ML20112D511

Intervenor Exhibit I-SC-LP-31,consisting of Attachment 5 Re Forwarding 830712 Final Rept of NRC-05-82-249, Test Review,Data Analysis & Review of Emergency Diesel Generators Operational..

ML20112D511
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	08/03/1984
From:	Kaye J ENERGY CONSULTANTS, INC.
To:	Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
CON-NRC-05-82-249, CON-NRC-5-82-249 I-SC-LP-031, I-SC-LP-31, OL-4, NUDOCS 8501140333
Download: ML20112D511 (30)

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ATTACHf!ENT 5 8501140333 840003 PDR ADOCK 05000322 C PDR

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1. . Energy Consu tents, no.

121 SEVENTH S 6 e 1 PITTSSURGH,PA.*?co-3487 412/434-5200 JAK-ENG-83-181 ~

July 12, 1983 .

Mr. E. B. McCabe U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 ,

SUBJECT:

WITNESS AND EVALUATION OF EMERGENCY DIESEI. GENERATOR TESTING AT SHOREEAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION FOR NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, REGION I STAFF. FINAL REPORT OF NRC CONTRACT NO. 05-82-249 PARAMETER PURCHASE ORDER NO. NRC-IE-82/83, TASK 38

Dear'.Mr. McCabe:

Enclosed are five (5) copies of the final report of the Evaluation and Witnessing of Emergency Diesel Generator Testing Proble=s at Shoreham Nuclear Power Station which was performed at Shoreham, New York by Mr. Ga11ard Kunkle and the Energy Consultants, Inc. staff in accordance with the reference contract. The final report incorporates the NRC co==ents on the preliminary report provided to Mr. G. Kuikle at the meeting in Region I on June 29, 1983.

The preliminary report was submitted to you previously by JAK-ENG-83-161 dated June 17, 1983. -

If you should have'any questions or comments, please contact me.

Sincerely.

ENERGY CONSULTANTS, INC.

~

John A. ye Manager Design and Consulting Engineering Department

• RJA/cv Enclosures cc: Jim Higgins - U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Coc: mission  ;

Richard A. Lofy - Parameter Ideorporated O

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FINAL REPORT TO U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i

REGION I FOR TEST REVIEW, DATA ANALYSIS AND REVIEW OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR OPERATIONAL / RELIABILITY PROBLEMS AT SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT I, SHOREHAM, NEW YORK NRC CONTRACT NO. 05-82-249 PARAMETER CONTRACT NO. NRC-IE-82/83, TASK 38 FROM APRIL 25, 1983 TO MAY 19, 1983 PRESENTED ON JULY 12, 1983 BY i DESIGN AND CONSULTING ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT ENERGY CONSULTANTS, INC.

i 121 SEVENTH STREET PITTSEURGH, PENNSYLVANIA 15222-3487 (412) 434-5230 PREPARED BY . .

bali /A/M ie REV!EWED BY [ . O. [J /g ,d i V

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title

. Pace I Introduction . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 A. Su==ary. . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 B. Equip =ent Id'entification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 C. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 D. Inspection Objectives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 E.

Persons Contacted. . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . .

4 II Testing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 III Corrective / Preventive Maintenance and .

Maintenance Records. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 IV Visual Inspections of Diesel Generators. . . . . . . . 14 Y

Review of Component Problems / Failures. . . . . . . . . 15 A. Engine Head Cracks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

P 15 B. Turbocharger Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-C. Engine Block Casting Indications . . . . . . . . . 17 D. General Review of Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Y

General Reco=nendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 8

_ _ _ . . _ . . . _ _ _ . _ . - - - - - rr ^ * ' ' - - " "" ' ' " - ' ' ~ ' ' '

t EVALUATION OF DIESEL ENGINE PROBLDd.S AND TESTING AT SHOREHAM. .

I. INTRODUCTION A. Su=arv :

An in depth assess =ent of selected operational proble=s was conducted which included areas such as corrective =aintenance, preventive =aintenance and ce=ponent failure.

This assess =ent included detailed reviews of selected problems identified in Long Island Lighting Co=pany (LILCO) Deficiency Reports, Repair / Rework Requests issued by the Start-up ' Group and failure reports issued by LILCO, Delaval and other vendors. In addition, observation of =aintenance activities as well as a physical inspection of each e=ergency diesel generator unit was conducted during both standby and, when possible. .

running conditions.

During the review of each ite=,

an atte=pt was =ade to deter =ine the following:

(a) Was the work acco=plished in accordance with approved procedures?

(b) Were properly calibrated tools applicable)

(if used during

=aintenance,7, , ,,, , , ,,,, .

(c) Were =easure=ents, adjustments, t'o rquing , etc. values within prescribed ranges?

(d) Were any trends detectable in readings or co=ponent failures?

(e) Were proble=s/ fail'ures caused by design, engine vibration, ince=plete or improper work =anship?

A review of selected preoperational diesel testing was also conducted. This-review included observations o f, in-process testing, reviews of test procedures, reviews of coupleted test procedures and evaluation ot coupleted test data.

• 4 During these I reviews and evaluations of the diesel generators, a number of - I problem areas were found to exist and are identified in the following report.

In addition to specific proble=s/co= cats, which are identified, a nu=ber of

• reco=endations and observations are also included which should be considered for corrective actions.

Although some proble=s are still occurring during operation / testing, the frequency at viiich they occur see=s to be decreasing. Additional' testing and corrective action is needed to provide a high level of confidence that the engines vill start and operate reliably. Specific

' ce=en ts and reco=endations are provided in various sections of this report.Section VI provides the specific reco=endations for additional testing. Once these reco=endations have been adopted (in conjunction with the reco==endations of '

the LILCO Task Force), and the testing ec=pleted with no probless, this should i

prov'de the necessary assurance that the e=ergency diesel can ace'enplish their design functions.

As identified in the reco=mendations of NUREG/CR-0660, the training and perfor ance of personnel (including Q/A) involved with maintenance and operation of emergency diesels contributed significantly to the reliability of ,

the various energency engines. This same area appears to be a problem at Shoreham.

The Repair / Rework program including records was felt to need' i=provement.

Additional review and evaluation is also needed of various test results as identified in Section II. In addition,Section V.B provides reco=sendations for further investigation as a result of the turbocharger failure.

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, ENERGY CONSULTANTS, INC.

. FCR U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I Contract No. NRC Contract No. 05-82-249 Parameter Purchase Order No. FRC-II-82/S3, Task 38 -

Docket No. 50-322

• License No. CPPR-95 Licensee: Long Island Lighting Ccmpany 175 East Old Country Road Hicksville, NY

Facility Na=e

Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Inspection Location: Shoreham, New York  !

(

Inspection Conducted: April 25, 1983 - May 19, 1983 Inspector: . .

/M Gailard L'. Kunkle, Senior consultant, Energy Consultants Inc.

B. Ecuie=entIdentidic'ation: -

Manufacturer: Engine - Transamerica Delaval Company Generator - Portec Electric Products Division Model: DSR-48 Serial Nambers: i 74010, 74011 and 74012 l Ratings: 4,889 horsepower 3,500 kilowatts (continuous) 3,900 kilowatts (2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> rating) 0.8 power' factor 4,375 kilovelt amps 4,160 kilovolts 607.2 amperage C. Backeround:

The three emergency diesel generato,rs at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit I, have experienced repeated proble=s during preoperational full load and endurance tests., The operational problens have included cylinder head

t .

problems (5 heads replaced), rocker arm asse=cly hold-down bolt failures, .

turbocharger bearing failure and linear indications in engine block casting.

D. Insoection Objectives:

• l

, Provide an independent review and assessment of emergency diesel generator operability,and the ability of the diesels to perform their design function, based on a comparison of design capabilities /perfor=ance ratings (as described in the Shoreham Final Safety Analysis Report, design specificaticas and vendor technical manuals) with actual cperational data (as ' described in licensee preoperational test records). Witness ongoing emergency diesel generator testing, if applicable, and assess test results.

Perform an assessment of past preoperational problems, including material fa1.*.ures, and deter =ine the appropriateness of corrective actions to provide assurance of futura diesel operability. Review, as appropriate, licensee reccrds of emergency diesel generator preventive and corrective maintenance act: ens sinch January 1,1981 and the licensen's written analysis of diesel faiJures and corrective actions. Assess the need for independent NRCicontractor material testing and for additional licensee material testing.

as may be required. I' E. Persons contacted: .

Long Island Lighting Co=oany '

E. Youngling J. Rivello

, Stone & Webster Encineering Corooration R. Purcell N. Rudikoff T. Paulantonio A. Stakutis R. Lavrance W. Dick T. Brown J.'Kamayer W. Cook . T. Gray ..

meet the acceptance criteria unless a power factor of al=ost one (1) was .

assumed. Some examples were observed where the voltage dropped and amperage decreased by about 10% and the recorded KW went up slightly -

(KVAR would remain constant). These inconsistencies need further evaluation to deter =ine if test requirements were actually met.

Coment #4: On April 27, observed that the official copy of PT. 307.005C in use for diesel testing did not contain TCN #1. (The step in progress had been changed by TCN #1. This TCN had been issued about two weeks

,- earlier.) .

Co=ent #5: The data sheets in test procedure PT. 307.005C vere not signed by and therefore did not indicate who the data takers were.

Co=en t #6: Some instrumentation on the diesels' being tested were not marked to indicate their calibration status as required by ANSI N45.2 and N18.7. For example, engine cache =eter, cooling water ther=ometers.

turbocharger air pressure, voltage, amperage and lube oil filter inlet and outlet pressure sages.

Co==ent #7: Some data had been changed / corrected by write overs making it difficult to read.

Coment #8: In' test procedure PT. 307.005A&C precaution 4.7 states i

diesel room temperature and humidity should be frequently monitored. .

There was no objective evidence that this was being done.

• a i Cement #9: Initial condition 5.5 in procedure PT. 307.005C was signed off (with no exception indicated) indicating the HVAC was in operation. .

However, the ventilation was not in normal operation as the ventilation damper was temporarily bypassed and failed open.

Co=ent #10: Step 8.4.1 of PT. 307.005A states " ensure total KVA of generator does not exceed 4375 KVA". Since there is no method provided i

to measure or requirement to calculate this value, it is not clear how this requirement was met. "

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II. TESTING

Background:

- To verify the ability of the diesels to perform their design function, the operational data in the preoperational test records were co= pared to the l design capabilities /perfor ance ratings described in the Shoreha= Final Safety Analysis Report, design specifications and vendor technical manuals. Actual testing was witnessed where possible.,

Su==arv:

Portions of testing on diesel engines 102 and 103 were observed over a period of cuo weeks. This testing was being perfor=ed in accordance with preoperational test procedures PT. 307.003 B-1 and PT. 307.005C TCN-1. In addition, the results of a co=pleted test procedure PT. 307.005A were reviewed. (It should be noted that the results of this ce=pisted procedure have not been reviewed nor accepted by the LILCO Joint Test Crcup.) The .

comments resulting from these reviews are as follows:

Coment #1: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Revision 1, August 1977) Section C.2(3) requires the energency diesel generators to be tested at a load equivalent to the continuous rating for 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> and for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> at the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> racing. The continuous full load rating of each emergency diesel generator set is shown in Table I.

Typical values of data recorded in PT. 307.005A for the full lead run are shown in the last column of Table I.

TABLE I

- Continueus Tull Lead Ratine Test Lead values 3,500 3.510 Kilowatts (KW) 4,160 4,225 Volts (V) 607.2 480 Amps (A) 0.8 1.0*

Power Factor (PT) ,

Kilovolt-Amps (KVA) 4.375 3.513*

• Calculated

-. . .. . ~. - . . . . . - _. -. ._,

4 Transamerica Delaval, Inc.

L. McHugh -

t R. D. Jacobs and Associates

.1. Jacobs U.S. Nuclear Rerulatory Cot =ission i

J. Higgins E. McCabe H. Nicholas L. Bettenhausen m

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j The low amperage (480 vs. 607.2) and calculated KVA diesel generator was not tested at its continuous full load (Note: the -

shows the power f actor and KVA ratings.

rating considering current, ding.)

higher voltage of 4.22S would only account for a 10 amp lower i

as not fully Typical data for the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> load run also shows the engNote:

basis. ne w loaded to its 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> load rating on thea530current / power amp load, the factor engine fuel During the 2-hour full load run at If the a=perage load were racks were very near their full travel stops.

increased, the fuel racks may have reached full travel be 110% amperage load was achieved.

obtained during' the test did not Note: The lower . than rated current d would probably have simulate normal bus load conditions (actual bus loa resul a lower power factor). The lower' current would not caused by heating, 8 The effects that are generator 1 R. ' heat loss. d therefore, were not effectively simulate .

To ensure the emergency diesels are d capable of carryin d at the emergency emergency loads, additional testing should be con ucte factor.

limits (voltage, amperage & KVA) while operating at a 0.8 pow

< Step 8.3.7 of PT, 307.005A states load diesel genera 100 KVAR.

comment #2:

full load then' defines full load as 3500 f, 70 KW and so d KVAR 1500 the +

Table I of the test procedure records KW but does pot recor 22 hour2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> In addition, Step 8.4.1 perfor=s the data cannot be verified.

70, -

full load run, however, this step only specifies a lead of 3 0 KV and does not address KVAR load.

then the generator may If step 8.3.7 definition of full lead is correct, $00 KVAR's were not have been at full load in step 8.4.1 since only about inconsistency should be the test. This maintained .throughout investigated and resolved.

In evaluating the recorded data, it was found that t

) did not always ce=nent 83_:

cair:ulated KW (using the recorded voltage and amperage

Commene ill: The diesel generator load values in Table II of ,

PT. 307.005A are not recorded in the correct units. The rable specifies W while values are actually recorded in W. -

Coc=ent #12: Various . steps in PT. 307.005A were designated to be witnessed by Operations Q/A. The following steps have been co=pleted but were not signed by Operations Q/A to indicate they witnessed the steps:

8.3.9, 8.3.11, 8.5.3 and 8.6.1.

1 Reco==endation #1: The readability of so=e of the test instru=entation dces net seem to be accurate enough to meet the test requirements. For example, the mini =um subdivision for W on the recorder was 200 W while

'the tolerance band specified in the procedure was +40 and -19 W.

Si=ilar problems existed for amperage and voltage. Test instru=ents should be accurate enough to be compatible with the tolerance of the acceptance criteria in the procedure, e.g., the readability of most analog instruments is one-half the smallest scale subdivision. The high.

speed recorder and charts should be analyzed to verify that their accuracy will actually permit reading (interpolating) chese charts to one-quarter or one-eighth cf the smallest st: ale subdivision as necessary to assure compliance with the test requirements.

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III. CORRICTIVE/ PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE AND MAIh'IENANCE RECORDS .

Background:

Approximately eight percent of the maintenance records (including Repair / Rework Requests, Rework Supervisor Work Su=maries and Quality Assurance Verification Reports) were reviewed to determine if the work was accomplished in accordance with all vendor technical requirements. This review also determined if the maintenance . and maintenance records properly i=planenced

,' both local and NRC requirements. In addition, proble=s were reviewed to determine (where possible) if the " root cause" had actually been identified and corrected.

Suc=arv:

In many cases it was not possible to verify, based on the maintenance records identified below, that the work had been properly conducted in accordance with

'both tachnical and administrative requirements. These problems fell into the following categories: '

1. Torquing - The Delaval Technical Manual, Volume I. Appendix IV provides a table of torque values to be used for various threaded fasteners. This table also stated that all torque values are based on the use' of a thread lubricant consisting of a 50/50 mixture of graphite and engine oil.

Comment A:

Some maintenance records indicate incorrect torque values may have been used. For example, Repair / Rework 408 indicates the rocker arm assembly was only torqued to 120 f t lbs instead of .

the required 365 ft lbs; Repair / Rework 417 indicates the rocker arm assembly and sub cover were torqued to 365 ft lbs, (i.e.,

overtorqued) although the sub cover is only required to be torqued to 120 ft lbs. The consequences of over or under torquing should be evaluated. ,

e s

Ce= ment B: A number of maintenance records do not provide any .

documentation or assurance that threaded fasteners were properly torqued since no torque values are recorded in the space provided -

(Start-up Instruction No. 6) and since the records do not provide any reference to the use of calibrated torque wrenches (i.e., there were no Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE) nu=bers and calibration due dates recorded in the space provided). The following Repair / Rework Packages are typical of thfs type cf proble=:

(1) 751 - no torque value and no M&TE nu=ber (2) 577 - no torque value and no M&TE number (3) 596 - no torque value and no M&TE nu=bers (si=11ar work on 805 & 808 had required infor=ation)

(4) 554 - states "no torque value, vendor specs" (5) 637 - no torque values recorded (6) 712 - no M&TE number for torque wrench used on head studs (7) 394 - no torque values and no M&TE numbers (8) 423 - no torque values and no M&TE numbers Comment Ct A number of maintenance records do not provide any assurance that the required thread lubricant was used during reasse=bly and torquing. Sone records specifically indicate "none" ,

or "NA" in the space pr.vided on the for=. Other packages did not include a copy of this cenpleted form to show a lubricant had been used. Start-up Instruction No. 6 provides a place for recording type of thread lubricant. Typical exa=ples are found in the following Rt. pair / Rework Packages:

l (1) 612 and 744 - indicate lubriennt was used on head studs, ,

other studs and bolts were not addressed (2) 712 - states "none" (3) 670 - states "NA" (4) There is no reference of any lubricant in packages 596,

, 360, 359, 511, 636, 637, 714 and 820.

Co=ent D: In many of the naintenance' records, the Quality Assurance verification report is so brief or general it is not

,possible to determine 'what was witnessed and verified. Typical examples are found in the following Repair /Revork Packages: 612, 349', 351, 360, 670, 712, 423 and 577.

Comment E: Some maintenance records indicated repairs and/or' inspections were performed but the acceptance criteria is not clear.

Typical examples can be found in the following Repair / Rework Packages:

(1) 751 - A jacket water pump vas disassemblel and the pump impeller was " inspected and found to be satisfactory". It is not clear what this acceptance was based on since no measurements were recorded and instructions do not specify what kind of inspection to perform (i.e., visual, measurement, dye penetrant).

(2) 546 - During repairs to a jacket water pump, this package .

states " started lapping and blue checking bore to shaft.

Attained 85 contact on blue check." No reference is =ade to any acceptance criteria for the required percentage of contact.

2. Maintenance Procedures - Seteral Repair / Rework Packages were found which ; indicated the repair work had been pqrfor=ed in accordance

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with verbal directions fro = the Delaval service representative. The ,

" specific directions or adjust =ents were not nor= ally recorded caking it i=possible to verify that the work was co=pleted in accordance -

with the technical specifications in the Delaval service =anual.

One exa=ple was found where a t.hrus t reading outside the specified tolerance was apparently accepted based on verbal direction of the vendor.

Typical exa=ples of these proble=s are found in the following Repair / Rework Packages:

Co==ent A: 590 - The vork su==ary in this package " checked total thrust of rotor ass e=bly -

0.007* (okay fro = Al Scott Delaval representative)".

A Delaval letter of Dece=ber 6, 1982 (attached to LDR-926) states the Elliott specifications call for a thrust of 0.008 to 0.018.

Coc:=ent B:

374 - The work su==ary in this package states " adjusted rocker ar=s accordingly as per Delaval representative".

Co==ent C: 546 - The work su ary in this package states " installed water pu=p with new gasket, tighten down bolts to representative approval".

Co==ent D: , 554 - This package docu=ented disasse=bly a jacket water pu=p for inspection and replaced the i=peller nut. The work sum =ary states "no torque value, vendor specs".

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9 IV. VISUAL INSPECTION OF DIESEL GENERATORS Backeround:

Visual inspections of each diesel generator unit was perfor=ed. k*nen possible, inspections were also perfor=ed while the engines were running.

These inspections were perfot=ed to deter =ine the general condition of each engine and detect possible abnor=al conditions.

,' Su==arv:

k'hile no =ajor proble=s were observed on any of the engines, so=e conditions were noted which should be corrected to ensure future proble=s do not occur.

Several other conditions were observed which should be evalusted to deter =ine the need for further corrective actions. Co==ents resulting fro = these inspections are as follows:

Con =ent #1: Many instru=entation, contr:1 and gage lines (1/4 inch to 3/4 inch size) are inadequately braced and vibrate excessively during operation.

j Some lines appear to need additional brackets while others have been re=oved fro = the brackets provided and were never reinstalled.

For exa=ple, the lube oil supply line to the turbocharger failed due to vibration while in its desig; brackets.

I Co==ent #2:

A label plate on each diesel specified required torque values. These values do not ,

all agree with the torque values currently .

in the technical =anual.

Co==ent #3:

' So=e bolts on the air inlet elbows to the head were loose .

and partially unthreaded apparently due to vib. ration during operation. -

Sone bolts had washers, some lock vashers and others no washers. The application of vashers and/or lock washers should be specified.

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REVIEW OF COMPONENT PROBLt.'.iS/ FAILURES A. Enrine Head Cracks .

Background:

LILCO Deficiency Reports 1040, 1065, 1056 and 1141, various Repair / Rework Requests and correspondence with Delaval documents the identification of cracks in three cylinder heads. The Delaval Failure Analysis Reports indicate the cracks found in the three cylinder heads occurred as a result of manufacturing defects (hot tears resulting from sand inclusions in the casting and uneven cooling). The s=all a=ount of leakage that might occur would be blown out with the exhaust. Since these cracks were self-relieving and non-propogating, Delaval stated they would not affect operability or availability in stand-by service.

The Delaval reports also indicate improved - casting, ,

manufacturing and testing techniques would preclude cracks in the latest head design. ,

LILCO letter SNRC-873 indicates that a. leak detection procedure recorcmended by Delaval will be implemented until the per=anent corree,tive action can be accomplished. This permanent corrective action will install cylinder heads of the latest available design.

Su ary:

LILCO's . corrective action of installing the latest design heads should eli=inate this problem once the work is completed. This work is currently scheduled to be completed on a non-controlling basis. The leak detection procedure recommended by Delaval would identify any future cracks should they '.

-occur. .

Based on a review of the actions being taken by LILCO, additional independent NRC/

o contractor material testing is not reco== ended.'

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Rece==endations:

.. - t (a) Since water leakage / build up into a cylinder during long idle -

periods could have drastic consequences in an emergency start, it is i

recc== ended that if an engine does not have the new design heads *

, installed, then it should be barred over with the indicator cocks l

open on a weekly basis afte: reactor critical testing has started.

This barring procedure, in conjunction with the barring procedures

" recommended by Transa= erica Delaval, should assure the engines will operate satisfactorily with the existing heads.

(b) Since Delaval has indicated stricter manufacturing controls assures f the new heads are a high quality product, consideration should be given to either auditing or monitoring the production of some of these new heads or perfor=1ng' detailed receipt inspection and testing of one or two of these new heads. .

4 B. Turbocharger Failure ,

1 Backtround: .

LILCO Deficiency Report #926 documents the failure of a turbocharger thrust bearing. The initial evaluation by Delaval indicated the failure occurred due to a missing guide Sane on the nozzle ring. A subsequent report from the turbocharger manufacturer (United Technologies Elliott) concluded the missing blade ,

(vane) had failed in service apparently due to mechanical fatigue. In addition, Elliott indicated that additional analysis was being conducted on the no::le ring and that pressure and temperature readings just upstream of the turbine inlet easing during a rapid start-up cycle would be helpful. .

4 Su=iarv:

I-Based on the type of failure (mechanical fatigue), it is recou:= ended : hat this not be considered an isolated occut3ence until it has been determined exactly what conditions caused the fatigue failure.

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Rece==endation

Consideration should be given to: -

(a) Checking the other turbochargers for possible cracking (b) Evaluating the possibility of. the missing blade having been knocked back into the exhaust canifold as postulated by Elliott.

C .' Encine Block Castine Indications Eackcround:

LILCO Deficiency Report #1224 and Repair / Rework Request nu=bers 867, 868, 369, 870, 871 and 880 provide the details of Stone & Webster Engineering Corpora tion's (S&W's) investigation and engineering evaluation of linear indications which were found in the cam galley area of the engine block casting.

The investigation required t.he indications on each engine to be checked and mapped using non-destructive exa=17ation. A similar design engine with a substantial nu=ber of operating hours was checked by S&W engineers using nondestructive erm-iaation. Indications - were found of the same approx 1= ate size with no evidence of any propagation. S&W engineers found si=ilar indication on a new engine block cascing at the factory. This shows the indications occur during manufacture and are not a result of operations.

Calculations by Delaval showed the regions where the indications are located are subject to compressive stresses which would not cause the indications to propagate. Discussions with S&W 1ead engineers indicated Delaval is esnducting tests on an operating engine in order to verify their calculatiens and vill issue a report when 'this testing is co=pleted. Based on their .

evaluation of these indications, S&W has concluded that this indicarica vill present no proble=s to the operation and reliability ' of the energency diesel generators.

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Af ter a review of the actions taken by S&W and Delaval and discussions with '~

the S&W engineers, who conducted the evaluation, it is felt that their actions were adequate and the conclusions correct. However, the test results should be reviewed to ensure they verify the calculations.

D. General Review of Proble=s

Background:

During the detailed review of various Deficiency Reports, Tailure Reports and Repair / Rework Requests, a significant nu=ber of proble=s or errors have been iden'cified which see= to have occurred due to errors and inco=plete or i= properly completed work by the canufacturer. Attach =ent I to this section provides exa=ples of specific proble=s that fall into this category.

Su==arv:

' A large number and variety of proble=s that have been experienced can be attributed to ' vendor work =anship. These errors, in conjunction with the problems identified during audits of Delaval's Quality Assurance Progra=

(audits /reaudits conducted October 1975, February 1976 and June 1976),

indicate a weakly i=ple=ented Quality Control Progra=.

Reco==endation: .

Although the nu=ber of proble=s is decreasing significantly, they have not been co=pletely eli=inated and, therefore, reliability has not been -

de=onstrated. Based on this, strong consideration should be given to continued operation or testing until proble=s have been eli=inated and the engines run reliably. Once the required testing has been conpleted and all proble=s corrected, at least one engine should be started and run for the design seven days at a no=1nal load',of 3,500 KW.

The actions taken b'y Delaval to eli=inate these. quality-related proble=s .

should also be deter =ined and evaluated. This would ensure proble=s with future spare parts vill not occur. -

To provide the' confidence factor that the e: :y diesel engines vill opertte reliably, the periodic surve111ance ces .ng st.ould be increased to perfor= a four hour load test each month. If at the end of six months no f ailures have occurred, return to the surveillance testing specified in the technical specifications.

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ATTACEMENT 1 -

GENERAL REVIEW OF PROBLEMS -

394 -A =e=o in this package fre: a Delaval representative indicates the casing discharge on a jacket water pu=p was found partially blocked by excess '

casting =aterial.

442 - ESDCR-?41289 - accached to this package indicates Delaval suppl:.ed a jacket water pu=p with the wrong i=peller.

551 -

(See LDR-0832) - A =e=o attached to this package indicates a jacket water pu=p had been asse= bled with an extra washer behind the i=peller castle nut'and that the i=peller had been =achined to the wrong drawing which had been provided by Delaval. A second pu=p failed and investigation showed the i=peller had been i= properly installed at the factory.

577 - A Delaval Failure Analysis Report (attached to E&DCR-F43525) indicates .

the jacket water pu=p shaf t failure was induced by an i= properly tightened  ;

i=peller hub nut.

(There were no records to indicate this pu=p had been disasse= bled since it left the factory.)

4 LDR-816 - This deficiency report indicates incorrect springs were installed on the internal relief 'alvesv of the engine driven fuel oil pu=ps.

359 and 360 - (See LDR-654) - During a pre-start inspection of the gear cases, it was found that two of the engines were =issing so=e fitted bolts required on the ca= gear.

Delaval drawings require drilling holes and installing and torquing these bolts after final engine timing. -

701 & 702 - (See LDRs 1006 and 1024) - During inspection of the Governor Drive asse=bly, the following proble=s were found:

i (a) Coupling grid was broken due to =isalign=ent of the governor .

(b) A key of the wrong size was found installed on one engine ATTACHMENT 1 (CONT'D) .

(c) A coupling half was found pinned to the coupling adapter although -

this pin was not shown on the Delaval Drawing.

712, 744, 408, 636, 661, 663, 670, 714, 715 and 717 - (See LDRs 1040, 1065, 1056 and 1141) - Part of the problems with the cracked cylinder heads was attributed to manufacturing defects and thin castings. The f ac tory inspections and testing had failed to identify these deficiencies.

046 - (See LDR-0503) - Lube oil cooler tubes leaked due to improper rolling of tubes into the tube sheet which were not identified by vendor quality control.

236 - (Kee LDR-0560) - The lube oil pump suction line on one engine was found without a drilled passageway for the relief valve. This problem was attributed to jus oversight at the factory.

351 - During a routine gear inspection, an extra loose bolt was found in the gear' train. The bolt was badly beaten and chipped.

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.s VI. GENERAL RECOMMINDATIONS

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Background:

During the review of the Diesel Generator operations, testing and =aintenance, a

nu=ber of conditions were observed which did not specifically violate or deviate from requirements but which did, in the opinion of the inspectbr, indicate weakness or areas.which could be i= proved.

Other conditions in this category are those for which insufficient infor=ation was available to =ake a judgement and should be considered for further evaluation.

Su=a rv:

The following list of observations and reco==endations should be considered for further evaluation and/or possible corrective action:

Rece=endation 81: Repair / Rework Requests do not reference specific repair procedures. They nor= ally only reference the D'esel i Construction specification SHI-089.

This makes it difficult or impossible for either Q/A inspectors of other reviewer / auditors to determine what instructions were actually to be followed.

A system that requires identifying the specific repair procedures would be a maj or improvement. This would allov Q/A personnel to review the specific procedure and establish i hold / witness points as necessary. This could be similar to the procedure for Maintenance Work Requests.

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Rece=mendation #2: Based on the problems identified in the 1975 audit of Delaval of the failure to have calibrated torque wrenches plus the lack of adequate docu=entation in maintenance records for torque value makes .

it impossible to ensure all co=ponents have been properly torqued. Based

,on ,the work co=pleted to date, it is recom= ended that all components /

parts should have their torque values verified by analysis or tests.

Reco=endation #3: As stated in other sections of this heport, so e  ;

proble=s or failures are still" being experienced when an engine is run for testing.

Some proble=s result in the engine being shutdown for m

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o convenience to correct the problem. Other proble=s such as lube oil line .

failure and jacket water te=perature pneu=atic switch failure resulted in i==ediate engine shutdown. Testing / operation should continue until the -

engines all operate reliably. Af ter all work and testing is co=pleted, it is reco== ended that at least one emergency diesel generator should be started and run for seven days at about 3,500 KW. If a failure occurs, testing should continue until all three engines have de=enstrated their ability to operate reliably under load for the seven-day period.

Reco==endatien #4:

' Obtain the results of audits perfor=ed on Delaval by other utilities and evaluate their findings and corrective actions (i.e.,

Texas Utilities, Gulf States Utilities and San Diego Cas & Electric).

Based on this infor=ation, deter =ine the need for further additional audits of Delaval. .

Reco==endation #S: The engine exhaust inlet and outlet elbow from the turbocharger are uninsulated and could present a fire harard fro = a fuel oil or lube oil line failure. The need for insulating this area should be reconsidered or so=e other assurance provided that shows such a fire could not occur.

Reco==endation #6: There is a substantial opening (about four (4) inches f

vide and several feet long) between the flywheel and the protective cage

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around the generator. Since this opening is on the top pf the generator i

l adjacent to the baring device, it presents a possibility of ite=s falling l into the generator causing damage or short circuits. Consideration should be given to install a protective cover over this opening.

Reco==endation #7: In several af the proble=s/ failures which Long Island Lighting Co=pany has experienced, Delaval already had en i= proved /

upgraded replace =ent part which effectively el1=1cated the proble=. S&W and LILCO should =ake a strong effort to have Delaval supply them with a '

list of codifications, design changes, product upgrade, etc. which have l been made to this type o f, engine since the LILCO engines were i =anufactured. LILCO and S&W could then review this list and decide which l

of the modifications they want to i=ple=ent.

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t Reco==endation 68: During operation, a significant nu=ber of fuel oil and '. e f lube oi) leaks are appare=t. These leaks keep one individual busy r

cleaning up. During an e=ergency, personnel =ay not be available to keep -

s these leaks cleaned up. This could result in substantial accu =ulattens presenting a fire hazard. Action should be taken to eli=inate as much of this leakage as practical.

Observatien #1: So=e of the LILCO Maintenance Support Division personnel have ec=pleted a diesel =aintenance training progra= a few =onths ago.

Nere was insufficient ti=e available to determine the diesel experience or training for =aintenance personnel from the construction groups who have also perfor=ed repair work on the diesels.

Observation #2: As noted in other portions of this report, there are exa=ples that vendor field representatives operate so=ewhat informally at times in directing repairs. L'hile he is assigned in the field, the  !

Delaval representative is not clearly under the u=brella of the Delaval factory quality assurance plan. The utility (LILCO) personnel tend to '

i accept his ce=ments/ actions since he is the " vendor expert". k* hen a Delaval representative is performing or directing work at the site, his actions should ce= ply with the LILCO Q/A Progra= just the sa=e as any t other plant worker.

Observation f3: The jacicet water pu=ps do not have unique serial nu=bers

=aking it very difficult or i=possible to =aintain traceability especially during multiple pu=p changeouts or =aintenance.

Observation 04: The FSAR response to NRC question (request) 223.85 states, "As shown on Figure 9.5.7-1, a check valve prevents lubricating .

oil from being circulated through the turbocharger" when shutdown.

Eevever, a subsequent =odification (E&DCR F-34540) has now added a small lube oil supply to the turbocharger in the shutdown condition. This response and figure should be reviewed and revised as necessary.

Observation #5: In general, it was felt that the quality assurance, cugineering and testing ad=inistrative procedures that applied to start-up activities were weakly implemented.

~ A specific concern is the

• fact that most of the proble=s identified in this report have existed for over a year and were not identified and ccrrected by supervisory reviews -

or the audit program.

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