|
|
| Line 17: |
Line 17: |
|
| |
|
| =Text= | | =Text= |
| {{#Wiki_filter:- | | {{#Wiki_filter:}} |
| Filed: January 12, 1983 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA / 4F 5
| |
| NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n/g t y before the ! 17 --
| |
| ~
| |
| A %
| |
| ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD / 3 i YY
| |
| 'Y
| |
| )
| |
| In the Matter of )
| |
| )
| |
| PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW ) Docket Nos. 50-443 OL HAMPSHIRE, et al. ) 50-444 OL
| |
| )
| |
| (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2) ) ,,
| |
| )
| |
| APPLICANTS' SECOND ANSWERS TO "THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE'S SECOND SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DUCUMENTS TO PUBL!C SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, INC."
| |
| Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 5 2.740 and 2.740b, the 4
| |
| Applicants hereby submits the following answers to interrogatories propounded to them by the State of New Hampshire (Attorney General) ("NHAG").
| |
| 8301180230 830113 PDR ADOCK 05000443 C PDR
| |
| | |
| Interrogatory No. NH 9.41 NH 9.41 With regard to the answer to Interrogatory 9.23 relating to the plant ventilating system, the Applicant indicated "In some cases, these dampers are also provided with limit switches which, in conjunction with other instrumentation, will annunciate a system failure." Identify each of the "some cases" referred to which are designed with instrumentation to annunciate a system failure. Also, please identify the "other instrumentation" and explain how a system failure will be annunciated in each case.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| All tornado dampers shall be equipped with position switches. Damper position status will be transmitted to the nuclear plant computer for logging. No audio alarms or lights are associated with these dampers.
| |
| 1 (This information supersedes the information provided in Interrogatory No. NH - 10.18 relative to tornado dampers.) The following is a tabulation of safety related dampers which function to prevent reversed air flow. The table identifies each damper, describes damper type, and the type and location of position l l
| |
| indication and alarm, if any, and associated 1 instrumentation such as instrumentation or limited )
| |
| instrumentation on related fans. If no instrumentation l l
| |
| 2 1
| |
| | |
| is provided on a particular damper, the note section provides the specific reasons.
| |
| I Damper ID Type Position Indication / Alarm Note CAH-DP-312 to 317 Backdraft Position lights on MCB-
| |
| & CP-108 CBA-DP-21A,B Position Position lights on MCC 2 CBA-DP-27A,B Position Position lights on MCB CBA-DP-53A,B Control Position lights on MCB CBA-DP-56 Backdraft -None- 1 CBA-DP-57A,B Backdraft -None- 2 CBA-DP-58 Backdraft -None- 1 CBA-DP-59A,B Backdraft -None- 3 CBA-DP-310A,B Backdraft Low flow to main plant computer with alarm in conjunction vith "S" signal or air intake isolation EAH-DP-3A,B Backdraft Position lights on MCB &
| |
| CP-108, fan alarm Hi/Loe flow EAH-DP-25A,B Backdraft Position lights on MCB EAH-DP-30A, B Control Position lights on MCB, Status monitoring lights on damper
| |
| & fan EAH-DP-12A,B Control Position lights on MCB, low flow alarm on fan EAH-DP-10A,B Control Position lights on CP-23 in the main control room SWA-DP-45A,B Backdraft -None- 4 SWA-DP-60A,B Relief -None- 5 SWA-DP-63A,B Backdraft -None- 6 SWA-DP-64A,B Backdraft -None- 2 SWA-DP-67 Backdraft -None- 4 SWA-DP-68 Backdraft -None- 4 Notes:
| |
| 1 Damper isolates only the fan, not the system.
| |
| Air exhaust can be accomplished through exfiltration in case of damper failure.
| |
| i
| |
| | |
| , (*
| |
| : 2. Damper discharges to the atmosphere; failure cannot significantly affect overall system performance. Redundant damper available.
| |
| : 3. Flow path provides bypass capability only.
| |
| Hydrogen control capability not significantly affected if damper fails.
| |
| : 4. Exhaust fans have common intake plenum. A single failure will not significantly affect system performance.
| |
| : 5. Area pressurized by fans to keep out dust.
| |
| Damper failure would not increase dust level to significantly affect system operability.
| |
| : 6. In the event of failure the opposite train can provide ventilation.
| |
| Interrogatory No. NH 9.42 NH 9.42 With regard to the previous Interrogatory, explain the criteria used to select which " cases" (or dampers) would be designed with limit switches such that a system failure would be annunciated. What differentiates these selected cases frem other dampers which are not equipped with limit switches.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| In general only safety related dampers, whose failure can significantly affect system performance, are provided with instrumentation for position indications and/or alarms. The design is based on single active failure, so that if redundant flow paths are available instrumentation would not be provided. Also, if damper failure cannot significantly affect system operability on a short- term basis, i.e., more than a few days, instrumentation may not be provided.
| |
| This type of evaluation for ventilation systems design is based on engineer's judgment and standard engineering practices.
| |
| Interrogatory No. 9.45 (NH 9) 9.45 (NH 9)
| |
| Please resolve the discrepancies between plant and detector numbers mentioned in the Applicant's response to Interrogatory NH 9.12, and those listed in FSAR Table 12.3-13.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The only difference between our response to ,
| |
| interrogatory NH 9.12 and FSAR Table 12.3-14 is that the Plant Vent Monitors have beenredesigned and now 1
| |
| have the designations given in the response. The instruments with the tags RM-RE-6533-A-1, B-1, A-2, B-2, A-3, B-3, A-4 and B-4 have been deleted.
| |
| Interrogatory No. NH 13.4 NH 13.4 Describe in detail how and to what extent each phase of the control room operator training program provides or will provide for the following aspects of emergency response training:
| |
| (a) recognition of emergency conditions; 1
| |
| | |
| (b) classification of observed emergency conditions in accordance with the emergency classification system; (c) notification of emergency to off-site authorities; (d) recommendation of protective actions to off-site authorities; and (e) direction of station staff to take protective actions.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Emergency response training for Seabrook's control room operators is addressed in two areas of the station training program; operator license training and emergency response training.
| |
| Each operator who is licensed *by the Nuclear Regulatory Commissior. to operate Seabrook's nuclear reactors will have successfully comnleted the Seabrook operator license training program. The details of this program are presented in FSAR Section 13.2 i
| |
| Recognition of emergency conditions and corrective actions to mitigate the consequence of such conditions are specific objectives of both the classroom lecture series and simulator exercise training. Demonstration of proficiency in identification and proper response to a variety of emergency conditions is a program requirement for eligibility to be licensed by the NRC.
| |
| f
| |
| ,y.._.. ... y -
| |
| | |
| Classification of observed emergency conditions, notification of an emergency to off-site authorities, recommendation of protective actions to off-site authorities and direction of station staff to take protective actions are responsibilities delegated to senior shift management and station management personnel. General Physics Corporation, an experienced nuclear services consultant, has been contracted to develop Seabrook's emergency plan implementation procedures. As part of this contract, General Physics Corp. will develop the emergency response training instructional modules which will be used to train the station staff. Detailed development of the program and materials will be completed in late 1983 for a start of training in January, 1984.
| |
| Interrogatory No. SAPL Supp. 3.15 SAPL Supp. 3.15 Why was General Electric user group data used for the review of the Control Room Design Review? Are data from PWR users available?
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Those persons developing the survey portion of the Control Room Design Review used the checklist developed.
| |
| by the GE Owner's Group as a starting point for the 1
| |
| 4 i
| |
| development of their own checklist. Checklists of this j
| |
| type are available from many sources. We know of no
| |
| , checklist which has been developed by PWR Owner's j Groups. ,
| |
| i i
| |
| 1 4
| |
| 4 1
| |
| 1 1
| |
| 4 1
| |
| 1 l
| |
| (
| |
| i
| |
| | |
| Signatures As to Answers:
| |
| I, Wendell P. Johnson, being first duly sworn, do depose and say that the foregoing answers are true, expect insofar as they are based on information that is available to the Applicants but not within my personal knowledge, as to which I, based on such information, believe them to be true.
| |
| /
| |
| 0 o n
| |
| i,lN GJ jcfflk' r '
| |
| t
| |
| ) AYQl.
| |
| Wendell P. Jo nson Sworn to before me this day of January, 1983: ,
| |
| ' f.. y g' . ft '
| |
| 20A0 Notary g eAk !$'i ,.~ ''k ((
| |
| . tu -
| |
| My Comm ssion exp es: ocu E /9?? . , ,s : -
| |
| x j
| |
| . )'
| |
| l
| |
| .* , as ,
| |
| l
| |
| 'i Y d As to Objections: -
| |
| ~~ lu :
| |
| h;:,u. -f
| |
| \ c ll( ( /f &
| |
| Thomas G. pignan, Jr.
| |
| R. K. Gad III Ropes & Gray 225 Franklin Street Boston, Massachusetts 02110 Telephone: 423-6100
| |
| _9
| |
| | |
| CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE IS I, Robert K. Gad III, one of the attorneys for t Applicants herein, hereby certify that on January M, 1983 I made service of the within " Applicants' Second Answers to
| |
| 'The State of New Hampshire's Second Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents to Public Service Company of New Hampshire, Inc.'" by mailing copies thereof, postage prepaid, to:
| |
| Helen Hoyt, Chairperson Rep. Beverly Hollingworth Atomic Safety and Licensing Coastal Chamber of Commerce Board Panel 209 Winnacunnet Road U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Hampton, NH 03842 Washington, DC 20555 Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke William S. Jordan, III, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Harmon & Weiss Board Panel 1725 I Street, N.W.
| |
| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 506 Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20006 Dr. Jerry Harbour E. Tupper Kinder, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Assistant Attorney General Board Panel Office of the Attorney General U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commisrion 208 State House Annex Washington, DC 20555 Concord, NH 03301 Atomic Safety and Licensing Roy P. Lessy, Jr., Esquire Board Panel Office of the Executive Legal U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Director Washington, DC 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Robert A. Backus, Esquire Board Panel 116 Lowell Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 516 l
| |
| Washington, DC 20555 Manchester, NH 03105 I
| |
| p
| |
| | |
| Philip Ahrens, Esquire Edward J. McDermott, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Sanders and McDermott Department of the Attorney Professional Association General 408 Lafayette Road Au gu sta , ME 04333 Hampton, NH 03842 David L. Lewis Jo Ann Shotwell, Esquire Atomic Safety'and Licensing Assistant Attorney General Board Panel Environmental Protection Bureau U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Department of the Attorney General Rm. E/W-439 One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Washington, DC 20555 Boston, MA 02108 Mr. John B. Tanzer Ms. Olive L. Tash 5 Morningside Drive R.F.D. 1, Dalton Road Hampton, NH 03842 Brentwood, NH 03833 State Representative Edward F. Meany Roberta C. Pevear 155 Washington Road Drinkwatcr Road Rye, NH 03870 Hampton Falls, NH 03844
| |
| / .
| |
| 7 k . v -Q Robert K. Gad III l
| |
| -}}
| |
