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| number = ML12264A320
| number = ML12264A320
| issue date = 10/11/2012
| issue date = 10/11/2012
| title = South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 - Meeting Handout for 10/11/12 Pre-licensing Meeting License Amendment Request to Revise the Fire Protection Program (TAC Nos. ME9182 and ME9183)
| title = Meeting Handout for 10/11/12 Pre-licensing Meeting License Amendment Request to Revise the Fire Protection Program
| author name = Taplett K
| author name = Taplett K
| author affiliation = South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Co
| author affiliation = South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Co
| addressee name = Singal B K
| addressee name = Singal B
| addressee affiliation = NRC/NRR/DORL/LPLIV
| addressee affiliation = NRC/NRR/DORL/LPLIV
| docket = 05000498, 05000499
| docket = 05000498, 05000499
| license number = NPF-076, NPF-080
| license number = NPF-076, NPF-080
| contact person = Singal B K
| contact person = Singal B
| case reference number = TAC ME9182, TAC ME9183
| case reference number = TAC ME9182, TAC ME9183
| document type = Meeting Briefing Package/Handouts, Slides and Viewgraphs
| document type = Meeting Briefing Package/Handouts, Slides and Viewgraphs
Line 18: Line 18:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:Pre-licensing Meeting for License AmendmentRequesttoRevise Amendment Request to Revise the Fire Protection Program at the South Texas ProjectOctober11,2012 October 11, 2012 1 Agenda Agenda*Introductions*PurposeBkd*B ac k groun d*Fire Protection Program Change
{{#Wiki_filter:Pre-licensing Meeting for License Amendment Request to Revise the Fire Protection Program at the South Texas Project October 11, 2012 1
*BasesofChange
 
*Bases of Change*Additional Information to be Developed
Agenda
*Summar y y*Questions 2
* Introductions
SouthTexasProject(STP)Representatives South Texas Project (STP) Representatives*Mike Murray -Manager, Regulatory Affairs
* Purpose
*KenTaplett
* B k Background d
-LicensingEngineer Ken Taplett Licensing Engineer*Frank Cox -Fire Safe Shutdown Engineer
* Fire Protection Program Change
*Charles Albur y -Thermal-H y draulic Anal y sis Su p erviso r yyyp*Donald Rohan -Operations Procedure Writer -Responsible for plant off-normal procedures in response to fire
* Bases of Change
-PreviouslylicensedasaSeniorReactorOperator 3 Previously licensed as a Senior Reactor Operator Purpose PurposeDescribe the STP Nuclear O p eratin g Com p an y p ro p osal pgpyppto revise the South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2, Fire Protection Program 4  
* Additional Information to be Developed
* Summaryy
* Questions 2
 
South Texas Project (STP) Representatives
* Mike Murray - Manager, Regulatory Affairs
* Ken Taplett - Licensing Engineer
* Frank Cox - Fire Safe Shutdown Engineer
* Charles Alburyy - Thermal-Hydraulic    y           Analysis y       Supervisor p
* Donald Rohan - Operations Procedure Writer
  - Responsible for plant off-normal procedures in response to fire
  - Previously licensed as a Senior Reactor Operator 3
 
Purpose Describe the STP Nuclear Operating p       g Company p yp proposal p
to revise the South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2, Fire Protection Program 4


===Background===
===Background===
Background*The change involves revising the STP Licensing Basis ftithlttihtdbilit f or mee ti ng th e a lt erna tive s h u td own capa bilit y.*STP is required by their licensing basis to meet the itf10CFR50AdiRStiIIIL requ i remen t s o f 10 CFR 50 , A ppen di x R , S ec ti on III.L , Alternative and dedicated shutdown capability.STPiscurrentlyrelyingoncompensatorymeasuresto
* The change involves revising the STP Licensing Basis f meeting for    ti the th alternative lt   ti shutdown h td     capability.
*STP is currently relying on compensatory measures to meet their licensing basis.  
bilit
*STPrecentlywithdrewalicenseamendmentrequest
* STP is required by their licensing basis to meet the requirements i     t off 10 CFR 50 50, A Appendix di RR, S Section ti III III.L, L
*STP recently withdrew a license amendment request because insufficient information was provided to the NRC staff to approve the amendment request.
Alternative and dedicated shutdown capability.
5 FireProtectionProgramChange Fire Protection Program Change*In order to meet the regulatory requirements of Appendix R, Section III.L, the proposed amendment request:-Credits the performance of operator actions in the control room, in addition to tripping the reactor, prior to evacuation due to a fire fire-Credit the automatic trip of the main turbine in response to a reactortrip reactor trip.6 BasesofChange Bases of Change*Regulatory Guide 1.189, Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants, usuallycreditsareactortrippriortocontrolroomevacuation usually credits a reactor trip prior to control room evacuation
* STP is currently relying on compensatory measures to meet their licensing basis.
.In order to credit additional control room actions:Thlitdttthtibfd
* STP recently withdrew a license amendment request because insufficient information was provided to the NRC staff to approve the amendment request.
-Th e li censee mus t d emons t ra t e th e ac ti ons can b e per f orme d-The licensee should ensure that such actions cannot be negated by subsequent spurious actuation signals resulting from the postulated fire.-The licensee should consider one spurious actuation to occur before tlfthltihidthhthlttidditd con t ro l o f th e p l an t i s ac hi eve d th roug h th e a lt erna ti ve or d e di ca t e d shutdown system. *Both (1) the loss of offsite power and (2) maintainin g offsite p ower ()p()gpscenarios should be considered.*Automatic functions of circuits in the control room fire should not be creditedifthefunctionwouldmitigatetheconsequences 7 credited if the function would mitigate the consequences
5
.
 
BasesforChange(continued)
Fire Protection Program Change
Bases for Change (continued)*The feasibility and reliability of the additional operator actions have been demonstrated.*A single spurious actuation analysis demonstrates that no single spurious actuation could negate a control room actioninmannerthatAppendixR,SectionIII.L action in manner that Appendix R, Section III.L requirements are not met.
* In order to meet the regulatory requirements of Appendix R, Section III.L, the proposed amendment request:
*Theautomaticturbinetripanalysisprovidesreasonable
  - Credits the performance of operator actions in the control room, in addition to tripping the reactor, prior to evacuation due to a fire.
*The automatic turbine trip analysis provides reasonable assurance that the turbine will trip when actuated by a reactor trip and would not subsequently be negated by a fireinducecircuitfailure 8 fire-induce circuit failure.
fire
BasesforChange(continued)
  - Credit the automatic trip of the main turbine in response to a reactor trip trip.
Bases for Change (continued)*Defense-in-De p th Anal y sis addresses the py following:
6
-FirePreventionMeasures Fire Prevention Measures-Capability to detect, control and extinguish fires-Protection of structures, systems and components so thatfireswillnotpreventsafeshutdown that fires will not prevent safe shutdown-Safety margin analyses*Analysis for those actions with small time margins shows the plantcanachievesafeshutdownconditionswhen plant can achieve safe shutdown conditions when considering instrument uncertainties.*Analysis to justify plant safe shutdown is achievable in event all the requested actions are not completed.
 
9 Additional InformationtbDld t o b e D eve l ope dAddress the following scenario:
Bases of Change
-S p urious actuation of p ressurizer p owe r-o p erated relief valve ppp p (PORV), and
* Regulatory Guide 1.189, Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants, usually credits a reactor trip prior to control room evacuation evacuation.
-Pressurizer PORV block valve cannot be closed due to fire-induced circuit failure, and
In order to credit additional control room actions:
-No actions credited in the c ontrol room other than manual reactor trip and automatic turbine trip, and  
  - Th The licensee li         mustt d demonstrate t t th the actions ti   can bbe performed f     d
-Loss of offsite p ower. 10 p Additional InformationtbDld t o b e D eve l ope d*Scenario will address the following:-Ability to maintain and/or restore natural circulation-Impact on sub-cooling marginItflitit-I mpac t on f ue l i n t egr it y 11 AddiilIfi Addi t i ona l I n f ormat i on to be DevelopedAddthittltll
  - The licensee should ensure that such actions cannot be negated by subsequent spurious actuation signals resulting from the postulated fire.
*Add ress th e i mpac t on reac t or vesse l wa t er l eve l for a spuriously opened steam generator PORV.*Address the impact of a control room fire on the initiationofsafetyinjection.
  - The licensee should consider one spurious actuation to occur before control t l off the th plant l t is i achieved hi   d th through h ththe alternative lt   ti or ddedicated di t d shutdown system.
initiation of safety injection.
* Both ((1)) the loss of offsite power p      and ((2)) maintaining g offsite p power scenarios should be considered.
12 Summary Summary*License Amendment Request will be resubmitted Requestapprovalofsameoperatoractionsandautomatic
* Automatic functions of circuits in the control room fire should not be credited if the function would mitigate the consequences consequences.
-Request approval of same operator actions and automatic turbine trip as the previously withdrawn request.-Bases for approval are the actions can be performed and that theactions cannot be negated by subsequent spurious actuation signals resulting from the postulated fire.-Automatic turbine trip relies on success of reactor trip.-Sufficient defense-in-depth/safety margin exists to demonstrate safe shutdown conditions can be achieved based on analyses previously performed and additional information to be developed.
7
13 Questions?
 
Bases for Change (continued)
* The feasibility and reliability of the additional operator actions have been demonstrated.
* A single spurious actuation analysis demonstrates that no single spurious actuation could negate a control room action in manner that Appendix R, Section III.L requirements are not met.
* The automatic turbine trip analysis provides reasonable assurance that the turbine will trip when actuated by a reactor trip and would not subsequently be negated by a fire induce circuit failure fire-induce         failure.
8
 
Bases for Change (continued)
* Defense-in-Depth    p Analysis  y     addresses the following:
  - Fire Prevention Measures
  - Capability to detect, control and extinguish fires
  - Protection of structures, systems and components so that fires will not prevent safe shutdown
  - Safety margin analyses
* Analysis for those actions with small time margins shows the plant can achieve safe shutdown conditions when considering instrument uncertainties.
* Analysis to justify plant safe shutdown is achievable in event all the requested actions are not completed.
9
 
Additional Information t be to    b Developed D         l     d Address the following scenario:
- Spurious p       actuation of ppressurizer p power-operated p       relief valve (PORV), and
- Pressurizer PORV block valve cannot be closed due to fire-induced circuit failure, and
- No actions credited in the control room other than manual reactor trip and automatic turbine trip, and
- Loss of offsite p power.
10
 
Additional Information t be to  b Developed D       l     d
* Scenario will address the following:
  - Ability to maintain and/or restore natural circulation
  - Impact on sub-cooling margin
  - Impact I     t on fuel f l integrity i t it 11
 
Additional Addi   i     l IInformation f     i to be Developed
* Add Address th the iimpactt on reactor t vessell water t llevell for a spuriously opened steam generator PORV.
* Address the impact of a control room fire on the initiation of safety injection.
12
 
Summary
* License Amendment Request will be resubmitted
  - Request approval of same operator actions and automatic turbine trip as the previously withdrawn request.
  - Bases for approval are the actions can be performed and that the actions cannot be negated by subsequent spurious actuation signals resulting from the postulated fire.
  - Automatic turbine trip relies on success of reactor trip.
  - Sufficient defense-in-depth/safety margin exists to demonstrate safe shutdown conditions can be achieved based on analyses previously performed and additional information to be developed.
13
 
Questions?
Questions?
14}}
14}}

Latest revision as of 13:33, 20 March 2020

Meeting Handout for 10/11/12 Pre-licensing Meeting License Amendment Request to Revise the Fire Protection Program
ML12264A320
Person / Time
Site: South Texas  STP Nuclear Operating Company icon.png
Issue date: 10/11/2012
From: Taplett K
South Texas
To: Balwant Singal
Plant Licensing Branch IV
Singal B
References
TAC ME9182, TAC ME9183
Download: ML12264A320 (14)


Text

Pre-licensing Meeting for License Amendment Request to Revise the Fire Protection Program at the South Texas Project October 11, 2012 1

Agenda

  • Introductions
  • Purpose
  • B k Background d
  • Bases of Change
  • Additional Information to be Developed
  • Summaryy
  • Questions 2

South Texas Project (STP) Representatives

  • Mike Murray - Manager, Regulatory Affairs
  • Ken Taplett - Licensing Engineer
  • Charles Alburyy - Thermal-Hydraulic y Analysis y Supervisor p
  • Donald Rohan - Operations Procedure Writer

- Responsible for plant off-normal procedures in response to fire

- Previously licensed as a Senior Reactor Operator 3

Purpose Describe the STP Nuclear Operating p g Company p yp proposal p

to revise the South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2, Fire Protection Program 4

Background

  • The change involves revising the STP Licensing Basis f meeting for ti the th alternative lt ti shutdown h td capability.

bilit

  • STP is required by their licensing basis to meet the requirements i t off 10 CFR 50 50, A Appendix di RR, S Section ti III III.L, L

Alternative and dedicated shutdown capability.

  • STP is currently relying on compensatory measures to meet their licensing basis.
  • STP recently withdrew a license amendment request because insufficient information was provided to the NRC staff to approve the amendment request.

5

Fire Protection Program Change

  • In order to meet the regulatory requirements of Appendix R,Section III.L, the proposed amendment request:

- Credits the performance of operator actions in the control room, in addition to tripping the reactor, prior to evacuation due to a fire.

fire

- Credit the automatic trip of the main turbine in response to a reactor trip trip.

6

Bases of Change

In order to credit additional control room actions:

- Th The licensee li mustt d demonstrate t t th the actions ti can bbe performed f d

- The licensee should ensure that such actions cannot be negated by subsequent spurious actuation signals resulting from the postulated fire.

- The licensee should consider one spurious actuation to occur before control t l off the th plant l t is i achieved hi d th through h ththe alternative lt ti or ddedicated di t d shutdown system.

  • Both ((1)) the loss of offsite power p and ((2)) maintaining g offsite p power scenarios should be considered.
  • Automatic functions of circuits in the control room fire should not be credited if the function would mitigate the consequences consequences.

7

Bases for Change (continued)

  • The feasibility and reliability of the additional operator actions have been demonstrated.
  • A single spurious actuation analysis demonstrates that no single spurious actuation could negate a control room action in manner that Appendix R,Section III.L requirements are not met.
  • The automatic turbine trip analysis provides reasonable assurance that the turbine will trip when actuated by a reactor trip and would not subsequently be negated by a fire induce circuit failure fire-induce failure.

8

Bases for Change (continued)

  • Defense-in-Depth p Analysis y addresses the following:

- Fire Prevention Measures

- Capability to detect, control and extinguish fires

- Protection of structures, systems and components so that fires will not prevent safe shutdown

- Safety margin analyses

  • Analysis for those actions with small time margins shows the plant can achieve safe shutdown conditions when considering instrument uncertainties.
  • Analysis to justify plant safe shutdown is achievable in event all the requested actions are not completed.

9

Additional Information t be to b Developed D l d Address the following scenario:

- Spurious p actuation of ppressurizer p power-operated p relief valve (PORV), and

- Pressurizer PORV block valve cannot be closed due to fire-induced circuit failure, and

- No actions credited in the control room other than manual reactor trip and automatic turbine trip, and

- Loss of offsite p power.

10

Additional Information t be to b Developed D l d

  • Scenario will address the following:

- Ability to maintain and/or restore natural circulation

- Impact on sub-cooling margin

- Impact I t on fuel f l integrity i t it 11

Additional Addi i l IInformation f i to be Developed

  • Add Address th the iimpactt on reactor t vessell water t llevell for a spuriously opened steam generator PORV.
  • Address the impact of a control room fire on the initiation of safety injection.

12

Summary

  • License Amendment Request will be resubmitted

- Request approval of same operator actions and automatic turbine trip as the previously withdrawn request.

- Bases for approval are the actions can be performed and that the actions cannot be negated by subsequent spurious actuation signals resulting from the postulated fire.

- Automatic turbine trip relies on success of reactor trip.

- Sufficient defense-in-depth/safety margin exists to demonstrate safe shutdown conditions can be achieved based on analyses previously performed and additional information to be developed.

13

Questions?

14