ML20214A941

Atty General Jm Shannon Application for Stay of Licensing Board Order Authorizing Issuance of OL to Conduct low-power Operation.* Requests That Commission Grant Stay of Partial Initial Decision.W/Addl Info & Certificate of Svc

ML20214A941
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	05/13/1987
From:	Bronstein D MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF
To:	NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP), NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
CON-#287-3481 OL-1, NUDOCS 8705200015
Download: ML20214A941 (107)

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;7 00CMETED UNITED STATES OF AMERICA USNRC NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND' LICENSING APPEAL BOARD '87 MAY 15 P4 :51 BEFORE THE COMMISSION OFF!N 7 ~ f5' OCCHU r , . Ji: T.

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l In the matter of ) Docket Nos.

) 50-443-OL,/

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF ) 50-444-OL NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al. ) (On-Site EP)

(Seabrook Station,7nTEs 1 and 2) ) May 13, 1987 l )

l ATTORNEY GENERAL JAMES M. SHANNON'S APPLICATION FOR A STAY OF LICENSING BOARD ORDER AUTHORIZING ISSUANCE OF OPERATING LICENSE TO CONDUCT LOW-POWER OPERATION l

Attorney General James M. Shannon (" Petitioner") hereby applies for a stay, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S 2.788, of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board's order of March 25, 1987 authorizing the issuance of an operating license to conduct low-power (up to 5 percent of the l rated power) operation and of the May 8, 1987 order of the Appeal Board denying a stay. There is currently a stay of low-power l operation in effect as a result of the Commission's order of January 9, 1987 and its decision of April 9, 1987 continuing that stay pending determination of whether the emergency response plan filed l

l by the applicants on April 8, 1987 satisfies the Commission's ruling l in CLI-87-02 that "a state, local or utility plan" be filed prior to low-power operation. Apart from that issue, the Commission should continue the stay to preserve the status quo pending resolution of other important issues raised on appeal before the Appeal Board and pending greater likelihood than now appears that a full-power operating license will be issued. In the alternative, if the 9)

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e Commission should conclude that a stay is not warranted, it should, at a minimum, grant a stay to allow the Attorney General to seek a stay from the Court of Appeals.

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SUMMARY

OF THE DECISION TO BE STAYED On June 17, 1986, the Applicants filed their Motion for Issuance of Operating License for Operation Not in Excess of 5% Rated Power.

On July 2, 1986, the Attorney General filed his Answer to that motion, objecting to issuance of a low-power operating license, and also filed a petition seeking waiver of 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(d). On March 25, 1987, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board issued its Partial Initial Decision. The Licensing Board concluded that all on-site safety issues had been resolved to its satisfaction, with the exception of deficiencies found in the safety parameter display 3

system, which it ordered corrected prior to full-power operation, and certain environmental qualification shortcomings, to address which the Board required the filing of various materials prior to issuance of a low-power operating license. The decision authorizes issuance of a low-power operating license upon the filing of these environmental qualification materials.

On April 6, 1987, Attorney General Shannon filed before the Appeal Board his Notice of Appeal, as well as an Application for a Stay Of Licensing Board Order Authorizing Issuance of Operating License To Conduct Low-Power Operation. The Appeal Board denied the l stay application on May 8, 1987.

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II. GROUNDS FOR A STAY An analysis of the four criteria for a stay set forth in 10 C.F.R. S 2.788(e) compels the conclusion that a stay of the issuance

of a low-power operating license is warranted in this case. Where, as here, full-power operation is at least one year away -- and may well never. occur.-- there can be no justification whatsoever for beginning low-power-operation immediately. Low-power operation should be postponed until the important issues raised in this appeal t

are resolved and until there is a greater likelihood than now appears that full-power operation will be authorized. Such a postponement will result in no harm to the applicants.

.A. Petitioner is Likely to Prevail on The Meri s of This Appeal.

The issues which Petitioner has raised o ! appeal are discussed below. There is a high likelihood that the icensing Board's partial Initial Decision Will be reversed by the Appeal Board, by the Commission, or by the Court of Appea/ls.

1. Issuance of a Low-Power Operating License Without rceparacion or a separate og supplemental Environmental Ampact dcacement Aggressing low-Power Uperations V1olates tne National Environmental Policy Act.

TheLicensing'Boarderredin!issuingitsdecisionwithout ordering supplementation of the' environmental impact statement (EIS). Issuance of a low-power operating license is a major federal action within the meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act,

'42'U.S.C. 4321 et seq., and consequently a separate or supplemental environmental impact statement is required in order to assess the costs and benefits of low-power operation apart from the costs and benefits of full-power operation, particularly since it now appears that no full-power operating license is likely to be issued.

Although the Commission denied supplementation of an EIS in the Shoreham. case, this case is markedly different in terms of the a

k likelihood of a full-power operating license being issued. In Shoreham, the Commission concluded that there had been contradictory ,

statements by Suffolk County concerning participation in emergency planning. Here, the Commonwealth and the Massachusetts-towns have consistently stated that no emergency plan will work and have not wavered from their consequent refusal to participate in emergency planning. Even more importantly, in Shoreham the utility submitted its own emergency plan. Here, the Applicants have failed to do so despite their claim that the plan filed on April 8, 1987, which is i nothing more than an old draft Commonwealth plan rejected by the Commonwealth as inadequate, is a " utility" plan. Thus, the application is not even yet complete. 10 C.F.R. S 50.33(g).

Finally, the utility in Shoreham never attempted the.last-ditch I

effort which Applicants have sought in this case: seeking waiver of a crucial regulation (10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(2), which mandates a l 10-mile EPZ) in its gamble to obtain licensing.1! t Moreover, the Commission itself has distinguished Shoreham in CLI-87-02, slip opinion at 6, and has also noted the improbability I

of a license being issued for a plant, like Seabrook, under the current regulations where a state does not participate in emergency planning. See 52 Fed. Reg. 6980, 6981 col. 1-2 (March 6, 1987).

Therefore, since full-power operation is so doubtful the benefits of low-power operation, which occur only as a result of the energy produced by full-power operation, will most likely not be 1/ It should be noted that the low-power license in Shoreham was Tssued in July 1985 and that now, nearly two years later, there is neither any full-power operating license nor any prospect for its issuance in the near future.

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realized. See Affidavit of Dale Bridenbaugh, 1 15 (Exhibit 1, hereto). On the other hand, low-power operation creates significant environmental costs, see Affidavit of Dale Bridenbaugh, 11 8-16, and Affidavit of Gordon Thompson (Exhibit 2, hereto). Since the EIS does not assess the costs and benefits of low-power operation, supplementation is warranted.

2. Issuance of the Low-Power License Violates 10 C.F.R. 3su.gitoits; and Part 50, App. E, IV D 1, 3.

The regulations require that means of notifying the population in the event of an emergency be in place prior to i

low-power operation. The Licensing Board erred in rejecting j

two late-filed contentions which allege serious deficiencies in the sirens installed in communities within the EPZ, resulting in an inability to satisfy these standards. Attorney General Shannon's late-filed contention asserted that the sirens in portions of Merrimac, Massachusetts fail to meet either of the

alternative NRC/ FEMA sound level acceptance criteria for providing reasonable assurance that the populace will hear the i

sirena during an emergency. See Motion of Attorney General James M. Shannon To Reconsider Late-Filed Contention With

• Revised Basis And To Reopen The Record, dated March 3, 1987 l

i (Exhibit 3, hereto). In addition, SAPL's late-filed contention challenged the legality of the sirens and detailed problems and malfunctions which occurred during a test of the sirens in East Kingston, New Hampshire. See Seacoast Anti-pollution League's Contention and Motion To Admit Late-Filed Contention, Reopen

! The Record On On-Site Emergency Planning, And Condition The

b Issuance Of A Lic0nse Up To 5% Of Rated Power On Applicants' Compliance With 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), dated February 6, 1987 (Exhibit 4, hereto). The Licensing Board's decision to reject these contentions constituted an abuse of discretion.

3. The Environmental Impact Statement Is Inadequate In Its Consideration Of " Class 9" Accidents.

Under tne Commission's Interim Policy Statement on Nuclear Power Plant Accident Considerations Under The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 45 Fed. Reg. 40101, the staff is obligated to analyze environmental consequences of serious accidents. The EIS for Seabrook did not include any analysis of consequences of a Class 9 accident; did not consider site-specific data; included no discussion of external events, such as sabotage, which could affect the risks; and did not quantify the uncertainty bounds. Thus, the Licensing Board erred in its order of May 11, 1983 granting Applicants' motion for summary disposition on SAPL Contention 3, which raised these issues.

4. Issuance of a Low-Power Operating License Prior to Resolution of Emergency Planning Issues Denies the Right to a Hearing Under S189(a) of the Atomic Energy Act.

For the past thirteen years, beginning with litigation of the construction permit and throughout the litigation of the operating license, the Attorney General has sought early determination of important emergency planning issues affecting off-site safety.

Pursuant to S 189(a) of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. S 2239(a),

petitioner is entitled to a hearing on these issues prior to the issuance of any operating license. Sholly v. N.R.C., 651 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 495 U.S. 1194 (1983).

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Although Congress at one time allowed issuance of low-power licenses prior to completion of the required hearing, 42 U.S.C. S 2242, that authority expired by the express terms of the legislation on December 31, 1983. 42 U.S.C. S 2242(e). Thus, 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(d) which allows issuance of a low-power license prior to determination of emergency planning issues, is invalid.

There is every reason to suppose that if the required hearing on

! emergency planning were held, the operating license would be .

denied. As the Commission is well aware, the applicants have been unable to file any emergency plan by the Commonwealth of I Massachusetts or the six Massachusetts towns within the EPZ, nor 3

have they filed their own plan in an effort to " compensate" for the lack of Massachusetts plans. Rather, they have filed a rejected i draft plan prepared by the Commonwealth and have also taken the extraordinary and unprecedented route of petitioning for waiver'of i the ten-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ, seeking reduction of the j zone to only one mile. That petition was recently denied by the Licensing Board. Under these circumstances, it cannot seriously be contended that the litigation of emergency issues is a mere formality or that the issuance of the license is inevitable or even likely.

i Petitioner and the public should not be required to suffer the irreparable harm attendant upon low-power operation when their right to a hearing on vital issues has thus far been denied. The 1

Commission should recognize the invalidity of 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(d)

• and should find that Petitioner is likely to prevail on this issue before the Commission or in the Court of Appeals. Moreover, the

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Commission should find that the Licensing Board abused its discretion in denying waiver of S 50.47(d) despite Petitioner's argument that issuance of.a low-power license before determination of emergency planning issues is inappropriate. See Petition of Attorney General Francis X. Bellotti To Revoke Regulation 50.47(d)

Or In The Alternative To Suspend Its Application In The Seabrook Licensing Proceeding, dated July 2, 1986 (Exhibit 5, hereto).

B. Petitioner Will Suffer Irreparable Injury if the Licensing Board Decision is Not Stayed.

Attached to this Application for a Stay are affidavits from Dale Bridenbaugh and Gordon Thompson, which are incorporated herein by reference. Those affidavits demonstrate that the following irreparable harm will occur if low-power operation commences:

(1) high level radioactive waste will accumulate from low-power operation (Thompson Affidavit) which will require safeguarding on-site for at least 15 years and subsequent disposal for tens of thousands of years at a cost of $20 to $30 million dollars (Bridenbaugh Affidavit, 1 14) and which will contribute to a national environmental problem that currently has no solution, with none in sight, i.e., disposal of high-level radio-active waste; (2) irradiation of the nuclear fuel and plant components essentially commits the plant to use as a nuclear facility and, in the event no full-power operation occurs, will result in the site becoming a long-term radioactive waste storage facility (Bridenbaugh Affidavit, 1 10); (3) low-power operation will cause worker exposure to potentially harmful radiation (Bridenbaugh Affidavit, 1 11); (4) the irradiated fuel will lose its salvage value, at a cost of

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approximately $80 million (Bridenbaugh Affidavit, 1 12); and (5) the irradiated plant components will lose their salvage value, at a cost of at least $20 to $30 million (Bridenbaugh Affidavit, 1 13).

Moreover, Petitioner will suffer irreparable harm from the commencement of low-power operation prior to resolution of the issues raised in this appeal because Petitioner's right to have these issues first resolved will be irrevocably lost. See scripps Howard Radio Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 9-10 (1942).

C. Applicants Will Not Be Harmed By A Stay.

Low-power operation generally only requires approximately three months to complete and the test program for Seabrook as specified in the Final Safety Analysis Report is scheduled to last only four months. Bridenbaugh Affidavit, 1 4. Lengthy delays in the time between the completion of low-power operation and the commencement of full-power operation require repetition of certain tests. Id.

In this case, it is apparent that no full-power operation can occur for at least one year 2/ and most likely not at all. Even assumi,ng that full-power operation will eventually be authorized, the Applicants will not be harmed -- and may, in fact, be aided --

by a short delay in low-power operation pending resolution of these issues and a stronger showing that full-power operation is likely.

D. The Public Interest Favors a Stay.

A short delay in low-power testing will not delay the eventual full-power operation (if any) of the plant. The harm to the 2/ The most recent annual report of the primary applicant, Public Service Company of New Hampshire, projects a start-up date for Seabrook Station no earlier than June, 1988.

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A environment from low-power operation should be avoided until full-power operation becomes more certain. Moreover, the important issues raised herein concerning hearing rights, NEPA violations, and emergency notification demand resolution prior to the irreversible consequences resulting from low-power operation.

CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, it is respectfully requested that

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this Commission grant a stay of the Partial Initial Decision, authorizing issuance of an operating license for operation not in excess of five percent of rated power, pending resolution of the issues raised in this appeal and pending a greater likelihood than now appears that a full-power operation license will eventually be issued. In the alternative, if the Commission denies the requested stay, Petitioner requests a stay sufficient to allow further appeal to the Court of Appeals. See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), 21 NRC 1616 (1985).

Respectfully submitted, JAMES M. SHANNON, Attorney General By: ,

i < // 4 h; Donald S. Bronstein Carol S. Sneider Assistant Attorneys General Department of the Attorney General One Ashburton Place, Room 1902 Boston, MA 02108 (617) 727-2265 Dated: May 13, 1987

EXHIBIT 1 e-AFFIDAVIT OF DALE G. BRIDENBAUGH

1. My name is Dale G. Bridenbaugh. I am President of' MHB Technical Associates ("MHB"), a technical consulting firm specializing in nuclear power plant safety, licensing, and regulatory matters, located at 1723 Hamilton Avenue, Suite K, San Jose, California 95125. I received a Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering from South

. Dakota School of Mines and Technology in 1953 and am a licensed professional nuclear engineer. . I have more than 30' years experience in the engineering field, primarily in power plant analysis,. construction, maintenance, and operations. Since 1976, I have been employed by MHB and have acted as a consultant to domestic and foreign government agencies and other groups on nuclear power plant safety and licensing matters. Between 1966 and 1976, I was employed by the Nuclear Energy Division of General Electric Company ("GE") in various managerial capacities relating to the sale, service, and product improvement of nuclear power reactors manufactured by that company. Between 1955 and 1966, I was employed in various engineering capacities working with gas and steam turbines for GE. Included in my duties at GE was supervision of startup testing of equipment

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in fifteen to twenty fossil and nuclear power plants. I also was responsible for various nuclear fuel projects ranging from the remote disassembly of irradiated fuel to the supply of reload fuel for operating nuclear plants. I have authored technical papers and articles on the subject of nuclear power equipment and nuclear power plant safety and have given testimony on those subjects. Other details of my experience and qualifications are contained in Attachment #1.

2. My experience with the Seabrook plant began in September 1983 when my firm was retained by the Massachusetts Attorney General to evaluate the prudence of expenditures by Fitchburg Gas and Electric Company on Seabrook Unit 2. Since that initial assignment I have evaluated various phases of the Seabrook project in five different engagements. In my work as consultant on the 4 Seabrook plant, I have performed diverse assignments,

focusing primarily on technical reviews and analysis of safety and cost issues. I have visited the plant on several occasions and have participated in a number of interviews 1

and/or depositions of key Seabrook management personnel.

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3. The purpose of this Affidavit is to explain the technical reasons why low power testing to 5 percent power 4

at Seabrook is of no value if subsequent power operation at or near full power is not authorized. It will further in fact, several irreversible explain that there are, changes which would result from testing at the 5% level while no significant electrical power would be produced.

These changes would limit the options available for the f

plant and plant site in the event that full power operation is not subsequently authorized.

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I, SEOUENCE OF TESTING AND POWER OPERATION 4.

Every nuclear plant needs to have fuel loaded and systems tested before it is permitted to operate at power levels sufficient to turn the turbine and generate electric power. The typical test sequence is to perform non-nuclear zero-power tests first, then proceed to "zero-power" nuclear tests and subsequently to low-power nuclear operation with no electrical production.

Electrical production is usually f

deferred until the test program achieves a power level of 10-15%.

Permission to proceed to a higher power level is in l

general predicated on fulfillment of the test objectives at 4

A the lower levels. When the testing is completed safisfactorily at the lower levels and other requirements are satisfied, the plant is then permitted to operate at higher power levels and ultimately at a level at which sufficient steam is generated to allow production of electricity. Power levels are gradually increased and tests are conducted until full power operation has been achieved and the unit is considered to be in commercial operation.

The minimum length of time in which this process can be completed is about three months. At Seabrook, the test program as specified in the Final Safety Analysis Report is scheduled for four months. All other factors being equal, the initial operating phase at a new nuclear unit can be most efficiently performed if a smooth transition is made from fuel loading to low power operation and on to the power testing above 5%. If a significant delay between the testing steps occurs, it is most burdensome for that delay A

to take place after power operation has begun. The reason for this is because the power test program is designed so as to be able to proceed from the completed tests at a lower authorized power level to tests at the next power step. If lengthy delays are introduced, it then becomes necessary to repeat certain activities such as instrument calibrations

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and heat balance calculations to assure safe and smooth transition to the next authorized level. A delay prior to initial nuclear operation does not bring about the need for duplication of these operations.

5. In the case of Seabrook Unit 1, the loading of fuel into the reactor has now been completed and the Company has completed the tests intended to be performed prior to nuclear operation of the unit. This work was authorized by the granting of a "zero" power license by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") on October 17, 1986, and fuel loading was begun on October 22, 1986. William B.

Derrickson's 1/ September 26, 1986 presentation to the NRC's Advisory Committee of Reactor Safeguards ("ACRS")

indicated that the scheduled time for completion of the non-nuclear tests following fuel loading was 4 to 6 weeks:

Our request is to be able to load fuel and do the hot testing with the coolant system at operating temperature and pressure.

We have several tests to run, from tests from the original hot function tests. This whole effort from the day we receive the license to completion of the hot functional tests will 1/ Mr. Derrickson is a Senior Vice-President of Public Service of New Hampshire and has primary responsibility for the Seabrook project.

take about a month or six weeks. (ACRS Transcript, pp. 14-15)

6. In the case of Seabrook, the operating license has been requested in not one, but three separate phases. The first phase which. consists of fuel loading and hot functional tests (but no criticality and no irradiation of the fuel) has now been completed. The second phase, now under review, would permit low power testing and subsequent heatups involving operation at up to 5% of full power. The third phase, if authorized, will permit operation between 5%

and 100% power.

7. The NRC action to permit low power operation at Seabrook at this time is a deviation from common past practice. The traditional licensing practice was in the past to grant an operating license as a result of a single licensing action. In those cases, fuel loading and low power test activities were then performed and integrated with ascension to full power. Shortly after the Three Mile Island accident, the NRC began to issue licenses in a two-step (low power-full power) process. This two-step process was implemented to help ease the licensing review backlog which resulted from the licensing hiatus following the 1979 accident. Initially, this two-step process worked c.-,. ,., . . . .- .~., _._y . _ - _ - . , _ _ . _ , . ._,,,,,__..y., -m, .. ~. _ . - c,--

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j. reasonably well. . Plants that were granted a low power i

license generally completed the fuel loading and low power testing by the time the full power license was issued, with t

the low power testing and the full power licensing relatively close together in time. 2/ Since 1984, however, there have been several cases of lengthy delay between the

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4 low power license and the approval for operation above 5%.

Examples of these delayed cases include:

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1) Diablo Canyon 1, where a three year delay was n

experienced between the initial low power license (September 1981) and full power approval (November i 1984).

2) Shoreham, where a low power license was awarded in j

July 1985 and full power authorization is yet to be issued.

3) Perry, which received low power authorization in i

March 1986, did not receive full power approval i

until December 1986.

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2/ Of the 15 plants licensed for low power operation i

! between March 1979 and June 1984 which also received a full power license during that period, the average time i between the low power and full power licenses was less

! than 5 months. The average time from initial criticality to award of the full power license was only 1/2 month (excluding Grand Gulf which was delayed for approximately two years because of improperly drafted i Technical Specifications). See Attachment #2, portions of letter from NRC Chairman Palladino to Congressman j

Edward Markey, June 15, 1984.

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These delays illustrate clearly that NRC approval of low power operation gives no assurance that timely authorization 4

of power operation is forthcoming. This would appear to be particularly relevant for seabrook which is heavily engaged i

in the resolution of complex emergency planning issues.

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IRREVERSIBLE CHANGES IN STATUS QUO DFMULTING FROM LOW POWER OPERATION

8. Before a reactor "goes critical" as it does for the first time during low power testing, neither the nuclear

fuel nor the reactor or its components, are irradiated or contaminated by radiation. (The uranium contained in the fuel is of course naturally radioactive, but this material

is at a very low level and is fully contained within the l

fuel rods.) Low power testing, however, necessarily causes irreversible changes to a nuclear reactor and its supporting i

systems.

9. There is necessarily significant irradiation of l the nuclear fuel as a result of low power testing. This l irradiation results in the build-up of quantities of fission

! products within the fuel which requires that the fuel i

3 subsequently be handled, transported, and treated as i

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irradiated fuel. Once these fission products have been produced, they cannot be removed from the fuel by any usual means. Thus, the irradiation from low power testing is irreversible. During low power testing some components of the Seabrook plant would also be irreversibly irradiated while other components will become contaminated with activated corrosion products and/or fission products. These include the reactor pressure vessel and internals, the steam generators, the control rods, incore nuclear instrumentation, and other reactor components, equipment, and piping. Once contaminated by substantial quantities of radioactive fission products, special care would be required in handling these items.

10. The irreversible changes to the plant resulting from power operation as described above makes a significant change in the way in which the Seabrook plant must be considered. Prior to power operation, the plant equipment and components are radiation free (with the exception of nuclear fuel and some sensors), and there is no limitation as to what future option for the plant and the plant site may be selected. It is possible in this condition that the plant could be abandoned, coverted to non-nuclear use, or operated as a nuclear unit as planned. Once radioactive,

the options are reduced. Both the plant and plant site become nearly irreversibly committed to a nuclear facility.

This is because much of the plant equipment will be made radioactive and because the site itself becomes (de-facto) a long-term radioative waste storage facility since there is

no approved storage facility available to receive the irradiated nuclear fuel.

11. Because of the unavoidable irradiation and contamination described above, the conduct of low power testing of necessity requires some worker exposure to potentially harmful radiation during the course of the testing as well as after the testing is completed. The amount of exposure may not be large and unless errors are made, probably would not exceed allowable limits. However, it is an additional unavoidable impact which results from low power testing. The necessity of performing the associated health physics protection requirements further complicates maintenance and operation steps and makes plant security a more critical and time consuming function.

12. In its non-irradiated condition, the fuel loaded into the Seabrook core probably has a recovery (or salvage) value that is likely equal to or a major fraction of the

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e original purchase value of that fuel. This fuel, if not irradiated, likely could be sold to other nuclear plants to use as is, or, if necessary, to be reconfigured for a different reactor. (For example, some bundles might require manual disassembly and rod rearrangement or reconfiguration of the pellets for the ncessary pattern of enrichment.)

Once the fuel is substantially irradiated and there is a significant build-up of fission products as would occur during the proposed 5% power operation, it makes fuel reconfiguration, and therefore most opportunities for reuse of the fuel, more complicated and costly and therefore far less likely to be implemented. Based on present day nuclear fuel costs, the value of the Seabrook fuel is approximately

$50-80 million. Salvage value approximately equal to this amount could be realized from the fuel in its present condition. While it is technically possible that irradiated fuel could be transferred to a different reactor of the same design and subsequently used, there would be significant penalties associated with such an action. It would be necessary to ship the fuel in shielded casks which may or may not be readily available. The fuel itself would not be of optimum design for equilibrium operation. Such a transfer has, to my knowledge, never been done in U.S. power reactors and would probably require lengthy review by the NRC and/or other regulatory bodies. Consequently, I conclude that the fuel has little or no value if used for testing up to 5% power.

13. The proposed 5% power operation would also result in the loss of potential salvage value for other plant components that would be substantially irradiated or contaminated (i.e., steam generators, reactor components such as control rods and other internals, coolant pumps and seals, valves, piping and instrumentation sensors). I estimate the salvage value of these components to be at least $20-30 million. These components are virtually identical in all Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactors, many are periodically replaced, and others are useful for replacement in the event of component failures. Thus, a resale market for them should exist unless they are irradiated. In an interview conducted in conjunction with a Vermont proceeding (Vermont Public Service Board, Docket 5132), William B. Derrickson, Vice-President of PSNH stated his estimate of the salvage value of the cancelled Seabrook Unit 2 to be approximately $25 million. (See Attachment #3, November 12, 1986 Interview, William B. Derrickson, p. 74.)

It is likely, however, that if these same components were

irradiated and/or contaminated by power operation, they would have little or no or perhaps negative salvage value.

14. Additional costs resulting from a decision to perform low power testing are the costs of decontaminating, decommissioning, and disposal of the fuel and portions of the reactor system following a low power testing period in the event that a full power license is not obtained. The cost of necessary removal / disposal / decontamination efforts

! could be tens of millions of dollars, depending on the specific disposal requirements. Such efforts also carry with them the potential for additional worker radiation exposure. In addition, the irradiated fuel will need to be treated as high level radioactive material and would likdly ultimately be disposed of as spent fuel. Because of the lengthy time periods during which spent fuel must be isolated from the environment, Federal law has assigned the responsibility for its ultimate disposition to the U.S.

Department of Energy (DOE) . 2/ DOE will perform the 1/ Guidelines for the recommendation of nuclear waste sites were enacted in 10 CFR Chapter III, Part 960 on November 30, 1984. These guidelines do not specify precisely the length of time that high level waste must be safeguarded from the environment. The guidelines do, however, give an indication of the time periods required by including numerous statements of

" Qualifying" and " Favorable" Conditions such as

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ultimate disposal of high level waste, but is also required to recover the full cost of disposal from the utility. DOE has published expected costs for the receipt and ultimate disposal of irradiated fuel. These expected costs are currently being collected at a rate of $.001/ kwhr of generation for fuel exposed now to be disposed of by DOE in the future. Fuel typically operates at a design exposure of 20,000 MWD (t)/ ton. For such fuel, this collection rate is j equP/alent to approximately $150,000 per ton. DOE has not established a rate for fuel exposed to the lower level (b) Favorable Conditions. (1) Site conditions I such that the pre-waste-emplacement ground-water i travel time along any path of likely radionuclide travel from the disturbed zone to the accessible l environment would be more than 10,000 years.

i (2) The nature and rates of hydrologic processes operating within the geologic setting during the i Quaternary Period would, if continued into the

! future, not affect or would favorably affect the ability of the geologic repository to isolate the waste during the next 100,000 years.

(Part 960 - General Guidelines For the Recommendation of Sites for Nuclear Waste Repositories, 10 CFR, Chapter III)

Citation of the above guideline is not intended to imply that the Seabrook Site will be required to store the irradiated fuel for the next 10,000 to 100,000 years. It does however, give an indication of the irreversible effects involved in the decision being

, considered.

l associated with the 5% power test operation, but there is no reason to expect that the cost per ton could be negotiated to much below DOE's published rates as DOE is required by law to obtain full cost recovery. Accordingly, the potential cost for disposal by DOE of the 90 tons at i

j Seabrook could be as much as $13,000,000, not counting l transportation or possible cost increases. In addition, no '

disposal facility is planned or expected until after the year 2000, at least 15 years in the future. It wou1(1 l therefore be necessary to store and safeguard the spent fuel on site until that time. Assuming an operations and i

i security staff of at least 10-15 people for this chore, an annual cost of $500,000 to $1,000,000 is not unreasonable and is probably low. The cost of spent fuel disposal alone l thus becomes a $20 to 30 million obligation. Reactor l components removal, handling and disposal would be additionally required.

l THERE IS NO PURPOSE SERVED. AND THE BENEFITS PRODUCED BY LOW POWER TESTING ARE OUTWEIGHED BY THE I ADVERSE AND IRREVERSIBLE CHANGES IN THE STATUS 000 l

15. The essential purpose of a low power license is to test reactor systems which cannot be effectively tested in noncritical conditions. It is necessary to conduct such

testing prior to operating the plant at higher power levels (i.e., greater than 5% power) . At 5% power, the reactor would barely produce enough steam to spin the turbine and synchrcnize the generator. Taking into account the station auxiliary power needs, it is likely that there would be no not electric power supplied to the grid as a result of the testing, and there would be no displaced oil or fuel cost savings. Instead, power from the grid would be required to run the plant during the tests. Thus, none of the benefits assumed in the NRC's Environmental Impact Statement for Seabrook would be achieved by low power testing; however, as noted, low power operation would result in environmental impacts, such as plant contamination with radioactive material, the likely loss of the resale value of the fuel and other components once they become irradiated, the cost of decontamination, decommissioning and disposal, worker exposure, and last but not least, the potential commitment of the site to lengthy radioactive waste storage use.

16. Because low power testing standing alone produces no net benefits but does have serious adverse effects, it is my opinion that thtre is no reason to conduct low power testing just for its sake alone. Rather, low power testing can be rationally justified only in circumstances where l

O there is no substantial doubt that the plant subsequently will operate at higher power levels so that its benefits (i.e., generation of electricity) will be available to offset the adverse effects (fuel irradiation, radioactive contamination, potential worker exposure) which cannot be avoided. In my technical opinion, the optimum time for performing low-power testing of any nuclear reactor is shortly before full-power operational approval is reliably

~

anticipated to be obtained.

n -n uf DALE G. BRIDENBAUGH [

Subscribed and sworn.tp before me on this . W ' day of 7A. .. /, 1987. * ^ 1^ '- y?. ..a L 2,.,,o. w y p s.,

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PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF DALE G. BRIDENBAUGH DALE G. BRIDENBAUGH MHB Technical Associates 1723 Hamilton Avenue Suite X San Jose, California 95125 (408) 266-2716 EXPERIENCE:

1976 - PRESENT President - >HB Technical Associates, San Jose, California Co-founder and partner of technical consulting firm. Specialists in energy consulting to governmental and other groups interested in evalua-tion of nuclear plant safety and licensing. Consultant in this capacity to state agencies in California, New York. Illinois, New Jersey, Pennsylvania Oklahoma and Minnesota and to the Norwegian Nuclear Power Committee, Swedish Nuclear Inspect (mate, and various other organizations and environmental groups. Performed extensive safety analysis for Swedish Energy Commission and contributed to the Union of Concerned Scientists's Review of WASH-1400. Consultant to the U.S. NRC - LWR Safety Improvement Program, performed Cost Analysis of Spent Fuel Disposal for the Natural Resources Defense Council, and contributed to the Department of Energy LWR Safety Improvement Program for Sandia Labo-ratories. Served as expert witness in NRC and state utility commission hearings.

1976 - (FEBRUARY - AUGUST)

Consultant, Project Survival, Palo Alto, California Volunteer work on Nuclear Safeguards Initiative campaigns in California, Oregon, Washington, Arizona, and Colorado. Nunwrous presentations on nuclear power and alternative energy options to civic, government, and college groups. Also resource person for public service presentations on radio and television.

1973 - 1976 Manager, Performance Evaluation and Imorovement, General Electric Com-pany - Nuclear Energy Division, San Jose, California itanaged seventeen technical and seven clerical personnel with responsi-bility for establishment and management of systems to monitor and mea-sure Boiling Water Reactor equipment and system operational performance.

Integrated General Electric resources in customer plant modifications.

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coordinated correction of causes of forced outages and of efforts to im-prove reliability and performance of BWR systems. Also responsible for development of Division Master Performance Improvement Plan as well as for numerous Staff special assignments on long-range studies. Was on special assignment for the management of two different ad hoc projects formed to resolve unique technical problems.

1972 - 1973 Manager, Product Service, General Electric Company - Nuclear Energy Division, San Jose, California Managed group of twenty-one technical and four clerical personnel.

Prime responsibility was to direct interface and liaison personnel involved in corrective actions required under contract warranties. Also in charge of refueling and service planning, performance analysis, and service communication functions supporting all completed commercial nuclear power reactors supplied by General Electric, both domestic and overseas (Spain, Germany, Italy, Japan India, and Switzerland).

1968 - 1972 Manager, Produc t Service, General Electric Company - Nuclear Energy Division, San Jose, California Managed sixteen technical and six clerical personnel with the responsi-bility for all customer contact, planning and execution of work required after the customer acceptance of department-supplied plants and/or equipment. This included quotation, sale and delivery of spare and re-newal parts. Sales volume of parts increased from $1,000,000 in 1968 to over $3,000,000 in 1972.

1966 - 1968 Manager, Complaint and Wa rranty Service, General Electric Company -

Nuclear Energy Division, San Jose, California Managed group of six persons with the responsibility for customer con-tacts, planning and execution of wurk required after customer acceptance of department-supplied plants and/or equipment--both domestic and over-seas.

1963 - 1966 Field Engineering Suservisor, General Electric Company, Installation and j Service Engineering Jepartment, Los Angeles, California Supervised approximately eight field representatives with responsibility for General Electric steam and gas turbine installation and maintenance work in Southern California, Arizona, and Southern Nevada. During this period was responsible for the installation of eight different central station steam turbine-generator units, plus much maintenance activity.

Work included customer contact, preparation of quotations, and contract negotiations.

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1956 - 1963 f

Field Engineer, General Electric Company, Installation and Service Engi-neering Department, Chicago, Illinois i

' Supervised installation and maintenance of steam turbines of all sizes.

Supervised crews of from ten to more than one hundred men, depending on the job. Worked primarily with large utilities but had significant work with steel, petroleum and other process industries. Had four years of experience at construction, startup, trouble-shooting and refueling of the first large-scale commercial nuclear power unit.

1955 - 1956

! Engineering Training Program, General Electric Company, Erie, i Pennsylvania, and Schenectady, New York i

Training assignments in plant facilities design and in steam turbine testing at two General Electric factory locations.

1953 - 1955 United States Army - Ordnance School, Aberdeen, Maryland Instructor - Heavy Artillery Repair. Taught classroom and shop disas-l sembly of artillery pieces.

i 1953 1

Engineering Training Program, General Electric Company, Evendale, Ohio i Training assignment with Aircraft Gas Turbine Department.

1 I

EDUCATION & AFFILIATIONS:

BSME - 1953, South Dakota School of Hines and Technology, Rapid City. l l South Dakota, Upper 1/4 of class.

, Professional Nuclear Engineer - California. Certificate No. 0973.

r Member - American Nuclear Society Various Company Training Courses during career including Professional

, Business Management, Kepner Tregoe Decision Making, Effective Presenta-tion, and numerous technical seminars.

HONORS & AWARDS:

l Sigma Tau - Honorary Engineering Fraternity.

General Managers Award, General Electric Company.

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PERSONAL DATA:

Born November 20, 1931, Miller, South Dakota Married, three children 6'2", 190 lbs., health - excellent Honorable discharge from United States Army Hobbies: Skiing, hiking, work with boy Scout Groups PUBLICATIONS & TESTIMONY:

1. Operating and Maintenance Exoerience, presented at Twelfth Annual Semi-l nar for Electric Utility Executives, Pebble Beach, California October 1972, published in General Electric NEDC-10697, December 1972.

2. Maintenance and In-Service Inspection, presented at IAEA Symposium on Experience From Operating and Fueling of Nuclear Power Plants.

Bridenbaugh, Lloyd & Turner, Vienna, Austria, October,1973.

l 3. Operating and Maintenance Experience, presented at Thirteenth Annual i

Seminar for Electric Utility Executives. Pebble Beach, California, November 1973, published in General Electric NE00-20222, January 1974.

4. Improving Plant Availability, presented at Thirteenth Annual Seminar for

! Electric Utility Executives, Pebble Beach, California, November 1973, published in General Electric NE00-20222 January, 1974.

i S. Aoplication of Plant Outage Exoerience to Improve Plant Performance, Bridenbaugh and Burdsall, American Power Conference, Chicago, Illinois,

April 14, 1974.

6. Nuclear Valve Testing cuts Cost, Time. Electrical World. October 15, 1974.

7. Testimony of D. G. Bridenbaugh, R. B. Hubbard, and G. C. Minor before l the United States Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy February 18, 1976. Washington 0.C. (Published by the Union of Concerned Scien-tists Cambridge, Massachusetts.)

8. Testimony of D. G. Bridenbaugh, R. B. Hubbard, and G. C. Minor to the California State Assembly Committee on Resources, Land Use, and Energy, March 8,1976.

9. Testimony by D. G. Bridenbaugh before the California Energy comission, entitled, Initiation of Catastrophic Accidents at Diablo Canyon, Hear-ings on Errergency Planning, Avila Beach, California, November 4,1976.

10. Te'stimony by D. G. Bridenbaugh before the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Com-mission, subject: Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant Performance, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Hearings, December,197.6.

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11. Testimony by D. G. Bridenbaugh before the California Energy Commission, subject: Interim Spent Fuel Storage Considerations, March 10, 1977.

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12. Testimony of D. G. Bridenbaugh before the New York State Public Service Commission Siting Board Hearings concerning the Jamesport Nuclear Power Station, subject: Effect of Technical and Safety Deficiencies on Nuclear Plant Cost and Reliability. April,1977.

13. Testimony by D. G. Bridenbaugh before the California State Energy Com-mission, subject: Decommissioning of Pressurized Watar Reactors, Sun-desert Nuclear Plant Hearings, June 9,1977.

14. Testimony by D. G. Bridenbaugh before the California State Energy Com-mission, subject: Economic Relationships of Decommissioning, Sundesert Nuclear Plant, for the Natural Resources Defense Council, July 15, 1977.

15. The Risks of Nuclear Power Reactors: A Review of the NRC Reactor Safety  ;

Study WASH-1400, Kendall, Hubbard, Minor & Bridenbaugh, et. al., for tne Union of Concerned Scientists, August, 1977.

16. Testimony by D. G. Bridenbaugh before the Vermont State Board of Health,

subject

Operation of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Plant and Its Impact on Public Health and Safety, October 6,1977.

17. Testimony by D. G. Bridenbaugh before the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com-mission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, subject: Deficiencies in Safety Evaluation of Non-Seismic Issues, lack of a Definitive Finding of Safety, Diablo Canyon Nuclear Units. October 18, 1977 Avila Beach, Cal-ifornia.

18. Testimony by D. G. Bridenbaugh before the Norwegian Commission on Nuclear Power, subject: Reactor Safety / Risk. October 26, 1977.

, 19. Swedish Reactor Safety Study: Barseback Risk Assessment, MHB Technical Associates, January, 1978. (Published by the Swedish Department of Industry as Document Os! 1978:1)

. 20. Testimony by D. G. Bridenbaugh before the Louisiana State Legislature Committee on Natural Resources, subject: Nuclear Power Plant Deficien-cies Imoacting on Safety & Reliability, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, February 13, 1978.

21. Spent Fuel Disposal Costs, report prepared by D. G. Bridenbaugh for the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), August 31, 1978.

1

22. Testimony of D. G. Bridenbaugh, G. C. Minor, and R. B. Hubbard before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, in the matter of the Black Fox j Nuclear Power Station Construction Permit Hearings, September 25, 1978, i Tulsa, Oklahoma.

23. Testimony of D. G. Bridenbaugh and R. B. Hubbard before the Louisiana Public Service Commission, Nuclear Plant and Power Generation Costs, i November 19, 1978, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

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24. Testimony by D. - G. Bridenbaugh before the City Council and Electric Utility Commission of Austin, "exas, Design, Construction, and Operating Experience of Nuclear Generating Facilities, December 5,1978, Austin, Texas.

25. Testimony by D. G. Bridenbaugh for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Department of Public Utilities, Impact of Unresolved Safety Issues, General Deficiencies, and Three Mile Island-Initiated Modifications on Power Generation Cost at the Proposed P11 grim-2 fluclear Plant, June 8, 1979.

26. Improving the Safety -of LWR Power Plants MHB Technical Associates, prepared for U.S. Dept. of Energy, Sandia Laboratories, September 28, 1979.

27. BWR Pipe and flozzle Cracks, MHB Technical Associates, for the Swedish fluclear Power Inspectorate (SKI), October,1979.

28. Uncertainty in Nuclear Risk Assessment Methodology. MHB Technical Asso-ciates, for the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI), January 1980.

29. Testimony of D. G. Bridenbaugh and G. C. Minor before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, in the matter of Sacramento Municipal Utility Dis-trict, Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station following THI-2 accident, subject: Ocerator Training and Human Factors Engineering, for the Cali-fornia Energy Commission, February 11, 1980.

30. Italian Reactor Safety Study: Caorso Risk Assessment, MHB Technical Associates, for Friends of the Earth, Italy, March,1980.

31. Decontamination of Krypton-85 from Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant, H.

Kendall, R. Pollard, and D. G. Bridenbaugh, et al, The Union of Con-cerned Scientists, delivered to the Governor of Pennsylvania, May 15, 1980.

32. Testimony by D. G. Bridenbaugh before the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, on behalf of New Jersey Public Advocate's Office, Division of Rate Counsel, Analysis of 1979 Salem-1 Refueling Outage, August 1980.

33. flinnesota fluelear Plants Gaseous Emissions Study, MHB Technical Assoct-ates, for Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, September,1980.

34. Position Statement, Proposed Rulemaking on the Storage and Disposal of fluclear Waste, Joint Cross-Statement of Position of the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution and the Natural Resources Defense Coun-cil, September,1980.

35. Testimony by D. G. Bridenbaugh and G. C. Minor, before the New York State Public Service Commission, in the matter of Long Island Light Com-pany Temporary Rate Case, prepared for the Shoreham Opponents Coalition.

September 22, 1980, Shoreham Nuclear Plant Construction Schedule.

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36. Supplemental Testimony by D. G. Bridenbaugh before the New Jersey Board 3 of Public Utilities, on behalf of New Jersey Department of the Public  !

Advocate, Division of Rate Counsel, Analysis of 1979 Salem-1 Refueling Outage, December,1980.

37. Testimony by D. G. Bridenbaugh and G. C. Minor, before the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, on behalf of New Jersey Department of the Pubite Advocate, Division of Rate Counsel. Oyster Creek 1980 Refueling Outage Investigation, February 1981.

38. Economic Assessment: Ownership Interest in Palo Verde Nuclear Station, MHB Technical Associates, for the City of Riverside, September 11, 1981.

39. Testimony of D. G. Bridenbaugh before the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, in the Matter of the Regulation of the Electric Fuel Component Contained Within the Rate Schedules of the Toledo Edison Company and Related Matters, subject: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station 1980-81 Outage Review, November,1981.

40. Supplemental Testimony of D. G. Bridenbaugh before the Public Utilities Comission of Ohio, in the matter of the Regulation of the Electric Fuel Component Contained within the Rate Schedules of the Toledo Edison Com-pany and Related Matters, subject: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station 1980-81 Outage Review, November 1981.

41. Systems Interaction and Single Failure Criterion, Phase 2 Report MHB Technical Associates for the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SK!),

January, 1982.

42. Testimony of D. G. Bridenbaugh and G. C. Minor on behalf of Governor 4

Edmund G. Brown Jr. , before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, regarding Contention 10, Pressurizer Heaters, January 11, 1982.

43. Testimony of D. G. Bridenbaugh and G. C. Minor on behalf of Governor l Edmund G. Brown Jr. , before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, '

regarding Contention 12, Block and Pilot Operated Relief Valves, January 11, 1982.

44. Testimony of D. G. Bridenbaugh before the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Department of Public Utilities, on behalf of the Massachusetts Attorney General, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. 1981-82 Outage Investigation, March 11, 1932, l

45. Testimony of D. G. Bridenbaugh before the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, on behalf of the Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate, Beaver Valley Outage, March,1982.

46. Interim testimony of D. G. Bridenbaugh and G. C. Minor before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, on behalf of Suffolk County, in the matter of Long Island Lighting Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, 4

regarding Suffolk County Contention 11, Passive flechanical Valve Fail-ures, April 13, 1982. -

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47. Testimony of D. G. Bridenbaugh and G. C. Minor before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, on behalf of Suffolk County, in the matter of Long Island Lighting Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, regard-ing Suffolk County Contention 11. Passive Mechanical Valve Failures, April 13, 1982.

48. Testimony of D. G. Bridenbaugh and R. B. Hubbard, in the Matter of Jer-sey Central Power and Light Company For an Increase in Rates for Elec-trical Service, on behalf of New Jersey Department of the Public Advo-cate, Division of Rate Counsel, Three Mile Island Units 1 & 2, Cleanup and Modification Programs, May, 1982.

49. Testimony of D. G. Bridenbaugh and G. C. Minor on behalf of Suffolk County, before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, in the matter of Long Island Lighting Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, regarding Suffolk County Contention 22, SRV Test Program May 25, 1982.

50. Testimony of 0. G. Bridenbaugh and G. C. Minor on behalf of Suffolk County, before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, in the matter of Long Island Lighting Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 regarding Suffolk County Contention 28(a)(vi) and SOC Contention 7A(6),

Reduction of SRV Challenges, June 14, 1982.

51. Testimony of D. G. Bridenbaugh before the Illinois Commerce Commission, on behalf of the Illinois Attorney General's Office, Expected Lifetimes and Performance of Nuclear Power Plants, June 18, 1982.

52. Testimony of D. G. Bridenbaugh and R. B. Hubbard on behalf of the Ohio Consumers Counsel, before the Public Utilities Ccmmission of Ohio, re-garding Construction of Perry Nuclear Generating Unit No.1, October 7, 1982.

53. Issues Affecting the Viability and Acceptability of Nuclear Power Usage in the United States, prepared by MHB Technical Associates for Congress of tne United States Office of Technology Assessment for use in con-junction with Workshop on Technological and Regulatory Changes in Nuclear Power, December 8 & 9, 1982.

54. Testimony of D. G. Bridenbaugh on behalf of Rockford League of Women Voters, before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, in the matter of Commonwealth Edison Company, Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, regarding Contention 22, Steam Generators, March 1, 1983.

55. Testimony of G. C.111nor and D. G. Bridenbaugh before the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, on behalf of the Office of Consumer Advocate,

Regarding the Cost of Constructing the Susquehanna Steam Electric Sta-l tion, Unit I, Re: Pennsylvania Power and Light, April 20, 1983.

56. Surrebuttal Testimony of D. G. Bridenbaugh before the Pennsylvania Pub-lic Utility Commission, on behalf of the Office of Consumer Advocate, Regarding the Cost of Constructing the Susquehanna Steam Electric Sta-tion, Unit I, Re: Pennsylvania Power and Light, April 20, 1983.

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57. Testimony of D. G. Bridenbaugh In the Matter of Public Service Gas &

Electric, Base Rate Case, Nuclear Construction Expenditures, on behalf of New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate, Division of Rate Coun-sel, October 13, 1983.

,. 58. Affidavit of D. G. Bridenbaugh, in the Matter of Jersey Central Power and Light, on behalf of New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate, Division of Rate Counsel, TMI Fault Investigation, November 23, 1983.

59. Testimony of D. G. Bridenbaugh, in the Matter of Public Service Electric

& Gas, on behalf of New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate, Divi-sion of Rate Counsel, LEAC Investigation, Salem-1 Outages. December 1, 1983.

60. Rebuttal Testimony of D. G. Bridenbaugh, in the Matter of Public Service Electric & Gas, on behalf of New Jersey Department of the Public Advo-cate, Division of Rate Counsel, LEAC Investigation, Salem-1 Outages, January 18, 1984.

61. Testimony of D. G. Bridenbaugh, L. M. Danielson, R. B. Hubbard and G. C.

Minor before the State of New York Public Se*vice Commission, PSC Case No. 27563, in the matter of Long Island Lighting Company Proceeding to Investigate the Cost of the Shoreham Nuclear Generating Facility --

Phase II, on behalf of County of Suffolk, February 10, 1984.

62. Testimony of D. G. Bridenbaugh, in the Matter of Jersey Central Power &

Light Company, on behalf of New Jersey Department of the Public Advo-cate, Division of Rate Counsel, Base Rate Case, Oyster Creek 1933-84 Outage and O&M and Capital Expenditures May 23, 1984.

63. Direct Testimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh and Richard B. Hubbard, Before the Illinois Commerce Commission. Illinois Power Company, Clinton Nuclear Station, Docket No. 84-0055, available from Illinois Governor's Office of Consumer Services July 30, 1984.,

64. Joint Direct Testimony of Dr. Robert N. Anderson, Professor Stanley G.

Christensen, G. Dennis Eley, Dale G. Bridenbaugh and Richard B. Hubbard Regarding Suffolk County's Emergency Diesel Generator Contentions, Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, Long Island Lighting Com-pany,.Shoreham Nuclear Plant, NRC Docket No. 50-322-OL, July 31, 1984.

65. Direct Testimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh, Regarding Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3 - Investigation of Outages Due to Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking Before the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, Philadel-phia Electric Co., Docket No, M-FACE 8408, on behalf of Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate September 1984.

66. Surrebuttal Testimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh, Lynn M. Danielson, Richard B. Hubbard, and Gregory C. Minor, Before the New York State Public Ser-vice Commission, PSC Case No. 27563, Shoreham Nuclear Station, Long Island Lighting Company, on behalf of Suffolk County and New York State Consumer Protection Board, October 4,1984.

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67. Direct Testimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh, Lynn M. Danielson and Gregory C. Minor on Behalf of Massachusetts Attorney General, DPU 84-145, Before the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, regarding the prudency of expenditures by Fitchburg Gas and Electric Light Company on Seabrook Unit 2, November 23, 1984, 84 pgs.

68. Direct Testimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh, Richard B. Hubbard and Lynn K.

Price on Behalf of Massachusetts Attorney General DPU 84-152, Before the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, regarding the investi-gation by the Department of the Cost and Schedule of Seaborok Unit 1 December 12, 1984.

69. Direct Testimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh, Lynn M. Danielson and Gregory C. Minor on Behalf of Maine Public Utilities Commission Staff regarding Seabrook Unit 2. Docket No.84-113 December 21, 1984.

70. Direct Testimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh and Gregory C. Minor Regarding Suffolk County's Emergency Diesel Generator load Contention, Docket No.

50-322-OL, January 25, 1985.

71. Direct Testimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh, in the Matter of the Motion of Public Service Electric & Gas, on behalf of New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate, Division of Rate Counsel, Motion To Increase The Level of the Levelized Energy Adjustment Clause, Docket No. ER 8501166 and Docket No. 837-620, April 24, 1985.

72. Direct Testimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh on behalf of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in the Matter of Boston Edison Company DPU 85-1B, A Hearing to Determine Whether Fuel and Pur-chased Power Costs Associated with the Outage at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Which Began on December 10, 1983 and Ended on December 30, 1984 Were Reasonably and Prudently Incurred. May 13, 1985.

73. Direct Testimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh on behalf of the Residential Ratepayer Consortium, in the hbtter of the Application of Consumers Power Company for a Power Supply Cost Reconciliation proceeding for the 12-month period ended December 13, 1984, regarding Palisades Outage Re-view, Case No. U-7785-R, August 28, 1985.

74. Direct Testimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh, Lynn M. Danielson, and Gregory C. Minor on behalf of the Department of Public Service, State of Vermont Public Service Board Docket No. 5030, Central Vermont Public Service Corporation, November 11, 1985.

75. Direct Testimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh on behalf of New Je sey Depart-ment of the Public Advocate, in the matter of JCP&L for an increase in rates, Base Rate Case, Oyster Creek O&M and Capital Expenditures, November 25, 1985.

76. Direct Testimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh on behalf of New Jersey Depart-ment of the Public Advocate, in the matter of JCP&L, TMI-Restart - LEAC, Re: TMI-Restart Commercial Operation Standards & Reliability of Service, January 31, 1986.

77. Direct Testimony of Dale G.. Bridenbaugh, Gregory C. Minor, Lynn K.

Price, and Steven C. Sholly on~ behalf. of State of Connecticut Department

. of the Public Utility Control Prosecutorial Division and Division of Consumer Counsel regarding the prudence of expenditures on Millstone Unit 3 February 18, 1986.

78. Direct Tastimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh and Gregory C. Minor on behalf of Massachusetts Attorney General regarding the prudence of expenditures by New England Power Co. on Seabrook Unit 2. February 21, 1986.

79. Direct Testimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh and Gregory C. Minor on behalf of Massachusetts' Attorney General regarding WMECo Construction Prudence for Millstone Unit 3. March 19, 1986.

80. Direct Testimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh and Gregory C. Minor on behalf of Massachusetts Attorney General regarding WMECo's Commercial Operating Dates and Deferred Capital Additions on Millstone Unit 3. March 19 1986.

81. Rebuttal Testimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh and Gregory C. Minor on behalf of. Massachusetts Attorney General regarding New England Power Company's Seabrook 2 Rebuttal April 2, 1986.

82. Direct Testimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh and Gregory C. Minor on behalf of State of Maine Staff of Public Utilities Commission regarding Con-struction Prudence of Millstone Unit 3. April 21, 1986.

83. Direct Testimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh and Peter M. Strauss on behalf of New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate, Division of Rate Coun-sel, regarding Base Rate Case: In-Service Criteria for Hope Creek, Hope Creek 0&M and Decommissioning Costs, and Operating Plant O&M Costs, May 19, 1986, 107 pp.

84. Direct Testimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh on behalf of New Jersey Depart-ment of the Public Advocate, Division of Rate Counsel, regarding Base Rate Case: Hope Creek Commercial Operating Date and Criteria, Hope Creek 0&M Costs, Operating Life, Capital Additions, and Decommissioning Costs.

May 27, 1986, 85 pp.

85. Direct Testimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh, Richard B. Hubbard, and Lynn K.

Price on behalf of State of Illinois Office of the Attorney General and Office of Public Counsel, regarding Evaluation of Clinton Costs Docket No. 84-0055, July 9, 1986.

86.- - Direct Testimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh and Gregory C. Minor on behalf of the Vermont Department of Public Service, regarding Tariff Filing of Central Vermont Public Service Corporation Requesting a 12% Increase in Rates, Docket No. 5132, August 25, 1986.

87. Direct Testimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh and Richard B. Hubbard on behalf of the Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate, regarding Pennsylvania Public Utility Comission vs. Duquesne Light Company and Pennsylvania Power Company, Docket Nos. R-860378 and R-850267, September 22, 1986.

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CHAIR M AN

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The Honorable Edward J. Mar. key, Chair.an Subcomittee on Oversight and Investigations Cemittee on Interior and Insular Affairs United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C., 20515

Dear Congressman Markey:

Ycur lettee of March 30, 1984 reouested an explanation of the risks associated with low power operation at comarcial nuclear power reactors.

In addition, you raised five specific questions which we have responded to in Attachment 1 to ,this, letter.

W1th regard to the risks associated with lw power coeration, Attachment 2 is a Comission pacer developed by the staff addressing this issue. As indicated by this paper, the overall conclusion that the staff must reach for fuel loading and low power testing up to 5 percent power, is that there is no undue risk to the health and safety of the public for the limited coerations autWorized. In practice, the staff has develooed analyses that indicate that the risks of 5 percent power cperation can be expected to be appreciably less 'than the risks of 100 percent power operation.

Ccmissioner Gilinsky did not participate in the preparation of this reply.

We trust that this information is responsive to your cencerns.

Sincerely.

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Nunzio J. Pciladino Attachents:

As stated cc: Rep. Ron Marlenee

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CUEST!ON 5:  ?

For. .l reactors licensed since the accident at Three F.i'.c Island, please provide the foilowing ( A) the dai.e of issuance of the low power license; (B) the date of initial criticality; (C) the date of 5 percent power operation; (D) the date of issuance of the full pcwer license; (E) tne date that power levels of 25 cercent or higher were first attained; (F) the date that oewer levels of 90 cercer. or hicher were first attair.ed; (G) exe.casic,s granted by the Net *~

to the low pow ~er licensee and, (H) exe ptiens granted by the ftRC to the full power licensee.

A';SWER . .

The data recuested is provided in the attached Table 5.1. We interpreted t'.e cate of 5 percent ocwer cperation to be the date that this power level was excceced. Where the plant has not achieved the event listed the syT.bol N/A has been used .

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, t-STATE OF VERMONT PUBLIC SERVICE BOARD .

E

__________x IN RE: Tariff Filing Of  :

Central Verment Public Service  :

' Ccrporaticn Requesting A  : Docket No. 5132 12 Percent Increase In Rates  :

To Take Eff ect June 2, 1986.  :

I j_ -

______________x t

l INTERVIEW WITH: WILLIAM B . DERRICKSCN

.(' l j

I e

i

!, Seabrook Statica i

New Hampshire Yankee l General Cf fice Building Seabrook, New Ha=pshire Wednesday, Nover.ber 12, 1986 10 :07 a.m.

i 4 TADC E J . 5 S C'4L ER CERTI FIED SHORTHAND REPORTER REGISTERED PROFESSICNAL REPORTER

\ I P.O. Box 571 (603) 77 8-7 47 0 cr Exeter, N.H. 03833 1-800-527-3311 4

I i

.- I

~ ,

( 1 PRESENT:

2 i

2 !M.H.B. Technical Associates l Gregory C. Mincr, Vice President and '

3 3 Judith R. Lieb erman , Associate Censultant 17 23 Hamilten Avenue, Suite K 4  ; San Jose, Calif ornia 95125 I

5 t Cahill, Gorden & Reindel I (by Thcmas R. Jcnes, Esquire) 6 80 Pine Street l

i New York, New York 10005; 7 for Public Service Company of New Hampshire.

8 '

Downs, Rachlin & Martin (by Elizabeth B. Mullikin, Esquire) 9 100 Dorset Street, Suite 1 P.O. Box 190 10 Burlington , Vermen t 05402-0190; f or Central Verment Public Service Corporation .

11 Departmen t of Public Service

(, - 12 i (by Christopher Micciche, Special Ccunsel) l 120 State Street 13 Mcntpelier, Verment 05602 14 lSwidler & Berlin (by Andrew Weissman, Esquire) 1000 Thomas Jef f ersen Street, NW 15 Washington , D.C. 20007 ;

for C.V.P.S.C.

16 17 18 INDEX Interview with: Direct 20

' William B. Derrickscn 3 21 (by Mr. Minor) 22 23 i

l

I l

3 1

PROCEEDI NGS 2

3 -

EXAICNATICN 4 ,

BY MR. C UOR:

1 5 Q This is not a deposition. I guess I should start 6 by saying that. Just for the usual pattern of 7

these type $f things, I will intrcduce myself. I 8 am Greg Minor of M.H.3.

To my right is 9

Judy Lieberman, also of M.H.B.; Chris Micciche of I

10  ; the Department of Public Services in Ver=cnt.

11 And we are here, Mr. Derrickscn, to ask you 12 some questiens about the proj ect; and I understand 13 you have schedule restraints; and I appreciate your

- 14 being here today.

15 .

i I would like to just go back and start, if you 16

, would, by telling me your first association with 17 ,

this prcj ect and whether that was as a censul tan t 18 to Florida Power and Light or direct involvemen t 19 l with the positien at New Hampshire Yankee.

20 lA Okay.

We did have an involvemen t at Florida Power 21 l and Light Cenpany with respect to Public Service to 22 l send some people up here to provide some assistance 23 to Public Service in 1983, I believe, and we did I

( -

., 7 3 1 uniquely cut and ben t for this plant. Structural 2

steel-is the same way, uniquely cut, specific e

3 connections out here. You would have to design a 4 building arcund that structural steel. I dca't 5 think we are going to find too many people excited 6 to do that.

I think moisture separators, 7 reheaters, simply because not that many plan ts are 8

being buil t. , They have ccpper nickel tubes, and I 9

don ' t think there is much of a market for those.

10 Other compenents we are going to have to look 11 .

at an a case-by-case basis. Original large cotors 12 f or replacement, and we will go to sad make an 13 attempt to see what we can do in- those areas.

14 Other than that, I don ' t know. We haven ' t looked 15 at that. We have to get a team together to really 16 go cut Er.d catalog model, make and see if we can 17 find a match up around the country semeplace.

13 Q Is it viable to sell the Model F steam generators 19 as a replacement part unit?

20 ;A There are two uses for them. One wculd be a 21 cceplete steam generator change out in ancther 22 facility that could use them. Another would be a 23 lot cf utilities are putting training facilities in i

74 1 where they are taking the tube sectica, the tube e

2 sheet section and using it to practice any current 3 testing and tube plugging. We may be able to do 4 setething like that. I dca't knew. We will work 5 en it. If that is the marching crders, that is 6 what we will do.

7 Q Have you made any estbnate of salvage values?

8 A I think the g,uys did. I think they are looking at 9 S26 millicn. I say 25 plus cr minus. That is for 10 scrap and f or what they thcught they cculd sell 11 intact, which is a lot.

12 Again, we are competing with Marble Hill's 13 exact nuclear ster = system, so we are ccmpeting 14 with somecne else's parts. I have been arcund the 15 coun t ry, and I f ctnd Marble Hill all over the 16 ccar. t ry . So it 's quite interesting.

17 MR. MINOR: Thank you very much 13 for ccming in, Mr. Derricksen.

l i

19 i 20 (Whereupen, at 11:50 a.m., the 21 interview was adj ourned. )

e 4 .n 23 e

t

0 75 1

CERTIFI CATE -

---

l 2

STATE OF lid' Hid!? SHIRE 3

4 I, Marianne Kusa-Ryll, Registered Professicnal 5

Reporter, do hereby certify the foregoing to be 6

a true copy of the interview of WILLI AM 3. DERRICF.SC:1, held at the 5ew Har.pshire Yankee General Of fice 7

Building, Seabrook, liew Har.pshire, en Wednesday, 8

liover.b er .12, '19 8 6.

. .S... . . MOA 4 C /.4':L".. p.!.

10 .

. Marianne Kusa-Ryll, CSR, RPR 11 Ab

• 1 14 15 16 i8 13

n. ao I

h 21 22 23 l

i i 1 EXHIBIT 2 1 Affidevit of Gordon Thompson 19 february 1987 l pageI Affidavit of Gordon R Thompson PhD I, Gordon Thompson, hereby depose and say:

My qualifications are set forth in an attached resume (Attachment 2). This indicates that I have experience in studying the characteristics of nuclear power plants and the management of radioactive wastes.

This affidavit addresses the implications of low-power operation of the Seabrook nuclear plant in terms of the generation of radioactive wastes.

Specifically, I have estimated the production of radionuclides in the fuel assemblies of the Seabrook plant for various periods of operation at 5% of rated power, and have compared the resulting concentrations of radionuclides with the NRC standards governing near-surface disposal of radioactive wastes. The results of this analysis are summarized in an attached table (Attachment 1).

The standards in question are laid down in the NRC's Final Rule, " Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste"(Federal Register, Vol. 47, No. 248,27 December 1982, pp 57446-57482). At section 61.55, this document provides tables showing the concentrations of radionuclides which are acceptable for near-surface disposal of radioactive wastes. My analysis considered intact Seabrook spent fuel assemblies as articles of r Mactive waste, and compared the concentrations of radionuclides within those assemblies with the NRC standards. For the alpha-emitting transuranic nuclides, the concentrations are expressed in Curies per unit mass; for all other nuclides the concentrations are expressed in Curies per unit volume.

The production of radionuclides at Seabrook was estimated using the ORIGEN2 computer code, run at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory at my request. 0peration at 5%-power was assumed for periods of 1,10 and 100 days. Production of nuclides in reactor components other than fuel assemblies (such as in control rods) was not considered.

Attachment I summarizes the results. This table shows the concentration of each relevant radionuclide, in an average Seabrook spent fuel assembly, as a fraction of the concentration permissible for near-surface disposal of that assembly as radioactive waste. A 3 year delay is assumed between reactor shut-down and disposal of the spent fuel as waste.

i

' Affidwit of Gordon Thompson 19 february 1987 pap 2 The table shows that, af ter 100 days of operation, the spent fuel approaches permissible concentrations of several fission and activation products. For example, the concentration of Cs-137 in this case is 31%

(3.1x10-I) of the permissible level. In addition, however, it will be noted that the spent fuel contains concentrations of transuranic alpha emitters which are well above permissible levels even for a period of operation of I day. In fact, even fresh Untrradiated fuel would not be acceptable for near-surface disposal because of its high concentration of alpha emitters.

Ninety-five percent of the long-lived (half-life more than 5 years) alpha activity present af ter 1 day of operation Is contributed by the urantum isotopes present in fresh fuel.

However, untrradiated Seabrook fuel could be transferred to another nuclear plant and used there. If the fuel is irradlated, this may not be feasible. If re-use of irradiated fuel is not feasible and the Seabrook plant is tested at low power but does not receive a full-power license, then the Seabrook fuel will become radloactive waste. My analysis shows that this waste will not meet the NRC's requirements for near-surface disposal.

ww*w*

Signed under the pains and penalties of perjury, this 19th day of February 1987:

cW ne w g .M Gordon R Thompson PhD A Institute for Resource and Security Studies

,q //[ h' -

27 Ellsworth Avenue Cambridge, MA 02139 i

Attachments:(1) Table titled " Concentrations of Various Radionuclides in Seabrook Spent Fuel, as a Fraction of Concentration Permissible for Near-Surface Disposal,3 Years After Operation for 1,10 or 100 Days at 5%-Power' (2) Resume for Gordon Thompson, January 1987.

s 2

• Conservation Law Foundation of New England, Boston, MA,1985 :

preparation of testimony on cogeneration potential at the Maine facilities of Great Northern Paper Company.

• Town & Country Planning Association, London, UK, 1982-1984 : coordinattun and conduct of a study on safety and radioactive waste implications of the proposed Sizewell nuclear plant.

• US Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC, 1980-1981 assessment of the cleanup of Three Mile Island Unit 2 nuclear plant.

• Center for Energy & Environmental Studies, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ,1979-1980 : studies on the potentials of various renewable energy sources.

• Government of Lower Saxony, Hannover, FRG, 1978-1979 : coordination and conduct of studies on safety aspects of the proposed Gorieben nuclear fuel center.

Other Exoerlence ( selected )

• Co-leadership ( with Paul Walker ) of a study group on nuclear weapons proliferation, institute of Politics, Harvard University,1981.

• Foundation ( with others ) of an ecological political movement in Oxford, UK, which contested the 1979 Parliamentary election.

• Conduct of cross-examination and presentation of evidence, on behalf of the Political Ecology Research Group, at the 1977 Public inquiry into proposed expansion of the reprocessing plant at Windscale, UK.

• Conduct of research on plasma theory ( while a PhD candidate ), as an associate staf f member, Culham Laboratory, UK Atomic Energy Authority, 1969-1973.

• Service as a design engineer on coal plants, New South Wales Electricity Commission, Sydney, Australia,1968.

Publications ( selected )

• The Nuclear Freeze Revisited ( written with Andrew Haines ), November 1986, Nuclear Freeze and Arms Control Research Project, Bristol, UK.

• Nuclear-Weaoon-Free Zones A Survey of Treatles and ProDosals ( edited with David Pitt ), Croom Helm Ltd, Beckenham, UK, forthcoming.

• International Nuclear Reactor Hazard Study ( written with fif teen other authors ), September 1986, Greenpeace, Hamburg, FRG ( 2 volumes ).

• "What happened at Reactor Four" ( the Chernobyl reactor accident ), Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. August / September 1986, pp 26-31.

• The Source Term Debate A Reoort by the Union of Concerned Scientists

4 3

( written with Steven Sholly ), January 1986, Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA.'

• " Checks on the spread"( a review of three books on nuclear proliferation ),

Nature.14 November 198S, pp 127-128.

• Editing of Persoectives on Proliferation. Volume I, August 1985, published by the Proliferation Reform Project, institute for Resource and Security

Studies, Cambridge, MA.

• "A Turning Point for the NPT T, ADIU Reoort. Nov/Dec 1984, pp 1-4, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK.

• " Energy Economics", in J Dennis (ed), The Nuclear Almanac. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA,1984.

• "The Genesis of Nuclear Power", in J Tirman (ed), The Militarization of Hlah Technoloav. Ballinger, Cambridge, MA,1984.

• A Second Chance New Hamoshire's Electricity Future as a Model for the Nation ( written with Linzee Weld ), Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA,1983.

• Safety and Waste Management imolications of the Sizewell PWR ( prepared

, with the help of 6 consultants ), a report to the Town & Country Planning Association, London, UK,1983.

• Utility-Scale Electrical Storage in the USA The Prosoects of Pumoed Hydro.

Comoressed Air. and Batteries. Princeton University report PU/ CEES "120, 1981.

• The Prosoects for Wind and Wave Power in North America. Princeton University report PU/ CEES

• 117,1981.

• Hydroelectric Power in the USA Evolvina to Meet New Needs. Princeton University report PU/ CEES

• 1IS,1981.

• Editing and part authorship of " Potential Accidents & Their Ef fects", Chapter Ill of Reoort of the Gorieben International Review. Dublished in German by the Government of Lower Saxony, FRG,1979 -- Chapter ill available in English from the Political Ecology Research Group, Oxford, UK.

• A Study of the Consecuences to the Public of a Severe Accident at a Commercial FBR located at Kalkar. West Germany. Political Ecology Research Group report RR-1,1978.

Exoert Testimony ( selected )

County Council, Richland County, SC,1987 : Implications of Severe Reactor Accidents at the Savannah River Plant. i

• International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War,6th Annual

, Congress, Koln, FRG,1986 : Relationships between nuclear power and the threat of nuclear war.

, -- ,,,,,e-,-------e -,w,-...---- w,-,a----.,v.w- _, - - - - -,,n-,,,__ , ,,,,,,,ea-wy,w- ,,--,.,,,-n- ,ww w-e -

b t

4

• Maine Land Use Regulation Commission,1985 : Cogeneration potential at facilities of Great Northern Paper Company.

• Interf alth Hearings on Nuclear issues, Toronto, Ontario,1984 : Options for Canada's nuclear trade and Canada's involvement in nuclear arms control.

• Sizewell Public inquiry, UK,1984 : Safety and radioactive waste implications of the proposed Sizewell nuclear plant.

• New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission,1983 : Electricity demand and supply options for New Hampshire.

• Atomic Safety & Licensing Board, Dockets S0-247-SP & 50-286-SP, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission,1983 : Use of filtered venting at the Indian Point nuclear plants.

• US National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere,1982 :

Implications of ocean disposal of radioactive waste.

• Environmental & Energy Study Conference, US Congress,1982 : Implications of radioactive waste management.

Miscellaneous

• Australian citizen.

• Married, one child.

• Resident of USA,1979 to present; of UK, :o9-1979.

• Extensive experience of public speaking tvore professional and lay audiences.

• Author of numerous newspaper, newsletter, c.c ;iiagazine ticles and book reviews.

• Has received many interviews from print and electr;.,nic media.

f EXHIBIT 3 6

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Before Administrative Judges:

Sheldon J. Wolfe, Chairman Emmeth A. Luebke Jerry Harbour

)

In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-443-OL-1

) 50-444-OL-1 PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY ) (On-Site Emergency Planning OF NEW HAMPSHIRE et al. ) And Safety Issues)

)

(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) )

)

) March 3, 1987 MOTION OF ATTORNEY GENERAL JAMES M. SHANNON TO RECONSIDER LATE-FILED CONTENTION WITH REVISED BASIS AND TO REOPEN THE RECORD Attorney General James M. Shannon hereby moves that the Board reconsider its Memorandum and Order of February 6, 1987, denying his motion of January 12, 1987, requesting that the Board admit a late-filed contention and recpen the record in the on-site emergency planning phase of this proceeding.

In seeking this reconsideration of his late-filed contention, the Attorney General submits a revised basis for admitting the contention. The contention and the revised basis are as follows:

s.

Contention: Applicants have failed to comply with the provisions of 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(5) and Part 50, Appendix E, SIV(D)(1) and (3), because no administrative or physical means have been established to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway located within the Town of Merrimac, Massachusetts.

Basis: In some populated areas of Merrimac (specifically along Bear Hill Road, in Merrimacport, and in Merrimac Terrace) the Applicants' alert and notification siren system fails to meet either of the alternative NRC/ FEMA sound level acceptance criteria for providing reasonable assurance that the populace -

k will hear the sirens-during an emergency. See NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, Appendix 3, SSC.3e and f, at pp. 10-11; FEMA-REP-10, SE.6.2.1, SE.6.2.1 (Fixed Sirens).

Compliance with these criteria requires a showing that either:

(1) the expected sound level coverage is at least 60 dBC; or (2) the expected sound pressure level exceeds the average measured summer daytime ambient sound pressure levels by 10 dB. Id. Applicants admit that the first standard is not met in these areas because the expected siren sound pressure level in these areas is below 60 dBC, falling between 50-60 dBC.

See Affidavit of James A. MacDonald, dated 1/22/87, accompany Applicants' Response to Attorney General's contention "A," Letter (hereinafter "MacDonald Affidavit"} at Attachment of HMM Associates, dated July 7, 1986 (attached hereto as

4 Exhibit "A"). The alternative standard is not met either, because Applicants have not submitted reliable ambient background sound measurements, as required by NUREG-0654 and FEMA-REP-10, to show that the expected sound pressure level generally exceeds the avarage summer daytime ambient background noise levels in these areas of Merrimac by at least 10 dB.

(Because the expected pressure levels fall between 50-60 dBC, and therefore could be as low as 50 dBC, the ambient background noise levels must not exceed 40 dB to meet this "10 dB above background" standard.)

Background dB measurements taken by Applicants to document compliance with the "10 dB above background" standard were taken.in the wrong octave band, not "in a band about the siren signal frequency," as required by FEMA. See NUREG-0654, App.

3, SC.3.f. Applicants' measurements were taken in the 1000 Hz octave band. See MacDonald Affidavit at Attachment "B," Letter of HMM Associates, dated January 20, 1987 (attached hereto as Exhibit "B"). The 1000 Hz octave band has a band width of 708Hz to l'10 4 Hz. The frequency signal of the warning sirens in Merrimac are 680 Hz, and are thus not within the 1000 Hz octave band. See Affidavit of Brian Koning, attached hereto, E

at 15. Background dB measuremets taken in the 1000 Hz band will produce readings " roughly 3 dB" lower than those taken in the 500 Hz octave band (band width of 355 Hz to 708Hz), which should have been used for the measurements. Koning Affidavit

at 15. In addition, Applicants' sound measurements were taken on an inappropriate, non-representative day, a federal and state holiday (Martin Luther King, Jr., Day), when both commuter and commercial traffic would be diminished and background noise level presumably lowered. Background measurements taken in Merrimac in the proper frequency and on a more representative day indeed indicate that the "10 dB above background" standard is not met in at least three separate locations in Merrimac. See Koning Affidavit at 16.

Furthermore, applicants have not complied with the FEMA requirement, contained in FEMA-REP-10, that the documentation submitted to support a claim.that the "10 dB above background" standard is met include all of the following:

A description of how the average summer daytime ambient sound pressure levels were determined, including survey locations and the rationale for their selection; Identification of actual measurements including frequency range, time span, and location; Any assumptions used to determine the measured ambient along with rationale for those assumptions; I

Relationships of population density to measured ambient levels; Effects of major transportation routes; and Effects of any commercial activities in the area.

See FEMA-REP-10, Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants, November, 1985, at E-8,9. Only the second of the items listed above was 1

4-

described in the HMM letter of January 20, 1987 attached hereto as Exhibit "B."]

The failure of this siren system to comply with either of NUREG 0654's sound level criteria is a serious deficiency such that there is currently no assurance that all persons in Merrimac will hear the sirens.

While Applicants could attempt to meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 550.47 (b)(5) and Part 50, Appendix E SIV(D)(1) and (3), either by enhancing the capability of the siren system or by providing other alerting methods to these areas in Merrimac, Applicants have not done so.

While many of the issues relevant to the adequacy of the Applicants' Alert and Notification System will be addressed in the off-site emergency planning phase of this licensing hearing,1! the Commission has determined that the means to notify the population within the plume expo,sure EPZ must be in place prior to low power operation. See Statement of Consideration, 47 Fed. Reg. 30232, 30234 (July 13, 1982) 1/ In light of Applicants' Response to the original late-filed contention submitted by the Attorney General, which establishes that two sirens in Merrimac will be operated by battery-power, Attorney General Shannon omits from the basis set forth in this revised contention the allegation that there are no operable sirens in Merrimac. However, the Attorney General reserves the right to litigate at the off-site phase of this licenseing proceeding the issue of whether batteries will, in the event of a radiological emergency, reliably provide sufficient power for sufficient time to enable the use of the speaker system to instruct the populace in Merrimac.

l

.e (Commission Response to Issue 6). See also, Southern California Edison Company (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), 15 NRC 61, 191-195 (1982) (affirming the need to provide means to notify the off-site public and response organizations during low power operation.) In light of this, no decision authorizing the issuance of a low-power license should issue until the Applicants have demonstrated the means to notify and instruct the populace in the Town of Merrimac in the event of a radiological emergency.

I.

~~

The Attorney General Had Good Cause For Not Filing This Contention, With This Revised Basis, At An Earlier Date.

In its Memorandum and Order of February 6, 1987, the Board found that the Attorney General "has not shown good cause for failing to file its contention in a timely manner" as required by 10 C.F.R. 52.714(a)(1). This ruling is based on the reasoning that, As of May 22, 1986, Massachusetts knew or should have known that the Town had refused to permit the electrical hooking up of sirens. Moreover, as of June 2, 1986, it knew or should have known that the Town had ordered immediate cessation of all work on sirens.

Memorandum and Order of February 6, 1987 at p. 4. The Board has attributed too much significance to these votes.

Although the Attorney General was informed last July that the design number of notification sirens were not in place in

e the Town of Merrimac, he was not aware of the reasons. The Attorney General is not responsible for monitoring resolutions of Massachusetts towns and was not aware until recently of the actions taken by the Merrimac Town Meeting on May 6, 1986, and by the Board of Selectmen on June 2, 1986. Even if the Board were correct, however, that the Attorney General "should have known" as of May 22 that the Town had voted not to allow further hook-up of sirens, the Attorney General could not have known at that time what the Applicants' response to these votes would be. Applicants have never acknowledged being legally bound by the Selectmen's resolution of June 2, 1986. In fact, Applicants have consistently disregarded that resolution insofar as it also required the removal of sirens and the cessation of "all work" on siren " operation." Applicants have not removed the two existing sirens in Merrimac nor have they ceased "all work" which keeps them operable. See Mcdonald Affidavit (acknowledging that the Applicants replace the batteries in the sirens and perform an " operability test" every two weeks). Furthermore, Applicants have not conceded that this resolution imposes a legal barrier to the installation of battery-operated sirens.

Moreover, although the actions of the Town impose a legal impediment to the installation of a third siren in Merrimac, Applicants have remained free to take compensatory measures to ensure that the entire populace of Merrimac receives early y.+- -

, . , . - . _ - . , - . ..m- -,_,_ _ _, _

- _ - _ _ - . . _ _ - . . 4.__ . . .. , .__ _ . ~ . _ ~ ~ , . . . - _ _ _ . .

e-notification of an emergency at the Seabrook nuclear plant.

For example, perhaps the siren system could have been enhanced

,. outside of Merrimac to ensure that greater sound pressure levels reached those portions of the town which otherwise would 0 be inadequately covered, or perhaps alternative notification methods could have been implemented within Merrimac.

Thus, the actions taken by the Town in May and June did not clearly put the Applicants in a position of unremediable non-compliance. It was not unreasonable to expect that in the last nine months Applicants would resolve this siren problem prior to low-power operation.

j Indeed, the Applicants announced publicly throughout the summer.and fall of 1986 that the " sirens will be operational" prior to initial criticality. See letters from John DeVincentis to Vincent Noonan, dated May 6 and October 16, l

1986, attached to the Attorney General's original motion to admit this late-filed contention, dated January 12, 1987.

These letters certainly implied that the NRC staff was addressing'this important safety issue. Only in January, when issuance of the low-power license seemed imminent and, despite applicants' representations to NRC, there had still been no c

measures taken to compensate for the lack of a third siren in Merrimac did it become necessary to file a late-filed contention to ensure that the public in Merrimac would be ,

notified in the event of an emergency at Seabrook.

b 1

e Only now, as a result of the papers filed by the Applicants and the NRC staff in response to the Attorney General's motion, has it become apparent that the Applicants were attempting to I compensate for the lack of the third siren by demonstrating compliance with the "10 dB above background" standard.1! In

, addition, it has now become clear, for the first time, that the manner in which the NRC Senior Resident Inspector for Seabrook addressed this issue was totally inadequate and in complete 1

disregard of the requirements of NUREG-0654 and FEMA-REP-10.

i In his affidavit, attached to the NRC Staff Response to 4

Massachusetts' Motion To Admit Late Filed Contention, the NRC Senior Resident Inspector states that he " met with Seabrook personnel on a number of occasions during the summer of 1986 to discuss, among other things, the operability of the sirens in Merrimac." Affidavit of Antone C. Cerne at 13 (attached hereto as Exhibit "D"). Regarding the adequacy of having two sirens in Merrimac, he states as follows:

4

6. During the meetings last summer, the licensee 1 indicated that they were encountering difficulties in installing the planned third siren in Merrimac.

t The licensee at that time submitted an analysis J

i 2/ It is also only as a result of these pleadings of 1 Applicants and Staff which attempt, for the first time, to demonstrate compliance with the "10 dB above background" standard, that the Attorney General has had cause to hire an acoustics expert to take sound measurements in Merrimac.

Applicants did not take their own background measurements until January 19, 1987. Thus, the Attorney General could not have asserted earlier that the Applicants' measurements were in l error and that the siren system does not meet the "10 dB above I background" standard.

~ ._, . . _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , - _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . . , _ __

p 8

l-performed by HMM Associates to demonstrate that this third siren is not needed in order to provide notification to any part of the town.

The analysis concluded that the two remaining sirens would produce noise levels of at least 10 decibels above normal in all areas of Merrimac.

The standard of 10 decibels above normal has been accepted by the NRC and FEMA.

Nevertheless, we now know, from the two HMM letters (attached hereto as Exhibits "A" and "B") submitted with the Applicant's Response of January 22, 1987, that the analysis HMM submitted to NRC last summer did not include any background noise measurements. Instead, HMM's conclusion that two sirens in Merrimac would be adequate was:

based in large part upon our judgment that an ambient sound level survey there would reveal background noise levels of less that 40 dBC, and thus the siren coverage would comply with FEMA's "10 dB above background" criterion specified in Section 3.c.f. of Appendix 3 of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1.

Letter from HMM to James A. Mcdonald, PSNH, dated July 7, 1986, at p. 1 (attached as Exhibit "A") (emphasis supplied). Indeed, HMM stressed in that letter that they "ha(d] made no background noise measurements to confirm this (judgment]." Id,. at p. 2. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector, for reasons not explained in his affidavit, accepted HMM's " judgment"1 despite the requirements of NUREG-0654 and FEMA-REP-10 that the "10 dB above 3/ One cannot help but wonder how many other safety requirements were similarly checked by NRC, without regard to the regulatory requirements, by asking Applicants for their

" judgment" whether the requirements were met.

\

background" standard can only be met through the submission of properly-taken measurements of the background sound levels.

Even the standard cited in the Cerne Affidavit to demonstrate the acceptability of Applicants' siren system is inaccurate. The standard is not 10 decibels above normal as cited, Cerne affidavit at 16, but 10 dB (or more) above "the average measured summer daytime ambient sound pressure levels." FEMA-rep-10, SE.6.2.1. at p. E-8 (emphasis supplied). Therefore, the standard itself requires that measurements be taken.

In summary, the Attorney General has good cause for failing to file this contention, with this revised basis, at an earlier point in these proceedings. The motion to reopen the record is

" timely" for the same reasons.

II. Other Standards For Late-Filed Contentions And Motions To Reopen The Record Are Met The Attorney General has raised an exceptionally grave safety issue: portions of the populated areas of Merrimac will not receive early notification of an emergency at Seabrook.

Through the testimony of the Attorney General's acoustics experts from Cavanaugh Tocci Associates, the Attorney General's participation may reasonably be expected to assist in developing a sound record. See 10 C.F.R. 52.714(a)(1)(iii).

The substance of their testimony is contained in Mr. Koning's

) 4 affidavit attached hereto. The proceedings will be broadened and delayed minimally, see 10 C.F.R. 52.714(a)(1)(v), but for good and important safety reasons. A short discovery period and a one-day hearing is all that would be required to resolve this contention. The filing of proposed findings and Indeed, conclusions could occur within two weeks thereafter.

the Attorny General still maintains that this contention could easily be resolved by summary disposition even with this revised basis.

Given that the low-power license is currently being stayed by the Commission, a reopening of the record at this time should not result in any undue delay in issuance of a low-power license decision. Moreover, even a short delay in low power operation will not affect the commencement of full power operation, if any, since issuance of a full power operating license is at least one year away. Furthermore, a reopening of the record is required in order to ensure the correction of a previously unrecognized serious safety flaw that the NRC staff has not addressed in exercising its safety oversight responsibilities. For these reasons, and for the reasons stated in the Attorney General's previous motion of January 12, the motion to reopen the record meets all the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 52.734(a)(1). Therefore, the Board should reconsider its Order of February 6, 1987 and admit the Attorney General's contention with its revised basis.

)'

Respectfully submitted, JAMES M. SHANNON ATTORNEY GENERAL On -( I $ . .'5M , t.1 . s .

Carol S. Sneider Donald S. Bronstein Assistant Attorneys General Environmental Protection Division One Ashburton Place, Rm. 1902 Boston, Massachusetts 02108 617-727-2265 DATED: March 3, 1987 0

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' 2 p1 Flan e HMM Ref. No. 979 July 7,1984 Mr. Jeees A. Mcdonald Radiolo01 cal Assessment Manager P5MH - Seabrook Station P.O. Son 300 Seabrook, NH 03874 SUSJECT: Seabrook Station Alert and Motification Systee Analysis of Coversee Without Siren t96-3

Dear Mr. Mcdonald:

As directed by Mr. James Robinson, HMM Associates has undertaken a brief analysis of the adequacy-of-coverage of the Seabrook Alert and Motification System in the event that the Merrimac Siren MM-3 cannot be installed as planned. Our analysis suggests that, even with Siren MM-3 removed the Seabrook siren system would still satisfy the guide 1I,nes of Section C 3.f of Appendix 3 of NUREG-045a/ FEMA. REP-1, Rev.1.

A draft copy of a revised siren systes coverage esp, without Siren MM-3's contribution, is enclosed.

The deletion of Siren MM-3 would result in a reduction in the desien siren sound coverage throughout auch of northern and central Merriese, MA, and portions of Amesbury, MA and Meeton and South Heepton, MM. Meet of,this area will still be covered by a stren sound level of et least 60 dSC, esintaining compliance with the FEMA criterion specified in Section C.3.e of Aspendix 3 of MUREG-OdS4/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1. In several small areas, however, the design siren sound coverage will be reduced belos 60 GSC, to between 50 and de dBC; less than a total of ana-quarter of a square elle will be so affacted. Oute conclusion that adequate siren coverage will be maintained throughout these areas is based in large part upon our judgeant that an ambient sound level survey there would reveal background noise levels of less then 40 #C, and thus the siren coverage would comply with FEMA's "10 dB above background

• criterion specified in Section 3.c.f of Appendix 3 of NUREG-Od54/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1.

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l Although not densely populated, people do live within the areas where siren coverage will be reduced to between 50 and do oSC.

Examination of USGS topographical maps of these areas shows houses located siong Bear Mill Road in Merriesc, MA; along Amesbury Road in Newton, MN; and along the shores of Tuxbury l Pond in South Hampton, NM and Amesbury, MA. Hence, FEMA would <

not consider siren coverage to be adequate unless it can be l shown that the sound levels of the siren tone in these areas exceed the esisting background level by 10 de or more; FEMA 1 normally requires ambient noise level asesurements for this j purpose. Again, it is our judgment that the astient naise '

levels in these areas would be found to be sufficiently low that the "10 de above background

• criterion can be set; however, we have made no background noise seasurements to confire this.

Should you decies to submit a formal amendment to the FEMA-REP-10 rap pt documenting the deletion of Siren NN-3, we recommend that cackground seasurements be made in those areas where coverage has been reduced to between 50 and 40 dSC. Such sensurements would take about one day to complete. Pisese let us know if you want us to proceed with an actient noise level survey in these areas.

Very truly yours, Robert S. Serens R$5: 1de l 0501w cc: John Robinsen John OeWincentis f

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- -.e M Asher Asunus Ceneert Messeeriweette 01742 min ars use HMM Ref. No. 979/3378f January 20, 1987 Mr. James A. MacDonald New Hampshire Yankee Seabrook Station P.O. Box 300 Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 RE: Background Noise Measurements in Merrimac, Massachusetts

Dear Mr. MacDonald:

As indicated in our letter to you of July 7,1986, most of the town of Merrimac, Massachusetts is covered by a siren design sound level of 60 dSC or more from the existing two sirens in that town or from sirens in adjacent communities. A siren design coverage of 60 dBC or more is considered acceptable for lightly-populated areas such as Merrimac under Section C, 3, e of Appendix 3 of NUREG-0634/ FEMA REP-1, Revision 1.

There are, however, five small areas in Merrimac where the siren design sound level coverage is between 50 and 60 dBC. Two of these areas are unpopulated and appear inaccessible by road.

The other three areas contain residences. These are along a portion of Bear Hill Road part of Merrimaccort, and in Merrimac Terrace. On January 19, 1987,HMMconductedbackgroundnoise measurements in these populated areas.

The background noise measurements were conducted in accordance with Section C, 3, f of Appendix 3 of NUREG-0654 and with FEMA REP-10/ FEMA-43. Data were observed continuously for a period of 30 minutes at each location in the standard 1000 Hz octave band and were subject to a statistical analysis. The L90 levela (i.e., the levels exceeded 90 percent of the time during the measurement period at each location) are reported below:

Location L90 8 ear Hill Road 26 dB Merrimacport 40 dB Merrimac Terrace (no.) 34 de Merrimac Terrace (so.) 34 OS A

_2_

These measured levels are all 40 dB or less. Hence, a siren design sound level of 50 d8C or more provides adequate coverage in these areas, in accordance with Section C, J,-f of Appendix 3 of NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1.

Yours trulyf f

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yDavidN.Naast ~

DNK/jf )

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a UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before The ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In The Matter of )

)

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF ) Docket Nos. 50-443-OL-1 NEW HAMPSHIRE, et a1 ) 50-444-OL-1 (Seabrook Station, Units 1 ) (On-Site EP and and 2 ) Safety Issues)

)

AFFIDAVIT OF BRION RONING I, Brion Koning, do depose and say as follows:

1. I am employed as a Staff Consultant with Cavanaugh Tocci Associates, Inc., Consultants In Acoustics, 327 F Boston Post Road, Sudbury, MA, 01776. I have been employed by this firm in my present capacity, and previously as a sound and vibration measurement technician, since March 10, 1979.

During this time I have had extensive experience with the measurement and analysis of environmental sound levels.

2. Cavanaugh Tocci Associates, Inc. has been retained by The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Department of the Attorney General, to conduct background L90 sound lever measurements in the standard 1000 Hz octave band at four specified measurement locations in Merrimac, Massachusetts. On February 11, 1987, I conducted Lo 9 measurements at roadside locations adjacent the property addressees listed in the table below.

3. The measurement instrumentation consisted of a Bruel & Kjaer Type 2231 modular precision sound level meter outfitted with a Type 4145 one-inch condenser microphone, Type 1624 octave band filter set, and Type BZ 7101 statistical analysis module, mounted approximately 5 feet above grade atop a Type UA 0801 tripod. A type 4230 sound level calibrator was used to confirm instrumentation calibration immediately prior to, and following environmental sound level measurements. The statistical analysis module provides the system capability thereby to automatically display octave band L90 levels, eliminating any manual calculation methods. The instrumentation and measurement procedures comply with current American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standard S1.4 for Type 1 Precision Sound Measurement Instrumentation.

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Affidavit of Brion Koning Page 2 of 3

4. While sound measurements were being conducted, measured l temperatures ranged from 34 - 36 , and estimated wind velocities ranged from 0-10, mph occasionally gusting to 15 mph, with the exception of Location #4 where winds ranged from 5-15 mph with gusts to 25 mph. It is important to note that observed wind activity was intermittent, often exhibiting lulls between breezes. It is estimated, to a high level of confidence, that audible wind activity occurred less than 90% of the time, thereby rendering the measured L90 sound levels representative of background levels occuring on less windy days.

5. Appendix 3, Section (C3a) of NUREG-0654 indicates that large sirens emit sound energy in "... a predominately narrow band i

300 to 800 Hz..." Section (C3f) states: " Background dB should be determined in a band about the siren signal frequency. Inclusion of background noise energy from outside this band could be misleading." Although Section (C3f) does not specify the band band width (octave, 1/3 octave, 1/10 octave, etc.), it clearly indicates that background measurements should be conducted in a band that includes the siren signal frequency.

The standard 1000 . Hz octave band (specified for these measurements) encompasses a frequency band width of 708 Hz to 1410 Hz. I have been advised that the siren design report submitted for the warning sirens subsequently installed in the Merrimac area, indicates design sound energy was to be generated at a fundamental frequency of 700 Hz. Furthermore, I have also been advised that the actual fundamental frequency of warning sirens installed in the Merrimac crea is 680 Hz. Therefore, assuming band width of one octave to be sufficient, it may be more appropriate to measure background noise in the standard 500 Hz octave band (band width 355 Hz to 708 Hz) in connection with audibility studies for these sirens.

In addition, generally measured octave band background environmental sound levels are characterized by sound pressure levels at lower frequency bands that are roughly 3 decibels higher than adjacent higher frequency bands.

Specifically, this 3 dB per octave " slope" indicates that background sound levels in the f00 Hz, octave band are most often roughly 3 dB higher than the adjacent 1000 Hz octave band. Accordingly, L9o (5 min.) measurements in the 500 Hz band were conducted to augment the specified L9 o (30 min.)

measurements int eh 1000 Hz band. The measurement data indicates that background sound level in the 500 Hz octave band (encompassing the siren fundamental frequency) were higher than measured 1000 Hz octave band levels by 3 dB or l more.

i

, )

Affidavit of Brion Koning Page 3 of 3

6. The measurement locations, octave band levels, and time intervals are as follows:

Time Interval Location ikHz L90(30 min.) 500 Hz L90(5 min.) (approx.)

1. 1 21 Pleasant St. 41 dB 46 dB ll:55am-12:30pr

1. 2 25 Merrimac St. 39 dB 42 dB 12:35am-1:15pm 43 4 River Rd. 34 dB 40 dB 1:20pm-1:55pm

1. 4 64 Bear Hill Rd. 41 dB 47 dB 11:10am-ll:50ar Signed under the penalties of perjury this 12th day of February, 1987.

/s/ d .

F Brion Koning

)

U.4ITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC EAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

) Docket Mos. 50-443 OL-01 PUBLIC FERVICE COMPANY OF ) 50-444 OL-01 net' HAMPSHIRE, y al. ) On-site Emergency Planning

) and Safety Issues (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2 )

AFFIDAVIT OF ANTONE C. CERNE

1. I am the NRC Senior Resident inspector for the Seabrook fccility. I have been a resident inspector at Seabrook for 6 year . Prior to joining the NRC in 1978, I was involved with heavy construction and project management and inspection with the United States Army Corps of Fngineers. I hold a Masters Degree in Nuclear Engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

2. The purpose of this affidavit is to address the issue of the operability of emergency alert and notification sirens in the town of Merrimac, Massachusetts.

i

3. The question of the operability of alert and nctification sirens l for Seabrook first came to my attention in the spring cf 1986 as a result of an inspection item raised during the NRC Region I Office's emergency preparedness implementation appraisal of Seabrook conducted at that time.

As a result. I met with Seabrook personnel on a number of occasions

.. .i

,1 during the summer of 1986 to diserss, among other things, the operability of the sirens in ?!errimac.

4. The licensee had originally intended to have three sirens cover the town of ?!errimac. Licensee personnel have informed ne that because of problems in hooking up to the electrical grid, the licensee was relying upen batteries to power two of the sirens in Pferrimac. I was also informed that the bctteries will be replaced every two weeks to assure a continuous power supply for the sirens.

5. As part of my review of the licensee's preoperatienal testing proE'rr.n for Seabrook , I have reviewed copies of test reports that indicated that the two sirens in Merrimne bsve been tested and are operable. I have also reviewed the licensee's schedule for future festing to assure the continued operability of the sirens; the sirens at Pferrimac villl b e tested every two weeks to assure that they remain operable.

The Staff ands this cchedule to be acceptable.

6. During the meetings last summer, the licensee indicated that they were encountering difficulties in installing the planned third siren in Merrimac. The licensee at that time submitted an analysis performed by HMM Associates to demonstrate that this third siren is not needed in order to provide notification to any part of the town. The analysis concluded that the two remaining sirens would produce noise levels of at least 10 decibels above normal in all areas of !Ferrimac. The standard of 10 decibels above normal has been accepted by the NRC and FEMA. The

/

i e EXHIBIT 4 Filed: February 6, 1987 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO\1 MISSION Before the ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD in the Matter of PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF Docket Nos. 50-443-OL NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET AL (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) On-Site issues

{

SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE'S CONTENTION AND MOTION TO ADMIT LATE-FILED CONTENTION, REOPEN THE RECORD ON ON-SITE EMERGENCY PLANNING, AND CONDITION THE ISSUANCE OF A LICENSE UP TO 5% OF RATED POWER ON APPLICANTS' COMPLIANCE WITH 10 CFR 650.47(b)(5)

The Seacoast Anti-Pollution League submits herewith the following late-filed contention and moves pursuant to 12.734 that the Licensing Board reopen the record in the on-site emergency planning and safety phase of this proceeding to litigate this con t en t ion r ega r di ng compl iance by Appl i can t s ' wi th t he Commi s s ion's regulations at 10 CFR at 950.47(b)(5), specifically, whether Applicants have demons trated that the means exist to provide adequate early notification and clear ins t ruct ion to the populace wi thin the plume exposure pathway EPZ. SAPL further moves that no decision that may authorize the issuance of an operating license up to 5% of rated power be issued until this contention is resolved in such a manner as to provide for adequate notification to the public as

e required by the regulations. Alternatively, SAPL moves that any issuance of'a low power license condition the issuance of such license upon Applicants'-compliance with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5).

L I. Satisfaction of the-Five-Part Test for Admission of Late-Filed j- Contentions at (2.714(a)(1)

SAPL's contention No. 38 meets the five-part test set forth at ,

1 62.714(a)(1) of the Commission's regulations for_the reasons set l

s-forth below, t'

A. Good cause, i f any, for failure to file on time SAPL did not file this contention earlier because, i

prior to the test of the East Kingston sirens on January 31, 1987, SAPL had no site specific empirical basis upon which to found the assertion that the siren system as a whole would not

)

provide reasonable assurance of prompt notification and clear l -

instruction to the populace.1 SAPL was aware of the Superfor i Court's finding in regard to the legality of the i nstallation i

1 of the poles, but SAPL had planned to await the outcome of the def endant 's (PSNN's) Supreme Court appeal of the decis ion before acting to file a contention. it has now become clear that, even shoutd the util'ity succeed in having the Superior Court

decision overturned on appeal, the mere existence of the siren

system in the EPZ does not ensure its adequate operability and a

j compliance with the standards set forth in t h e Comm i s s i o n 's

1. The Massachusetts At torney General filed a content ion on January i 12, 1987 pertaining to a deficiency i n the public alerting system i for the Town of Merr imac, -Massachuset t s. SAPL agrees with the j Massachusetts Attorney General that the absence of sirens is a serious i matter.

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regulations. Theref ore, SAPL sat is fies this standard s ince "no adequately based contention could have been filed earller" which addressed the adequacy of the public aler ting sys tem as a whole.

Philadelphia Electric Comapny, (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-806, 21 NRC 1183, 1190 (1985).

Availability of other means to protect petitioner's B.

interest No other party to this proceeding has filed such a broad-based contention including the issues of the reliability of operation of the siren system and its legality and there is therefore no other means of assuring that the public alert and notification system will be in place and be brought into compliance with the Commission's regulat ions in timely f ashion other than through the filing of this contention.

C. Extent to which petitioner can contribute to development of a sound record SAPL can bring as a witness Frederick H. Anderson, Jr. to testif y to the f acts set forth in his Affidavit attached hereto. SAPL is f urther looking into the possibility of securing an expert witness who could testify as to the issues pertaining to the audibility and intelligibility of public alerting systems.

i D. Extent to which other parties will represent petitioner's interest As stated above at B, no other party has raised as broad-based a contention dealing with both the reliability of operation of the siren system or its legality. NECNP had cer tain issues related to the power supply for the systems and its audibility, but all of NECNP's contentions related to the siren system have since been dismissed. Now that there is actual test evidence of the system's lack of reliability, audibility and intelligibility, it is of vital interest to SAPL to have these issues adjudicated. SAPL's interests will not be represented save through this contention.

E. Broadening and delay of proceedings The admission of this contention at this time will necessarily result in broadening and delay of the proceedings since the record will have to be reopened. However, this effect is more than offset by the extraordinary public safety significance of the issues raised by this contention and the clear requirement that certain off-site elements of the Applicant's emergency plans, including compliance with 150.47(b)(5), be reviewed " prior to issuing an operating license authorizing low-power testing and fuel loading." 47 Fed. Reg. 30232, at 30234, Col. 1 (July 13, 1982).

Indeed, Applicant's Director of Emergency Preparedness has conceded that "Before low power testing can be done at a nuclear power plant, the f ederal government requires

O that the plant have in place a prompt notification system for nearby areas." (See Attachment A, letter of Terry Harpster of June 27, 1987.)

II. Satisfaction of Criteria for Reopening Records in Formal Licensing Proceedings at 42.734.

A. Pursuant to Q2.734 the following criteria are satisfied:

1) Timeliness The filing of this contention is timely for the reasons set forth above in the discussion of the satis f act ion of the Q2.714(a)(1) requirement for a showing of good cause, if any, for failure to file on time. in the discussion of the final rule on the criteria for reopening records in licensing proceedings, the Commission noted that this timeliness requirement overlaps the first o f t he 9 2.714(a)(1 ) cr i t er ia. 51 Fed. Reg. 195 35, a t 195 38, Col. 1 (May 30, 1986).

2) ,

Significant Safety or Environmental Issue The issue of public notification and alerting is significant to public safety. Without appropriate warning to the public, there is no reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken pursuant to 150.47(a)(1). Applicants may try to argue that public alerting and notification is not a safety concern at power levels less than 5% of rated capacity.

Such an argument is lacking merit because the Commission

has explicitly s tated that this is a requirement for fuel loading and low power testing. 47 Fed. Reg. 30232, supra.

3) Materially different result Had the empirical evidence of the lack of reliability and the issue of the legality of the siren system been brought earlier before this Board, SAPL believes that this Board would have been obligated to inquire f urther into these mat ters and could not have made its initial licensing determination in favor of the Applicants.

B) Affidavit This motion is accompanied by the Affidavit of Frederick H. Anderson, Jr. \1 r . Anderson is a competent individual with knowledge of the facts set forth in his affidavit.

SAPL Contention No. 38 Applicants have not complied with the provisions of 10 CFR 150.47(b)(5) and Appendix E, (IV, D.1 and 3 and Part 50 of the Commisslon's regulat ions and NUREG-0654 !1.E.6 and Appendix 3 because the s iren sys tem f or public aler t ing and ins t ruct ion is unreliable, not properly audible, and does not convey properly intelligible messages and does not, therefore, ensure prompt alerting and notification of the public. Furthermore, the installation of the siren system has been f ound illegal by a New Hampshire Superior Court.

Basis NRC ' regulat ions require that operating license applicants demonstrate that "means to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone have been established." 10 CFR 6 50.4 7(b)(5 ) .

Further, the design objective of the notification sys tem is "to have the capability to essentially complete the initial notification of the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes." Appendix E l!V D.3. Addit ionally, the not i ficat ion sys tem must assure " direct coverage" of essentially 100% of the populat ion within 5 miles of the site and assure 100% coverage within 45 minutes of the ent ire plume exposure EPZ. NUREG-0654 II.E.6 and Appendix 3.

A recent test of sirens in the Town of East Kingston, New Hampshire raises serious questions concerning the ability of the presently installed siren sys tem in the Seabrook EPZ to ef f ect timely and intelligible alerting and notification of the public. As described in the attached Affidavit of Frederick H. Anderson, Jr.,

an attempt to carry out a voice notification remotely from the Rockingham County Dispatch in Brentwood, N.H. f ailed. Secondly, the attempt to activate the strens from the same location resulted in only one of the sirens working. The activation of the sirens from the Eas t Kings ton EOC tha t followed s t ill was flawed by an inoperable siren. Further, the audibility of the sirens in terms of their ability to alert citizens in their homes was questioned by a local official. Though a New Hampshire Yankee maintenance crew was able to get the inoperable siren to go off, the succeeding voice announcement from the local EOC wa s not heard at six monitoring locations and was scratchy and unintelligible at the two locations where heard.

The test raises the issues of 1) the reliability of the siren system; 2) the audibility of the siren system; and 3) the intelligibility of messages broadcast over the system. It is entirely possible that the existing winter weather conditions of ice and snow may have been a factor in the system failures. Indeed, two of the judges who served as members of the Board in the Indian Point Special _

Proceedings wrote to the Commission and expressed serious concerns about public alerting on winter nights with snow. (See Attachment s B, let ter of Dr. Oscar H. Paris and Frederick J. Shon, June 9,1986. )

They stated:

At the time we wrote those recommendations, we were unaware of the alerting rate estimated by NUREG/CR-2655,PNL-4226 for a snowy winter night at IP. Had we been made aware of that report before we made our findings in the IP proceeding, we would have recommended that the Commisslon require that a second, backup system for prompt alerting, such as tone alert radios, be provided in the Indian Point EPZ. We urge that t h e Commi s s i o n consider such a requirement now. M.

Whatever the reason, whether snow and ice were factors or not, the sirens are not reliable, are sometimes inaudible, and the messages broadcast over them are not clear enough to ensure that adequate public alerting and notification can be carried out.

Additionally, there is the issue of the legality of the siren system as presently installed in the Seabrook Station EPZ. A judge in Rockingham County Superior Court on January 22, 1987 f ound against Public Service Company of New Hampshire in a suit brought by the Town of Rye seeking removal of the siren poles. The Town of Hampton Falls was a co-plaintiff in the proceeding. PSNH was ordered to cause the

e removal of the poles and siren /public address sys tems within 30 days of the date of the decision. Rockingham Superior Court, No. 86-E-

34. (Copy of decision appended as Attachment C.)

For these reasons, the public alerting and notification requirements 10 CFR 950.47(b)(5) and Appendix E flV, D1 and 3 are not met in the Seabrook Station plume exposure pathway EPZ. It follows that there is no reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook as required by 650.47(a)(1).

Respectfully submitted, SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE By its attorney, BACKUS, MEYER & SOLOMON

.- .:L f Robert A. Backus P. O. Box 516 116 Lowell Street Manchester, N.H. 03105 Tel: (603) 668-7272 DATE: February 6, 1987 I hereby cer t i f y that a copy of the wi thin SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE'S CONTENTION AND MOTION TO ADMIT LATE-FILED CONTENTION, REOPEN THE RECORD ON ON-SITE EMERGENCY PLANNING AND CONDITION THE ISSUANCE OF A LICENSE UP TO 5%

OF RATED POWER ON APPLICANTS ' COMPLI ANCE WITH 10 CFR 6 5 0. 47( b)(5 ) . has been

, sent this date, firs t class, postage prepaid, to all parties on the attached service list.

':,, g.s w A -

Robert 4. Backus 4

.g.

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_ - _ _ _ , . - . _ . . - , , , _.y _ _ , , . , . , , __,,,y_,._,,,_v.,__,,_y , , _ , , , , . , _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . , _ ., ,.

4 W1 t n New Hampshire Yankee June 27. 1986 i,f f i O f Dear hetshbert

'j

'.d 4 l-

• ' I I would 1the to share with you some tapertant teformation en feabrook Station and

' " ' its alert and notificatten systes, dii Construction of Seabrook station will soon be complete. Af ter receivt g a Icw-l

' 'l'

. power operating license. New Kar.pshire Yankee will load nuclear f eet (Mto the Seabroca reactor. The next step v111 he a series of Icw-power tests at up to inve

' Il I i percent of its normal capacity.

w g Sef ore low-power testtets ca9 be done at a noclear power plant. the federal gavern-sent requires that the plant have in place a prompt notification syster f ar nearby areas.

• r , ., %

A .$ An accident at leabroek is entremely unlikely. The plant has been butit ant tested T to strict quality and saf ety standards. and the reactor containeent htidts; 1s

'*%. e the strongest in the l'ented States. However, if there were an tactas- at leastoca

. that could af f ect the pubitc. the notification system would be used t: alert you.

7, please take a setent new to read about this systee and snare Ents LMf:r: stun with

• your fastly i O l

' 1. If there should be an energenev at leabrook station that could af fect the pubite in any way, warning strens in your area would make a steady three-to-five etnute signal.

g

[$E 2. If you hear this signal. you should tarn on your radio. !*.rgenes y * ==  ; broadcasts stil tell you what is happesing and wnat to do. StavtM4 gsj tuned to the radio sigPt be all you would need to do. Or. vez stu.t 2 a 2. , be told to take other actions.

4 m c" 3. Please do net use your telephone except for a perse9a1 emerdesev.

g j ;' i The pnene itses saw be needed for official business. If ycu can is

• a. so without using your phone, please check to see if your neig%bers have heard and understood the energency sessage.

As lesbrook coves closer to running above (tve percent power, and to full operation, you will receive sore materials en emergency nottrication and response plans for your area. In the seantine, if you have guestions about this letter, please catt the following nor-emergency number between 4:30 a.m. and 6:00 p.es (603) 47.-115..

Thank you.

$tacerety.

/ (. 89la

] *'

- 7 Terry Harpster y j. {

y

• Director of toergency preparesses-g ,

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eO 99 300 Sece ees NM n38's e.s, .

_- , _ _ . . . ._.__.___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ , _ _ _ _ , _ _ . _ , _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ ~ _ . , . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . , ~ . _

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

)

)

In the Matter of ) Docket Nos.

) 50-443/444-OL

)

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW ) (On-Site EP and

)

HAMPSHIRE ET. AL. ) Safety Issues) h

)

(Seabrook Station, Units 1 ani 2 )

)

)

AFFIDAVIT OF FREDERICK H. ANDERSON, JR.

1. My name is Frederick H. Anderson, Jr. I have in the -

past served as Assistant Civil Defense Director, Public Information Director and Assistant Transportation Coordinator for the Town of South Hampton, New Hampshire with regard to its Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Seabrook Station.

In addition I am a reporter for the Town Crier newspaper in South Hampton.

I am also President of Ideas + Information, Inc., a marketing research firm in Exeter, New Hampshire.

2. The Town of South Hampton is located within the ten-mile plume exposure EPZ of the Seabrook nuclear plant. South Hampton abuts East Kingston, New Hampshire.

3. East Kingston held its first audible test of its emergency notification sirens January 31, 1987, and, representing the Town Crier I observed this test, primarily from inside the East Kingston EOC.

4. On Saturday January 31, 1987 I arrived at the East Kingston EOC at about 10 AM.

When I arrived members of the East Kingston Fire and Police departments were being sent to eight locations within the town to monitor a test of the sirens. Four of the teams were sent to the four siren locations (EK-1 to 4) and the other four were to determine how well the sirens could be heard in other parts of the town.

5. As the first phase of the test,a vocal announcament, warning that a test was to be made, was to occur using the voice capability of the sirens. Rockingham County Dispatch attempted to make such an announcement remotely from their EOC in Brentwood, NH using their 1

PAGE TWO OF TWO l

radio system, but none of those people in the field reported being able to hear anything from the sirens.

]

6. An attempt was then made to set off the sirens remotely from Rockingham County Dispatch, as would be the case in the event of an emergency at Seabrook. Only one of the sirens (EK-4) on Exeter Road, was reported to be working.

7. Robert Fairbanks, Emergency Management Coordinator in East '

Kingston, tried to reach Rockingham County Dispatch by radio and was unable to.

Mr. Fairbanks then decided to try to operate the sirens directly from the EOC. Using the Whelan console, he was able to activate three of the four sirens using a " Wail" sound. EK-2 still did not operate.

Next Fairbanks activated the " attack" siren sound. Again only three of the four sirens worked.

8. I went outside the EOC while a siren was going off. East Kingston Fire Chief David Conte said that he hadn't yet heard a noise that would get him out of a house.

9. A maintenance crew from New Hampshire Yankee, with a rented cherry picker truck, which was stationed in front of the EOC, was sent to try to repair siren EK-2. EK-2 was activated locally by the NHY technicians at the siren. Mr. Fairbanks cancelled a test from Rockingham Dispatch because they were working on the siren.

10. Toward the end of the test Mr. Fairbanks tried to make an announcement from the EOC over the sirens. The person at siren EK-3 reported the transmission was " scratchy" and the person at siren EK-2 reported it was " unintelligible." None of the other six monitoring locations reported being able to hear the voice transmission.

i fr-Y O c y Ar s ,

7D sP i Frederick H. Anderson, Jr'. N Then personally appeared the above named Frederick H. Anderson, Jr. and made oath that the above statements by him subscribed are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.

Before me

/h$$ zA

/

Notary Public Dated g[t7 My commission expires /o[g/97 2

t

,,(g * % e,k OC0K~T NU.'83Ut h (

. UNITED STATES

, ' , I g( ) j

'a (.y NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD PANEL PROD. & UTIL p. FACW.,f' _h

$ . qgp e W ASHINGTON. D C. 20555 /

Ni  %

%..... f June 9, 1986 g w ..

Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts r

" $1y'N.

• l Commissioner James K. Asselstine

}Cr y, Jg, , if". p' Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal Commissioner Lando W. Zech, Jr. -

4 !.

Dear Mr. Chairman and Commissioners:

The May 16, 1986 letter to you f rom the Shearon Harris .JUN SERVED fIcep (SH) o::erating licerse board (SH letter), expressing a generic concern about the adequacy of FEMA standards for .

Judging nuclear power plant sirens, came to our attention last week during the Annual Meeting of the ASLBP. We are writing to express our endorsement of the position taken by the SH board and to bring to your attention concerns that we have as a result of matters discussed in the SH letter.

As members of the board that heard the Indian Point Special Proceeding, we are concerned that the autnors of NUREG/CR-2655, PNL 4226, which was cited on p. 2 of the Shearon Harris letter, predicted that on a winter night with snow the sirens at Indian Point would alert only 53% of the residents in the EPZ. The SH letter pointed out on p. 3 that the record developed in the SH proceeding showed that the estimates in NUREG/CR-2655, PNL 4226 are probably low by 10-20 percentage points. With the upper value from this range added to the Indian Point statistic, the sirens would be projected to alert only 73% of the residents on a winter night with snow. We agree with the SH board that such a level of alerting "cannot reasonably be viewed as satisfying the ' essentially 100%' regulatory requirement" adopted by the Commission.

We call to your attention that in the Indian Point (IP) -

proceeding we found that 4,642 persons lived 7Ttnin T 75 miles of the IP site. 18 NRC 811, 873 (1983). This zone is well within the 2-mile distance within which lethal exposures resulting from a severe accident at IP would probably occur, according to NRC testimony. Id., at 868. If we assume only 73% of these close-in EPZ resTdents were alerted by sirens, and we perform the same adjustment for self-alerting described in the SH letter, we obtain a total alerting projection of only 83%, well below the regulatory requirement of the Commission. Such a low percentage of alerting within 1.25 miles of the IP site could result in more than 700 unalerted persons who could be exposed to a lethal radiation

. /

June 9, 1986 dose. Moreover, as the IP record shows, snow falling through a radiation plume can result in hot spots downwind from the point of release, which could significantly increase the chance of early health ef fects. Id., at 981. Obviously, a delay in evacuation by persons who were not alerted by the early notification would increase the risk of their experiencing s,uch exposure.

In our Recommendations to the Commission, issued on October 24, 1983, we found that the effect of severe winter storms on evacuation had been given insufficient consideration in the emergency planning for IP. Id., at 981.

At the time we wrote those recommendations, we were unaware of the alerting rate estimated by NUREG/CR-2655, PNL-4226 for ,

a snuwy wir+.er night at IP. Had we been made aware of that report before we made our findings in the IP proceeding, we would have recommended that the Commission require that a second, backup system for prompt alerting, such as tone alert radios, be provided in the Indian Point EPZ. We urge that the Commission consider such a requirement now.

We have another serious concern to bring to your attention, namely, the failure of the Staff to bring NUREG/CR-2655, PNL-4226 to our attention during the IP proceeding. The manuscript for NUREG/CR-2655 was completed in February, 1982, and the document was published in September, 1982. The IP board heard testimony on emergency planning in the spring of 1983, and the record was not closed until April 29, 1983. 18 NRC 811, 841-42 (1983). Commission Question 4 in the IP proceeding specifically asked:

What improvements in the level of emergency planning can be expected in the near future, and on what time schedule, and are there other specific offsite emergency procedures that are feasible and should be taken to protect the public?

In view of that question and the extensive testimony taken with respect to emergency planning at IP, as well as the Commission's then existing policy with regard to board notifications, we believe that it was incumbent on the Staff to bring NUREG/CR-2655 to our attention. Certainly the McGuire doctrine, which has been dealt with in a number of Tecisions, makes it clear that any matter that is " relevant and material" to an issue being adjudicated by a Licensing or Appeal Board must be provided to that Board. Duke Power Co. -~

(William B. McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 an3 7TT ALAB-143, 6 AEC 623, 625-26 (1973); Georgia Power Co. (Alvin W. Vogtle Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 7J~ XEKi!79T~~7 NRC 404,

f June 9, 1986 1

408-12 (1975); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-35FI 4 NRC IF7, 406 n. 26 (1976); Tennessee Valley Authorit (Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, &

ITT IEXETE77, . NPC 1387, 1394 (1982); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, UnTI TTT IEXI:77TT 19 RRC 1350, 1357-60 (1984); Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project,' Units 1 & 2) EFFTI5-6, 2T NKU 447 (1985). In light of this precedent, of the significance of the results of NUREG/CR-2655 to emergency planning at IP, and of the fact that emergency planning was litigated in the IP proceeding many months after NUREG/CR-2655 was issued, we believe Staff's failure to bring this matter to the Board's attention, when viewed even in the most favorable light, to be a serious oversight. .

Respectfully submitted.

L N Dr. Oscar H. Paris

([~'/ m[ .

~

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FredericE-

., L Y-cc: M. Malsch, Acting General Counsel S. Chilk, Secretary /

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j No. 36-E-34 Pa3a No. 2 h

As part of its plan for evacuation and response, the Defendan:

has ins:alled a system for public notifica: ion consisting of a series of sirens placed on poles located in several New Ha=pshire seacoas con = unities , including the Plaintif f Touns . The poles are approxica:ely 63 feet in height (as opposed to a s:andard utili:7 pole 33 fee: in height) and attached to the top of the poles is a 300 pound siren /public address system. This is the sole use of the pole; it is used for no other purpose.

In Novenber of 1935, the Defendant, through its Manager of nuclear Projec:s, no:ified the Board of Selectmen of the Town of Rye of i:s in:en: to place these poles and sirens in differen: areas l

c: the coun. The selectnen cade 1: clear by appropriate responsa

! that 1: vas their intention to resist any such attempt.

Notwi:hs:anding their insistence that they uould not coopera:e by per=i::ing the poles for these purposes, the Selectnen, on Septecher 12, 1934, pursuant to R.S.A. 231:161 I(a), granted '

applications for pole perni:s subtit:ed by the Defendant to the Toun Clerk on July 9,1934 for this purpose. It is the contention of the town selec::en :ha: they were no: avare that these poles were to be used for any:hing other than the trans=ission of elec:ric pcwer despi:e the fact tha: the Defendan:'s agen: had indicated to l tha selec::en that they would be seeking pole licenses for this purpo3e.

i i

i

. po. 86-E-3a Page No. 3 y

Pursuant to these licenses and licenses granted by the DOT purportedly under the authority of R.S.A. 231:150 el sec., the Defendan: has installed a nu=ber of poles with sirens throughout the Town of Rye on town-maintained highways and state-taintained highuays. The Defendant has likewise installed a series of poles on'scate-naintained highways located in the Town of Ha pton Falls pursuant to licenses obtained from the D0!.

The ultina:e issue to be determined is whether R.S.A. 231:160 e sec_., authorizes the towns and/or the State to issue pole licanses for the erection of poles for purposes related solely to this siren warning sys:c=. The Defend 2n: and the DOT caintain tha:

said s:a:utes are to be interpre:ed to include this purpose while the Plainci'i and intervenor maintain that this use is not consisten:

wi:h the language or intent of the statu:e.

The authori:y to erect poles on the highuays of the State is found in R.S.A. 231:160 which reads as fo*_lous:

"Au:hority to Erect. Telegraph, television, telephone, electric light and electric pcuer poles and s: rue:ure, and underground conduits and cables, with their respec:ive at:achments and appur:enances may be erected, installed and caintained in any pub *.i highways and the necessary and proper wires and cable may be suppor:ed on such poles and strue:ures or carried across or placed under any such hishuay by any person, ccpar:nership or corpora: ion as provided in this subdivision and no: otherwise."

Thus, any pole erected on the highuays of the State cus be used ui:hin the parace:ers of this statu:e. Therefore, any license Sranted for the erection of a pole for :he purpose ou: side of these parate:ers is null and void.

1

, No. 86-E-30 Pago 3o. 4 The legislature, through this statu:e, has listed those uses or purposes fcr which poles may be erected (the statute does not list the types of co=panies which =ay erect poles as the State contends) .

The list includes " telegraph, television, telephone, electric ligh:

and electric power poles . . .," a very specific and lici:ed enumeration.

o I: is a well-established principle of statutory construction that "the expression cf one thing in a statute implies the exclusion of another" In Re Gachle, 113 U.H. 771, 777 (1973); See also Vaillancourt v. Concord General Mutual Insurance Coccanv, 117 N.H.

43 (1977); 2A J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory cens: rue:icn, L See: ion 47.23-21 (4th ed. C. Sands 1973).

In this case, the legislature has provided a very specific and li=ited enu= era: ion of uses for which poles may be erected on public highways. The statute contains no terms indicating the non-exclusivity of this list; such as "such as ...," "like ..." or

" including bu: not limited to ..." Therefore, applying the above-sta:ed principle of statutory construction, this Court must conclude tha: the legislature did not intend to allow the erec:icn of poles by utili:y cc=panies for any purpose the company cay see fi:, bu:

only for those purposes lis:ed. Thus, the licenses granted the r Defendant by the Town of Rye and the State Department of Transper:ation for the erec: ion of poles for a sys:e= of public notification were granted without statutory authori:7 and are, therefore, null and void.

c __

t , ,

4 Uo.'35-E-34 Page do. 5 i

Accordingly, the poles erected pursuant to these licenses were erec:ed without authority.

This position is fur:her suppor:ed by the legislative his:ory of 2.S.A. 231:160. The statute has been amended a number of times since its passage in 1381 to acconcodate technological innova: ions and the needs of socie:7 These innovations include telephones, television, electric lights and elec:ric pouer. Each tine the.

legisla ure has specifically acended the stature to provide for these innovations and has specifically listed that par:icular innova: ion as a per=issable use for utility poles. The legisla:ure could have used broad languasa in providing for future innova:icns or sociatal needs but has chose, instead, to provide specifically for each neu use. Obviously, then, it is the role of the lesislature to acccc=oda:e these neu uses and not the role of this Court.

Even assu=ing arcuendo, the list was not intended by the legislature to be e:cclusive, these poles and the use to which they have been put are not within the general nature of the types of uses designated .n the statute. Excluding electric light poles, the poles designa:ed in the statu:e are all u:ility peles; that is, they are all enployed to provide some direc: service to the public. They all transmi: some service to'the heceowner. The Defendant argues that these poles do relate to the trans=ission of electricity. This relacionship, however, is far too a::enuated. In fact, the purpose to which these poles are pu: is far too novel to have been conce=placed by the legislature in this s:a:ute.

, No. 86-2-35 Page Jo. 6 Finally, these siren /public address systems can hardly be :erned ateurtenances.

Webster defines an ac.c.ur:enance as "a subordina:e part of adjune:: accessory obj ect," Webster's Colleziare Dictionarr (1974) It's o'cvious that the sole purpose of these poles is the siren / public address systen. They are, therefore, nc:

subordinate or adjunct par:s, but the only feature of these poles.

Defendant has cited in i:s Supplemen:al Memorandum of La.: the case of Vernet, et al v. Exe:er, 123 N.ii. ,(decided Dece=ber 30, 1956 for the proposi: ion tha: cunicipalities canno exercise veto power ever the Sta:e's performance of its statutorily candated functions. It centends that, by challenging the applicability of RSA 231:160 el sec., the plaintiff Towns are, in effec:, seeking to exercise local au:hority to prohibit the State froo inplementing a nuclear energency response plan as i: is obliged to do under RSA 107-A, et sen and RSA 107-3 er sec. This argumen: is without meri:, however, as, in any event, it is not the State, but the defendant cc=pany which is taking the action the towns seek to enjoin In short, the S: ate is not, in authorizing the erection of the poles by the Defendan:, exercising a function s:a:utorily =anda:ed. I:

is, ra:her, rei, vin 3~ on the lezislative au:hority of RSA 231:160 e sec, which, for the reasons given herein does not authorize the erection of poles for this purpose.

For t.ne toregoing reason, t.ne Der.encan: Is orcere,. to cause e.ne n

Ne. 86-E-34

'Page No. 7 9

removal of these poles and the siren /public address systems at its sole expense within 30 days of the date hereof.

So Ordered.

January 20, 1957 _____a_

Walter W / M" ding Justice

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I' EXHIBIT 5 4

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION oetore the ATOMIC SAFSTt AND LICENSING BOARD

)

In the matter of )

) Docket Nos. 50-443-OL-1 PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF ) 50-444-OL-1 NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al. ) On-site Emergency Planning e

) and Safety Issues (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) ) Dated: July 2, 1986~

)

4 )

PETIFION OF AITORNEI GENERAL FRANCIS X. BELLOTTI

- TO REVOKE REGULATION 50.47(d) OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO SUSPEND ITS APPLICATION IN THE SEABROOK LICENSING PROCEEDING Attorney General Francis X. Bellotti, acting pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S2.758, hereby petitions the Commission to revoke the regulation appearing at C.F.R. 550.47(d), or in the alternative to suspend its application in ene present proceeding, and as grounds enerefor states the following:

(1) Section 189a of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C.

$2239(a) (1982), provides a right to a prior hearing on all issues material'to issuance of an operating license. Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 735 F.2d 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

t

, (2) Regulation 50.47(a) permits the issuance of an operating license authorizing fuel loading and/or low power 3 ..

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operation at up to 5% of rated power before any findings or s- determinations are made "concerning the state of off-site emergency preparedness or the adequacy of and capability to implement state and local off-site emergency plans." 10 C.F.R.

S50.47(d).

(3) Insofar as Regulation 50.47(d) allows issuance of an operating license, even at less than full power, prior to a hearing on all issues relevant to licensure, including off-site emergency planning, it violates the statutory right to a hearing provided by section 189a and must be held invalid.

(4) No nearing nas yet been held in the instant case on off-site emergency planning issues, and regardless of any economic or safety Justifications for Regulation 50.47(d) or the fact that a nearing on emergency preparedness issues will be held prior to full-power authorization, operation of the Seabrook nuclear power plant at 5% of rated power will create significant irreversicle consequences. Among these irreversicle consequences will ce irradiation of tne plant, significant fuel irradiation, and worker exposure. See Affidavit of Albert Carnesale; Affidavit of Dale G. Bridenoaagn and Gregory C. Minor (prepared for Shoreham licensing proceeding out relevant hereto). None of these consequences can be mitigated by's later hearing, and thus application of Regulation 50.47(d) will effectively deny interested parties their right to a prior hearing on all issues relevant to licensure.

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(5) Regulation 50.47(d) wnich, together with Regulation 50.57(c), authorizes temporary low-power operation prior to a hearing on all issues relevant to licensure is furthermore in violation of the Atomic Energy Act's statutory scheme which twice, on an emergency basis, authorized the issuance of temporary low-power operating licenses prior to completion of a full hearing on all issues relevant to licensure but no longer authorizes sucn temporary low-power licenses. See 42 U.S.C.

S2242 (expired Decemoer 31, 1983).

Even if there did exist statutory authority for Regulation 50.47(d) special circumstances warrant an exception to its applicat' ion in the instant proceeding:

(1) No emergency response plans have been submitted to FEMA or the NRC for that portion of the Seabrook Station's plume exposure EpZ or ingestion exposure EPZ within Massachusetts. See Affidavit of Secretary of Puolic Safety Charles V. darry (attached hereto).

(2) Five of the six Massachusetts communities within the plume exposure pathway have voted not to participate in emergency planning and not to participate in any exercise of emergency response plans for Seacrook. See Affidavit of Charles V. Barry.

(3) The Governor of Massachusetts has not to date indicated any intention to suomit, or implement in the event of an emergency, compensatory plans for the five Massachusetts communities not participating in emergency planning. See Affidavit of Cnarles V. darry.

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.v, (4) Furthermore the Governor of Massachusetts nas not to date indicated any intention.to submit state emergency response plans for the Commonwealth of dassachusetts or to commit state resources to tne exercise or implementation of emergency.

response plans for Seaurook. Indeed, he has ordered the planning process suspended while he attempts to gather

.1 information on tne Chernobyl accident. See Affidavit of Charles V. Barry. .

(5) Regulation 50.47(a)(1) provides that "no operating license for a nuclear power reactor will be issued unless a finding is made by'NRC that there is " reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will oe taken in tne event of a radiological emergency." 10 C.F.R. 50.47(a)(1).

(6) Witnout participation oy the 'Massacnusetts state and local governments in emergency planning, it is unlikely that the requisite section 50.47(a)(1) finding for licensure can ce ,

1

made for the Seacrook plant or that the regulatory emergency planning standards set fortn in section 50.47(a) can ce met, thus raising a strong likelihood that the seaoroon nuclear poder plant may never receive a license to operate at 4

full-power, or that if it does receive such license it will not do so until after several years of litigation, see, e.g., Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1)

ALAB-88, 22 NRC 651 (1985).

(7) Tne purpose of low power operation is to allow testing of plant systems prior to full-power operation, which testing 1

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, can typically be accomplished in a period of a few months.

See, e.g., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Emergency Planning, 46 Fed. Reg. 61132, 61133 (December 15, 1981).

(8) No cenefit can De derived from low-power operation if the reactor does not receive a license to operate at full-power and little, if any, oenefit can be derived from continuing low-power operation beyond tne several months required for testing. See Dale G. Bridenbaugh and Gregory C. Minor.

(9) Nevertneless, operation at low-power coes produce significant irreversible consequences, such as plant irradiation, fuel irradiation and worker exposure, which consequences only increase the longer a plant operates at lower-power. See Affidavit of Albert Carnesale and Affidavit of Dale G. Bridenbaugh and Gregory C. Minct.

(10) In promalgating Regulation 50.47(d) the Commission contemplanted that low-power operation would oe conductea only for a period of short duration. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra at 61133; Statements of Consideration, Emergency Planning, 47 Fed. Reg. 134 (July 13, 1982).

(11) It is therefore Attorney General dellotti's contention tnat Regulation 50.47(d) should be waived in ene instant case where tnere is no assurance that operation at full-power will ever occur and if it does occur will not occur for nearly a year, or possibly years, and thus any possible benefits to oe attained from commencing low-power testing at this time will be far outweighed oy the significant and

4' irreversible adverse environmental consequences of such ,

operation. See Affidavit of Dale G. Brioenbaugh and Gregory C.

Minor.

(12) In its Statement of Consideration for Regulation 50.47(d), the Commission asserted as basis for its determination that off-site emergency planning was not required for low-power operation that there would be little off-site risk cecause "the fission product inventory during low power testing is much less than during higher power operation due to the low level.of reactor power and short period of operation."

See, Statements of Consideration, Emergency Planning 47 Fed.

Reg. 30232 (September 1, 1982).

(13) Nevertneless operation at 5% of rated power for a longer period of time will at some point lead to the accrual of waste products in tne fuel sucn that core melting could occur in the event of the interruption of the core cooling. See Affidavit of Gordon R. Thompson.

(14) If Applicants presently receive their license to operate at low-power, such operation is very 11Kely to continue for 4-period of time mucn longer than that contemplated oy the Commission in promulgating degulation 50.47(d), tnereby raising a risk of off-site consequences not intended oy the Commission in adopting Regulation 50.47(d). See Affidavit of Gordon d.

Thompson.

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(16) Regulation 50.47(d) should further be waived until such time as there is conducted a full investigation and assessment of-the recent nuclear accident at Chernobyl, its causes and the implications of such accident for off-site planning (cased upon available information, that accident required the evacuation of all persons within an 18 mile radius of tne plant even thouyn tne Chernocyl reactor was only operating at approximately 6% of rated power Wnen the accident occurred).

Respectully suomitted,

. FRANCIS X. BELLOTTI ATTORNEf GENERAL i

By: Carol S. .Sneider Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Division Department of tne Attorney General One Ashburton Place, Room 1902 Boston, MA 02108 (617)727-2265 DATED: July 2, 1986

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1 00LMETEP USNHC UNITSD STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 17 HN( 15 P4:52

) 0FFIM -

In the Matter of ) DMg W

/

)

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW ) Docket No.(s) 50-443/444-OL~l HAMPSHIRE, ET AL. )

(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) )

)

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Donald S. Bronstein, hereby certify that on May 13, 1987 I made service of the within document, by mailing copies thereof, postage prepaid, by first class mail, or as indicated by an asterisk, by Federal Express mail, to:

• Lando W. Zech, Jr., Chairman

• Thomas M. Roberts, Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission East West Towers Building East West Towers Building 4350 East West Highway 4350 East West Highway Third Floot Mailroom Third Floor Mailroom Bethesda, MD 20814 Bethesda, MD 20814

• James K. Asselstine, Commissioner

• Frederick M. Bernthal, Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission East West Towers Building East West Towers Building 4350 East West Highway 4350 East West Highway Third Floor Mailroom Third Floor Mailroom Bethesda, MD 20814 Bethesda, MD 20814

• Kenneth M. Carr, Commissioner Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission East West Towers Building East West Towers Building 4350 East West Highway 4350 East West Highway Third Floor Mailroom Third Floor Mailroom Bethesda, MD 20814 Bethesda, MD 20814

.(-

i Gary J. Edles Howard A. 4ticer Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal

- Atomic Safety & Licensing App +3.

Board Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commmission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 27n :33.

East West Towers Building Iast West Towers Building rnird Floor Matiroom Third Floor Matiroom 4J50 East West Highway 4350 East West Highway Beenesda, M3 20814 Betnesda, MD 20814 Sheldon J. Wolfe, Chairperson Helen F. Hoyt, Chairperson Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Atomic Safety & Licensing 30 sed U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commmission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Con?.:ss::-~

East Jest Towers Building East West Towers Building Inied Floor Mailroom Third Floor Mailroom 4350 East West Htgnway 4350 East West Highway Betdesda, MD 20d14 Bethesda, MD 20814 Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke 3r. Jerry Harcout Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Atomic Safety & Licen' sing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commmission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commisst:-

East West Towers Building East West Towers Building

'Jnied Floor Mailroom Third Floor Mailroom 4350 dast Jest Highway 4350 East West Highway Beenesda, MD 20814 Bethesda, MD 20814 H. Joseph Flynn, Esq. Stephen E. Merrill Assistant General Counsel Attorney General Office of General Counsel George Dana Bisbee, Esq.

federal Emergency Management Assistant Attorney General Agency Office of the Attorney General 500 C Street, S.W._ 25 Capitol Street Jasnington, DC 20472 Concord, NH 03301

• 0ccketing and Service Paul A. Fritzsche, Esq.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Office of the Public Advocate Commission State House Station 112 Washington, DC. 20555 Augusta, ME 04333 Rooetta C. Pevear Diana P. Randall State Representative 70 Collins Street rown of Hampton Falls Seabrook, NH 03874 3rinkwater Road dampton Falls, NH 03844 Atomic Safety & Licensing Rooert A. Backus, Esq.

Appeal Board Panel Backus, Meyer & Solomon U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 116 Lowell Street Commission P.O. Box 516 East West Towers Building Manchester, NH 03106 Third Floor Mailroom 4350 East West Hignway Betnesda, M3 20814

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• Snerwin E. Turk, Esq. .

Judith H. Mizner, Esq.

Office of the Executive Legal Silvergate, Gertner, 3a<er Director . Fine, Good & Mizner U.S. tiuclear Regulatory Commission 88 3 road Street Tenth Floor Boston, MA 02110 7735 Old Georgetown Road Bethesda, MD 20814 Atomic Safety & Licensing Jane Doughty Board Panel Seacoast Anti-Pollution 'ea ;e U.S. tiuclear Regulatory 5 Market Street Commission Portsmouth, :lH 03801 Jashington, DC 20555 Paul McEachern, Esq. J. P. Nadeau Mattnew T. Stock, Esq. Board of Selectmen Shaines & McEacnern 10 Central Road 25 Maplewood Avenue Rye, NH 03870 P.O. Box 360 .

Portsmouth, NH 03801 Sandra Gavutis, Chairperson Calvin A. Canney Board of Selectmen City Manager RF3 1, Box 1154 City Hall ate. 107 E. Kingston, :lH 03827 126 Daniel Street Portsmouth, IIH 03801 Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Angelo Machiros, Chairman U.S. Senate

.lasnington, DC Board of Selec men 20510 25 High Road (Attn: Tom Surack) Newbury, MA . 950 Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Peter J. Matthews one Eagle square, Suite 507 Mayor concord, Old 03301 City Hall (Attn: dero Boynton) Newburyport, MA 01950 Donald E. Chick liilliam Lord rown : tanager Board of Selectmen rown of Exeter Town Hall 10 Front Street Friend Street Exeter, NH 03833 Amesoury, MA 4

01913 3rentwood Board of Selectmen Gary 11. Holmes, Esq.

RFD Dalton Road Holmes & Ellis acentwood,:lH 03833 47 tiinnacunnet Road Hampton, NH 03841

.4-e Philip Ahrens, isq. Diane ~ Curran, Esq.

Assistant Attorney General Harmon & Weiss Department ot bne Attorney Suite 430 i General 2001 S Street, N.W.

deate House Station #6 Wasnington, 3C 20009 Augusta, ME 04333 Thomas G. 3tgnan, Esq. Richard A. Hampe, Esq.

R. K. Gad III, Esq. Mampe & McNicholas Ropes & Gray 35 Pleasant Street 225 Franklin Street Concord, NH 03301 aoston, MA 02110 Beverly dollingworth Edward A. Thomas 209 Winnacunnet Road Federal Emergency Management dampton, NH 03842 Agency 442 J.W. McCormack (POCH)

Boston, MA 02109 i

William Armstrong Michael Santosuosso, Chairman Ctvil Defense Director Soard of Selectmen Town of Exeter Jewell Street, RF3 2 10 Front Street South Hampton, NH 03827 Exeter , ilH 0383J Rooert Carrigg, Chairman Anne E. Goodman, Chairperson Board of Selectmen Board of Selectmen Town Office 13-15 Mawmarket Road Atlantic Avenue Durham, NH 03824 Noren Hampton, NH 03862 Allen Lampert Charles P. Graham, Esq.

Civil Defense Director McKay, Murphy and Graham rown of 3rentwood Old Post Office Square 20 Franklin Street 100 Main Street Exeter, tlH 03833 Auesbury, MA 01913 Rep. Edward J. Markey Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr.

Cnaleman Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S. House of Representatives U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Succommittee on Energy Commission Conservation and Power East West Towers Building aoom H2-316 4350 East West Highway douse Office Building Third Floor Mailroom Annex No. 2 Bethesda, MD 20814 1 Waanington, 3C 20515 Artn: *inda Correia Y .

Donald S. Bronstein Assistant Attorney General 3 ATE 3: May 13, 1987

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