ML060690151

Memo from L. Rubenstein, NRR, to W. Johnston, NRR, Safety Evaluation Report Input for Section 9.5.1 - Fire Protection Concerning Safe Shutdown Capability and Alternative Shutdown Capability

ML060690151
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek, Callaway
Issue date:	05/09/1983
From:	Rubenstein L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Johnston W Division of Engineering
References
FOIA/PA-2006-0095 NUDOCS 8305180009
Download: ML060690151 (9)

Text

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, Docket Nos: 50-482/483 LRubenstein MAY O:0 i " ,,, k MEMORAfDUH:FOR: William V.' John:tont Assistant Director for Materials, Chemical 1nd Envirorrital1 Technology, Division of Engineering FROMt:

i  :: Lo S. Rubsnsta,: isistant Director'for Core and Plant

.- Systm Divis10 of Systems Intgraton

SUBJECT:

SAFETY EVALUATION RORTINPUT FOR SECTION 9.5.1 - FIRE PROTECTION CORWNING,SAFE SHUTDON CAPADILITY MD

-ALTERNATIVESHUTDOWN CAPABILITY - SNUPPS (CALUAWAY AND tWOLF CEK)

Enclosed Is the Auxiliary Syst isragh's valuation if the SNUPPS Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Capability and Alternativ' Shutdown Capability.

The systems nseded for shutdown were evaluated,' aganst Sections 2lI.G and

,III.L of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part S0.. We conclude that the systems identi-fled tor shutdown and th methodology applied by the applicants to identify plant areas of noncompliance with Section 111.G.2 arelacceptable. We further conclude that the design of the reote shutdown sy tam meets the requirements oA Section of Appndix pp1.e R. 'n b Chemical Euigineoring Branch should review the dequacy of the barriers outside containoent Identified by the applicant and the combustibles inside contaltient to assure the adequacy of separation withfi1n the containment.  ;;Ad(F\ ^ ii'ltil' zi\

L S RubensteingAssistant Director I,` for Core and Plant System

!IM~ion Of Systemn Integration

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/enclosure:

R. Mattson 0. Edison D. Elsenhut J. Holonich

' T. Novak 0. Parr 4 P. Triplett V.s j1n ey8

/ R. Capra R. Forguson

. B. J. Youngblood W. LeFave 8

Contact:

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Z.V i3s l(>i*t APPENDX"R SECTION

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'jNiI i . i. > .8irtSr S £11. AND '.I.L.

P NSL' IS"AO SNUPPS ,UCLEARIPLANT,:'CALLAVAY VI~

AND VOLF CREEK)

AUXSLSAII'Y SStES RANCH',

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Our review of the' SNUPPI I fire protection of sale shutdown cap-It.

ability included the

,~ lIst -of equipment and i

. . - . components identi-lied in Section 3.IICS)' . . . .). }' i of th'sSNUPPS Finat Report (tfSAR) as being Safety Analysis nocessaryfor hot

• and/or cold Shutdowni the safe cotd shutdown analysis in FSAR Section j remote shutdown capabitlity S.4A, the described in FSAR I cable separation discussed Section 7 4o the in tSAR Section 34 hazards analysis and and the fire design comparison with Appendix R in Section 9.5. VI also FSAR reviewed the control j ' analysis submitted by letter dated November room fire hazards 15v 1982.

, The applicant's safe shutclown analysis and fire hazards anatys Is demonstrated that redundancy exists for, Systems needed and cold shutdown. for hot The saft shutdown analysis included ponents. cabling and con-support equipment needed to achieve hot and cold shutdown.

Thuso In tho event of a fire anywhere planto at least one in t he train of systems would

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be available to ail 1A 1315W ~wnUW III 6 a AII1 L AA as D&AdA

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Ioi -SUtdow f .t

, g Forndpo h rt5hutdO W l ea ofrthe fo d l t ongsafe shuth I k ,5;20rte ane., helc dupa reactor cooLant and.1i sacontro~ e dSystm.. For cold I rSI if bi'. nd ra Caabiit t i a $, ngtrMIS iW,::d

& ,*~ r 0dw,Syish; pp~ates

• ~~ . 1 1, ' -J be used fo r oO Would bWrd Iviable:;.

M n 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> aft er aleostaedvtatr fIr e. The XCAFpt aVattablLty 'of thes lfl~Sd stone IncI'tod the COMPonentu, cabL ing Aaenctudes~h Id is,J gevneratorsp emergency

~ ~issa'~'~lec y V ntf ati rl~l~t ., 'is t th o oo ing Water systonp and the

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ems WOUIeog becfirs, itPPtilcant's avaftb' edw hazalrds lanalysis sl1nvvsn

'demonstrated 1:

that except SS - - '

'for'Inside cantainmeont and ,

-SYStem1s and cneehodtd. inside the controL room, fogfe 'shutdown are redundant 11~.

' ' '.1 ' ' cabling .

separated In acordance.4ith, I2l.O.2. b, or, c of Appendix R.

j ~ For the cont tr'fl~teapiathas8 shultdr'om, thebpplican Provided alternate hudncpbity ~Outslfdo t.w II room In accordance w it h

~X g o Apnl IrZs ide th e,COnt ain ment there Is at L eta st 12fetbtenredundant Wae IShutdoawn dlvistons or bet ween djIverst systems such; as the letdown flotation valvts and the 1~

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power operated retief and blockvalves.,

.Thus, the requirements of IIX.G.2.d are net for separation inside containment.

The applicant performed an etec'tricat train separation study order to ensure that in at tea'st one train of the above equipment avaitable tn the is event of a tiro in areas which might these components. affect Safeshutdown equipment and'cabling.was identified and traced through each fire

~* area irou'the components to the power source. -V Additional equipment and cabLing considered as associated either because of itshared common power source common encLosure or or whose fir' induced spurious operation affect shutdown were couLd atso identified.

Extensive use of program checks were computer used to ensure separation. I..

raceway is identified Each circuit and in the computer programi and the identi-fication includes the appLicable separation group. The program is used to check that cables oat- particular separation group are routed through the appropriato raceways.

We have reviewed the applicant's method of determining that separation crite' the a of Appendix A are mJt and have reviewed

• ssociated circuits the identified by the applicant and the necessary or modifications actions made to prevent spurious that would affect operation safe ptant shutdown.

Bosed on our review we 0 .

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' conctude that 'the api i iaot hasi'*dequately Addreised the effects

of .thenecessry

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't1i'd and tht*

ev a nd n t"d v i c4l 8i'rut'soi~ adequa'te to'snsui

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£ that 'such

. '-s+ ' Nsv conclude 'that the applicant a athodology fdor veretyint that

.Separation is,*4 in oc~ordanc* . !',

withAppendix RF1

' 'l It fn SSS.G.2 is., therefore.

She applicantt .4d ; s nrc it sindtcrtiod that the onlysare outside contadnven t y nwdere redundant davire ansds not suparated barriers in accordance by with St:.4*2 is the control room.

Alternute shutdownracti  ;  ;

s wlnt perevrequired for u the

.. I An order to assure ontrol root the availability of the safe shutdown Sn the event that systens.

a fire dcsables tho o ontrot roov the shurtdown panel associted rfyote with trapn equipment t Located in a separate fire area of the aux111^zy bultdi~ng provides an otter-native to fire protection separatilon vitoln thi'control room.

The control functionalyis indicatdhons protdtedntatb shutdown pmnet outxoie are rtectrnantdivisoitondaor otherwse separate andrrndependont thewron eontrol roon Atfor to rection V.C of thns SER tor surther dasausbion of lternatave shutdown capsstmsty.

n sed on tht abovet the dysteas tdentcoted for rchievnt shtdnng spae r nete n-ehutdown ln the event oft fre o oers cceptrate nd I. ... .. .... . , . 4.,

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the methodotogy used to 4 - '. ' ,

assure -adoquato. protection ' ,

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safe shutonsstm of sinacrace Wiih ,Section 11ZS.Gof Appendix R and thlrefoue'ii acceptable.

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-Cs' sbitity`

V.C 'Alternative Shutdown Capab t ,

Section 7.4'of the SNUPPS.FSAR describes the remote down panels' capabIlity.

4 ., 4 ,; . .

• 4 , 4 shut-Section SA ot theF$SAR and thet

-control roo fire'hazoard' i

nsLysisrdsted Novexber

. w, i 1S, 1982i describe remote 4. i!

shutdown capability for equipment not on the remote shutdown panel. The design objective the'remote'shutdown I  ;

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of systema,'or the purposes

~~. of this evalu-ation isto achieve , , 4. *.

and'maintaln cold shutdown in the event ofa fire In the control rooa. The train' remote shutdown panet wilt b tlhe primary alternative shutdown panel since the necessary instruments and controls on this panel are isolated or isolable trom the control room.

The turbine driven ANU pumpotrain O motor driven AfU punpf associated ANf cont-il^,lthe jtxosphereic'dunp valves for steam generators lind 0, the group 0 pressuri-

er backup heaters, andithe train S letdown Isolotion valve can be controlled at the train 0 alternate shutdown panel for maintaining hot standby. 'Separate isotrtion o j i

2 4 4 44,

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'swlthts rov1Jd tao'cs L-.stat

..,, 1ons'"foricontrct ot

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,..?,j lystems ,nd'ioclp shu~tdown

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supportr;!

syst~ems w1,l L b,"'se **.**.

unction with '-0procedurst in co Approach -using pre-ptanned oprto ttn '

o na ints in *)t;,,standby, and to achieve and maintain cold shutdown,'w'ithln , ,4 *-. , , .

n4o 72 'houirs.  ;

t h ih ktrI- . j 'I

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Tho desig f h riiotoeshut Own'ryst*

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.the performance goais' - ,

' 4 outtin'sd_ n'Section SIS.L Appendix R. Romct'vJty-~controlrisaccomplished ot K 4,~

scram before the optrator 4,, l . 4 ,'

by asnual ltvoi the contrat

-'4. . room and boron addition via . . 4  ! .:i * ' * , .....

the chemica1 *nd votunecontrol ,

system using the refueltng,'water , 41, ,', ,j j! l I, storage tank CRWST) the charoind 4 , .11,

• and nTheudeingn ofacthr pudps. The reactorncootant ,

sra~moe shua 4'~ 4 ow onkeuprlunctionr is ayso'perforted byhtdh

• systemp complifes wiOthl the penrfo rmance goats chserngmpulps and u ST.ed .4 .

o'lAntinventory i sassured tout~l'ne bnestireonvZ!Z. I Reactor hof hu-bpromantinhing reactor coopant pucp seit tooLing,andlstannjectaond scram eore thdtospherato lsotlting sll leave thie.contro t*andchby roo an boo adito vi possibte h pathsot,o,41nvontor;y hmcl'n oueoto Lost such as PORasn

yte usn RHR suction th reuln hultonq'wiormth ae 7nd traetn'CV excss tdown its and the reactor n vesseL head vents, l~ll these operations 14*

down is cccotploshed by the AN systom tbrough the'bstyan a, D lq

ell, .~ -.. 4

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-removalto'cold shutdownis achieved by the'residuaL

' renoval

' soThejtowing'nstruments heat on the Alter-nat shutdown, panel uill be used to *onitor process

!Pressurizer Level

" R Reactr' coolant system pressure (wide range)

Steam generator Level (widi range)

I ANW A.iX fltow.

livI Rector coolant cold log temperature CTO)

Reactor, coolant hot leg temperature CT Source range nuclear )

H instrument The above.instrunentation wilt all be isolated control room on the from the

,train 3'alternate shutdown panel.

Isolated valve position indication for the Letdown isolation' AFM system.-

alve#,and the atmospheric are also located on dump valves the train B panel. t We have reviewed Actions"required by the procedures achieving and maintaining for saft plant shutdown fire. For hot standby following a the -immediate actions precautionary oessureosto are mainly atisure no spurious occur due to the control operations ProCIN fire. tome operations require cutting al'ontrol power cable at tOe equipment V

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-t ; ',' ,o ensuri It

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h i'ful'qn'.thcf 4

.,t.f .  ;. c'ontrot' rCl* oil' not prevent'

• t' ' crainI., equipmnnt t ;w\Sr 4,44,, i 1# fitS@'4,  ; 'S' jt: ';c i ' s,,

!~ '£c atirtln itonii may ' be I.s.:s:':,,,

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.4' or the fuel'oW, tranrsf

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qurd or, pumplo, fuo V pO cooln

,, <, and some ventilation-damper':that syte i i,;,necessary are not immediately for. or ~dotrilnlntr'l to Maintaining Iw hot~ standby

'conditionI."-These 1.

4 ctions wittbe .

doscribed inthe pro-achieving and 'c4durese.S*For, mantaning cold 1

loc ct operation of RHi.i thoeton trlvelp Lotdownovatees and qertain CCp oystetion *vSucy btrequired and be In the cold shutdotwn procdurpsu We havo the proposedactilons revie ted nd mnpower rre enmentoi nd con-ct nue they fr in accordance withmitai4 n nd tta.L.5 to Appendix R sinceh'they icon beo ccobplescbd I

I exlunive of 4

fire brige

• enbors rnd 4ar tr4igtforward &nd cated uncompti-such toat cohd shutdown cant be chleved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> r'e Based on aur rvyiews we eoncluds that the q ltuedntive shutdown colda hutdo orrthe control rae herts the i equere-psonts od AppRndix th Sectnbn acomLi snd cs therieore acetptabLee 4.

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