IR 05000440/2004003: Difference between revisions

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{{IR-Nav| site = 05000440 | year = 2004 | report number = 003 | url = https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight/reports/perr_2004003.pdf }}
{{Adams
| number = ML040230321
| issue date = 01/23/2004
| title = Re Final Significance Determination for a White Finding and Notice of Violation (NRC Inspection Report No. 05000440-04-03)
| author name = Caldwell J
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-III
| addressee name = Kanda W
| addressee affiliation = FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
| docket = 05000440
| license number = NPF-058
| contact person =
| case reference number = EA-03-194, IR-03-006, IR-04-003
| package number = ML040290319
| document type = Letter, Notice of Violation
| page count = 11
}}
 
{{IR-Nav| site = 05000440 | year = 2004 | report number = 003 }}
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:ary 23, 2004
 
==SUBJECT:==
PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION FOR A WHITE FINDING AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-440/04-03)
 
==Dear Mr. Kanda:==
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the final results of our significance determination of the preliminary White finding identified in Inspection Report No. 50-440/03-06.
 
The inspection finding was assessed using the significance determination process and was preliminarily characterized as White (i.e., a finding with low to moderate increased importance to safety, which may require additional NRC inspections). This preliminary White finding concerned the failure to follow the requirements of the Perry Emergency Plan during an Alert level event on April 24, 2003.
 
The finding involved an undue delay in declaring an actual emergency condition on April 24, 2003, when the shift manager did not properly classify the event in a timely manner in accordance with your emergency plan when damage to irradiated fuel caused a high alarm on the fuel handling building ventilation exhaust gaseous radiation monitor. This finding was preliminarily classified as White because it involved a failure to implement a risk significant planning standard. This preliminary White finding was associated with an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.47.
 
In our letter dated October 30, 2003, transmitting the inspection report, we provided FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) an opportunity to request a Regulatory Conference or provide a written response. At your request, a Regulatory Conference was held on December 9, 2003, at the Region III Office in Lisle, IL. A copy of the handout you provided at the conference has been entered in the NRCs document system (ADAMS) and is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html, ADAMS accession number ML033500224.
 
During the conference, you agreed with the NRCs preliminary assessment of the violation and use of the significance determination process, however you requested that the NRC use discretion in determining the significance of the violation. You also believed that the significance would be more appropriately characterized as Green since: (1) actions had been taken to protect onsite personnel; (2) the duration of the building ventilation radiation monitor alarm was short (less than one minute); (3) the building ventilation radiation monitor was in close proximity to the bubbles from the damaged fuel (from which you concluded the exhaust air that activated the alarm may not have been a representative sample of the buildings air);
(4) the technicians inspecting the fuel did not associate bubbles from the damaged fuel to the building alarms (due to many past similar occurrences); (5) there was no significant release to pose a threat to the public health and safety; and (6) your root cause evaluation and corrective actions taken were thorough.
 
Your presentation and slides identified the results of your root cause evaluation issues which included: (1) the failure to communicate timely information concerning the failed fuel to the control room; (2) the lack of adequate roles and responsibilities for the fuel handling building activities; and (3) the shift managers ineffective assessment of plant conditions and delayed response to those conditions. The presentation also included slides of the event timeline, your root cause evaluation, corrective actions, regulatory and radiological considerations.
 
The NRC acknowledges that: (1) there was no impact on actions to protect public health and safety; (2) actions were taken to protect onsite personnel; (3) there was no significant radiological impact to onsite personnel; and (4) your root cause evaluation appeared to capture the major factors of the event. However, the NRC concludes that your emergency classification system was not properly used during the event. After completing safety actions, as appropriate (i.e., area evacuations and ensuring safe plant conditions), the shift manager did not carry out his continuing responsibilities to review emergency action levels, classify the event, and fulfill the duties of the Emergency Coordinator. Specifically, once the possibility that there was fuel damage was brought to his attention 20 to 30 minutes into the event, the shift manager failed to promptly use the emergency classification scheme as required by the Perry Emergency Plan in accordance with 10 CFR 50.47 (b)(4), and consequently, the event classification was unnecessarily delayed.
 
With respect to your position that there was no safety significance to this event, the NRC recognizes that the safety significance of this particular event was low. Per the emergency preparedness SDP (during an actual event), significance is based on the event classification level, and whether or not there was a failure to implement a risk significant planning standard.
 
During the time period noted above, the shift manager failed to implement a risk significant planning standard during an Alert condition. The failure to implement a risk significant planning standard is important to safety, since the emergency classification is the trigger for ensuring that emergency response personnel and equipment are quickly in place if it becomes necessary to implement actions to protect the public health and safety. In addition, timely emergency classification allows the state and surrounding counties the time necessary to assess conditions, staff their facilities, and make informed decisions for protecting public safety. Such a finding is considered White in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix B, and has low to moderate importance to safety.
 
After considering the information developed during the inspection and at the Regulatory Conference, the NRC has concluded that the inspection finding is appropriately characterized as White (i.e., an issue with low to moderate increased importance to safety, which may require additional NRC inspections). You have 30 calendar days from the date of this letter to appeal the staffs determination of significance for the identified White finding. Such appeals will be considered to have merit only if they meet the criteria given in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 2.
 
The NRC has also determined that the failure to properly implement the standard emergency classification and action level scheme resulting in an undue delay in declaring an actual emergency is a violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), as cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice). The circumstances surrounding the violation are described in detail in the subject inspection report. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, the Notice of Violation is considered escalated enforcement action because it is associated with a White finding.
 
Because plant performance for this issue has been determined to be in the regulatory response band, we will use the NRC Action Matrix, to determine the most appropriate NRC response for this event. We will notify you, by separate correspondence, of that determination.
 
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if any, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction. The NRC also includes significant enforcement actions on its Web site at www.nrc.gov; select What We Do, Enforcement, then Significant Enforcement Actions.
 
Sincerely,
/RA by Geoffrey Grant Acting for/
James L. Caldwell Regional Administrator Docket No. 50-440 License No. NPF-58 Enclosure: 1. Notice of Violation 2. Licensee Presentation ADAMS Accession #033500224 3. Regulatory Conference Attendance List See Attached Distribution
}}

Latest revision as of 17:15, 19 March 2020

Re Final Significance Determination for a White Finding and Notice of Violation (NRC Inspection Report No. 05000440-04-03)
ML040230321
Person / Time
Site: Perry FirstEnergy icon.png
Issue date: 01/23/2004
From: Caldwell J
NRC/RGN-III
To: Kanda W
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
Shared Package
ML040290319 List:
References
EA-03-194, IR-03-006, IR-04-003
Download: ML040230321 (11)


Text

ary 23, 2004

SUBJECT:

PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION FOR A WHITE FINDING AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-440/04-03)

Dear Mr. Kanda:

The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the final results of our significance determination of the preliminary White finding identified in Inspection Report No. 50-440/03-06.

The inspection finding was assessed using the significance determination process and was preliminarily characterized as White (i.e., a finding with low to moderate increased importance to safety, which may require additional NRC inspections). This preliminary White finding concerned the failure to follow the requirements of the Perry Emergency Plan during an Alert level event on April 24, 2003.

The finding involved an undue delay in declaring an actual emergency condition on April 24, 2003, when the shift manager did not properly classify the event in a timely manner in accordance with your emergency plan when damage to irradiated fuel caused a high alarm on the fuel handling building ventilation exhaust gaseous radiation monitor. This finding was preliminarily classified as White because it involved a failure to implement a risk significant planning standard. This preliminary White finding was associated with an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.47.

In our letter dated October 30, 2003, transmitting the inspection report, we provided FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) an opportunity to request a Regulatory Conference or provide a written response. At your request, a Regulatory Conference was held on December 9, 2003, at the Region III Office in Lisle, IL. A copy of the handout you provided at the conference has been entered in the NRCs document system (ADAMS) and is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html, ADAMS accession number ML033500224.

During the conference, you agreed with the NRCs preliminary assessment of the violation and use of the significance determination process, however you requested that the NRC use discretion in determining the significance of the violation. You also believed that the significance would be more appropriately characterized as Green since: (1) actions had been taken to protect onsite personnel; (2) the duration of the building ventilation radiation monitor alarm was short (less than one minute); (3) the building ventilation radiation monitor was in close proximity to the bubbles from the damaged fuel (from which you concluded the exhaust air that activated the alarm may not have been a representative sample of the buildings air);

(4) the technicians inspecting the fuel did not associate bubbles from the damaged fuel to the building alarms (due to many past similar occurrences); (5) there was no significant release to pose a threat to the public health and safety; and (6) your root cause evaluation and corrective actions taken were thorough.

Your presentation and slides identified the results of your root cause evaluation issues which included: (1) the failure to communicate timely information concerning the failed fuel to the control room; (2) the lack of adequate roles and responsibilities for the fuel handling building activities; and (3) the shift managers ineffective assessment of plant conditions and delayed response to those conditions. The presentation also included slides of the event timeline, your root cause evaluation, corrective actions, regulatory and radiological considerations.

The NRC acknowledges that: (1) there was no impact on actions to protect public health and safety; (2) actions were taken to protect onsite personnel; (3) there was no significant radiological impact to onsite personnel; and (4) your root cause evaluation appeared to capture the major factors of the event. However, the NRC concludes that your emergency classification system was not properly used during the event. After completing safety actions, as appropriate (i.e., area evacuations and ensuring safe plant conditions), the shift manager did not carry out his continuing responsibilities to review emergency action levels, classify the event, and fulfill the duties of the Emergency Coordinator. Specifically, once the possibility that there was fuel damage was brought to his attention 20 to 30 minutes into the event, the shift manager failed to promptly use the emergency classification scheme as required by the Perry Emergency Plan in accordance with 10 CFR 50.47 (b)(4), and consequently, the event classification was unnecessarily delayed.

With respect to your position that there was no safety significance to this event, the NRC recognizes that the safety significance of this particular event was low. Per the emergency preparedness SDP (during an actual event), significance is based on the event classification level, and whether or not there was a failure to implement a risk significant planning standard.

During the time period noted above, the shift manager failed to implement a risk significant planning standard during an Alert condition. The failure to implement a risk significant planning standard is important to safety, since the emergency classification is the trigger for ensuring that emergency response personnel and equipment are quickly in place if it becomes necessary to implement actions to protect the public health and safety. In addition, timely emergency classification allows the state and surrounding counties the time necessary to assess conditions, staff their facilities, and make informed decisions for protecting public safety. Such a finding is considered White in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix B, and has low to moderate importance to safety.

After considering the information developed during the inspection and at the Regulatory Conference, the NRC has concluded that the inspection finding is appropriately characterized as White (i.e., an issue with low to moderate increased importance to safety, which may require additional NRC inspections). You have 30 calendar days from the date of this letter to appeal the staffs determination of significance for the identified White finding. Such appeals will be considered to have merit only if they meet the criteria given in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 2.

The NRC has also determined that the failure to properly implement the standard emergency classification and action level scheme resulting in an undue delay in declaring an actual emergency is a violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), as cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice). The circumstances surrounding the violation are described in detail in the subject inspection report. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, the Notice of Violation is considered escalated enforcement action because it is associated with a White finding.

Because plant performance for this issue has been determined to be in the regulatory response band, we will use the NRC Action Matrix, to determine the most appropriate NRC response for this event. We will notify you, by separate correspondence, of that determination.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if any, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction. The NRC also includes significant enforcement actions on its Web site at www.nrc.gov; select What We Do, Enforcement, then Significant Enforcement Actions.

Sincerely,

/RA by Geoffrey Grant Acting for/

James L. Caldwell Regional Administrator Docket No. 50-440 License No. NPF-58 Enclosure: 1. Notice of Violation 2. Licensee Presentation ADAMS Accession #033500224 3. Regulatory Conference Attendance List See Attached Distribution