readily removable module, the equipment is taken offline and repaired from repair parts or og vendor service.
The potential failure of each module or equipment is analyzed in Appendix A.
The following information is given for each item in Appendix A:
1 1.
NPPD Equipment Number (same as PMIS caotnet numcers M
2.
PMIS Cabinet Number 3.
Module Identification E
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SAac.19321 10,8.84
E 502-8500108-52 REV LTR D Pace 21 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) 5 Aoril'1996 4.
Module Function l
S.
Fai1ure Made i
6.
Failure Mechanism 7.
Effect on PMIS E
8.
Method of Failure Detection 9.
Criticality 10.
Recoverg Remarks l
11.
Notes
- E Module location is given by item 2.
Module identification is extended by a
brief verbal description of the item.
A I
description of the modules function is given in* item 4.
Potential failure modes and mechanisms are listed in items 5 and 6.
The effect on PMIS is listed in item 7.
The methods available for failure detection and isolation are given in item E
8.
The criticality of the failure is given in item 9).
The criticality of a Pailure is classified into four categor:es as f o 110ws:
1.
Minor failure - Any failure that does not degrade the overall performance and effectiveness of tne I
PMIS.
I 2.
Major / Minor failure - Any failure which has the potential to degrade the PMIS performance ano effectiveness.
l 3.
Major failure - Any failure that will degrade the PMIS 6erformance and effectiveness but can be l
l c on tr o l l e d.'
'E 4.
Critical Failure - Any failure that will degrace
'E t n'a system and immediate corrective action is required.
E 5.
Catastrophic Failure * - Any failure enat results in PMIS damage which would endanger PMIS mission accomplishment.
~
y-SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
,/ i SAIC-19321 E
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E 502-8500109-52 REV LTR 9 Page 22 5 April 1996 5
Recovery remarks are included in item 10) and indicate oriefly E
the course of action required to return the PMIS to operatinnal status.
The number of fatture criticality classifications in Appendix A
5 are summarized in Table 3-I.*
I TAMLE 3-I.
FAILUWE CHTTICALITY CLASSIF'1 CATION 5tfit* A R Y cutTICALITY CLASSfFICATI0d F4 tl.i!R E MINDH MAJOR / MINOR MAJnq CRITICAL TOTAL E
........................+..............+............................,
St10i,E ROINT 45 6
26 1
in
,.............'..........+..............+........+....................
REDtt.JO A*if 30 4
65 A
107
.......................,..............+............................
TOTAL 75 to 41 9
185 5
- From the total failure mode classifications in Table 3-I,::
can be seen that 58 percent of the failure mode classifications occur in a redundant loop of the PMIS configuration.
Forty-two E
percent of the ' failure mode classifications are single point failures but of this 42
- percent, 60 percent are minor mode failures and do not require immediate corrective action.
Of the nine critical failure modes eight are in redundant loops of the PMIS and while they require immediate corrective action they do not fault the Control Room Display System.
The one I
single point critical failure is the Star Coupler for which there is no mean time between failure data.
The Star Coupler i s,
- however, a
passive device and is not as susceptible to failure as a powered device.
While single point minor failures compose 70 percent of the total minor failures, these failures cover single point failures in the peripheral switch system and non-control room I
display /hardcopy devices.
Seventy percent of the major / minor and major failure modes are E
in redundant loops of the PMIS.
These faults are in Data Acquisition components and display /hardcopy devices which affect the Control Room Display Display System.
E There were no catastrophic PMIS failure modes ioentified.
E E
i
_ Scmsco. uc 1,0~S,me~ T,emm coe,ee.1,em SAIC-19321 10/8/84
502-8500108-52 REV LTR D Page 23 12 June 1986 The FMEA indicates that the PMIS and SPOS are highly fault tolerant.
The E
PMIS hardware provides a Control Room System availability of 99.80 percent as analyzed in Appendix B.
The Control Room Display System Power Supply has an availability of 99.83 percent as analyzed in Appendix C.
The series availability of the Control Room System an<1 Power Supply is 99.63 percent.
l i
The PMIS and Control Room Display System availability is based I
on immediate system repair by module replacement from the PMIS Spare List given in Appendix D.
E
- 3. 7. 1 Soare Part List The Spare Part List for the "as built" system is given in Appendix D.
5
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I 5
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,5 SAIC 19321 10/8!84
502-8500109-52 REV LTR D b
R-L APPENDIX A E
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION L
Fk Il l
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
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E 502-9500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Paga A-2 DATA ACQUISITION EQUIPMENT 5 April 1996 A.1 DATA ACGUISITION EGUIPMENT
'E lE i
B B
E E
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1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO.
9-90, 9-01, 9-82, 9-83, 9-G4, 9-95, 9-96, 9-88, 9-93 3.
MODULE ID:
Computer Products Inc. Model RTP 7436/21-000; Part No.
021-0211-008 A/D converter card.
4.
FUNCTION:
The analog / digital sampled data output from sensor variable signal E
conditioning amplifiers are converted to digital words which form a part of the data stream to the Intelligent Remote Control Unit and thence to the data concentrators.
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Daard component failure.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
A failed A/D converter will either E
generate meaningless or no data output.
The sensor variables being converted to digital l5 data samples will be lost until the A/D converter is replaced.
E G.
METHOD OF FAILURE:
The particular set of missing DETECTION:
sensor variables will identify the data acquisition cabinet and channel.
9.
CRITICALITY:
Major-The failed data set may include Control Room Display E
variables. The data is lost to both PMIS processors.Immediate corrective action required.
E E
E sc,,Nce.,,uc 1,oNs, men 1,0Nm cos,0 1,0N SAIC-19321 10/8/84
s 502-8500108-52 REV LTR B
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FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-4 DATA ACGUISITION EGUIPMENT 5 April 1996 10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed A/D card Reolace with spare A/D card Reoair failed A/D card and return to inventorg.
11.
NOTES:
e L
W H
n W
I EI 1l 1l ll SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC-19321 10i8c84
II l
502-8500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-5 DATA ACQUISITION EQUIPMENT 5 Aoril 1G96 E
1.
NPPD EQUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO.
9-80, 9-91, 9-82, 9-93, 9-94, 9-85, 9-86, 9-88, 9-93 3.
MODULE ID:
CPI Model 7411/60-001; Part 022-5002-000, 022-5002-001, 021-0004-000s E
Intelligent Remote Control Unit, Dual 4.
FUNCTION:
The Intelligent Remote Control B
Unit interfaces data I/O via che high-speed optical modems and the sensor data multiplexer I
in the data acquisition multiplexer cabinets.
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Board component failure.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Failure of an IRCU causes a loss of data to one data E
concentrator. In tnis case all data from a particular data acquisition cabinet is lost to I
that particular data concentrator until the fault is corrected.
Control Room Data Display Sysbem data may be included.
9.
METHOD OF FAILURE The particular set of missing DETECTION:
sensor variables will identify the E
data acquisition cabinet anc channels faulted.
9.
CRITICALITY:
Major-PMIS operating without I
backup in the failed data acquisition system cabinet.
Immediate corrective action I
required.
II E
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC.19321 10/8/84
l 502-9500108-52 REV LTR D FAILUREMODEANDEFFEChSANALYSISDOCUMENTATION Page A-6 DATA ACQUISITION EGUIPMENT 5 Anvii iGas 10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Failover to backup data E
concentrator if primary data concentrator is affected.
Remove failed IRCU module.
I Reoair failed IRCU and return to inventory.
11.
NOTES:
E E
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E E
E E
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~ SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC-19321 E
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E 502-8500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALiSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-7 DATA ACGUISITION EGUIPMENT 5 Aoai l 199e 1.
NPPD EQUIP. NO. -
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO.
9-80, 9-81, 9-82, 9-83, 9-84, 9-95, 9-86, 9-88, 9-93 3.
MODULE ID:
CPI Model 7420/60-000; Part No.
021-5258-000, high-speed optical modem. Remote multiplexer cabinet 4.
FUNCTION:
The high-speed optical modem interfaces the I/O data stream from the data acquisition I
multiplexer cabinets with the optical cable link
~
with the data concentrators.
Two HSOM's per mux cabinet.
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Board component failure. Optical signal output device.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated I
failure. Modulaced light source failure.
7.
'EFFECT ON PMIS:
Failure of one HSOM will cause a E
loss of data to one data concentrator.
In this case all data from a particular I
data acquisition caoinet is lost to that particular da ta concentrator.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE Bad data flags from one PMIS CPU DETECTION:
at the operators console. Data channels lost will indicate aata aquisition group.
9.
CRITICALITY:
Major-Immediate corrective action required.
I 10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Failover to backup data concentrator if primary data concentrator is affected.
Remove failed HSOM module Reolace with spare HSCM mooul+
Reoaiz failed HSGM anc return to service or spare inventory.
S AIC-19321 10/8/84
l
'E 502-9500109-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Paga A-2 DATA ACGUISITION EGUIPMENT 5 anni 1 icce 11.
NOTES:
H50M, optical cable or HSD5P units I
all produce approximately same fault situation.
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l.
NPPD EQUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet numoer.
2.
NO.
9-104 (System A); 9-105 (System D) 3.
MODULE ID:
Computer Products Inc. Model RTP 7420/65-000s Part No.
021-5261-000. Computer Room; High Speed dual serial port 4.
FUNCTION:
High-speed dual serial port interface between optical cable inputs from all mux caninets to data concentrators A and B.
Two HSDSP's per data concentrator for 9 optical I/O ports.
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Board component failure.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state E
(IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Loss of I/O interface witn two of the remote multiplexer caninets to one data concentr'ator.
Loss of one I/O interface may indicate an optical cable failure.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE Bad data flags from one PMIS CPU E
DETECTION:
at the operators console. Data channels lost will indicate data aquisition group.
9.
CRITICALITY:
Major-Immediate corrective action required.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Failover to backup data I
concentrator if primary data concentrator is affected.
Remove failed HSDSP unic I
R_e o l a c e with spare HSDSP unic Reoair failed HSDSP anc return to service or spare inventory.
II
__ =
b SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
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-5 Aoril 1C86 11.
NOTES:
Optical cable failure or high-speed optical modem may be faulted module in single channel failures.
See Figure 2-2.
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~ SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION S AIC-19321 10,8,84
e l
4 502-8500108-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-11
~
DATA ACGUISITION EGUIPMENT 5 Aoril 1996 1.
NPPD EQUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO.
9-104 ( SYSTEM A ); 9-105
( SYSTEM B )
3.
MODULE ID:
Computer Products Inc. Model RTP r
8620/20-000 Computer Room; Data a
Concentrator 4.
FUNCTION:
Data Concentrator - Accepts data
[
streams from all plant sensor multiplexer inputs and formats telemetry records for transmission to the Central Processing Units (CPU's) 5.
FAILURE MODE:
CPU, msmory card component l
Failure. Power supply or cooling system failure.
l 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state I
(IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure.
l 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Failed data stream in one I
redundant I/O path to CPU-A.S processors.
l Minimal PMIS data lost during failover.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE Bad data flags and interrupts at DETECTION:
CPU-A,B operator consoles 9.
CRITICALITY:
Major-PMIS operating without backup capability in plant sensor data input system. Immediate corrective action should be taken.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed Data Concentrator to offline status. Run diagnostic programs to determine failed component.
11.
NOTES:
See Figure 2-2 mE-s_
= SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 10,8;84 J
502-9500108-52 REV LTR B FTILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-12 DATA ACGUISITION EQUIPMENT 5 April 1996 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO.
9-104 ( SYSTEM A ); 9-105
( SYSTEM B.)
E 3.
MODULE ID:
Computer Products Inc. Model RTP 7420/70 Computer Room; Parallel Host Interface 4.
FUNCTION:
Two RTP 7420/70 units per Data C'oncentrator provides two data communication output channels to each of the PMIS CPU-A,B data processors.
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Card component failure.
Power supply or cooling system failure.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Failed data stream to one data I/O path to either CPU-A or CPU-B processor. Minimal PMIS data lost during failover.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE Dad data flags and interrupts at DETECTION:
CPU-A,8 operator consoles i
9.
CRITICALITY:
Major-PMIS operating without backup capability in plant sensor data input system to one processor. Immediate corrective action shoul( be taken.
I 10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed Parallel Host Interface units Reolace with spare unit.
I Reoair failed RTP 7420/70 and return to service or spare parts inventory.
lII r_
25 2~
i
_E EE i
Jh SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 10/8/84
i 502-8500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-13 DATA ACGUISITION EGUIPMENT 5 April 1996 11.
NOTES:
A Data Concentrator failure fails two paths to CPU-A and CPU-S.
A PHI failure fails one path to one PMIS processor.
See Figure 2-2.
E
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_=
=_m Eh SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 10/8i84
502-8500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-15 INFORMATION PROCESSING AND ARCHIVING 5 April 1966 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO.
9-102D and 9-103D 3.
MODULE ID:
Computer Products Inc. - Medel RTP 7410/77-000 Computer Rooma Host Interface Adapter 4.
FUNCTION:
Host Interface Adapter to the Digital Equipment Corp. Model DR11-W Computer Interface Unit.
The HIA units accept the data stream from the PHI unit in the Data Concentrator unit and interfaces with the DEC DR11-W high-speed parallel interface.
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Card component failure.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Failed data stream in o.e redundant I/O path to either CPU-A or B processors. Minimal PMIS data lost during failover.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE Dad data flags and interrupts at DETECTION:
CPU-A or 9 operators console.
9.
CRITICALITY:
Major-PMIS operating without I
backup capability in plant sensor data input system to one processor.
Immediate corrective action should be taken.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed Host Interface Adapter Reolace with spare HIA unit Reoair failed RTP7410/77 and return to service or spare parts inventory.
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC.19321 10/8/84
E 502-8500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-16 INFORMATION PROCESSING AND ARCHIVING-5 April 1996 11.
NOTES:
An HIA and a PHI failure produce the same data I/O path fault.
See Figure 2-2.
!E 1
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11 502-8500108-52 REV LTR S FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-17 INFORMATION PROCESSING AND ARCHIVING 5 April 1996 E
1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS caninet numoer.
2.
NO..
9-102D and 9-103D 3.
MODULE ID:
Digital Equipment Co.-
Model DR11-W High-speed Parallel Interface.
Computer Room 4.
FUNCTION:
General purpose direct memory access (DMA) controller which i
interfaces the data concentracor to the VAX UNIBUS Adapter. The DR11-W controls the bus via non-processor requests to transfer data directly between the daca concentrator _and memory. Two DR11-W's per CPU control the two data concentrator inputs.
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Card component failure.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Failed data stream in one redundant I/O path to either CPU-A or B processors. Minimal PMIS data lost during failover.
9.
METHOD OF FAILURE Dad data flags and interrupts ac DETECTION:
CPU-A or B operators console.
9.
CRITICALITY:
Major-PMIS operating without backup capability in plant sensor data input system to one processor.
Immediate corrective action should be taken.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed DR11-W unit Reolace with spare DR11-W unit Reoair failed DR11-W offline and return to service or spare parts inventory.
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION E
SAIC-19321 10:8/84
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NOTES:
HIA, PHI, and DR11-W units are serially interconnected E
E 5
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[
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-19 INFORMATION PROCESSING AND ARCHIVINO 5 April 1996 w
1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet numo e r.
2.
NO.
9-102A and 9-103A l
3.
MODULE ID:
Digital Equipment Co.- Model DW780-AA UNIBUS Adapter 1.
Computer Room I
4.
FUNCTION:
The UNIBUS Adapter includes power supplys and requires a Ball-KU
{
mounting box and DD11-CK backplane to accommodate DR11-W interface I
units.
5.
FAILURE RODE:
Power supply component failure.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state 1
(IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Complete data stream loss to CPU-A f
or B CPU-A to CPU-B interconnect I
bus link also failed. Switch to hot-backup CPU if failure is in l
PMIS cabinet 9-102A. No switch if failure in cabinet 9-103A.
Some PMIS data will not be lost.
l 0.
METHOD OF FAILURE Automatic switch to hot backup DETECTION:
system j
9.
CRITICALITY:
Critical-PMIS operating wienout back-up CPU. Immediate corrective action required.
l 10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed UNIBUS Adapter Reolace with spare unit Reoair failed power supply offline and return to service or spare parts inventory.
11.
NOTES:
\\
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 10/8'84
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FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-20 INFORMATION PROCESSING AND ARCHIVING 5 April 1986 L
1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO. -
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO.
9-102D and 9-103D 3.
MODULE ID:
Digital Equipment Co.- Model BA11-KU expansion mounting oon F
and Model DD11-DK expansion backplane. Computer Room m
4.
FUNCTION:
Rack-mountable expansion box with slides for the VAX UNIBUS 1 expansion cabinet. Provides mounting space for five system units and is compatible with i
DD11-DK expansion backplanes.
Mounting for DR11-W units.
{
5.
FAILURE NODE:
Communication between the data concentrator I/O lines and the DR11-W High Speed Parallel Interface faulted.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure. Damage to backplane or Ball-KU mounting box.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Loss of coordination between CPU-A and CPU-B.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE Automatic system switch. Fault DETECTION:
messages at Computer Operators Console.
9.
CRITICALITY:
Critical-PMIS equipment operating without backup computer system.
I Immediate corrective action imperative.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove faulted branch of computer systems to offline status.
Repair Ball-KU or DD11-DK system Return Redundant brancn of computer system to online status SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 10 8/84
5 502-9500109-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-21 INFORMATION PROCESSING AND ARCHIVING 5 April 1996 E
11.
NOTES:
A failure of this type is fairly I
unlikely but would be a serious event.
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INFORMATIGN PROCESSING AND ARCHIVING 5 Ancil +CCs 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet numoer.
2.
NO. -
9-102A (Computer A); 9-103A (Computer S) 3.
MODULE ID:
Digital Equipment Co.- Model VAX 11/780 Computers-Computer Room W
4.
FUNCTION:
Central Processing Units of the l
PMIS. Includes High-speed Floating Point Processor, extended memory I
and LSI-11 console processor.
I 5.
FAILURE MODE:
Board component failure in any of the CPU modules, j
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure.
I 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
An automatic switch to the backup processor should occur if the primary CPU fails.
Fault messages l
will appear at the operstors console if the backup CPU fails 8.
METHOD OF FAILURE Fault messages at Computer I
DETECTION:
Operators Console.
9.
CRITICALITY:
Critical-PMIS operating without
}
backup CPU system. Immediate corrective action required.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove faulted CPU system from
{
online mode.
Run Diaanostic Proarams of failad module.
l Reolace or repair failed modul+
Return CPU system to online status.
11.
NOTES:
-s g_
=
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INFORMATION PROCESSING AND ARCHIVING 5 April 1996 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO. -
Same as PMIS cabinet numoer 2.
PMIS CAG.
NO.
9-113 (Computer A Console) 3.
MODULE ID:
Digital Equipment Co.-
E Model LA-100 Keyboard, send / receive, microprocessor controlled.
I hardcopy printer and terminal.
Computer Room.
4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS Computer A Operators Console 5.
FAILURE MODE:
Mechanical, electrical and electronic.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Mechanical moving parts, electrical motors, relays and switches, I
resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure. Insufficient preventive maintenance.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Faulted Operators Console - Manual switch to hot backup system.
No data lost.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE Operators Console A inoperativo.
DETECTION:
faulty computer responses or 5
no response.
9.
CRITICALITY:
Major-PMIS Computer A system E
operating without backup during Console failure.
Immediate corrective action required.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed LA-100 Console Replace with spare unit E
Reoair failed LA-100 offline ans return to service or spare parts inventory.
11.
NOTES:
See Doc. No. 501-650010e-105 for preventive maintenance details II
. --=M SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC-19321 10 8,84
E 502-9500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-24 INFORMATION PROCESSING AND ARCHIVING 5 Apr21 1986 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS caninet number 2.
NO.
9-114 (Computer B Console) lg 1
3.
MODULE ID:
Digital Equipment Co.-
3 Model LA-100 Keyboard, send / receive, microprocessor controlled, I
hardcopy printer and terminal.
Computer Room.
4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS Computer B Operators Console 5.
FAILURE MODE:
Mechanical, electrical and electronic.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Mechanical moving parts, electrical motors, I
relays and switches, resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure. Insufficient preventive maintenance.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Faulted Operators Console -
E Computer B system degraded or down. No data lost.
9.
METHOD OF FAILURE Operators Console B inoperative, 5
DETECTION:
faulty computer responses or no response.
9.
CRITICALITY:
Major-PMIS Computer B system E
operating without backup during Console failure.
Immediate corrective action required.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed LA-100 Console Replace with spare unit E
Reoair failed LA-100 offline and return to service or spare parts inventory.
11.
NOTES:
See Doc. No.
501-9500106-105 For preventive maintenance details.
E E
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
~
I SAIC 19321 10 8<84
L F
L 502-9500108-52 REV LTR B N
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-25 L
INFORMATION PROCESSING AND ARCHIVING 5 April 1996
- L 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet numoer.
2.
NO..
9-102A and 9-103A 3.
MODULE ID:
Digital Equipment Co.-
Model CI780-AA CompuSer interconnect adapter.
4.
FUNCTION:
The CI780-AA is a microcoded intelligent dual path computer interconnect adapter. It is used in conjunction with the SCOOG-AC Star Coupler and BNCIA CI cable
[
set.
u 5.
FAILURE MODE:
Card component failure, power supply failure or interface c-failure.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state P
(IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
An automatic switch to the
{
backup processor should occur if the primary CPU fails.
Faulc messages will appear at the F
operators console if the oackup L
CPU fails.
Some data lost.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE Automatic system switch. Fault f.
DETECTION:
messages at operators console.
9.
CRITIC ALITY:
Major-PMIS operating without j
backup disk system. Immediate corrective action required.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed CI7BO-AA unit l
Reolace with spare CI790-AA unit Repair failed CI780-AA unit and return to service.
11.
NOTES:
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION S AIC.19321 10/8/84
l 502-8500108-52 REV LTR S FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-26
)
INFORMATION PROCESSING AND ARCHIVING 5 April 1996 1.
NPPD EQUIP. NO. -
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO.
C-112 E
3.
MODULE ID:
Digital Equipment Co.- Model SC008-AC-Star Coupler-Computer Room 4.
FUNCTION:
The Star Coupler allows multiple computer systems to be
/
interconnected. The SC008-AC S
is a. passive device providing E
a dual CI path and electrical isolation between CPU nodes.
E 5.
FAILURE MODE:
One or more signal paths througn the Star Coupler faulted.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Physical damage-not likely to E
happen in service.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Faulted Star Coupler faults master
'and/or not-backup computers.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE Computer systems faulted on DETECTION:
startup.
l """
9.
CRITIC ALITY:
Critical-PMIS inoperative until repaired.
10.
RECOVERY REMsJKSr Return PMIS to offline status and repair or replace Star Coupler.
11.
NOTES-g lE E
i, SCIENCE APPLICATIONS ~lNTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC-19321 10/8/84
l L
FL 502-8500108-52 REV LTR B r
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-27 INFORMATION PROCESSING AND ARCHIVING 5 April 1996 l
1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO. -
Same as FMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO.
9-108 and 9-109 lI 3.
MODULE ID:
Digital Equipment Co.-
Model HSC-50 Intelligent I/O server-Computer Room 4.
FUNCTION:
The HSC-50 server offloads all l
disk management functions from the host systems and provides host-independent data base sharing for the connected. VAx I
11/780 processors. Included uten each HSC50 are two HSCSX-BA cata l
channel interfaces for disk drive interface.
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Card component failure, power t
I supply failure or interface failure.
j 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelatea I
- failure, f
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
The HSC50's serve both processors, B
it is independently powered and electrically isolated from the l
CPUs it serves. The failure of one HSC50 will reduce redundancy of the disk drive system. No data lost.
I 8.
METHOD OF FAILURE Fault messages at Compucer DETECTION:
Operators Console.
9.
CRITICALITY:
Major-PMIS operating witnout backup disk system. Immeolate corrective action required.
a -e by SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC-19321 10s8!84
E 502-9500109-52 REV LTR S FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-2S INFORMATION PROCESSING AND ARCHIVING 5 April 1996 10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
HSC50 has self contained diagnostics to provide host-independent diagnostic and maintenance Remove HSC50 to offline status Reoair HSC50 and return to service.
11.
NOTES:
E E
I lE E
I
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'=
-MJh SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION I
SAIC 19321 10/8/84
II 502-8500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-29 INFORMATION PROCESSING AND ARCHIVING S April 1996 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO..
Same as PMIS caninet number.
2.
NU.
9-110 and 9-111 E
3.
MODULE ID:
Digital Equipment Co. Model RAG 1 456 MB fixed disk drives.
4.
FUNCTION:
The RA91 is a high capacity, rack mounted Winchester disk to provide a formatted capacity of 456 MB. Two disks are proviced for each processor. One is employed as a system disk and one as a data disk.
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Mechanical, electrical and i
electronic 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Mechanical moving parts, etc.
Electrical motors relays and switches, read / write heads and I
electronics, power supplies, fuses, air cleaning system.
Insufficient preventive maintenance.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Failure of the system or data disk drive can result in an automatic switch to the hot backup system.
Some data lost.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE Fault message at Computer DETECTION:
Operators Console and/or automatic switch to hot backup system.
9.
CRITICALITY:
Major-PMIS operating without backup disk system. Immediate corrective action required.
II E
-gMJh SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION E
SAIC 19321 10< 8/84
502-8500109-52 REV LTR S FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-30
)
E INFORMATION PROCESSING AND ARCHIVING 5 April 1996 10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Place disk drive system in offline status. Repair disk drive from repair parts or vendor service.
Return disk drive system to service.
11.
NOTES:
E E
SAIC 19321 10;8/84
502-0500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-31 INFORMATION PROCESSING AND ARCHIVING 5 April 1996 1.
NFPD EGUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO.
9-102Ai 9-102B, 9-106 3.
MODULE ID:
Digital Equipment Co.
Model TU79-AB (see 11) 1600 BPI magnetic tape drive - System A-Computer Room 4.
FUNCTION:
Magnetic tape recording-System A only.
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Mechanical, electrical and electronic 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Mechanical moving parts, I
electrical motors, relays and switches, air pumps and actuators, read / write heads and electronics, power supplies, fuses, insufficient preventive maintenance.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
System A magnetic tape drive E
failure, f aults: 1) magnetic. tape data archiving, 2) tape playback.
PMIS data lost only if areniving is required during tape drive failure G.
METHOD OF FAILURE System A tape drive inoperative i
DETECTION:
l 9.
CRITICALITY:
Major-PMIS Computer operating lI without backup system if system B is required during magnecic tape drive failure-Immediate corrective action required.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Place System A magnetic tape drive in offline mode. Reoair tape drive from repair parts or vendor service. Return System A magnetic tape drive to normal service.
japr e_a_v a..
=
j
~ ~
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 l
E 10,8.84
502-8500108-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-32 INFORMATION PROCESSING AND ARCHIVING 5 April 1G86 11.
NOTES:
TU70 System includes, one massbus adapter, a tape formatter, tape drive, and power supply.
See Doc. No. 501-8500106-105 for maintenance details.
The massbus adapter is located in the PMIS cabinet 9-102A.
The power supply is located in the PMIS cabinet 9-102B.
The tape drive controller and tape drive is located in the PMIS cabinet 9-106.
l I
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Il l
l l
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E-E E----
Ibig.. SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 10,8/84
1 502-9500109-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-33 INFORMATION PROCEESING AND ARCHIVING 5 Aorti 1446 1.
NPPD EGUIP, NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet numoer.
2.
NO. :
9-103A, 9-103D, 9-107 3.
MODULE ID:
Digital Equipment Co.
Model TU78-AD (see 11) 1600 DPI magnetic tape drive - System B-Computer Room 4.
FUNCTION:
Magnetic tape recording-System B only.
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Mechanical, electrical and electronic 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Mechanical moving parts, electrical motors, relays and switches, air pumps and actuators, read / write heads and electronics, power supplies, fuses, insufficient preventive maintenance.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
System B magnetic tape drive failure, faults: 1) magnetic cape data archiving, 2) tape playback.
PMIS data lost only if archiving is required during tape drive failure G.
METHOD CF FAILURE System B tape drive inoperative DETECTION:
9.
CRITICALITY:
Major-PMIS Computer operating without backup during System D magnetic tape drive failure-Immediate corrective action required.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Place System D magnetic tape artve in offline made. Reoair tape drive from repair parts or vencar service. Return System G magnecie tape drive to normal service.
5 __
a- -
=
,. SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL C'.<RPORATION SAIC-19321 10tS/ 84
r L
502-9500108-52 REV LTR B
_r i
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-34 INFORMATION PROCESSING AND ARCHIVING 5 Acril 1986 11.
NOTES:
TU79 System includes, one massbos adapters a tape formatter, 7
tape drive, and power supply.
L See Doc. No. 501-8500106-105 for maintenance details.
The massbus adapter is located
[
in the PMIS cabinet 9-103A.
The power supply is located in I
the PMIS cabinet 9-103B. The tape drive controller and tape drive is l
located in the PMIS cabinet 9-107.
l 1
l' I
1 B
1 f_
Jb. SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 10,8/84
50D-8500109-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-35 INFORd4 TION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING 5 April 1986 E
A. 3 INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING i
I E
E
.E E
I 1 5
~
K $-
=
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fh. SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION l
SAIC-19321 10/8/84
I l
502-8500108-52 REV LTR G l
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-36 INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING S April 1996 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet numoer.
2.
NO.
9-102D and 9-103B l
3.
MODULE ID:
Digital Equipment Co. Model I
DW780-AA UNIBUS Adapter #2 -
Computer Room l
4.
FUNCTION:
The UNIBUS Adapter includes power m
supplys (9-102A and 9-103A)
{
and requires a DAll-KU mounting box and DD11-DK backplane to B
accommodate five DMF32-LP (DMF-AD) units.
l 5.
FAILURE MODE:
Power supply component failure.
l
.6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated B
failure.
l 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Complete loss of communication to B
Control Room. EOF, TSC, CNS Engineering, and Chemistry / Health l
Physics areas. No loss of data.
B 8.
METHOD OF FAILURE Loss of displays and hardcopy DETECTION:
capability at Control Room, l
EOF, TSC, CNS Engineering, and Chemistry / Health Physics areas.
j 9.
CRITICALITY:
Major-PMIS operating without backup display /hardcopy I
capability.
Immediate corrective action required.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failec UNIGUS Aaapter P 5.
Reolace with spare P.
S.
Reoair failed power supply offitne and return to service or spare parts inventory.
11.
NOTES:
^
E --
E SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION S AIC-19321 10< 8i84
I 502-8500100-52 REV LTR D
~
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-37 B
INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING S April 19S6 1.
NPPD EQUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO.
9-102C and 9-103C 3.
MODULE ID:
Digital Equipment Co.
Model BA11-KU Expansion Mounting Box and Model DD11-DK expansion backplane.
Computer Room.
4.
FUNCTION:
Rack mountable expansion box witn slides for the VAX UNIDUS 42 expansion cabinet. Provide 9 mounting space for five system units and is compatible wit 5 E
DD11-DK expansion backplanes.
Mounting for DMF32-AG units.
l S.
FAILURE MODE:
Communication between the A or D computer system and all peripheral display and hardcopy units may I
be faulted.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state l
(IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure. Damage to backplane or BA11-KU mounting box.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Variable and system degrading.
I Individual groups or all peripherals on the A or B
}
computer system may be faulteo.
No data loss.
B.
METHOD GF FAILURE Croups of peripherals relative to l
DETECTION:
particular DMF32-AD asynchronous controllers or all peripherals may be faulted.
9.
CR ITIC ALITY:
Major-PMIS equipment operating I
without backup display communications. Immediate corrective action required.
Il
^
J
. SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 3
10.8/84
_J
IL 502-9500108-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-3S INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING 5 April 1996 L
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove faulted branch of computer system to offline status.
Reoair Ball-KU or DDii-DK system.
~
L Retura Redundant branca of computer system to online status L
11.
NOTES:
IL L
E E
EI
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g
~
. SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 10/8 84
II 502-8500108-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-39 INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING
= Acril toc 4 1.
NPPD EOUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet nuinoer.
2.
NO. -
9-102C and 9-103C E
3.
MODULE ID:
Digital Equipment Co. Model DMF32-LP (DMF-AD) intelligent nigh performance communications controller-Controller 0-one each for systems A and D-Computer Room h
4.
FUNCTION:
An eight-line asynchronous M
interface between the PMIS l
computers, the system peripheral switch and modems and terminals.
I t
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Board component failure, failure may be one or more output ports to complete board fajlure (9 ports.'.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure. Card contact damage, power supply or fuse fault.
i 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
See Table A.3-I, Column I for FMIS peripherals faulted by complets l
failure of DMF32-AD Unit O.
In no case are l
all peripherals 4aulted in
=
any PMIS display area.
I 8.
METHOD OF FAILURE Comparison of inoperettve DETECTION:
peripherals with 5 Columns in Table A.3-I, will d e: t e r m i n o particular DMF32-AD eatled 9.
CRITICALITY:
Major-Control Room Display 1,
Control Room matr1x orinter I
and peripheral switen control are faulted. Immediate corrective action required.
I 10.
RECOVERV REMARKS:
Remove fatled DMF32-A0 controtler Reolace with spare controllwr Repair failed DMF32-AD conern!1er offline lE lg SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 1
_=
l3 SAIC 19321 to.e.e4
L
[
502-8500100-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-40 INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING 5 April 1G96 q
11.
NOTES:
Peripheral switen may oe controlled manually if required.
E E
E E
i rI L
I I
I l
5 SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION I
SAIC 19321 10e 8r 84
?~~L 502-8500108-52 REV LTR D r
I FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-41 INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING 5 Adril 1%
1 l
TABLE A.3-I.
PMIS DMF32-AD PORT ASSIGNMENTS
.......................+...................+...................+
C a b(f MN 1
2 3
4 5
l
.............+...................+.........+.........+.........
DMr No.
nMF No.
nMF No.
DMF NO.
OMF Mn.
I PORT 0
1 2
3 4
+.....__...._+........_+.........+.........+.........+.........+
l PARAF.LEL LINR I
PRINTER SYMC.
VAX730 MET ASYNC. 0 l
1 2
CR CR CR CR CR I
IDr 0 int 1 int 2 IDT 3 IDT 4 3
C/HP C/HP ENG FNG ENG l
4 0FEOF OFROF TSC ONEnr CR IDT SM SM SM SM l
5 ONEOF TSC ONEOF TSC TSC LA LA int IDT 0 IDT 1 B
6 CR NSSS CR. BOP CR NSSS CR.SPL OFEur LA. ALM 1 LA. ALM 2 LA.#ED3 LA. LOC LA l
7 SW VR VR I
CONTROL.
RPTS/RWM VT PRnG LA PROG,
+............+.........+....__...+.........+.........+.........+
CH CONTROL ROOM IDT IDT 7310 CRT
(*/HP CH EM ISTR Y / H E A fsTH PHYSICS VT DEC VT220 CRT ENG E*f G T N E ER I'f G LA DEC LA100 TYPER nN E3F 0*fSTTE ROF SM MAfDT MilY.
I TSC TFCHfitC% SitPD09T CENTER OF F0F OFFSTTF F0F VH VAX CnMPUTER RunM MFT HETEnRnLnGTCAL CnMp.
AL1 A f; A R M S p f,
- SPECTAT, O t. A REPnRT
- 7. SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SA8C 19321 iors,s4
F L
502-8500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-42 INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING 5 ADrtl 1996 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO. -
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
PMIS CAG.
NO.
9-102C and 9-103C 3.
MODULE ID:
Digital Equipment Co. Model DNF32-LP (DMF-AB) intelligent high L
performance communications controller-Controller 1 one each for systems A and D-Computer Room 4.
FUNCTION:
An eight-line asynchronous interface between the PMIS
~
i computers, the system peripheral switch and modems and terminals.
5.
FAILURE NODE:
Board component failure. Failure may be one or more output ports to complete board failure (G ports).
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure. Card contact damage, power supply or fuse fault.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
See Table A.3-I Column c-l 2 for PMIS peripherals faulteo I
by complete failure of DMF32-AG Unit 1.
In no case are all J
peripherals faulted in any PMIS display area.
p 8.
METHOD OF FAILURE:
Comparison of inoperative DETECTION:
peripherals with 5 Columns in Table A.3-I, will determine particular DMF32-AD failed 9.
CRITICALITY:
Major-Control Room display, Chemistry / Health Physics display, EOF SAIDT Mus.
TSC LA100 typer and Control Room LA100 faulted. Immediate corrective action required.
jf ~=
f
~_
.. SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION I
SAIC-19321 10 8484
r~L 502-9500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-43 INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING 5 April 1996 10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed DMF32-AG controller Reolace with space controller R.rj; d failed DMF32-AB controller ofe{line i
11.
NOTES:
j, I
l l
l l
l E
1 1
l 1
B 1
. SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 10/0/84
I 502-8500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-44 INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING 5 April 1C86 1.
NPPD EQUIP. NO. :
Same as PMIS cabinet numoer.
2.
PMIG CAS.
NO.
9-102C and 9--103C
{
B 3.
MODULE ID:
Digital Equipment Cc.
Node 1 DMF32-LP l
(DNF-AD) intelligent high performance communications I
controller-Controller 2 - one each for systems A and B-l Computer Room 4.
FUNCTION:
An eight-line asynchronous interface between the PMIS computers, the system peripneral switch and modems and terminals.
}
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Board eamponent failure. Faiiure may be one or more output parts to I
complete board failure (8 ports).
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure. Card contact damage, f
power supply or fuse fault.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
See Table A.3-I Column 3 for Pr1IS j
peripherals faulted by complete I
failure of DMF32-AD Unit 2.
B In no case are all peripherals faulted in any PMIS display area.
l 8.
METHOD OF FAILURE Comparise, of inoperative DETECTION:
peripherals with 5 Columns i
in Table A.3-I will determine I
particular DMF32-AD failed 9.
CRITICALITY:
Major-Control Room display ano l
LA-100 typer, Engineering CRT display, TSC SAIDT Mux control, E
and one EOF IDT display f aul te i.
Immediate corrective action I
required.
]
=
i
~
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 10 8 84
E 502-8500109-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-45 INFORMATIGN I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING 5 Aort: 1986 10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed DMF32-AG controller 5
Replace with spare controller Reoair failed DMF32-AD controller offline 11.
NOTES:
E E.
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION I
SAIC 19321 10,8'84
IL 502-0500108-52 REV LTR B e
l FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-46 INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHINO 5 April 1986 U
1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO. -
Same as PMIS cabinet numoer.
2.
NO. -
9-102C and 9-103C m
l' 3.
MODULE ID:
Digital Equipment Co. Mooel DNF32-LP (DMF-AD) intelligent
~'
high performance communications controller-Controller 3 -
one each for systems A and G-Computer Room 4.
FUNCTION:
An eight-line asynchronous interface between the PMIS E'
computers, the system peripheral switch and modems and terminals.
[
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Board component failura. Failure may be one or more output ports to complete board failure (8 ports).
m I
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state I
(IC) aging, heat or unrelaced failure. Card contact damage, l
power supply or fuse fault.
7.
EFFECT JN PMIS:
See Table A.3-I Column 4 for emIS l
peripherals faulted by complete I
failure of DMF32-AD Unit 3.
In no I
case are all peripherals faulted in any PMIS display area.
l 8.
METHOD OF FAILURE Comparison of inoperative I
DETECTION:
peripherals with 5 Columns in Table A.3-I will determine I
particular DMF32-AD failed 9.
CRITICALITY:
Major-Control Room display and l
LA-100 typer, Engineering CRT display, EOF SAIDT Mux control, and one TSC IDT display and Computer Room programmers display failed. Immediate corrective action required.
jT
~
=
=
5
~ SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SA6C 19321 10 8,84
E 502-0500108-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-47 INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING 5 April 1996 10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failea DMF32-AG controller E
Reolace with spare controller Reoair failed DMF32-AB controller offline t i, NOTES:
E E
E
..g E
- E E
- E E
E
!E
'E E
- 7. SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION S A8C-19321 E
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- _.. ~.. _ _ _ _ _. _ _. -.
11 502-9500100-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-49 INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING 5 April 1986 1.
NPPD EQUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO.
9-102C and 9-1030 5
3.
MODULE ID:
Digital Equipment Co. Model DMF32-LP (DMF-AD) intelligont nigh performance communications controller-Controller 4 -
E one each for systems A and D-Computer Room 4.
FUNCTION:
An eight-line asynchronous E
interface between the PMIS computers, the system peripheral switch and modems and terminals.
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Daard component failure. Failure may be one or more output ports to I
complete board failure (9 ports).
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid stace E
(IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure. Card contact damags, power supply or fuse fault.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
See Table A.3-I Column 5 for PntS peripherals faulted by comploto failure of DNF32-AD Unit 4.
In no I
case are all peripherals faultwo in any PMIS display area.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE Comparison of inoperative DETECTION:
peripherals with 5 Columns in Table A.3-I will determine particular DNF32-AG failed 9.
CR ITIC ALITY:
Major-Control Room display and SAIDT Mux control, Engineering I
display, TSC IDT display, Offsite EOF LA-100 typer and Computer Room LA-10v I
typer faulted.
Immediate corrective action requtred.
l lII l
3 __
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FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-49 INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING 5 April t%
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed DMF32-AD controller I
Reolace with spare controller Reoair failed DMF32-AD controller l
oHline 11.
NOTES:
l l
l l
l 1
I 1
1 B
i g=,jc.. SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPOR l
SAIC 19321 10< 0 / 84
11 502-8500109-52 REV LTR G FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-50 INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHINO 5 Aoril 1956 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO. -
Same as PMIS cabinet numoer.
2.
NO. -
9-130 3.
MODULE ID:
IDS Softswitch Model 9105 4.
FUNCTION:
Computer A and/or B communteation witn peripheral switch chassis E
- 0, # 1, and #2 on an individual basis.
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Board component failure.
l' 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated I
failure.
Card contact damage, power supply or fuse fault.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
A Softswitch failure may occur with no immediate effect on PMIS and become apparent during an automatic or software requested peripheral switch.
The actual communication line switch groups may be switched manually if the switch group power supply is functional.
No data loss.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE Unless the Softswitch failure DETECTION:
activates unscheduled
,!g peripheral switching, i may not g
be immediately detected. A frequent check of switch function should detect a quiescene failure.
l 9.
CRITICALITY:
Major-The peripheral swicch system may be operated manually in case of fault.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed Softswitch I
Reoair Softswitch offline. Return Softswitch to service.
l l ll
=
3.__
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 E
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FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-51 INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING 5 April 1996 l
11.
NOTES:
An undetected failure in caro 0 i
channeI L of the DMP32-AB card can inactivate the Softswitch.
l l
l l
l l
l 1
B l
l l
B 1
B l
B 3; _=
_.. SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
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E 502-G500100-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-52 INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING 5 April 1996 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO..
Same as PMIS caninet number.
2.
NO.
9-104; 9-130; 9-105 E
3.
MODULE ID:
IDS Master Module, Model MMT-2 (I unit per chassis) - Computer Room.
E 4.
FUNCTION:
The Master Module provides the power supply and control as switch modules (524). Software control of PMIS peripherals.
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Board component failure, power supply or fuse failure
(.750 A slow blow).
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor. solid stace (IC) aging, heat or unrelated B
failure.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Peripheral switch failure. If an automatic switch is initiated ene failed MMT-2 may fail to completely switch all peripherals. If failure is not a power supply failure a manual peripheral switch can be c om'p l e t e d.
A power supply failure I
will leave the S24 switch modules latched in the suitch position at failure time.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE Peripherals cannot be switched on DETECTION:
software command and possibly not on manual demand.
9.
CRITICALITY:
Major-The SPDS are dependent on all three switch chassis. See Table A.3-II for peripherals E
affected by each MMT-2) chassis group Immediate corrective action required.
I E
g SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
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502-0500109-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-53 INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING 5 April 1996 10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed MMT-2 Replace failed MMT-2 with spare unit.
Return repaired MMT-2 to service and spare unit to spaces.
11.
NOTES:
E E
E E
E E
E E
E SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 E
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5'02-8500108-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-54 INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING 5 April 1986 t
TABLE A.3-II.
COMPUTER RCOM IDS CHASSIS AND SWITCH ASSIGNMENTS
+........,....................+....................+.....................
C3LUwN 1
2 3
............................+....................+....................
SWITCH CAa. NO. 9 104 CAR. NO. 9 110 CAB. NO. 9 105 5
No.
CHASSTS so,
CilASSIS 81 CHASSf3 s2
........,.................s..+....................+....................
O LINE PRINTER TSC.f. A ENG.VT1 1
SPARE CR-Lal ON EOF-SM E
2 SPARE SYNC.
NOT IfSED TSC-IOTO 3
NnT USED VAX 730
.C#.LA3 4
NnT USED
~
NOT ftSFD VR.VT 5
CR.TDTD ROT t! SED MET E
6 C/HP.Vr0 CR-IDT2 NOT USED 7
0F EOF.fDT ENG.VTO NOT USED t
8 ON EOF-LA
.TSC-SM CR=fDT4 9
CR.LA0 ON EOF. int ENG.VT2 5
to hESERVEn*
CR=L A2 '
CR=SM 11 NOT U3E0 RPTS/RWM TSC-IDT1 12 NnT UsEn NOT USED OF F0F-LA 13
- CR-fDT1 NOT IISED VR.LA E
14 C/HP=VT1 NOT USFD FTLLER 15 0F EOF.SM CR-IOT3 FILLER
+........#....................+....................+....................+
- SEE DRAWING NO.
105 4500005-01 (SHEET 2 0F 4)
CR C0" TROL ROOM TDT IDT 2310 CRT C/HP CHEMISTRY / HEALTH PHYSICS VT DEC VT220 CRT E'-
ENG ENGINEERING LA DEC LA100 TYPER On EOF nNSITE EOF SM SAIbT Mi1X.
TSC TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER OF EOF OFFSITE EOF.
E' VR VAX COMPflTER Rn0M MET METEOROLOGICAL COMP.
1 I
lil SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION E
SAIC-19321 10.8;84 l
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FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page'A-55 INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING 5 Aoril ICG6
~
L 1.
NPPD EQUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet numoer.
2.
NO. -
9-1044 9-130s 9-105 c
3.
MODULE ID:
IDS Multiport Softswitch, Model S24( 8 relay units E
per chassis ) -
L Computer Room.
4.
FUNCTION:
Interface units with common L
RS-232C devices like terminals and printers.
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Board component failure,
~,
mechanical relag failure.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state IC aging, heat or unrelated
- failure, mechanical relag failure 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
An individual channel failure util result in a single peripheral fault or failure to switen
{
a peripheral.
B.
METHOD OF FAILURE A single peripheral switching DETECTION:
failure or failure to operate properly.
9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor - One peripheral device is l
affected I
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed relay Reolace failed relay with repair part.
11.
NOTES:
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC-19321 10/8iS4
__d
502-8500108-52 REV LTR G FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Pago A-56 INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING 5 April 1966 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NU.
9-10i 3.
MODULE ID:
Digital Equipment Co.
E Model LP32-EA 600 LPM Line Printer - Computer Room 4.
FUNCTION:
Software maintenance and computer operational hardcopy data output.
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Mechanical or electronic 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Mechanical (print heads, paper I
drive, fans, electrical motors, relays, switches, etc) and electronic (resistor, capacitor,,
solid state IC's, rectifiers, I
etc.)
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Impaired Loftware maintenance ai. d I
computer operational hardcopu capability during line printer failed duration.
No PMIS data loss.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE Line printer operative.
Faule DETECTION:
light on.
Fault message on computer operators console.
9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor - line printer is not essential to PMIS (SPDS)
I mission.
Single point of failure.
I 10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Repair line printer offline from same repair parts or venaar service.
l l
11.
NOTES:
Preventive maintenance is essential to minimize failures in this equipment.
See Doc.
No.
501-G500106-105 for applicable maintenance and I
diagnostic information.
l l
l l
l SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC-19321 10,8484
11 502-8500109-52 REV LTR G FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-57 INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING 5 April 196e 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO.
9-115 3.
MODULE ID:
Digital Equipment Co.-
Model LA-100 Keyboard, send / receive, microprocessor controlled, hardcopy printer and terminal. Computer Room.
4.
FUNCTION:
Software development and maintenance operators terminal.
E 5.
FAILURE MODE:
Mechanical, electrical and electronic.
I 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Mechanical moving parts, electrical motors, relays and switches. resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure. Insufficient preventive maintenance.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Little to none-No data lost.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE Programmers terminal inoperative.
DETECTION:
9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor-The programmers terminal is l
not part of the Control Room j
Display System.
t l
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Initiate repair procedures for l
programmers terminal.
11.
NOTES:
Tnis unit is servec from switen chassis #2 in cabinet 9-105, switch 13.
1
~m---h_^j-
~
N SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC-19321 10,8.84
502-0500108-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-59 INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING 5 April 1996 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet numoer.
2.
NO.
9-116 3.
MODULE ID:
Digital Equipment Co.- Model VT-220-AA display. Computer Room.
4.
FUNCTION:
Software development and maintenance operators terminal.
5.
FAILURE MODE:
CRTr power supply, electronic or fuse failure.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Little to none-No data lost.
G.
METHOD OF FAILURE Programmers display inoperative.
DETEC TON:
9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor-The programmers display is not part of the Control Room Display System.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Initiate repair procedures for programmers display.
I 11.
NOTES:
This unit is served from switch chassis #2 in cabinet 9-105, switch 4.
l I
l l
l l
1 l
l SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SMC 19321 10,8,84
502-8500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Pago A-59 INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING 5 April 1986 1.
NPPD EQUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO.
Chassis 0, Cab. No. 9-104; Chassis 1,
Cab. No. 9-130; Chassis 2, Cab. No. 9-105; 3.
MODULE ID:
Candalf Model 3000A Card Modem Rack Mount and Model PS3100 power supply.
Computer Room 4.
FUNCTION:
Mount for RM3319 (short-haul) card modem communication interface between PMIS computer and remote peripherals. See Table A.3-III for remote peripherals served by Chassis O modems.
S.
FAILURE MODE:
Power supply failure, rack mount damage, fuse.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure. Card contact damage, communication cable damage, terminal or connector fault, fuse 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
See Table A.3-III for peripherals faulted by complete rack failure 8.
METHOD OF FAILURE Comparison of inoperative DETECTION:
peripherals with Columns 1,
2 and 3 in Table A.3-III will determine card modem rack mount fault 9.
CRITICALITY:
Major-control room displays are involved 10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed PS3100 power sup;1 9 Reolace with spare PS3100 module Reoair failed PS3100 power supply offline Il SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC-19321 I
1018184
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502-8500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-60
' INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING 5 April 1986 11.
NOTES:
Damage to the Model 3000A rack will require the removal of all card modems, repair
{
rack and replace.
E F
i l
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1 lI
>I iI
>I i
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC-19321 10e 8/ 84
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L TABLE A.3-III.
COMPUTER ROOM GANDALF CARD MODEM RACK MOUNTS F
L
.............................+....................+....................+
7 CU f.U M N 1
2 3
........ +.................... +.................... +....................
SLOT CAB. NO. 9 104 CAR. NO. 9 130 CAR. NO. c.105 NO.
CHASSTS 60 CHASSIS #1 CMASSIS #2
(
............................. +.................... +....................
O NOT USED CR.LA1 ENG=VT1 1
NnT USED NOT lfSFD nN EnF.SM 2
CR.TDTO NOT ttSrD TSC.IDTO 3
C/HD.VTO CR.IDT2 CR.LA3 4
ON ROF.LA ENG.VTO NOT IISED
~
5 CR.LA TSc.SM NOT IISED 6
NOT USED ON EOF.IDT CR.IDT4 7
NOT USED CR.LA2 ENG.VT2 8
CR.IDT1 NOT IISED CR.5M 9
C/HP.VT1 NOT USED TSC.IDT1 10 TSC.LL CR.IOT3 NOT USED 11 NnT USED NOT flSED NOT ifSED 12 Nnt USED NOT (1 SED NOT IfSED I
13 NOT USED NOT USED NOT USED
+........+....................+....................+....................+
SEE DRiWING NO.
105 8500005 01 (SHEET 3 0F 4)
CR CO*f TRuf. R004 IDT IDT 2310 CRT l
C/HP CHEMISTRY / HEALTH PHYSICS VT DEC VT270 CRT Ef!G ENGINEERTNG
ISC TECHNICAi, SUPPnRT CENTER OF EnF OFFSITE EDF VR VAX C0uP' ITER ROOM "ET METEOROLOGICAT. C0"P.
h SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC-19321 10/8/84 J
(
502-8500108-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATICN Page A-62 INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING 5 April 1986 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO. -
Same as PMIS cabinet numoer.
E 2.
NO. :
9-104, 9-130, and 9-105 E
3.
MODULE ID:
Gandalf Model RM3319/H (short-haul) card modems-rack mounted-Computer Room E
4.
FUNCTION:
Communication interface from FMIS Computer to Control Room peripherals. See Table A-3.IV E
for individualcard modem function 5.
FAILURE MODE:
Card component failure, rack mount failure 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state I
(IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
See Appendix page number referenced in Table A-3.IV 8.
METHOD OF FAILURE See Appendix page number E
DETECTION:
referenced in Table A-3.IV (see 11) 9.
CRITICALITY:
See Appendix Table A-3.IV for individual card modem failure criticality.
10.
RECOVCRY REMARKS:
Remove failed card modem I
Reolace with spare card modem Repair failed card modem E
11.
NOTES:
Failure of the standalone short-haul modems in the Control Room will produce the same effect on the PMIS as in individual care I
modem failure.
11 11 II SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC-19321 E
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FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-63 INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING 5 April 1496 TABLE A.3-IV.
COMPUTER ROOM GANDALF CARD MODEMS I
+......,......+..............+............+..............+.............+
DACK S t.U T CONTR0f. ROnM PERIPMERAT, SEE APPENDIX CRITICALITY NO.
- f 0.
MODEM Nn.
In p Acs-e I
............+..........................+..............+.............-
2 9
9-123R s0 SAINT-MilX A.79 MAJOR 0
2 9-1179 at IDTe0-CA A-67 MAJOR I
O 8
9-11BR s2 InTsi-CR A-69 MAJOR R
1 3
9-119R s3 InTs3-CA A-71 MAJnR 1
to 9-1208 s4 IDT52-CR 4-73 MAJOR 2
6 9-121B s5 InTs4-CR A-75 MINnR 0
5 9-124R sA P R I NT-rdSSS A-81 MTNDR 1
0 9-125R 37 PRINT-BOP A.R3 MTNOR 1
7 9-126R sR PRINT-NSSS A-85 MINOR 2
3 9 1278 so PRINT A-R7 MTNOR
+......,......+...
..........+......-LOG
......+..............+.............+
B l
l l
l l
I I
I 1
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FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-64 INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHER/L SWITCHING 5 April 19S6 L
1.
NPPD EQUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO. -
9-104, 9-130, and 9-105 3.
MODULE ID:
Candalf Model RM3319/H (short-haul) card modems-rack mounted-Computer Room I
4.
FUNCTION:
Communication interface from PMIS Computer to.the Technical Support Center (TSC) peripherals.
See Table A.3-V for individual card modem function l
~
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Card component failure, rack mount failure
{
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
See Appendix page number referenced in Table A.3-V.
l 8.
METHOD OF FAILURE See Ap p erid i r page number DETECTION:
referenced in Table A.3-V I
(see 11) 9.
CRITICALITY:
See' Appendix Table A.3-V for I
individual card modem failure criticality.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed card modem I
Reolace with spare card modem Reoair failed card modem I
11.
NOTES:
Failure of the standalone short-haul modems in the TSC l
will produce the same effect on the PMIS as in individual card modem failure.
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC-19321 10,8,84
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1L 502-8500108-52 REV LTR B r-l FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-65 INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING 5 April 1996 F
k TAGtE A.3-V.
Cn9PUTER RunM GANDALF CARD MnnEMS E
.......,......+..............+............+..............+.............,
RACK S t.07 TSC PERIPHERAT.
SEE APPENDIX CRITICALITY NO.
40 MODEM Nn.
In pAGE s c-
......+......+..............+...........................+.............
- 1
- S 9-134R sin IDT80 A-90 MINnH
- 0
- 10 9-135R sit IDTel-A-92 MTNDR
- 2
- 2 9-137R F17 SAINT-MUX A-95 MINnR l
- 2
- 9 9-138R *13 PRINT.
A.97 MINOR 1
+...... +...... +.............. +............ +.............. +............. +
- EMGTNEERING CHANGE ORDER N84 10 DATED 5-1-85 l
rn nRAdING NO. 105-8500005 01 SHEET 4 0F 4 l
lI TARLE A.3.VI.
l RACK SLOT CNS ENG.
PERIPMERAT.
SEE APPENDIX CDITICALITY NO.
40.
MODE 4 NO.
In PAGF s
...... +...... +.............. +.........................................
f 1
4 9-131R 814
2 0
9-132R 815 DFC CRTel A-101 MTNnR
- 0
...............................................................INnR I
- ENGINEERING CHANGE ORDER N84-10 DATFD 5-1-85 In ORAdING MO. 109-8500005 01 SHEET 4 0F 4 I
1 TARLE A.3-VIT.
l RACK Sf 0T CH./ HEALTH PHY PERTPHERAT.
SEE APPENDIX CRITICAT.ITY NO.
40.
MnDEM NO.
In PAGE a
......,......+........................................................
0 3
9-128R s17 DFC CRTs0 A 105 4 THOR 82 87 9-1298 81R DEC CRTs1 A-107 urngp
.......+......+..............,............+............................,
- ENGTNEERING CHANGE ORDER N84 10 DATED 5-1-85 In DRAdING MD. 105-R500005-01 SHEET 4 0F 4 SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC-19321 10/8i84
II 502-550010S-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-66 E
INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING 5 April 19E6 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
PMIS CAG.
NO. -
9-104, 9-130, and 9-105 5
3.
MODULE ID:
Candalf Model RM3319/H (short-haul) card modems-rack mounted-Computer Room E
4.
FUNCTION:
Communication interface from PMIS Computer to the CNS Engineering E
peripherals. See Table A.3-VI for individual card modem function 3
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Card component failure, rack mount failure 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state E
(IC) aging, heat or unrelated i
failure E
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
See Appendix page number referenced in Table A.3-VI.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE See Appendix page number iE DETECTION:
referenced in Tacle A.3-VI (see 11)
E 9.
CRITICALITY:
See Appendix Table A.3-VI for individual card modem failure criticality.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed card modem Reolace with spare card mooem Reoair failed card modem 11.
NOTES:
Failure of the stanc lone short-haul modems in the CNS Engineering area will B
produce the same effect on the PMIS as in individual card modem failure.
II l
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- II SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION l
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l FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-67 INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHINO 5 April 19G6 L
1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO. -
5ame as PMIS cabinet number.
H 2.
NO. :
9-104, 9-130, and 9-105 3.
MODULE ID:
Candalf Model RM3319/H (short-haul) card modems-7 rack mounted-Computer Room 4.
FUNCTION:
Communication interface from PMIS Computer to the Chemistry /Healen c
l Physics peripherals. See Table A.3-VII for individual card modem function F
L 5.
FAILURE MODE:
Card component failure, rack mount failure I
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelaced failure 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
See Appendix page number referenced in Table A.3-VII.
{'
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE See Appendix page number DETECTION:
referenced in Table A.3-VII (see 11) 9.
CRITICALITY:
See Appendix Table A.3-VII for individual card modem failure criticality.
I 10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed card modem Reolace with spare card modem Reoair failed card modem I
11.
NOTES:
Failure of the standalone short-haul modems in the l
Chemistry / Health Physics area will produce the same I
effect on the PMIS as in individual card modem failure.
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 1048,84 J
E 502-8500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-6S E
INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING 5 April 1996 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO. -
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO.
9-104, 9-130, and 9-105 3.
MODULE ID:
Gandalf Model RM3319/H 5
(short-haul) card m dems-rack nounted-Computor Room E
4.
FUNCTION:
Communication interface from FMIS Computer to the (On-site) EOF peripherals. See Table A.3-VIII for individual card modem E
function 5.
FAILURE MODE:
Card component failure, rack mount failure 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelatec E
failure 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
See Appendix page number referenced in Table A.3-VIII.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE See Appendix page number DETECTION:
referenced in Table A.3-VIII i
(see 11) 9.
CRITICALITY:
See Appendix Table A.3-VIII for individual card modem failure criticality.
j 10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed card modem l
Reolace with spare card modem Reoair failed card modem E
11.
NOTES:
Failure of the stanaalone short-haul modems in the (On-site) EOF area will l
produce the same effect on I
the PMIS as in individual card modem failure.
E E
i
,. SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC-19321 10.8.84 l
t
i L,
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lL 502-9500108-52 REV LTR B
~
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-69 INFORMATION I/O AND PERIPHERAL SWITCHING 5 April 1996 F
L, TABLE A.3-VIII.
COMPUTER ROOM GANDALF CARD MODEMS F
i
.......+......+..............+............+.............+..............
RACK S t.07 04.STTr FnF PFRIPHERAT.
MEE APPENDIX CRITIFAT.ITY Nn.
40.
%n0E4 Nn, In pAGF e s
......+......+..............+............+..............+.............
t 6
9 139R #14 IDT80 A-124 MINnR 2
1 9 1414 s2n S AInT.MllX A.127 l4TNOR l
0 4
9 142R 821 POINT.
A 130 lATNOR I
+......+......+..............+............+..............+.............,
l I
t.IIM G H A uf.
OFF. SITE gnF PERIPHERAI, SER APPENDTX CRITICAT,ITY unngw 40, MnDEM 1n.
ID PAGE s
...........+..............+............+..............+.............
I 1
9 139C e4 int'0 A-124 MINnR I
2 9 141C,85 SAINT MllX A.127 MTNnR 3
9 142C e6 PRINT.
A=130 MTNnR
,...........+..............+............+..............+.............+
l I
l l
1 l
1 l
lI 1
=_
w
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SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAlc 19321 10.8 84
l 502-0500108-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-70 INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT 5 AoriI t99e iE A. 4 INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT i
'E E
I E
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lE
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- E l
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC-19321 1018i84
II 502-8500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-71 INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT 5 April 1996 1
1.
NPPD EQUIP. NO..
Same as PMIS cabinet numoer.
2.
NO.-
9-117A 3.
MODULE ID:
IDT Model 2310 CRT, Display E
Generator and keyboard, Control Room-IDT unit 1
4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-Control Room Display System 5.
FAILURE MODE:
CRT, board component failure, fuse 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure, CRT failure, fuse 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Impaired Control Room Display monitoring and control.
Versatec printer / plotter E
hardcopy capability lost.
No system data loss.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE One Control Room display DETECTION:
inoperative all other Control Room peripherals operative. Fault message E
at Computer Operations Console-DNF-0 PORT-2 9.
CRITICALITY:
Major / Minor-Control Room IDT display is a potential SPDS display.
Immediate corrective action required.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed display l
Reolace with spare display Reoair failed display offline (see 11)
Return repaired unit to service and spare unit I
to spare inventory 11.
NOTES:
See Doc. No. 501-9500105-106 for t
applicable maintenance and diagnostic information. See Figure A. 4-1.
l l
=
. SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 1018s S4 1
I u
502-8500108-52 REV LTR B FL FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-72 INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT 5 April 1996 FL r
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MODEM #0 S1175
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MODEM C n
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MODEM *2 t
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1 MODERS *4
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S123A TO RACK OU INCOsWUTER S121A S1213 VSO R/
P1. OTTER T4 MODEM #8 toCRT S,_
S1388 I
peggg ALARM e
MOOGR0 g g LA.10B i
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MODEM # 7 IA100 I
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S17FA SPECIAL M00EM 89 t.A 00 saa 17972tAl FIGURE A.41 SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAC 19321 10/8< 84
ll 502-9500109-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-73 INFORMATION CONTRCL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT 5 April 1996 1.
NPPD EQUIP. NO. :
Same as PHIS cabinet number.
2.
NO.
9-117B 3.
MODULE ID:
Candalf LDS-319 (short haul)
E standalone modem No.
1.
' Control Room 4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-Control Room Display Communication link 5.
FAILURE MODE:
Board component, communication E
cable failure.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state E
(IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure. Damage to communication cable or terminals.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Degraded Control Room Display System information availability.
NSSS alarm /NSSS report hardcopy reports available.
No PMIS data loss.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE One Control Room IDT (9-117A)
DETECTION:
inoperative-all other Control Room peripherals operative Fault message at Computer IE Operations Console-l3 DMF-0 PORT-2 9.
CRITIC ALITY:
Minor / Major-Control Room Display
- E System is essential to tne PMIS mission. Immediate corrective action required.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Check communication link-see 11 Remove failed short haul modem Reolace with spare modem or E
Control Room Unit.
Reoair or Reolace failed modem II
-~
-,. SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 E
10/8/84 i
L 502-8500100-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-74 INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT 5 April 1996 F
11.
NOTES:
There are nine (9) aaditional short haul modems in the Control Room Equipment L
hich can se used for quick recovery. The corresponding short haul modem
{
in the Computer Room will produce the same effect on the Control Room Display System on p
failure. Se ts Figure A.4-1.
L I
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JQ,. SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 10 8'84
[
11 502-8500109-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-75 E
INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT 5 April 1986 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
PMIS CAG.
NO..
9-118A 3.
MODULE ID:
IDT Model 2310 CRT, Display Generator and Keyboard, IDT Unit Number 1 Control Room.
4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-Control Room Display Interface 5.
FAILURE MODE:
CRT, board component failure, fuse 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid stace (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure, CRT failure, fuse 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Impaired Control Room Display information availability. No data I
loss.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE One Control Room Display (9-119A)
DETECTION:
inoperative-all other Control Room peripherals operative.
Fault message at Computer Operations Console-E DMF-1 PORT-2 i
9.
CRITICALITY:
Major / Minor-Control Room E
Display System is essential to PMIS mission. Immediate corrective action required.
l l
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed display Reolace with spare display Reoair failed display offline (see 11)
Return repaired unit to service and spare unit to spare inventory 11.
NOTES:
See Doc. No. 501-8500105-106 for applicable maintenance and I
diagnostic information See Figure A.4-1 l
l
- h. SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION l
S AIC-19321
,o:.:
502-8500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-76 INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT 5 April 1996 1.
NPPD EQUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
PMIS CAG.
NO.
9-11GB E
3.
MODULE ID:
Candalf LDS-319 (short haul) standalone modem No.
2.
Control Room 4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-Control Room Communicacion link 5.
FAILURE MODE:
Board component, communication cable failure.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid staca I
(IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure. Damage to communication cable or terminals.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Degraded Control Room Display information availability.
No system data loss.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE One SPDS (9-119A) inoperative-all DETECTION:
other Control Room peripherals E
operative Fault message at Computer Operations Console-DMF-1 PORT-2 9.
CRITICALITY:
Major / Minor-Control Room Display System is essential to the PMIS mission. Immediace corrective action required.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Check communication link-see 11 E
Remove failed short haul modem Roolace with spare modem or Control Room Unit.
Repair or Reolace failed modem 11.
NOTES:
There are nine (9) additional short haul modems in the
!E Control Room Equipment 5
which can be used for quick recovery. The corresponding short haul b
i I
=?
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION I
SAIC 19321 10/8.84 l
502-0500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-77 INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT 5 April 1996 modem in the Computer Room will produce the same effect i
I on the Control Room on failure.
See Figure A.4-1 i
E E
E E
l E
~
.. SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 10/8e 84
502-8500108-52 REV LTR B l
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-76 INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT 5 April 1986 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO. -
Same as PMIS cabine number.
2.
NO..
9-119A E
3.
MODULE ID:
IDT Model 2310 CRT, Display Generator and keyboard, Control Room-IDT unit No.
3.
4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-Control Room Display Interface 5.
FAILURE MODE:
CRT, Board component failure, fuse 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid staca (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure, CRT failure, fuse 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Impaired Control Room monitoring and control. Versatec printer / plotter hardcopy capability lost.
No system data loss.
9.
METHOD OF FAILURE One display inoperative, DETECTION:
all other Control Room peripherals operative. Fault message at l
Computer Operations Console-l DMF-3 PORT-2 E
9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor / Major-Control Room IDT display failure. Immediate corrective action required.
l l
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed display Reolace with spare display Repair failed display offline (see 11)
Return repaired unit to service l
and spare unit to spare inventory 11.
NOTES:
See Doc. No. 501-8500105-106 for applicable maintenance and diagnostic information See Figure A 4-1 l
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 10/8/84
502-0500108-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-79 INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT 5 April 1996 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO. -
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO. -
9-119D 3.
MODULE ID:
Gandalf LDS-319 (short haul) standalone modem No.
3.
Control Room 4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-Control Room Display Communication link 5.
FAILURE MODE:
Doard component, communication cable failure.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure. Damage to communication cable or terminals.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Degraded Control Room Display information availability.
Alarm report hardcopy reports available No system data loss.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE One Control Room IDT (9-119A)
DETECTION:
inoperative-all other Control Room peripherals operative Fault message at I
Computer Operations Console-DMF-3 PORT-2 9.
CRITICALITY:
Minar/ Major-Control Room Display System is essential to the PMIS mission. Immediate corrective action required.
l 10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Check communication link-see 11 Remove failed short haul mocem Reolace with spare modem or Control Room Unit.
Reoair or Reolace failed modem 11.
NOTES:
There are nine (9) additional short haul modems in the Control Room Equipment which can be used for quick IDT
~ SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 10/8/84 l
502-8500108-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-80 INFORMATION CONTRCL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EQUIPMENT 5 April 1996 recovery. The corresponding short haul modem in the Computer Room will produce the same effect on the Control Room Display System on failure.
See Figure A.4-1 II l
i l
l l
l SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC-19321 10/8/84
502-8500108-52 REV LTR 8 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-81 INFORMATION CONTAOL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT 5 Aceil TC9%
1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
i 2.
PMIS CAG.
NO.
9-120A i
3.
MODULE ID:
IDT Model 2310 CRT, Display Control Generator and Keyboard, Control Room Display System Unit Number 2.
II 4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS Display Interface 5.
FAILURE MODE:
CRT, board component failure, fuse 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelateo failure, CRT failure, fuse 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Impaired Control Room Display information availability.
No data loss.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE One Control Room IDT.(9-120A)
DETECTION:
inoperati've-all other Control Room peripherals operative.
Fault message at Computer Operations Console-DMF-2 PORT-2 9.
CRITICALITY:
Major / Minor-Control Room Display System is essential to PMIS mission. Immediate corrective action required.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed display Reolace with spare display Repair failed display offline (see 11)
Return repaired unit to service and spare unit to spara inventory 11.
NOTES:
See Doc. No.
501-8500105-10e see applicable maintenance and diagnostic information See Figure A.4-1 i
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SA C19321 10/8/84 a - -. _. -.,... -
r) 502-9500109-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-92 INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT 5 April 1986 1.
NPPD EQUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS caninet number.
2.
NO. :
9-120B 3.
MODULE ID:
Candalf LDS-319 (short haul) standalone modem No.
4.
Control Room 4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-Control Room Display Communication link 5
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Board component, communication cable failure.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state
\\
(IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure. Damage to communication cable or terminals.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Deg.raded Control Room Display information availability.
DOP alarm report hardcopy reports available.
No system data loss.
G.
METHOD OF FAILURE One Control Room (9-120A) display E
DETECTION:
inoperative-all other Control Room p'eripherals operative Fault message at Computer Operations Console-DMF-2 PORT-2 9.
CRITICALITY:
Major / Minor-Control Room Display IDT is essential to the PMIS mission. Immediate corrective action required.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Check communication link-see 11 Remove failed short haul modem Reclace with spare modem or Control Room Unit.
)E Reoair or Reolace failed modem 11.
NOTES:
There are nine (9) additional short haul modems in the Control Room Equipment which can be used for quick recovery. The corresponding short haul modem II
,,, SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION S AIC-19321 10/8/84
502-8500108-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-93 l
INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EQUIPMENT S April 1996 in the Computer Room will produce the same effect on the Control Room IDT on failure.
See Figure A.4-1 E
E E
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E E
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. sc,eNce,Puc 1,0Ns,mRN 1,0N < cos oe 1,0N l
SAIC 19321 10/8/84
E l
502-8500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-94 INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT 5 April 1996 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
PMIS CAG.
NO.
9-12iA 3.
MODULE ID:
IDT Model 2310 CRT. Display Generator and keyboard, Control Room IDT Unit No.
4.
4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-Control Room Display Interface 5.
FAILURE MODE:
CRT, board component failure, fuse 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure, CRT failure, fuse 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Impaired Control Room monitoring.
I Versatec printer / plotter hardcopy capability lost.
No system data loss.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE Control Room display inoperative, DETECTION:
all other Control Room peripherals operative. Fault message at E
Computer Operations Console-DMF-4 PORT-2 9.
CRITICALITY:
Minar/ Major Control Room display I
is a potential SPDS display in case of SPDS displays failed. Immediate corrective action required.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed display Replace with spare display Reoair failed display offline (see 11)
Return repaired unit to service and spare unit to spare I
inventory 11.
NOTES:
See Doc. No. 501-9500105-106 for I
applicable maintenance and diagnostic information See Figure A.4-1 5
=~-
E SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION E
SAIC 19321 10.8/84 l
II 502-9500100-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-G5 INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT 5 April 1996 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO. :
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO..
9-121B E
3.
MODULE ID:
Candalf LDS-319 (short haul) standalone modem No.
5.
Control Room E
4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-Engineering display Communication link I
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Board component, communication cable failure.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state E
(IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure. Damage to communication cable or terminals.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Degraded Control Room display.
information availability. Special log hardcopy reports available No rjs tem data loss.
9.
METHOD OF FAILURE Control Room display (9-121A)
, E DETECTION:
inoperative-all other Control Room peripherals operative Fault message at Computer Operations Console-DNF-4 PORT-2 9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor / Major-Control Room Display System is essential to the PMIS mission. Immediate l
corrective action required.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Check communication link-see 11 Remove failed short haul modem Reolace with spare modem or Control Room Unit.
<E Reoair or Reolace failed modem 11.
NOTES:
There are nine (9) aaditional short haul modems in the Control Room Equipment which can be used for quick display recovery. The corresponding E
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION Z
- . E '
~
E SAIC 19321 10,8!84 i
E 502-8500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-56 INFORMATION CONTRCL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT 5 April 1986 short haul modem in the Computer E
Room will produce the same eHec e on the Control Room display.
See Figure A.4-1 E
E E
E E
E
'B B
.E l
E E
C E
-#fh SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPOR 8
SAIC 19321 10,8/84
E 502-9500109-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-97 INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT 5 April 1996 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO. :
9-122 E
3.
MODULE ID:
SAIDT Multiplexer Control Room 4.
FUNCTION:
The SAIDT Multiplexer accepts data from the hardcopy port on each Control Room IDT display system and relays data to the Versatec printer / plotter.
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Board component failure, fuse E
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or other unrelated failure 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Failure of the SAIDT Mux will fault the Control Room Versatec printer / plotter. Hardcopy E
recording capability is not available during the failed multiplexer condition. No PMIS data lost 9.
METHOD OF FAILURE Control Room Versatec DETECTION:
printer / plotter cannot be E
accessed from any Control Room Console 9.
CRITICALITY:
Major-Control Room E
hardcopy capability is inoperable.
The TSC Versatec printer / plotter can be considered for backup.
8 Immediate corrective action is required.
E E
E
~ SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION E
SAIC 19321 10 8/84
L
~
L 502-8500108-52 REV LTR S FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION
,Page A-GG INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EQUIPMENT S April 1996 l*
10.
RECOVERY RENARKS:
Remove failed multiplexer Replace with spare module (if p
available)
Repair failed multiplexer s
off-line 11.
NOTES:
See Figure A.4-1
~
u F
i L
Fl ll 1
I SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC.19321 10/8184
L J
lu 502-9500108-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE'AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-69 INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT 5 April 1996 F
1.
NPPD EQUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO. :
9-123A L
3.
MODULE ID:
Versatec Model V-90-911 printer / plotter Control Room L
4.
FUNCTION:
Control Room Display hardcopy capability.
F L
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Mechanical failure, board component failure, fuse f
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Faulty or insufficient scheduled maintenince time. Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure, L
mechanical failure, fuse 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Failed hardcopy capability for Control Room No PMIS data loss.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE Control Room printer / plotter b
DETECTION:
inoperative, SAIDT multiplexer possible source of failure 9.
CRITIC ALITY:
Minor-Loss of strip chart l
function.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed printer / plotter from l
service i
Reclace with spare p/p or p/p from other station Repair failed printer / plotter and l
return to service (see 11) 11.
NOTES:
See Doc. No. 501-0500105-106 for l
applicable maintenance and diagnostic information. See Figure A.4-1
. SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 1018i84
502-8500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-90 INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EQUIPMENT 5 April 1996 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO. :
9-123B E
3.
MODULE ID:
Candalf LDS-319 (short haul) modem O Control Room-to SAIDT Multiplexer E
4.
FUNCTION:
Communication interface from PMIS Computer to SAIDT Mux /Versatec V-90 5.
FAILURE MODE:
Board component, power supply, fuse or loss of AC power E
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Loss of control over SAIDT Mux from PMIS Computer G.
METHOD OF FAILURE Loss of control over SAIDT Mux DETECTION:
from any Control Room console.
Fault message at Computer E
Operations Console-DMF-4 PORT-4 9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor-loss of strip chart function.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed Gandalf modem Reolace with spare unit E
Reoair failed modem Return repaired modem to service and spare modem to spare inventory 11.
NOTES:
See Doc. No. 501-9500105-106 for applicable maintenance and I
diagnostic information See Figure A.4-1 E
E b b_
E SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 5
SAIC 19321 10/8184
II 502,9500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-91 INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EQUIPMENT 5 April 19G6 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO. :
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO..
9-124A E
3.
MODULE ID:
DEC Model LA100 Matrix Printer Control Room 4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-NSSS Alarm printer interface E
for hardcopy reports.
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Mechanical failure, board component failure, fuse 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Faulty or insufficient scheduled maintenance time. Resistor, I
capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure, i
mechanical failure, fuse 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Failed hardcopy NSSS Alarm report capability No PMIS data loss.
G.
METHOD OF FAILURE Control Room NSSS printer DETECTION:
inoperative, Control Room 5
displays, Versatec printer /ploccer and remaining matrix printers operative.
E 9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor-failed NSSS matrix printer Alarm capability. Immediate correction action should be taken.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed NSSS LA100 Alarm Matrix Printer E
Reolace with spare printer Repair failed printer, return repaired NSSS Control Room alarm printer to E
service and spare printer to inventory.
I 11.
NOTES:
See Doc. No. 501-0500105-106 for applicable maintenance and diagnostic information.
See Figure A.4-1 E
Mc
=
=
=
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION I
SAIC 19321 10 8/84
E 502-8500108-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-92 INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EQUIPMENT 5 April 1996 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO..
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO. -
9-124B E
3.
MODULE ID:
Gandalf LDS-319 (short haul) standalone modem No. 6; Control Room to NSSS alarm printer 4.
FUNCTION:
Communication interface from PMIS computer to the NSSS alarm matrix printer 5.
FAILURE MODE:
Board component failure, power supply failure, fuse or loss of AC power.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Loss of NSSS alarm printer capability. No PMIS data loss.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE Control Room NSSS alarm matrix l
DETECTION:
printer inoperative. Fault (5
message at Computer Operations Consa1e-DMF-O PORT-6 l
9.*
CRITICALITY:
Minor-Failed NSSS alarm matrix 5
printer capability.
Immediate corrective action should be taken.
i g 10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed modem g
Reolace with spare modem Recair failed modem Return repaired modem to I
service and spare modem to spare inventory.
11.
NOTES:
See Doc. No. 501-95001DJ-106 for I
I applicable maintenance and l
diagnostic information.
l.
See Figure A.4-1 E
E SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 10s8/84
u r
L 502-9500108-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-93 INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT 5 April 1986 L
1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO..
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
s 2.
NO..
9-125A 5
3.
MODULE ID:
DEC Model LA100 Matrix Printer Control Room e
L 4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-BOP Alarm printer interface for hardcopy reports.
d l
S.
FAILURE MODE:
Mechanical failure, board component failure, fuse F
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Faulty or insufficient scheduled I
maintenance time. Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure, mechanical failure, fuse
,L 7.
EFFECT ON FMIS:
Failed hardcopy BOP Alarm report capability. No PMIS data loss.
r-L G.
METHOD OF FAILURE Control Room BCP printer DETECTION:
inoperative, Control Room
{
displays, Versatec printer / plotter and remaining matrix printers operative.
[
9.
CRITIC ALITY:
Minor-failed BOP matrix printer alarm capability. Immediate correction action should be f
taken.
I 10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed DOP LA100 Alarm Matrix Printer l
Reolace with spare printer i
Reoair failed printer, return repaired BOP Control Room alaren l
printer to service and spare printer to inventory.
11.
NOTES:
See Doc. No. 501-8500105-106 for applicable maintenance and diagnostic information.
See Figure A.4-1 E 4E5
~
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 10/8/84
E 502-8500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-94 INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EQUIPMENT 5 April 1986 1.
NPPD EQUIP. NO..
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO. -
9-125B E
3.
MODULE ID:
Candalf LDS-319 (short haul) standalone modem No.
7.
Control Room to BOP alarm matrix printer 4.
FUNCTION:
Communication interface from PMIS computer to the BOP al' arm matrix printer 5.
FAILURE MODE:
Board component, power supply failure fuse or loss of AC power 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated E
failure.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Loss of BOP alarm matrix printer capability. No PMIS data loss.
O.
METHOD OF FAILURE Control Room BOP alarm matrix
'g DETECTION:
printer inoperative. Fault message
!g at Computer Operations Console-DMF-1 PORT-6 5
9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor-failed BOP alarm printer capability.
Immediate corrective action should be taken.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed modem Peolace with spare modem t
Reoafe failed modem
' E Return repaired modem to service and spare modem to spare inventory.
I 11.
NOTES:
See Doc. No. 501-8500105-10e for applicable maintenance and diagnostic information.
See Figure A.4-1 S
l SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 5
SAIC 19321 10/8/84
11 502-8500108-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-95 INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EQUIPMENT 5 April 1GS6 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO.,
9-126A E
3.
MODULE ID:
DEC Model LA100 Matrix Printer Control Room 4.
FUNCTICN:
PMIS-NSSS Report printer interface for hardcopy reports.
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Mechanical failure, board component failure, fuse 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Faulty or insufficient scheduled maintenance time. Resistor, I
capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure, mechanical failure, fuse 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Failed hardcopy NSSS Alarm report capability.
No PMIS data loss.
,E 8.
METHOD OF FAILURE Control Room NSSS printer DETECTION:
i n o p e,r a t ive, Control Room displays, Versatec printer / plotter I
and remaining matrix printers operative.
9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor-failed NSSS matrix printer E
report capability. Immediate corrective action should be taken.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed NSSS LA100 Report i
i Matrix Printer Reclace with spare printer E
Reoair failed printer, return repaired NSSS Control Room Report printer to service and-spare printer to inventory.
I 11.
NOTES:
See Doc. No.
501-5500105-106 for applicable maintenance and lI diagnostic information.
See Figure A.4-1 Ii l5
~
='
=
I
-. SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION E
SAIC-19321 10:8:84 i
i E
502-9500108-52 REV LTR S FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-96 INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT 5 April 1956 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO..
Same as PMIS cabinet numeer.
2.
NO..
9-126B E
3.
MODULE ID:
Gandalf LDS-319 (short haul) modem No.
G.
Control Room - to NSSS Report Matrix Printer 4.
FUNCTION:
Communication Interface from PMIS Computer to the NSSS Report Matrix Printer 5.
FAILURE MODE:
Daard component, power supply failure, f u s e, or loss of AC power.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid s t a t e, (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Loss of NSSS Report Printer capability.
No PMIS data loss.
E G.
METHOD OF FAILURE Control Room NSSS Report Matrit DETECTION:
Printer inoperative. Fault I
message at Computer Operations Console-DMF-2 PORT-6 9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor-Failed NSSS report matr1x 5
printer capability.
Immediate corrective action should be taken.
I 10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed modem Reolace with spare modem Reoair failed modem Return repaired modem to service I
and spare modem to spare inventory.
11.
NOTES:
See Doc. No. 501-0500105-10e Aor applicable maintenance and diagnostic information.
See F1gure A.4-1.
LE i
$=_?
Y l
,. SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION i
E SAIC 19321 10< 8/ 84 i
II 502-8500108-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Pace A-07 INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EQUIPMENT 5 Apr'l 1986 i
1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO. -
Same as PMIS cabinet numoer.
2.
NO. -
9-127A E
3.
MODULE ID:
DEC Model LA100 Matrix Printer Control Raam 4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-Special Log printer i n ca r f.t c e E
for hardcopy reports.
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Mechanical failure, board component failure, fuse t
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Faulty or insufficient scheduled maintenance time. Resistor, E
capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure, mechanical failure.
fuse 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Failed hardcopy Special Log printer capability.
No PMIS data loss.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE Control Room Special Log printer DETECTION:
inoperative, Control Room E
displays. Versatec printer /ploncer and remaining matrix printers operative.
9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor-failed Special log matrix printer report capability.
Immediate corrective action should be taken.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed Special Log LA100 E
Report Matrix Printer Replace with spare printer Reoatr failed printer, recurn repaired Special Log Control Room I
printer to service and spare printer to inventory.
I 11.
NOTES:
See Doc.- No. 501-8500105-106 for applicable maintenance and diagnostic in f orma tion.
See Figure A.4-1.
1 -__
~
- 7. SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION E
SAIC 19321 10i8e 84
E 502-0500100-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-95 INFORMATION CONTRCL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EQUIPMENT 5 April 1C96 1.
NPPD EQUIP. NO..
Same as PMIS cabinet number E
2.
PHIS CAG.
NO.
9-1275 5
3.
MODULE ID:
Candalf LDS-319 (short haul) modem No.
9.
Control Room - to Special Log Matrix Printer 4.
FUNCTION:
Communication Interface from PMIS Computer to the Special Log Matrix Printer 5.
FAILURE MODE:
Daard component, power supply failure, fuse, or loss of AC power.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid stato (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Loss of Special Log Printer capability.
No PMIS data loss.
G.
METHOD OF FAILURE Control Room Special Log M trix DETECTION:
Printer inoperative. Fault nessage at Computer Operations Console-DMF-3 PORT-6 9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor-Failed Special Log matrsx 5
printer capability.
Immediate corrective action should be taken.
l 10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed modem Replace with spare modem Renatr failed modem E
Return repaired modem to servica and spare modem to spare j
inventory, j
11.
NOTES:
See Doc. No. 501-G500105-106 for applicable maintenance and diagnostic information.
See Figure A.4-1.
- E l
e
- ^
2 -
E l
. SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION I
SA6C 19321 1018184
11 502-8500106-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-99 INFORMATION' CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT 5 April 1996 1.
NPPD EQUIP. NO. -
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
PMIS CAG.
NO. -
9-134A E
3.
MODULE ID:
IDT Model 2310 CRT, Display Generator and keyboard. Technical Support Center-Unit 0 4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-TSC Display Interface 5.
FAILURE MODE:
CRT. board component failure, fuse 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure, CRT failure, fuse 11 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Impaired TSC monitoring.
Versatec printer / plotter hardcopy capability lost. No system data loss.
I 8.
METHOD OF FAILURE TSC Unit 0 display inoperative, DETECTION:
all other TSC peripherals operative. Fault message at i
Computer Operations Console-i DMF-3 PORT-5 l
l 9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor-TSC Unit 0 display has a back-up display unit 1 10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed display Reolace with spare display Reoair failed display offline (see 11)
Return repaired TSC Unit 0 to service and spare unit to spare inventory 11.
NOTES:
See Doc. No. 501-0500105-106 for applicable maintenance and diagnostic information See Figure A.4-2.
II 5
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION E
SAIC 19321 10 8.84
i E
502-8500100-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-100 INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT 5 April 1996 E
S' l
,,3 I
e
- 10 t07 2310 l
unggu CRT UNIT O ggg73 1 S,38 l
E SAlOT l
MULTIPLEXER PLOTTER
+,m y;
!E
- I
- 11 l
107 2310 he00EM CR7 UN471 I
V I
I g
l
.im E
1
- 12 3
MODEM i
i I
., =
l l
OEC LA 100 l
- Em EEER l
=
l g
. CO-U
L. _ _ _._ _ _ __ _ _ _. _ __'_* _ _ _ __ _._ al
=
r -
C
,.0 E, - -
1 I
l
- 14 osc VT220 l
MODEM CRT UNIT 0 g
l 5,m I
e
- 18 OEC VT220 1
~ s MODEM CRT UNIT 1 1
I
,, =
I MC vT220 I
e$s CRT UNIT 2 l
E L______MOOEM
_____________a c- -
, m- - - - - - - -
l 4.OOEM 17 DEC VT220 2
h CRT UMtT 0 I
i I
l i
l S'M osCvTm 12sA l
MOOeM CR7 UNif 1 1
m w________________________.
I saic itetsea l
FIGURE A.4 2 l
l
=
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 10:8;84
502-8500108-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-ici INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT 5 April 1G96 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS caninet number.
E 2.
NO..
9-134D 3.
MODULE ID:
Candalf LDS-319 (short haul) standalone modem No.
10.
Technical Support Center (TSC).
4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-TSC Display Interface i
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Daard component, communication cable failure.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated I
failure. Damage to communication cable or terminals.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Degraded TSC information availability.
No PMIS data loss.
G.
METHOD OF FAILURE TSC display Unit 0 inoperative DETECTION:
TSC display Unit i and DEC LA100 matrix printer operative.
'g Fault message at Computer g
Operations Console-DMF-3 PCRT-5 9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor-TSC display Unit 0 has a back-up display-Unit 1 10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Check communication caole link-see 11 Remove failed short haul mode.n Reolace with spare modem l
Reoair or Reclatt failed modem 11.
NOTES:
Failure of the short-haul caro modem in the Computer Room I
terminating the PMIS-TSC communication linkwill produce the same effect on the TSC display Unit O.
See Figure A.4-2.
=
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 1018:84
502-8500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-102 INFORMATION CONTRCL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT 5 April 1956 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO. -
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
PMIS CAG.
NO. -
9-135A 3.
MODULE ID:
IDT Model 2310 CRT, Display Generator and keyboard, Technical Support Center-unit i 4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-TSC Display Interface 5.
FAILURE MODE:
CRT, board component failure, fuse 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid staca (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure, CRT failure. fuse 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Impaired TSC monitoring.
Versatec printer / plotter nardcopy capability lost.
No system data loss.
O.
METHOD OF FAILURE TSC unit i display inoperative.
DETECTION:
all other TSC peripherals operative. Fault message at Computer Operations Console-DMF-4 PORT-5 9.
CRITICALITY:
ntnor-TSC unit i display has a back-up display unit 0 10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed display Reolace with spare display Reoair failed display offline (see 11)
Return repaired TSC unit i to service and spare unit to spare inventory 11.
NOTES:
See Doc. No. 501-0500105-10s for applicable maintenance and diagnostic information See Figure A.4-2.
-f -__ ^
=
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 10/8/84
502-0500100-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-103 INFORMATION CONTACL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EQUIPMENT 5 April 1996 1.
NPPD EQUIP. NO..
Same as PMIS cabinet numoer.
2.
NO. :
9-135D 3.
MODULE ID:
Gandalf LDS-319 (short haul) standalone modem No.
11.
Technical Support Ce'nter (TSC).
4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-TSC Display Interface i
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Daard component, communication cable failure.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure. Damage to communication cable or terminals.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Degraded TSC information availability. No PMIS data loss.
O.
METHOD OF FAILURE TSC display Unit i inoperative DETECTION:
TSC display Unit 0 and DEC LA100 matrix printer operative.
Fault mess' age at Computer Operations Console-DMF-4 PORT-5 9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor-TSC display Unit i has a back-up display-Unit 0 10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Check communication cable link-see 11 Remove failed short haul modem Replace with spare modem Reoair or Reolace failed modem 11.
NOTES:
Failure of the shorthaul card modem in the Computer l
Room terminating the PMIS-TSC communication Itnk will produce the same e#fect on the TSC display Unit 1.
l l
See Figure A.4-2.
=
E
.. SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 10/0/84
502-8500108-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-104 INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT 5 Aoril 1996 l
1.
NPPD EQUIP. NO..
Same as PMIS cabinet number 2.
NO. -
9-136 3.
MODULE ID:
SAIDT Multiplexer E
FUNCTION:
The SAIDT Multiplexer accepts data from the hardcopy port on each TSC IDT display system and relays data to the Versatec printer / plotter.
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Daard component failure, fuse 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or other unrelated failure 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Failure of the SAfDT Mux will fault the TSC Versatec printer / plotter. Hardcopy recording capability is not available during the faileo multiplexer condition.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE Versatec printer / plotter i
DETECTION:
inoperative. Cannot be accessea from any TSC Console 9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor-The TSC recording unit is l
inoperable during the failed j
multiplexer condition. The Onstee EOF Versatec printer / plotter can be considered for backup.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed multiplexer I
Reolace with spare modulo fif available)
Reoair failed multiplexer oefline 11.
NOTES:
See Figure A.4-2.
l 11 jf==
b SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SMC 19321 l
10/8,84
{
II 502-9500100-52 REV LTR S FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-105 E
INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT 5 April 1996 1.
NPPD EQUIP. NO. -
Same as PMIS cabinet numoer.
2.
NO.
9-137A E
3.
MODULE ID:
Versatec Model V-90-911 printer / plotter Technical Support Center 4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-TSC Display Interface 5.
FAILURE MODE:
mechanical failure, board component failure, fuse 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Faulty or insufficient scheaulaa maintenance time. Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelatea failure, mechanical failure, fuse 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Failed hardcopy capability for TSC. No system data loss.
B.
METHOD OF FAILURE TSC Versatec Model V-GO-911 DETECTION:
printer / plotter inoperative, SAIDT multiplexer operative.
9.
CR ITIC ALITY:
Minor-degraded TSC capability.
Immediate corrective action snould be taken.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed printer / plotter from service Reolace with spare p/p or p/p from other station Reoair failod printer / plotter and return to service (see 11) 11.
NOTES:
See Doc. No. 501-8500105-106 for applicable maintenance and diagnostic information.
See Figure A.4-2.
E'
~ h,
=
.. SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION I
SAIC 19321 10/8,84
502-9500108-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-106 B
INFORMATICN CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EQUIPMENT 5 April 1996 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
PMIS CAG.
NO. -
9-137D 3.
MODULE ID:
Candalf LDS-319 (short haul)
E standalone modem No.
12.
Technical Support Center (TSC).
4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-TSC Display Interface 5.
FAILURE MODE:
Board component, communication cable failure.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated I
failure. Damage to communication cable or terminals.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Failed TSC SAIDT multiplexer E
PMIS-TSC interface and Versatec printer / plotter availability.
E G.
METHOD OF FAILURE TSC SAIDT multiplexer and Versatec DETECTION:
Printer / plotter inoperative.
TSC display units O and i operative Fault message at E
Computer Operations Console-DMF-2 PORT-4 9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor-TSC SAIDT multiplexer and Versatec printer / plotter failed 10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Check communication caole link-see 11 Remove failed short haul modem Reolace with spare modem Reoair or Reolace failed modem 11.
NOTES:
Failure of the short-haul card
'I modem in the Computer Room terminating the PMIS-TSC communication link will produce the same effece i
E on the TSC SAIDT multiplexer and versatec printer / plotter.
See Figure A.4-2.
II r_
ak= -
=
E SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 10/8 84
II 502-8500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-107 INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT 5 April 1986 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO. -
Same as PMIS caninet number.
2.
NO..
9-13SA E
3.
MODULE ID:
DEC Model LA-100 Matrix Printer Technical Support Center (TSC) 4.
FUNCTION:
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Daard component failure, mechanical failure, fuse.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
No or insufficient maintenance time.
Resistor, capacitor.
solid state (IC) aging, heat I
or unrelated failure.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Failed hardcopy report c a p a b i l.s t y for TSC.
No PMIS data loss.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE TSC matrix printer inoperative.
DETECTION:
Fault message at Computer l
Operations Console-DMF-1 PORT-5 l
9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor-Failed TSC printer hardcapy capability.
Immediate correceive action should be taken.
l l
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed LA-100 matrir printer Reolace with spare printer Reoair failed printer
,E Return repaired TSC matric princer to service and spare printer to inventory.
11.
NOTES:
See Doc. No. 501-0500105-10e for applicable maintenance and l '
diagnostic information.
See Figure A.4-2.
I 11 II 5_
~_
E SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION B
SAIC-19321 10/8/84 i
i
l II 502-0500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-10S INFORMATION CONTRCL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT 5 Aoril 1956 1.
NPPD EQUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet numoer.
2.
NO. -
9-13SB E
3.
MODULE ID:
Gandalf LDS-319 (short haul) standalone modem No.
13.
Technical Support Center (TSC).
4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-TSC Display Interface 5.
FAILURE NODE:
Board component, communication cable failure.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid stace (IC) aging, heat or unrelated B
failure. Damage to communication cable or terminals.
E 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Failed TSC matrix printer availability.
No PMIS data loss.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE TSC matrix printer inoperative E
DETECTION:
TSC display unit 0,1 and Versecec Printer / plotter operative.
Fault message at Computer E
Operations Console-DMF-1 PORT-5 9.
CRITICALITY:
intnor-Immediate corrective action E
required.
TSC system condition degraded.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Check communication cable link-see 11 Remove failed short haul modem Reolace with spare. nod em Repair or Reolace failed modem 11.
NOTES:
Failure of the short haul card l'
modem in the Computer Room terminating the PMIS-TSC communication link will produce the same effect on the TSC E
matrir printer.
See Figure A.4-2.
E
. SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION i-
~
5 SAIC 19321 10.9/84
L 502-S50010S-52 REV LTR D I
FAILURE MODE AWD EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page' A-109 INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EQUIPMENT 5 April 1996 l
1.
NPPD EQUIP. NO.
Same as PMI6 caninet number.
2.
NO.
9-131A l
3.
MODULE ID:
DEC Model VT220 CRT, keyboard CNS Engineering-Unit 0 4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-CNS Engineering-Display Interface 1
5.
FAILURE MODE:
CRT, board component failure, fuse 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid s ta r:e j
(IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure, CRT failure, fuse 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Impaired CNS Engineering monitoring.
No system data t u.5 s.
G.
METHOD OF FAILURE CNS Engineering Unit 0 DETECTION:
inoperative. CNS Engineering Units i and 2 operative.
B Fault messag'e at Computer Operators Console l
DMF-2 PORT-3 9.
CRITICALITY:
ritnor-CNS Engineering Unit 0 ti a s l
Units 1 and 2 as backup I
E 10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed display Replace with spare display J
Repair failed display offline B
(see 11).
Return repaired CNS Engineering Unit 0 to service and spare unit to spare inventory 11.
NOTES:
See Doc. No. 501-8500105-106 Ar 2
l applicable maintenance and diagnostic information.
See Figure A.4-2.
l
\\
l SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
.i
^
=
~ ~
l 5
suc tssai tocs e4 l
lI 502-8500109-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-110 INFORMATION CONT 4CL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT 5 April 1995 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO. -
Same as PMIS cabinet numeer.
11 2.
PMIS CAG.
NO. -
9-131D E
3.
MODULE ID:
Candalf LDS-31C (short haul) standalone modem No.
14.
CNS Engineering.
E 4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-CNS Engineering display interface 5
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Doard component, communication cable failure.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state 5
(IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure. Damage to communication cable or terminals.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Degraded CNS Engineering information availability.
No PMIS data loss.
l l
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE CNS Engineering display unic 0 DETECTION:
inoperative. Display units 1 and 2 operative.
Fault message at 5
Computer Operations Console-DMF-2 PORT-3
, 5 9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor-CNS Engineering display unit 0 has backup displays units 1 and 2.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Check communication cable link-l see 11 Remove failed short haul modoin E
Reolace with spare modem Reoatr or Reolace failed modom 11.
NOTES:
Failure of the short haul caro E
modem in the Computer Room terminating the PMIS-CNS Engineering communication I
link will produce the same effect on the CNS display unit 0 See Figure A.4-2.
II E
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
=
.E SAIC-19321 10/6/84
E 502-9500109-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-111 INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT 5 Aoral 195e 1.
NPPD EQUIP. NO. -
Same as PMIS cabinet number 2.
NO.
9-132A 8
3.
MODULE ID:
DEC Model VT220 CRT, keyboard CNS Engineering-Unit 1 i
4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-CNS Engineering-Display l
Interface 5.
FAILURE MODE:
CRT, board component failure, fuse 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure, CRT failure, fuse 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Impaired CNS Engineering monitoring. No system data loss.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE CNS Engineering Unit i DETECTION:
inoperative. CNS Engineering Units 0 and 2 operative.
E Fault message at Computer Operators Console DMF-3 PORT-3 9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor-CNS Engineering Unit I has Units 0 and 2 as back-up lB 10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed display Replace with spare display Repair failed display offlino (see 11).
Return repaired Ca8 Engineering Unit 1 to service and spare unit to spare inventory 5
11.
NOTES:
See Doc. No. 501-8500105-106 cor applicable maintenance and diagnostic information.
See Figure A.4-2.
I lE lE E
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 8
SAIC 19321 10/8 84
II 502-8500109-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-112 INFORMATION CONTDCL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT 5 April 1996 1.
NPPD EOUIP. NO..
Same as PMIS cabinet number 2.
PMIS CAG.
NO.
9-132D E
3.
MODULE ID:
Gandalf LDS-319 (short naul) standalone modem No.
15.
CNS Engineering.
E 4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-CNS Engineering display interface 5
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Board component, communicatiun cable failure.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state
,I (IC) aging, heat or unrelateo failure. Damage to communication cable or terminals.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Degraded CNS Engineering information availability.
No PMIS data loss.
E 8.
METHOD OF FAILURE CNS Engineering display unit i DETECTION:
inoperative. Display units 0 ano 2 operative.
Fault message'at Computer Operations Console-DMF-3 PORT-3 5
9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor-CNS Engineering display unit i has backup displays units 0 and 2.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Check communication cable link-see 11 Remove failed short haul modem E
Reolace with spare modem Repair or Reolace failed modem
,g 11.
NOTES:
Failure of the short haul card g
modem in the Computer Room terminating the PMIS-CNS Engineering communication linx
'5 will produce the same effect on the CNS display unit 1.
See Figure A.4-2.
5 SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION l
SAIC 19321 10s8/84
E 502-9500109-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-113 INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EQUIPMENT 5 April 19S6 1.
NPPD EQUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO.
9-133A E
3.
MODULE ID:
DEC Model VT220 CRT, keyboard CNS Engineering-Unit 2 4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-CNS Engineering-Display 3
Interface 5.
FAILURE MODE:
CRT, board component failure, fuse 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure, CRT failure, fuse 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Impaired CNS Engineering monitoring. No system data loss.
9.
METHOD OF FAILURE CNS Engineering Unit 2 DETECTION:
inoperative. CNS Engineering Units O and i operative.
Fault message at Computer Operators Console DMF-4 PORT-3 9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor-CNS Engineering Unit 2 nas Units O and 1 as backup E
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed display Replace with spare display Repair failed display offline (see 11).
.B Return repaired CNS Engineering l
Unit 2 to service ano spare unit to spare inventory 11.
NOTES:
See Doc. No. 501-9500105-106 for applicable maintenance and diagnosti, information.
I See Figure A.4-2.
E E
E SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 5
SAIC.19321 10/8184 l
l
r L
502-8500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-114 INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY COUIPMENT 5 April 19ec L
1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO..
Same as PMIS cabinet nummer.
2.
NO.
9-1338 1"
3.
MODULE ID:
Gandalf LDS-319 (short haul) standalone modem No.
16.
7 CNS Engineering.
L 4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-CNS Engineering display interface l
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Board component, communication cable failure.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid staca (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure. Damage to communication cable or terminals.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Degraded CNS Engineering information availability.
I No PMIS data loss.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE CNS Engineering display unit 2 l
DETECTION:
inoperative. Display units 0 and 1 operative.
Fault message at Computer Operations Console-DMF-4 PORT-3 I
9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor-CNS Engineering display unit 2 has backup displays l
units O and 1.
I 10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Check communication cable link-see 11 l
Remove failed short naul mocem I
Reolace with spare modem Reoair or Reolace failed modem 11.
NOTES:
Failure of the short haul card modem in the Computer Room terminating the PMIS-CNS f
Engineering communication Itna will produce the same effect on the CNS display unit 2.
See Figure A.4-2.
SCIENCE APPLICATIOr:S INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC.19321 10/8/84
E 502-8500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-115 INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EQUIPMENT 5 Apri1 1986 1.
NPPD EQUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS caoinet number.
2.
NO.
9-12SA E
3.
MODULE ID:
DEC Model VT220 CRT, keyboarc Chemistry / Health Physics-Unib 0 4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-Chemistry / Health Physics Display Interface 5.
FAILURE MODE:
CRT, board component failure, fuse 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid stace (IC) aging, heat or unrelacea failure, CRT failure, Puse 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Impaired Chemistry / Health Physics monitoring. No system data loss.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE Chemistry / Health Physics-Unit 0 DETECTION:
inoperative.
Unit 1 operativo.
Fault message at Computer I
Operators Console DMF-1 PORT-3 9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor-Chemistry / Health Physics-5 Unit 0 has Unit i as backup.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remov'e failed display I
Replace with spare display Reoair failed display offline (see 11).
Return repaired C h emi s tr y / Hee l f:n I
Physics-Unit 0 to service and spare unit to spare inventory.
I 11.
NOTES:
See Doc. No. 501-8500105-10e for applicable maintenance and diagnostic information.
See Figure A.4-2.
E E
E M= =
~ SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 E
10/8!84
502-8500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-ilo E
INFORMATION CONTROL, DISPLAY AND HARDCOPY EGUIPMENT 5 Anril icos 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO. -
9-12SB 3.
MODULE ID:
Gandalf LDS-319 (short haul)
E standalone modem No.
17.
Chemistry / Health Physics.
E 4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-Chemistry /Healtn Physics display interface 5.
FAILURE MODE:
Board component, communication 5
cable failure.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state B
(IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure. Damage to communicatic.n cable or terminals.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Degraded Chemistry / health Physics information availability.
No PMIS data loss.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE Chemistry / Health Physics display DETECTION:
unit 0 inoperative. Display ontt 1 operative.
Fault message at Computer Operations Console-DMF-1 PORT-3 l
1 E 9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor-Chemistry / Health Physict
!g display unit O has backup display unit 1.
I 10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Check communication cable link-see 11 Remove failed short haul modem E
Reolace with spare modem Repair or Reolace failed modem 11.
NOTES:
Failure of the snort haul carc E
modem in the Computer Room terminating the PMIS-Chemistry / Health Physics I
communication link will produce the same effect on the Chemistry / Health Physics display unit O.
See Figure A.4-2.
E SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 10/8/84
II 502-0500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-117 5 Anci. tcoe 1.
NPPD EQUIP. NO..
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO. -
9-129A E
3.
MODULE ID:
DEC Model VT220 CRT, keyboard Chemistry / Health Physics-Unic i 4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-Chemistry / Health Physics 5
Displag Interface 5.
FAILURE MODE:
CRT, board component failure, fuse 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure, CRT failure, fuse 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Impaired Chemistry / Health Physics monitoring.
No system data loss.
~
9.
METHOD OF FAILURE Chemistry / Health Physics-Unit i DETECTION:
inoperative.
Unit 0 operative.
Fault message at Computer E
Operators Console DMF-0 PORT-3 5
9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor-Chemistry / Health Physics-Unit i has Unit 0 as backup.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed display B
Replace with spare display Reoair failed display offline (see 11).
I Return repaired Chemistry / Health Physics-Unit 1 to service and spare unit to spare inventory.
I 11.
NOTES:
See Doc. No. 501-8500105-106 for applicable maintenance and diagnostic information.
E See Figure A.4-2.
ll II II SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 5
SAIC 19321 10.8784
502-8500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Pago A-115 5 Aoril 198s 1.
NPPD EQUIP. NO. -
Same as PMIS cabinet number 2.
NO.
9-1298 3.
MODULE ID:
Gandalf LDS-319 (short haul) standalone modem No.
15.
Chemistry / Health Physics.
E 4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-Chemistry / Health Physics display interface E
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Board component, communication cable failure.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state I
(IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure. Damage to communication cable or terminals.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Degraded Chemistry / Health Physics information availability.
No PMIS data loss.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE Chemistry / Health Physics display DETECTION:
unit 1 inoperative. Display unit 0 operative.
Fault message
,I at Computer Operations Console.
DMF-0 PORT-3 9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor-Chemistry / Health Physics i
display unit i has backup display unit O.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Check communication cable link-see 11 Remove failed short haul modam E
Reolace with spare modem Repair or Reolace failed mo d ein 11.
NOTES:
Failure of the short haul E
card modem in the Compucer Room terminating the PMIS-Chemistry / Health Physics iI communication link will produce the same effect on the Chemistry / Health Physics display unit 1.
See Figure A.4-2.
lE SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC.19321 10/8t84
E 502-9500108-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-119 5,:,o n i 1 toas 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet number 2.
NO.
9-139A 3.
MODULE ID:
IDT Model 2310 CRT Display Generator and keyboard, Onsite (oHsite) Emergency operations facility (EOF) - Unit O.
4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-EOF Display Interface 5.
FAILURE MODE:
CRT, board component failure, fuse 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelatea B
failure, CRT failure, fuse 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
EOF monitoring failed.
,E Versatec printer / plotter harccopy l
capability lost.
l No system data loss.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE EOF display inoperative, matrir DETECTION:
printer operative.
Fault message at Computer Operations Console DMF-2 PORT-5 9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor-Immediate correceive ac;; ton required.
EOF system condition
" failed" i
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed display
(
Replace with spare display Repair failed display offline (see 11)
Return repaired EOF unit O to E
service and spare unit to spare inventory i
11.
NOTES:
See Doc. No. 501-8500105-106 for applicable maintenance and diagnostic information See Figure A.4-3.
!E E
M=
=
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAK:19321 10/8/84
E 502-8500108-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-120 5 Aor: 1 1%
5 r------------------------,
l 1
I l
SimeA I
I Sisse Si4o 10T 2310 i
E f_l SHORT. HAUL COLOR SAlOT i
~
~g MODEM
- 19 MULTIPLEXER l
GRAPHICE)
" " ' " " ^ ' '
I I
TORACx g
S'*'s I
mount M -)Tg SwORT. waul I
" 0 0 "
- 28 I
m COwuTER l
Sid:A Si4tA aOOM l
l -l-OEc LAias vERsaTEC I
E' SNORT.muL MATRIX mmTERi l
\\7 MOOEM* i m mTER PLOTTER j
I i-________________________a p________________________q l
1 5
l I
Stase iOT 2 ie
- 4,y.c I
COLOR SAlOT l
f4 GRAPMCS k
~
~'
I WLM WR l
NRM-A )
I E
S14ic g
l TO LOao.
A.v c HAUL MODEMS I
LOfee HAUL m COMPUTER
~ l MOOEM*S l
ROOM S142C DEC LA10e VERSATEC t
l fl ASYNC MATRIX PRINTER /
l
\\:
LO8eG HAUL PRl80TER PLOTTER
'----------- f fi I
I t
- ALTER 8 TATE LOCATION POR EOP EQUIPMENT lAsc $
y oe FIGURE A,43 E
E E
g
- _nh
=
-MJh SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION I
SAIC 19321 10,8,84 l
11 502-8500108-52 REV LTR S FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-121 5 Anvil fccA 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS caninet numoer.
E 2.
NO.
9-139B (onsite uni t );
9-139C (offsite unit).
3.
MODULE ID:
Candalf LDS-319 (short haul) standalone modem No.
19.
Emergency Operations Facility E
(EOF).
4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-EOF display interface 5.
FAILURE MODE:
Board component, communication cable failure.
E 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure. Damage to communication cable or terminals.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Failed EOF information availability.
No PMIS data loss.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE EOF display system inoperative.
DETECTION:
EOF matrix printer operative.
I Fault message at Computer Operations Console-DMF-2 PORT-5 Referenced.
E 9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor-Immediate corrective action required.
EOF System condition
" failed" 10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Check communication cable link-see 11 Remove failed short haul modem Reolace with spare modem Reoair or Reolace failea modem
- g 11.
NOTES:
Failure of the short haul card lg modem in the Computer Room l
terminating the PMIS-EOF lI communication link will produce the same effect on the EOF display.
See Figure A.4-3.
1 SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC-19321 E
10,8r 84 l
ll 502-9500109-52 REV LTR S FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-122 5 April ic94 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO. -
9-140 E
3.
MODULE ID:
SAIDT Multiplexer Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) 4.
FUNCTION:
The SAIDT Multiplexer accepts cata from the hardcopy port on the EOF IDT display system and relays cata to the Versatec printer / plotter.
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Board component failure, fuse 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or other unrelated failure 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Failure of the SAIDT Mux will fault the EOF Versatec printer / plotter. Hardcopy recording capability is not available during the f.atled multiplexer condition.
No PMIS data loss.
8.
METHOD GF FAILURE EOF Versatec printer / plotter DETECTION:
inoperative. Printer / plotter E
possible source of failure 9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor-Failed EOF printer / plotter I
hardcopy capability.
Immeoiate corrective action should be taken.
Consider TSC printer / plotter for backup.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed multiplexer Reolace with spare unit (if available)
Reoair failed multiplexer offline 11.
NOTES:
See Figure A.4-3.
11
~~
=
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION I
SAIC.19321 10/8/84
502-8500108-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-123 5 Ac.ril ic9e 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO.
Same as PMIS caninet numoer.
2.
NO. -
9-141A E
3.
MODULE ID:
Versatec Model V-80-911 printer / plotter Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) 4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-EOF Display Interface 5.
FAILURE MODE:
Mechanical failure, board component failure, fuse 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Faulty or insufficient scheduled I
maintenance time. Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure, mechanical failure, fuse 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Failed hardcopy capability for TSC. No system data loss.
9.
METHOD OF FAILURE EOF Versatec Model V-90-811 DETECTION:
printer / plotter inoperative, SAIDT multiplexer possible source of failure.
EOF display system operative.
E 9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor-failed EOF printer / plotter hardcopy capability.
Immediate corrective action should ne taken.
Consider TSC printer / plotter E
for backup.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed printer / plotter E
from service Reolace with spare p/p or p/p from other station Reoair failed printer / plotter and return to service (see 11) 11.
NOTES:
See Doc. No. 501-8500105-106 for I
applicable maintenance and
/2 diagnostic information.
See Figure A.4-3.
1 E
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 10iSe84
502-9500108-52 REV LTR D FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-124 5 Anril tG96 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO. -
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO.
9-141B (onsite unit);
9-141C (offsite unit).
3.
MODULE ID:
Gandalf LDS-319 (short haul) standalone modem No. 20.
Emergency Operations Facilicy I
(EOF).
4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-EOF SAIDT multiplexer interface 5.
FAILURE MODE:
Board component, communication cable failure.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid scate (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure. Damage to communication cable or terminals.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Failed EOF Versatec printer / plotter hardcepy availability.
No PMIS data loss.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE EOF Versatec printer / plotter does DETECTION:
not respond to PMIS communicotton.
Fault message at Computer Operations Console-DMF-3 PORT-4 Referenced.
9.
CRITIC ALITY:
Minor-Immediate corrective aceton required.
EOF printer / plotter hardcopy facility " failed" 10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Check communication cable link-see 11 Remove failed short. haul modem Reolace with spare modem Reoair or Reolace failed modem 11.
NOTES:
Failure of the short haul caro modem in the Computer Room terminating the PMIS-EOF communication link will produce the same effect on tne EOF SAIDT Mux on failure.
See Figure A.4-3.
II SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION E
SAIC-19321 10/8/84
502-8500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-125 5 Acril tC96 1.
NPPD EGUIP, NO. -
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO..
9-142A 3.
MODULE ID:
DEC Model LA100 Matrix Printer onsite/offsite Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) 4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-EOF hardcopy reports.
5.
FAILURE MODE:
Mechanical failure, board component failure, fuse 6.
FAI, LURE MECHANISM:
Faulty or insufficient seneduled maintenance time. Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure, mechanical failure, fuse 7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Failed hardcopy report capability for EOF.
No PMIS data loss.
8.
PETHOD OF FAILURE EOF matrix printer inoperative, DETECTION:
EOF display, and Versatec printer / plotter operative.
9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor-failed EOF printer hardcopy capability.
Immediate corrective action should be taken.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Remove failed LA100 Report Matrix Printer E
Reolace with spare printer Reoair failed printer, return repaired ECF matrix printer I
to service and spare printer to inventory.
11.
NOTES:
See Doc. No.
501-8500105-10e for l
applicable maintenance and i
diagnostic information.
I See Figure A.4-3.
~ SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC-19321 10/8/84
502-0500108-52 REV LTR B FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION Page A-126 5 April 1996 1.
NPPD EGUIP. NO..
Same as PMIS cabinet number.
2.
NO.
9-142D (onsite unit);
9-142C (offsite unit).
3.
MODULE ID:
Gandalf LDS-319 (short haul) standalone modem No. 21.
Emergency Operations Facility E
(EOF).
4.
FUNCTION:
PMIS-EOF matrix printer interface 5.
FAILURE MODE:
Board component, communication cable failure.
6.
FAILURE MECHANISM:
Resistor, capacitor, solid state (IC) aging, heat or unrelated failure. Damage to communication cable or terminals.
7.
EFFECT ON PMIS:
Failed EOF matrix printer availability.
No PMIS data locs.
8.
METHOD OF FAILURE EOF matrix printer inoperative DETECTION:
EOF display and Versatec printer / plotter operative. Fautt message at Computer Operations Console-DMF-0 PORT-6 Referenced.
9.
CRITICALITY:
Minor-Immediate corrective action required.
EOF system conditson l
degraded.
10.
RECOVERY REMARKS:
Check communication cable link-see 11 Remove failed short haul modem Reolace with spare moaem Reoair or Reolace fa11ed modem 11.
NOTES:
Failure of the short haul card modem in the Computer Room terminating the PMIS-EOF l
communication link will produce the same effect on the EOF matrix printer See Figure A.4-3.
i SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 10/ 8 t84
502-8500108-52 REV LTR B l
l II APPENDIX B CONTROL ROOM DISPLAY SYSTEM i
ESTIMATED AVAILABILITY / RELIABILITY The VAX cluster configuration will meet or exceed the following worst case availability analysis.
SAIC has calculated the availability of the SPDS to be the following:
Control Room Display System Availability = 99.90%
Details on these calculations, the MTBF and MTTR used, and clock diagrams are presented in the following.
The MTBF and MTTR for major components in the PMIS are given in Table B-I.
Failure criteria for this analysis is any hardware malfunction which causes a
system or subsystem nonoperable status and creates a requirement for unscheduled maintence.
It is assumed that preventive maintenance will be conducted on a
noninterference
- basis, i. e.,
during scheduled shutdowns or during an operating mode without placing the equipment in a nonoperable condition.
Mean Time-to-Repair (MTTR) is defined as the average time to perform corrective maintenance action (a MTTR of four hours was assumed for the PMIS availability calculation).
This time period begins with equipment failure and ends when the equipment is returned to operational status.
It includes time for fault detection, fault isolation, access / secure, maintenance operations (repair or replace), and function testing.
t SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 10s8/84
r 502-8500108-52 REV LTR B CONTROL ROOM DISPLAY SYSTEM Page B-2 ESTIMATED AVAILABILITY / RELIABILITY 5 April 1986 II Availability is the probability that a system or equipment, when used under specified operational conditions and support environment, will operate satisfactorily at any point in time.
Inherent availability (Ai),
as quantified in this
- analysis, assumes an ideal support environment ( i. e., available tools,
- spares, trained personnel, etc.)
and excludes preventive maintenance
- actions, logistics supply time and administrative downtime.
System success is defined as all data inputs available, and at least one path in all redundant systems is available.
Single point failure items occur in the data input system in the individual data input signal conditioning amplifiers and the associated multiplexers.
These failure points are minimized by redundant signal sources and the proper routing of such signals into the data input system.
A block diagram of the Control Room Display System arranged for availability computations is shown in Figure B-1.
Individual series and redundant path groups are computed on attached data sheets 1 through 6.
System availabilities are as follows:
Data Sheet Unit Availability 1
Data Acquisition System 0.999248 2
Data Processing 0.999941 3
Disk System 0.999797 4
Data I/O 0.999999 5
Peripheral Sw 0.999999 6
Control Room Displays 0.999999 Total Control Room Display System Availability 0.997985
= 99.80%
Since the Control Room Display System is a very redundanc syscem it should be fault tolerant in operation.
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 10/8/84
mn TAHl.E B-I U1 O MTRF/MTTR DATA FOR THE FMIS COMP 0teFf4TS jZq 32 e.-----..--......--...............---.......----..--................................................--.....,
y c3 i
C04PONENTS MTRF
- f. A M BD A 0 MTTA
-1 I
( HOHRS )
FATI. RATE
( HOtIR S 1
+..................--.......................--...--.............,-............................,-------......-*
O CPT-SIG4AL CONDITIONING CHASSIS-PART 040 5454-000 NA NA 4
3> O I
<3
[
CPT. A/D CnNWERTER. 4ODEL 1416121 11132 (.
9.0 4
(g us 9.0 4
2> U1 rm O
CPt. U16 U41WERSAL COMTRnLt.ER. mnDEL 7434/10 110670
~m E3 3 2
CPI. INTELLit:ENT REMOTE CONTROI,llNIT-MODEL RTP7411/6 35998 27.8 4
yh u
m
~<
o CPI. HIGH SPFE0 OPTICAL MODEMS. MODEL RTP1420/60 286829 3.5 4
-1 PJ b
< (f)
I l
CPI-HIGH SPFEn DUAL SERIAL PORT. MODEl. RTP7420/65 95514'.
10.8 4
)$
C 143.5 4
r ITI O
O CPT-DATA CONCFNTR470R-MODEL RTPS620/20 1345.
m -1 o
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M2 1
d CPI. PARALI.El, HOST IMTFRFACE-MODEL RTP7420/70 98102'.
10.2 4
D O
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CPT-HilSF INTERFACE AD8PTER 12848'.
13.7 4
I U8 i
(/)
M PJ
~
nEC-WRX ll/78n CPil 1650'.
606.1 2.2 g
-4 XI A
nEP-DISK DHIVF-MODEL RA81 10000 100.0 2.3 ITI 32 p
DEC. 14tELIGFNT DISE/ TAPE CONTROL.LER. MODEL HSC50 5000.
200.0 1.2
-1 g-
~
-4 O
nEr. 1600 RPT TAPE DRI VE. MODt.L TEll?4 3
2 nonEI, 7078 7298 435.2 4.2 1
MonEt, sID A50 (M ASSetIS AnAPTER) 18294 54.7 3.0 g
r-O DEC. HIGH SPFE0 FLOFING point-MODEl. FP190 219no.
41.8
.9 O
3 5
nt.c. u'8180 % ADAPTER. MODFL DW7R0 (W/PS) 4900'.
204.5 1.9 o
33 nEr. ting LPet L t.J F PHTNTER. M nDFI, LP32.FA (f.P26) 1700 SAN.2 2.0
>d ng,r. ExpANsgn4 uny. gants, R At g.KII (pAtt.AA) 19350 51.7 1.2 O
g s....---...........--..........--
-.......--.--------.......e-....--.......<-.--........--+----..........,
2 SFE HEFER ANC6: P At;E R-9 6 F0H DIGIT 48. Enulppt.NT MTRF DATA D
et,44804 : F A II.uR t's PE R u ll.t.i pti HollPS y y 4
w u2 CD 5y
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- 8
TARLE R=I
( CONTINUFD 1 fr3 O MTRF/MTTR DATA FOR THE PMIS COMPONENTS UJ O
-i Z gg CONPONENTS WTRF LAMBDA
- MTTP yO
( HOURS 1 F A f t.
RATE
( HOl 1
-1 I
.....___.................__.._______...__________...._____............................................'RS g,,
DEC-BACKPt.ANE. MODEl. ODil-DK 52358 19.1 NO DATA o
DO nEC-8=LINF COMM. CONTROI.LFR-MonEL nMF32 I.P (DMF32.AB) 6709 149.1 1.5
<3 2
3>
i Co DEC-HIGH SPEEn PARALLFL INTF.~4 FACE. MODEL DRil-W 21132'.
46.0 2 '. 4 g"_.3 O
> UI E
nEC- 007 4 ATRIX PRINTER-MnDEL LA100 3635 215.5 1.1 Ea T 2
., r Q
DEC-AI,PHANil4ERIC CRT. MODEL VT220-44 17520'.
57.1 I ". 0 hk o
-1 PJ nEC. 2 4R 405 MEMORT-4nDFL HA180=FA (N5180-EA) 55450'.
10.0
'. 9
< VJ l
77 s<
m
%I (1)
Un g
nEC= STAR CaifPLER= Mn0FL SC008-AC 20000 50'.0 4
(rl -4 O
O I' lTI O
nEC. COMPUTER TNTERCONNECT= NODEl. CI180-AA 15000 66.7 4
H2
_.4 O
~O MICR0=ll FOR RPIS/RWM
.to El g
2 (SPECIAL FilNCTIONS)
(/)
[-
Ut e-.
10 nEC. 400FL llc 23-R j*
g
-4 Nortl.nF(KDFil-BA)
- 22100, 44.1 1.1 Il ITI MSVil-PE 17815.
55.9
.6 (rl f
R4714-AR 10000 1000.0 4
y RonXI (CONTRnLI.ERl 70no.
142.0 4
g-*
-4 an58-4
- 1362, 135.8 9
_4 o
RX50-AA
- 3522, 283.9 6
23 2
-MODEL FPF-ll
- 11000, 90.9 1.5 b
4nnEL MSV.PL 10600 94.3 6
g r-O SFE REFEHANCE PAGE R=3 ann B.4 FOR nICITAT. EQtIIPMENT MTBF DATA O
er.4Mann = Fall.URES PER M ll.I.T ON H0flRS 33 TO 23 d
I O
I us 2
O
- b T
- . ra 6-
- LCf I
h 8
E6 21.
93
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/
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( CONT itatlFD )
ym MTRF/PITTR DATA FON THE PMIS COMPONFNTS
>0
-I r g,
C04P3NENTS MTfir I.AMnnAo MTTR o
( HOIINS }
FAIL RATE
( HullR S 1
>O c3 3
TDM. SnFT LeitrH - n0 DEL 9101 2 n o n 0'.
50 4
&a r~
U 105 PndEH OD8tLF / MASTER CONTRul.LEN U41T MODEl,MHT.2 3n000 31.1 4
> [0 O
cn T yh g
MonEt, R A.I 100000'.
10.0 4
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o m
T0%. A/6 SoflFCH{NG MODilLE*. MODEI, 524 40000 25.0 4
-4 N
I
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15.7 4
CANDALF. enEM RACK N0 tid ?
?
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66.7 4
I~ m O
O m3 w
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4 CAMDALF. STA104Ln4E 4dnEM. PODEf.l.DS.119 2R000.
35.7 4
m g) o~
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I MnDFL 2110 10000'.
1000 4
I O
g 107. CRT DISPLAY H
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-1 TOT. DI5 PLAY GENFRAFOR. MnDFL 2310
- 5000, 200 4
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SPOE OBSPLA v3 sac,es
- reese, ars pnyygg SUPPLY I
C SuCCEs8 Iv1 TIM FIGURE 81. CONTROL ROOM OfSPt.AY SYSTEM AVAILA8tLITY SLOCK OIAGRAM
l l
1 502-8500108-52 REV LTR B CONTROL ROOM DISPLAY SYSTEM Page B-7 ESTIMATED AVAILeBILITY/ RELIABILITY 5 April 1996 l
l B
l OATA SHrET et B
H U f,T T P f.E X ER C A n I t'ETS fn NATA CntJCE*8TR ATOR i
l SitBSySTN mnDEL MTTR Cn 4 PO*
NII1R E R AVAILAntLTTY WTRF
- t. A M 00 A LnGTSTic l
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _' E 1 T A /O CD.1 CPI 7436/21 0.9990640714 111378 A.99 4
'li4 T V. C 3 *l T. CPI 7434/30 0.999963R57A 110670 9.64 4
l IRCfl CPI 7411/60 0.909AAAAA42 359A8 27.79 4
1140*4 CPT 7420/60 0.9990960946
- 286879, 3.49 4
l I
SERIES AV A f f, ARIf,ITY
- 0.909A028594 2 mifX/SERTES A V A I t, A R I f,ITY = 0.9996057587
'HSDSP CPI 7420/65 0.99995A131A 45534 10.47 4
SERIE9 A V A [f, ARIT.ITY
= 0.9995630070 4 SYS I" 9EUIFS AVAILABILTTY = 0.09A25676A8 l
l B
l SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAK:19321 10;8/84
FL 502-9500108-52 REV LTR B FL CONTROL ROOM DISPLAY SYSTEM Page B-G ESTIMATED AVAILABILITY / RELIABILITY 5 April 1996 IL E
DATA.9HFET st (COHTTrit1En)
DATA CiltfCEl4TR ATOR Tn Cpit T/n
+
+...........+...........+..............+.......+.........+...........+
StfBSYSTFM MODEL MTTR C04PO N114RER AVAILABTLITY WTRF LAMHnA LnGTSTIC E
.......'fE1T MUL r T P t.EX ER 0.998256768A
~
NATA Ctic.
CPI A620/20 0.9970348406 1145 743.49 4
REntnID A N T Cn tJ CE9 0.909991267a
+...........+...........+..............+.......i.........+...........+
+...........+...........+..............+.......+.........+...........+
l PARA. HnST I*ffERFACE CPT 7420/70 0.999950227R 48102 in.19 4
I HOST TNTF.
AD& PIER CPT 7410/77 0.9999450447 72R4R 13.73 4
H.S. PARA.
IHrERFACE DEC nR11.W 0.999R159735 71732 4A.02 4
I
+...........+...........+..............+.......+.........+...........+
SPRTE4 AVAILARILITY
= 0.9997203153 RrDl1Nn A9 r At' A TL ABTLTTY = 0.9909099218 I
I I
I I
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION I
SAIC-19321 10/8/84
1 502-8500108-52 REV LTR B i
CONTROL ROOM DISPLAY SYSTEM Page B-9
' ESTIMATED AVAILABILITY / RELIABILITY 5 Aoril 1986 NATA SHEET s1 (CntlTINUED)
DATA COLLECTInN SYSTE
,...........+...........+..............+.......;.....................+
E SitBSYSTEM MnDEL MTTR COMPO4ENT NIIMAER AVAILABILITY
,...........,...........+..............+.."TRF
. LAMBDA LnGTSTIC
.....+.........+...........+
MULTIPLEYER 0.998256768R NATA C3NC.
0.999991267R i
DATA CPU-I/O 0.9999909219 DATA COLLECTION B
SYSTEM 0.9982479130 2275.,
439'.6 4
,...........,...........+......_........+.......+.........+............
E E
E E
lE l
E SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION E
SAIC 19321 10/8/84 l
l
E 502-8500109-52 REV LTR D CONTROL ROOM DISPLAY SYSTEM Page B-10 ESTIMATED AVAILABILITY / RELIABILITY 5 April 1996 l
l I
l DATA.9HRET 82 CDU ll SitB SYS TEM MODEL MTTR CnMD0 NilWRER AVAILABILITY MTRF t.AMBDA LnGTSTIC
,E
+......'f E 1 r
....+...........+..............+.......+.........+...........+
FXP. 83X Ball-K 0.9997933744 19350 51.68 4
AACKphANE Dn11 0K 0.9999216087 52358 10.10 4
ffNT8ilS AnPT DW7A0.AA 0.9991843393 4900 204.08 4
'5 HS PARA INT Opit-w 0.9998159735 21732 4A.02 4
VAX CPU 11/780 0.9975816203 1650 606.n6 4
HSFP FP7A0 0.9994326640 23900 41.94 4
6MR 405 4EH AS780-FA 0.9997816200 55450 54.10 4
5 CONSOLE INT LSI-11 0.9097334044 15000 66.67 4
f, A.10 0 LA100-AA 0.99890n7969 3635 275.10 4
TAPE ORIVE TtI7R 0.9982623R05 2298 435.16 4
MASSBUS AOP UDA50 0.9997813969 1R294 54.66 4
COMP I PIICN T CI780=AA 0.9997334n44 15000 66.67 4
TOTAL CPU 0.99235n3903 520.524 1921.14 5
DEDUNDANT 0.9999414835
+...........+...........+..............+...... 4.....................;
5 E
E E
'E E
E E
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION l
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E 502-8500108-52 REV LTR B CONTROL ROOM DISPLAY SYSTEM Page B-11 ESTIMATED AVAILAGILITY/RELIADILITY 5 April 1996 E
E DATA SHRET 83 OISK SYSTEu lI
+...........+...........+.............................................
SitBSYSrRM MODEL MTTP CDMP0 GENT NitMRER AVAILABILITY 4TRF
, LAMBDA LnGTSTIC
+...........+...........+..............+.......+.........+...........,
l If47ELLIGRNT HSC50 0.9992006395 5000 200 4
DISK C3NT.
l l
SYSIRM DTSK R481 0.9096001599 10000 100 4
NATA OTSK R481 0.9096001599 10n00 100 4
+...........,...........+..............+.......+.........+...........i t
l SFRTES AVAIf,ARILITY
= 0.9984017583 l
RFDitMDANT AVATLLBILITY = 0.999997445A l
+...........+...........+..............+.......+.........+...........+
l STAR COUP.
SC008.AB 0.99990004 20000 50 4
i
,...........+...........+..............+.......+.........+...........+
TOTAT. DISK SYSTEM AVAILARILITY = 0.9997974R61 5
1 E
l i
lE l
E
'E 1
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION l
SAIC-19321 l
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~
CONTROL ROOM DISPLAY SYSTEM Page B-12 ESTIMATED AVAILABILITY / RELIABILITY 5 April 1986 5
DATA SHFFT 84 Il4TnttS AtfD OMF32.An NATA I /O SYS* FEM
+........... +........... +.............. +....... +......... +........... +
E SilaS Y S TF4 MODEL PTTP C'1
- D o '8 E*3 T AVAILABILTTY MTRF
- f. A M B D A LOGTSTir
+........... +....'i l l M A E R
.......+..............+.......+.........+...........+
FXp A'f S T 04 RAlt.KU 0.9997933244 19150 51.68 4
B A f)1f AACKPLANF
- 0011 0K 0.9994236087 5215R 10.10 4
'trif alls OW7AO.AA 0.9991843393 4400 704.nR 4
ADAPTED tir4Teils s7 0.9484015191 CO S 'i. C D'I T.
OMF32.LR 0.9494041417 6700 140.n5 4
+........... +........... +.............. +....... +......... +........... +
E 2 Offi 0F 5 f.UGIC %VAlf.ARILITY = 0.9999909494 SFR T ES A V AIf, ARIf,ITY
= 0.9484015191 0.94949R7433 REDtt un A'f r AV A T L AB TI,Y 77
=
E E
E E
E E
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E 502-8500108-52 REV LTR D CONTROL ROOM DISPLAY SYSTEM Page B-13 ESTIMATED AVAILABILITY / RELIABILITY 5 April lo86 E
E NATA SHEFT e5.
IDS PERTPHEDAf. Sd-GANnAfaF MnDFM PnwER Stf ppg,Y
+...........+...........+..............+.......i.........+............
Sff 95Y% TEM m n 0 F'L MTTD E
C94P0"E9T
' N'I M R E R AVATLAHILTTY UTAF fi A M 0n A f.nGTSTIC
+...........+.........................+.......+.........+...........+
I f.* T WI S s7 0.9989015191 4
DORr 7.CH 0"F12=AR 0.9994041417 4
SOFT SWITCH 910R 0.9997006395 50no 700.00 4
+...........+...........+..............+.......+.........+...........+
SFR TES A V A If, ARIf,ITY
= 0.99750A3n87
[ THt4 TS THE POTENTI AI, AV AILAt3ILITY nF THE SnVTSWITCH OPEDATI'fG OM C0"tt % N D. ftANffAf, S4TTCHING TS AVATLABf,E. 1 5
8 ASTER MMT.7 0.9996001590 10000 MOOu t.E 9W CollLE S24 0.99992n0064 50000
+...........+...........+..............+.......+.........+...........+
= 0.9998400192 ST.1GLE 9dTTCH AVAT[,ABTLTTY = 0.9904407411 1.(1 41(1.A1 A V A If, ARI f.f tY = 0.9999096867
+...........+...........+..............+.......+.........+...........+
E I
400EW P.S.
PS3100 0.9992006195 5000 2n0.00 4
+........... +...........,.............. +....... +......... +........... +
1.(1.A)t'1 41 A V A II. AR I T. TTY
= 0.9990903610 E
INTAL pRRTPHERAf. SW SYSTE'4 AV A IL ARIf,ITY = 0.9099900477 l
E E
E E
1
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~ SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION S AIC-19321 10/8184
E 502-9500109-52 REV LTR B CONTROL ROOM DISPLAY SYSTEM Page B-ia E
ESTIMATED AVAILABILITY / RELIABILITY 5 April 1796 E
E DATA SHERT e6 SPDS DISPt.AY SYSTEM
+...........+...........+..............+.......+.........+...........+
E Sf 865YS TEM MnDEL MTTR Cnquaa:Eur stiwaER AVATLABILTTY wTRF TAMHnA LnGTSTTC 2
,...........,...........,..............+.......+.........+...........,
AACK M O U 'IT R u 3 391/ 54 0.999R571633 78000 35.7 4
wonE4 0.9 9A571631 78000 15.7 4
4
%T A 1n a r.0 PIE f,nS.319 unnE9 TOT.CRP 211n 0.9496001594 10n00 106 4
E DISPf.AY 707 nT9Pf,AY 2110 0.9997006195 5000 70n 4
,..'I t,9 A 7 0 R CE
.........+...........+..............+.......+.........+...........+
E SFRTES AVAIT.ARILITY
= 0.9985158084 TWO OTSPLAYs NUT OF FTVR Ifp AVAILARTLTTY= 0.9990909999 r
E E
E E
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~ SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION E
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502-8500108-52 REV LTR C I
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I I
APPENDIX C CONTROL ROOM DISPLAY SYSTEM POWER SUPPLY l
l AVAILABILITY / RELIABILITY DATA l
C.1 INTRODUCTION The purpose of this analysis is to determine the reliacility l
provided by an Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) as required by reference listed below.
The existing primary power supply system is shown in Figure C-1.
l
}
C. 2 GENERAL REFERENCE-Letter dated 17 August 1984 to SAI from NPPD.
SUD.JEC T:
SPDS IMPLEMENTATION AUDIT.
With the Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) in the PMIS Power l
Supply Configuration as shown in Figure C-1, a high voltage transmission line failure does not interrupt the supply of power to the PMIS.
The UPS has a
battery bank with sufficient capacity to power the PMIS for 30 minutes in a standalone mode.
This time period is sufficient for the emergency diesel power supply to start, warm-up and assume the 125VDC power bus load which includes the battery bank charging load and the PMIS load.
A time flow chart showing the operating and failed conditions for the three PMIS power sources is shown in Figure C-2.
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 10 8/84
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l 502-9500108-52 REV t.TR C E
CONTROL ROOM DISPLAY SYSTEM POWER SUPPLY Page C-3 GENERAL 6 June 1986 i
l l
lC MTTR l
l TRANSMISSION LINE I
rl I
l CHARGING DISCHARGE 2.C CHARGING MODE MODE MODE W/ DIESEL-ON LINE g
B C
MEAN TIME TO FAILURE rl
=.5 HOURS L_____
l 10 SECONDS TO STARTUP DIESEL l
ON LINE t
15 MIN q a
1
J l
1
HJ DIESEL SYSTEM DIESEL BEGINS SERVING j
DIESEL BEGINS SERVING PMIS LOAD ESSENTIAL PLANT LOADS TIME r
SAIC-21285 4/7/86 FIGURE C 2. PMIS POWER SUPPLY TIME CHART
{
l SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIO.NAL CORPORATION j
SAIC 19321 10/8!84
502-S500108-52 REV LTR C CONTROL ROOM DISPLAY SYSTEM POWER SUPPLY Page C-4 GENERAL 6 June 1956 In line A the nigh-voltage transmission line is operating as the prime source of PMIS power until a point in time when tnis source of power is interrupted.
The transmission-line power supply is not available for an average time equal to tne mean time to repair (MTTR) before transmission-line power returns.
In line C, the Emergency Diesel Power System is alerted at line A
failure time.
A time delay elapses until diesel startup (10 seconds) is completed.
Diesel delay time (15 minutes) is I
completed and the diesel power supply System assumes tne 125VDC power bus load.
It may be noted that the right-hand portion of the loop of Figure C-1 is available to supply power to the SPDS power bus in the event of a rectifier or inverter failure in the UPS.
During l
a failure of this type an operational Emergency Diesel Power Supply System is not available to the SPDS power bus and a
transmission line interruption results in a
" FAILED" condition.
C. 3 CLASS 1E MULTIPLEXER POWER SUPPLY Appendix C is designed to answer the particular question posed in the reference listed in Section C.2 of Appendix C.
Figure C-1 deals only with the primary power system to the SPDS as this is the part of the total system addressed by the question in the above mentioned reference.
Figure C-1 is, nowever, not the only I
high reliability power supply system serving the PMIS.
This section describes the 1E power supply to the IE multiplexers in the PMIS.
l 5
A block diagram of the IE Multiplexer Power Supply System is shown in Figure C-3.
The system " Start-Up" Transformer is fed from a
345/161 kV transformer to a 161 kV substation, which in turn energizes the system "Startup" Transformer.
This power source is considered to be operating in parallel with an Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) 69 kV power source operating as CNS 's Emergency Power Feed.
THis combination of power sources powers the Division 1 and Division 2 power supply bases.
A Division 1 Diesel Generator is available in cold standby mode as backup for the Division 1 Bus.
Similarly a Division 2 Diesel E
Generator is available as cold standby backup for the Division 2 Bus.
II m.
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION l
l SAIC.19321 1018:84
i 502-8500108-52 REV LTR C C:
CONTROL ROOM DISPLAY SYSTEM POWER SUPPLY Page C-5 CLASS 1E MULTIPLEXER POWER SUPPLY 12 June 1986 START UP OPPD TRANSFORMER 69 V p
DIESEL DIESEL FOR FOR DIVISION 1 DIVISION 2 E
MAIN GEN MAIN GEN l
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DIVISION 1 OlVISION 2 DISTRIBUTION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM SYSTEM E
SAIC 23104 6/5/86 CLASS 1E CLASS 1E MULTIPLEXERS MULTIPLEXERS FIGURE C 3. BLOCK DIAGRAM OF 1E MULTIPLEXER POWER SUPPLY
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SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION E
SAIC.19321 10/8/84
502-8500108-52 REV LTR C CONTROL ROOM DISPLAY SYSTEM POWER SUPPLY Page C-6 CLASS 1E.9ULTIPLEXER POWEP SUPPLY 6 June 198e The normal feed for the Class 1E Buses is from the main generator,
- however, because of various outages during tne itee of CNS a Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) for tnis source is meaninglass and is therefore neglected here.
C. 3. 1 CLASS 1E POWER SOURCE RELIABILITY COMPUTATIONS The reliability of the parallel combination of the "Startup" Transformer and the OPPD 69 kV Emergency System is determined from data items (7) and (8) in Table C-1.
For Item (7):
R7 = exp (-168/94,696) =.9982274746 For Item (8):
RB = exp (-168/7405.8) 9775703308
=
The reliability of the parallel combination is:
R7IIRO = 1- (1-R7)*(1-R8)
.9999602428
=
The Division 1 Diesel Generator can be considered to be in parallel with the "Startup" Transformer and OPPD Emergency Source if short interruptions (cold standby start to online delays) to the 1E multiplexer are tolerated.
This condition is accepted here.
For Item (3)
R3 = exp (-168/5558.6) 9702287238
=
The parallel combination of R7, R8 and R3 is:
R = R3ll CR7IIR83 = 1- (1-R3)*(1-R7 Q RO)
R=
9999988164 The Division 1 Power Bus feeds the Division i
distribution system which is in series with the power delivery point to tne l
1E multiplexers.
For Item (9)
R9 = exp (-168/103680) i l
.9983809417
=
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 10/8/84
4 l
502-85C0109-52 REV LTR C CONTROL ROOM DISPLAY SYSTEM POWER SUPPLY Page C-7 CLASS 1E MULTIPLEXER POWER SUPPLY 6 June 1986 Reliabiltty of power to the 1E multiplexer is:
R *Rg 9999999164*.9993809417
=
99637976
=
or 99.94% for a mission time of 1 -week The MTEF for the complete system is 103604 32 hours3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br /> C. 4 POWER SOURCE RELIABILITY COMPUTATIONS To compute the PMIS Power System Reliability Estimate it must be assumed that the Emergency Diesel Power System always starts and assumes the 125VDC Power bus load before the 30 minute UPS battery backup limit.
It will also be necessary to neglect items shown in Figure C-1 for which there is no data in Table C-I.
A mission-time "t" must be selected and one-week or t=168 hours will be selected arbitrarily.
l C.4.1 Case 1 The reliability of the Power Supply System to the SPDS Bus is controlled by items (1) and (2) in Table C-I.
For item (1):
R1 = exp (-Lambda
- t)
E 997942329
= exp (-168/01565.9)
=
For Item (2):
R2 = exp (-168/754717.0) 999774248
=
The SPDS Power bus reliability without the UPS is:
R = R1*R2 =.9977203157 or R1R2 = 99.77%
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION E
SAIC.19321 10,8/84 l
l
502-9500108-52 REV LTR C CONTROL ROOM DISPLAY SYSTEM POWER SUPPLY Page C-9 POWER SOURCE RELIABILITY COMPUTATIONS 6 June ICG6 The transmission line power source is effectively in parallel with the Emergency Diesel Power Supply wnen tne time to bring the diesel system on-line is provided by the UPS.
The reliability of R1, R2 and R3 operating in redundant mode i s:
R1R2= 0.9977203157 (from above)
For item (3):
R3= exp(-168/5559.6) 9702287238
=
The redundant power supply combination is:
R1R211R3 = 1 - (1-R1R2)(1-R3)
RP =
9999321309.
The redundant transmission line/ diesel power system serves the UPS 125VDC power bus though the UPS rectifier.
Table C-I contains data for the UPS equipment but not for individual parts of the UPS.
In the absence of this data it will be assumed that the MTBF for the UPS rectifier and inverter are identical and they total 100,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> in the UPS series service.
- Thus, Item (5):
R5 = esp (-168/100,000) 9983214104
=
UPS Rectifier / Inverter reliability is:
RR = J R5 =
9991603527 The reliability of the power sources down to the UPS 125VDC power bus is:
RP*RR =.9999321309
- 9991603527 9990925406
=
Since the UPS battery power supply also terminates on the 125VDC power
The reliability for the UPS battery operating in normal (charging) mode is:
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 3
S AIC-19321 10/8/84 l
502-9500108-52 REV LTR C CONTROL ROOM DISPLAY SYSTEM POWER SUPPLY Page C-4
[
POWER SOURCE RELIADILITY COMPUTATIONS e June ICS6 I
Item (4).
R4=
9910699251 As a source of prime puwer to the the SPDS bus the MTBF for the I
UPS battery is 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> or I
R4 = 0 to the transmission line/ diesel power system.
The UPS, however, l
does cause the diesel power system to appear to be operating in hot-standby mode to the SPDS power bus.
The redundant comoination of power units to the 125VDC power bus is the redundant transmission line/ diesel power combination or:
R=
9990925406 (From above) l Power from the 125VDC power bus passes through the UPS inverter I
before appearing on the SPDS power bus.
The UPS inverter has the same reliability as the UPS rectifier so that the system reliability with the UPS to the SPDS power bus is:
R=
9990925406*.9991603527 l
9992536552
=
The reliability or the PMIS power supply is:
I 96,116.9 R = --------------- = 99.93%
l 96,116.9 + 168 I
l s
=
-- w SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC 19321 10,8/84
]
502-9500108-52 REV LTR C CONTROL ROOM DISPLAY SYSTEM POWER SUPPLY Page C-10 POWER SOURCE RELIADILITY COMPUTATIONS 6 June 1G9e E
TABLE C-I.
MTDF/MTTR DATA FOR SPDS POWER BUS E
UNIT MTDF LAMBDA MTTR (HOURS)
(FAILURES /
(HOURS) 10E6 HRS) 1.
12.5KV 91565.9 12.260 2.932 (1) 2.
MPD2 in MPF 754717.0 1.325
- 7. 2
<1) 3.
Diesel Generator 5558.6 179.900 (NA)
(1) 4.
UPS Battery 19726.6 53.400 0.85 (1) 5.
UPS Equipment 100000.0 10.000 (NA)
(1) 6.
MPD1 in MPF 754717.0 1.325
- 7. 2 (1) 1 7.
Startup XFMR 94696.0 10.560 (NA)
(1)
E (1) Reference Letter From:
Nebraska Public Power District K. C.
Walden to Jim Murphy Dated 19 January 1995 Sub Jec t:
Mean Time Detween Failure (MTBF) Calculations for Power Supply System to PMIS B
Equipment 9.
OPPD Emer.
7405.8 135.030 (NA)
(2) 9.
Class 1E Distr.
103680.0 9.645 (NA)
(2)
(2) Reference Letter From:
Nebraska Public Power District J. C.
Murphy Dated 16 May 1986 Sub j ec t:
Review of the FMEA SAIC Doc. No.
502-0500100-52 Rev D SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION E
SAIC-19321 10< 8184
502-5500108-52 REV LTR C CONTROL ROOM DISPLAY SYSTEM POWER SUPPLY Page C-11 CONCLUSIONS 6 June ICSo C. 5 CONCLUSIONS The apparent MTBF for the transmission line/ diesel (UPS) power combination (99.53% reliability) is 96,116.9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />.
Tne improvement in continuous supply of power over tne I
transmission line alone (diesel system in cold standby) i s:
22,506.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> or a
30.6%
improvement attributable to tne UPS/ Diesel c omb i n.a t i o n.
E E
E E
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SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION E
SAC 19321 10/8/84
rL 502-3500108-52 REV LTR C r
b I
u ll APPENDIX D PMIS "AS GUILT" SPARE PARTS LIST ll l
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SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION I
SAC 19321 10 8/84
E 502-9500105-52 REV L7R C PMIS "AS BUILT" SPARE PARTS LIST Page D-2 6 vune 1766 5
~
NPPD SPARES VENDOR QUANTITY DESCRIPTION MODEL NO.
PART NO-CPI 14 Univ. H.S. Wide Gate Card 7436/50-003 C21 5234-003
'E CPI 1
Univ. H.S. Wide Gate Card 7436/50-002 C21 5234-002 CPI 1
Univ. H.S. Wide Gate Card 7436/50-001 021 5234-001 CPI 1
Univ. A/D Cony. CD 14 Bit Res.
7436/21-008 021-0211 008 CPI 6
16 Bit Opt. Isol C/l Card 7437/37-012 021 5230-012 E
CPI 1
High Speed Optical 7420/60-000 021 5258-000 CPI 1
Dual IRCU 7411/60-001 022-5002-000 CPI 1
Dual IRCU 7411/60-001 022-5002-001 CPI 1
Dual IRCU 7411/60-001 021-0004-000 E
CPI 1
Red. Acc. Univ. Controller 7434/30-000 070-5076-000 CPI 2
U16 Univ.1/O Controller 7433/30-000 070-5073-000 CPI 1
RTD Ref Module N/A 040 5442-000 CPI 2
5 MS COS D/l Card N/A 038 5064 204 E
CPI 13 8ch All Surge Card N/A 038-5097-000 CPI 6
D/l Surge C M N/A 038 5098-000 cpl 2
5 MS COS Surgs and Output Card N/A 038 5099-102 CPI 1
Universal Chassis 7431/30-003 070-0004-003 E
CPI 1
16 Bit D/l 7437/20-051 021 5227 051 CPI 1
1/0 Bus Terminator Card 7416/20-000 021-0004 000 CPI 1
Dual 28V Signal Cond. Supply N/A 040 5563-001 CPI 1
DALCAl. Card 7436/10-001 021 5271 001 E
CPI 1
Pulse input Card 4ch 16 Sit N/A 021 5278-010 CPI 1
Pulse input Surge Protect Card N/A 038-5099 104 CPI 1
Analog Output 4ch 7455/30-000 021-0161 000 CPI 1
Analog Output Surge Protect Card N/A 038 5107-000 E
CPI 1
4ch Bridge Comp. Card 7504/26 158 038-0012 158 CPI 1
Sv @60A Dual Power Supply N/A 040 5435 001 CPI 1
5V -@30A Dual Power Supply N/A 040 5483-001 I
CPI 1
15V @9A Dual Power Supply N/A 040-5486-001 CPI 1
15V @6A Dual Power Supply N/A 040 5484-001 CPI 1
Relay Output Card 7435/40-001 021 0205-001 l
CPI 1
0-Bus l/O Controller 7410/66-000 021 0217-000 l
CPI 1
0-8us 1/O Controller 7410/66-000 021-0004 000 CPI 1
High Speed Dual Serial 7420/65-000 021 5261 000 CPI 1
ParaHel Host Interface 7420/70-000 021 5260-000 CPI 1
Host Interface Adapter 7410/77-000 071 5081-000 E
CPI 1
115V Disk Assembly N/A 070-5080-000 cpl 1
Motorola MVME110 CPU Board N/A 023-5001 000 CPI 1
Motorola MVME200 64K Ram Bd.
N/A 023 5002-000 CPI 1
Motorola MVME420 SASI Adpt. Bd.
N/A 023 5003-000 l
CPI 1
Motorola MVME201256K Ram Bd.
N/A 023 5005-000 CPI 1
Motorola MVME400 Dual Serial Port N/A 023 5004-000 CPI 1
System Monitor Board N/A 021 5262-000 l
CPI 1
Battery Board N/A 021 5272 000 l
CPI 1
115V Power Supply Assembly N/A 060-5003-000 CPI 2
IRCU to Modem Cable 7420/34 000 314 5053 000 SAIC 23105(1)(TY20$)
6/6s86 l
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l SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION fI SAIC 19321 10,8/84
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5 i
502-9500109-52 REV LTR C E
PMIS "AS BUILT" SPARE PARTS LIST Faga 0-3 6 June 1356
~
3 NPPD SPARES (Continued)
VENDOR QUANTITY DESCRIPTION MODEL NO. PART NO.
E CPI 2
Cooling Fan Assembly 7505/40-002 070-0035 002 CPI 1
RO Surge Protect Card N/A 038 51C6-000 CPI 2
1/O Bus Cable 10 feet 7417/30-010 314-5043 010 CPI 1
1/O Interconnect Cable 7414/30-005 314 5042-005 E
CPI 1
RTP Pass Through Card N/A 038 5140-000 CPI 1
AC/DC Surge Prot. Card N/A 038-5100-013 CPI 1
RTP Controller Panel 7505/05-001 070 0044-001 CPI 1
Extender Card 7505/71 000 021-0017 000 5
CPI 1
Extender Card 7505/72-000 314-0007-000 CPI 1
Card Puller 7505/80-000 250 5032-000 CPI 1
Motorola Extender Card N/A 023 5006-000 CPI 1
Motorola Extender Card N/A 023 5007-000 CPI 1
Of Test Fixture 7507/31-000 021 5228-000 DEC 1
Falcon Single Board Computer DEC 11/21 +
KXT 11 A8 KEPCO 1
Kepco Power Supply RMT001 AA N/A E
VERSATEC 1
Versatec V 80 Controller Card SAIC 1
10T Interface Card 411 N/A VERSATEC 1
Versatec Printer / Plotter V 80 711-0550 N/A DEC 1
VAX 11/780 Spares Kit E
DEC 8
FP780-AA Spares Kit DEC 1
HSC50 Spares Kit DEC 1
C1780 Spares Kit DEC 2
DMF32 A8 Spares Kit 5
DEC 2
Memory Spares Kit DEC 1
TU78 Spares Kit DEC 1
Unibus Adapter Spares Kit DEC 1
Masabus Adapter Spares Kit l
OEC 1
RA81 Disk Drive l uur DEC 1
DR11 W DEC 1
Power Supplies, Each Type DEC 1
Teletypewriter LA 100 E
DEC 1
RPIS/RWM Micro 11 IDS 1
Softswitch Access Controller 9108 N/A IDS 1
Switch Controller MMT2 N/A IDS 3
Switch Mod.
S-24 N/A E
IDS 1
MMT 2 to S 24 Cable N/A N/A GANDALF 1
Power Supply PS3100 N/A GANDALF 3
Modem Card RM3319 N/A GANDALF 3
Standalone Modem LOS319 N/A E
PARADYNE 2
Long Haul Modem IDT 1
CRT, Keyboard & Display Generator 2310 (or N/A equiv.)
E SAIC-23105(2)(TY205)
E 6/6/86 l
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